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


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HISTORY
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THOMAS CARLYLE



THE HISTORIANS' HISTORY OF THE WORLD . . .

A COMPREHENSIVE NARRATIVE OF THE RISE AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS AS RECORDED BY THE
GREAT WRITERS OF ALL AGES

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
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CHAPTER IV

ABSOLUTISM AND DISASTER

[1848-1866 A.D.]

Two men decided the fate of Austria after the revolution—Prince Felix Schwarzenberg and Alexander Bach. When Prince Schwarzenberg on the 24th of November, 1848, took over the ministry of foreign affairs and thus at the same time the supreme direction of the business of state, he was yet in the prime of life. But his physical strength had long been considerably shaken. The ordinary enjoyments of life no longer tempted him, a quiet uniform line of action seemed to him insupportable. Gradually a stronger and stronger means was needed to draw him from his apathy. His passion, now almost extinguished, only rekindled when the highest stake was involved; only when his boldest throw was to be made did his nature seem to revive.

Most likely but for the revolution he would have died long before at his post at Naples. The revolution gave him back his strength. Once again life seemed worth living. He was able daily to play with danger, to exhibit a placid calm amidst the surrounding excitement, to try his luck at apparently impossible tasks. His first noteworthy act during the year of the revolution was to protest against the count and the ministry and in the name of the army against the peace negotiations which were going on at the time. He accomplished his second characteristic action on the 1st of November, 1848. Though the stability of the imperial diet had already been much weakened by the flight of numerous deputies, and had already been prorogued by the emperor on the 22nd of October, it was still assembled in Kremsier under the presidency of Smolka, and its presence constantly embarrassed the military despots. Though the decrees of the imperial diet had become powerless, they could still spread trouble in the excited provinces and among the suspicious peasantry in every possible way. Prince Schwarzenberg, who had joined the army of his brother-in-law, Prince Windischgrätz, quickly settled the difficulty. He ordered the porter of the imperial diet to close the iron doors and not to allow

anyone to enter the house. These actions let it be seen that the ministry, with Prince Schwarzenberg at its head, would carry on the government with a strong hand.

The events which quickly followed fully realised these expectations; he cleared away all the barriers to absolute power, scattered the diet, and abolished the constitution; for in these institutions he perceived the weakening of the state. Austria, which in the year 1849 was shaking to her very foundations, and resembled a helmless wreck which almost excited the sympathy of the other states, should again become great and powerful. The more difficult the task, the more it attracted him. A diplomat to the core, he had never troubled himself about home politics, and for the last ten years had had only flying glimpses of his own country, so that he looked for the strength and greatness of Austria in her position with regard to foreign powers. What was needed was to obtain for Austria the place of most consideration in the European concert, and to extend her dominating influence over the widest possible area.

His imagination was caught by the impossible ideal of a "state of sixty millions" composed of Austria and Germany, and in which the government of the imperial state would take the prominent part. All other interests were sacrificed by him to this dream. The inner organisation of the state troubled him only in so far as it must afford him the means required for his bold forward policy—namely, money and soldiers. How could a statesman who intended to make foreign powers bend unconditionally to his will, and who repaid any opposition to it with relentless animosity, endure institutions whose development might have compelled him to confine his plans within reasonable bounds? The methods he adopted for their fulfilment, more even than the aims themselves, presupposed an absolute rule. And besides, there was in Prince Schwarzenberg a strong element of military pride. He was rightly called the army diplomatist. Unfortunately, circumstances had so ordained that the army regarded Austria as a newly conquered country and her peoples as stubborn enemies to order, whom only force could constrain to obedience. Neither from this side was there a grant of the smallest privilege to the people to be hoped for.

It was otherwise as regards the second leading minister, Alexander Bach. In opposition to Prince Schwarzenberg, he was not at all imbued with feelings hostile to the conferring of a few limited constitutional rights. It was with no hypocrisy that he had in the first years of his power brought forward one organic law after another, with almost too much haste, and had issued the regulations of the provincial diet. His political insight, which was by no means insignificant, told him that the state would gain in vigour and internal strength by these measures. But it must be owned that no sooner did he think the introduction of even a modified form of constitution would endanger his own position, than he turned round. And therein he was not wrong. The concession to the people of a personal share in the government would have brought the great landed proprietors, the aristocracy, into the foreground.

But the latter pursued Bach with the bitterest hatred. The great German and Slav nobility could not pardon him for having risen by the revolution; moreover, they recognised in him the chief instrument that had harmed their material interests. Bach had followed the legitimate course of insisting on the fact that, notwithstanding the change in the system of government, the great achievement of the revolution, namely, the emancipation of the peasantry from territorial burdens, should hold good. As to the Hungarian aristocracy, they remembered only too well that it was Bach who, in September, 1848, had most warmly defended the Pragmatic Sanction and most sharply attacked the separation of Hungary. Though the old nobility dared not insult the minister in public, as they did the defenceless Pillersdorf, yet they sought every imag-

[1849-1850 A.D.]

inable means to annoy him and show him their contempt. They discovered or exaggerated every touch of vanity which was supposed to belong to the minister; they maliciously described his embarrassments, and were constantly busy announcing his approaching fall. In the soul of Bach political insight struggled with the instinct of self-preservation. In accordance with human nature, the latter was victorious! Instead of preparing for his adversaries the ground whence they might have attacked him, he preferred to cut the ground from under their feet. In fine, he found it more convenient to govern without the interference of impertinent and arrogant representatives of the people—not to bind himself by organic laws, but to announce his intention from time to time and just as it suited him.

The consequences of the absolute government which had lasted for so many years made themselves felt long before that government itself ceased to exist. The political parties, as yet scarcely formed, were destroyed in the bud. The justifiable hope of the political parties thwarting the national ones and thus destroying the rigid isolation of the latter was abandoned forever. On the other hand the national antagonisms revived, more strongly accentuated than they had ever been before, the hatred of the different races, the estrangement of the provinces, and the stupid indifference to their common interests grew and flourished. Towards the end of the revolution a hard school of politics had taught the national parties reciprocal tolerance, had to a great extent banished envy and jealousy, and placed confidence in their place.

The higher the value which the leaders of national parties learned to place on constitutional rights, the more willingly did they relinquish the privileges set apart in small circles. The non-German deputies to the imperial diet even went so far as to concede the use of the German language in the public life of the state, and admitted that every educated man in Austria should speak German. Czech spokesmen gave assurances that from henceforth men of their race would study German more diligently than before. The ten years of absolute rule again transformed these conciliatory dispositions into bitter hatred. The various races, shut out from all participation in political life, retired into their national seclusion, incensed at the withdrawal of the concessions already made, and determined to consider henceforth only the most narrow national interests as the guiding star of their actions. The national agitation in the year of the revolution had been, comparatively speaking, innocent and harmless as compared with the passion and acrimony with which, from that moment, the most extensive claims, all under the guise of inalienable rights forcibly withdrawn, were put forward. The very secrecy imposed on the movement was its best nourishment. Like a band of freemasons, those in the different provinces who were of the same opinion clung to one another. Each was known to the others, and found support in them; strictly secluded from outside influences, they formed a brotherhood among themselves which was founded upon common hatred and defiance.

The German race suffered most. The system of absolute centralisation required thousands of officials who could write German; only a minority of these belonged to the German race. Most of them misused the German language in an unheard-of manner. The non-German peoples did not distinguish well. They considered all these people as "Swabians"—as representatives of German nationality. They expended their hatred upon Germans, generally speaking, and believed themselves to be doubly entitled to do so, on account of the oppression they had been subjected to by the officials who murdered the German language. When Germans and non-Germans were living together in one province the former discovered quickly enough the daily increasing antipathy to them. All nationalities were united in hatred of the Germans

and all considered them their most dangerous opponents. Such was the chief fruit of the ten years' rule of absolutism.^b

The policy of these ten years but left Austria weakened, disorganised, ruined, and powerless in face of the disasters of 1859 and 1866, with the race hatreds more alive than ever, and her diverse nationalities completely alienated by the deceptions which followed 1849. When we peruse the writings and reactionary newspapers of the period we find in them the most hyperbolic eulogies for the policy of Schwarzenberg, the saviour of Austria within and without. In France the *Revue des deux Mondes* published hymns of admiration to the "restorer of the empire of the Habsburgs," to the man of iron who had conquered demagogy: and the work of the man of iron fell to pieces at the first shock.^d

HAYNAU IN HUNGARY

Force of arms had won back Hungary for the dynasty, and for the time the land was governed by force of arms. The dreaded representative of the most inflexible army discipline, General Haynau, remained at the head of affairs there as the imperial representative, free from all subordination to the Vienna ministry. The whole country was divided into military districts, and officers of high position were put in charge of them. Military courts administered justice; at headquarters, questions of finance and administration replaced the plans of action and projects of siege of some few months ago. It was only later, when affairs were in extremest confusion, that the discarded civil officials succeeded in gaining greater effect for their works, and were allowed, to some extent, to represent administrative discipline.

The difficulties which arose in the path of the restoration of law and order were enormous. The masses still held to the revolution, and carelessly hoped that in a short time there would be a complete change of circumstances. Magyar was the only language they knew; but those who could speak Magyar were generally disposed rather to rail against the government than to expound their views and hopes in peaceful and moderate fashion. In filling up the minor government appointments there was little other choice than to give them to men who were strangers to the people of the country and could not make themselves understood, or to fall back upon the Magyar element, which was friendly to the revolution; and, greatly to the astonishment of loyal spirits, this was in fact done in many cases. To this obstinacy of the conquered element was now added the highly impolitic conduct of Haynau and his advisers. So that confusion was increased, hate perpetuated, and misery made irrecoverable. Moreover, the conquest was followed up to the uttermost possibility by incessant arrests and condemnations. Even if the bloody day of Arad were not repeated, the sentences to long years of imprisonment were never ending. More than forty-five ex-officers were condemned by the military tribunal of Arad on December 20th, 1849; twelve other sentences followed on January 16th, 1850; forty-two in February, etc.; and besides the Arad tribunal there were others in Pest, Pressburg, Hermannstadt, and other places, which acted with the same rigour. The consciousness that the power of a military court can reach everyone, the aspect of innumerable arrests upon the most superficial grounds for suspicion—these ensured throughout the land at least outward tranquillity.

There was no attempt at opposition, no overt force opposed to the measures of the authorities; but the inner feeling of the people was anything but peaceful. The proof of this is the foolish credulity with which the most senseless reports were received, provided they favoured the national cause. Invisible hands distributed Kossuth's farewell speech in Orsova and other revolutionary writings. The German theatre in Pest was interdicted, whilst on the con-

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trary the Hungarian National Theatre showed uninterruptedly full houses. In order to be revenged upon this intangible spirit of opposition, the military authorities allowed themselves to be seduced into disciplinary punishments, to carry out which proved impossible, if Hungary was not to be turned into a desert. The suppression of Kossuth-notes, it is true, may be said to have been justified by political necessity. As long as these notes were in circulation in the country the revolution to all appearances was not yet subdued, so that their confiscation was an act of necessity, no matter what private interests were hurt thereby. On the other hand, the order to draft into the army as a punishment all the Hungarian national guards who had taken up arms against the Austrians, was a senseless one. Literally carried out, it would have exiled the entire male population of Hungary, as there was scarcely a Magyar who at some time or other had not been in the national guards, and taken part in the struggle. Had they then no need of an army of their own, in order to watch this force of armed malcontents? And even if this were not the case, who could have tilled the ground and cared for the families left behind? This measure was no sooner announced than it aroused such universal resentment, and promised so many obvious difficulties in its execution, that its repeal immediately followed. First it was confined to those individuals who had used arms after January 5th, 1849; later on the whole national guard was amnestied, and those men already removed were restored to their families. Only the Honveds remained subject to this enforced conscription.

Still stranger was the campaign ordered by Haynau against the shekels of the Hungarian Jews. A contribution of 8,000,000 gulden was demanded from them as a punishment for their revolutionary sympathies, and all the Jewish communities were included without exception in the levy. This entirely arbitrary measure was equivalent to a confiscation of property, and of course bore far more heavily upon the innocent than upon the real revolutionaries, who for the most part had no fortune to surrender. Here, too, after the government had uselessly incurred the indignation of an influential class of people, it was forced to yield to the necessity of the case and repeal the decree.

A decree of Haynau dated March the 12th, 1850, enacted that all Jewish communities and families which could not be proved to have directly or indirectly taken part in the revolution were to be exempt from the penalty. Divided among a smaller number of individuals, the sum demanded was still less attainable; as, moreover, the new administration delayed these odious denunciations and thus innumerable lawsuits were kept hanging over the people's heads, a few months later, in July, 1850, the decree was repealed. Simply for the sake of avoiding the expression of public opinion upon this complete retreat, the government ordered one million to be used for starting a fund for teachers and seminaries for rabbis, but clothed even this order in the form of a wish.

The Vienna ministry had no share whatever in all these political sins. In both the cases quoted it had sent a representation to dissuade General Haynau, had appointed Baron von Gehringer to co-operate as a civil commissioner; he was to settle purely administrative matters, and urged upon the general the extreme advisability of not compromising the government by premature actions and impractical regulations. Haynau, however, regarded himself as the emperor's proxy, and hence as being endowed with unlimited power; and despised the wishes and warnings of the civil administration. He obstinately waved aside every interference, and continued by his measures sorely to injure the common interest of the kingdom. The battle had by degrees become a personal matter—Haynau desired to show the world that he would suffer no minister, least of all Bach, in authority over him; to this purpose he sacrificed every essential interest. In those days Bach's position was not yet

fully assured, and if Haynau had pursued his aim with calculating coolness, he might perhaps have attained it; but in his passion he precipitated matters and suffered defeat.

There were still awaiting numbers of deputies of the Hungarian national assembly, mostly under heavy accusations, languishing in the prisons under sentence. As the inquiry seemed to drag on unjustifiably, the ministry ordered all inquiries into the cases of deputies still under constraint to be completed, and the documents sent to Vienna. These orders were repeated more than once, and still Haynau took no notice. Again urged and admonished, he summoned the subordinate ministers into his presence, informed them of the command of the ministry, which, as he said, interfered with his full power, and recommended them to disregard these messages and close the inquiries, pass sentences, and report them to him, for him to carry out. Thus indeed it happened, after the judges had protected themselves from all responsibility by an order in black and white. In the cases of the twenty-four ex-deputies of the Debreczen assembly the sentence of death by hanging was passed. Haynau however unconditionally pardoned them all, with one exception. Already he had often interpreted orders of the government at his own discretion, executing them late, partially, and at last not at all. But as until now he had only infringed upon the prerogative of the ministry, his disobedience had been unpunished.

Haynau Discharged

This time he had not only compromised the government and compelled it to an involuntary leniency; he had infringed upon the prerogative of the Crown, in whose exclusive gift were all acts of mercy. Immediately after the news of Haynau's action had reached Vienna the council of ministers assembled and unanimously demanded the dismissal of the general, the emperor himself being also convinced that this was essential. The wording of the imperial decision, which appeared in the *Wiener Zeitung* on the 8th of July, was as follows: "In accordance with the suggestion of the ministers of state, his imperial majesty is pleased to deprive Inspector-General Haynau of his post as commander-in-chief of the third army and of the full powers which accompany it"; and on the following day appeared an announcement of the pension allotted to the general, together with an article in the ministerial *Correspondence* formally accusing General Haynau of disobedience.

The effect of this unexpected sentence on the hitherto omnipotent general needs no description. Though he dared not vent his immediate anger on the ministry he could not remain entirely silent. An article of the Vienna *Reichszeitung*, from an official source, was used by the infuriated general as an opening for airing his wrath. In a reply inserted in one of the Pest papers he protested against the reproach of disobedience. He had used his right of pardon only in the emperor's name, and within the limits of the power assigned to him; and therefore in casting suspicion on the obedience of a man like himself, who had destroyed the revolution at its roots, he could see only the attempt to play into the hands of the democracy (demagogues, as it reads in the correction in Haynau's own hand), and once again to call into question the footing of the monarch throughout the country.

The close of this explanation was significant of Haynau's character and of the facts of the situation: "The author of this shameful article represents me as a second Belisarius, without however having the power to deprive me of my eyesight, and without his being favoured with the spectacle of me in misery, leaning on my beggar's staff and guided by my only daughter." Significant also are two other facts: the garrison at Pest parted from their general with

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ceremony, as though they wished to show him that the army took a different view of his behaviour from that adopted by the ministry; the military journal moreover, the *Soldaten-freund*, published a violent article attacking the government, and comparing Haynau's dismissal to the fate of Wallenstein. Neither was Haynau's discharge welcomed by the Magyar population of Pest and other towns; on the contrary, there were many signs of sympathy with the grim despot, shortly before so deeply hated. Many attributed this change of feeling to the last great act of clemency which Haynau had performed while yet in office. Further, the report that Haynau had learned gradually to think more and more favourably of the Magyar country and people, and had represented their interests with partiality in Vienna, may have had something to do with the homage shown him on the eve of departure by the whole population of Pest. But, above all, the root of this changed feeling lay in the conviction that under Haynau's rule there would have been no change in the policy of the government toward Hungary, but that in all essential relations it would have continued as it was.

HUNGARY UNDER ARCHDUKE ALBERT

In fact, no new regulation was resolved upon, even by the ministry. On the 16th of September, 1850, Archduke Albert took General Haynau's place as civil and military governor; but neither then nor at any time was there any alteration in the method of governing. Martial law still held sway. Sympathisers with the Hungarian revolution were persecuted, and all anti-governmental appeals on the part of the people suppressed. The only difference was that there was no more wholesale condemnation; and when sentences of death by hanging were still passed, as on September 22nd, 1850, upon Kossuth and his thirty-five most important adherents, they only concerned men who were outside the pale of military jurisdiction. A very long time elapsed before the national spirit of Hungary was weaned from its ancient but, on the whole, rather obsolescent national institutions and customs, and persuaded to adopt the modern bureaucratic methods; bounties had absolutely to be presented before registers of land could be established upon Hungarian soil; while to ensure the uninterrupted course of justice, there remained no other way than to transplant whole colonies of officials into Hungary; and even these model officials, unacquainted with the language and customs of the country, without influence over the people, and without the respect of the national aristocracy, were not always able to carry out their instructions and preserve outward order. Above all, the new system of taxation and the introduction of the tobacco monopoly bristled with difficulties and were not established in Hungary until the rod and the prison had been called upon to support authority. Even more irritating than the prohibition of free trade in tobacco was the annoyance to which the tobacco cultivators were subjected, and the burdensome superintendence of the revenue officers, who of necessity had to be always pottering about in the exercise of their office, and who were odious wardens to the peasant in kitchen and bar and field.

Still, the government was right to pay no heed to the momentary unpopularity of this economic measure, and to break down all barriers to intercourse, all material differences in the economic treatment of Hungary and the rest of the crown lands. The destruction of the customs line on the Hungarian border is indeed the only, but at the same time a most important, positive regulation, which, in the years immediately following the revolution, was made a means of forcibly drawing Hungary into closer connection with the main country. It had the best results, and promised well for other reforms made in the spirit of centralisation and in the interests of state unity.^c

ABSOLUTISM IN LOMBARDO-VENETIA

The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was subjected to a yoke of iron under the governor-general, old Radetzky. Its history during these execrated years is that of councils of war pronouncing sentences on sentences against those who ventured to protest. A proclamation of Radetzky's, dated July 22nd, 1851, further aggravated the state of siege. The prisons were filled, and on the 4th of November the priest Don Giovanni Grioli, guilty of publishing national books, was shot at Milan. This whole monotonous and heart-rending series of arrests directed against the patriots must be read in the newspapers of the time.

Moreover, the system of terror reigned from one end of the monarchy to the other. On the least suspicion the most illustrious men were thrown into the cells: witness Count Adam Potocky arrested on the 27th of September, 1851, at Cracow, to the immense consternation of his fellow citizens. On the 22nd of August of the same year a decree had disbanded all the national guards of the empire. At Prague the siege redoubled in vigour. The reaction, not having enough victims within the limit of the empire, endeavoured to find some abroad among the refugees; it threatened Turkey and Switzerland, both guilty of giving too generous an exercise to the right of asylum, and the first care of the Austrian chiefs in occupying neighbouring countries was to seize the subjects of their emperor; witness the Hungarian, Michael Perringer, arrested in Schleswig, and the Galician, Patacki, arrested at Hamburg, both of whom were hanged at Vienna on the 5th of February, 1852. The Catholic clergy resumed their mischievous and persecuting supremacy; the war on thought redoubled in rigour. One minister of Francis Joseph even had for an instant the idea of requiring the catalogues of all private libraries, in order to banish from them "bad books." The ex-liberal Bach was associated with all these measures.

AUSTRIAN FINANCE (1849-1859)

The financial situation was deplorable. Austria had only held her own in face of the events of 1848-1849, thanks to the co-operation of the Bank of Vienna; towards the end of 1850 her debt to this bank had reached the enormous total of 231,000,000 florins, and from 1851 to 1853 it remained at a figure varying from 144,000,000 to 125,000,000 florins, to increase again during the Crimean War (1854-1856) to 326,000,000 and 371,000,000 florins. Besides this she incessantly had recourse to credit by means of multiplied loans, under every imaginable form, now giving the concession of the loan to some great banking house, now appealing to the public by way of a national subscription, now promising interest in fiduciary moneys, there promising to pay the interest in coin, etc. To all this we have to add the debt contracted in 1848 for the liberation of the soil. The law of the 7th of September, 1848, had abolished feudal rights, some gratuitously, others under certain conditions. The sum representing the revenue and profit of these burdens and services had been capitalised; it had then been reduced by one-third, regarded as equivalent to the charges which those interested had formerly had to support; and the two remaining thirds formed the amount due to the former lords as purchase and just indemnity. The peasants, formerly the vassals, were to pay the two-thirds of the purchase and a third of the indemnity, a payment which was made by an addition to the land taxes. The provinces and the state were to pay the rest, and this was done through special funds by the mechanism of the provincial treasuries. In 1859 this debt for the liberation of the soil still amounted to 279,172,456 florins in Austrian money (the florin of 100 kreutzers).

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THE CONSTITUTION OF MARCH ABOLISHED

On the 21st of August, 1851, an article of the *Wiener Zeitung* (the official journal) gave notice of the abolition of the constitution of March, 1849, which was the more frank since this constitution was already abolished in fact. This article said: "The final solution of the question of the constitution must be referred to the Throne, it must be placed in the august hands of his majesty. Everything must depend on the maintenance of the full and entire power of the emperor. Austria has been saved from the revolution by the people's attachment to the monarchical principle." In effect, on the 1st of January, 1852, the august hands of his majesty did sign letters patent abolishing the constitution of the 4th of March and the fundamental rights, reducing all the provinces of the monarchy to crown states divided into bailiwicks and circles (whose authorities were assisted by consultative commissions composed of members of the hereditary nobility, land owners, and commercial magnates), facilitating the establishment of entails and the leaving of property in trust, suppressing the jury, etc. It is to be understood that there was no question of a parliament; the provincial diets sufficed under the control of the imperial council, whose members were nominated by the emperor. This régime was to last until 1861.

THE CONCORDAT (1855)

The theocracy must also be restored in all the plenitude of its domination.^d Ever since the year 1830, it had been no secret that between the Vienna cabinet and Rome existed close and intimate relations; that as a result a new clerical era must sooner or later arise for Austria; that from the Danube were being offered, with the ardour of voluntary servitude, conditions that would blossom on the shores of the Tiber into results which, by their astounding magnitude and radiant splendour, would prove to the world that the rulers of the Eternal City still retained their authority over the magnates of the earth.

At last, August 18th, 1855, the work was completed—the work which has cemented the bond between Rome and Austria until this day, the work which was intended by its founders to cement it till the end of all days.

Whatever papistically minded canons could invent; whatever claims to ecclesiastical power they could enforce; with whatever superstitions and creeds they could flatter credulous souls; whatever conditions they could impose as operative in the Catholic Church, or only express in the form of pious wishes for the fruits of their Christian teachings; whatever they could claim as constant inalienable rights of the church and of its visible head, or as only the outflow of that authority in the exercise of which one must show oneself a time-server—in the concordat all is either conceded with the greatest generosity, or, if withheld, withheld only because of the necessities of the times; and all is set forth so clearly as a system, and acknowledged to be so binding in theory, that the right of further concessions, indeed to the complete fulfilment of the ultramontane programme, comes into force and can be employed when considerations of expediency shall no longer exist.

In the concordat we find papistical jurisdiction in conjugal matters handed over to the ecclesiastical judge, and submitted to the canonical legislative power; we find an extension of the bishops' right of jurisdiction over the inferior clergy, which allows the bishops full power of punishment by means of the law of the state, and which changes the personal freedom of the lower clergy to a condition of ecclesiastical discipline; we find a formal exemption of the bishops from the jurisdiction of the courts, the practicability and binding power of which, in the cases of the bishops, according to the concordat, Article 14 *de jure*, is very questionable; we find further the whole educational

system made subordinate to the church under conditions so loosely defined that, in view of the extremely elastic nature of Article 5 of the concordat, it is practically unconditional subjection. The censorship of the church is introduced, and the power of the state is impressed, not only to respect its decisions, but, "with the aid of every means useful for the purpose," to enforce them; and all laws cease, or are suppressed, which were framed to hold within bounds the increase of property in mortmain, and other laws which regulated the miscarriage of property to the church; also a complete solution of the question, so many-sided in Austria, of patronage, a solution acting, as was afterwards shown, to the prejudice of the patrons who suffered damage to their privileges with undiminished continuance in their responsibilities.

With such concessions to Rome, Austria bought the favour of the clergy and sowed discontent among her own people. For the Vienna cabinet this concordat had no other result than to win the favour of members of the holy college at Rome; if that were any gain, the pledges given were clearly advantageous to the country. The interests of Rome and Austria in Italy were, apart from this, identical, and where the interests of both sides are engaged, there is no question of concessions from either. It is therefore unjust to reproach Austria with having prejudiced aims of high policy with this concordat; these aims were already reached and realised before the conclusion of the treaty. Rome is forced to further Austrian policy with the utmost ardour, for every weakness of Austria is at the same time a weakness of the allies of Austria among the clergy.

It is not clear why the statesmen of Vienna should have paid a price for the support of the Romans and for the favour of these gentlemen of the Vatican, as, in so doing, they were purchasing that which they already possessed for nothing. They may have imagined that in so doing they were fulfilling a pious duty, restoring to the church something which it could claim by moral right; or they may have had some other motive. Sentiment may have turned the scale in favour of this understanding; sober considerations of a political nature certainly were not consulted. Politics have nothing to do with the variable moods of the feelings; an injudicious action remains injudicious, no matter how fine the feelings of the heart which have influenced the doer.^e

SCHWARZENBERG AND GERMANY

At the commencement of the period of reaction Austria's poverty had not prevented her from making a fairly good figure abroad. In Germany Schwarzenberg had succeeded in securing the maintenance of the federal compact which secured to Austria the preponderance in the Germanic world. Prussia had been held in check by a coalition of princes skilfully grouped round the emperor Francis Joseph. On the occasion of an insurrection in Hesse the elector had implored the support of the diet whilst his subjects demanded that of Prussia. The emperor of Austria had met the kings of Bavaria and Württemberg at Bregenz. A few days later he had had an interview at Warsaw with the emperor Nicholas.

A conflict broke out between Austria, whose troops were occupying Hanau, and the Prussians, who occupied Cassel; and Austria assembled a formidable army on the frontiers of Hesse. On the 26th of November, 1850, she summoned Prussia to evacuate that province within twenty-four hours. Prussia gave way. Mantenffel came to Olmütz (November 29th, 1850) and humiliated his king before the demands of Schwarzenberg. Prussia engaged to co-operate in the re-establishment of the elector, not to act in Holstein save with the concurrence of Austria, and to take part in the conferences opened at Dresden to prepare the future organisation of Germany. The

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Prussian statesmen long preserved the memory of the humiliation of Olmütz, while Schwarzenberg might consider himself Metternich's successor and the arbiter of Europe.^f

After the convention of Olmütz, the re-establishment of the German Confederation, the *Bund*, and of the old diet at Frankfort resulted from the laborious conferences of Dresden. As before 1848 the Gothic assembly held its sittings at Frankfort with its two species of meetings—the *Plenum*, and the *Engere-Rath*, or restricted council; here Austria dominated, seeking to realise the idea she had brought forward at Dresden of entering with all her Italian and Slav provinces into the German Confederation, an idea which was not only combated by Prussia, but which in 1851 excited vigorous protests from France and England. Prussia even declared, through her envoy, in October, 1851, that she renounced the incorporation of her Polish provinces (Posen and East Prussia), in order to compel Austria to do the same. The diet, rendered sterile by the covert but perpetual contest between the two great states, consumed itself in impotent and tedious debates on the unitary idea, failing in all the measures which might have been the symbol of that unity—such as the establishment of a general law relating to the press and to a federal police; but rushing on reactionary measures, such as the suppression (August, 1851) of the fundamental laws of the German people decreed by the parliament of 1848, and the revision in a conservative direction of the constitutions of individual states. It succeeded in scarcely anything but the organisation of a federal army, which it concentrated in the Rhenish provinces, although welcoming with sympathy the Napoleonic *coup d'état* of the 2nd of December, a eulogy on which might be read as early as the 4th of December in the *Wiener Zeitung*. The unitary idea appeared to be more and more compromised. "German unity," an Austrian pamphlet ironically said, "is the squaring of the circle; when one thinks one has it, that is just the moment when one recognises its impossibility. It resembles our cathedrals—there is not one finished."

Schwarzenberg died on the 5th of April, 1852. Count von Buol-Schauenstein succeeded him as minister of foreign affairs; but the emperor suppressed the presidency of the council of ministers, which Alexander Bach, who was only minister of the interior, had hoped for, and announced that he would continue in person the absolutist, centralising, and Germanic policy of Schwarzenberg. The latter had failed in the task of obtaining the admission into the confederation of Austria with all her provinces. He had also failed in another task, which was one side of the same question—that of winning her admission into the *Zollverein*, or customs union, which had been formed in 1834, and was to be renewed in 1854. But here Prussia opposed an invincible resistance, into the details of which it would be tedious to enter. Schwarzenberg had perfectly understood that, if the political form of the confederation was the diet, its commercial form was the *Zollverein*, and that in order to lead Germany it was necessary to be in both. Prussia, however, having the same comprehension of the situation, defended the commercial position, since she had been dislodged from the other at Olmütz; and only consented to a simple alliance between the *Zollverein* on the one hand and Austria on the other, but by no means to an incorporation.

Schwarzenberg's policy was really continued everywhere. Austria pressed her yoke on Italy, seeking besides to bind the destinies of that country to her own by customs treaties with the sovereigns bowed beneath her influence, and by knitting the railways of the peninsula with her own. From their capital, Verona, her generals and police multiplied executions and trials, supported the court of Rome against French influence, created embarrassment on embarrassment for the Piedmontese cabinets, bathed the Romagna in blood by executions, and provoked an insurrection in Milan which, breaking out on the 6th

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of February, 1853, was suppressed in terrible fashion and followed by the sequestration of all the property of Lombardo-Venetian emigrants. In Hungary existed the same system of rule—executions and Germanisation. Francis Joseph made frequent journeys in his states, in the midst of official transports, acclaimed by the Italian nobles or the Magyar magnates, who, like Paul Esterházy, displayed at the receptions at Pest jewelry valued at a fabulous sum. On the 24th of April, 1854, the young sovereign married Elisabeth Amelie Eugenie, daughter of Maximilian Joseph, duke in Bavaria; Francis Joseph was twenty-four years old and the new empress seventeen.

AUSTRIA'S ATTITUDE DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR (1853-1856 A.D.)

It was under these circumstances that war in the East broke out between Russia on the one hand and France, England, Piedmont, and Turkey on the other. The question of the holy places at Jerusalem was for Russia a pretext to try to get hold of the succession of the Sick Man. She counted on the co-operation of Austria, which she had saved in 1849 and which had herself just forbidden the Turkish army, led by Omar Pasha, to attack the Montenegrins. Nicholas had a lively affection for the young Francis Joseph and looked on him as almost a ward and pupil. Only recently, at the grand manoeuvres of Olmütz, he had desired to parade before his beloved Habsburg at the head of the regiment of Austrian lancers which belonged to him, and had afterwards pressed the Austrian emperor in his arms, weeping. He lived on terms of comradeship with the Austrian generals. How then could he expect that Francis Joseph would take part against him, for that England which had so enthusiastically received the rebel Kossuth, and for that France which was governed by a representative of Napoleon I?

It was therefore without hesitation that he gave Prince Menshikoff that celebrated mission of May, 1853, by which he claimed the protectorate over all the Greek Catholics throughout the Ottoman Empire, which amounted to demanding of Turkey the abdication pure and simple of her sovereignty.

Schwarzenberg, a great composer of *mots*, had said after the Russian intervention that Austria would one day astonish the world by her ingratitude. That day had come. Austria was forced for the sake of her Slav provinces to maintain the *statu quo* on the Danube, and consequently the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Order at Belgrade, at Mostar in Bulgaria, was, for her, order at Agram, Karlowitz, Prague, etc. Her part was to resist the attraction of Slavism. She therefore at first contented herself with proposing a conference in virtue of the treaty of 1841, which placed the existence of Turkey under the guarantee of the five powers; and with sending a note which Turkey refused to accept as exorbitant, and which Prussia interpreted in the most abusive sense. Francis Joseph wrote to the czar. The latter answered by the publication of a manifesto to the Greek Christians, which breathed the purest Panslavism, and sent Count Orloff to Vienna (January 29th, 1854) to demand the neutrality of Austria towards England and France. Buol demanded in return that Russia should at least pledge herself to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to abandon the Danubian provinces. Orloff refused; Buol remained firm, and the Russian diplomatist quitted Vienna saying, bitterly: "Since you make war impossible to us you might as well declare it against us." The czar was furious at this check, and Austria concentrated a corps of troops on the Danube; on the 20th of April she signed a convention with Prussia by which the two mutually guaranteed each other's possessions, German or non-German. All the small states of the confederation adhered to this convention, with the exception of Mecklenburg.

[1854-1855 A.D.]

After the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, Austria sent Russia a fresh note (August 8th, 1854), in which she demanded that the protection hitherto exercised by Russia over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia should be replaced by that of the five powers; that the navigation of the Danube from its estuary should be freed from all restrictions; that the treaty of the 13th of July, 1841, should be revised by the high contracting powers in concert, and that Russia should cease to claim the right of exercising an official protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, whatever the creed to which they might belong. Prussia and the diet approved; Russia refused.^a

There were dangers ahead, whichever side Austria might decide to uphold. The western powers might at any time influence affairs in Italy, to the extent of engaging the full strength of the Austrian Empire; Turkey had a sufficiently powerful military force to be capable of sustaining an obstinate fight; and finally, came the consideration that Germany would actively oppose Austria, directly she declared herself to be in alliance with the powers hostile to Russia, on account of her unquestionable friendship with that country. It was, however, assuredly to the interests of the kingdom that peace should be speedily restored, as the conditions of warfare were paralysing everything.

In fact, what Austria had to consider was that an alliance with Russia might draw down on her an attack from three sides; that neutrality and the maintenance of a passive attitude would mean the continuance of an unendurable situation, whereas she was in a position to bring strong pressure to bear upon Russia with a view to restoring peace. These considerations were decisive for Austria when, on December 2nd, 1854, England and France concluded a treaty which at once came into operation. That it was intended to bring about peace is shown by the subsequent proceedings; the proposals agreed upon at the Vienna congress were once more laid before the Russian ambassador in Vienna, who declared the readiness of the czar to treat for peace on their basis.

How difficult the whole situation was for the Austrian monarchy is clearly shown by the two following circumstances: Sardinia now hastened to conclude a treaty with the western powers, and sent auxiliary troops to take an active part in the struggle; whilst Germany on the other hand declined the proposal to mobilise the allied forces and appoint a commander-in-chief. It was only agreed that the forces should be kept in readiness for active fighting—but this measure was aimed not only against Russia, but also against the western powers. This last condition was introduced at the desire of Prussia, which had now reassumed a friendly attitude towards Russia. The motives for Sardinia's action were easily recognisable; she had held herself in readiness for an attack upon Austria, should that country join issue with Russia, and now sought not only to oblige the western powers by this active sympathy in a great European question, but also to win for herself a place in the "council of the greater powers" and in all circumstances to have the opportunity of opposing the policy of Austria. The attitude of Prussia is equally comprehensible, making use as she did of the situation in order to declare herself the friend of Russia.

The death of the czar Nicholas seemed to be a favourable turning point in the effort to secure peace, and the conference of the different states convened at Vienna in 1855 was expected to make use of it; but the negotiations proved fruitless, and Austria fell back upon the policy of neutrality. The army was once more reduced, and the scheme of a war of aggression upon Russia finally abandoned. Both parties in the strife desired the end of this hopeless struggle, and it only remained to find an occasion upon which it could be resigned without abatement of "military honour." The storming of Sebastopol by the

[1855-1858 A.D.]

allies and the conquest of the Armenian fortress of Kars by the Russians offered a suitable occasion, since both armies had scored a victory. The Austrian government accordingly once more sent proposals for peace to St. Petersburg in December, 1855; they were treated with consideration, but the peace conference was convened in Paris, instead of in Vienna.

In accordance with the peace concluded in 1856 Russia had to resign her "protectorate" over the Christians in Turkey and to give up the mouths of the Danube; the navigation of the Danube was declared free, and the Black Sea "closed"; that is to say, no war ships of foreign powers should be permitted to make the voyage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The conference at Paris had given the new French emperor, Napoleon III, the opportunity of successfully assuming the rôle of the arbiter of Europe, of joining with the opponents of Austria, and of crippling the latter's influence.⁹



PUSTERTHAL, TYROL

THE WAR OF ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE (1859 A.D.)

At the sitting of the Congress at Paris, on the 8th of April, Walewski, the French minister of foreign affairs, suddenly called attention to the situation of the States of the Church and of the kingdom of Naples, and to the dangers attendant on the occupation of a great part of Italy by the Austrian armies. The plenipotentiaries of Austria, Buol-Schauenstein and Hübner, declared that they had no answer to make on these subjects, which were foreign to the congress. Cavour asked to be heard, and drew a very striking picture of the occupation of the Roman states by Austria, an occupation which had endured for the last seven years. "The presence of the Austrian troops in the legations and in the duchy of Parma," he added, "destroys the political equilibrium in Italy and constitutes a veritable danger for Sardinia. It is our duty to point out to Europe the existence of a state of things so abnormal as that which results in the indefinite occupation by Austria of a great part of Italy."

Baron von Hübner made a vehement reply. The Russian plenipotentiary, Count Orloff, could but rejoice to see ungrateful Austria called to account in her turn. This was only an exchange of ideas, but the Italian question had been brought forward and Cavour could write to one of his friends, "In three years we shall have war."


We may pass rapidly over the years 1857 and 1858, which saw the organisation of the Danubian principalities into an administrative union, the signing of the convention for the free navigation of the Danube, and the death of old Radetzky, who was replaced by the archduke Maximilian (January 5th, 1858).

[1858-1859 A.D.]

These two years were, properly speaking, a preparation for the war of Italy, a diplomatic struggle with Piedmont preceding the armed struggle. Europe felt a presentiment of it. After the Crimean War, France had approached sensibly nearer to Russia, who was herself drawing Prussia into her orbit, and in all the conferences of these two years we constantly see Russia, France, and Prussia voting against Austria and England. The Stuttgart interview between Napoleon III and Alexander II in 1857 still further accentuated this situation. Cavour was advancing to his goal with an unheard-of persistency, preparing fleets, armies, finances, alliances, lancing against Austria the collection of the letters of Joseph de Maistre, in which the empire of the Habsburgs is treated as the enemy of the human race, making every effort to conciliate France, even to obtaining the vote, after the Orsini crime, of a disgraceful law against refugees. In July, 1858, he had that famous interview with Napoleon III at Plombières in which war was decided on, and on the 1st of January, 1859, at a New Year's reception, the emperor said to Baron von Hübner, the ambassador of Austria: "I regret that our relations with your government are not so good as they were. I beg you to tell the emperor that my personal sentiments for him are unchanged."

Russia intended to leave Austria to her fate, England sent Lord Cowley to Vienna to try to prevent a rupture between Austria and Piedmont by concessions from the former. Buol-Schauenstein asked if these concessions guaranteed Austria her possessions in Italy. Cavour, sounded by Lord Cowley, answered that the dangers of war could only be averted by the creation of a separate national government for Lombardo-Venetia, the cessation of the occupation of Romagna, and the establishment of constitutional institutions at Parma, Modena, and Florence. Russia then proposed a congress, which was accepted on the 22nd of March by Austria, on the condition that it should be preceded by disarmament on the part of Piedmont. Napoleon III had, or feigned to have, some inclinations towards peace, which entirely deceived Hübner. Buol-Schauenstein, deceived by Hübner, assumed the most arrogant tone towards Piedmont; and finally, on the 19th of April, addressed to her a haughty ultimatum, requiring disarmament within three days.^a

Napoleon's New Year's greeting was immediately appreciated at its right value by the military party in Vienna, whilst the Austrian diplomacy remained on the wrong track till almost the last moment. The immediate victim of imperial brusquerie, Baron von Hübner, to whom in Paris everyone gave the cold shoulder, lived so entirely without the circle of impending events, was so thoroughly out of touch with those who initiated the various movements, that



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he wrote to Vienna that the address was a cordial effusion of the heart, such as might well occur among friends, whereof the brusque and outspoken manner need cause no uneasiness. This exposition of the famous words, "I much regret that our relations with your government are no longer as friendly as formerly," was quite in accordance with the acumen which caused the ambassador to persuade a secret emissary of the military party that the colossal preparations for warfare, of which the latter collected constant proofs during his tour through France, were of no consequence, as the emperor of the French was suffering from softening of the brain. Buol, too, thought that peace might yet be possible, until he was ordered to despatch the ultimatum to Turin. The existing contradictions pointed to war as sooner or later the only issue of the situation. At bottom Buol was also right in his conviction that the existence of constitutional Piedmont was in itself apart from all else an invincible threat against the reign of Austrian absolutism in Italy, and not less right in his proclamation: "Austria has carried the matter to such lengths that it is now an alternative of Austria supreme as far as the Alps, or Italy free as far as the Adriatic."

This was discovered by the Vienna military party, but, startled at themselves and their own rashness, they equalised the profits by frittering the precious time in disconsolate hesitation, after they had precipitated the decision. For there was a moment when in all earnest Napoleon faltered from following his first step by his second; Cavour had to compel him to hold by his resolution, just as in the *coup d'état* his companions, Morny and St. Arnaud, had been obliged to do. To accomplish this the Piedmontese minister used as a handle the ultimatum from Vienna, the peremptory nature of which gave him the opportunity to represent Austria in the light of the peace-breaker, and thus declare existent the *casus fœderis* for which France had pledged her aid. As a preliminary condition to a peace congress England had proposed the inhibition of the mobilisation of the volunteer corps.

On the 20th of April Napoleon telegraphed to Cavour, "Accept at once; answer by telegraph," and the *Moniteur* accepted in the name of France. Cavour was in despair, when he received news through Naples that the ultimatum dated the 19th, which was to give him breathing time, was on its way from Vienna. On the 23d Baron Kellersperz handed it in at Turin; it contained the peremptory interpellation: "Will Piedmont, within the space of three days, promise to place its army on the footing of peace and dismiss the volunteer corps?—yes or no." With this declaration of war, which left the London proposal formally out of the question, Austria had burned her boats; it now remained only to let the action follow the threat, as thunder follows lightning. The Piedmontese army should have been scattered, before a Frenchman put his foot on Italian soil; the French corps could then have been annihilated as they landed in troops or came down through the mountain passes. Instead of this, Gyulai let three days beyond the term assigned to Piedmont elapse before, on the 29th of April, he crossed the Ticino. Meanwhile the first French soldiers came into Turin and Genoa, but only in quite small divisions; their debouchment troubled Gyulai as little as seven years later the Prussians pushing through the Bohemian mountains disturbed Benedek. In this case strong rainfalls and swollen rivers played the same part as the mists of Chlum played at Königgrätz. Gyulai, without in the least concerning himself about the matter, allowed the allies to concentrate their forces, although it was not till May 20th, at the great reconnaissance at Montebello, that a division of the French under Forey came under fire. On the 30th, at Palestro, there was still only one Zouave regiment to support the Italians. Then on the 4th of June the battle of Magenta was followed by the over-hasty evacuation of Lombardy, and the battle of Solferino on the 24th of

[1859 A.D.]

June led to the meeting of the two emperors at Villafranca, where, on July 11th, the preliminaries of peace, including the loss of Lombardy to Austria, were signed.

THE AVALANCHE

This hurried submission of Austria was in fact due, not so much to the result of the battles—of which Magenta at any rate cannot be considered as decisive, and even Solferino can hardly pass as an overwhelming defeat, since the French had not won a foot of ground—as to the anxiety arising from a just appreciation of the spirit of the country, in addition to the suspicion, carefully fostered by the French, that Prussia would use the continuance of the war to undermine Austria's position in Frankfort. The fear of the disposition of the people took the greater hold, because, with the landing of the French at Lussin-Piccolo in the Quarnero Gulf on the 3rd and the bombardment of Zadar, the war had approached that neighbourhood where from Fiume onwards along the magnificent Marie-Louise road it could draw to it the Croats and the other southern Slavs. Kossuth, Türr, and other émigrés were in Napoleon's headquarters; an army ready to descend on the enemy's coast would assuredly meet with no opposition from the Croats and Serbians, who were much disaffected, and in Hungary would certainly light the flames of insurrection. The universal misery during a decade had for the moment stilled the fierce race-hatred of the Magyars and the southern Slavs, which had reigned in 1849. That the reflections of the headquarters were not without grounds is shown by the remarkable article in the preliminaries, which assured to all those who had been compromised a general amnesty. As it was certain that 6 per cent. of the imperial Austrian troops which had been under fire—that is, 15,000 out of 250,000 men—had been taken prisoners, and that these were almost without exception Hungarians, Croats, or Italians, we may find not only this decision but many others taken by Austria easily comprehensible.

The temper in the hereditary lands disclosed a higher degree of resignation, but a bitterness no less intense. The manifesto of Laxenburg brought little improvement. At an unfortunate moment the preamble greatly irritated diplomatic sensibilities in foreign countries by the words: "Our oldest and most natural allies have obstinately refused to recognise the fact that Austria should face the coming events, the significance of which increases daily, in full and undivided strength." The conclusion set forth a promise which was too indefinite to inspire new life into the general apathy: "The blessings of peace are doubly precious to me, because they will give me the necessary leisure to turn my attention and care more than ever to the successful discharge of the duties I have imposed upon myself, of developing the riches, material and spiritual, of the kingdom, and so increasing its well-being within and its power without, as well as of ensuring the continuance of peace by timely improvements in its laws and government."

But week after week ran by and nothing was done. At the end of July the Linz chamber of commerce addressed the following warning in its annual report to Bruck: "The chamber has repeatedly declared that it confronts a grave and by no means smiling future with confidence, because it relies upon the strength of the nation. These words are doubly true to-day. Day after day it grows plainer and events emphatically prove that the free development of intelligence, of public opinion, of association, of industry in trade, of unions of the people, and of agricultural interests will be given every possible opening. The nation feels the need of a wider, more self-reliant development of its powers; without this it will hardly be able to keep its place in competition with other nations. Upper Austria, because it loves its fatherland, struggles

for progress; for true progress in all directions it will have the necessary spirit of self-sacrifice."

Again, on the 7th of August a semi-official article written in Vienna lamented in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*: "The temper in Vienna is both depressed and irritable. Between the emperor and his people a coterie has intruded itself. After all, where are the followers of the concordat policy and its consequences? How wofully in error are those who believe the concordat will be greeted with unanimous joy by the whole body of clergy! There are—apart from the inferior clergy who are delivered by the concordat into the hands of the ambitious and therefore hated bishops—many bishops who shake their heads whenever the concordat is mentioned. Nevertheless all possible efforts are being made to bring about a change of persons in the principal offices, and unhappily not without success—hence the ever-increasing despondency. There must be a change; the sound feeling of Vienna protests with too much energy against the present state of things, and public displeasure manifests itself too unmistakably to remain much longer unattended with result. In this fact lies at the moment the (unhappily) sole hope of improvement."

At last on August 22nd the *Wiener Zeitung* announced the longed-for dismissal of Bach and Kempen. The latter was simply pensioned; the former may have regarded his nomination as ambassador in Rome as an advancement, for this over-salaried post passed as the first in Austrian diplomacy after that of minister of foreign affairs. Bruck's restless but somewhat fruitless ambition accomplished the dismissal of Toggenburg at the same time, and demanded the unwarrantable suspension of the ministry of commerce, whose agenda were distributed among the different departments of finance, foreign and domestic. The avalanche came with a rush, after the first impetus had once been given; but who would have believed that, fully twelve years later, nobody would yet have an idea which direction, once set in motion, it was likely to take?^h

THE OCTOBER DIPLOMA (1860 A.D.); THE FEBRUARY PATENT (1861 A.D.)

After some hesitation the emperor undertook a series of reforms tending gradually to introduce the constitutional régime into his states. He first created a strengthened Reichsrath, or imperial council (March 6th, 1860)—that is to say, he added to his ordinary council thirty-eight members taken from among the notables, and representing the different countries of the empire; they were to employ themselves with the finances and general legislation. This assembly, which was purely consultative, had no right of initiative. It was but a small concession in face of the hopes and demands of the peoples. Finally, these were listened to. Goluchowski, a Galician nobleman, and consequently a stranger to the quarrels between Germans and Hungarians, was summoned to the ministry, and with his help the diploma of the 20th of October (*Oktoberdiplom*) was elaborated. This was the charter of the new liberties. The following is a summary of it:

Henceforth the sovereign exercised the legislative power in concert with the diet and with a *Reichsrath* composed of delegates from the diets. The competence of the Reichsrath extended to legislation concerning interests common to all the countries of the empire—finance, commerce, communication, and war. Other matters were the province of the diets. All citizens were equal before the law as regards religious creed, financial burdens, and military service. The number of members of the Reichsrath reached about one hundred; the ministries of the interior, of justice, and worship were suppressed. The diets still remained organised on the principle of privileged castes.

[1861 A.D.]

The task of applying and developing the principles comprised in the diploma of the 20th of October was confided to the minister Schmerling; he completed it by the patent of the 26th of February, 1861. Like Bach or Metternich, his first object was to maintain the preponderance of the Germanic element; he aimed at applying to Austria the parliamentary theories which are suitable only to homogeneous states. He created two chambers. That of the lords comprised princes, great land owners, prelates, and eminent men appointed by the sovereign. The chamber of deputies comprised 343 members elected by the provincial diets and distributed thus: Hungary, 85; Transylvania, 20; Croatia-Slavonia, 9; Dalmatia, 5; Bohemia, 54; Moravia, 22; Silesia, 6; Lower and Upper Austria, 28; Salzburg, 3; Styria, 13; Carinthia, 5; Carniola, 6; 6 for Istria and Trieste, 38 for Galicia, 5 for Bukowina, 12 for the Tyrol and Vorarlberg. The suppressed ministries were restored and the attributes of the central parliament enlarged at the expense of the provincial diets.

The hopes to which the October diploma had given rise among the federalists were reduced to nothing. Yet it could not be imagined that the Hungarians would sell their autonomy so cheaply and consent to deliberate on the interests of their kingdom with the Venetians, the Slovenes, and the Poles. Their deputies were only to sit when the common interests of the whole monarchy were in question; their presence constituted the full Reichsrath; in their absence there was a restricted parliament in which the other groups occupied themselves with questions beyond the competency of their own diets. Thus the centralist minister managed to get rid of the principle of a dual government. On the other hand, he organised all the provincial diets on a uniform model, but with an electoral system scientifically constructed to stifle the Slav majorities under the German minorities. This system replaced the representation of the estates by that of interests; it admitted three curiæ of electors: the great land owners, the citizens of the towns, and the peasants of the country districts. The large properties belonging to aristocratic families which held them in fee from the dynasty; the towns where, even in non-German districts, there are numerous Germanic colonies, were especially favoured.

The elective circles were distributed in the most arbitrary fashion: in Bohemia, for example, the Slav towns had a deputy for every 12,020 electors, whilst the German towns had one for every 10,315. In the rural circles the Slavs had a deputy for every 53,200 inhabitants, whilst the German circles had one for every 40,800 electors. The German town of Reichenberg, with 19,000 inhabitants, had three deputies, whilst the Slav town of Prague, with 150,000 inhabitants, had only ten. Certain German towns were constituted as veritable rotten boroughs. The German borough of Parchen, with 500 inhabitants, had a deputy; the Slav town of Kladno, with 8,000 inhabitants, had not a single one. In short, this electoral system was a veritable deception.

After the constitution of February the peoples of the empire were divided as to whether or not they should accept it by sending deputies to the new Reichsrath. Venetia, Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia refused to let themselves be represented there; 140 deputies (more than a third) were missing out of 343; "We can wait," said Schmerling, proudly. But all his diplomacy was unavailing against the obstinacy of the Hungarians.

"I know only the Hungarian constitution, I can treat only on the basis of the Hungarian constitution," Deák invariably answered to all the proposals of the Viennese statesmen, even when Schmerling had succeeded in attracting the Transylvania deputies to Vienna. The Hungarian diet, convoked at Pest in April, 1861, refused all compromises; some of the rigorous lawyers even affected not to recognise Francis Joseph, because he had never been crowned. In countries possessing historic rights the coronation is not merely a religious

ceremony; it is a mutual contract in which the sovereign makes an oath acknowledging the historic rights of the kingdom; hence the importance which the Czechs and Magyars attach to it. The legists, not recognising the uncrowned king, wished to vote only a resolution; Deák persuaded them to draw up an address. In this document, remarkable for its lucidity and its logic, he appeals to the historic rights of the kingdom.

"The fundamental condition of our political life and of our national independence," it said, "is the legal autonomy and the independence of our country. Our first duty is to consecrate all our faculties to obtaining that Hungary shall remain Hungary and keep her constitutional rights. We solemnly declare that we can sacrifice to no consideration, to no interest, the rights derived from treaties, laws, royal letters, and coronation oaths." It claimed the execution of the laws of 1848 and of the engagements undertaken in the Pragmatic Sanction. The government of Vienna thought it could daunt the Hungarians by force. The diet was dissolved (August 22nd). The assemblies of the comitats were forbidden, royal commissioners were substituted for the refractory *Obergespanne*; but the Magyars persisted in their resistance, even when Schmerling had succeeded in attracting to Vienna the deputies of Transylvania.

Bohemia was scarcely more satisfied than Hungary. She complained with reason of the iniquity of the electoral system granted by Schmerling; she sent her deputies to the Reichsrath, but only with the reservation of all the rights of the kingdom. After 1863 they ceased to take part in the debates of this assembly. The only liberty for which thanks were due to Schmerling was that of the press; but the Slavs profited little by it. In Bohemia and Moravia, within the space of three years, fourteen Czech journals shared between them sixty-one months of imprisonment, simple or severe (with fasting and irons), and 21,500 florins in fines.

THE POLISH INSURRECTION (1863-1866 A.D.)

The insurrection of Russian Poland in 1863 provoked an intense ferment in Galicia and plunged the Vienna cabinet into serious embarrassments. Its attitude was very ambiguous. Whilst Prussia concluded a military convention with Russia against the insurgents, Rechberg, then minister of foreign affairs, preserved Machiavellian caution towards both parties. Napoleon III, in sympathy with the Poles, had reckoned on Austria for a campaign against Russia and Prussia. He wished to help the Vienna cabinet to resume Silesia and secure to Austria the Danubian Principalities in exchange for Venetia. These projects were neither understood nor liked at Vienna. The government of the emperor Francis confined itself to addressing diplomatic notes to St. Petersburg and finally placed Galicia in a state of siege. This ambiguous conduct irritated to a singular degree not only the Poles but also their congeners of Bohemia and Moravia, who were more inclined to sympathise with the Polish revolution than with the Muscovite autocracy.

The work of Schmerling was not of the kind which is destined to endure. In 1865 the emperor undertook a journey to Pest in order to come to an understanding with the Hungarians; he gave them a new chancellor and dismissed Schmerling. The partisans of parliamentary Germanism lamented, but in the provinces the joy was immense. Prague, Pest, and Lemberg were illuminated. Schmerling was replaced by Belcredi, a Moravian by origin and far less enthusiastic than his predecessor for the hegemony of the German nationality. The diets of the great Slav countries, Bohemia and Galicia, showed themselves grateful for the change of ministry and hastened to react

[1863-1866 A.D.]

against the germanising measures of the preceding cabinet; in Galicia, for instance, the Polish language was introduced into all the schools.^f

On the 20th of September the emperor published a manifesto suspending the constitution of the 26th of February, 1861, in order to arrive at a new organisation which might satisfy all the nationalities. The imperial council, or Reichsrath, was indefinitely prorogued. Count Belcredi's plan was to group the countries according to their language and origin in several states, to give them complete autonomy for their internal affairs, and to reserve such matters as were of common interest to a central parliament; but if the Czechs and Poles applauded this plan the Germans and the Hungarians would not hear of it. The Germans wished to preserve Schmerling's system while perfecting it in the direction of liberty. The Hungarians, in the name of the "continuity of the law," demanded the preliminary re-establishment of the constitution of 1848, with a responsible ministry; then only would the Deákists consent to a revision of the fundamental laws for the purpose of finding out how they might be made to agree with Belcredi's plan. This amounted to dualism already designed, prepared, and superposing itself on the equality of the races in a liberal confederation.

The Hungarian diet met on the 5th of December, 1865. In it Deák had an enormous majority. He obtained the vote of an address demanding the nomination of a responsible Hungarian ministry which should alone be qualified to propose such modifications as were deemed necessary. It was impossible to come to an agreement. Count Belcredi recoiled before the certainty of displeasing the Slavs by accepting the proposed dualism. After long debates, which lasted till February, 1866, the diet was adjourned. Deák repeated Schmerling's phrase, "We can wait." The terrible year of Königgrätz was to abridge this effort, and the Belcredi ministry simply bears in history the name, "ministry of the suspension" (*Sistirung*).^d

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION (1863-1866)

Prussia had not lost the memory of the humiliation of Olmütz; she aspired only to take her revenge and to place herself at the head of Germany. It must be acknowledged that this rôle suited her better than it did her rival; for, except in the duchy of Posen and in some parts of Silesia, the Prussian state is purely German. King William, crowned 1861, had found in Bismarck the minister of that policy which was to bring Prussia to the apogee of her power. Prussia and Austria both endeavoured to range Germany under their domination, whilst at Dresden Beust was imagining a triad in which the little kingdoms would have formed a counterpoise to the two great empires.

Without here going into all the efforts of Austria to secure the hegemony, let us only remember that she proposed the drawing up of a uniform code of civil procedure for all Germany; this project fell to the ground. In August, 1863, the emperor Francis Joseph convoked the German princes at Frankfort to elaborate a plan of federal reform; the German sovereigns met in the hall of the Römer; the king of Prussia alone refused to appear. Francis Joseph wished to secure for his dynasty the perpetual presidency of the directory of the German Confederation; he wished to obtain that in case of war Germany should intervene to guarantee him in his possessions situated outside the confederation. This is not the place to relate how the question of Schleswig-Holstein developed. Germany has always coveted this half Danish, half German province, the possession of which secures large outlets for her navy. In 1863 the king of Denmark thought the time had come in which Schleswig, which had hitherto formed a part of Holstein, might be definitely incorporated with

his kingdom. The diet protested and caused Holstein to be occupied by the federal troops. Rechberg was at this time Austria's minister of foreign affairs, and in 1863 he had declared that it was not his intention to raise the question of nationalities—a question to be dreaded by Austria more than any other power. However, he allowed himself to be drawn by Bismarck into undertaking the seizure in the name of the confederation and in concert with Prussia. Twenty thousand Austrians, co-operating with the Prussian army, attacked the Danes (January 27th, 1864). The two armies, in spite of the heroism of the Danes, gained an easy victory. Rear-Admiral Tegetthoff flew the Austrian flag with honour in the North Sea, and by the Peace of Vienna, on the 30th of October, 1864, King Christian IX yielded all his rights over Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to the conquerors.

But if it had been easy to win this booty it was less easy to divide it. It was evident that the duchies were too remote from Austria to admit of her usefully possessing them either wholly or in part. Prussia offered to buy her right of possession. On the 14th of August, 1865, the Convention of Gastein was signed. Austria ceded the duchy of Lauenburg to Prussia for 12,500,000 francs. It has been calculated that this was about 149 francs for each inhabitant. Austria kept Holstein while Prussia reserved Schleswig for herself. The small states protested in vain against this immoral convention, which completely disregarded the rights of Germany. A little later Prussia offered 300,000,000 francs for the cession of the duchies; Austria refused, but subjects for chicanery were not lacking to the statesmen of Berlin: they complained of the over-liberal administration of Austria in Holstein, they raised claims to intervene in that administration.^f Friedrich Giehneⁱ thus describes the situation at this time:^a

Giehne's View of the Situation

After the war cloud in the north seemed for the time to have blown over, one finds oneself again face to face with the Schleswig-Holstein question, which lay behind the cloud, and again one is driven to wonder at the innocence which allowed itself to become responsible for this complication. If the matter be regarded without prejudice, it will appear far simpler. Let us, for example, suppose that some one from the far west of America came over to Europe, some one who had heard absolutely nothing about the matter, and that he was appointed arbitrator; he would put a number of questions, in order to learn how the matter stood, and there would be some such dialogue as the following:

"Has the war against Denmark then been conducted in the name of Prussian claims to Schleswig-Holstein?"

"No; there has been no thought of such a thing; nor indeed in that case would Austria have had any possible reason for participating in the war."

"What then was the actual cause of the war?"

"Well, for one thing, the right of the German Confederation to Holstein; for another, the separation of the Danish succession from that of Schleswig-Holstein, which descends to the duke of Augustenburg."

"So then it appears this claim has been renounced—or is it handed over to Prussia?"

"Neither; but Count Bismarck now declares that the king of Denmark has been the one and only lawful duke of Schleswig-Holstein."

"So then Count Bismarck will, by right of succession, reinstate him in the dukedom?"

"Not so much that, so they seem to say in Berlin; we will rather draw the other conclusion—that rightfully Denmark should retire from the dukedom,

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and consequently endorse by means of this registration the one valid and just course."

"Oh, then Denmark has resigned the dukedom to Prussia?"

"Not so, but to Prussia and Austria jointly; only, Prussia now desires that, in a spirit of benevolent comradeship, Austria should resign her part of the claim and so leave the whole."

"Then Austria's joint claim is not denied by Prussia?"

"By no means; Prussia's claim would in that case also be invalid."

"Good; but where are they then at issue?"

"Why, because Austria can see no reason for blindly giving up her right to Prussia, and Prussia makes this a cause of offence."

"And how has Count Bismarck sought to persuade Austria to renounce her right in favour of Prussia?"

"Until now, only by attacks in the papers, threats of war, of joining forces with Austria's enemies, besides denying Austria entrance to the German Zollverein."

"Well, that is certainly a strange kind of *captatio benevolentiae*. Count Bismarck has taken a radically wrong road for his purpose. He should read the fable of the storm wind, which tries to tear the traveller's mantle from him: the more violently the wind blows, the closer the wanderer wraps his cloak around him. Count Bismarck would in his place do the same; how comes it then that he expects anything else in another?"

THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR OF 1866

If Bismarck heard such admonitions as this, he did not heed them. The real point at issue was far more vital than any question as to the rulership, or other affairs, of Schleswig-Holstein; it had to do with the leadership of the Germanic nations. Should Austria still aspire to her old-time supremacy, or could Prussia challenge that supremacy and make good the challenge? That was really the question that underlay all the trivialities of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute; and it was a question that could never be definitely settled except by the verdict of war. Each party felt this, and each prepared for the contest.^a Austria armed, but Prussia was far superior to her in military organisation; she had besides a secure alliance with the young kingdom of Italy, impatient to acquire Venetia, to whom she promised a large subsidy. In vain did Napoleon III attempt to settle the question of the dachies and that of Venetia by means of a congress. He was no more successful than he had been in the affairs of Poland.

The Battle of Königgrätz (1866)

Austria felt both her honour and her military pride to be at stake. General Gablenz was commissioned to convoke the diet of Holstein in order to learn the wishes of the country on its future fate. Bismarck declared that the Convention of Gastein had been violated; he occupied Holstein and mobilised the Prussian army. The small states of Germany declared against Prussia, but she rapidly occupied Hesse, Saxony, and Hanover (June, 1866). Baden, Bavaria, and Würtemberg held their own, but struggled feebly; Italy sent her fleet to the Adriatic and her troops to the Quadrilateral. The Prussians entered Bohemia. It was a lightning campaign. Benedek, the commander of the Austrian forces, instead of occupying Saxony, had awaited the enemy beyond the defiles of Bohemia; his lieutenants, Clam-Galatz and Gablenz, were successively defeated at Jicin and Nachod on the 26th and 27th of June; he himself concentrated his troops near Königgrätz (Kralove-Gradec) and the

village of Sadowa. A great battle was fought on the 3rd of July; it cost the Austrians 20,000 prisoners, 160 cannon, 18,000 dead and wounded; Prague and a great part of Bohemia were occupied by the Prussians, whose officers, disguised as photographers and peddlers, had carefully studied the topography the year before. The road to Vienna lay open and the enemy marched on that capital by way of Moravia.^f

On the day of the battle itself the most contradictory reports were received and discussed with feverish excitement. It was felt that the destiny of Austria was at stake; men were preparing for bad news; but the dreadful tidings received on the morning of the 4th of July—"the army of the north no longer exists"—surpassed all that had been feared. But to yield, to sue for peace, was out of the question, at least with the Prussians; it was preferable, if Austria's own strength were not sufficient, to continue the fight with foreign assistance, even at the price of the greatest sacrifices.

Where this might be looked for and in what direction the sacrifices had to be made was not far to seek. Italy must be appeased by the abandonment of Venice and an attempt made to involve Napoleon in the war. To give way as regarded Italy was, from the military standpoint, quite possible, since, on the battlefields between the Adagio and the Mincio, the ancient renown of the Austrian arms had been upheld and even a great victory gained with an inferior force. It is true that, according to the agreement of the 8th of April, Victor Emmanuel could not conclude peace without the consent of Prussia; but if Napoleon demanded it, would it be possible to refuse him? If one looked closely at the manner in which the Italians conducted the war, were there not observable distinct traces of disinclination, discord, and a longing for peace? South of the Alps there were at any rate no visible signs of the powerful energy and unity which governed the Prussian plan of campaign. If Moltke's proposals had been listened to, the Italians would have crossed the fortresses of the Quadrilateral which stood in their way or gone round them and directed their advance on German Austria with the utmost speed. Besides this, volunteers under Garibaldi ought, in accordance with the proposal which Usedom addressed to La Marmora on the 17th of June, to have landed on the Dalmatian shores to penetrate into Hungary and entice that country to rebel, a task to which a corps of refugees formed by Klapka in Prussian Silesia would have contributed from the north.

As Usedom rightly stated, blows like those would have struck not merely at the limbs but at the heart of the Austrian monarchy, and would have made the victory of Italy and its result, the acquisition of Venetia, final and irrevocable. However, La Marmora would not listen to those counsels; he thought them dangerous, and besides felt it an insult that he should receive orders from Berlin. He was no longer in Florence when he received Usedom's note and no longer prime minister. He had surrendered that office to Ricasoli and the ministry of foreign affairs to Visconti Venosta, who, up to that time, had been ambassador at Constantinople—that he might himself take command of the army. The important document followed him to the headquarters at Cremona and he received it on the 19th, just as he was on the point of sending the declaration of war to Mantua. However, instead of seriously considering the matter, he put it aside in a bad temper, and even after a second demand he did not consider it worth a reply. He had his own plan of campaign, and saw no occasion to let himself be diverted from it.

However, even in the Italian camp, the voices worthy of note were not at one with him. Whilst he adhered to the opinion that the Austrians must be first enclosed in their fortresses and that then only could further operations with the remaining forces be considered, Cialdini, in conformity with the Prussian plan, wished to press forward over the nether Po, to the east of the

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fortresses. The consideration which the latter general enjoyed was so great and his unyielding nature so well known that La Marmora thought it best to leave him a free hand; thus he gave him the leadership over one of the four divisions which were to take the field, assigned to him his position on the nether Po close to Ferrara, and settled with him that they should mutually support each other by a strong demonstration if Cialdini crossed the Po or La Marmora the Mincio. But they came to no agreement as to what each was to accomplish and who was to be first to attempt the crossing of the river. Each privately reserved the honour for himself.

La Marmora himself commanded three divisions, which were composed of at least one hundred and twenty thousand men, under the leadership of Durando, Cucchiari, and Rocca. Cialdini's one division was at least as strong as two of the others put together; so that the Italian army consisted of more than two hundred thousand men. To these the Austrians under the archduke Albert could not oppose half the number; although the whole army of the south amounted on paper to one hundred and ninety thousand men, less than half of them, perhaps seventy-five or eighty-five thousand, had remained to take the field. Were it only on account of the smallness of this number, La Marmora believed that he had no reason to fear an attack; besides, Nigra announced from Paris on the 15th of July that the Austrians, as he knew on the best authority, would shun a battle. Notwithstanding the vigorous protest of the king, who was keenly sensible of the danger of this supposition, on the 23rd he resolved to cross the Mincio and to leave Cucchiari to observe Mantua on his right, to push with the left wing, Durando's, between Peschiera and Verona, and to advance the centre (under Rocca) towards the west and across the Adige, that he might there join hands with Cialdini, who intended to cross the Po during the night of the 25th.

The Battle of Custozza

Those in the Italian camp had no idea that at this moment Archduke Albert, with the whole of his army, was already on the uplands eastward from Peschiera to Verona, and ready for the battle. The preparations to convey the army quickly across the Adige into this position had been all made with the greatest secrecy, and the measures had succeeded perfectly. The edge of the chain of hills reaches from Valeggio on the Mincio northeastward to Sommacampagna and thence northward to Bussolenga on the Adige, just at the south of Sommacampagna. Villafranca lies in the plain; midway between Sommacampagna and Valleggio is Custozza, on the Tione, a rivulet which here cuts through the upland and runs onward into the plain. Durando and his division had marched north from Valeggio into the upland and were having a fight with the Austrians which somewhat scattered his forces. They did not allow him to cross the Tione, and finally threw him back on the Mincio. The most important and hottest fight and that in which success varied most took place at Custozza, which was several times taken and lost. Whilst the fight at this place was at its fiercest, the greater part of Rocca's corps was close by to the southeast, near Villafranca, which it had reached early in the morning on its way from Goito. However, after having sustained a tremendous charge of the Austrian cavalry, it remained idle the whole day, in spite of the pressing entreaties of Bixio, who commanded one of the divisions, and of the crown prince Humbert, that they might be permitted to strike a blow.

Towards evening, and after the Austrians had taken Custozza by storm, a second attack upon Villafranca was attempted. The Italians repulsed it, but were now compelled to abandon their position and with drums beating marched back to the Mincio. In the afternoon La Marmora himself had entirely lost

his head; he left the battlefield and went to Goito, two miles and a half from Custozza. It is said that the king had opposed his orders and was perhaps even responsible for Rocca's inaction.

Painful as this defeat must have been to Italian pride, the loss was not great. One only of the four corps was beaten; the three others were entirely or almost entirely unweakened. The enemy's loss amounted to scarcely two hundred—less than that of the Italians. In a total of some eight thousand this is not saying much; besides, the Austrians would feel the diminution much more than their opponents. There was no need whatever for La Marmora to retire farther than the western bank of the Mincio, and if he gave orders to withdraw behind the Po he was chiefly induced to do so by anger. Cialdini had announced that, after the unfortunate issue of the battle at Custozza, he, for his part, would remain on the southern bank of the Po, and that he had begun to effect the return of the troops which had crossed. On more mature consideration, and when it was known that the archduke Albert was not advancing, the retreat was suspended and the army remained at Oglio. Cialdini, who had gone back to Modena, also returned to his former position; and at Parma, on the 29th of July, he personally promised the general in command that he would once more do all in his power to cross.

Notwithstanding this, La Marmora refused to retain command of the army. Meanwhile Cialdini would not accept it. Thus dissension and confusion reigned in the Italian camp and the Austrians were at liberty to withdraw their troops from Venetia unmolested and unobserved by the enemy, and to lead them to join the army of the north. When, after the battle of Koniggratz, the command to do this was issued from Vienna, the Italians were so far away from the enemy that with the best will in the world they would no longer have been able materially to hinder it.

Napoleon's Intervention (1866 A.D.)

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the retreat of the army of the south naturally implied the renunciation of Venice; for it was to be expected that the Italians, when informed of it, would follow, and even cross the frontiers of German Austria. There was only one means of preventing this, and Francis Joseph availed himself of it. On the 5th of July he ceded his Italian possessions to the emperor Napoleon, and asked him to mediate a peace between him and Victor Emmanuel, not meaning peace with Prussia too; on the contrary, he now intended to fall upon this enemy with all his force and hoped that Napoleon would be on his side in the struggle. But the French emperor was neither prepared nor disposed for war. Thus he only accepted the Austrian invitation under the condition that his mediation should also extend to Prussia. He took as a basis the propositions which he had brought forward in his letter of the 11th of July, and since in these the maintenance of Austrian influence in Germany and (excluding Venice) the integrity of the Austrian monarchy were declared for, Francis Joseph consented, well persuaded that Prussia would refuse to submit to those conditions and thus still force the emperor into a war.

The rejoicing which broke out in Paris in consequence of the turn affairs had taken was on a vast scale. The streets were resplendent with decorations in tricolour. The emperor's triumph was celebrated by a brilliant illumination of the capital—the servile newspapers boasted of the glory and power of France in the most extravagant tone. Napoleon himself hastened to inform Victor Emmanuel of the event. Thus on the 5th he telegraphed: "The Italian army has had an opportunity of showing its valour; therefore further bloodshed is useless, and by agreement with me Italy can easily obtain Venice. I

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am writing to the king of Prussia to propose to him, as well as to your majesty, an armistice which may serve as a preliminary to negotiations for peace."

This news was like a thunderbolt to the sense of honour of all patriotically disposed Italians. Venice was to be united to the mother country, not as having been won by her own strength, but as a present at the hands of a powerful protector; peace was to be concluded, not at the price of her own blood, but by the betrayal of Prussia. To La Marmora himself it was extremely painful that Napoleon should prevent the advance of Prussia at the cost of the honour of Italy. He called it degrading to receive Venice as a present from France, and feared that by this step the army would lose all prestige and Italians would become ungovernable. Even on the 5th itself, Visconti Venosta had it plainly declared in Paris that Italy would not suspend hostilities without the consent of Prussia, and skilfully took advantage of the opportunity to add that the surrender of southern Tyrol was also required. Ricasoli, burning with shame at the thought of the part he was being asked to play, was even determined on war with France, if, as the French diplomats were threatening, the latter were to regard Venice as her own property and forbid the entrance of the Italians; for which purpose, as the French ambassador is said to have scornfully declared, all that was needed was the despatch of one corporal and four men.

In honourable fashion expression was at once given to these resolutions. On the 5th of July itself, Cialdini was ordered to attack the *tête de pont* at Borgoforte on the south bank of the Po, and the following night compelled its evacuation. During the night of the 8th three bridges were thrown across the river, and early in the morning began the crossing of eighty thousand men. The despatch of Garibaldi to Hungary was also resolved in the council of ministers, though this plan was never executed. Cialdini had now to endeavour at any cost to overtake the retreating Austrians; but this was a difficult task, and with the utmost efforts it could only be fulfilled in so far that Medici came up with the enemy on the 21st of July to the north of Bassano, and hurled him back in triumphant battle. At the same time Garibaldi with his volunteers invaded the Tyrol from the western side of the lake of Garda, and the two generals hoped to join hands in Trent.

The Sea-fight at Lissa (1866)

The fleet also was tested to the utmost; within eight days, so Ricasoli demanded of Admiral Persano, the enemy's fleet must be destroyed and Istria occupied. Not without reason did he calculate on a brilliant victory over the Austrians by sea. Enormous sums, about 300,000,000 francs, had been expended on the fleet during the last five years, and twenty-four ironclads could be opposed to the enemy's seven. The Italian fleet was also superior to that of their adversaries in wooden steamboats; only in regard to sailing vessels did the latter have the advantage. But in these triumphant calculations they forgot that number is of much less consequence on sea than on land. They were ignorant of the unpardonable carelessness with which the equipment of their own fleet had been carried out; they did not know the indefatigable attention with which Tegetthoff, the opposing admiral, had studied the lessons of the American war, and how he had trained his men to the resulting new style of warfare. From admiral to sailor, from captain to engineer, each individual man in the Austrian navy was drilled in a fashion quite different from that followed in the Italian, and the superior mobility and adaptability of the ships which was thus acquired practically doubled their number. Thus Tegetthoff was full of bold self-confidence; as early as the end of June he had appeared before Ancona and vainly challenged Persano, who lay there,

to fight. Now he was watching from Polat for the moment when the enemy should give him an opportunity to fight. Persano did not dare to attack him there. When ordered by Ricasoli to put an end to his inaction, he turned towards the island of Lissa, attacked its fortresses on the 18th and 19th of July, and endeavoured, though without success, to land troops there. On the 20th, when he had thus spent the greater part of his coal, he received the news that Tegetthoff was approaching.

In three "wedges"—first the seven iron-clads with the flagship the *Max* at their head, then the large wooden ships led by the *Kaiser*, and last of all the smaller vessels—the Austrians advanced towards the enemy's fleet, which was drawn up in two long lines. In the first row there were twelve ironclads, forming three groups, separated by large spaces; the second, at a considerable distance, was composed of the wooden ships. The middle group was led by the *Re d'Italia*, Persano's flagship, but the admiral himself was not on it; he sailed on board the smaller *Affondatore* towards the hindmost wedge of the Austrian ships, though without accomplishing anything there. Tegetthoff, on the other hand, broke through one of the intervening spaces and attacked the centre group from behind. He threw himself with four ironclads upon the *Re d'Italia*, to whose assistance came only the *Palestro*, whilst the wooden ships of the Italians timidly held back and the other ironclads were wholly occupied with the Austrian wooden vessels. When he had thus surrounded the enemy's ship on all sides he suddenly bore down broadside against her with his *Max* and made a huge rent in her side. In a few minutes the sea rushed in and the proud vessel sank with her whole crew.

The *Palestro* did indeed manage to get away, but a shell had set her bunkers on fire; the flames spread and reached the powder magazine. In vain did the captain order his men to leave the vessel in time; like himself, the sailors chose to perish with their ship. A terrific explosion announced the moment at which brave men met an heroic death. Though the *Kaiser* caught fire and was compelled to retire, no ship was lost on the Austrian side. Tegetthoff brought his vessels safely through the enemy's ranks and took up his position with Lissa behind him. Persano, however, hastened, as fast as his coal supply permitted, to return to Ancona, and in the harbour lost even his *Affondatore*, which was sunk under very suspicious circumstances. Thus the battle of Lissa was a much more distressing defeat than that of Custoza, and the disappointment reacted in so discouraging a manner, whilst the state of the fleet was besides so deplorable, that the ministers could find no admiral who would venture a second attack at sea.

Preliminaries at Nikolsburg

The Prussians, in the mean time, had duly profited by their victory. On the 5th of July, after an armistice which Gablenz had requested on the 4th had been abruptly refused, the advance began which, on the 6th and 7th, brought the victorious armies across the Elbe. The Silesian corps under Mutius alone remained behind to watch Königgrätz and Josephstadt. The occupation of Prague and the north of Bohemia was assigned to the Mülbe reserve corps, which was coming up from Saxony. The crown prince marched on Olmütz, Frederick Charles on Brünn, Herwarth on Iglau. These movements were not interrupted by Napoleon's offer of mediation. By the night of the 5th of July it had reached the king; and, like that addressed to Victor Emmanuel, it included a proposal for an armistice. If France was not to be driven straight into the Austrian camp, there could be no question of an abrupt refusal. The king therefore immediately replied that he himself had no real objection to offer to the French proposal, but that he must first be

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assured of the assent of Italy and of Austria's approval of the principal Prussian demands.^j

The king of Prussia nevertheless continued to march on Vienna by Olmütz, Brünn, and Iglau. The army of Italy had been recalled with the conqueror of Custoza, the archduke Albert, who had been appointed generalissimo; and it was concentrating on the left bank of the Danube. On the 18th of July the headquarters of the king of Prussia were transported to Nikolsburg, ten miles from Vienna. Resistance was difficult; Albert had only twenty thousand men, partly organised, to oppose to the Prussian armies, increased by reinforcements to two hundred and forty-six thousand. On the 26th the preliminaries of peace were signed at Nikolsburg.^a

AUSTRIA AFTER KÖNIGGRÄTZ

The day of Königgrätz was a turning point in the history of Austria. On it not merely the Austrian army, but also Belcredi's suspension policy, had suffered a decisive defeat. "Away with this system!" was the general cry of the German press, which would no longer allow itself to be silenced, even by the state of siege. The government's demands for the straining of every nerve for the fatherland met only passive resistance or defiant disobedience. The agitation in favour of the constitution began in the hereditary countries on the 7th of July with an address of the Salzburg municipal council requesting the summons of the Reichsrath. Vienna answered the imperial manifesto of the 10th with the petition that the capital might not be exposed to the dangers of a contest, but that in regard to governmental and political conditions those changes might be introduced which would be calculated to give men's minds security for the future. But Belcredi would not give way so easily. An address of the Viennese municipal council in favour of a change of ministry received a sufficiently ungracious answer. Indignation increased the more. Above all, it was evident that there was no way out of the situation without a reconciliation with Hungary.^k

But it was in vain that Deák wrote on the 17th of July in *Naplo*: "Hungary's desire is immediate peace; the perilous position of the monarchy brooks no delay. A considerable part of the empire is overrun with unfriendly forces; only Hungary has remained free. But Hungary is dead. With Hungary everything, or at least much, may be done. But Hungary can do nothing for herself; her hands are tied. To untie them, and once more to reinvest the land with life, a constitutional government is needed, and nothing else. If Hungary is still to be of real use to the monarchy, it can only be by having at her head a government which shall be the outcome of the national will and in which the nation shall have a guarantee of its rights."

The day after, the old man himself travelled to Vienna, to consult with Belcredi as to the advisability of appointing a responsible ministry. All in vain! The originator of the September patent stood like Archimedes in besieged Syracuse, face to face with the impending catastrophe, beneath which the foundations of the monarchy were loosening and the whole structure giving way in every straining point; none the less full of delight that, peace being concluded, no one under the protection of the state of siege could disturb the circle of his doctrines of suspension.


On September 23rd the Peace of Prague with Prussia had not only registered the surrender of Venice, but also, in direct opposition to Bismarck's proposals at Brünn, had proclaimed the complete exclusion of Austria from Germany and stipulated for a war indemnity of 40,000,000 thalers, of which the half at least would be reckoned for Austria's claim on Schleswig-Holstein and for the free maintenance of the Prussian army until its departure. Ac-

According to Article 4, Austria was obliged to give her consent to a new construction of Germany without taking into account the imperial state; to recognise the northern alliance, and acquiesce in the agreement that the states south of the Main should join in an alliance—further explanation of the national connection of the latter with the northern alliance to be reserved between the two parties.

Ten days later, on the 3rd of October, the “union of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom with the kingdom of Italy” was sanctioned by the Peace of Vienna, Austria thus publicly declaring her official recognition of the fact. According to Article 5, Italy assumed the whole remainder of the debt of Monte Lombardo-Veneto, as it stood, which had been left to Austria at the Peace of Zurich, as well as the payment of 35,000,000 gulden of silver according to the reckoning of the Venetian share of the national loan of 1854. Count Belcredi, however, found that from these two treaties of peace nothing had resulted save that there was one province less.

Like Benedek’s world-historic “plan” during the war, the minister’s plan for the reorganisation of the monarchy now faced biting ridicule with despairing resignation. Easy though it was for the count to wrap in impenetrable mystery a plan amounting in the end to an utter want of plan, nevertheless two points shone like stars from out the darkness of the night. Belcredi believed that he had finally rid himself on the flat plain of Königgrätz of the suspended constitution, and, according to his own reckoning, he now needed less than ever to trouble himself about the German burghers. The official paper took a high tone: “Whilst the centralists hold by the constitution of February, no one will deal with them; should they give it up, they would still have no right to demand that they should be met.”

The Germans recommended to the generosity, the tender mercies, of the Czechs and Slavs! The Germans represented as the sole victims of the day at Königgrätz—they who had, on the contrary, brought to the Slavs and the reigning clique dominion over the monarchy as a princely post-nuptial gift! The conclusion of the preliminaries of peace and the proclamation of the state of siege in Vienna had scarcely been allowed by the government to get abroad, and the tongues of the German Austrians were scarcely gagged, when ministry and Slavs both prepared to cook their own soup at the devastating fire which had run through the empire. From the 9th to the 11th of August a meeting arranged by the leaders of the Czechs took place in Vienna in the hotel *Zur Stadt Frankfurt*—a meeting that chose pompously to christen itself a “Slav congress”; but, to Belcredi’s great vexation, it only demonstrated the utter impossibility of getting the Slav races under one hat, to say nothing of throwing them into the scales as a make weight in favour of a united state, as against the pretensions of the Magyars.^h





CHAPTER V

THE DUAL MONARCHY SINCE 1866

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DUALISM (1866-1868 A.D.)

THE whole world believed that the decree had been passed for the final dissolution of the Austrian Empire, the complete effacement of what was, far more than Italy, a geographical expression. The *finis Austriae* was echoed in all appreciations, even the most indulgent. Nationalities detesting one another and aspiring in the chaos towards autonomy; an alarming financial and commercial crisis; Germanism and Panslavism begging, each on its own account, for the spoils of the vanquished of Königrätz; the army humiliated; discouragement; the small sympathy of the modern world, which saw in the crown of the Habsburgs the symbol of absolutism, of clericalism, and the oppression of the peoples,—all seemed to be conjured up to render Felix Austria the most unhappy of countries. All the constitutional forms which had been applied to her had successively failed. Their enumeration was a long one: constitution granted by the emperor Ferdinand, April 25th, 1848; constitution granted by Francis Joseph in May, 1849, and revoked by the patent of the 31st of December, 1851; absolutism of Schwarzenberg and Bach; diploma of the 20th of October, 1860, returning to the constitutional régime; timid federalism of Goluchowski; centralist liberal constitution of Schmerling of the 26th of February, 1861, suspended by the manifesto of the 20th of September, 1865; federalist essays of Belcredi repulsed by Hungary and contemporary with the crisis of Königrätz. What was there left to try? There remained only the dualism desired by the Hungarians, who had become the arbiters of the empire's destiny and were well aware of the fact.^b

On the 30th of October a new man, the Saxon minister Von Beust, who had become more than dispensable at Dresden, entered the anti-German "count's ministry" (*Grafenministerium*).

The first thing to do was to satisfy the more important half of the realm, namely, Hungary. On the 19th of November the provincial diets, with the exception of that of Transylvania, were opened; but the Hungarian provincial diet of Hungary was informed by an imperial rescript of the main idea of the government in the understanding which was to be arrived at. "The

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country now stands on the threshold of the fulfilment of its wishes," the rescript ran; it offered the appointment of a responsible ministry for Hungary and the establishment of the municipal self-government of the country; the unity of the imperial army, of the customs system, of the indirect taxation were to be preserved; concerning the state debts and the finances a compromise was to be effected. It was announced that in the other provinces also—they were comprehended after the name of the little river which at one place forms the boundary between Hungary and the duchy of Austria, under the designation Cisleithania—the "system of responsible government" must come into force, which was indeed a necessity. In the December of that year Beust himself went to Pest in order to come to an understanding with the leaders of the Deák party. That the government at Vienna, where it was the custom to do everything either too soon or too late, should have wished to grant by an ordinance of the 31st of December, before the reconciliation of Hungary, a general obligation to bear arms, was a folly for which Beust was not responsible and which at once proved itself impracticable.

The ministers persuaded the emperor to summon an extraordinary Reichsrath to conclude the negotiations with Hungary, but Beust's influence induced



VON BEUST (1809-1886)

him to abandon this policy; on the 4th of February Belcredi was dismissed, Beust became minister-president, and the February constitution was restored with the narrow Reichsrath. Hungary now received a responsible ministry, with Count Julius Andrassy as the first prime minister.

The Reichsrath met at Vienna on the 22nd of May, 1867. In the beginning of June it presented to the Crown an address demanding a revision of the February constitution and the completion of the reconciliation with Hungary. On the 8th of June the ceremony to which the Hungarians attached so much


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importance took place at Buda, and amidst all the pomp Francis Joseph was crowned with the crown of St. Stephen. The reconciliation was sealed by the grant of a general amnesty. Kossuth alone refused to take advantage of this act of grace; he protested against the attitude of the Deák party with which the agreement had been made, and preferred to remain in exile till his death, which took place at Turin in 1894.^{ac}

The Reichsrath at Vienna developed an energetic legislative activity. The double task of the year, the establishment and completion of the February constitution and the conclusion of the Ausgleich with Hungary, was successfully accomplished. Before the close of the year, on December 21st, the emperor sanctioned the "fundamental law of the state," which dealt with the representation of the kingdom, the rights of the citizens of the state generally, the establishment of a supreme imperial court of justice, the exercise of governmental and executive power, and the treatment of the affairs affecting all the provinces of the Austrian monarchy, which completed the February constitution in a liberal spirit; and at the same time the difficult and tedious Ausgleich negotiations with Hungary were brought to a conclusion in specific laws. The two halves of the empire were to have common interests as to foreign affairs, war, and, to some extent, finance; and accordingly for these affairs three "common" ministers were appointed (December 24th): Beust, as imperial chancellor for foreign affairs, John, as minister of war, and as finance minister, Von Becke. The four parliamentary bodies of the two halves of the empire appointed Hungary forty and Austria forty delegates, and these delegations were to meet annually, now in Vienna, now in Buda, to control the conduct of common affairs in parliamentary fashion, and to grant the necessary funds. The Ausgleich laws were accepted by the representative bodies in Vienna and Buda. Sanctioned by the emperor the same day as the four "fundamental state laws" of Cisleithania, they formed with them a whole, and accordingly we have now to distinguish in the Habsburg monarchy between Hungarian, Cisleithanian, and common affairs.

By the Ausgleich Hungary had received the lion's share. The country had obtained everything that it could reasonably desire—more, perhaps than it could bear: amongst other things it was at liberty to create a debt of its own; but the first attempt in this direction was not to be an entire success, when the Hungarian minister of finance, ignoring the great money centre, Vienna, addressed himself immediately to the foreign exchanges; not half of the intended railway loan was subscribed for. Transylvania, abandoned by Vienna, was entirely incorporated with the crown of St. Stephen. The German population of the country boldly continued the difficult struggle for their own peculiar civilisation against the Magyar supremacy, the Rumanians were dreaming of their own nationality and future, as were the Poles, the Serbs, etc.

With Croatia an Ausgleich after the pattern of that of Austria-Hungary was concluded in November, 1868; by its terms the Croatian deputies joined the Hungarian diet; but the question of the position of the coast town of Fi-



FRANCIS JOSEPH (1830-)

ume, concerning which no agreement could be arrived at, was reserved. The reconciliation once effected, the relation of the king remained undisturbed in accordance with the chivalrous and loyal character of the nation; the Hungarians were especially gratified to find that the "queen" felt more at home in their country than in Vienna. The majority of the returned refugees also attached themselves honestly and zealously to the king. They could do so the more easily when Francis Joseph, at the end of that year (1868), sanctioned the law which gave the country its own *Honved* or militia army with an archduke, Joseph, as commander-in-chief. The speech from the throne, with which Francis Joseph in person closed the diet, extolled the integrity of the realm of St. Stephen, and the official designations—Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria, king of Hungary—left no doubt of the recovered independence.

It was the party of Deák which had won this victory and continued to dominate the situation. On the 17th of December their leader, the most influential of the Hungarian statesmen, gave utterance to a phrase which gained double weight from the fact that he from whose lips it came had never voiced a different language: "The existence of Austria is as important to us as ours is to Austria"; and in an election speech in the beginning of 1869 Count Andrassy pointed out with still more emphatic eloquence how advantageous to Hungary the *Ausgleich* was. The elections of March, 1869, were also in favour of this party. In the new parliament they had a majority of 90 votes, 30 of them Croatian. Nevertheless, the opposition, which still considered the connection with Vienna too close, had increased from 120 to 170 votes, and the increase had come mainly from the Magyar comitats themselves. On the 23rd of April the king opened the new diet with a speech in which, with much justice, stress was laid on the necessity of internal reforms. With such reforms, school laws, interdenominational laws, abolition of corporal punishment, judicial reform, municipal laws, the now pacified country busied itself; in 1870 a loan of fifteen millions was granted for the purpose of beautifying the capital so that it might not be inferior to Vienna. In a certain sense the centre of the empire was now in Buda.^c

THE REVOCATION OF THE CONCORDAT (1868 A.D.)

On New Year's Day, 1868, the Bürgerministerium, the first parliamentary ministry of Cisleithania, came into office under the presidency of Auersperg. Its first task was to alter the condition of subservience to the Roman church produced by the concordat of 1855. By May it had won the passing of three laws: restoring the civil laws concerning marriage, in place of those of the Catholic church; circumscribing the influence of the clergy in educational matters; and regulating to the disadvantage of the Roman church questions concerning the religion in which the children of mixed marriages were to be educated, conversions to other denominations, etc. These laws, which virtually abolished the concordat, evoked an indignant protest from Rome, and the higher clergy in Austria itself exhorted their flocks to resistance; but this action, far from resulting in an abolition of the laws, roused a strong counter-agitation, and in 1870 the government formally repudiated the concordat.^{ac}

STRUGGLES OF NATIONALITIES WITHIN THE EMPIRE

The ill-will and malice of the higher clergy was only one hindrance among many, and was so formidable only because it was partly united, partly in alliance with the resistance which the separate nationalities opposed to the constitutional state of Cisleithania.

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It was only in the few purely German provinces that the *Bürgerministerium* possessed a firm support. Even of these the Tyrol offered resistance, for here the dominant ecclesiastical influence was joined to narrow provincial patriotism. The officials and the small liberal party, which counted for something only in the few towns of the province, did not form an effectual counterbalance to the sheer weight of ignorance and superstition which burdened the masses. In Galicia, where, in the last case, the Ruthenian population could be counted on against the Polish, conclusions were once more tried in September, 1868, when a visit of the emperor with a great following had just been announced. The provincial diet adopted an address and a "resolution," which declared against the revised constitution and against the fundamental law of December, 1867, and advanced a claim for a very comprehensive autonomy for the "kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria and the grand duchy of Cracow." The imperial governor, Count Goluchowski, offered only a lukewarm opposition: a telegraph message was sent to the effect that under these circumstances the emperor, whom here also they affected to call the "king," had given up his visit to the country.

Far more serious was the state of affairs in the provinces of the crown of Wenceslaus, especially in Bohemia. Here the hatred of the Czechs was aroused by the assurance that the one and a half million Germans were far superior in prosperity and culture to the two and a half million Czechs. A characteristic token of this national hatred, which drove into the background all other feelings, even those of religion, was the pilgrimage which in July of that year a company of Czechs made to Constance, in order to celebrate in that city the anniversary of the death of Huss, the great heretic, in whom they honoured, not the forerunner of the Reformation and the first martyr in the struggle against a false church, but the enemy of the Germans. As a rule their demonstrations were not so harmless. Already in January, 1868, on the occasion of a visit of the new minister, Herbst, to Prague, the most excited tumults had arisen, and the Germans had had to be protected by an appeal to arms. Every opportunity, as for instance the laying of the foundation stone of a Czech national theatre, had been the signal for similar demonstrations.

It was a graver matter when the over-polite Baron von Beust in a moment of weakness allowed himself to be drawn, on the occasion of a journey of the emperor to Prague, into negotiations with the Czech leaders, behind the back of the minister-president. The views of the Czech party found their sharpest expression in what is known as the Declaration, which the Czech members of the provincial diet caused to be handed to the German majority by three of their number and which bore eighty-one signatures. They set forward under ten heads the view that the relation of Bohemia to its "hereditary king" was a mutually binding legal relation, which could not be altered by one side (as had been done in the February constitution); that no representative body outside Bohemia (as the Viennese Reichsrath) had the right to dispose of Bohemia's rights in her name; that therefore they, before committing themselves to any sort of recognition of the situation created by the *Ausgleich* with Hungary, demanded an agreement between the king and what was, politically and historically, the Bohemian nation; their conviction was that of the Bohemian-Slav nation throughout the provinces of the Bohemian crown, a nation which counted five million souls. The corresponding party in Moravia made the same declaration to the Moravian provincial diet under date of August 25th, asserting the rights of this marquisate; against which claims Silesia, the third province belonging to the "historical" crown of Wenceslaus, protested (19th of September).^c

The following exposition of the aims of the Slavs, set forth by one of their own writers, shows how wide-reaching their projects were:^a

A CZECH'S DEFENCE OF SLAVISM IN 1867

It would be really too absurd seriously to impute it to these people as a crime that they should feel themselves to be Slavs and that they should wish to be thus recognised. The Slav finds himself and his future only in Slavism, exactly as the Saxon and the Prussian find theirs only in Germanism. Therefore the Slavs have made it a dogma that whatever the idiom to which they may happen to belong they will never deny their Slav parentage.

Panslavism, regarded as an idea of our epoch, was never, as a matter of fact, anything but a problem against which the idealogues of all the Slav tribes will break their heads, with perhaps as little success as that of the learned men of old in the search for the squaring of the circle or the philosopher's stone. Nevertheless, these problems of the Middle Ages have given a salutary impulse to men's minds, and therein consists the essential moral value of this idea, nowadays turned into a heresy and almost impossible to realise.

As a political question this word designates to us Slavs a problem whose solution the most idealogical and ardent among us reserves for the most distant future. The work of literary Panslavism is, however, a work of preparation, which is still wholly indirect and which will not fail to turn to the advantage of the whole aggregate of civilisation. There is an endeavour to take advantage of everything which is healthy in the national elements in order to combat the heterogeneous, worn-out, and corrupt elements. An attempt is being made to annul from the literature the divorce which exists between nature and intellect, and to struggle with united forces against the social misery which native and foreign despots have managed to spread amongst the numerous Slav tribes. By a purely scientific necessity, and partly against their will, the Slav philologists have opened for themselves a way to a mutual understanding. Antiquarians and historians have of necessity met and saluted one another half way. The consecration of poetry could not be wanting to this fraternisation, and, as elsewhere, the poets have been followed by philosophers rich in ideas—philosophers who, in harmony with the past and present of the Slavs, each one, be it understood, in accordance with his own personal point of view, have endeavoured to construct for them a new future.

In this manner there has come into existence quite naturally a phalanx of energetic and sympathetic men, who nevertheless exist in Slavism only as a party. Doubtless we cannot refuse to the men of this party a merit which permits them to outstrip others in the field of science; but they are pure theorists only, and the Slavs are careful not to recognise in them more than a mediocre influence on politics and social life. It is only in a domain entirely ideal that their activity is of any importance.

But Slavism, as a political lever, has, above all, the merit of being a means of defence against individual interests. Each section of the Slav peoples has passed through important historic periods. Mighty branches have been separated from the trunk under the pressure of the centuries, and even for science the question of how far the ancient frontiers of the Slav domain once extended is still one on which little light has been thrown. Whatever the past, the residue of the Slav nation is still sufficiently great and sufficiently important; and as there are, even at this hour, branches of that family which are compelled to wrestle for their existence with foreign and hostile elements, it is natural that they should endeavour to escape the fate of those of their brothers who are already lost, and to try all that is possible to safeguard their nationality. Their position, which is entirely defensive, merits, then, the more esteem as they do not endeavour to enrich and aggrandise themselves by spoliation.

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Hitherto the efforts of Slavism have had an essentially civilising character. The western Slavs are even the natural intermediaries and interpreters who are to initiate their eastern brothers into the enlightenment and the ideas of the epoch. Then only will Europe be able to congratulate herself on having escaped the dangers of the new stagnation with which she is evidently menaced. So long as we had not entered on this path we were reproached with being in a lethargy, and treated as barbarians. But since these barbarians have been endeavouring completely to divest themselves of such remains of barbarism as they may still retain, the alarm is sounded throughout the camp, and the cry is everywhere raised—"To arms!"

That such a proceeding endangers only the outposts of Slavism is an evident fact. But the progress of civilisation will none the less continue its march in all the Slav countries; and when a certain maturity shall have been reached, the emancipation of the Slavs through the whole extent of their country will meet with no further obstacles. And for this the Slavs need neither tutelage nor advice. Where there is something for us to take in the domain of foreign civilisations we are the first to appropriate it, and we are only fulfilling our duty if in this natural process we consider our needs and our social relations.

But since it is acknowledged that it is nothing but the dread of a great Slav state which makes the Slavs appear dangerous, we on our part will not hide our frank conviction on this head. With a Slav empire on the one side, France on the other, what will become of Germany? cry the wise prophets. She will remain what she is, we reply without irony; she will remain the fair empire of central Europe, the refuge of speculative science, the *rendezvous* for the literature of the world; only she will be more concentrated politically, more elastic in her social advance, and her free people will place itself in more friendly relations with other free peoples than it has been able to do to this present day when, servile itself, it can awe only those who are still more servile.ⁱ

PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY

In face of difficulties like these, and of other difficulties, to describe whose details no human pen possesses sufficient endurance, the new constitutional machine laboured under every sort of hindrance and obstacle. Already in the year 1868 the discussion of the budget had almost produced a ministerial crisis; but finally the financial law was accepted. Thus while the Reichsrath was wasting its breath the seventeen provincial diets deliberated from August to October. An excess of parliamentary tumult echoed through the empire, once so still; and on the 17th of October the Reichsrath resumed its labours in a difficult debate on the military law which settled the war strength of the army at eight hundred thousand men for the next ten years. The ministers had to bring all their influence to bear to pass this measure, and Von Beust especially displayed as a deputy all his arts to show how reassuring was the situation, which was at the same time so little reassuring that it called imperatively for such an army; the minister Berger summed up this political position by saying that at this moment France was struggling to cross the Rhine, Prussia the Main, and Russia the Pruth; while Italy desired to have a piece of Trentino, and even Rumania had an eye on a convenient bit of Austria."^c

The pressure of a strong Left party in the house of deputies, the federalistic opposition of the provincial diets, the struggle with the bishops and their followers, proved too much for the government. Auersperg resigned and was replaced by Taaffe. After this change had been effected, the Reichsrath was closed (May 15th). But the difficulties with the nationalities continued.

The new law concerning military service required the inhabitants of southern Dalmatia, who had hitherto been exempted from that duty, to serve in the militia. The Bocchese, or inhabitants of the district round the Bocche di Cattaro, rose in rebellion, and, the first attempt to quell the rising having failed, quiet was restored only by an agreement which granted all their demands. But Taaffe's proposal for a conciliatory policy towards the nationalities generally was rejected by the emperor. Taaffe withdrew from the ministry and the measures taken by his successors only rendered the situation worse.

The protest of the Polish deputies against the attempts to curb their independence took the form of a simple refusal any longer to attend the deliberations of the diet; and in this they were imitated by the Slovenes and the deputies from Görz, Trieste, Istria, and Bukowina, so that the rump parliament which they left was now almost wholly German. It was now decided to adopt a conciliatory policy, and a ministry under Count Potocki was appointed to execute it.^{ae}

The Potocki cabinet, whilst pressing the constitution of December, 1867, tried to elaborate a project which might prove satisfactory to federalism. The upper chamber was to be composed of members elected by the diets, the Reichsrath of members nominated by direct election; the nationalities would have received some satisfaction. These good intentions remained without result. The advent of the Franco-German War still further complicated the situation. Austria was not, from the military point of view, in any condition to afford aid to France and demand of Prussia satisfaction for Königgrätz; she left the preponderance in her government to the Germans, who applauded the success of their Prussian compatriots and celebrated the glory of the new Germany through the medium of journals inspired from Berlin. The Magyars for the most part rejoiced over the victories of Prussia; let the absorption of Cisleithania into a greater Germany be once accomplished, and they would have their hands free to realise all the dreams of Hungarian ambition. It was under these circumstances that the emperor thought himself called upon to summon (February, 1871) to the head of affairs a cabinet designed to assert a federal policy.

Bohemia and the Fundamental Articles

Count Charles Hohenwart, governor of Upper Austria, introduced into this cabinet two Czechs, Jireček in the department of education and Habětinek in that of justice. This fact alone indicated the spirit which was to animate the new ministry; it was evident that the first thing was to satisfy Bohemia. But the task of the Hohenwart ministry was a very difficult one; the Germans had to be deprived of the supremacy which the existing organisation of the electoral system incontestably assured them. A struggle must be begun with the Teutons within and without. One of the chiefs of the German party exclaimed in the Reichsrath itself: "To concede to Bohemia what is granted to Galicia would be to reduce two millions of Germans to the position of the Ruthenians. But it must not be forgotten that these Germans are the blood relatives of a great neighbouring people." Another orator said, "We have not conquered at Sedan to become the helots of the Czechs." Certain newspapers compared Bohemia to Schleswig, and made very plain allusions to Prussia's rôle of liberator.

Nevertheless the minister set to work valiantly: he opened negotiations with Rieger and Palacky, the political chiefs of Bohemia, and laid before the Reichsrath a new law which enlarged the powers of the provincial diets and granted them the initiative in matters of legislation. This bill was of course rejected. A little later he presented a special bill concerning Galicia which

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sanctioned the chief points of the Resolution (of 1868). Questioned as to whether he intended to propose analogous measures for other provinces, he frankly exposed his programme: he declared that if Bohemia could rest satisfied with the concessions which he was preparing for Galicia he would not hesitate an instant to offer them to her.

This was the signal for a general outbreak. The Germans in the Reichsrath voted an address to the emperor (May 26th), declaring that the cabinet had not their confidence. The sovereign answered by proroguing the two Viennese chambers. On the 12th of August the Reichsrath was dissolved and the provincial diets were convoked for the 14th of September following. On the other hand, official negotiations were opened between Vienna and Prague. Rieger, whose rôle in Bohemia was analogous to that of Deák in Hungary, elaborated, in agreement with Count Clam-Martinitz, the programme on which the definitive reconciliation of Bohemia with the constitutional régime was to be concluded. The sovereign and the minister showed themselves to be prepared for the most important concessions. On the 14th of September the diet of Bohemia was opened by a message or royal rescript; this time the Czechs, who had been absent for several years, again put in an appearance, and—thanks to the new elections, in which for the first time the government had not tampered with the suffrages—even in spite of the Schmerling electoral system, they had a majority. The rescript of the 14th of September promised the recognition of the rights of the kingdom of Bohemia with the coronation of the sovereign, and invited the diet to make it known by what means an accord might be established between the kingdom and the rest of the monarchy. “Recognising the political importance of the crown of Bohemia,” said the emperor, “mindful of the splendour and glory which that crown has lent to our predecessors, and full of gratitude for the fidelity with which the Bohemian nation has supported our throne, we are ready to recognise the rights of the kingdom and to review that recognition by the coronation oath.”

The diets of Bohemia, Moravia, and Carniola welcomed this declaration with enthusiasm, while it excited violent indignation on the part of the Germans. A bill establishing a new electoral system and a law concerning the nationalities were presented to the diet of Prague. The German deputies at once protested, and left the hall of session. Nevertheless a commission was appointed to elaborate the final programme on which to base the relations of the kingdom of Bohemia with the rest of the Austro-Hungarian states. This programme was epitomised in the Fundamental Articles, which the diet voted unanimously; it sent them to Vienna and adjourned to await the sovereign’s answer.

According to the Fundamental Articles Bohemia, like Hungary, was to be represented for all the common affairs of the empire by a delegation nominated by the diet of Prague and no longer by the Reichsrath. She was to treat with the other Cisleithanian states only by the intermediary of her delegates. She obtained complete autonomy and recognised as affairs common to the whole monarchy only war, diplomacy, and commerce. A senate composed of members appointed by the emperor was to adjust the disputes which might arise between the different kingdoms or provinces. Finally the representation of the towns and rural communes was to be considerably augmented—an arrangement which would have assured to the Czech nation the preponderance which belongs to it in the kingdom in virtue of history and statistics. The diet of Moravia gave its approbation to the Fundamental Articles and demanded the institution, or rather the re-establishment, of a special chancellor for the countries of the crown of St. Wenceslaus. The Slavs of the monarchy ardently desired the success of a policy which, by drawing Austria towards federalism, would put an end to the German and Magyar hegemony.

On the other hand the programme of Rieger and Clam-Martinitz excited

to the highest degree the self-love of the Germans and Hungarians. The Hungarians dread Slavism, for they know that the emancipation of the Slavs of Bohemia, Carinthia, and Carniola would give the Serbs and Slovaks a moral strength which might at any moment be turned against the Magyar dominators; as to the Germans of Austria, it is a very small number of them which desires to put into practice the celebrated axiom of Francis II: *Justitia erga omnes nationes est fundamentum Austriæ*. Many of them look for a greater Germany, and ask nothing better than the annihilation of that Czech nation which obstinately rears its head between Vienna and Berlin, and which is, as has often been said, a thorn in German flesh (*ein Pfahl in deutschen Fleisch*).^d

AUSTRIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

For the first four years, while Beust was chancellor, the foreign policy was still influenced by the feelings left by the war of 1866. We do not know how far there was a real intention to revenge Königgrätz and recover the position lost in Germany. This would be at least a possible policy, and one to which Beust by his previous history would be inclined. There were sharp passages of arms with the Prussian government regarding the position of the south German states; a close friendship was maintained with France; there were meetings of the emperor and of Napoleon at Salzburg in 1868, and the next year at Paris; the death of Maximilian in Mexico cast a shadow over the friendship, but did not destroy it. The opposition of the Hungarians, together with financial difficulties, probably prevented a warlike policy. In 1870 there were discussions preparatory to a formal alliance with France against the North German Confederation, but nothing was signed. The war of 1870 put an end to all ideas of this kind; the German successes were so rapid that Austria was not exposed to the temptation of intervening—a temptation that could hardly have been resisted had the result been doubtful or the struggle prolonged. The absorption of south Germany in the German Empire took away the chief cause for friction; and from that time warm friendship, based on the maintenance of the established order, has existed between the two empires. Austria gave up all hope of regaining her position in Germany; Germany disclaimed all intention of acquiring the German provinces of Austria.^e

Numerous interviews, of which the Gastein baths were most frequently the pretext, afforded an opportunity for exchange of ideas. It was observed that, in the summer of 1871, these interviews had been very numerous at Ischl, Salzburg, and Gastein. There on several occasions the emperor of Austria had met the German emperor, and Bismarck had interviewed Andrassy. Thus all the German and Magyar influences were united to baffle the hopes of Bohemia; the emperor Francis Joseph thought himself obliged to give way before this coalition. The ministry made a first backward step by declaring that the Fundamental Articles would be submitted to the next Reichsrath; for those who know how that assembly was composed the result of such an expedient could not appear doubtful. Rieger, on a journey to Vienna, put forth a supreme effort to secure the execution of the engagements undertaken by the sovereign. Less fortunate than Deák, he failed. On his return to Prague he was the object of a warm ovation. A singular spectacle was then offered to the world: the Hohenwart ministry resigned (November, 1871); Von Beust, for reasons still not fully known, was relieved of his functions as chancellor, and charged with the ambassadorship in London; Andrassy, the leader of the Hungarian cabinet, was appointed in his place, and thus the Magyar preponderance in the councils of the monarchy was secured.^d The following sketch of Andrassy's policy shows to how great an extent this was so.^a

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Count Julius Andrassy had taken an active share in the re-establishment of Austria in that position as a great power which was closely connected with the dualism; and, in defending this work by the advice he gave to the king, had filled the part of a factor of the first rank. But since the Franco-German War the confidence which he inspired in the king of Hungary had given him the decisive word; from that time he had been the true ruler of Austria-Hungary. It was on the 14th of November, 1871, that appeared the royal autograph which removed Julius Andrassy from the premiership, and appointed him minister of the ruling house and of "common" foreign affairs. The title of chancellor, which does not appear in the *Ausgleich*, he did not assume, and with this title vanished the last traces of Austria's traditional policy; a new period began, where already breathed the spirit of constitutionalism in which, when the barriers hitherto existing should have been torn down, the union of Hungary's interests with those of Austria as a great power might result.

This harmony of interests was of great assistance to Count Julius Andrassy in the realisation of the great plan which he had already announced during his premiership; he wished to convince the monarch that it was not in the West but in the East that Austria had to guard her interests, and in the service of these interests he sought to bring about a permanent alliance with Germany and thus to put an end to the isolated position of Austria-Hungary. Already before this he had been able to take the first step towards the execution of his plan.

Prince Bismarck was well aware that it was not to Beust but to Julius Andrassy that he owed the neutrality of Austria-Hungary. Emperor William and his chancellor were anxious to make the personal acquaintance of the Hungarian statesman; consequently, when, in August, 1871, Emperor William had completed his cure at Gastein, he requested Francis Joseph to present Andrassy to him. The presentation took place at Salzburg. It was here that Andrassy first met Bismarck and here that he began to weave the first threads of the friendship which the efforts of these two great minds towards a common aim afterwards rendered so firm and lasting. The situation of Europe, but also the circumstance that Austria-Hungary perceived her interests in the East, made an alliance with this state, whose interests did not clash with those of the German Empire, very desirable for Germany. It was just at this point that the interests of the two states met, and, since neither of them was planning conquests, but each was merely anxious to confirm the existing state of affairs and secure her own interests, both made their aim the preservation of peace.

With this object, in order to attain to an alliance with Germany, Andrassy endeavoured first of all to arouse confidence in the neighbouring courts. Germany's confidence was already won, but Russia showed a certain aversion for Austria-Hungary: this aversion must be overcome. Then, too, it was a question of awakening confidence, and the more since Andrassy was well aware that the friendship of Germany could only be obtained if he were successful in winning Russia's confidence. Already the latter had rendered Germany great services on two occasions; she could not lightly turn her back on so useful an ally. But if Austria-Hungary could bring Russia's confidence to the point at which she herself stood in her relations to Germany, then the conclusion of an alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary would be only a question of time; for between two equally friendly powers Germany must prefer as an ally Austria-Hungary—who, like herself, wished only to secure existing conditions and protect her own interests; whilst Russia was bent on acquisitions in the East, and by her eagerness for conquest might easily bring about a European coalition against herself, which it was not, however, to the interests of Germany to forward, since the latter was only anxious to preserve peace.^f

DUALISM IN TRANSLEITHANIA

On the 8th of October, 1867, Hungary opened the subscription list for her first national loan of 150,000,000 francs for the purpose of extending her network of railways. On the 1st of February, 1868, for the first time, the new mechanism of the delegations entered on its functions. The Hungarian delegation sat at Vienna, side by side with the Cisleithanian delegation, and proved, especially in the discussion of the Army law, very tempestuous and very sensitive.

In Hungary itself party strife was very keen. To the Deákist party, whose chief rôle was that of conciliator, and which had the majority, three vigorous parties were opposed: (1) the Left, under the leadership of Keglivicz and Jókai, having for its organ the newspaper called the *Hon* (the "Country"); (2) the left Centre, more constitutional, led by Tisza and Ghyezy, and with the *Hazunk* (the "Fatherland") for its organ; (3) the extreme republican Left, having at its head Bészœrmenyi and Madaraz, and for newspaper the *Magyar Ujsag* ("Magyar News"). On the 25th of March, 1868, the Left and left Centre signed an agreement to afford each other mutual assistance, with the object of obtaining the triumph, by constitutional means, of a programme including the suppression of the delegations and the common ministry and the separation of the army. Great excitement was raised by the election of Kosuth by the electors of Fünfkirchen; Bészœrmenyi was condemned to a year's imprisonment for having published a letter of the celebrated outlaw. Notwithstanding this, the diet ratified his election on the 4th of April; but he did not come to take his seat.

The dream of the ultra-Magyars was that the Hungarian army should be separated from the Austrian army and commanded in Magyar exclusively by Magyar officers. The Army law was therefore discussed with animation, and Deák and Andrassy had constantly to remain at the breach in order to procure its vote on the 8th of August, 1868, by the table of deputies, and on the 11th of August by the table of magnates. On the 23rd of June a law dealing with public education took teaching completely out of the hands of the clergy. The financial laws and a law concerning the comitats were also voted, and on the 9th of December, 1868, the diet separated after having accomplished a truly enormous mass of legislative work. The second meeting of the delegation took place, this time at Pest, from the 16th of November to the 4th of December. During this time Francis Joseph had resided at Buda. The end of the year saw the Ghyezy party drawing near to the Deákists and the Tisza party to that of Jókai.

The elections for 1869 were made with an incredible ardour mingled with corruption and violence; there were sanguinary struggles, arrests, murders. Generals Klapka and Türr, exiles who had profited by the amnesty of 1867, protested against such disgraceful proceedings. The Deákists carried the day, though they lost about thirty votes; there were 270 of them in the parliament which opened on the 23rd of April, whilst the Left had 110 votes and the extreme Left 60. The strife of parties was reproduced in the discussion of the address; each brought forward one of its own, but that of the Deákists was voted on the 3rd of June. A judicial organisation was then voted. The delegations met for the third time, and at Vienna. The Hungarian parliament adjourned on the 22nd of December till the 14th of January, 1870.^b

The Magyars displayed a savage energy against the nationalities sacrificed by the Ausgleich. "The Hungarians," M. Laveleye has remarked, "perceive little besides what is conformable to their desires; towards what is contradictory to them they are blind." The Croats were far from being satisfied with

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the conditions it was intended to impose on them; in 1866 their diet had voted various resolutions declaring that Croatia had abandoned nothing of her autonomy, that she had no intention of sending representatives to the Hungarian diet, but would treat directly with the sovereign. They had refused to send their deputies to the parliament of Pest; the Magyar conquerors had compelled the diet of Agram to dissolve a first time in January, 1867—a second time in May, 1867. This diet refused to vote the proposals drawn up at Pest and protested against the annexation to Hungary of the port of Fiume, which was disputed between the two kingdoms. Bishop Strossmayer,¹ the soul of the opposition, who afterwards so distinguished himself at the Vatican council [where he opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility], had been exiled. A doubtful personage, compromised in shady speculations, had been imposed on Croatia as *locum tenens banalis*. The Hungarian government had recourse to a means which recalls the proceedings of Schmerling: it modified the electoral system of the diet and thus obtained a sort of rump parliament with a majority favourable to its designs.

This artificial majority concluded with the Magyars a treaty which could have only a provisional character and which had afterwards (1873) to be revised. The Croats sent thirty-one deputies to the parliament of Pest—they had no responsible minister at Pest; at Agram the ban exercised the executive power; the finances of Croatia, with the exception of a sum of 2,200,000 florins reserved for the needs of the country, had to be returned to the Hungarian treasury. Doubtless Croatia enjoyed a certain autonomy; but she was sensible of the deep injury she had received by the manner in which the diet had been modified, by the personality of the ban that had been imposed upon her, by the persecutions inflicted on all the organs of the national party. Such was the terrorism which reigned at Agram that the independent newspapers had to appear at Vienna. In 1873 Croatia obtained a more equitable arrangement and a responsible minister at Pest.

Whilst the Magyars were thus crushing the Slav or Rumanian nationalities, they allowed the Germans a free course. On the morrow of the Prussian victories, in 1871, there appeared at Pressburg a review whose tendencies were in favour of the German Empire. It bore the proud title of *Die Deutsche Wacht an der Donau* (the German guard on the Danube); it was the counterpart of the *Wacht am Rhein*. As a result of the agreement concluded in 1867, the Serb voivodeship was suppressed and the Serb countries were reincorporated with the kingdom of St. Stephen; the Hungarians spared no pains in the magyarisation of the country and affected to recognise the Serbs only as a religious sect; they imposed on them Magyar schools and unremittingly persecuted the Serb press.

The *Umladina*, a literary society of Serb students, the *Matica*, another society for the publication of Serb books, were the objects of severe measures. Amongst the Slovaks the spectacle was offered of gymnasiums closed, the *Matica* suppressed; Panslavism was the pretext generally advanced to justify these measures, which left behind them a profound irritation. The Rumanians were not more fortunate than the Slavs; on the 15th of May, 1868, they held, near Blasieu, the anniversary of the meeting which they had held for twenty years in the same place. They renewed the demand to be recognised as a nation, side by side with the Szeklers, the Saxons, and the Magyars [who form with them the population of Transylvania, but whose aggregate number is not equal to theirs]. The diet of Pest replied by an annexation pure and simple of Transylvania to Hungary.^d

¹ [In Csuday's *History of Hungary* Strossmayer is characterised as distinguished by profound insight, wide knowledge, and eminent talent for oratory, but, above all, by boundless ambition.]

Hungary from 1871 to 1875

But discord was everywhere—amongst the Magyars themselves, where the Deák party and the Left could not agree; and between the Magyars and their subjects, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Rumanians. The Deák party had proposed that general elections should take place only once in five years, instead of once in three. It calculated that, as the dualistic compact, the *Ausgleich*, had to be renewed in 1877, it would then be master of the situation; whilst if the Left were to triumph at the general elections of 1875, it would be that party which would be in power at the time of the renewal. An attempt was made to effect a compromise between the two parties, but it failed. The Deák party maintained itself in power only by the vote of the thirty-one Croat deputies, as at Vienna the constitutional party only prevailed in the Reichsrath, thanks to the Galician vote.

When Lónyay, the head of the Hungarian cabinet, saw that the Croat nationalist party had won the day in the Croatian diet elected in 1871, he hastened to dissolve that diet at its first sitting and to direct fresh elections, with the intention of either seducing the national Croat party by concessions or, if he failed, of obtaining at Pest the vote of an electoral reform depriving more than one hundred thousand electors of the right to vote and extending the duration of the mandate from three to five years. The Left manœuvred to prevent these two bills from coming under discussion, by causing each of its members to make a long speech on each of the one hundred and four articles of the bill, so as to prolong the discussion till the 19th of April—the date at which the last sitting of the Hungarian diet must take place. Count Lónyay was a manipulator provided with a giddy speed. He had attained to the ministry in spite of Deák and never had any consideration in the parliament, but he was agreeable to the court.

His hand weighed heavily on the Serbs and Croats. He decreed the dissolution of the Serb congress (July, 1872), and appointed Grūjic, bishop of Pakracz, metropolitan. A new congress was convoked, to which General Molinary was despatched as royal commissioner, and on the 21st of August he in his turn dissolved the assembly.

During this time the elections to the Hungarian parliament had taken place (July), and the result was the return of 245 Deákist members and 145 for the Left. Miletitch now protested, in the name of the Serbs, against the autocratic proceeding of the Hungarian government. The Croatian diet, in which, in spite of the same proceedings on the part of the Magyars, the national party had got the better of the unionists, sent deputies to Vienna to demand the revision, by agreement with the Hungarian deputies, of Article I of the compromise of 1868; to which request the emperor consented.

On the 6th of September, 1872, took place that famous interview of the three emperors at Berlin, which was the subject of so many comments in the European press and drew the three courts close together in that alliance which the Eastern Question so much disturbed. Hungary only manifested through the delegations the more resistance to the increase of the war budget, so greatly did she fear lest Austria should allow herself to be tempted into interference in European affairs, which Transleithania, occupied only with her own concerns, did not admit. On the 18th of November an unprecedented scandal was produced in the diet: a member of the Left, Csernatonyi, denounced with so much energy as well as evidence the financial jobbery carried on by Lónyay, that the latter had to hand in his resignation.

He was replaced by Joseph Szlávy, the son of an Austrian major, and, like Andrassy, a participant in the insurrection of 1848, which had cost him five

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years in prison. But the system pursued with regard to the non-Magyar peoples was in no way altered by this event. In the first months of 1873 the diet of Agram, moved by the internal sufferings of the country, consented to conclude with the Hungarians a fresh compromise, which gave the Croats only very imperfect satisfaction, and the result of which was to deprive the Serbs and Rumanians of the assistance of Croatia during several years. The new compromise was voted on the 5th of September, by nineteen voices to ten.^b

Szlávy carried on the affairs of government for a short time only. The bad years [which followed on his accession to power], whose effect was still further heightened by wasteful management of the finances, plunged the country into a position of financial embarrassment and sowed the seeds of the discontent which the opposition, divided into two factions, the left Centre and the extreme Left, vigorously fanned with their speeches. The attack from this quarter induced Joseph Szlávy to hand in his resignation, whereupon the king intrusted the former minister of justice, Stephen Bittó, with the formation of a cabinet (March 21st, 1874). Bittó succeeded in persuading one of the leaders of the left Centre, Koloman Ghiczy, to accept the financial portfolio. The new minister took up with great energy the task of regulating the financial conditions, and introduced numerous reforms in direct and indirect taxes on land, houses, incomes, business profits, stamps, salaries, sugar, wine, meat, and the dues on tobacco; but with all this he could not win the left Centre for the government. The left Centre, now under the sole leadership of Koloman Tisza, continued its attacks on the government; the Deák party, which was still in the majority, could not shut itself away from the conviction that it must make concessions to the left Centre for the welfare of the country, whilst the latter party perceived the necessity of abandoning the policy it had hitherto pursued and uniting with the Deák party. Thus was brought about what is known as the "fusion," by which the greater part of the Deák party was amalgamated with the left Centre into one as the liberal party, the consequence of which was Bittó's resignation (February 14th, 1875). The king now commissioned Baron Béla Wenkheim to form a cabinet, and the ministry of the interior was taken over by Koloman Tisza (March 3rd, 1875).^f

Four months later the restraining hand of the great Hungarian statesman, Francis Deák, was removed by death. Hungary was at this time face to face with a deficit of 35,000,000 gulden, and the new ministry made every effort to turn to the best account the resources of Hungary herself. A new loan was raised and the income tax increased. The renewal of the financial Ausgleich with Austria was to take place at the end of 1877, and Tisza endeavoured to take advantage of the occasion to obtain better terms for his own country. After a long struggle a compromise was agreed upon, which satisfied neither party, but was nevertheless accepted again in 1887 when the decennial renewal again fell due.

DIRECT ELECTION FOR THE REICHSRATH

When in 1871 German influence had called the Magyar Andrásy with his dualistic policy to take charge of the highest ministerial office in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the formation of the new Cisleithanian ministry was intrusted to the Carinthian nobleman, Count Adolf Auersperg. The federalistic policy was at once abandoned; the circulation of the manifesto which the emperor himself had signed, recognising the claims of Bohemia, was forbidden, and copies exposed in the streets were seized by the police. In the following spring the provincial diet of Bohemia was dissolved and the exertions of the

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Bohemian Germans, backed by the government, which did not scruple to gag the press, resulted in the return of a German majority at the ensuing elections. The indignant Czech minority refused to share in deliberations whose results must necessarily be contrary to their wishes, and the Germans consequently had it all their own way.

The Auersperg ministry now undertook a scheme designed to do away with the inconvenience of the constant struggles with the provincial diets. This was to deprive those diets of the right to elect the members of the Reichsrath, who were to be chosen in future through direct election by the people, the right of voting being vested in the electors for the provincial diets. The Poles headed the opposition to this measure, which was sharply contested; and when it was finally carried both they and the Czechs refused to vote. The Reichsrath was now dissolved, and a new one, elected on the new system, gave the administration a majority of 113.

Before these elections took place Austria's political troubles had been cast into the shade by a violent disturbance in the financial world.^a

THE VIENNA KRACH (1873 A.D.)

In consequence of the war of 1866 Austrian paper had suffered a considerable depreciation, though it was happily of short duration, thanks to the excellent harvest of 1867, which gave rise to a prodigious export of articles of food and in consequence a return of specie to the country, which soon recovered itself.

Moreover, the grant to the Hungarians of an independent constitution and the peace which had thus been made between Austria and Hungary, after the long centuries of social war between them, produced an era of commercial confidence and an extension of speculation which only served to corroborate the happy effect of the good harvest of 1867. Unfortunately, this period of prosperity was not to be of long duration; the exaggeration of the good hopes of the future which the Austrians had conceived and which was also a consequence of the satisfaction which they felt at having obtained a parliamentary constitution, engendered a perfect fever of speculation, culminating in the financial crisis or *Krach* of Vienna in 1873—a crisis whose memory has been preserved in the minds of the Austrians under the name of the “epoch of foundations,” because the whole activity of the speculators consisted in founding new financial establishments and inundating the market with their shares.

At first these operations were carried on seriously enough. Thus several great lines of railway were built which had a certain practical purpose and have rendered useful services to the country. But in a moment the foundations became wholly dangerous, for speculation was directed to the creations of banks, each of which set to work in its turn to form new establishments and factitious enterprises of every description. Now we learn from a report published in 1888, on the Austrian economical movement since 1848, that during the period from 1867 to 1873 there were founded at Vienna and in the provinces 1,005 stock companies, most of which failed in 1873. In this number are reckoned more than seven hundred banks. There were at Vienna at this time so many companies for the construction of business houses, and they had acquired so much ground, that in order to carry out their programme to the letter the Austrian capital would have had to increase its size to proportions surpassing the extent of London and Paris together. The frenzy reached its height at the moment of the preparations for the universal exhibition at Vienna in 1873.

A few days after the 1st of May, the date of the inauguration of the ex-

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hibition, all this beautiful dream vanished. As everyone wished to enter into the prodigious benefits promised, all began to sell the securities for which there were no longer any buyers. Stocks fell at a frightful rate, and on the 9th of May, 1873, a day distinguished in the economical history of Austria under the name of Black Friday, the factitious edifice of her new prosperity fell to pieces, burying under its ruins innumerable fortunes which had been honestly acquired. On that day the largest *comptoir de bourse* in Vienna, whose clientèle was composed of the wealthiest and most conspicuous Austrian aristocrats, failed. Two thousand other failures soon followed. At the exchange the market came to a complete standstill; no one wished to receive the stocks purchased the day before, and there was a chaos, a confusion, a general disorder, a despondency beside which the financial disasters which had occurred elsewhere were as nothing.

The same day the largest banks of Vienna formed themselves into a syndicate to constitute a grand committee of succour. Nevertheless, not one of the companies which suffered shipwreck on this occasion managed to reconstruct itself. In 1878 there were thirty-two at Vienna which had not yet finished the liquidation of their accounts. However, the new establishments were not all of a doubtful character: a few great banks created at this period survived the catastrophe, which had, as it were, merely given them the baptism of fire from which they were to emerge only more firmly established.

The extension of speculation has had one advantage—that of bringing into Austria's financial transactions a little modern life, activity, and impulse. In this point of view the *Krach* of 1873 was for that country a period of purification, and consequently a cause of new life. Since the establishment of the parliamentary system, the Austrian legislative body in concert with the government has made it its object to efface the evil effects of the crisis of 1873, to restore the equilibrium in the budget, and to raise the economic resources and the credit of the country. For this purpose the events of 1873 were the cause of a series of measures being undertaken with regard to the Exchange, with a view of preventing their recurrence—measures which, though they may have somewhat hampered speculation and the market, have been not the less salutary.^g

NEW CHURCH REGULATIONS (1874 A.D.)

The first months of the year 1874 were employed in grave discussion of bills presented by the Cisleithanian government and intended to determine the regulations of church and state in accordance with modern ideas and, it may be said, according to the principles which inspired at the same time the famous ecclesiastical laws at Berlin. These bills were presented to the Reichsrath on the 9th of March; the question in hand was the mode of regulating the nomination of ecclesiastical functionaries. Already, on the 2nd of February, Pius IX had addressed to the Austrian bishops an encyclical in which he condemned the denominational laws. Certain archbishops, those of Vienna, Breslau, and Salzburg among others, openly declared that they would not obey the new laws. Prince Auersperg on his side publicly announced that the government would know how to make itself obeyed, and returned a firm answer to the Vatican. The law, which the chamber voted by a majority of three-fourths, was adopted on the 11th of April by the upper chamber without modifications. Let it be noted that these laws were very moderate. They were submitted to. Pius IX even specially authorised the bishop of Linz to accept them; he had enough of the religious struggle in Prussia against Bismarck and Falk. The emperor sanctioned the new laws on the 8th of May.

THE FORMATION OF THE YOUNG CZECH PARTY

This same year saw the Young Czechs resolutely break with the policy of abstention, which, ever since 1867, had proved of such little use to the Old Czechs, without in any way abating the autonomist claims of Bohemia, but without giving up the hope of obtaining for the kingdom of Premysl a compromise, or *Ausgleich*, like that which the kingdom of St. Stephen had obtained. They declared in September, 1874, that they would take their seats in the provincial diet of Prague, that they would recognise the constitution of December, and that they would go to the Vienna Reichsrath to endeavour to win there a triumph for their ideas; this to the great scandal of the feudalists, like Thun, Belcredi, and Clam-Martinitz. The same month, on the occasion of the great military manœuvres of Brandeis, Francis Joseph made a journey to Prague, where he was received with enthusiasm, but where he refused to hear any autonomistic address. Already the Czechs of Moravia had taken their seats in the Reichsrath in the hope of bringing about a reconciliation on the basis of existing institutions. This did not mean a reconciliation with that German party which, while adorning itself with the title of *Verfassungstreue* (faithful to the constitution), looked to Berlin alone, aspired to lose itself in German unity, and considered Austria only as a refuge for the time being, in default of anything better.

The Serbs also received some satisfaction; their ecclesiastical congress was held in July at Karlowitz. This congress is the only national instrument which the Serbs possess; and it may be regarded as a large diocesan council, at which clergy and laymen take part together, which appoints the members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and administers the considerable funds of the churches, the foundations, and the schools.^b

AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In 1874 an insurrection broke out between the Slav peoples, Serbs and Croats, of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the causes of this revolt we need not look further than the disorders and excesses of the Ottoman administration. Austria, instead of wholly taking the side of the Christians and playing towards them the part of liberator, was paralysed by her internal dissensions and by the pressure brought to bear on her by her two powerful neighbours, Russia and Prussia. The Triple Alliance, which has its origin in the partition of Poland, was renewed and drawn closer on the occasion of the probable dismemberment of Turkey. In September, 1872, the three emperors had an interview at Berlin, and from that time the oriental policy of the three chancellors, Bismarck, Andrassy, and Gortchakoff, remained more or less uniform. Everyone knows that in this Triple Alliance the chief part was played by Russia and the third part by Austria. When in 1874 the cabinet of Vienna concluded directly with Rumania a treaty of commerce and a convention relative to the railways of the two states, the Porte thought itself called upon to protest against this violation of its sovereign rights. The three chancellors came to an understanding to refuse its claims. "The day will come," cried Arifi Pasha sorrowfully, "when it will be impossible for any human will to curb the torrent which the long series of violated treaties will unchain."

From the first the insurrection of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the cause of serious embarrassment to Austria; she had to propitiate at once the ill will of the Magyars and the anxious jealousy of her own allies. The Hungarians felt that the Slav race was already too numerous in the empire, and had small anxiety to see a new annexation increase the element which must one day submerge them. It was by no means to the interest of Russia and Prussia to

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permit their ally to widen her frontiers and increase her army of warlike populations. After 1874 Austria was observed alternately taking the most contradictory measures: at one time she permitted the Turks to violate her territory with impunity and ravage the frontiers of Croatia; at another she forbade them to disembark arms and troops in the territory of Klek. At Constantinople her ambassador, in conjunction with General Ignatiev, called on the Porte to accomplish those famous reforms which it is forever promising and never executes. The diplomatists who recommended them knew perfectly well that they were not realisable.

In January, 1876, a note from Andrassy summed up the wishes of civilised Europe. The conference which met at Constantinople (December 23rd, 1876) only served to demonstrate anew the impotence of diplomacy and the incorrigible obstinacy of the Porte. It was evident that the existing difficulties could be settled only by the sword. The declaration of war made to Turkey by the principalities of Servia and Montenegro still further increased the embarrassment of Austria-Hungary. The Slavs demanded that the government should take the field, and followed with feverish attention the phases of a heroic but fatally unequal struggle. The Hungarians neglected no opportunity to give vent to their hatred of the Servians and their sympathy with the Ottomans. A subscription was opened at Pest to offer a sword of honour to Abdul-Kerim Pasha, who had just won the victory of Djunis over the Servians. A Magyar deputation presented itself at Constantinople to exchange manifestations of an enthusiastic friendship with the officials and the *softas* (Mussulman students). General Klapka, the famous defender of Komárom, the same who not long before had offered his sword to Prussia against Austria, put his military experience at the service of the Porte. A little later the softas came to Pest to return their Magyar brothers the visit they had received from them. The sultan, to evidence his gratitude towards the Hungarians, sent the emperor-king some fragments of the Corvina library, which had fallen as spoil to the Ottomans. These manifestations, puerile enough after all, were especially directed against Russia, whom the Hungarians could not forgive for the part played by Nicholas in 1849; but they deeply angered the Slavs, who identify their cause with that of the Servians and Bulgarians.

At Pest Andrassy endeavoured in vain to restrain his fiery compatriots and make them understand that street demonstrations could not bring about a modification of the external policy of the monarchy. The Hungarian ministry, far from calming popular passions, associated itself with them. Andrassy caused the arrest of the Servian Stratimirovitch, one of the heroes of the insurrection of 1848, who had offered his sword to Prince Milan Obrenovitch; he threw into prison the journalist deputy Miletitch, who was accused of having desired the victory of his compatriots and negotiated a loan for their cause. To justify these strange measures old laws were appealed to, which declared guilty of high treason those who furnished arms to the Ottomans and other infidels!

Thus the monarchy, divided at home, dragged itself painfully along in the wake of its two powerful allies; in spite of the enthusiasm of the Slavs and the indignation of the Magyars, it had to look on quietly at the successes of the Russians, who, after the fall of Plevna, led their victorious troops to the gates of Constantinople. The Treaty of San Stefano, afterwards modified in some of its clauses by the congress of Berlin, proclaimed the independence of Rumania, Servia, and Montenegro, and increased the territory of those principalities. Bulgaria was erected into an autonomous principality, subject to the nominal suzerainty of the sultan and the effective tutelage of Russia.^d

Powerless as Austria might be to pursue an independent policy, she nevertheless contrived to derive considerable advantage from the situation.^e

The Treaty of Berlin (1878 A.D.)

In accordance with secret arrangements made before the war, Austria was to receive a compensation in exchange for her benevolent neutrality. This compensation was the mandate which was given her at the Treaty of Berlin (July, 1878) to occupy the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina "to restore order." It was from these provinces that had proceeded the signal of the insurrection which had set the whole Balkan Peninsula in flames and which had provoked the victorious intervention of Russia; they might fancy that, the Porte once conquered, they, like Bulgaria, would be erected into autonomous provinces, or perhaps annexed to the congeneric principality of Serbia or of Montenegro. They had no suspicion of the fate which was reserved for them. The preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, signed the 3rd of March, 1878, between Russia and Serbia, simply decided the application to them of "the ameliorations proposed by the conference of Constantinople with the modifications to be decided in agreement between the Porte, Russia, and Austria-Hungary." The Treaty of Berlin, which was signed the 13th of July following, by the representatives of all the great powers in congress, promulgated another decision.

"The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina," ran Article 29, "shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The government of Austria-Hungary not wishing to undertake the administration of the sanjak of Novibazar, which extends between Serbia and Montenegro in a southeasterly direction and to beyond Mitrovitza, the Ottoman administration will there continue to exercise its functions. Nevertheless, in order to secure the maintenance of the new political situation as well as the freedom and safety of the routes of communication, Austria-Hungary reserves to herself the right of keeping a garrison and having military and commercial roads throughout this part of the old vilayet of Bosnia."

This last clause of the article was very important. The sanjak of Novibazar is that part of Bosnia which divides Serbia from the principality of Montenegro. Now the government of Vienna was deeply interested in the isolation of the two Servian principalities, both enlarged by the Treaty of Berlin, and which at a given moment might intend to join hands in order to act together against the Osmanli. Henceforth, common action, whether against the Turks or against so powerful a neighbor as Austria-Hungary, was manifestly impossible. Austria holds Montenegro by the Bocche di Cattaro, Serbia by the Danube.

On the other hand the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina utterly annihilated the hopes of the patriot Servians or Montenegrins, who had dreamed of reconstituting the empire of Czar Donchan for the benefit of a Slav sovereign. This empire might have become a centre of attraction for the Slav provinces of Dalmatia and Croatia and for the Serbs of Novi-Sad and Temesvár. Austria, therefore, in stifling in their germ these hopes of the great Servian party, was exercising a serious danger. The disappointment at Belgrade and Cettinje was profound. Many patriots would willingly have sacrificed the aggrandisements granted to the two principalities by the Treaty of Berlin on the sole condition of seeing the *statu quo ante bellum* pure and simple re-established in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So long as the two provinces remained in the possession of Turkey it was possible to apply to them the principle *Adversus hostem æterna auctoritas*. Pretexts to intervene for the deliverance of their Slav brothers had not been wanting to the Servians and Montenegrins, but they failed from the moment that Austria took it upon herself to introduce the principles of religious toleration, equality of races, and European administration.

[1878-1880 A.D.]

The Austrian government was no sooner invested with the mandate which it had induced the Berlin congress to confide to it, than it prepared to execute the mission. On the 31st of July and the 1st of August, 1878, the troops commanded by Field-marshal Joseph Philippovitch crossed the Save and penetrated into the new domain of the empire. It was expected that the occupation would be accomplished without a blow; but unexpected difficulties were encountered. It was not without regret that the Bosnian Mussulmans who were the feudatories of the country had seen the severance of the ties which bound them to their co-religionists of Constantinople; they could not with a light heart give up the conditions by which they had profited for centuries, nor reform the abuses to which they owed their prosperity. The orthodox Christians regretted their delayed or lost hopes of union with the Serb countries; the Catholics alone could welcome the Austrian occupation with real sympathy.

For the purpose of occupying the two provinces, a complete army corps and one division of infantry were set in motion. The Turkish government could not officially refuse to obey the commands of Europe, but it privately sent arms, ammunition, and provisions to the Mussulmans of the two provinces. Bands were organised under an intrepid and fanatical chief, Hadji Loja. All able-bodied men between fifteen and sixty-two years of age were enrolled. A revolution broke out at Sarajevo; a provisional government was formed to resist the foreign occupation. Its leader was Hadji Loja, who took the title of "first patriot of the country." The Austrians had crossed the Save without meeting with any resistance; but as soon as they reached the first defiles they encountered well-armed troops who showed great skill in taking advantage of the natural obstacles with which the country is bristling. They saw themselves repulsed at Maglaj, at Gradačac. They ascertained that they had in front of them not only improvised militia but also twenty-six battalions of the Turkish army, and that it was no question of a military promenade. The Bosnians were even in possession of artillery.

There were moments when the Austrians found themselves in a very critical situation. In most cases the natives abandoned the towns, which could not have held out against the hostile cannon, and took shelter behind natural defences, whence they inflicted considerable losses on the army of occupation. The latter left more than five thousand men on the field and was obliged to send for reinforcements before advancing. Sarajevo was not reached till the 19th of August. But the fall of the capital of Bosnia did not bring with it the cessation of hostilities. The war continued in the mountains. Herzegovina was not finally occupied till the end of September, and Bosnia only by the end of October. To secure its possession three army corps had been sent and 62,000,000 florins expended.

The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it seems to have only a provisional character, is evidently considered by Austria-Hungary as a definitive conquest. If the sultan remains virtually the sovereign of the two provinces, it is Austria-Hungary who administers them, and she certainly has no desire to restore them to their former master. They open to her the route to Saloniki, they offer vast outlets to her commerce, they permit the establishment of easy communication between Hungary and Dalmatia—in short, they constitute an honourable compensation for the loss of Venetia.

It was evident that the new province could not be adjudged to either Hungary or Cisleithania; it had no right to send representatives to the parliament of Vienna or to that of Pest. It is therefore governed in the name of the emperor-king, by the minister of the common finances.^d

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE (1883 A.D.)

In 1885 a war broke out between Servia and Bulgaria, when Austria, which had acquired a paramount influence in Servian politics, interfered to stop the victorious advance of the Bulgarian troops. Nevertheless, when Russia subsequently forced the resignation of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, the strong sympathy manifested in Hungary for the Bulgarian cause compelled the Austrian government to announce that it would not permit Russia to interfere with the independence of Bulgaria; and when a successor to Alexander had at last been found in Ferdinand of Coburg, then a lieutenant in the Austrian army, the favourable attitude assumed towards him by Austria at one time (1886-1887) seemed to threaten to lead to an invasion of Galicia on the part of Russia. This danger was, however, happily averted by the action of Germany. Andrassy's dream of an alliance with the German Empire had been realised in 1879 in a treaty negotiated by him, but not actually signed till after his resignation. In this agreement the two powers agreed to unite to maintain the *status quo* as established by the Treaty of Berlin, Germany also undertaking to assist Austria in case of an attack by Russia, while Austria pledged herself to render the same service to Germany in case of her being attacked by France and Russia together. Italy had acceded to the treaty in 1883, and this Triple Alliance was now (1887) resumed and its terms were published. In 1891 it was again renewed for twelve years.^a

The accession of Italy to the [Triple] Alliance increased the isolation of Russia, to whom but one ally now remained—the French Republic, which was inspired by a boundless hatred for Germany and which meditated a war of revenge. In politics the idea of revenge was identified with Gambetta, in the army with the future commander in the war, General Chanzy; but after the death of Gambetta on the 31st of December, 1882, and of Chanzy on the 4th of January, 1883, more peaceful days began in France also. The idea of revenge has not indeed even yet been entirely abandoned, offensive action has only been delayed because European conditions are not yet favourable to it; but Russia is fully determined not to submit to the existing state of affairs, and, partly for the sake of winning back the advantages once already obtained in the East, partly with the object of directing abroad the attention of the nihilists who are daily becoming more dangerous, she has several times been on the verge of declaring war.^f

AUTONOMY

The strenuous opposition of the Hungarians to the oriental policy of the central government was a main cause of the fall of the liberal ministry of Auersperg, who handed in his resignation in February, 1879. The presidency of the cabinet was now assumed by Stremayr; but the ruling spirit was Count Taaffe, the minister of the interior. The liberal party was defeated at the elections, and Count Taaffe formed a ministry of members of all parties, which was known as the "ministry of conciliation." It failed of its effect. The liberals' unwise opposition to an army bill ended in their defeat, and this dealt the final blow to the constitutional party. Taaffe was obliged to rely on the support of the clerical party and on the Poles and Czechs, and consequently he was unable to avoid making concessions in the direction of that federalism which was their cherished object. In 1880 an ordinance was passed which obliged officials in Bohemia and Moravia to transact government and law business in the language of those with whom they had to deal; and the result was

[1883-1884 A.D.]

the resignation of many German officials. The attachment to their own nationality of the different sections of the population in Bohemia and Moravia increased, and with it the bitterness between Germans and Czechs. Within the last two decades the proportion of Czechs to Germans in the city population had greatly increased. At Prague, a city in whose population the German element had once preponderated but in which the Czechs had now won an increasing majority, the Germans found themselves exposed to acts of violence against which the authorities afforded them little protection.

In 1883, on the dissolution of the provincial diet of Bohemia, the Czechs hoped to secure a two-thirds majority which might bring about a readjustment of the electoral law in their favour; but this design came to nothing. More successful was the project of reconstituting the chambers of commerce at Prague, Budweis, and Pilsen so as to give the Czechs the preponderance—a measure which derived its importance from the fact that the chambers sent several members to the provincial diet; but when the minister of commerce was proceeding to follow this up by similar measures in regard to the Brünn chamber of commerce, he was met by such protests, both in the house of deputies and from the Hungarian press, that he had to give way.^a

The same course which was pursued in Bohemia and Moravia was also followed in all the other provinces of the crown where Germans and Slavs dwelt side by side. In the provincial diet of Carinthia the Slovenes acquired a majority; even in the purely German provinces, like Upper and Lower Austria, Slav elements began to appear. A spirit of gloom and bitterness took possession of the German Austrians. Nevertheless, they also roused themselves to resistance. Since their adversaries had especially attacked the German schools, they founded, in 1880, the German School Union, with the object of preserving the scattered German islands of their nationality, and opposing the further retreat of Germanism by founding and preserving German schools in the endangered communities. Supported from the German Empire by considerable supplies of money, the union succeeded in stopping in many places the further downfall of Germanism, in spite of every imaginable hindrance which the Slavs, generally supported by the authorities, sought to put in their way. In the parliaments also the German Austrians bestirred themselves. The two clubs of the constitutional party, that of the liberals and the Progress Club, let their party differences rest, constituted themselves, one hundred and fifty strong, as the “united Left,” and declared it to be their task to rally round the banner of Germanism and to persist in legal resistance to the Taaffe ministry. For that it was impossible in Austria to form parties according to political views, and that the whole party grouping could only follow national tendencies, was taught by the small success of Count Coronini’s attempt to found a club of the left Centre, which declared its good will towards all the nationalities and its independence of the government without regular opposition.

It was with the object of opposing a dam to the rising Slavonic flood that Count Wurmbrand introduced into the house of deputies in January, 1884, a motion to request the government to bring forward a law by which, while German was to be retained as the state language, the employment in office, school, and public life of the language in common use in the province (*Landsübliche*) should be ordained. The motion aroused an extremely excited debate, which lasted five days, and it was finally rejected by 186 to 155 votes. The whole Right, including the five ministers, voted against it. A like fate awaited the motion of Herbst for the revocation of the language ordinance of the 19th of April, 1880. In consequence of these two rejections the members of the united Left considered the question of their withdrawal from the house of deputies. What finally decided them not to quit the scene of the contest

was the circumstance that Vienna and its environs had been laid under exceptional laws in consequence of the anarchist crimes; for so profound was the distrust of the Taaffe ministry that they feared lest this measure might be turned not merely against anarchists but also against obnoxious political tendencies, which would then have field for free speech only in this house.

But the harmony amongst the Germans did not last long. They split up again into a German-Austrian club and a German club representing a "more rigid shade of opinion," the chief spokesman of which was the deputy Knotz; from this again fifteen deputies under Steinwender separated themselves, *à propos* of the Jewish question, under the name of the German National Union, and it was not till 1888 that they all found themselves together again as the united German Left. In Bohemia the insupportable character of the national feud—which had recently been manifested, at one time in what is known as the Lesc Kvičala, a bill to forbid the attendance at German schools of Czech children; at another, in a new language ordinance of the minister of justice, Pracak, dated the 23rd of September, 1886, in accordance with which the supreme court of justice at Prague was ordered to despatch all causes handed in in Czechish without translation—led the Germans to believe that the only solution was the administrative division of Bohemia into two parts according to nationalities.^h

However, two motions introduced into the provincial diet, one for the formation of German administrative and judicial circles, and another to give the Czech language an official equality with German, even in German Bohemia, were alike rejected; whereupon the German deputies left the hall and refused to take any further part in the proceedings of the diet. In the Viennese house of deputies an attempt to secure the recognition of German as the state language was frustrated.^{ah}

Matters had already gone so far that in 1885 the address from the house of deputies, in reply to the speech from the throne, indicated "the organic development of the autonomy of the provinces of the crown" as the object to be desired. Greg, the leader of the Young Czechs, did not hesitate to declare frankly that "the future of the Czechs lies on the Volga." But these centrifugal tendencies were most strongly expressed at the two opposite poles—in Galicia and amongst the Italians. Since 1848 the Austrian Poles had laboured to make Galicia the kernel to which the Prussian and Russian Poles might in some sort attach themselves, and from which insurrection might spread to Posen and Warsaw; and the authoritative favour which they enjoyed facilitated their endeavours to form a Polish state within the state, from which even the German official language was to be ousted and in which the three millions of non-Polish Ruthenians were to count for nothing. Even in the matter of material advantages they allowed themselves to reckon on the support afforded them by the Taaffe ministry, and meditated a preference in their own favour and at the expense of the German provinces in the new regulation of the territorial taxes. Less than ever did the Poles of Galicia feel themselves to be Austrians.

Italia Irredenta

On the opposite side, in the south, the brutality with which the Slavs laboured for the oppression of the Italian element daily supplied the *Italia irredenta* with fresh nourishment and an appearance of justification.^h

The term *Italia irredenta*, or unredeemed Italy, was used to designate those Italian populations which were even now not included in the kingdom of Italy, and hence also the party which was in favour of their union under the government of the Italian peninsula. In Italy itself this party was very strong, and its opinions found an echo not only amongst the Italian-speaking subjects

[1885-1887 A.D.]

of Austria in Tyrol, Görz, Istria, Trieste, and Dalmatia, but also in the Swiss Ticino, the French Nice and Corsica, and in the British island of Malta. The congress of Berlin, while it had conceded to Austria the acquisitions of Herzegovina and Bosnia, had apportioned no corresponding advantages to Italy, and the irredentists, now headed by Garibaldi, began an agitation with the object of inducing the Italian government to permit the occupation of the Austrian provinces of Welsch-Tyrol and Trieste. There were riots in the districts in question and the Austrian government set troops in motion; but the occupation did not take place. For some time the Italian government made no attempt to suppress or even discourage the movement, but in 1881 the French occupation of Tunis made clear to the Italians the advantage of friendship with Austria; the government set its face against irredentism and eventually joined the two imperial powers of Germany in the Triple Alliance.^a

The efforts of the Slavs towards decentralisation and federalisation were gradually striking at the nerve centres of the imperial state. The Poles grew louder in their demand that the direction of the Galician railway should be transferred to Lemberg, whilst it was the opinion of the Czechs that it should follow that of the Bohemian railways to Prague. Vienna threatened more and more to sink into a provincial town, and, what was far worse, the unity of the army seemed likely to be destroyed. In the year 1885 the minister of war, Count Bylandt, could not hide from the delegations his patriotic anxiety lest the process, going on in so many of the provinces of the crown, by which the schools were losing their German character, might be injurious to the army; for in case of war a knowledge of the German language was an unqualified necessity for the non-commissioned officers, and the unity of the army was essentially connected with the unity of the German word of command. A memorial of the deputy Von Dumreicher pointed out that of the volunteers serving for one year about 60 per cent. failed to reach the rank of an officer, chiefly for lack of a knowledge of the language, and that even of those 40 per cent. who passed many had not sufficiently mastered the language of the service to understand and execute a simple order. In face of such conditions the Czechs could not, at the discussion of the Army law of 1888, avoid giving their votes to the provisions which made a knowledge of German compulsory for officers.

But if the German Austrians of Cisleithania had to sustain in defence of their nationality a struggle which was fertile in defeats and losses, the Germans beyond the Leitha saw themselves a prey to the fanatic hatred of the Magyars. In Hungary the whole school system was mercilessly magyarised; the German school union was opposed by a Magyar one whose tendency was not protecting but conquering. In the year 1869 there were in Hungary, according to a statement of the minister of education, Trefort, 5,819 popular schools in which the Magyar language was employed, and 1,232 where German was spoken; in 1884 the former had increased to 7,933; of the latter 676 were left. The prosperity of the German secondary schools of Transylvania was stunted and depressed in every possible way; Saxon land was deprived of its self-government and of the rights which dated centuries back; the academy of law at Hermannstadt was first diligently degraded and in 1887 wholly abolished. Even the higher Magyar nobility abandoned Vienna and took up its permanent residence at Pest. The Germans of Hungary retained only the poor consolation that, like them, the Rumanians and Slavs must resign themselves to acquiesce, willy-nilly, in being absorbed into the dominant race. When, in 1875, the Serb leader, Miletitch, protested in the lower house against making the other nationalities share the burden of the 300,000 gulden demanded by the government for the Hungarian national theatre, on the ground that Hungary was not a state of the Magyar nation, but a state of

nationalities in which the non-Magyars formed the majority, Tisza poured forth his indignation: it was fortunate for the speaker that the privilege of the house protected him; outside it he would find that the Magyar state was strong enough to cripple its enemies! Whereupon Serbs, Croats, Rumanians, and Saxons left the hall in wild tumult.

REFORM IN THE HUNGARIAN HOUSE OF MAGNATES (1885 A.D.)

A progressive step was marked in the year 1885 by the reform of the upper house, the table of magnates, which considerably diminished its numbers by the provision that no one could sit in it by right of his noble descent who did not pay at least 3,000 gulden in annual taxes. The king was given the right to appoint a third of the members of the upper house from the citizen class, according to merit and capacity. A new *Ausgleich* with Croatia was agreed upon, in place of that of 1873, which lapsed in 1879; and in 1881 the incorporation of the former Croatian-Slav military frontier into the kingdom of Croatia was effected. Since this almost doubled the population of the kingdom, the Croats requested a corresponding increase in their representation in the Hungarian diet; but any increase of the Slav element in this being obnoxious to the Magyars, the latter compelled the Croats to a compromise extremely unfavourable to them, by which the number of Croatian representatives in the lower house was only increased from thirty-four to forty and in the upper house from two to three. This only added fresh fuel to the hatred of the Croats. In Zagorje the oppressive conduct of the Magyar officials caused a revolt of armed peasants, and when the financial deputation in Agram adorned its arms with inscriptions in Magyar as well as Croatian, the angry mob tore them down. The extreme section of the Croat national party under Starcewitch was openly struggling for separation from Hungary; fifteen of them were the cause of such excesses in the Agram provincial diet that it was resolved to exclude them from it, and as they refused to submit they were forcibly removed.^h

But the agitations did not cease. In 1893 the Rumanians drew up a formal statement of their grievances; and although the instigators of the movement were punished, their severe treatment was one of the causes which led to the fall of the Wekerle ministry in 1894. The contest concerning the renewal of the *Ausgleich* was fought out under Bánffy and his successor, Koloman Szell. The desire of the Magyars for the possession of a separate army in which the Magyar language only should be employed has recently been the cause of active parliamentary obstruction over the Recruiting bill; during the dispute it was found necessary to refuse their discharge to soldiers entitled to it and riots were the result. On March 10th, 1894, however, the opposition suddenly abandoned its tactics, and the reconciliation of the combatants took place in a sensational scene in the lower house.^a

When in 1888 the two clubs, the German Austrians and the Germans, joined once more under the name of the united German Left into a new club with eighty-seven members, so as the better to guard against the common danger and to defeat the educational demands of the clericals, the national Germans remained apart with seventeen members. They were also infected by the growing spirit of anti-Semitism. The German parties had originally been the party of the capitalists, and comprised a large number of Jews; this new German party committed itself to violent attacks upon the Jews, and for this reason alone any real harmony between the different branches would have been impossible.

[1890-1893 A.D.]

THE BOHEMIAN AUSGLEICH

Notwithstanding the concessions about language, the Czechs had, however, made no advance towards their real object—the recognition of the Bohemian kingdom. Perhaps the leaders of the party, who were now growing old, would have been content with the influence they had already attained, but they were hard pressed at home by the Young Czechs, who were more impatient. When Count Thun was appointed governor of Bohemia their hopes ran high, for he was supposed to favour the coronation of the emperor at Prague. In 1890, however, instead of proceeding to the coronation as was expected, Taaffe attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the opposing parties. The influence by which his policy was directed is not quite clear, but the Czechs had been of recent years less easy to deal with, and Taaffe had never really shown any wish to alter the constitution; his policy always was to destroy the influence of parliament by playing off one party against the other, and so to win a clear field for the government. During the month of January conferences were held at Vienna, with Taaffe in the chair, to which were invited representatives of the three groups into which the Bohemian representatives were divided, the German party, the Czechs, and the feudal party. After a fortnight's discussion an agreement was made on the basis of a separation between the German and the Czechish districts, and a revision of the electoral law. A protocol enumerating the points agreed on was signed by all who had taken part in the conference, and in May bills were laid before the provincial diet incorporating the chief points in the agreement. But they were not carried; the chief reason being that the Young Czechs had not been asked to take part in the conference, and did not consider themselves bound by its decisions; they opposed the measures and had recourse to obstruction, and a certain number of the Old Czechs gradually came over to them.

Their chief ground of criticising the proposed measures was that they would threaten the unity of the Bohemian country. At the elections in 1891 a great struggle took place between the Old and the Young Czechs. The latter were completely victorious; Rieger, who had led the party for thirty years, disappeared from the Reichsrath. The first result was that the proposed Ausgleich with Bohemia came to an end. But the disappearance of the Old Czechs made the parliamentary situation very insecure. The Young Czechs could not take their place; their radical and anti-clerical tendencies alarmed the feudalists and clericals who formed so large a part of the Right; they attacked the alliance with Germany; they made public demonstration of their French sympathies; they entered into communication with other Slav races, especially the Serbs of Hungary and Bosnia; they demanded universal suffrage and occasionally supported the German radicals in their opposition to the clerical parties, especially in educational matters; under their influence disorder increased in Bohemia, a secret society called the *Umladina* (in imitation of the Servian society of that name) was discovered, and stringent measures had to be taken to preserve order. The government therefore veered round towards the German liberals; some of the ministers most obnoxious to the Germans resigned, and their places were taken by Germans. For two years the government seemed to waver, looking now to the Left, now to Hohenwart and his friends; for a time Taaffe really had the support of all parties except the Young Czechs.

ELECTORAL REFORM

After two years he gave up his cautious policy and took a bold move. In October, 1893, he introduced a reform bill. Universal suffrage had long been demanded by the working men and the socialists; the Young Czechs also had

put it on their programme, and many of the Christian socialists and anti-Semites desired an alteration of the franchise. Taaffe's bill, while keeping the curiæ of the feudal proprietors and the chambers of commerce as they were, and making no change in the number of members, proposed to give the franchise in both towns and rural districts to everyone who could read and write and had resided six months in one place. This was opposed by the liberals, for with the growth of socialism and anti-Semitism they knew that the extension of the franchise would destroy their influence. On this Taaffe had probably calculated, but he had omitted to inquire what the other parties would do. He had not even consulted Hohenwart, to whose assistance he owed his long tenure of power. Not even the pleasure of ruining the liberals was sufficient to persuade the conservatives to vote for a measure which would transfer the power from the well-to-do to the indigent, and Hohenwart justly complained that they ought to have been secure against surprises of this kind. The Poles also were against a measure which would give more influence to the Ruthenians. The position of the government was hopeless, and, without waiting for a division Taaffe resigned.

The event to which for fourteen years the Left had looked forward had now happened. Once more they could have a share in the government, which they always believed belonged to them by nature. Taught by experience and adversity, they did not scruple to enter into an alliance with their old enemies, and a coalition ministry was formed from the Left, the clericals, and the Poles. The president was Prince Alfred Windischgrätz, grandson of the celebrated general, one of Hohenwart's ablest lieutenants; Hohenwart himself did not take office. Of course an administration of this kind could not take a definite line on any controversial question, but during 1894 it carried through the commercial treaty with Russia and the laws for the continuance of the currency reform. On the 12th of June, 1895, it resigned.

BADENI'S MINISTRY

After a short interval the emperor appointed as minister-president Count Badeni, who had earned a great reputation as governor of Galicia. He formed an administration, the merit of which, as of so many others, was that it was to belong to no party and to have no programme. He hoped to be able to work in harmony with the moderate elements of the Left; his mission was to carry through the Ausgleich with Hungary; to this everything else must be subordinated. During 1896 he succeeded in carrying a reform bill, which satisfied nearly all parties. All the old categories of members were maintained, but a fifth curia was added, in which almost anyone might vote who had resided six months in one place and was not in domestic service; in this way seventy-two would be added to the existing members. This matter having been settled, parliament was dissolved. The result of the elections of 1897 was the return of a house so constituted as to make any strong government impossible. On both sides the anti-Semitic parties representing the extreme demagogic elements were present in considerable numbers. The united German Left had almost disappeared; it was represented only by a few members chosen by the great proprietors; in its place there were the three parties—the German popular party, the German nationalists, and the German radicals—who all put questions of nationality first and had deserted the old standpoint of the constitution. Then there were the fourteen social democrats who had won their seats under the new franchise. The old party of the Right was, however, also broken up; side by side with forty-one clericals there were twenty-eight Christian socialists led by Doctor Lueger, a man of great oratori-

[1879-1897 A.D.]

cal power, who had won a predominant influence in Vienna, so long the centre of liberalism, and had quite eclipsed the more modest efforts of Prince Liechtenstein. As among the German national party, there were strong nationalist elements in his programme, but they were chiefly directed against Jews and Hungarians; Lueger had already distinguished himself by his violent attacks on Hungary, which had caused some embarrassment to the government at a time when the negotiations for the Ausgleich were in progress. Like anti-Semites elsewhere, the Christian socialists were reckless and irresponsible, appealing directly to the passions and prejudices of the most ignorant. There were altogether two hundred German members of the Reichsrath, but they were divided into eight parties, and nowhere did there seem to be the elements on which a government could be built up.

The most remarkable result of the elections was the disappearance of the liberals in Vienna. In 1879, out of 37 members returned in Lower Austria, 33 were liberals. Now the Christian socialists were first with 28, then the socialists with 14, and the few remaining seats were divided between the nationalists and the radicals. It was impossible to maintain a strong party of moderate constitutionalists on whom the government could depend, unless there was a large nucleus from Lower Austria. The influence of Lueger was very embarrassing; he had now a majority of two-thirds in the town council, and had been elected burgomaster. The emperor had refused to confirm the election; he had been re-elected, and then the emperor, in a personal interview, appealed to him to withdraw. He consented to do so; but, after the election of 1897 had given him so many followers in the Reichsrath, Badeni advised that his election as burgomaster should be confirmed. There was violent antipathy between the Christian socialists and the German nationalists, and the transference of their quarrels from the Viennese council chamber to the Reichsrath was very detrimental to the orderly conduct of debate.

The limited suffrage had hitherto prevented socialism from becoming a political force in Austria as it had in Germany, and the national divisions have always impeded the creation of a centralised socialist party. The first object of the working classes necessarily was the attainment of political power; in 1867 there had been mass demonstrations and petitions to the government for universal suffrage. During the next years there was the beginning of a real socialist movement in Vienna and in Styria, where there is a considerable industrial population; after 1879, however, the growth of the party was interrupted by the introduction of anarchical doctrines. Most's paper, the *Freiheit*, was introduced through Switzerland, and had a large circulation. The anarchists, under the leadership of Peukert, seem to have attained considerable numbers. In 1883-1884 there were a number of serious strikes, collisions between the police and the workmen, followed by assassinations; it was a peculiarity of Austrian anarchists that in some cases they united robbery to murder. The government, which was seriously alarmed, introduced severe repressive measures; the leading anarchists were expelled or fled the country. In 1887, under the leadership of Doctor Adler, the socialist party began to revive (the party of violence having died away), and since then it has steadily gained in numbers; in the forefront of the political programme is put the demand for universal suffrage. In no country is the 1st of May, as the festival of Labour, celebrated so generally.

THE LANGUAGE ORDINANCES OF 1897

Badeni after the election sent in his resignation, but the emperor refused to accept it, and he had therefore to do the best he could and turn for support to the other nationalities. The strongest of them were the fifty-nine Poles and

sixty Young Czechs; he therefore attempted, as Taaffe had done, to come to some agreement with them. The Poles were always ready to support the government; among the Young Czechs the more moderate had already attempted to restrain the wilder spirits of the party, and they were quite prepared to enter into negotiations. They did not wish to lose the opportunity which now was open to them of winning influence over the administration. What they required was further concession as to the language in Bohemia. In May, 1897, Badeni therefore published his celebrated ordinances. They determined (1) that all correspondence and documents regarding every matter brought before the government officials should be conducted in the language in which it was first introduced: this applied to the whole of Bohemia, and meant the introduction of Czech into the government offices throughout the whole of the kingdom; (2) after 1903 no one was to be appointed to a post under the government in Bohemia until he had passed an examination in Czech. These ordinances fulfilled the worst fears of the Germans. The German nationalists and radicals declared that no business should be done till they were repealed and Badeni dismissed.

They resorted to obstruction. They brought in repeated motions to impeach the ministers, and parliament had to be prorogued in June, although no business of any kind had been transacted. Badeni had not anticipated the effect his ordinances would have; as a Pole he had little experience in the western part of the empire. During the recess he tried to open negotiations, but the Germans refused even to enter into a discussion until the ordinances had been withdrawn. The agitation spread throughout the country; great meetings were held at Eger and Aussig, which were attended by Germans from across the frontier and led to serious disturbances; the cornflower, which had become the symbol of German nationality and union with Germany, was freely worn, and the language used was in many cases treasonable. The emperor insisted that the Reichsrath should again be summoned to pass the necessary measures for the Ausgleich; scenes then took place which have no parallel in parliamentary history. To meet the obstruction it was determined to sit at night, but this was unsuccessful. On one occasion Doctor Lecher, one of the representatives of Moravia, spoke for twelve hours, from 9 P.M. till 9 A.M., against the Ausgleich. The opposition was not always limited to feats of endurance of this kind. On the 3rd of November there was a free fight in the house; it arose from a quarrel between Doctor Lueger and the Christian socialists on the one side (for the Christian socialists had supported the government since the confirmation of Lueger as burgomaster) and the German nationalists on the other under Doctor Wolff, a German from Bohemia, the violence of whose language had already caused Badeni to challenge him to a duel.

The nationalists refused to allow Lueger to speak, clapping their desks, hissing, and making other noises, till at last the Young Czechs attempted to prevent the disorder by violence. On the 24th of November the scenes of disturbance were renewed. The president, Herr von Abramovitch, an Armenian from Galicia, refused to call on Schoenerer to speak. The nationalists therefore stormed the platform, and the president and the ministers had to fly into their private rooms to escape personal violence, until the Czechs came to their rescue and by superiority in numbers and physical strength severely punished Herr Wolff and his friends. The rules of the house giving the president no authority for maintaining order, he determined, with the assent of the ministers, to propose alterations in procedure. The next day, when the sitting began, one of the ministers, Count Falkenhayn, a clerical who was very unpopular, moved that "any member who continued to disturb a sitting after being twice called to order could be suspended—for three days by the

[1897-1899 A.D.]

president, and for thirty days by the house." The din and uproar was such that not a word could be heard, but at a pre-arranged signal from the president all the Right rose, and he then declared that the new order had been carried, although the procedure of the House required that it should be submitted to a committee. The next day, at the beginning of the sitting, the socialists rushed on the platform, tore up and destroyed all the papers lying there, seized the president, and held him against the wall. After he had escaped, eighty police were introduced into the House and carried out the fourteen socialists. The next day Herr Wolff was treated in the same manner.

The excitement spread to the street. Serious disorders took place in Vienna and in Gratz; the German opposition had the support of the people, and Lueger warned the ministers that as burgomaster he would be unable to maintain order in Vienna; even the clerical Germans showed signs of deserting the government. The emperor, hastily summoned to Vienna, accepted Badeni's resignation, the Germans having thus by obstruction attained part of their wishes. The new minister, Gautsch, a man popular with all parties, held office for three months; he proclaimed the budget and the *Ausgleich*, and in February replaced the language ordinances by others, under which Bohemia was to be divided into three districts—one Czechish, one German, and one mixed. The Germans, however, were not satisfied with this; they demanded absolute repeal. The Czechs also were offended; they arranged riots at Prague; the professors in the university refused to lecture unless the German students were defended from violence; Gautsch resigned, and Thun, who had been governor of Bohemia, was appointed minister. Martial law was proclaimed in Bohemia and strictly enforced. Thun then arranged with the Hungarian ministers a compromise about the *Ausgleich*.


RENEWED CONFLICT BETWEEN GERMANS AND CZECHS

The Reichsrath was again summoned, and the meetings were less disturbed than in the former year, but the Germans still prevented any business from being done. The Germans now had a new cause of complaint. Paragraph 14 of the law of 1867 provided that, in cases of pressing necessity, orders for which the assent of the Reichsrath was required might, if the Reichsrath were not in session, be proclaimed by the emperor; they had to be signed by the whole ministry, and if they were not laid before the Reichsrath within four months of its meeting, or if they did not receive the approval of both Houses, they ceased to be valid. The Germans contended that the application of this clause to the *Ausgleich* was invalid, and demanded that it should be repealed. Thun had in consequence to retire, in September, 1899. His successor, Count Clary, began by withdrawing the ordinances which had been the cause of so much trouble, but it was now too late to restore peace. The Germans were not sufficiently strong and united to keep in power a minister who had brought them the relief for which they had been clamouring for two years. The Czechs, of course, went into opposition, and used obstruction. The extreme German party, however, took the occasion to demand that paragraph 14 should be repealed. Clary explained that this was impossible, but he gave a formal pledge that he would not use it. The Czechs, however, prevented him passing a law on excise which was a necessary part of the agreements with Hungary; it was therefore impossible for him to carry on the government without breaking his word; there was therefore nothing left for him to do but to resign, after holding office for less than three months. The emperor then appointed a ministry of officials who were not bound by his pledge, and used paragraph 14 for the necessary purposes of state. They then made way for a ministry under Herr von Körber.^c

During the early months of Dr. Körber's tenure of office there was a suspension of hostilities to allow the passage of certain necessary measures, but the lull was merely momentary. In the elections in December, 1900, and January, 1901, the most obstructive and fanatical sections, such as the extreme German Nationalists, were the chief gainers. In spite of all opposition, Dr. Körber managed to maintain himself until December, 1904, when he was succeeded by Baron Gautsch, who retained most of the other members of the Cabinet. The agitation for suffrage extension in Hungary gave impetus during the same year to a movement for a similar change in Austria. Enormous mass-meetings of those favouring the change were held, and at one which occurred at Vienna on November 28th more than 200,000 persons were present. In February, 1906, Baron Gautsch introduced a liberal suffrage bill in the lower chamber of the Reichsrath.

In Hungary the years of the new century have been productive of even greater confusion than in Austria. The Hungarian independence party, under the leadership of M. Kossuth, son of the leader of 1848, have pursued a campaign against the dual government by obstructing all the measures of the Ministry and have themselves declined to take office. In this way they have made it extremely difficult for any Ministry to last for any length of time. Thus, when Count Tisza, who took office in October, 1903, adopted the policy of changing the standing legislative rules in such a way as to prevent the obstructive tactics of the Opposition, a bitter contest resulted. The most striking incidents occurred on December 13, 1904, the day of the opening of a new session of the Reichstag. On that day the Opposition entered the House before the usual time of meeting, assaulted the police when they attempted to interfere, destroyed the furniture and woodwork, and were finally photographed sitting on the heap of ruins. Shortly after this disgraceful scene Count Tisza determined to appeal to the country, and a new election was held in January, 1905. The Opposition succeeded, however, in convincing many of the voters that Tisza was too much under Austrian influence, and as a result the Ministry was decisively beaten. Tisza then resigned, and, after the Emperor had vainly tried to come to terms with the leaders of the Opposition, Baron Fejervary was entrusted with the task of forming a government. The new Cabinet attempted to gain support by a proposal for manhood suffrage on an educational basis, but as the Crown opposed such a step, the Ministry resigned in the following September. The Emperor then attempted once more to form an Opposition Cabinet; but the leaders again refused to promise not to endeavour to secure the use of the Hungarian language in the Hungarian regiments of the army—a matter which for some time had caused much discussion—or to agree to other conditions; and he was ultimately forced to recall Fejervary and approve his suffrage programme for the extension of the right to vote to all literate male citizens over the age of twenty-four years. The extreme Hungarian party opposed the contemplated change because, since the Magyars are in a minority in Hungary, it would lessen their political influence. On February 19, 1906, parliament was dissolved, and in enforcing the dissolution troops were used.

In 1907 a general election took place, which was important as being the first conducted in the dual kingdom on the principle of universal suffrage. This reform was due not to popular agitation but to the personal initiative of the Emperor Francis Joseph. No less than twenty-one parties were returned to the new Chamber, but the outstanding feature of the election was the success of the two socialist parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Socialists.^a



CHAPTER VI

A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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THE EMPEROR FRANCIS I AND AUSTRIA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION OF MARCH, 1848

THE emperor Francis I ended his days on the 2nd of March, 1835, at the age of sixty-seven years, during forty-three of which he had exercised his hereditary rule, fourteen years over the German and twenty-nine over the Austrian Empire. In inorganic fashion and under many vicissitudes this extensive state seems to have been built up in the course of centuries out of old Habsburg lordships, German imperial territories, dominions of the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns, out of the possessions of the Habsburg-Spanish power on the soil of Italy and the Netherlands, with eastern Galicia (Halicz-Wladimir), and the north Carpathian districts of the old kingdom of Poland, that is, from elements and nationalities fundamentally different both historically and politically.

The emperor Francis I wore the German imperial crown more or less as an heirloom which had belonged for many centuries to the house of Habsburg-Austria, until the end of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German nation" (1806), after he had already assumed the title of a hereditary emperor of Austria (1804).

In his time falls the permanent loss of Belgium and the old Habsburg lordships in the west of south Germany, and on the other hand the gain of western Galicia (Little Poland), at the third partition of Poland, and the acquisition of the heritage of the Venetian Republic on the Adriatic. After the second fall of Napoleon, the inheritor of the power of the French Republic, the great territorial robberies of the years 1806 and 1809 had been made good by the "Restoration" of Europe as a result of the congress of Vienna, and the Austrian supremacy in the confederacy assumed the place in Germany of the Habsburg empire. The emperor's declining years were darkened by the rec-

ognition of the painful truth that his first-born and heir, Ferdinand, was incapable of rule, and that consequently a regency, a "cabinet government," in his name, was necessary. But other grave circumstances accompanied this one.

Austria, the chief member of the so-called "Holy Alliance," saw herself outstripped in the Græco-Eastern question by one ally, Russia, and in the German question by the other, Prussia. Emperor Francis, the embodiment of patriarchal absolutism, and his trusted adviser, the chancellor Metternich, lived to see that their obstinate fight against the liberal and constitutional movement in southern and western Europe remained without any assured results, and that the nationalistic efforts after freedom and separate existence were becoming dangerously strong, mainly in Austrian Italy by means of Carbonarism and Mazzinism¹, but that they had also long had a fruitful soil and a sphere of activity in the heart of the Austrian monarchy with its many races and languages. As regards foreign countries, an ominous isolation of Austria and an unmistakable waning of her political credit are visible.

But above all there was a strange dualism in the empire. On this side, in Cisleithania, the western half of the empire belonging to the German Confederation, the emperor ruled as an absolute sovereign; on that side, in Transleithania, as a constitutional "king of Hungary," represented by his brother, the archduke palatine, Joseph, to whom it had been granted to fulfil his difficult office for a full half century (1796-1847) with a keen eye and a firm hand and yet to remain popular. In this contrast between the German Austrian "bureaucratic and police rule" (*Beamten und Polizeistaate*), as the enemies of the system of administration designated it, and the Hungarian "constitutional government," was concealed the chief danger for the policy of Metternich, the guiding spirit of the regency (*Staatsconferenz*) in the days of the emperor Ferdinand the "good" (1835-1848), who made yet another territorial acquisition by the incorporation of the free state of Cracow (1847), after the speedy suppression of the rebellion of Galician Poland in 1846. Metternich did not fail to recognise this danger, without however being able to overcome it, for the conservatives of Hungary (Aarel Dezseffly and his circle) also set themselves against any encroachment by the Vienna cabinet on the Transleithanian constitution.

The question of Hungarian reform, hand in hand with the preponderance of the Magyar population in public life, a preponderance which had been on the increase ever since 1830, collected round its banner not only its leader Count Stephen Széchényi, who had given utterance to the significant phrase, "Hungary was not, it will be," and the brilliant liberal aristocrat, the freiherr von Eötvös, but also the strict autonomists Niklas Freiherr von Wesselényi and the two *comitat* deputies Francis Deák and Louis Kossuth. Of these the first remained the most persevering advocate of the constitution in the constitutional "conscience" of Hungary, whilst the second, a man of demoniac force with word and pen, was worshipped as its idol by the radical Magyar youth. In this variable circle, which only too soon became inimical to Széchényi's influence and authority, the watchword was the national and political Magyarisation of Hungary, and the dominions of its crown, while on the other hand, as a challenge to this, voices in favour of the ideal of a Croat, Slavonian, and Dalmatian kingdom were raised louder and louder by the instinct of self-preservation in the Transylvanian Saxons, the Rumanians, the Slovaks of upper Hungary, the Hungaro-Serbs or Raizen, the Croats, and, especially, in "Illyrism," here represented by Ludwig Gaj.

In Galicia the Polish question had been agitated ever since 1846, though, on

¹ Giovine Italia.

[1847-1848 A.D.]

the other hand, the east Galician Ruthenians, as opponents of the Polish supremacy, remained the government's natural ally. But even in the heart of the hereditary lands of Bohemia and German Austria, there was a crisis preparing, serious both from a political and from a national standpoint. In the struggle which the aristocratic or feudal party in Bohemia (of which Palacky was and remained the historical and political adviser) had been carrying on ever since 1843 with ever increasing vigour against the measures of the Vienna cabinet and in favour of a "Bohemian constitutional law," the liberal Czech party with its nationalistic aspirations came to the aid of the aristocracy as a temporary ally, determined to extend its influence into the neighbouring province of Moravia.

Amongst the German Austrians, especially in Vienna, there arose increasing dissatisfaction with the uneasy position of Austria both at home and abroad, and with the symptoms of her financial and economical maladies, and the discontent showed itself in numerous pamphlets, all printed abroad. Above all, here also was prepared an attack by the privileged orders, on the bureaucratic régime, which was soon, however, as we shall see, thrust into the background and outbalanced by the German liberal and democratic movement in the form of a struggle for a constitution.

But before ancient Austria fell to pieces, the summer lightning of non-German nationalist agitations manifested itself on the soil of the east Alpine districts, as, for example, amongst the Slovenes, at that time indeed still comparatively harmless, and, more particularly, amongst the *Welschtirolern* or Italians of the Tyrol, in the "Trentino" question, which was already of long standing, and as a solution of which the southern part of the Tyrol was to acquire a separate national and political standing.

THE REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AFTER MARCH, 1848

The February revolution of 1848 in France, making itself felt in the Austrian Empire, loosed in the whole range of the emperor's dominions a storm which it had become impossible to oppose. The month of March is associated with the break-up of ancient Austria, for which Metternich's enforced retirement, after thirty-eight years of office, had paved the way. On the other hand the movement in favour of German unity, with its endeavour immediately to create a constitutional Germany by means of a national parliament, got the better of the vain attempt of the confederate government to forestall it, and at once drew the confederate territories of Cisleithania into its sphere. Side by side with the white cockade, the token of young constitutional Austria, speedily appeared the German tri-colour, whilst the old imperial colours, the *Schwarzgelb* (black and yellow), were affected by the "reactionaries" as a token of enmity to the constitution.

As an immediate danger to the existence of the state government, signs at once appeared of a nationalist revolution on the verge of breaking out in Austrian Italy, with which country the commander of the forces there, Count Joseph Wenzel Radetzky, had long been familiar; he did not fail to recognise the signs of the times. The desertion of the Milanese to the Sardinian king Charles Albert, the "sword of Italy," was soon after effected. Radetzky had provisionally to abandon the country between the Ticino and the Mincio, and within the quadrilateral of fortresses with Verona as his base to assemble the forces for new attacks. At the same time Daniel Manin, as national dictator, proclaimed (March 23rd) a republic of Venice and Venetian Austria.

The young, immature constitution of Austria postponed its honeymoon,

and the first constitutional ministry of Cisleithania (that of Freiherr Franz von Pillersdorf) was hurried ever swifter and swifter in the democratic current, a significant token of which was the removal of the imperial court from Vienna to Innsbruck in Tyrol; meantime, beyond the Leitha, matters were drawing to a crisis. In Hungary the newly established constitution had instituted a responsible ministry similar in kind to the Cisleithanian, in place of the old Hungarian court authorities and central administrative offices. The advance of the radical Magyar party towards a personal union with Austria hastened the rising of the non-Magyar nationalities of the kingdom of Hungary against the hegemony of the Magyars. Upon this was founded the popularity of the *ban* of Croatia, Jellachich, who soon went into opposition against the Hungarian ministry as insubordinate and thus found himself for a time in a false position relative to the imperial court.

The Slav party also made an attempt to bring about a common understanding, though the Slav congress of Prague was able to do little to bring such an understanding into effect. Similarly in Moravia the feeling in favour of provincial independence or autonomy showed itself to be stronger amongst the Slav inhabitants than the desire to go hand in hand with the Czechs who were thirsting for the pre-eminence. The Poles pursued their own way, but in face of the friendly attitude adopted towards the government by the Ruthenians, the Galician revolution had first no prospect of success, all the less since in Russian and Prussian Poland an impulse towards national movement had no room for free play. For the Whitsuntide rising in the capital of Bohemia a speedy end was prepared by the commandant, Prince Alfred Windischgrätz.

On the other hand, several circumstances seemed likely to renew the historical coherence of Cisleithania with Germany and to strengthen it nationally and politically. These were the strong representation of German Austria in the imperial parliament at Frankfort, and especially the choice (July 29th) as administrator of the German empire of Archduke John, who since 1809 had been the most popular prince of the house of Habsburg-Lorraine, and, in addition, the election of a German imperial government with Anton, Ritter von Schmerling, a constitutional centralist from Austria, as imperial minister of the interior (August); but when it came to the question how effect was to be given to this coherence, insurmountable difficulties had soon to be encountered.

The Austrian diet in Vienna, freshly created in the time of the new Austrian ministry (Wessenberg-Dobblhoff-Bach), as the parliamentary representation of the collective non-Hungarian provinces of the imperial state (July 22nd), was opened by Archduke John shortly after the retirement of the Pillersdorf ministry (July 8th), and here too its three hundred and thirty-eight members soon showed signs of antagonistic principles in questions of nationality and party politics. Here we find first of all the attacks of the Slavs on the political leadership of the Germans, and, on the other hand, the strife between the conservative Right and the liberal and democratic Left. Amid such feuds between nationalities and political parties, amid dogmatic and doctrinarian squabbles, the young parliament of Cisleithania could show only one permanent constitutional achievement—the abolition, on the motion of Hanns Kudlich, of the subjection to the soil (*Grundunterthänigkeit*) and its burdens, by which the peasant class were to be immediately won over to the political movement for freedom. Meantime, Radetzky, the vigorous field marshal, who had reached his eighty-third year, had energetically begun an offensive war against Sardinia on the soil of Austrian Italy. By the end of July, 1848, the Milanese was again in his hands. Only Venice persisted in her secession.

The situation in Hungary, however, soon took an ominous turn, as was shown by the imperial rehabilitation of the ban Jellachich, by the retirement from his untenable position of the archduke palatine Stephen, who had been

[1848-1849 A.D.]

wavering between the revolution and the Court of Vienna; by the actual dictatorship of Kossuth, the "saviour of the nation," supported by the national militia (*Honvéd*), and also by the radical reconstruction of the Hungarian ministry. The murder of the imperial commissary, Count Lamberg, already exhibited the climax of national and political passions and gave a foresight of the secession of Hungary.

Quite as gloomy was the aspect of affairs in Cisleithania when the fatal October days of Vienna opened and the war minister, Count Latour, was murdered by a raging mob; whereupon the imperial court (which had returned in August from Innsbruck) fled from the revolution to the fortified Moravian city of Olmütz (October 18th), and the Vienna diet became helpless before demagoguery. Nevertheless, the government, thanks to the strengthening of the Austrian dominion in upper Italy by Radetzky, soon felt itself strong enough to take in hand the siege of Vienna under the superintendence of Prince Windischgrätz and the ban Jellachich, to prevent its attempted succour by the Magyars, to take the city, and, by transferring the diet from Vienna to the small Moravian town of Kremsier near Olmütz, to pave the way for a new order of affairs. The installation of the new ministry with Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, brother-in-law of Field-marshal Windischgrätz, at its head (November 20th) forms the decisive turning point; for the key-note of his circular letter or programme was a "strong central government" and the "integrity" of Austria, against the evident desire for secession on the part of the Magyars.

The change of system now being prepared required first of all a new ruling personality. Emperor Ferdinand the "good" abdicated the throne and his eighteen-year-old nephew, Francis Joseph, introduced with his accession (December 2nd) the period of the "restoration" of monarchy. The winter campaign against Magyar Hungary began, for here the change of rulers and the manifesto of the new sovereign were answered with a protest (December 7th) and an appeal to arms, whilst Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Rumanians, and Transylvanian Saxons saw the pledge of their own future in the imperial camp.

But in the German question also the breach of the national parliament at Frankfort with the new Austrian system of government was imminent. When the formation of Germany into a "narrow" confederation without Austria, the union with her in a "wider" confederation, and finally the imperial scheme with the Prussian king as successor to the German Empire were brought forward, Schwarzenberg's note to Prussia (December 13th) set forth as an ultimatum the reception of the whole monarchy into the German confederacy and into the German customs union (*Zollverein*)—and the Austrian premier's declaration of the 28th of December culminated in the words, "Austria will know how to maintain her position in the newly formed state of Germany." The year 1849 forms in a way the epilogue of the liberal and national movement for liberty, marks the passage to the conceded constitution of Austria, and so introduces the second stage of Austria's apprenticeship, the founding and continuance of the absolutist and unified state.

It is true that the war in Hungary got beyond the new government. Here the national diet had first effected its removal to Debreczen (January), then, by the declaration of independence (April 14th) and Kossuth's governorship, completed with the dynasty a breach that had many consequences. Soon after Budapest too was wrested from the imperials. But this was the high-water mark of the success of the radical Magyar party, at a time when the Sardinian king had already long ago been beaten on his own soil at the battle of Novara (March 23rd), and Venice was face to face with the prospect of resubjection. Since the meeting at Warsaw between the czar Nicholas I and the emperor Francis Joseph (May 15th), Austria was secure of the alliance of Russia, and

the offer of her armed assistance was the more readily seized upon as it became more and more evident that the means of bringing the war with Hungary to a speedy end were very inadequately supplied by the forces which Austria had at her disposal, and which had formerly been under the supreme command of Prince Windischgrätz, then of the freiherr von Welden, and were now under the orders of Radetzky's resolute brother-in-arms, the freiherr von Haynau.

Russia's military columns soon invaded Hungary, and, five weeks after the flight of the disunited revolutionary government from Budapest to Szeged, followed the surrender at Világos of the military "dictator," Arthur Görgey, and with it the end of the dream of independence and of the civil war of Hungary. Kossuth and his chief followers fled out of the country.

On the 6th of August the western powers had expedited the conclusion of peace between Austria and the Sardinian king Victor Emmanuel, and on the 27th of the month Venice yielded to the arms of Radetzky. Thus the questions concerning the authority of the government were successfully disposed of. But the newly strengthened empire, with Russia to support her, was now able to interfere decisively in the solution of the German question, and on the 9th of March she again emphasised her claim for the admission of the whole of Austria into Germany, while, on the other hand, she rejected the German plan for a constitution as inadmissible. The stone was soon set in motion.

The resolution to transfer to Prussia the hereditary empire of Germany, which was passed at Frankfort by a narrow majority on the 28th of March, 1849, was answered by Schwarzenberg with the recall of the Austrian deputies to the national parliament (April 5th) and he soon beheld King Frederick William IV give way on the question of the empire. In the course of the fruitless negotiations between the German powers concerning the reconstruction of Germany—as at the Pillnitz interview of the Emperor of Austria with the kings of Prussia and Saxony (September 8th)—the old German confederation and the Frankfort confederate diet (*Bundestag*), under the presidency of Austria, soon again appeared as the only possible solution, and on the 20th of December the archduke John, whom orders from Vienna had constrained to remain at his disagreeable post, resigned his thankless task of administrator of the empire. Meantime the situation of internal politics in Austria had also undergone a decided change.

The diet at Kremsier, in which German centralists and Slav federalists (under the leadership of Palacky and Ladislaus Rieger) were soon engaged in a violent quarrel, did indeed just contrive to complete the work of constitution-making which had been begun at Vienna; but the new "strong" government preferred the grant of a constitution dictated by the crown to the parliamentary creation of one, and by a *coup d'état* dissolved the diet which had long been a source of embarrassment (March 7th). This "granted" constitution was nevertheless only an expedient of the moment, and was to prepare the way for the institution of the absolutist unified state.

TEN YEARS OF THE UNIFIED STATE WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION (1850-1860)

It was the aim of the newly strengthened authorities, and also in harmony with the general tendencies of the age in Europe, as quickly as possible to combine the mastering of the liberal, democratic, and nationalist revolution and the revival of the idea of the state as embodied in the dynasty, with a transformation of the monarchy into a single uniformly administrated empire, without popular representation or provincial autonomy and with an absolute form of government; and at the same time it was intended to get rid of the

[1850-1852 A.D.]

dualism as existing before March, 1848, as well as of all the historical claims of the provinces and estates—a measure for which the revolution had already paved the way—and from henceforward to place all the strength of the nation at the service of the monarchical idea and thus to realise the motto of the new emperor: “*Viribus unitis.*”

The phase of transition to this “new birth” of Austria is formed by the years 1850-1851. The new year’s gift (1850) of the Cisleithanian provincial constitution is designed to make the diet to a great extent superfluous and to replace it (April 14th, 1851) by a *Reichsrath* appointed by the emperor as a “council” of the crown. Even before this (January) the minister of justice, Schmerling, the creator, in accordance with the spirit of constitutionalism, of juries (January, 1850), and the minister of commerce, Karl L. von Bruck, an able and fertile-minded political economist who as a liberal and Protestant had become obnoxious, had left the cabinet, where the leadership was now in the hands of the two men in the young monarch’s confidence, the premier Schwarzenberg and Alexander Bach. The latter was now minister of the interior as successor to Count Franz Stadion and was endowed with abilities of the first rank. With them was associated Count Leo Thum, a Bohemian nobleman who as minister of public worship and education had entered on the inheritance of the liberal reform of 1848, and as a friend of science and learning, advised by able men, adhered to its principles; but in church matters and denominational questions was beginning to show more and more rigour towards the Catholics.

The 20th of August, 1851, marks the commencement of the actual transformation of the constitutional state into the unified state without a constitution, by the abolition of the responsibility of ministers, and in another direction by the abrogation of Stadion’s communal law and the jury. Thus the abrogation at the end of the year of the constitution granted on the 4th of March, 1849, appeared merely as the culmination of the reaction for which the way had been long since smoothed.

The twenty-one crown provinces of Austria, loosed from all the historical ties which had formed them into groups, without representation by provincial assemblies, without privileged orders and patrimonial territorial government, henceforth appear under a rule emanating from Vienna and conducted in uniform fashion according to the principles of unification through the agency of superior and inferior officials appointed and paid by the government. German becomes the state, official, and educational language (except in Austrian Italy), and the copious volumes of the *Reichsgesetzblatt* show what an immense work in all departments of public life the “reconstruction” of the imperial state, still in operation in many points, undertook to accomplish and did accomplish.

As Prince Schwarzenberg, the thorough-paced aristocrat and absolutist in mind and will-power, died as early as April, 1852, the whole epoch, namely 1850-1859, is generally called the “Bach” epoch, for the lion’s share of its creations falls to that proud, many-sided man.

Though in more than one direction the internal history of Austria from 1850-1860 exhibits many similarities with that of the state reform of the emperor Joseph II (1780-1790), yet it differs from this in one particular especially. Whilst the so-called “Josephism” had in view and effected the union of church and state, now the opposing stream asserted itself more and more, and the crown yielded to it and to the wishes of Rome by the conclusion of a concordat, negotiated by the Viennese archbishop, Othmar Rauscher, in which the advantages were exclusively on the side of the Catholic church, henceforth free in the state. It was this concordat with the papal chair that threw the gloomiest shadows of “reaction” over “New Austria,” for it enraged liberal-

ism, injured the peace of the denominations, and was necessarily injurious to education.

But the absolutist system, and more particularly its exponent Bach, the statesman who had gone over from the revolutionary party, did not find foes only in the camps of the German liberals as friends of the constitution and autonomists. The feudalists, especially those of Bohemia, cheated out of their territorial jurisdiction, also bore a grudge against the absolute system; and in Hungary Bach was the best hated man, not only amongst the nationalist liberals of 1848-1849, but also with the conservatives who stood forward for the Hungary of the days before March and for her "historic rights." As for their right wing, the "old conservatives" or "notables," in April, 1850, they had still set their hopes on a memorandum to the crown. And even yet, in 1856, this party ventured once more to make an attack on Bach, but again without success, although the "address" which they offered to the crown (printed 1857) overflowed with protestations of loyal submissiveness and of sorrow at the "errors" of Hungary (1848).

It even came to a trial of strength, which the new system had to abandon in face of the growing discontent on the hither side of the Leitha and the passive resistance beyond it. Here, as always and everywhere, all depended on the vanquishing power of success and this again was conditional on the situation in regard to external politics.

Until the year 1852 Austria, in close alliance with Russia, had the upper hand in the German question. Prussia's humiliation at Olmütz (November 20th, 1850), the results of her withdrawal from the affair of the Hessian electorate and the Danish question, the decline of her political credit in Germany, the Dresden conference (December, 1850)—fruitless as far as Prussia was concerned—all this Schwarzenberg had lived to see. His successor was Count Karl Buol-Schauenstein, who could not command the same restless energy and weight as his predecessor.

Czar Nicholas I believed that in consequence of his assistance in the putting down of the Hungarian rebellion, and the aid he had rendered in the Prussian question, he might reckon on the unlimited gratitude of Austria; and her effective interference with Turkey in favour of the menaced state of Montenegro appeared to him as a further pledge of the political co-operation of Austria in case of Russia's taking up arms against the Porte. The fatal half-heartedness of Austria's foreign policy in the Crimean War (1853-1854), her wavering between neutrality and partisanship, in the course of which matters went as far as the conclusion of a convention with the Porte and the temporary but costly occupation of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Dobrudscha, earned her the lasting enmity of Russia, without being able to win for her the friendship of the western powers, at whose head, since the *coup d'état* (December 2nd, 1853), stood the new empire of France with Napoleon III.

The so-called Holy Alliance was therefore finally dissolved. Prussia, since 1857 under the prince-regent William (soon King William I), again won the ascendant in the German question, and from 1852 possessed in Bismarck the best of advocates for her cause at the confederate diet of Frankfort.

Napoleon III now took up the idea of nationality, the most dangerous for a monarchical state composed of different peoples as Austria was, and he became the active supporter of the policy of the Italian minister, Cavour, which aimed at Italy's unity and erection into a great power. Soon (1859) Austria stood alone in a war with Sardinia and the latter's ally, Napoleon III. The immense requirements of the war essentially aggravated the financial situation, to improve which Freiherr von Bruck, finance minister since 1855, had laboured in every direction; the minister of foreign affairs, Buol-Schauenstein, soon retired (14th May). His successor was Count Rechberg (previously presiden-

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tial envoy at Frankfort). Austria's defeats in Poland, at Magenta, and Solferino, were followed (11th of July) by the preliminary Peace of Villafranca, which sealed the loss of Lombardy to Sardinia, and confirmed the hopes entertained by the nationalists in Venetia of shaking off the Austrian rule.

This war had not only led the Magyar emigration under the banners of Sardinia and alienated the sympathies of the Magyars from the royal standard of Austria, but in its results it reacted in the gravest manner on the existing system of government, against whose further continuance in Cisleithania German liberals, feudalists, and Slav federalists in their various ways engaged in a united struggle; whilst beyond the Leitha the old conservatives and the advocates of the continuity of the administration and of the constitution of 1848 (under the leadership of Francis Deák) greeted its break-up with double joy, the former in the firm expectation that they would now attain to the helm, the latter determined to bide their time and increase the passive resistance.

Bach's dismissal (August 21st, 1859) introduces the transformation of the absolute monarchy into a semi-constitutional state.

The formation of the new cabinet, at whose head now stood the Polish count, Agenor Goluchowski, was immediately followed by negotiations with the old conservatives of Hungary, and with the feudalists of Cisleithania, and by the strengthening of the Reichsrath (March, 1860) through appointment by the crown, whereby the antagonism between liberal minority and conservative majority immediately became apparent and soon led to the dismissal of the Reichsrath (September 29th).

On the other hand, we see (July 1st) the way prepared for the reorganisation of Hungary on the basis of her constitution as it existed before 1848, which amounted to a renewal of the dualism existing previous to the revolution of March. The old conservatives of Hungary endeavoured (July 30th), by means of a compromise with the German feudalists and with the Slav federalists of Cisleithania, to bring about a common action for the maintenance of their interests. This explains the fact that the original draft for the "October Diploma" as the charter of a new constitution came from the pen of a Hungarian old conservative (Count Emil Dezsewffy), and that its contents, as well as the accompanying provincial statute, display a tendency to federalism and decentralisation. The German liberals of Cisleithania, the centralists, and autonomists now hastened to raise powerful objections to it, and so precipitated Goluchowski's retirement (December 13th). In his place Schmerling, the representative of the constitution and centralism, comes forward as the new confidential servant of the crown, and steers the ship of state along the lines of a centralised constitutional government.

THE NEW STAGE OF APPRENTICESHIP OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUSTRIA AND THE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION (1861-1866)

It is significant that Schmerling's fundamental creation of the year 1861, the so-called "February patent," had to be introduced in a way as a "supplement" to the October diploma, and that the new parliamentary representation of the empire—originating as the house of deputies from indirect election, that is, election by the provincial diets, and as the "house of peers" from nomination by the crown—bears the name of *Reichsrath*, a name given in the absolutist era to a council of the crown which was very far removed from a parliament; whilst the assembly of magnates and deputies, summoned to Ofen (Buda) on the 14th of February, felt itself to be indeed a Hungarian diet, and the dominant party (Deákists) announced their fixed adherence to the consti-

tution of the year 1848—that is to say, to the dualism of the period following the March revolution.

Add to this that the “broader” Reichsrath, in which Transleithania, the provinces of the Hungarian crown, were likewise to be represented, became a pure fiction; that the Reichsrath remained in fact a “narrow” Cisleithanian assembly, faced by the Bohemian federalists and the Czech nationalists, who were mistrustful and full of indignation at the pre-eminence and supremacy of the German liberal centralists; and that in Hungary the old conservatives, now thrust into the background, had also a grudge against the new system, while on the other hand the Deákists remained resolved to use all the stubborn force of passive resistance to place obstacles in the way of Schmerling’s centralism.

That statesman’s well-known expression, “We can wait,” here failed in its effect, and even in his own camp soon encountered vigorous opposition. For however valuable the gains of the new era might be, Schmerling’s centralism had still certain hardships even for the German liberals, the gloomy aspect of foreign affairs disquieted them, the Hungarian question weighed on them like a nightmare, and the dread of Slavism and federalism in Cisleithania in itself drew them closer to the Magyars as to natural allies whose confident demeanour and skilful tactics made more and more impression on the hither side of the Leitha.

In the diet (March 31st, 1865) Moritz von Kaiserfeld, the Styrian liberal and autonomist, made a sharp attack on Schmerling’s policy of inertia (*Zuwartungspolitik*), which at most could cite no better evidence of its success than the entry of the Transylvanian deputies into the “broader” Reichsrath (1863) at a time when the old conservatives of Hungary and the feudalists of Cisleithania were conspiring against the minister, and a confidential servant of the crown from that camp, Count Maurice Esterházy, an Austrian minister without portfolio, was successfully undermining the political credit and influence of the minister-president with the court.

Only too soon (June 26th, 1865) the fatal resignation of Schmerling was brought about, and his successor, the Moravian nobleman Count Richard Belcredi, guided Transleithania back into a federalist current, in much the same channel as that of the year 1860, without of course being able to bring about any rotation of the Hungarian question and the “pacification” of Hungary.

For beyond the Leitha there was an obstinate adherence to the fundamental idea of the address drawn up by Deák (April, 1861), according to which Hungary was not in a position to recognise either the October diploma or the February patent, and would only “enter into relations and union with the other constitutional provincial territories of Austria in constitutional independence and liberty.”

In Bohemia, where Old and Young Czechs as conservative and progressive parties were at feud with one another, Belcredi again failed to overcome the opposition. But above all he encountered the natural enmity of the German liberals and centralists, who could not but see in the suspension of the Reichsrath brought about by Belcredi (September 20th, 1865) a stroke aimed at the February constitution, while in his scheme to resolve the monarchy into five territorial groups and orders they beheld a forecast of the disintegration of Austria by way of federation and feudalism, and this at a time when the German question appeared on the scene with complications involving grave consequences to the state.

Ever since Bismarck had succeeded to the office of minister-president in Prussia (September, 1862), he had been determined to make amends for the political defeat of Prussia in 1850 and gradually to sap Austria’s influence in

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Germany. The most significant token of this was the absence of the Prussian king, William I, from the Frankfort diet of princes of August 17th, 1863, at which the emperor Francis Joseph I presided. Although the relations between the two powers grew more strained as the result of a clever move of Bismarck by which he brought the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Count Rechberg, in his train, we find (1864) the two states side by side in the war against Denmark as representatives of the empire, and after its termination in *condominat*, that is, in joint administration, of Schleswig-Holstein. By this Austria injured her credit with the central states and still more with the national liberals in Germany.

But the division between the two powers was immediately apparent in the Schleswig-Holstein question, and on the other hand Bismarck sought (as early as July, 1865) to bring about the armed "neutrality" of the German central states in case of a war with Austria, though in this he was unsuccessful. He contrived to assure himself of a friendly attitude on the part of Napoleon III, and, above all, to conclude (April 8th, 1865) a military alliance with Sardinia, which, sure of the favour of the French emperor and on the way to the annexation of all Italy, was now aiming at the conquest of Venice. This alliance had for its object the complete overthrow of Austria's dominion in Poland. Napoleon III was here reckoning on the mutual weakening of the two chief German powers, whilst Austria was prepared to resign Venice on the outbreak of war, but found the proposed Franco-Italian compromise inadmissible. Of Russia, Prussia was sure in any case, for Czar Alexander II had entered into his father's grudge against the Viennese court as an inheritance, and the fact that on the occasion of the rebellion in Russian Poland (1862-1863) Austria remained unmolested in Galicia, further increased the distrust of the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

Now came Austria's double war with Prussia and Sardinia in the summer of 1866. It is true that the German central states—in especial the kingdoms of Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, Würtemberg—stood by Austria when the breach between the two great powers was followed (June) by "the fratricidal war" (*Bruderkrieg*), as in the general indignation against Prussia it was designated by public opinion in South Germany; and, besides this, at the seat of war in Upper Italy the Austrian southern army under Archduke Albert and his chief-of-the-staff, Franz von John, won the decisive victory of Custoza (June 24th), to which was soon added (July 20th) the dazzling success of Wilhelm von Tegetthoff—the defeat of the Italian fleet, under Admiral Persano, in the waters of the Adriatic, near the island of Lissa.

But Prussia overthrew the German allies of Austria, one after another, and Saxony shared the ill success of Austria on the battleground of Bohemia. The command of the Austrian northern army had been forced on the most popular general, the master of the ordnance, Ludwig R. von Benedek, in spite of his express refusal; and in the "seven days' battle," after a series of unfortunate skirmishes—in which, besides Prussia's superiority in the needle-gun of the infantry, strategical mistakes and insubordination on the part of individual Austrian commanders were revealed—the Austrians suffered the great defeat of Königgrätz-Sadowa (July 3rd).

The resolution of the emperor Francis Joseph to deliver up Venice to Napoleon III and make use of him as an intermediary for the negotiation of a peace with Italy, then push the southern army northwards and so continue the struggle with Prussia even if he had to summon the *Landsturm* (general levy of the people), soon gave way to sober recognition of the fact that peace must be made with the victor. On the other hand, Bismarck's wisdom and foresight in face of the formidable attitude of France and in the interest of the main object of his policy, were successful in restraining the Prussian king

from making annexations at the expense of Austria and Saxony. The formation of the North German Confederation and Prussia's treaties of alliance with the conquered states of South Germany preceded (July 5th-25th) the Nikolsburg negotiations (July 26th) and the definite Peace of Prague with Austria (August 23rd).

Austria withdrew from Italy and from Germany, with which she had been in close historical and political connection for more than a thousand years; and thus the German question was finally solved in favour of the predominance of Prussia and the idea of German unity.

THE *AUSGLEICH* WITH HUNGARY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUALISM OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DOWN TO THE NEW INTERNAL CRISIS OF CISLEITHANIA (1867-1878)

The entry of the whilom Saxon prime-minister, Ferdinand Freiherr von Beust, who had hitherto represented the anti-Prussian policy of the central states, into the service of Austria as conductor of foreign affairs (October 30th, 1866), opens an era of transition which brings with it the retirement of the minister of the interior, Belcredi, and an *Ausgleich* (agreement) with Hungary.

When, on the 6th of January, 1867, Belcredi dissolved the provincial diets of the Alpine districts and also those of the Bohemian group of territories and of Galicia, because there his federalistic system seemed to be combated, while, on the other hand, in Prague and Lemberg the strife between the various nationalities was raging furiously; and when writs for elections to provincial diets were then issued for the purpose of securing from the new provincial diets an extraordinary Reichsrath, the German liberals responded (January 13th) to this attempt on the part of the government to win a federalist majority with a refusal of the elections, and at the same time issued a declaration signifying that they would only depute an "ordinary" "constitutional" Reichsrath.

In this they could at least count on the support of Beust, whose removal the federalists were endeavouring to obtain; and Beust hastened Belcredi's dismissal, which involved a reconstruction of the ministry (February 7th, 1867). Beust was placed at its head, and soon (March) we also find a trusted follower and old friend of the emperor, Count Eduard Taaffe, included in it as minister of the interior. Ten years later, under the same conditions, he was destined to provoke a fresh state crisis.

Beust, new to the state of affairs in Austria, and rather an acute diplomatist than a solid statesman, had soon made up his mind to make an *Ausgleich* with Hungary according to Deák's scheme or *Formel*—a course which was indeed unavoidable; on the other hand, he was resolved to maintain for Cisleithania the "narrow" Reichsrath as the only representative body possible for the western half of the empire. Thus the imperial rescript of the 27th of February addressed to the Hungarian diet, by its recognition of "statutory continuity" (*Rechtscontinuität*) in Hungary and of her constitution of 1848—implying the final abandonment of the centralistic idea of unification which Schmerling's constitutionalism had still maintained—opened a new era in the existence of the Austrian state; and nothing is more significant of the change of the times and of the state policy than the fact that the formation of the new responsible ministry of Hungary fell to Count Julius Andrassy, who from 1849 to 1850 had been counted amongst those condemned and exiled by the government.

On the 8th of June the coronation of the emperor Francis Joseph took

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place in Hungary with historical display. Transleithania was henceforth only united with Cisleithania dynastically and through the ministries of foreign affairs for war and for imperial finance, and matters concerning the common affairs represented by these three departments were arranged through the medium of delegations selected on either side in the diet and the Reichsrath. For Transleithania there was henceforth only a "king" of Hungary, and here there was a confident presentiment that the centre of gravity of the divided monarchy would be moved ever farther and farther east—a view in which Bismarck also regarded the future of Austria.

The German liberals of Austria saw in Hungary an ally against Slav federalism, and the latter found consolation in the hasty manner in which the Ausgleich had been prepared, especially in the decided inequality in the apportionment of the mutual disbursements or quota for common affairs; for, in accordance with it, 70 per cent. fell on Austria and 30 per cent. on "Hungary." This condition, settled at first for ten years, henceforth forms the chief financial crux of the Ausgleich, and in it, apart from the question of how to bring about a profitable customs- and commercial-union between the two powers and adjust the economic rivalry of Austria and Hungary, originates the lasting difficulty of the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich from decade to decade.

Transleithania had now become a political body in which Transylvania was absorbed and the old Serbian "Wójtodina" disappeared. Croatia, also, which had been excluded from the negotiations concerning the Ausgleich in consequence of its efforts for separate existence, had to accommodate itself to the Magyar pre-eminence in spite of the separate position accorded to it with its ban and three provincial ministers. Its Ausgleich with Hungary stipulates for 55 per cent. of the revenues of the province, for the expenses of common affairs, and the despatch of forty-three deputies to the Hungarian diet. That historic heirloom, the old Austrian military frontier, is also on the way to abolition and partition.

In his struggle for national and political self-preservation the Magyar was designedly and recklessly centralist, in opposition to the historical autonomy of Transylvanian Saxonland and all efforts after separate existence on the part of other non-Magyar elements of the population; he introduced his tongue as the legal language of the state, and laid for it a broad and deep foundation in the educational system.

In contrast to this, an essential and deplorable defect is shown by the development of the Austrian constitution, which had been interrupted in 1850, again attempted by Schmerling in 1861 though on other lines, stopped by Belcredi from 1865-1867, and once more taken in hand under Beust in the four fundamental laws of the 21st of December, 1867; the firm establishment of a single state language, the German, as an essential pledge of the predominance of the feeling for the state in compensation for all failings, was wanting and was never to be attained.

So on the 1st of December, 1867, the new ministry of Cisleithania, usually called the *Bürgerministerium*—in which we find a Pole, Count Alfred Potocki—comes on the scene under the presidency of Prince Carlos Auersperg, who was replaced by Count Taaffe, provisionally on the 26th of September, 1867, and definitively after the 17th of April, 1869. Besides these there were the three above-mentioned Austro-Hungarian "imperial ministers" (*Reichsminister*) for common affairs, foreign finance, and war. There now begins an epoch of ministerial activity and parliamentarism in Austria which was calculated and destined to produce much that was durable and fruitful.

The three denominational laws (May 25th, 1868) made a beginning, after which Austria finally abandoned the concordat of the year 1855 and prepared

for its formal abolition. Thereupon followed the new political organisation (Giskra, minister of the interior; Herbst, minister of justice), with its separation of the judicial machinery from the political or administrative government, the funding of the public debt (imperial minister of finance first Von Becke, then Melchior Lónyay, and Austrian minister of finance, Brestl), and also (October) the reform of the joint Austro-Hungarian army by the law concerning universal conscription with a period of three years' service in the line (imperial war minister Freiherr von Kuhn), the formation of the Austrian militia (*Landwehr*) with its own minister (the counterpart to this is found in Hungary in the institution of the *Honvéds* or "defenders of the country," established in 1848), as well as the reintroduction of juries and the new general law concerning national schools.

For the foreign policy of the monarchy the "tragedy" in Mexico—the violent end at Queretaro (June 19th, 1867) of the archduke Maximilian, whom a visionary longing for great achievements and the interested policy of Napoleon III had enticed from Austria into a hazardous position as elected "emperor" of the Mexicans, and whom at the decisive moment France had abandoned to his destruction—was only of some significance in that the emperor of the French, irritated at Prussia's rapid and unforeseen accession of power, was desirous of paving the way to an understanding with the court of Vienna, and under the name of a visit of condolence effected a meeting with the emperor Francis Joseph at Salzburg (August 18th-23rd).

If the Austrian imperial chancellor, Count Beust, veiled all thoughts of vengeance on Prussia, and, on the other hand, the difficulty of putting down the rebellion of the Dalmatian Kriwoschtjie diverted the attention of Austria from the great political question of the threatening collision between France and Germany and fixed it for a time on the south, yet the relations between Vienna and Paris continued and French diplomacy spared no efforts to secure Austria's alliance for the war against Prussia.

But the sympathies of the German Austrians ranged themselves decidedly on the side of Prussia as the pre-eminent power of Germany and her national protector; and in this they were in accord with the view represented by the Hungarian minister-president Count Julius Andrassy, that, for the sake of the dualism and, above all, of the security of Hungary, it was imperative to adhere unswervingly to the position of 1866 and the arrangement between Austria and Prussia as the peace concluded at Prague had established it.

But the main point was that Prussia was certain of the friendly alliance of Russia in the case of Austria's taking arms in favour of France. Thus in July, 1870, the policy of the Vienna cabinet was confined to the path of a strict neutrality, although a military preparedness against Russia, in any case for the protection of Galicia, was kept in view; and soon the world beheld the downfall of Napoleon's empire and the appearance of the German Empire of Prussia, whose recognition by Austria could meet with no difficulties.

But meantime a new crisis in the internal politics of Austria was preparing and bringing a serious danger to the constitutional gains of the years 1867-1868, to centralism, and consequently to the preponderance of the German liberals in the Reichsrath. Already in August, 1868, the Czech federalists and nationalists, encouraged by the successes of Hungary, had announced, in a declaration drawn up independently of the provincial diet of Prague, that they were resolved to win the same kind of separate position for the territory of the "Bohemian crown"; the Galician Poles had brought forward a similar claim in their "resolution" in the provincial diet of Lemberg, and the federalists and clericals of German Austria sided with them in the struggle with the German liberal *Bürgerministerium*. Unfortunately, the latter fell to pieces of itself through personal enmities and political differences; so that it was sub-

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jected (January-March, 1870) to a new reconstruction, and this was soon accompanied by a secession in the Reichsrath, which inflicted a blow on parliamentarism, and by the dissolution of the refractory provincial diet.

The reconstructed ministry lost all credit even with its own German liberal party, and also the confidence of the Crown, now falling more and more under the influence of its enemies. Thus it came again to the perilous attempt to solve the knotty internal problem of Cisleithania by way of federalism, as Belcredi had previously suggested. The first to enter on this path (April, 1870), but hesitatingly, as one who was only half a federalist and anxious to restore internal peace, was the new minister-president Count Alfred Potocki, a Galician magnate; but when he, despairing of any success, retired, February 7th, 1871, it was followed with much decision by his successor, Count Karl Hohenwart, a strict federalist, a champion of the October diploma, and a nobleman of feudal and clerical views, in whose cabinet two Czechs and a Pole took their seats.

When, on the 12th of September, the new ministry of Cisleithania emphasised the "legal position of the Crown of Bohemia" by a "royal rescript" to the provincial diet of Bohemia, this was immediately followed by the so-called "fundamental articles" of Slavonian Bohemia, of the 9th of October, as an embodiment of its demands and at the same time a protest against the continuance of Cisleithania as a "newly created state structure." Then came Pražák's motion in the provincial diet of Moravia for the union of Moravia and Austrian Silesia with Bohemia. The government wished by means of new elections to oppose the German liberals as centralists and adherents of the constitution with a federalistic majority; but encountered such a vigorous resistance in the camp of the opposing party and also in Hungary, who saw her interests threatened by the federalist experiment, that the imperial chancellor, Count Beust, and Count Andrassy, succeeded in persuading the emperor against the project and brought about the dismissal of the Hohenwart cabinet.

Before this (August), the important interview of the Austro-Hungarian monarch, Emperor Francis Joseph, with the German emperor, William I, had taken place at Wels-Ischl and Gastein, at which the two imperial chancellors, Bismarck and Beust, are said to have come to an agreement as to the bases of a friendly relation. Beust had then no idea that Hohenwart's resignation would be closely followed by his own dismissal (6th of November), and the falling into abeyance of the imperial chancellorship. Count Julius Andrassy, previously minister-president of Hungary, took his place as minister of foreign affairs for both sections of the empire. He became the main pillar of the dualism, the protector of Magyar interests, and, as the possessor of Bismarck's confidence in international politics, also the advocate of a good understanding with Prussia.

Thus in Cisleithania German liberal centralism once more took the helm. The new ministry (November 25th, 1871), usually called the *Doktorenministerium*, with Prince Adolf Auersperg at its head, was to a certain extent a continuation of the Bürgerministerium of the years 1867-1870, worked in the same direction, and hoped by the elective reform bill of the 15th of February, 1873 (minister of the interior, Doctor Lasser), to make an advance towards the establishment of a federalistic majority through the elections to the Reichsrath. These had hitherto been made through the provincial diets; but now direct Reichsrath elections were introduced independently of the provincial diets—a measure which at a previous time it had been attempted to carry out in individual cases, as, for instance, for Bohemia, but which was now adopted by both houses, peers and deputies, and sanctioned by the Crown as a law (April 3rd, 1873). At the same time was effected an increase of the number of deputies from 203 to 353, and they were henceforth chosen in the

“elective circles” of the province from *curia* or groups representing the various interests: great land owners (85), towns, chambers of commerce (137 together), and four country districts (131).

This reform was followed in January, 1874—in the time of the new administration of the office of minister of education and public worship by Karl von Stremayr—by the “denominational laws,” which culminated in the final abolition of the concordat (1868) and brought about a second passionate protest on the part of the Roman curia. This attitude of Rome, the resolutions in contradiction to history and the spirit of the times, the new dogmas of the papacy, prepared in Austria as elsewhere the way for the Old Catholic (*altkatholischen*) movement.

But the greatest difficulty was immediately prepared for the new ministry by the renewal of the financial *Ausgleich* with Hungary, where Deák’s party (January, 1876) blended with the left centre into the liberal “government party” supported the new minister-president, Koloman Tisza (October, 1875), and succeeded in procuring the conversion of the Austrian national bank into an “Austro-Hungarian bank” (June 27th, 1878), as a logical consequence of the state dualism.

When the new phase of the eastern question came up, when the Christian *rajahs* in Herzegovina and Bosnia rose in rebellion (1875), when Russia appeared in favour of the principalities of the Balkan Peninsula which had become insubordinate to the Porte, and when finally the war of Czar Alexander II with Turkey broke out and the Peace of San Stefano (March 3rd, 1878) was forced on the Russians—the Berlin congress (June) assigned to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the hinterlands of Dalmatia and Croatia, and this “occupation” was effected after a tough contest with the predominant Turkish population in those provinces (18th of August). But now the German liberal party committed the fatal mistake of pushing their adherence to principles to an extreme, when they raised a most ill-timed outcry against the occupation, and in this way gave offence to the Crown and cut the ground from under the feet of the ministry of their own party, which had been tottering ever since 1876. The result was that in July, 1878, Prince Auersperg and his colleagues had to request the Crown’s permission to resign.

THE ERA OF THE CISLEITHANIAN AUSGLEICH (1879-1898)

The Auersperg German liberal ministry, the *Doktorenministerium*, was soon to vanish from the scene. The imperial minister of finance, Depretis, failed to form a new cabinet, and so, on the 16th of February, 1879, the celebrated Count Taaffe assumed the difficult task. Taaffe, who possessed the emperor’s confidence, was a political empiric, a scorner of fixed principles and of parliamentarism, a constant opportunist, and accustomed to find himself at home in every situation. Recently, from 1871 to 1878, he had been governor of the Tyrol. The Auersperg cabinet had been dissolved on the 6th of October, 1878, but had continued to manage the affairs of the state until the 16th of February, 1879. Taaffe had first to construct a new transition ministry with individual members of the previous one, and after the 13th of August he had, as minister-president, to provide for the composition of a government which, as a coalition ministry (including the Old Czech Pražák), should achieve the “reconciliation” of the various nationalities on the basis of the constitution—that is, effect an *Ausgleich* in Cisleithania.

Since this could be brought about only at the expense of the German constitutional party, the so-called Left, and as the latter set itself against

[1879-1891 A.D.]

Taafe's programme, he endeavoured to secure the adherence of the Galician Poles—who were constantly more and more favoured politically in the matter of their autonomy; of the Old and Young Czechs, and of the federalistic clerical party under Hohenwart's leadership—the so-called Right Centre—who now joined together as the Right, and found themselves in the majority with 168 votes against 145 of the Left (forty deputies remained free lances, not siding with either party). The Right now became the government party.

This decided alteration in internal conditions, so threatening to German liberalism in Cisleithania, somewhat counterbalanced the important agreement concluded between Bismarck and Andrassy. In this the object of the former was to secure Germany against schemes of reprisal on the part of France and the Russian Empire, whose alliance the republic was courting, while Andrassy had in view the protection of the dualism of Austria-Hungary and of the Magyar element against the idea of Slav unity (September 21st–October 7th, 1879). This agreement accomplished the alliance of Austria and Germany in the interests of peace and mutual defence.

This was Andrassy's last political achievement. He resigned immediately; his successor at the foreign office was Heinrich Freiherr von Haymerle (since 1877 Austrian ambassador to the royal Italian court in Rome), who continued in the course of policy marked out by Andrassy; and on his death, soon after (October 10th, 1881), he was followed in his turn by Count Gustav Kálnoky, who did the same, and in unison with Bismarck arranged the expansion of the German and Austrian alliance into a triple alliance—Austria, Germany, and Italy as opposed to France and Russia (1883). From this time forward the triple alliance of central Europe remained the guiding line of continental politics and the point of attack for the Slav world of Austria, as was repeatedly the case even in Hungary with the opposition party.

Taafe's attempt at an *Ausgleich* had to begin with concessions to the Czechs (language ordinance of the 19th of April, 1880) and to the clericals (new school ordinance of the 2nd of May, 1883, as an amendment of some provisions of the school law of 1869), and he was soon embarrassed by comprehensive demands.

On the other hand, the opposition of the Germans in Bohemia to the growing ascendancy of the Czechs was increasing in vigour. The government was anxious to silence it, and in January, 1890, opened the Vienna *Ausgleich*-conference, intended, amongst other things, to investigate the question of the nationalistic delimitation of the judicial circuits, which had been the crying one on the German side since 1886. Besides this, Taafe had also to inquire into the practical necessity of insisting on German as the state language, which was repeatedly emphasised, in especial by the military party and its leader Archduke Albert as chief inspector of the forces. But the German liberal motion (by Wurmbrand) made in the Reichsrath in 1880 and 1884 had against it the main forces of the whole Right as well as the German feudalists and clericals, and was laid aside.

Thus the *Ausgleich* ministry remained in an uncertain attitude, wavering between the German constitutional party, the united Left, and its opponent, the united Right. In February, 1891, the place of the minister of finance, Dunajewski, a Pole, was taken by the German Austrian, Doctor Steinbach. In Hungary also the government's difficulties increased, for their party had against it a growing opposition, which was composed of the so-called "popular party" (*Apponyi*) and the fractions of that "independence party" which aimed beyond the dualism at a personal union of Hungary with Austria. Since Francis Kossuth, the son of the ex-governor Louis Kossuth (who died at Turin, 1893), succeeded in obtaining the rights of citizenship in Hungary

which the opposition would have already claimed for his father in 1889, this independence party possesses in him a leader, though one of moderate abilities.

Meantime, in view of the growing opposition, the minister-president Tisza had given in his resignation; he was followed (March, 1890) by Count Julius Szapáry, who was compelled to retire by the opposition of the clergy in the Protestant question (November, 1892), after which the new minister-president Wekerle became all the more urgent for civil marriage, the regulation of mixed marriages, the legal acceptance of the Jewish faith, and the freedom of religious worship. But Wekerle fell into disgrace with the Crown through the intrigues of the "Kossuth party," and in December, 1894, resigned his post to Freiherr Desiderius Bánffy.

Shortly after this (1895, May) occurred the dispute on the question of jurisdiction between Bánffy and the imperial minister of foreign affairs, Kálnoky, in the affair of the nuncio Agliardi and his attempt to summon the episcopate of Hungary to resist the new church laws. The circumstance that this dispute ended in the retirement of Kálnoky shows that in such trials of strength Hungary—as both before and after—retained the advantage. Kálnoky's successor was the Polish nobleman, Count Agenor Goluchowski, son of the minister of that name who held office in the year 1860.

It is significant that the last months of the "conciliatory ministry" (*Versöhnungsministerium*) were accompanied by the refractory conduct of the Young Czechs, who in the provincial diet of Prague (May) resorted for the first time to a method of opposition hitherto unheard of—that of riotous "obstruction"—and by a rising of the Slav mob in Prague (September) which resulted in a state of siege. On the other hand, Steinbach's proposition, brought forward on October 10th—a new method of election to the Reichsrath for the curia of the towns and country districts—was destined to make the government popular with the social democrat party, the advocates of the working class—the "small man" (*der kleine Mann*). This party had been gradually increasing in strength, and by its means the opposition of the Left was to be reduced to a yet smaller minority. But as not only the Left but also the German conservative feudalists (the Hohenwart party) and the Poles as agrarians made a decided stand against this bill, the Taaffe ministry suffered a parliamentary defeat and resigned (November 11th, 1893).

The cabinet now appeared as a continuation of that of Taaffe, again under the guise of a coalition ministry, but by means of a compromise with the Left it was far better balanced than the retiring one and composed of German liberals, Poles, and German conservative liberals. At its head was placed Prince Alfred Windischgrätz, the younger, without a portfolio. He also had as little success in pushing through the election reform as in advancing the cause of the nationalist Ausgleich in Cisleithania, and finally came to grief over the opposition of the Left to the bill for a Slav gymnasium in the Styrian town of Cilli. This measure was forced on the government by the Slovenes of Inner Austria and their allies in the Reichsrath, when the Left immediately threatened to secede from the coalition. The Windischgrätz cabinet at once (June 19th, 1895) gave place to a "transition" or bureaucratic ministry formed by the governor of Lower Austria, Erich von Kielmannsegg, which was immediately followed (October 2nd) by a new conciliatory coalition ministry, of mainly German complexion. Its president was the Polish count, Kasimir Badeni, previously governor of Galicia, the man of a "strong hand."

In his brief programme emphasis is indeed laid on "a powerful, patriotic Austria, advancing with solidarity," as the goal to work for, but the government adhered to the Right as the government party and consequently was only too soon compelled to engage in a sharp encounter with the German Left in the Reichsrath. Still, the new government was successful in passing (Febru-

[1896-1898 A.D.]

ary, 1896) the elective reform of Taaffe and Steinbach, in accordance with which every citizen of twenty-four years of age was enfranchised under certain conditions; and consequently the five curiæ or "general elective classes" were brought into existence, and seventy-two new members were added to the three hundred and fifty-three of which the house of deputies had hitherto consisted.

The elections in question not only resulted in many instances in the humiliation of the German liberals, who were already greatly divided among themselves and outstripped in influence and political credit by the younger groups on the Left (popular party, German progressive party, free German union, Old German or Schönerer party), but the results also strengthened the social democrats (fifteen deputies) and their opponents, the Christian socialists, a group which was connected with the clericals and the Catholic popular party (it had its origin in anti-Semitism), and which, since the appearance of Karl Lueger as a candidate for the office of burgomaster in Vienna, had acquired for itself the pre-eminence in the municipal council of the imperial capital. They (twenty-seven deputies) became in a certain sense the pointer in the balance of the parliament's resolutions, since the united Right, as the government party, counted without them two hundred and fifteen deputies, and stood facing an opposition of one hundred and seventy-eight deputies of the united Left, exclusive of the social democrats.

Badeni published a new language ordinance for the transaction of official business in Bohemia (April, 1897), in which his chief aim was to win over the Young Czechs; and he also attempted, by a provisional measure (*provisorium*) to get over the difficulties in the way of renewing the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich. These proceedings at once precipitated a tumultuous outburst of indignation in the form of the "German obstruction," and from the 24th to the 26th of October there were fresh tumults in the house of deputies, till matters came to such a pass that the Badeni ministry had no course left to it but to resign (November 28th, 1897).

The Crown now made an attempt at the formation of a "Bureaucratic ministry," of German complexion, through the agency of Freiherr Paul von Gautsch, who had previously been minister of public worship and education; but this was followed, as early as the 7th of March, 1898, by a new cabinet presided over by the ex-governor of Bohemia, Count Francis Thum, a feudalist. In this "reconstruction" a Young Czech, Doctor Kaizl, for the first time took his place as finance minister, and soon a member of the Catholic people's party, the Tyrolese Freiherr von Dipauli, became finance minister.

In Hungary, which in 1897 celebrated with much pomp and stir the festival of the thousandth anniversary of her existence, the so-called independence party and the popular party compelled the resignation of the premier Bánffy (February, 1898), when Koloman Szell took his place and had to accept as a legacy the difficult work of the financial Ausgleich.

On the 2nd of December, 1898, amid these intestine conflicts, closed the fiftieth year of rule of the emperor Francis Joseph, who was now sixty-eight years old, and whose reign had been fraught with severe trials and abrupt changes of political system. The violent death of his son and heir, Rudolf, on the 30th of January, 1889, the murder of the empress Elizabeth in Geneva, September 10th, 1898, by the mad act of an anarchist, are the tragic incidents in his personal life as a ruler before his jubilee. A successor to his throne was appointed in Francis Ferdinand, the eldest son of his deceased brother, Archduke Karl Ludwig, heir of the house of the dukes of Modena-Este, which had, however, been dispossessed in Italy—a house closely connected with that of Habsburg-Lorraine. This affair, as well as the marriage of the archduke Ferdinand with the countess Chotek, was a much agitated state question, especially in Hungary.

THE MEETING-POINT OF THE CENTURIES.

The years 1899-1906 afford by no means a cheerful view of the internal affairs of Cisleithania. In 1899 (September 23d) the Thum Ministry had to yield to the attack of the German Opposition. It was followed by a "bureaucratic ministry" got together at command of the Crown by the ex-governor of Styria, Count Manfred Clary Aldringen, who was honestly anxious for a political and nationalistic Ausgleich in Cisleithania, as is shown by the abrogation of Badeni's language ordinance.

He failed in his mission, and within a few weeks it became necessary (December 21, 1899) therefore to reorganise the new "bureaucratic ministry" under the presidency of the Minister of Railways, Heinrich von Wittel, so that at least the provisional arrangement for the Ausgleich with Hungary might be disposed of. But in January, 1900, Ernest von Körber took Wittel's place as President and Minister of the Interior of the newly constructed "bureaucratic ministry," where, besides the "native minister" for Poland, room was also found for one for Czech Bohemia. Despite the difficulties arising out of the growing pressure of Slav demands, the question of the renewal of the financial Ausgleich with Hungary, and other matters, the new Premier managed to maintain himself until December, 1904, when he suffered defeat and was succeeded by Baron Gautsch, who had been Prime Minister for a short time in 1897 after the fall of Badeni. One of the problems which face the new Ministry is the reform of the suffrage.

Besides this the Welsch Tyrolese or Trentino question, the pressure of the Italians in Tyrol for complete administrative separation from German Tyrol, imperatively demands a decision. The foundation of Slav and Italian high schools appears merely as a consequence of nationalistic struggles, whilst on the other hand, the agitation for calling into existence again a university at Salzburg seems only a necessity of clerical party tactics. The movement in Cisleithania in favour of a so-called "break with Rome," the ostentatious conversions to the Protestant faith amongst the German population, spring from sentiments of German nationalism and from indignation at the attitude of the German Austrian clerics in discounting those sentiments; whilst in the Austrian clergy the Slav agitation possesses an important ally, and amongst the southern Slavs of Austria efforts are being made in favour of the introduction of the old Slav liturgy.

On both sides of the Leitha the advance of the extreme and radical parties is constantly becoming more perceptible; only in Hungary, where, moreover, the clerics remain nationalistic in their views, has the government still a strong, coherent liberal party at its disposal, whilst in Cisleithania this is not the case. Especially deplorable is the division into parties and the disunion among themselves which has been increasing in the ranks of the German population ever since 1879, and their intestine war to the damage of their own great cause and of the German leadership in the parliamentary life of the empire.

The Oriental question is moving towards a new and formidable crisis. Any moment may lead to the advance of the Austrians from Novi-Bazar, and bring in its train complications of incalculable extent, either over Albanian affairs with Italy, or in the Montenegrin, -Servian, -Bulgarian question with Russia. For the present nothing is more desirable than the inclusion in the monarchy proper of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only in fact, but also in name, as "New Austria," and the abrogation of the treaty with the Porte, dated the 21st of April, 1879, in accordance with which Austria-Hungary administers those countries as a trust, while the Sultan remains their sovereign—a relation which was and remains a fiction.

[1899-1906 A.D.]

The unhappy consequences of the costly changes of political system, of unfortunate wars and occupations, of heavy financial and economical crises, and—as throughout Europe in the last decades—the unlimited increase of the demands of the military administration for the maintenance of the armed peace, find their reflection in the history of Austro-Hungarian finance, of the national debt, of the debit and credit in the state accounts—a history full of pathological interest. The machinery of state and communal taxation works on unceasingly, without being able to find many new points of attack or contriving to adjust itself to the ability of the taxpayer.

The most ominous fact for an agrarian state such as Austria-Hungary is the decline in the peasant farmers and the crowding of the country population into the great and ever-growing cities. This is by no means counter-balanced by a remunerative expansion of trade and commerce by land and sea. The state idea, which no longer possesses its essential hold in power and success upon the new generation that has grown up since 1866, is ominously declining before the disintegrating nationalist movement in the direction of federalism on the part of the polyglot population of the empire; and although this movement appears to be still far enough from its aim, and the centre of union and gravity still remains in the dynasty, and though the vitality and innate force in the life of the state must not be underestimated, while the power of self-interest and the instinct of self-preservation still holds together the people of the dual state, even in spite of themselves, nevertheless the foundations of its existence may soon have to be defended against a final and far-reaching shock.





CHAPTER VII

THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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"THE greatest of the Hungarians," Count Stephen Széchenyi, wrote in 1822 as a motto for the diary which he kept in German: *La Hongrie n'est presque pas comptée parmi les nations!* (Hungary is hardly reckoned among the nations.) Shortly before, his father had descended to the tomb, despairing of the future of his native country. Herder believed that he foresaw the extinction of the Hungarian language. And now Hungary is an important element in the political life of Europe, and her people have also demonstrated their ability and determination to progress both economically and intellectually. This change, at a period which nevertheless was not favourable to the development of the smaller nations, I will now briefly describe in its causes and progress.

Down to the end of the seventeenth century Hungary was in constant and active contact with the political and intellectual movements of the West. But when the house of Austria and Catholicism acquired the ascendant, they did their utmost to prevent this contact from which Protestantism, then very powerful in Hungary, derived its force. Under Maria Theresa and Joseph II the government did indeed endeavour to do a good deal for the improvement of the country, which, owing to the Turkish wars and internal anarchy, had remained in a very backward state; but their best intentions were laid open to suspicion and rendered fruitless because they attacked not only noble-privilege, but also the nationality and self-dependence of the realm. Joseph II, by introducing German as the official language, gave the very impulse that was needed to secure a better cultivation and an improvement of the Hungarian speech, which had hitherto been somewhat neglected in favour of Latin. The diet of 1790, which confirmed the constitution, was the first to prescribe the study of the Hungarian language in the higher educational institutions. The

[1804-1848 A.D.]

antagonism to the dynasty ceased. The privileged classes of Hungary had indeed a common interest with the throne in opposing the French revolution and its teaching, but the nationalist movement did not cease to work. It is just from this epoch that the continuity of our literature begins.

Of all this nothing was known in Europe. It was known only that Hungary was a country of great natural resources, but neglected; it was known that its troops had fought bravely in all countries, but still it was regarded merely as a province of the Austrian Empire erected in 1804. As a fact the government of Hungary, albeit independent according to the letter of the laws, was merely a dependence of the Vienna administration. After the downfall of Napoleon, in the general exhaustion following on enormous efforts, the court thought to clear from its path the last obstacles to absolute rule. An attempt was made to raise recruits and demand taxes without consulting the diet. All this was opposed by the organs of autonomy, the *comitats*—that is, the assemblies of nobles. This induced the king (emperor) Francis I to summon the diet once more in the year 1825.

The Hungarian constitution, in the antiquated form it presented at this time, appears rather as a hindrance to progress than as a security for freedom. Nevertheless it had a real value, as is fully manifested by the enthusiasm with which men fought for it and the sacrifices made for it. With all its defects and weaknesses, it not only maintains the privileges of the nobles, but also embraces all the remains of the political independence of Hungary which the conflicts of centuries had left intact. Briefly: it was the legal bulwark against absolutism and against the endeavours of the Vienna court to germanise Hungary and incorporate her with the empire. Every attack from Vienna made the constitution still dearer to every patriot, and even caused the abandonment of abuses to appear as a betrayal. Effectual reform was to be thought of only when the nation itself should undertake it on a legislative basis.

This basis had now been won; from 1848 the constitutional work suffered no interruption and this epoch was the most fruitful and in many respects the most glorious of our modern history. At first the diet merely confined itself to securing the constitution and to the endeavour to add clauses making absolutism with the illegal recruiting and collection of taxes impossible. But soon a much higher and better ambition was awakened—that of developing the nation's own forces, and bringing the institutions and civilisation of Hungary nearer to those of the most advanced states—in a word, the ambition to convert her into a free modern state.

In so far as great movements can be the work of an individual, the merit of this change is due to Count Stephen Széchenyi. A man full of intellect and fire, and yet always with an eye to the practical, a perhaps unique mixture of warm feeling and cold calculation, of imagination and the calm understanding of things present, Széchenyi was at this time in the prime of manhood. (He was born in 1791.) His education had been almost exclusively foreign; it was only as an officer in Hungarian garrisons that he had made a closer acquaintance with his own country. As a captain of hussars he had distinguished himself in the Napoleonic wars, and had employed the years of peace in extensive travels, beholding with his own eyes the progress of Europe and the stagnation of his own nation. He had even thought of emigrating to America in order to satisfy his restless desire for achievement. But his patriotism conquered. The whole of his tremendous ambition was devoted to one aim: that of arousing his nation from its slumber, and making it free, cultivated, and rich, England especially serving him as a model.

A great sensation was made when, in the sitting of the *Ständetafel*, on the 3rd of December, 1825, during the discussion of the erection of the Magyar Academy, the magnate in uniform said shortly, "if such a society comes into

existence I offer it my annual income—60,000 gulden.” For him intellectual development stood in the first rank. For if Hungary advanced in this direction, not only was her language preserved, but her independence was better secured, as though by laws and formulas. His example found imitators; the fund increased, and in 1830 the academy was able to begin its labours.

There was no lack of patriotism, and even in the first decades of the century disinterested men had been found who erected institutions of public utility. Thus in 1832 Széchenyi's father founded the national museum, and his uncle Count George Festetich, the first school of agriculture at Keszthely. Széchenyi's office was to guide this public spirit into the right channels, and not merely to make the necessary reforms welcome to all, not only to indicate their logical sequence, but also to arouse the enthusiasm of the ruling classes to the point of action and sacrifice. Socially indefatigable, he still found time to sketch the picture of the new Hungary in a whole series of works which begins with the *Credit* (1830). To preserve a nation for mankind was his aim, and that nation should remain true to its word, its king, and its fatherland. It was a great step, when Széchenyi dared to declare in a society wholly feudal that the value of a people consists in the number of its scientifically constituted bodies. Universal liability to taxation, the emancipation of the serfs, the removal of noble-privilege on landed properties were his most important demands. Only by these means could a free state be developed. To enhance the commercial strength of the country he took part in the starting of the steamship service on the Danube, blew up the rocks of the Iron Gate, and laid the foundations of the Ketten bridge which was to unite Budapest and make of it a true metropolis. This undertaking had also a political importance, for the nobility, hitherto exempt from all customs and taxes, had here to renounce their privileges and take the bridge-toll on “their maiden shoulders.” Hungary was to be drawn into the commerce of the world, her products were to appear in the world's market. Intellectual and economical progress was the more needful in order that the foreign notions concerning capitalists and workmen, which were then invading the country unhindered, might not endanger the independence and efforts of the nation. “We cannot command history to stand still. The past is gone by; let us go forward!” is the essence of his teaching.

The success of this energy shows that public spirit existed in the country and only needed a leader to enable it to take effect. From 1830 the diet followed the path of reform unceasingly; the resistance of the government and of the upper house was overcome. Only in 1837 came a counter blow, when the government attacked the freedom of the press and of speech. At that time Louis Kossuth, the editor of the first parliamentary gazette, and Baron Nicholas Wesselenyi, a friend and travelling companion of Széchenyi and an impetuous champion of peasant emancipation, were thrown into prison. The diet of 1839-1840 took cognisance of the matter and the government had to release the prisoners. This was mainly owing to Francis Deák, the leader of the *Ständetafel*. The burdens of the peasants were regulated and diminished, the grievances of the Protestants adjusted, the Magyar tongue was recognised and introduced as the state language.

Up till this epoch the national movement had followed a uniform course. The diet occupied itself mainly with political questions; in it the opposition was pre-eminent, whilst Széchenyi turned his attention to social and economical matters and carefully avoided any encounter with the government. But although by diverse paths, both aimed at the same goal. This unity had its fruit. Hungarian literature then matured her first masterpieces. The idea that Hungary is once more to win for herself a place among the nations is the main theme; and Vörösmarty's poem *Szózat*, the appropriate national anthem

[1840 A.D.]

of Hungary, is the poetical expression of the hope and fear which filled men's minds at the time. Men began to believe in the future of Hungary, and even foreign countries began to give sympathetic attention to this movement. But in proportion as the movement grew, as its results and objects became evident, the dangers which threatened it multiplied.

Will not a free Hungary, intellectually and economically independent and devoted to progress, endeavour to loose the bonds which attach her to Austria and which are in many respects so oppressive and even degrading? Will she not, reviving her ancient traditions, set herself against the dynasty? Széchenyi, loyal and devoted to his king from the crown of his head to the sole of his foot, attempted to banish this doubt by saying that the interests of Hungary and her king were in reality the same, and that her close union with the whole monarchy and her political position were the first considerations. But centuries of struggle had accumulated so much distrust in government and people alike, that even a Széchenyi could not entirely dissipate it.

The other dangers were still nearer and more threatening. As is well known, Hungary is inhabited not by Hungarians alone. Hitherto property, intelligence, and political rights had been almost exclusively in the hands of the Magyars, and the best strength of the rest of the population had joined with them in order to acquire some influence. The emancipation of the peasants, the representation of the people must change all this. Croats, Germans, Slovaks, and Rumanians together were superior in point of numbers. Would not these peoples regard the supremacy of the Magyar language as an oppression, would they not endeavour to develop their own nationalities independently? The Croats were already stirring; amongst both northern and southern Slavs signs of Pan Slavism appeared; in a word, simultaneously with the acquisition of freedom, the problem of nationalities rose into prominence. This Széchenyi foresaw, and he also indicated the way to meet it. Avoidance of all violence and oppression, and on the other hand the development of Hungary both intellectually and economically, in order to preserve and increase her traditional preponderance, must, in his opinion, lead to the calming of antagonisms and reconcile the other inhabitants with the dominant nation. "Every better Hungarian helps the cause—every worse one repels and makes enemies," was his watchword. He also hoped for magyarisation, but in the most ideal fashion, through intellectual and material and liberal labour, unceasingly continued.

It is easy to sketch the fairest plans; to execute and give legal form to the idea is harder; but the hardest of all is to transform and guide the world of ideas, the whole being of a nation. This Széchenyi had to learn by experience. After the first successes, after the high-soaring expectations, his foresight, his carefully considered schemes appeared at fault. That clear understanding could not master the passions rooted in the deepest recesses of the soul, the impulse towards immediate possession of the object aimed at. And this impulse found a powerful leader in Louis Kossuth. After his release from prison, Kossuth founded a newspaper and preached the gospel of reform with glowing enthusiasm, with all the ornaments of his language and all the methods of appealing to the imagination which his rhetoric commanded. Széchenyi found himself obliged to stand forward, not against the policy, but against the tactics of the tribune of the people. The first champion of democracy, the poor advocate and newspaper writer continued to hold his own in the literary contest against the high-born aristocrat, the great man whom he himself called the "greatest of the Hungarians."

It was, however, something more than a personal antagonism, than the difference of position and temperament, which separated the two founders of modern Hungary from each other. Széchenyi, who had seen his country so

weak and had watched every sign of life with such anxious affection, looked upon internal peace as the first necessity, "in order that the tiny seed might unfold itself into a mighty oak." It was for this reason that he so jealously guarded the public opinion which he had created, for this that he sought to avoid any collision with the dynasty. Kossuth, on the contrary, in whom the traditions of the old struggle for liberty were revived, beheld with confidence the progress of his nation and was convinced that it must lay hold on every source of power which the constitution offered. If the exercise of legal rights should meet with resistance, he relied on the good cause, on the enthusiasm, on the patriotic sentiment of Hungary. Széchényi declared with prophetic discernment that this course would only lead to revolution, to the endangering of all that had been won, to inevitable defeat; but his Cassandra cries were lost in air. It was not only the youth and the women who applauded Kossuth; the most earnest men of the opposition, Deák and Wesselenyi amongst them, took part with him. Széchényi was left alone, and as the young aristocracy were uniting to form a new party, that of cautious progress, and the government, under the influence of the chancellor, Count George Apponyi, showed itself well disposed towards economical reforms, he approached the government, undertook the management of the department of communication, and devoted his energies to the great work of regulating the course of the Theiss and its tributaries.

Economical questions still further embittered the antagonism on either side. Széchényi desired to make the development of agriculture and cattle-raising the first consideration; Kossuth, to render assistance to trade and industry, which had hitherto been neglected and stifled by the Austrian system of customs. We see that in this Széchényi was still conservative, in keeping landed property in view and going out of the way of a collision with Austria; while Kossuth attacked the customs tariff, and through it the supremacy of Austrian industries, and at the same time wished to acquire influence for the democratic sections of the population who dwelt in the cities. Under his guidance, the "protective union" came into existence in 1844, its members pledging themselves to employ only articles of home manufacture.

The opposition, united against the government, was however divided on the important question of the future form of the administration. Kossuth wished to preserve the comitat as the best support of the constitution, while the young energies, the doctrinaires, including Baron Joseph Eötvös and the great writer, Baron Sigmund Kemény, saw the abuses of the old self-administration, and thought to secure the power of the state and with it the future of the nation by means of centralisation after a French pattern and by a responsible parliamentary government. The attacks which, in order to give a majority in the diet, the Apponyi government made on self-administration endeared the latter still more to the opposition. In the diet of 1847, which King Ferdinand V opened in the Hungarian language, the opposition had a majority; Kossuth, deputy for the Pest comitat, was its recognised leader. The debates for the most part turned on the illegal influence of the government on the comitat, an influence which the opposition wished by all means to make impossible.

It was, then, an active, rich political life which had developed here, where a few decades before a complete intellectual marasmus prevailed. And, into the midst of this eager progressive movement, fell like a bombshell the news of the February revolution in Paris, of the rising in Italy, of the awakening of the nations. The system of the Holy Alliance, and with it the narrow bureaucracy and Metternich's absolutism, was nearing its end.

Kossuth seized the moment. On the 3rd of March he moved that the diet should solicit the king to appoint a parliamentary government, but at the

[1848 A.D.]

same time to give Austria also a constitution. The future of the dynasty might rest on the most secure basis—that of liberty. By this Kossuth wished to put an end to the contrast between absolutist Austria and constitutional Hungary, the relation which Széchényi denominated “the mixed marriage”; he wished to secure Hungary’s statutory independence, but in no case to sever the tie which bound Hungary to the dynasty and Austria. The estates accepted the motion unanimously, the magnates hung back, the government meditated dismissing the diet. The rising in Vienna on March 13th, in consequence of which Metternich was forced to fly, the commotion in Pest on March 15th, and the revolution in Milan, soon put an end to hesitations. Austria received a constitution and Hungary her first independent ministry.

The new government, headed by Count Louis Batthyányi, included the best names in the country: Széchényi, Deák, Kossuth, Eötvös. Prince Paul Esterházy, the first nobleman of the realm, was appointed as minister at the court to manage the relations with Austria. The diet at once hurried through the most pressing reforms—the union with Transylvania, popular representation, universal liability to taxation, the abolition of serfdom with compensation to the landowners, the abolition of ecclesiastical tithes, equality of rights for all Christian denominations, state control of the universities, and a national guard. The programme of the patriots was carried out to a great extent as Széchényi had always dreamed, the greatest change had been peacefully completed without a drop of blood being shed. Universal rejoicing greeted the king when he came to Pressburg to confirm the new laws on the 11th of April, which was now to be celebrated as the national festival. The nobility, which of its own accord joined with the nation, had renounced great privileges, and assumed great burdens, deserves the gratitude of every friend of mankind.

Thus the Hungarian renaissance had attained its goal; the nation’s unwearying labour had borne fruit. Hungary, by her own efforts, without and in spite of her government, had become a free, independent, progressive state. The new blossoming of her literature, the interest in art and science, the sympathy with the prevailing ideas of the century gave hope of a fair future, when fresh complications again hazarded everything.

The Vienna court had indeed yielded to the pressure of circumstances, but it was not willing permanently to resign the influence it had hitherto exercised on the finances and army of Hungary. The refusal of the Hungarian government to take over a part of the national debt further strengthened the antagonism. It was not possible to come forward openly, it was enough to stir up nationalist feeling. The Croats under their new ban Freiherr Jellachich, the Serbs under the patriarch Rajachich, and later on the Rumanians in Transylvania refused to acknowledge the new government. The benefits of the new laws were not considered; a racial war with all its horrors was on the point of breaking out. On the 10th of June King Ferdinand did indeed condemn the attitude of the ban and summoned the Croats to acknowledge the Hungarian ministry, but the intrigues did not cease, and Hungary had to prepare to defend herself against internal foes. It was at this time that the first ten Honvéd battalions were organised.

The ministry remained loyal and hoped to persuade the king to come in person to his faithful country of Hungary. But the conviction that the rebels were receiving support from the government, and even from certain members of the dynasty, continually gained ground. On the 11th of July the diet, after a great speech by Kossuth, granted two hundred thousand men and 42,000,000 gulden for the defence of the country. Negotiations were entered into, it was hoped that peace might yet be preserved on the basis of the laws; but when the king dismissed the deputation from the diet without any satisfaction, when, on the 9th of September, Jellachich crossed the Drave at the

head of a great army, when the Reichsrath in Vienna, in which the Slavs were in the majority, refused to receive the Hungarians—then even the most peaceably disposed were forced to realise that the only choice lay between the cowardly abandonment of their privileges and armed resistance.

Never perhaps in the course of history was a thoroughly loyal people driven into revolution in such a way as was now the Hungarian nation. Széchenyi's powerful mind gave way under the strain of this breach between king and people. He was taken, a living ruin, to the lunatic asylum at Döbling, where he survived during twelve years of insanity. In September the ministry resigned; the king's representative, the palatine archduke Stephen, quitted the country; Jellachich advanced on Budapest. Then the diet appointed a commission of which Kossuth was the soul, and the death struggle of Hungarian liberty began.

In these gloomy days Kossuth's fiery eloquence, his conviction of the just cause of Hungary, his ceaseless activity, the charm of his person supported the self-reliance and courage of the people. The country became a military camp. Jellachich driven back (September 29th) marched on Vienna. The October rising in Vienna assisted Hungary to gain time. Then followed the abdication of the emperor Ferdinand and the accession of Francis Joseph I (December 2nd, 1848) whom the Hungarian diet, however, did not recognise as king. Every loophole for reaching an understanding was refused and in the middle of December the main army of Austria under Prince Windischgrätz marched to subject Hungary. The Honvéd army suffered reverses; in the beginning of 1849 Budapest fell into the power of the enemy. The diet fled to Debreczen. To its envoys, who endeavoured to treat, the prince gave the famous answer that he did not treat with rebels. Windischgrätz deemed the campaign ended and occupied himself with the new organisation of the country.

But Görgey had led his army northward to the mountains; the valiant Bem, in whose forces the poet Petöf was fighting, maintained himself in Transylvania, in the south Damjanics defeated the Serbs, and beyond the Theiss Kossuth organised the army of the people. From March the Hungarians, under the leadership of Görgey, Damjanics, and Klapka, took the offensive. In April Windischgrätz was driven back to Pressburg, and at the same time Bem in Transylvania defeated the Austrians, and the Russians who had come to their assistance. Besides the fortresses of Buda, Temesvár, Arad, and Déva, only the western borders were now in the power of Austria. Under the impression made by Windischgrätz's advance, the court had dissolved the Reichsrath in Kremsier and had announced the grant of a constitution in which Hungary appears merely as a crown domain. Under the impression of the Hungarian victories the assembly at Debreczen, on Kossuth's motion, declared the dethronement of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty (April 14th, 1849). Kossuth, who appeared as the incarnation of the revolution, was elected governor. The form of government was not determined, but a strong republican party was established. The capture of Budapest by Görgey (May 21st, 1849) placed the cause of Hungary at its zenith.

It had thus been shown that even with the help of the nationalities Austria could not master the Hungarian movement. This induced the emperor Francis Joseph to accept Russian intervention, which had already been offered. One hundred and sixty thousand Russians under Prince Paskevitch crossed the Carpathian passes; from the east another Russian army under Lüders broke into Transylvania, and from the west, Haynau, the master of the ordnance, led the main Austrian army against the great fortress of Komárom. Hungary would scarcely have been able to resist such overwhelming odds even under the most favourable conditions, but now in addition the disunion be-

[1849 A.D.]

tween Kossuth and Görgey crippled her forces. Görgey withdrew from the line of the Waag towards Komárom, and after several battles turned to meet the Russians. Haynau pressed impetuously forward, occupied Budapest and Szeged, and at Temesvár defeated Bem, who was hurrying up from Transylvania. The diet had fled to Arad; thither Görgey also betook himself. Here Kossuth laid down the government, and Görgey became dictator with the design of surrendering to the Russians. The capitulation followed at Világos on the 13th of August. At the end of September Klapka surrendered Komárom: the war was at an end; Hungary lay vanquished at the feet of the czar.

Into the soldier's place stepped the hangman. On the 6th of October the execution of thirteen Honvéd generals took place at Arad and that of Count Batthyányi in Pest. Görgey was pardoned at the instance of the czar, and spent eighteen years in confinement in Carinthia. He lost more than his life: the complaint of treachery was made against him, clouding the memory of his earlier heroism, and it was reserved for a later generation to demonstrate the truth of the verdict which even then Bismarck passed on him, that not bribery, but the perception that it would be useless to prolong the struggle had induced him to lay down his arms. Kossuth, Bem, and most of the ministers found an asylum in Turkey, while officers and officials were thrown into prison by hundreds or enrolled as common soldiers. Haynau, as the emperor's *alter ego*, went to work with a savagery which recalls the Russian doings in Poland. There seems to have been no idea that the Hungarian nation would yet have to be reckoned with.

Hungary seemed to be lost: according to the views of the Viennese statesmen, she was to become a mere name, to sink into a province of the great unified Austria. A dumb, deathly stillness brooded on the banks of the Danube and the Theiss, and with restrained fury in its heart the nation endured its fate. And yet the victims had not fallen in vain. The great world to which Széchényi and Vörösmarty had appealed followed the events of the war with the closest attention. The people that could fight thus for freedom and life seemed worthy of independence. Kossuth was hailed in England and America, not only as a great orator, but also as the representative of liberty and modern ideas.

As at an earlier time Kinsky had followed Caraffa, so now after Haynau's reign of terror came the system of Bach, the Austrian minister, who was anxious by any means to incorporate Hungary with Austria. The whole administration was germanised, the constitution destroyed, several provinces were cut off from the kingdom. In the time of the emperor Joseph centralisation under the banner of humanity and progress advanced against the antiquated Hungarian constitution. But now the constitution of 1848 might content even the most liberal, whilst absolutism not only oppressed the nation but was also an enemy to all intellectual culture. And when Bach ventured to point to the results of his system, it was Széchényi who, from his solitude at Döbling, in his *View*, which appeared anonymously in London, laid bare the weaknesses and illusions of the bureaucracy supported by gendarmes. The emperor of Austria, he wrote, can no more be ruler of Hungary both by right and might than a man can be at once the father and spouse of the same female.

In these years of trial our nation was animated by the memory of the great struggle, and literature made the nourishing of patriotism its chief object. At this time János Arany wrote his epics on Attila and the Huns and on the brilliant and chivalric epoch of Louis the Great. Maurice Jókai by his romances depicting all the beautiful traits of Hungarian life made their own country dear and valued by all. As liberty had once united the whole people, so now did the common oppression. Parties, orders, denominations, and even nationalities were welded together far more than they had ever been be-

fore. "Our nation, our language, shows fairer blossom from day to day," one wrote in 1859. The great work of the laws of 1848, the release of the serfs, the universal liability to taxation, was maintained by the alien rule. The removal of the customs in regard to Austria was turned to the advantage of material interests. The regulation of the course of the Theiss was also continued. The population, the prosperity, increased apace. Neither the sanguinary nor the peaceful work of the Vienna cabinet could cripple the vitality of Hungary. Only one safeguard seemed lost—trust in the ruler, loyalty. Men placed their hopes in Kossuth, and every political complication was considered from the standpoint of whether it might not call forth the outbreak of a new and successful revolution. When the Austrian army was defeated in Italy, in 1859, the court feared a general rising with the support of Napoleon III and Victor Emmanuel. Besides, there was no more popular name in Hungary than that of Garibaldi. Many patriots kept up close relation with Kossuth and the emigration.

In these circumstances and under the pressure of great financial difficulties, the emperor Francis Joseph, who had meantime ripened into manhood, set about the heavy task of remodeling the monarchy. The October diploma of 1860 had at least restored the old comitat constitution, and the coronation diet was summoned for the spring of 1861. In it two parties stood facing each other: the one did not acknowledge the change of rulers effected in 1848; the other, under the leadership of Francis Deák, desired, first of all, the restoration of the statutory continuity (*Rechtscontinuität*) before it would negotiate. The February patent of 1861, which again proclaimed a unified Austria, made the union yet more onerous. In that gloomy time, when many looked for the recovery of freedom by armed force and foreign assistance, this great man appeared as the incarnation of law, of the national conscience. When the negotiations failed in their object and in July the diet was dissolved, he declared the nation was ready to endure a little longer rather than give up its rights; "for what violence seizes can be won back at a favourable opportunity, but when a nation itself surrenders anything for the sake of avoiding trouble its recovery is always difficult and doubtful." Thus Schmerling's endeavour to incorporate Hungary under constitutional forms once more suffered shipwreck. Even in the Vienna Reichsrath itself influential voices were raised in favour of Hungary's rights.

After the *provisorium* and the fall of Schmerling, the emperor, acting under the influence of Deák's famous "Easter letter," again summoned the diet in the autumn of 1865, in order to prepare the Ausgleich. Francis Joseph was determined to conciliate the nation; besides the lessons of history, the great interest of his noble consort, the empress Elizabeth, had an immense influence on his decision. But the complete restoration of the constitution of 1848 encountered great obstacles. Neither the position of the monarchy as a great power nor the rule of the dynasty was held to be secure if Hungary, united with Austria merely by a personal union, was to have her army at her own disposal. The commission of the diet discussed with great earnestness the question of how the foreign affairs and military forces of the monarchy might be ordered in common without touching the self-government of Hungary. In this discussion Deák's knowledge and judgment gave him great weight, and the report which served for the groundwork of the Ausgleich is chiefly his work. But before the diet could discuss this report there broke out the great war against Prussia and Italy, in which Hungary, not yet conciliated, could not participate in a whole-hearted fashion.

The intimate connection between the development of Hungary and that of the general situation of Europe, but especially between Hungary and German unity, is unmistakable. So long as Austria stood at the head of Germany, so

[1865-1879 A.D.]

long as the house of Habsburg possessed the highest title of Christendom, it was almost inevitable that the idea of the empire should play the chief rôle in all political calculations, that Hungary should be subordinated to this idea, and that everything possible should be done to germanise her. But when in 1848 the union of Germany under the Prussian hegemony began, this idea lost much of its force. The thought that the dynasty driven out of Germany must seek for its support in Hungary undoubtedly played a great part in Kossuth's policy. The idea was not yet ripe. Austria recovered her influence in Germany, and in connection with this the germanisation of Hungary under Schwarzenberg, Bach, and Schmerling began anew.

But now, when the battle of Königgrätz put an end to all the dreams of Austrian supremacy, when Venice, the last remains of the Austrian possessions in Italy, had to be given up, when the ancient imperial idea with all its claims on world-rule was borne to the grave—the future of the dynasty and the position of the monarchy as a power rested on the conciliation of Hungary and the development of her strength. Austria having again become constitutional, free Hungary could renew her alliance with her. The Ausgleich was effected, and it was a great turning point, the end of evil days and the pledge of a better future, when Francis Joseph and Elizabeth were crowned with all the solemnities of ancient ceremonial on the 8th of June, 1867.

A few months before this a responsible ministry had been appointed for Hungary. At its head stood Count Julius Andrassy, who had taken part in the revolution, emigrated, and, returning, had joined with Deák, who called him a providential statesman. He had soon won and justified the monarch's full confidence without sacrificing his popularity. In 1868 an arrangement was made with Croatia, by which the internal administration, the judicial and educational departments of the neighbouring districts were placed under the autonomous government of that province. The main tasks for the government and the Deák party were and long remained the defence of the Ausgleich against the very numerous opposition which saw in it a restriction of the rights of Hungary, and the revision of the financial and military institutions which were the outcome of the Ausgleich. The new burdens, the necessity of setting aside money for the construction of railways, as well as a certain want of sound judgment in public economy, soon made it necessary to raise loans and brought the state finances into disorder. To cure this the leader of the opposition, Koloman Tisza, went over with the greater part of his followers to the government party, which now (1874) assumed the name of the "liberal" party, which it still bears. Tisza succeeded in remaining fifteen years at the helm and in bringing the finances into order, in which task the finance ministers Széll and Wekerle rendered good service.

Count Andrassy had also made his influence felt in the domain of foreign policy. In the time of the Franco-German war he was in favour of the preservation of neutrality. When in Austria, under the government of Count Hohenwart, the Slavs attained to rule and the Czechs came forward with great demands, he contended against federalism as endangering the Ausgleich, and obtained the dismissal of Hohenwart. In 1871 he himself assumed the conduct of foreign affairs. He it was who gave the policy of the monarchy its eastern direction, carried out the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 1879 concluded the alliance with Germany against Russia which has ever since subsisted. Since the Bosnian campaign nothing has disturbed the external peace of the monarchy. The relations of the nation to its truly constitutional ruler have remained untroubled, and the love of the people for its king has been exhibited on every occasion—in a particularly affecting manner on the sudden death of the heir to the throne, Rudolf, and at the murder of Queen Elizabeth. The increasing confusion in Austria has scarcely

been able to produce any effect on Hungary; it has merely rendered more difficult the renewal of the *Ausgleich* and the commercial treaty.

First the political struggle and then the financial situation hindered reform, and Tisza's motto was *Quieta non movere*. Nevertheless, the ever-increasing difficulties in the sphere of legislation concerning marriage finally necessitated a radical reform of church policy, which was carried out under the Wekerle ministry (1892-1894), after a severe contest. Under the succeeding Bánffy ministry the Hungarian state made great progress, but the parliamentary absolutism which he exercised brought on a parliamentary revolution, to which he succumbed. His successor, Koloman Széll, made a compact with the party of the minority, and in accordance with this introduced purity of elections and the jurisdiction of the curia (supreme court of justice) in electoral questions. The many necessary reforms of the administration, as well as the healing of the evils in the economical situation, are probably the chief task of the internal government of Hungary in the near future.

Hungary is a state with thoroughly modern institutions, but with partly mediæval economical conditions. The work of Kossuth and Deák has borne fruit; that of Széchényi towards the social development of the nation still waits for its continuator. Equality of political rights has been obtained, but a wide gulf still divides the ruling and lower sections of society; for a great, prosperous, cultured burgher class, which may constitute the kernel of the nation, has not yet been entirely developed. It is upon this—upon how it may be brought into existence, upon the extent to which, besides the great political capacity and the historically developed virtues of the nation, the value of its intellectual and material labours may also make itself felt—that the development and progress of the Magyar state probably depend.



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BOOK III

THE HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMANY FROM 1740 to 1840

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THE century of German history which lies between the years 1740 and 1840 and is covered by the reigns of three kings of Prussia (Frederick II, Frederick William II, and Frederick William III), and the Austrian sovereigns (Maria Theresa, her sons, Joseph II and Leopold II, and her grandson, Francis), owes its political character to the dualism which existed from 1740 onwards between Austria, the old leading power, and the rising kingdom of Prussia, which had rapidly grown into a state of European importance. The century is further characterised by the development and intensification of German national feeling, which, after the collapse of outward forms that had subsisted for a thousand years, till finally they lost all significance, aimed at and demanded the establishment of a homogeneous state, a new German empire. Lastly, for Germany this was the century during which liberal ideas, heralded by the philosophy of enlightenment and triumphantly vindicated in France earlier than elsewhere by the Revolution of 1789, gathered new force in Germany likewise and brought about the transformation of the absolutist régime and the differentiation of society according to estates into the modern type of political organisation.

The dualism between Austria and Prussia began as a struggle for the possession of a province—the possession, in fact, of Silesia, passing gradually into an acuter and more comprehensive phase, until it became a contest for supremacy in Germany. The conquest of Silesia by the youthful king, Fred-

erick II, established a balance of power between Austria and Prussia, and definitely removed the latter from the ranks of middle states of Germany. Saxony and Hanover, her north German neighbours and hitherto her rivals, and Bavaria, whose ruler had reached out his hand towards the imperial crown, withdrew without territorial gain from the struggle for the dominions left by the last of the Habsburgs; the thoughts of aggrandisement these middle states had cherished were all alike frustrated, whether their greedy eyes had been cast on the Austrian or on the Prussian frontier. Except for the loss of Silesia, Maria Theresa maintained possession of her ancestral heritage; and, after the episode of the Wittelsbach Empire, she won back the highest temporal dignity in Christendom for her husband, Francis of Lorraine. But without Silesia, she said, the imperial crown was not worth wearing; for Austria, once thrust forth from Silesia, had thenceforth but one foot in Germany.

The desire of regaining Silesia and restoring Austria's unquestioned superiority to a dangerous rival was the motive which actuated Kaunitz, the Austrian chancellor, in his project of overthrowing Prussia by means of a coalition of the great continental powers and reducing her territory to the Brandenburg possessions, which were all she had owned at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The attempt proved abortive. In the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great, allied with England and the neighbouring electorate of Hanover, then subject to the British crown, warded off the attacks of the Austrians, French, and Russians, of the Swedes and the imperialist forces. He issued from the great struggle without loss of territory, and with his power and prestige in Europe so greatly enhanced that nine years later he was able to win a fresh province for his kingdom by diplomatic action alone, without recourse to arms. Through the instrumentality of Prussia the dissensions between Russia and Austria, which appeared as if they must lead to a fresh outbreak of war, were adjusted in 1772 by an agreement at the expense of Poland, in spite of the fact that Russia would fain have kept Poland undivided under her own hegemony. West Prussia, the district about the lower Vistula and the ancient colony of the knights of the Teutonic order, which Frederick II thus withdrew from the Russian sphere of influence, was inhabited by a population in which the German element preponderated; while Galicia, which fell to Austria as her share in the partition, had a population of Poles and Ruthenians. Thus again the dominion of the Habsburgs lost its hold upon Germany, while the realm of the Hohenzollerns forfeited nothing of its purely German character.

Frederick II did not aim at obtaining a commanding position in Germany nor at wearing the imperial crown. The extension of his territory seemed to him a more important matter than the acquisition of an empty title; for to such insignificance had the imperial dignity sunk in the ancient empire. His *Fürstenbund* (league of princes) of 1785, an association which he formed with a number of estates of the empire, had not the reform of the empire for its object, but was designed (in view of the renewal of the old alliance between Austria and Russia) to act as a check on the policy of Joseph II, which aimed at territorial expansion in Germany and at the enhancement of the authority of the imperial government. Thus, as early as 1778, Frederick had successfully combated, sword in hand, the intention of the court of Vienna to annex Bavaria. The union of Bavaria and Austria—which Maria Theresa had tried to effect in 1743, during the war with Charles VII, the emperor of the Wittelsbach line—would not only have amply indemnified Austria for the loss of Silesia, but would have furnished her with a compact territorial sovereignty in south Germany. This would inevitably have rendered the differences between north and south, and in most cases the differences between religious

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confessions, more marked than ever; the dualism of Germany would have been perpetuated, and the accession of the commonwealths of southwest Germany to the federated states of the north, which actually took place in 1871, would in all likelihood have been forever beyond hope.

A fresh outburst of hostilities between the two great German powers, which seemed imminent after the death of Frederick the Great and Joseph II, was prevented by the Convention of Reichenbach (1790). And presently, for the first time in half a century, an alliance was concluded between the two ancient adversaries. Their common opposition to the French Revolution led the armies of the emperor Francis and King Frederick William II across the Rhine. The disastrous result of the military operations against revolutionary France resulted in a vehement outburst of the quarrel they had so lately laid aside; and at the Peace of Bâle (1795) Frederick William II broke with his ally. Prussia found ample compensation for the cession of her far from extensive possessions on the left bank of the Rhine in the secularisation of spiritual principalities and (to the great detriment of the national character of the German state) in the larger Slavonic domains, inclusive of Warsaw, the capital, which fell to her share in the second and third partitions of Poland. At the Peace of Lunéville Austria again received none but non-German provinces—Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia—in indemnification for the loss of Belgium and Lombardy.

Inspired with inexpugnable mutual distrust, Austria and Prussia entered upon a fresh struggle with France independently of one another, while the crumbling Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, thoroughly subjugated by the conqueror and heir of the French Revolution, gave place to a Rhenish confederation under the protection of France. By the Peace of Tilsit Frederick William III of Prussia lost all his dominions west of the Elbe and the greater part of the Polish acquisitions of his two predecessors, and in two wars the house of Austria lost the Tyrol, its possessions in Swabia, Venice, and the whole seaboard of Illyria and Istria, together with part of Carinthia and Carniola.

The comradeship of Austrians and Prussians in the war of Liberation waged by all Europe against Napoleon, and the memory of the evils that had accrued to both nations from their long quarrel, threw the antagonism between them into the background during the epoch of peace inaugurated by the Vienna Congress of 1815. Prussia's policy turned aside (as we all know) from the traditions of Frederick the Great. On more than one notable occasion, Frederick William III, Hardenberg the chancellor, and (to an even greater extent) his successors in office, made Prussia's line of action in the affairs of Germany subservient to the point of view of Austrian policy. At the instigation of Austria, who scorned to resume the imperial dignity offered her, the Congress of Vienna, instead of accepting the Prussian proposals, which aimed at the establishment of a strong executive government, gave the new Germany the form of a very loose confederation. In this arrangement the interests of the middle states, who would have liked best to combine in a separate confederation and so form a "third Germany" independent of the two great powers, were at one with the policy of the Hofburg at Vienna. Prussia ultimately assented (as Wilhelm von Humboldt, the Prussian plenipotentiary, said) in a solution which did not answer to her expectations, rather than forego the creation of a national Germany in any form. On the other hand, Prince Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, regarding the matter from his own point of view, even after the lapse of forty years (in a memoir written in 1855) speaks of the solution of the German question provided by the *Bundesacte* (act of confederation) as "the only one at any time conceivable in principle or feasible in practice."

The courts of Vienna and Berlin were strengthened in the conviction of the solidarity of their mutual interests by their joint championship of the principle of legitimacy, which was at that time reduced to a set theory to oppose the ideas of the French Revolution and the sovereignty of the people. The two now coalesced with Russia—who in the eighteenth century had been the ally now of one and now of the other—in the system of the Holy Alliance, which was based upon the principle of legitimacy. This alliance, created by the czar Alexander on September 26th, 1815, repeatedly endangered by differences that arose between Austria and Russia out of their dissimilar attitude toward the oriental question, was nevertheless adhered to and respected in theory by all three courts for many decades.

The presidency of the diet of the German Confederation which sat at Frankfort had fallen to the lot of Austria as a legacy and result of her ancient historic position in Germany. But even then the economic leadership of the nation had passed from the elder to the younger power, by the establishment of the German customs union (*Zollverein*). The Prussian customs law (*Zollgesetz*) of May 26th, 1818, "based on free-trade principles as compared with the tariffs of all great powers at that period, protective in character compared with those of the petty states," was at its first promulgation accompanied by the declaration that all neighbouring states were at liberty to join the Prussian system. A treaty concluded in 1828 between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt contained *in nuce* the constitution of the German customs union to be; which was completed when in 1834 the customs union concluded between Bavaria and Würtemberg in 1828, and a large number of the members of the so-called "middle-German trades union," became parties to the Prusso-Hessian agreement.

Austria, which had consolidated her *Mauith System* on a prohibitive basis, and whose immature industries needed protection against foreign competition, was not in a position even to contemplate joining the customs union, much as Metternich would have liked to wrest this confederation within the confederation, this *status in statu*, from the guiding hand of Prussia. One of the fathers of the customs union, Motz, the Prussian minister, regarded this economic organisation as "the real united Germany," in contradistinction to the pseudo-union of the German Confederation, and pointed out the possible political significance which this union of customs might acquire "in the event of a dissolution of the German Confederation in its present form and its reconstitution by the exclusion of all heterogeneous elements." Dahlmann, the historian and professor of civil law, called the customs union "Germany's sole success since the war of Liberation."

The establishment of the German Confederation was a bitter disappointment to such Germans as had looked for the political regeneration of Germany and the creation of a living national entity as the outcome of the patriotic rising of the year 1813. And what this same confederation did, no less than what it left undone, increased the grief and indignation of the nationalist opposition, and brought home to the reigning monarchs, more and more vividly as time went on, the conviction that the existing state of affairs was rotten, undignified, and intolerable.

Even in the worst period of political decadence the Germans had never wholly lost their national self-esteem (which had been kept alive in the age of Louis XIV by perpetual wars with France), in spite of the accessibility of the Germany of the period to the influences of French culture and its subservience to every turn of French fashion. About the middle of the eighteenth century the feats of valour performed by the Prussians and their north German allies in the Seven Years' War were realised and celebrated as a national triumph throughout the length and breadth of Germany. Presently German literature

[1810-1819 A.D.]

and German philosophy began to set up a new ideal of culture in opposition to the doctrines of the French *éclaircissement*. Klopstock when in his poems he substituted Teutonic mythology for the mythology of classic antiquity, Lessing when he impugned the authority of the French classicists, Herder and the youthful Goethe when they entered the lists for "German method and art," Schiller when he put forth his proud motto, "Here no strange gods are served henceforth," and stigmatised the nation as base that "did not joyfully stake its all for honour's sake"—were all animated by the same spirit. It is true that, hand in hand with this development of national sentiment and national pride, there went at first the sentimental adoration of the rising generation for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and afterwards an enthusiastic admiration of the new liberty of France and the hero-worship with which the personality of Napoleon inspired even a section of the German people. But in the days of Germany's lowest humiliation, after the collapse of the old state of Prussia and the formation of the confederation of the Rhine, when the last remnants of German manhood gathered about the Prussian flag, the heroic spirit of Stein, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Blücher laid hold upon the best thinkers and poets likewise. This spirit of patriotism, this faith in the fatherland, found its loftiest expression in Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*; the inspired preacher of political idealism admonished his fellow countrymen that they, being the nation of ideas and the guardians of a primeval treasure of living tradition, were under a greater obligation than any other people to see to the maintenance of their own existence; and proclaimed prophetically that the vivifying breath of the spirit-world would lay hold upon the dead bones of the body of the German nation and join them together, bone to bone, "that they might arise glorious in a new and transfigured life." Kleist, Körner, Arndt, and Schenkendorff struck in poetry the notes suited to that iron time. When Arndt returned home from Russia with Freiherr vom Stein in January of 1813, he found a nation "transformed to the very depths of its being, an ocean full of movement and life," a loftier spirit of "God's grace and God's blessing."

Even during the days of foreign domination, Jahn, the "father of gymnastics," had published his book *On German Nationality* (1810) against the outlandish coxcombry and love of foreign fashions which had brought matters to such a pass that no man would now recognise the "proud Germans" spoken of in the days of Charles V. After the expulsion of the French from Germany Arndt put in a plea for the foundation of German associations to cherish national customs, German feeling, and the sense of national unity, as distinct from particularism or the spirit of exclusive provincialism. Such associations flourished for a time in several towns in southwest Germany, while the "German *Burschenschaft*" (a patriotic association of German students) spread from Jena to all the universities after 1815—"based upon the relation of the younger generation in Germany to the growth of German unity," and intended to promote the development of every power in a Christian and patriotic spirit for the service of the fatherland. The outrages committed by individual members of the *Burschenschaft* led to the dissolution of these societies by the confederate governments and to the Karlsbad decrees of 1819 restricting the liberties of the universities. But the agitation among the educated classes in favour of unity was not stifled by these repressive measures; at the universities the rising generation filled itself full of strong national feeling, and at the beginning of the thirties Otto von Bismarck, then a student at Göttingen, laid a wager with an American friend that the goal of German unity would be reached in twenty years. Arndt's cry of 1813, "*Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein*" (The whole of Germany it shall be), never thenceforth died away in German lands.

The yearning for national unity was accompanied by the demand for constitutional government. The nationalist movement and the liberal movement acted and reacted upon each other. In the opinion of the champions of the idea of unity, united Germany was likewise to be a free and constitutional Germany.

The century that lies between the years 1740 and 1840 witnessed at its commencement the utmost extension of absolute sovereignty in the territorial states of Germany. Frederick II entered upon the heritage of the absolute monarchy which his father before him had established like "a rock of bronze." After her first war Maria Theresa abrogated a large proportion of the privileges still pertaining to the estates of her hereditary dominions, with the declaration that at her accession she had only ratified the privileges handed down for good, not those handed down for evil. Her son, Joseph II, abolished the last remains of representative government left to the estates. In Bavaria, Baden, and other states a representative constitution was equally a thing of the past; in the electorate of Saxony and the principalities which were combined to form the electorate of Hanover it was seriously curtailed. In Würtemberg and Mecklenburg alone did the opposition that represented the estates of the realm still make head against the absolutist aspirations of the sovereign power. Absolutism trampled privileges and private interests under foot in the name of the *salus publica*; its reforms represented the principle of progress as then understood. But this "enlightened despotism," with its maxim, "Everything for the people and nothing by the people," was soon subjected to the sharp criticism of a new political thesis. One of the spokesmen of the physiocratic school, the elder Mirabeau, enunciated the proposition that the true constitutional principle consisted in resistance "against the governing fever—the most deplorable malady of modern governments." Even in Germany enlightened despotism of the old school paled before this ideal. It is true that the republican propagandism which took its rise in France gained less firm foothold on the right bank of the Rhine than it might otherwise have done, by reason of the speedy collapse of the democratic French republic; but Napoleon's enlightened despotism—of which the states of the Rhenish confederation and, above all, the kingdom of Westphalia, the appanage of the junior branch of the Bonaparte line, served as an example—differed materially from the older enlightened despotism, inasmuch as it was based on the abrogation of the prerogatives of the heretofore privileged classes, and kept in view the principle and aim of the French Revolution—namely, the remodelling of the historically developed but degenerate state of things on the principles of reason and natural law.

The statesmanship of the German courts found itself face to face with the question of the attitude it should take up toward these demands and results of the French Revolution. In Prussia the ground was already prepared. For decades the government officials of the school of Frederick the Great had passed beyond the qualified liberalism of enlightened despotism, and absorbed ideas which tended to the establishment of political equality. We see the effluence of these tendencies as early as 1795, in the *Preussische allgemeine Landrecht* (Prussian common law). The catastrophe of 1806 opened the way for reforms long contemplated though hitherto delayed by *vis inertiae*, and a vigorous determination, like that of Freiherr vom Stein, insured their success. The fundamental idea of these reforms was to give both magistrates and people a larger measure of independence than either had enjoyed under the old system, in which the magistrates were held in tutelage by the king and cabinet, and the people by the magistrates. Thus uniformity, promptitude, and energy were to be infused into the clumsy and rusty mechanism of government, and the subjects of the realm, set free by the emancipation of the peas-

[1815-1819 A.D.]

ants and by liberal public institutions, were to be granted a share in public life and so inspired with a sense of individual responsibility. And, finally, Stein planned in his perfected political structure a participation of the Prussian people in imperial legislation and administration by means of the estates of the empire and the provincial estates, and a representation of the various interests and professional classes.

After Stein's resignation Frederick William III again and again promised his people national representation, most solemnly of all by the manifesto of May 22nd, 1815. Moreover, at the beginning of the German war of Liberation the emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia had declared, in the Proclamation of Kalish, that Germany should receive "a constitution in harmony with her primitive national spirit." The act of confederation of 1815 did not give popular representation to the German confederation, but Article XIII of that document stated, at least as regarded the several German provinces, that there was to be a representative constitution in all states of the confederation.

These promises were made the starting-point and juridical basis for the constitutional propaganda of the ensuing decades. The army regulations and the conversion of the old mercenary army into a system of national defence, based on the principle of the universal obligation to bear arms, were turned to account for the advancement of the cause of constitutionalism. At the triumphal celebration at the University of Kiel after the war of Liberation, Dahlmann said, "Peace and joy cannot securely return to earth until, even as wars have become national and thereby victorious, times of peace likewise become so, until at such times also the national spirit is consulted and held in honour, until the light of good constitutions shines forth and eclipses the wretched lamps of cabinets." What Dahlmann described as a liberal political programme was "the endeavour to gain the victory for moderate opinions," but the theoretical preceptor of the advanced "liberals"—for so they styled themselves, adopting a party designation which had first come into vogue in the constitutionalist contest in Spain—was Rotteck, professor of civil law at Freiburg. In his *Ideas concerning Constitutional Estates* (1819) in which he takes *Landstände* to mean a representative committee of the whole body of subjects of the realm, Rotteck throughout takes his stand upon the doctrine of natural law and regards the people as the natural depositary of political authority, and the government as merely the artificial organ to express the mandates of the popular will, though he proceeds to modify these Rousseau-like tenets by concessions to the monarchical principle.

The spread of liberalism, however, met with a barrier in an opposite tendency of the spirit of the age—in romanticism. Even as in the sphere of art and learning the romantic school loved to steep itself in the temper of past times, as it sought out and held up to admiration mediæval works of architecture and painting and monuments of language and history, showing how they had played their part in the sphere of religion, in the revival of faith in the Middle Ages, and the strengthening of the empire, so in the domain of politics they waxed enthusiastic over the patriarchal Germania of the old order of government and society. Hitherto the theory of politics had been pursued almost exclusively by the disciples of the doctrine of natural law, but now (1816) Haller published his *Political Science Rehabilitated*, in which he challenged the ideas of the sovereignty of the people and the origin of the state by "social contract"; ideas against which Haller advanced the thesis that the state came into being by inherent right, and rested on natural merit or on the grace of God. The word "constitution" he styled "the poison of monarchies," since it implied an authority in the democracy. Haller's theories were destined long to rule political education in such circles as dubbed themselves

the "conservative" party, after the example of the French; and the *Restauration der Staatswissenschaften* made its most illustrious disciple in the person of the crown prince of Prussia, afterwards King Frederick William IV. Thus the liberal and conservative principles were consolidated.

The Austria of Metternich, the leading state of Germany, borrowed from this discussion of the theoretical principles of constitutional order such arguments as suited the views of its own policy. The politicians of Vienna, using the term *landständische Verfassung* (constitution representative of the estates) to denote the reverse of the modern representative constitution, were inclined to regard the latter as altogether inadmissible. At the ministerial conferences held at Vienna in 1820, the assembled plenipotentiaries of the states of the German confederation inserted in the *Schlussacte* (final act), which they jointly concocted, an article which was notoriously aimed against the modern doctrines of the division of power and the sovereignty of the people, for it determined that all political power was necessarily vested in the head of the state and that the sovereign was only bound to call in the co-operation of a constitutional representative body in the exercise of certain definite rights. In order to fulfil the letter of the act of confederation the emperor Francis tolerated provincial diets of no political importance whatever in such of his provinces as belonged to the German confederation; and, apart from any doctrinary considerations, a glance at the confused medley of nationalities on the map was enough to negative the idea of popular representation in Austria. For this reason Metternich was all the more concerned to persuade the other great German power, behind which Austria could not afford to seem (in the eyes of public opinion) to fall in the matter of national institutions, that for Prussia also the introduction of popular representation was "incompatible with the geographical and internal conditions of the empire." As a matter of fact Frederick William III rested satisfied with establishing, in 1823, provincial diets in which representatives of the great landowners and peasant proprietors and of the cities likewise were allowed an advisory voice. On the other hand, the south German states of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden obtained in 1818 and 1819 constitutions which occupied an intermediate position between the old system of estates and the modern representative system. In the north German states of Hanover, Saxony, Brunswick, and the electorate of Hesse the forms of the constitution of estates were not modified until 1830, and then under pressure of revolutionary agitation.

This agitation of 1830, which spread to Germany from France and Belgium, was here essentially constitutionalist in its demands, the impulse towards nationality receded into the background before the claims of liberalism; the constitutional states of the south and the dominions of the two great absolutist monarchies, Prussia and Austria, were untouched by the irradiation of the revolution of July. After the success of the constitutionalist cause in the middle states of north Germany, the liberal movement was followed by a wave of radicalism, which plunged the governments of the southwest into fresh alarms by the great demonstration at the Hambach festival in 1832, the first German mass meeting, and by revolutionary attempts here and there. Within the *Burschenschaft*, which again began to come to the fore, liberal and revolutionary tendencies now preponderated over the nationalist and romantic tendencies of the older generation, and among the band of "young German" poets much was said concerning the harm wrought to liberty by the narrow-minded principle of nationality. The excesses of the radicals gave the parliamentary leaders of the constitutionalist party occasion for a new pronouncement (1832) against the employment of violent measures; and from that time forward the forces of German liberalism were divided into a constitutionalist and a radical wing.


[1831-1840 A.D.]

In Prussia the desire for a constitution did not find open expression during the old king's lifetime. Meanwhile a political work fraught with consequences of the highest importance to the welfare of the government and people was being noiselessly accomplished, by the organisation of a well-regulated system of administration, by a frugal and prudent management of the public revenues which restored public credit and the balance in the national finances, by a sagacious and far-seeing economic policy which culminated in the foundation of the customs union already referred to, by the cultivation of the old military spirit in the new army system created by Scharnhorst and Boyen, by the patronage of art and science in the large and liberal spirit in which the university of Berlin was founded in the very hour of the new birth of Prussia. Had Frederick William III been able to bring himself to give his people the representation he had promised them, the government might have been spared the revolution. And in that case it is certain that Prussia would long since have made the "moral conquests" in Germany which the man who was destined to be the first emperor of the new empire spoke of as worthy to be striven for as early as the year 1831.

A contemporary French observer, Edgar Quinet, in an essay on Germany and the Revolution published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1832, predicted truly the further course of the nationalist movement in Germany: the unification of the German nation by the agency of Prussia, the rise of a great man, who should see and know his star in the full light of day. But Quinet was mistaken if he thought that there existed between the king and people of Prussia a tacit agreement to postpone the triumph of the cause of liberty in order first to work together for the extension of the dominions of Frederick the Great. Neither king nor people was guided by any such tactics. The fact was rather that the leaders of the German liberal party were only waiting for the accession of the next sovereign to lay their wishes and claims before the throne, while the king was so far from conceiving of himself as the heir to the policy of Frederick the Great that he overlooked and blinded himself to the natural antagonism between his own kingdom and Austria, and to the German dualism which still lurked latent in the existing state of things, and believed that the salvation of Germany lay in a firm conjunction with Austria and in the reactionary system of Metternich.

Another generation had to pass away before the change foreseen by Edgar Quinet set in—when the great man whose coming he had prophesied arose, and clearly realised that the conditions of German dualism on either side could be definitely settled only by a great war; and when, in the struggle for the hegemony of Germany, the policy of Prussia accepted the alliance of liberal and nationalist ideas.





CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF BRANDENBURG

[TO 1640 A.D.]

OUR chief concern in the present chapter, as Professor Koser's introduction would imply, is with affairs that date from the accession of Frederick the Great. It was only from this time that Prussia was able definitely to challenge the supremacy of Austria in the German hierarchy. Until this time the elector of Brandenburg was only one of several great German princes, even though latterly he had borne also the title of King in Prussia. The early history of Brandenburg has received incidental treatment in the general story of the Holy Roman Empire. But in view of the important future to which this principality was destined it will be of interest to take a retrospective glance and, through a somewhat more detailed study of Brandenburg, to trace the stream of the great modern empire of Germany to its source.

In explanation of the title of the present chapter we must bear in mind that Prussia did not originally bear the same relation to the other principalities of Germany which its later dominance might lead one to infer. The term "Prussia" was originally applied to the dukedom of what is now called East Prussia, and it was only in 1701, when this dukedom was converted into a kingdom, that the term spread its significance so as to include the whole state of the previous electoral princes of Brandenburg. Moreover, it was not until 1806, when the Holy Roman Empire was finally dissolved, that Prussia became an independent kingdom; until then it had always been feudally dependent on the emperor. Brandenburg, the electoral principedom, begins to assume its political supremacy in Germany with the Great Elector; and the territorial possessions of the Brandenburg Hohenzollern included Brandenburg, East Prussia, Cleves, Mark, and Ravensburg, to which the Peace of Westphalia added hither Pomerania with Kammin, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden.

The early history of Brandenburg can be traced from the foundation of the North Mark in the reign of Henry I (*circa* 930), after successful conflicts with

[1230-1245 A.D.]

the Slavs, from whom this mark seems to have been designed to protect the Saxons. The opposition of Saxon and Slav, Christian and pagan, made intricate by innumerable combinations of one territorial unit with another, is the characteristic of more than two centuries—from the reign of the first to that of the fourth Henry. At the beginning of the twelfth century Henry IV and the empire are united with the Slavs and Wends to suppress the Saxon. The victories of Wefesholz and Köthen marked the rise of the Saxon cause, with which is identified the glory of the house of Ballenstedt and the humiliation of the last Salian emperor, Henry V. But the final triumph was reserved for Albert of Ballenstedt, the Bear, as he was called, who continued the war against the emperor, won possession of the markgrafschaft of Lusatia, and became master of the whole territory that had once belonged to his maternal ancestors. Lothair, the ally of Albert, now became emperor, deprived his friend of the markgrafschaft (for it had been acquired without ecclesiastical sanction), and invested him in compensation with the North Mark.

Of Albert the Bear Von Ranke says: "He succeeded in his design of crushing together the races that had contended violently with one another from time immemorial, so that they were merged into the Slav and German elements, under the predominating influence of the latter. He was always a close ally of church institutions, without the help of which his ambition could not have been fulfilled; he united the two greatest impulses of the time, that of religious incentive and that of territorial acquisition. So the country became part and parcel of general and of German civilisation. Albert is a great and worthy figure to head this history—a man of strong characteristics."

The element of religious dissension, the contrast between the pagan and the Christian elements in the people of Germany, is still further illustrated in the conquest of Prussia by the Teutonic order (1230-1283). Originally the order consisted of a few knights who were banded together for the cultivation of obedience, poverty, and chastity, and for the destruction of the infidel. Hermann of Salza, the first great grand master of the order, conceived the idea of transferring the centre of activity from Syria to eastern Europe. His first attempt was made in Transylvania in 1225, but met with no success. The knights of the order were then summoned to the aid of the Polish duke Conrad of Masovia in his conflict with the Prussians. In 1231 they constructed a fortress ring which they gradually pushed farther and farther. In the same year Landmeister Hermann Balko crossed the Vistula. The order founded Thorn in 1231; Marienwerder in 1233 after the battle of Sirguna; and Elbing in 1237. A great rising, supported by the duke Swantopolk of Pomerellen (1242-1245), was at last subdued, and justice was shown to the converted Prussians. The country was divided into four bishoprics—Pomeranien, Löbau, Ermland, and Samland. The order then made a bold stroke in the northeast, and founded



ALBERT, SURNAMED ACHILLES,
ELECTOR OF BRANDENBURG
(1414-1486)

[1252-1499 A.D.]

Memelburg, the modern Memel, in 1252; in 1255 many of them joined a crusading army under Ottocar II of Bohemia and Otto III of Brandenburg, which defeated the heathen Prussians, destroyed their idols, and baptised the vanquished by the score. Ottocar then founded the city of Königsberg.

Another desperate rising of the Prussians took place in 1260, by which all that had been won was again placed in jeopardy. Once again the fierce zeal of mediæval Christianity contended against the heathen. Mitau was founded in 1265; Semgallen reduced in 1273; Samland fell in 1265; Bartenland submitted in 1270, the Natangen in 1277. Landmeister Conrad Thiesberg put the finishing touch to the struggle by the subjection of the Lithuanian territory of Sudauen, which until 1283 had remained still free. The conquered people was reduced to utter slavery; but freedom was given to the faithful, and they provided the nucleus of a German aristocracy.

THE HOUSE OF HOHENZOLLERN

The period from 1134-1319 was that of the Ascanian line, which Albert the Bear had founded. Thus, during nearly two centuries, one dynasty had governed the mark, which had rejoiced in vast territorial expansions. In 1240 Berlin had become a fortified post of the mark, and it soon took the place of Brandenburg as a political centre of the markgrafschaft. With Waldemar's death in 1319 the Ascanian line became extinct. The history of Brandenburg now becomes merged into that of Bavaria and of Luxemburg, and a period of anarchy, lasting nearly a century, reduced both the territorial and internal conditions of the mark to a state far less prosperous than it had enjoyed in the height of the Ascanian period; it is at this point that we must look to the house of Hohenzollern for any ideas of state development. In 1192 it had received Nuremberg from the emperor Henry VI, and its area had gradually increased. In 1363 the dignity of imperial prince was added to this house. Finally, in 1411, Frederick VI, burggraf of Nuremberg, was given control of the mark of Brandenburg by the emperor Sigismund. On the 30th of April, 1415, he was formally invested with the office and the dignity of elector. (The recognition of Brandenburg as an electorate had been formally granted in the papal bull of 1356.)

Three points in the reign of Frederick should be noted: (1) his successful control of the lawless Quitzows and other robber barons; (2) the mildness of his policy towards the adherents of Huss; (3) the candidature for the imperial throne in 1438, when the houses of Hohenzollern and of Habsburg came into competition for the first time.

Frederick II, the son and successor of the elector (1440-1470), had to struggle with the large towns, which resented interference in their national affairs. He subdued Berlin, however, and built a royal castle within its walls; and also gained possession of Neumark, which had been given in pledge by the Teutonic order in 1402.

Albert Achilles, the brother and successor of Frederick II, reunited the Franconian lands to Brandenburg. The Prussian historian cannot claim that his policy was purely Prussian, for it was coloured by his devotion to the emperor. His *Dispositio Achillea* provides the first instance of the legal establishment of primogeniture; this was a family ordinance securing the future separation of Brandenburg and Ansbach-Bayreuth, and establishing the custom of primogeniture in each. John Cicero, the next elector (1486-1499), did comparatively little to extend the importance of Brandenburg; but Joachim Nestor, who succeeded him, introduced Roman law to secure a uniformity of procedure and to establish a fixed and central court of final jurisdiction in Berlin,

[1535-1617 A.D.]


instead of the travelling court that used to attend the sovereign on all his journeys. In spite of the growing predominance of Protestantism, Joachim I remained a Roman Catholic. He left the Neumark to his younger son John, in violation of the family law; and so Joachim II (1535-1571) succeeded to only part of the electorate. Both brothers became Protestants and played an interesting part in the development of the Reformation.

John George (1571-1598) permanently reunited the Neumark with Brandenburg, and proved a valuable state financier. The prosperity of Brandenburg grew rapidly, and the population was augmented by Protestant refugees from France and Holland. The reign of Joachim Frederick (1598-1608) is memorable for the foundation of a state council (*Staatsrath*), from which the bureaucracy of modern Prussia was ultimately evolved. John Sigismund (1608-1619) inherited the duchy of Prussia, and the territories of this elector were more than doubled in extent during his reign, covering at his death an area of thirty-one thousand square miles. His administration is of sufficient importance to justify us in pausing to consider it somewhat more in detail.^a

JOHN SIGISMUND (1608-1619 A.D.)

It was certainly a most difficult and responsible heritage which the elector John Sigismund received upon the sudden death of his father. John Sigismund was born November 8th, 1572, on the Moritzburg at Halle, and ascended the throne in his thirtieth year, so that a long reign was expected. Under the care of their good and pious mother—the markgräfin Catherine of Küstrin, daughter of John Küstrin, celebrated as being the brother of the elector Joachim II—he and his younger brother John George together received a most liberal and thorough education. Simple-minded, of a contemplative rather than a practical disposition, easily moved, he early showed a want of concentration and a decided lack of perception. In the hard battles which he had to fight from the very commencement of his reign—for the possession of the duchy of Prussia on the one side and the inheritance of Cleves on the other, as well as against the malicious intrigues of a fraudulent government—he often showed himself wanting in real capability and energy. But he possessed one virtue which inspired him with strength and determination in the most trying circumstances—he obeyed his conscience: “God help me to fill the high but difficult position,” he once wrote, “so that I can account for it with a clear conscience to God and my fellow creatures, both now and in the hereafter. I am his servant.” With this as his standard he fulfilled his duty.

Contrary to the exaggerated zeal of the strict Lutheran court chaplain and cathedral provost, Simon Gedicke, who instructed him in religion, he showed from the beginning distinct broad-mindedness regarding the religious questions raised by the disputes between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Already



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as a youth he had taken the oath, possibly at the instigation of his instructor Gedicke, and affirmed by writing that he would profess and follow the then avowed and recognisedly true religion of God's word in which he had been brought up—which was contained in the Bible, in the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, in the three established symbols of the Augsburg creed submitted to the emperor Charles V in 1530, and in the same apology for Christianity of the Smalkaldic Articles, the *Longer* and *Shorter Lutheran Catechism*, and the *Formula Concordia*; and that he would remain true and steadfast, swayed by no man. He also had to promise that he would make no further changes; that he would neither hinder nor prosecute any servants or teachers of this creed in the schools and churches, nor let any one of the above mentioned doctrines be altered in any way. But perhaps it was just the exaggerated zeal of Gedicke and his Lutheran companion which caused or at least helped the young markgraf, afterwards elector, to acquire a strong aversion to the intolerance of the denominational Lutheranism, and as we shall see later to espouse the Reformed creed.

The dark storm clouds of the Thirty Years' War stood threateningly in the sky as John Sigismund's reign drew to a close. In the spring of 1618 the dangerous state of Duke Albert Frederick of Prussia, who had long been suffering from a mental disease, called the elector and his wife [Albert Frederick's daughter] to Königsberg. The electoral prince was also summoned. On the 26th of August the duke died, and the elector John Sigismund had to thank the king Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, who had been victorious in Poland, that neither the king of Poland nor those Prussians who preferred the Brandenburg rule opposed his inheritance of Prussia. Gustavus Adolphus had been implicated in the war with Poland, which broke out from the quarrels and claims to the throne arising upon the extinction of the house of Rurik in Russia.

Sweden Seeks an Alliance with Brandenburg

Both powers, Poland and Sweden, tried to profit by the situation in Russia to advance the extension of their rule on the Baltic Sea; and Gustavus Adolphus, with a view to the invasion of Poland, entered Livonia and penetrated as far as the Düna. The possession of the provinces of Karelia and Ingermanland was the result of his victory. In the autumn of 1618 he concluded a treaty of peace for twenty-one years with the Polish army; but the fresh outburst of enmity which occurred soon after was evidently anticipated, for in Warsaw the treaty was not even confirmed. King Sigismund III, nephew of Gustavus Adolphus, not only laid claim to the Swedish throne—though he and his descendants were greatly disliked, chiefly on account of their Catholic religion—but he also, like Sweden, endeavoured to obtain control of the Baltic Sea. Here, as everywhere, discussions were rife as to whether the Catholic or the Protestant religion should have supremacy in northern Europe.

Under these circumstances it was important for Gustavus Adolphus to obtain a treaty with the electorate of Brandenburg. With this object in view, he had made several overtures in 1617, and had pointed out that the king of Poland would never renounce the idea of conquering Prussia, and that the concessions in favour of Brandenburg were dictated by necessity, not by good will; an agreement between Brandenburg and Sweden would be advantageous to both sides. He commissioned the landgraf Maurice of Hesse to facilitate such a treaty. During John Sigismund's stay in Prussia the treaty between Sweden and Brandenburg seemed agreed upon. To strengthen his position Gustavus solicited the hand of the second daughter of John Sigismund, the

[1618-1620 A.D.]

beautiful Marie Eleuore, then in the full attractiveness of youth, whom he had met on a secret visit to Berlin. But the settlement of a formal engagement was repeatedly deferred. The electoral prince George William opposed the union and favoured the suit of Prince Wladyslaw, of Poland, eldest son of Sigismund III, hoping thereby to gain the support of the Polish court in the trouble which threatened him from the Catholic League of Brandenburg. Marie Eleuore herself was adverse to a marriage with the Polish prince, as she knew she would be forced to become a Catholic. When Gustavus Adolphus went to Berlin to make a last definite settlement for his marriage, the electress Anna besought him to postpone it again, as her husband was very ill and his mind was so weak that the union would bring great trouble to both him and the country.

Towards the end of 1618 John Sigismund was struck down by an apoplectic fit, after having just recovered from a seizure of two years before, which had warned him of his approaching death. Maimed and broken in spirit and body, he returned to Berlin in June, 1619. Overwhelmed with all his cares and the disturbed state of Bohemia, which boded the outbreak of a general war, and prematurely aged by all the hard battles and struggles which had filled his troubled life, he now longed for peace and rest; he had often confessed to those around him that he was tired of life, and that if it should please God to free him he was ready to go. In the autumn the electoral prince was sent for, and John Sigismund, being no longer able to carry on his work, formally gave over to his son, on November 12th, 1619, "the hard and difficult position of ruler of his country." In order to be completely removed from all the noise and disturbances of the court, and to prepare himself in quiet seclusion for the end of his earthly career, he was removed from the castle in a litter to the house of his valet Antonio Freytag. Here his illness made such rapid strides that on December 23rd, attended by his wife, his heir, his three daughters, and many councillors and servants, his weary and troubled life came to a peaceful end.^b

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR IN RELATION TO BRANDENBURG

The territories of John Sigismund were inherited by George William (1619-1640), whose want of decision was pitifully exhibited in the long struggle of the Thirty Years' War. Carlyle has said of him, "When the Titans were bowling rocks at each other, George William hoped by dexterous skipping to escape share of the game." His vacillation is all the more glaring when viewed in direct contrast with the firm and creative will of his successor.

We have already had occasion to tell the story of the Thirty Years' War from the standpoint of Austria, and we shall revert to it when we come to the history of the Swedish warrior Gustavus Adolphus. But here we must view the contest from another standpoint; we must note its influence upon the principality of Brandenburg,—the nucleus of the future German Empire. The great Prussian historian Von Ranke has left us a masterly treatment of the subject, which we quote at length. Clearness of presentation will of course necessitate some repetition as to matters of fact; but chief interest will centre on the consequences rather than on the incidents of the great struggle.^a

It was the internal conditions of Austria [Ranke says] which led to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. In Bohemia and Austria themselves the two tendencies in politics and religion which divided the world came into immediate conflict. The government, which aimed at a compromise, was upset; another filled its place, which, in accordance with its nature, followed

[1620 A.D.]

a strong Catholic line of intention. After the death of the emperor Matthias the succession to the imperial throne fell to the lot of the most distinguished representative of this line of thought, Archduke Ferdinand of the younger branch of the German line of the house. He it was who strengthened the hitherto loose tie with Spain. Brandenburg acquiesced in this election because it could not be prevented. Nevertheless the Bohemians, both those of Czech and those of German origin, had fallen into a state of open rebellion. Things went so far that they even thought of withdrawing their crown from the house of Austria.

So it was now a step of universal historical importance when the leader of the union, Frederick V of the Palatinate, determined after some consideration to take up the cause of that union; in him was reflected the Protestant principle in its present state of advancement. It can easily be understood that this principle depended for its chief furtherance and a most far-reaching development upon the step taken by Frederick V. What a fair prospect, if only other considerations of high importance had not been put on one side! Up till now it had always been made a sticking point in general German policy not to allow the claim of the Bohemians to exercise free power of election. Only once, under George Podiebrad, had this power been fully exercised, but not without disadvantage and danger for Germany. Since then, the claim by hereditary, corresponding as it did with the circumstances of Europe and Germany, had again come to enjoy a preponderating validity. In accepting the choice that had fallen upon him, Frederick V of the Palatinate put himself in conflict with the prevailing dynastic ideas. It strengthened Bohemia in her national tendencies, but it weakened the connection in which her territories were involved with Germany. Those who had up till now been his friends and allies could not and dared not support him. The most respected Protestant electoral prince in Germany, John George of Saxony, went over to his enemies. Even his step-father, the first Stuart on the throne of England, withdrew his sympathy from him.

The exclusive principle of Catholicism, on the other hand, acquired fresh leverage, in that it figured as the prop of the title by hereditary, on which secular power in Europe from time immemorial had almost wholly rested. The emperor was still in a helpless plight, but Maximilian of Bavaria, the best armed prince of the empire, came to his side, and as the king of Spain, in pursuance of an agreement entered into with Ferdinand, espied his own interest in the deal and did not fail to provide continuous co-operation, an army was brought into the field by which the Bohemian forces which could not succeed in consolidating themselves in an organised military form were routed and annihilated in the first serious onslaught, as well as the allied troops of Transylvania and the German auxiliaries. The battle of the White Mountain decided the ultimate fate of Bohemia. A bloody reaction followed, almost unparalleled in the extent and gravity of its effect: at one blow utraquism, the Lutheran faith, and the Reformed confession were suppressed or abolished. Only in the neighbouring territories, whose overthrow had been determined by co-operation from the elector of Saxony, did the Lutheran confession still survive.

Brandenburg suffered its share of this blow in so far as it belonged on the whole to the system which was doomed in the struggle. But the weight of the event recoiled at once upon her peculiar position as a power. Twice already had the evil growing from the investment of the house of Austria with the crown of Bohemia been stifled by the Hohenzollern princes. The first time, in the fifteenth century, the question had been waived—otherwise a Polish prince would have come to the throne; and, as it was, there was no reason to suspect that this acquisition, in view of elements of opposition in the country,

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would entail any threatening increase of Austrian military power. These elements were still powerful when, in the sixteenth century, Bohemia became definitely incorporated with the house of Austria. Moreover, at that time the younger line in this house, in opposition to the older, joined the German princes. Now, however, the emperor was unrestricted master in Bohemia. From that time Bohemia formed a real base for the power of Austria, which rapidly fell back into her earlier association with Spain and found powerful support in strong Catholicism.

BRANDENBURG RECEDES BEFORE AUSTRIA

At the first glance we see to what an extent this caused Brandenburg to recede as a power, both at that period and for the future, before the power of Austria. Moreover, from the Bohemian affairs rose a great territorial struggle between the two houses. The house of Brandenburg still held the dukedom of Jägerndorf for its lawful possession. John George of Jägerndorf, who was not regularly recognised by Austria and who was from top to toe a zealous Calvinist, had joined the opposition formed by the estates against the emperor. He appears as lieutenant-general in upper and lower Silesia, and accordingly held to the king of the palatine house, whose cause, so to speak, was his own; nor did he consider that cause lost even after the battle on the White Mountain. His troops occupied Neisse and Glatz, and would not allow themselves to be dispersed even after the agreement with the elector of Saxony concerning Silesia. His patents exacted of the Silesian estates that they should remain faithful to the old confederation, and take warning by the example afforded by the terrible execution in Prague. But already the emperor Ferdinand had published a ban against him which was executed by the imperials and Saxons. Their power was far in excess of his: he saw himself compelled to leave the country and to flee to Transylvania. This involved for the house of Brandenburg not only the loss of the country but also of a great position, the influence of which extended over Bohemia and Silesia.

Brandenburg was also not a little affected by the consequences which the Bohemian affair had brought upon upper Germany. Ferdinand did not scruple to avenge with the full weight of his imperial authority the insult which had been inflicted upon him as king of Bohemia: he published the imperial ban against his unfortunate competitor. From various directions the armies of Spain and the Netherlands on the one hand and Bavaria on the other over-ran the unfortunate man's hereditary territories. The union was far too feeble to offer any resistance. Its disintegration and the course of events entirely robbed Brandenburg of its influence in upper Germany, but there was a particular necessity for submitting to this loss. The disintegration of the union formed part of the conditions necessary to enable the elector George William and his cousin in Franconia to receive the investiture of the emperor. At this moment these circumstances were complicated by the fresh outbreak of war between the Spaniards and the United Netherlands. It so happened that the site of their engagement was the territory of Cleves and Jülich. Spinola and Prince Maurice were face to face, each in his hostile encampment. The elector George William made a treaty with the republic by which his rights were secured. He himself could contribute practically nothing to the situation; the manner of its determination depended on far other powers than those at his command.

Of all the consequences of the battle on the White Mountain the most important, for Brandenburg as well as for the empire, was the emperor's undertaking to accomplish, together with the suppression of his opponent in the

Palatinate, a change in the concerns of the empire; this being effected by the transference of the electoral dignity of the Palatinate to his friend and supporter, the duke of Bavaria, to whom fell also a considerable portion of the confiscated land. A similar transaction had been effected in the war of Smalkald by the transference of the Saxon electorate from the Ernestines to the Albertines; at that time, however, such a transference had less significance because it did not alter the relations of the conflicting confessions. But under Ferdinand II this was exactly what was intended. An effort was made to found, in the council of electors, a Catholic majority such as already existed in the college of princes; by this majority the Catholic reaction would become supreme.

THE CONGRESS OF RATISBON

At the imperial congress held for this purpose at Ratisbon in the beginning of the year 1623, Saxony and Brandenburg opposed a scheme which threatened to rob them of that consideration in the empire which they derived from the electoral dignity; for, in the teeth of a Catholic majority, of what avail would be their votes in the college? With one accord they emphatically declared that the pronouncement of the ban had been irregular, that it was at variance with the electoral charter agreed to by the emperor, and that to recognise such a ban must imperil the position of all the other states, especially the smaller ones. The Brandenburg ambassadors further dwelt upon two points in the negotiations: in the first place, they said, the conduct of the emperor was liable to misinterpretation, because it was calculated to benefit his own interests; and, furthermore, it was most improper of him to rob of their hereditary portions the children of the count palatine and the agnates who were not concerned. But these representations did not impinge upon the resolutions already adopted by the spiritual electors. The emperor appeared to be less inaccessible than they were; in order to dissuade him, the Spaniards brought to bear considerations which concerned their position in Europe; but in the end he refused to break with the papacy, which was all in favour of the policy declared. Moreover, the duke of Bavaria was already far too powerful for the emperor to risk offending him. As the Brandenburg ambassadors foresaw the issue of the deliberation, they considered it necessary to secure for their elector the right of repudiating all share in and obligation under the decisions about to be taken. By the will of the majority the emperor thought himself authorised to proceed to distribute the feudal land. Saxony and Brandenburg signified their disapproval of such a course by refusing to allow their ambassadors to be present at the ceremony. But it appeared all at once that Maximilian of Bavaria was in close harmony with the spiritual electors, and was to become one of the most powerful members of this college, in which from henceforward Brandenburg and Saxony were of little account.

THE ALLIANCE AGAINST AUSTRIA

Ruinous for Frederick of the Palatinate as had been the consequences of accepting the crown of Bohemia (for it involved him in universal disapprobation), a fate no less ruinous was now to overtake the emperor; for the publication of the ban was regarded as illegal, and the house of the count palatine had numerous and influential friends. A great alliance was sealed in its favour; starting with England, this was to embrace on the one side France and Holland, on the other Denmark and Sweden. Bethlen Gábor was drawn into the understanding. The great question for Brandenburg now was whether or

[1626 A.D.]

not it should join this alliance. A fleeting idea arose that it would be well to give to the elector himself the personal direction of the war to be undertaken by Denmark in the empire and by Sweden in the territory of Poland; this would have been consonant with the geographical position, with the situation in general, and with German interests. But the elector, who possessed no armed force worthy of the name, was far too feeble.

True, he had one party round him which was in favour of entry into this alliance. This consisted chiefly of men of Calvinistic counsel, who, above all, kept in view the concerns of religion in its relation to Europe, and who thought to continue the policy of John Sigismund. Opposed to these, however, were the estates of the country, who saw their salvation only in association with the emperor; moreover, they did not wish to contribute to a war which might turn out to the advantage of the Calvinists. The elector complained bitterly that the thought and bearing of the inhabitants were solely directed to peace and enjoyment; his appeals and warnings were not listened to. The estates reproached him for leaving them without proper guidance. The danger was increasing, yet they thought it sufficient to occupy the fortresses in which the best property had been put for safety. Moreover, even at the beginning, they were willing to provide only three thousand men; and later on, as their enthusiasm diminished, the number dwindled to nine hundred. It was in their view sufficient if they maintained an attitude of respect towards the imperial majesty. How indeed could they have confidence when Count Schwarzenberg, the chief minister of the elector, was of the Catholic confession and meant to avoid a breach with the emperor under all circumstances? In this way the court and the country were torn by conflicting sentiments which did not admit of solution; the people could not even nerve themselves to maintain a strong neutrality. The necessary result of this was that the position of Brandenburg was made to depend on the issue of the war between the two great world powers, in which it did not dare to take part.

WALLENSTEIN'S IMPERIAL ARMY

What unparalleled vicissitudes were presented by this world-struggle! The first great spectacle was that of an imperial army, an army at last truly imperial, although led by an independent general who himself had mustered it, pressing into north Germany under Wallenstein with the intention of opposing that great alliance which had for its object the restoration of the expelled king of Bohemia.

It was a piece of good fortune for Brandenburg not to have taken part in the alliance; had it done so it would probably have been routed on the spot. The victory of the army of the league and the emperor over the king of Denmark now transferred the balance of power to the authority of the emperor and of the league in north Germany. The electors of Brandenburg and Saxony found themselves compelled to recognise Maximilian of Bavaria as a fellow elector with them. Brandenburg was ready to make every other possible concession, if it could only preserve the claims of the palatine house. And by the second campaign the mark was directly affected. When Wallenstein, who in the mean while had secured a free hand by resting in Hungary, came from Silesia and turned to a decisive attack on Denmark, he occupied the passes of the Havel, regardless of the electors; the Danes, too, were entering the country on the other side. But it was not in the territory of Brandenburg that the battle was to be fought. Nowhere could the Danes offer serious resistance; the imperial general completely mastered them by a successful movement to the peninsula.

WALLENSTEIN'S POLICY

For himself he thus secured an unparalleled position in the empire; the emperor rewarded his services with the dukedom of Mecklenburg. In order to maintain this dignity Wallenstein thought it well to bend before the hostility of Brandenburg and to win that electorate over to the imperial party. Of considerable importance was the territorial aggrandisement of which he held out a prospect to Brandenburg. In the elector he encouraged the hope of a favourable decision of the matter of Jülich and Cleves, and of indemnity for Jägerndorf. Above all, he promised his most active interest in the reversion of Pomerania, where there seemed to be a near prospect of a long-foreseen occurrence, namely the death of the last duke of old Pomeranian origin, by which Brandenburg was to acquire possession of the country. To this he added an indication that Mecklenburg should become the property of Brandenburg on the failure of its own line. Hereto he imposed only one condition, which was that Brandenburg should make common cause with him in his hostility to the Swedes.

The elector, who was the vassal of Poland, to which country he owed his investiture as duke of Prussia, offended by King Gustavus, who had taken arbitrary possession of Pillau, was indeed moved to consent. He sent a small body of troops to the help of the Poles; but this was just the occasion on which the power of Brandenburg was subjected to the deepest humiliation. When the troops of the elector caught sight of the Swedes, who were led by the notorious Bohemian fugitive, Count von Thurn, and who were their superiors both in numbers and strategical position, they threw down their arms; they were then for the most part incorporated with the Swedish army. The sense of their own weakness had combined with their religious sympathies to bring about this result. King Gustavus Adolphus had adopted an attitude in which he figured as the sole rallying point of the Protestant cause. The succour which the imperials sent to the Poles, still more the attempt which became visible at that time on the political horizon to establish a maritime connection between the powers of Spain and Poland, had wounded him in the nearest interests of his family and of his empire; for as king of Sweden he was still not recognised by the Poles. It was to counteract these plans that he sought to master the Prussian coasts for himself. If we regard the events of centuries in combination with one another we shall be unable to deny that his great and victorious policy brought about the first disaster which the Poles had suffered since the Perpetual Peace of 1466, by which the Prussian domains were made subordinate. Thus far Gustavus was considerably more the ally of the elector than his opponent; and the elector himself very soon recognised that the policy to which he was compelled to yield in Germany would be his ruin in Prussia; his own minister, Schwarzenberg, heard rumours in Vienna of an intention again to establish Catholicism in the territory of the Teutonic order and to restore it to the church.

But it was owing to the great progress of Catholic restoration by which this idea had been called forth, that Protestantism in Germany and the elector himself in person were immediately threatened. At the instance of the princes of the league the Edict of Restitution had been promulgated, announcing the intention of renewing the hierarchy in the full range of its influence. This step, while it threatened the existence of the Protestants, also roused every Protestant feeling. Even in the mark a respectful attitude towards the imperial majesty could not go so far as to run the risk of that ruin which now threatened. George William could not blind himself to the fact that this meant his ultimate downfall. Halberstadt had already gone over to an impe-

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rial prince, Magdeburg to a Saxon prince; there was a prospect, too, that the bishoprics of the mark would be re-established and ecclesiastical property restored; on the top of this was to come the reduction of Prussia. This was the final aim of Catholic policy; an elector of Brandenburg could not possibly look on in silence and see this accomplished. The dependence of George William on the ruling powers in the empire was not so absolute as to prevent him from feeling most keenly the injustice that was inflicted upon him. With sentiments of this nature he now turned his gaze toward Gustavus Adolphus, the husband of his sister, who, although he combated Poland, had never ceased to declare that in doing this he was striving to put a check upon the grasping policy of the house of Austria. As from a religious point of view he opposed the league and the elector Maximilian, so from a political point of view he opposed General Wallenstein.

RESISTANCE AGAINST AUSTRIA


The ruling spirits of the time were Maximilian and Wallenstein, with Gustavus Adolphus in opposition to them; but a fourth ruling spirit rallied to the side of Gustavus in the person of Cardinal Richelieu, whose life and soul were absorbed in anti-Austrian interests, and who wished for nothing better than to obtain for the king of Sweden a free hand against Austria, for the accomplishment of which it was above all necessary to bring about an agreement of Austria with Poland. England played in with France, with whom, it is true, but a short while ago it had once more been at loggerheads. In view of all these great influences George William had now also to make a decision; true, his immediate regard had to be centred upon the preservation of the dukedom of Prussia, but it was to his advantage that the Polish magnates were themselves opposed to restoring Prussia to her ancient condition, more particularly because they feared that King Sigismund would receive as a fee from the emperor a portion of the land for one of his sons.

The sharp edge of the differences between the elector- duke and the king of Sweden, as well as between the latter and Poland, would be removed if they all found a common opportunity of resisting the tendencies encouraged by the house of Austria. There was one interest for the elector which ran counter to such a combination of political aims. The great reversion which Wallenstein had raised to life would become of doubtful consequence the moment that the Swedes became masters of the Baltic; remote as such a contingency was, yet another disadvantage lay close at hand; in the first place the elector had to submit to the occupation of the Prussian coast-lines. To set this off he made one important condition against which Gustavus Adolphus struggled for a long time, but in which he at last acquiesced at the instance of the foreign ambassadors: this was the temporary occupation of Marienburg and Hoefft, by which the connection of the dukedom with the electorate was facilitated. The main point is that the elector, in defiance of the considerations militating against such a course of conduct, decided to enter into a friendly relation with Sweden, in which decision he was steadfast during a number of years, in spite of all that it cost him. True, it was only a standstill that was at this time effected; but it was destined to last six years—an invaluable respite in this crisis.

For such a space of time the king obtained a free hand against Austria. If he now determined to undertake the great work, it was not at the instigation of Brandenburg or other distinguished German princes, but above all under the influence of Cardinal Richelieu, who, although a prince of the Catholic Church, was driven by his own personal situation to save Protestantism in Germany.

[1630 A.D.]

What is Protestantism, if not the form taken by affairs which have diverged from the papacy and all that the papacy bore inevitably in its train? Gustavus Adolphus knew that the north German towns, especially the north German agricultural districts, wished to preserve their present position; for them, too, the independent position of the church which had been won was the essence of existence. What might become of them, asked he on one occasion, if a second Maurice of Saxony were to place himself at the head of them? The German princes of the time were too comfortably situated, too much restricted by traditional limitations, to undertake anything on their own responsibility. It



TOWER OF NIEDERLAHNSTEIN

is just this which makes of the man a figure in the history of the world—that in the contest of his day he perceives and grasps the moments governing the crisis, the relative disparity of ideas. Thus Gustavus Adolphus appeared in Germany in the summer of 1630; he disembarked in Pomerania, territory on which it must have given the elector of Brandenburg no satisfaction to see him; here he took up a firm position. By the side of Cardinal Richelieu, Gustavus Adolphus took up an attitude of singular greatness, in so far as he superimposed upon political motives that religious inspiration which had the truest and liveliest existence for himself. Together they formed a new combination of universal significance to confront the superior weight acquired by Spain and Austria in their alliance with the Catholic restoration. It was inevitable—fatalistic, that they should meet in Germany.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS

Immediately upon his first appearance in Germany Gustavus Adolphus took up a situation territorially and politically destined to be of the most lasting importance for the empire in general, and particularly for Brandenburg. As has been already mentioned, the hereditary succession in Pomerania, the chief object of the political ambitions entertained by the ancestors of the elector of Brandenburg, was nearing its solution. It was obvious that in a little

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while Bogislaw XIV would die without issue entitled to inherit. Already homage had been done to the elector in anticipation of this event. In the treaty which Bogislaw could not now refuse to make with Gustavus Adolphus, although there had been much preliminary hesitation, this claim had been considered without being expressed throughout in unequivocal terms. The main point established was that as presumptive successor to the duke the elector should accept the duke's treaty with the king of Sweden; and that in the event of the anticipated contingencies, he should provide the king with money to cover the accumulated cost of the war from his own pocket, and not from the treasury of the country. No doubt it was this point that caused the Brandenburg ambassador, who came upon the scene after the day on which the agreement had been made, to demand of the king a promise that the restoration of Pomerania should be gratis. The king expressed himself in very generous terms; he had come to support his friends, not to rob them. But for all this he would not have rested content with the restoration of the former condition of affairs. At the very outset he demanded a security for himself, which as he said could not depend on words—paper and ink—but must depend on real guarantees. With these conditions—that the costs of war should be provided, that he should remain master of Pomerania until they were paid, and that he should have real security—the king set foot on German ground.

It is perfectly obvious that it could not be easy for the elector of Brandenburg, from whom these stipulations were not in the slightest concealed, to regard the king as an ally in Germany. He would have preferred forthwith to give his adherence to the emperor and the empire; but all attempts made by the Saxon and Brandenburg plenipotentiaries at the college diet of Ratisbon to effect a withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution, or such a modification of it as would enable the constitution of their states to remain intact, were fruitless; a majority of the college stuck firmly to the edict. Wallenstein had once promised the Brandenburg minister that an exception would be made in favour of his master; but Wallenstein himself was compelled, by the majority which adhered to the Edict of Restitution, to resign. It was thought possible to repel the king of Sweden even without him, and some thoughts were entertained of inflicting new confiscation on those who should adhere to his side: such designs would have to be thwarted immediately. In Ratisbon there was an idea of forming for this purpose a union of all the evangelicals under the presidency of the two electors. The deliberations wavered long between loyalty and opposition; at the assembly at Leipsic the latter was determined upon.

Without reflecting, we may easily assume that the rising of Gustavus Adolphus and his victorious advance along the Oder lent the necessary enthusiasm. But as yet no agreement with the king had been arrived at; the probability that such an agreement was imminent was certainly taken into consideration. Already people began to talk of the conditions to which the king would have to acquiesce. Chief among these were the restoration of everything which he had conquered or should conquer, without indemnity, and the stipulation that he should conclude no peace in which the evangelicals received no satisfaction. We see that this is not altogether in agreement with what Gustavus Adolphus had allowed himself to promise in Pomerania. Moreover, he confronted Brandenburg with two further demands; for his security he demanded that the fortresses of Küstrin and Spandau should be open to him. The elector pleaded in his distress that by doing so he would offend emperor and empire. The king's reply was that as the emperor himself did not adhere to the imperial law, but acted as it suited his caprice, it was not likely that an elector could fail to be justified in doing what his situation demanded. It is easy indeed to understand that George William fought obstinately. The Swedes had possession of the Prussian coastlands; they established themselves

in Pomerania, and they now demanded the evacuation of his most important fortresses. What weighty consequences were involved in consenting to all this! But it could no longer be evaded; either they must join the side of the foreign king, or expect the most disastrous effects from the party which ruled emperor and empire. Several negotiations and meetings were broken up; for a long time they resulted in nothing—what seemed to be determined upon on one day was revoked on the next.

BRANDENBURG ALLIES ITSELF WITH THE SWEDES

The eyes of all were directed to Magdeburg, which was besieged by Tilly—a venture by which the fate of both electors must at one blow be decided if they did not secure for themselves a firm support in the king of Sweden. At last, afraid that even the Swedes would regard him in a hostile light, George William determined to provide them with the right of occupation of Spandau and, in a limited form, even of that of Küstrin. Gustavus Adolphus promised to defend these places against all enemies and at the conclusion of peace to restore them. We see to what a dependence upon the king Brandenburg had sunk; and yet as circumstances of extremity also comprise within them moments of salvation, so in this act lay the germ of a returning independence. The imperial party had stopped the elector from taking any active part in the defence of the country: they would not under any circumstances consent to his withdrawing troops from Prussia; permission to do this was granted by Gustavus Adolphus. The elector was to be enabled to make military preparations similar to those for which the Protestants had received instructions in the decree of Leipsic. In these armaments we may see one of the first foundations of the Brandenburg army, which began its formation at that time in a Protestant spirit, in alliance with the Swedes.

Magdeburg meanwhile had fallen; the elector of Saxony was beaten in his own territory and punished with measures of violence. Even he no longer hesitated to open his passes to the Swedes, and to conclude an alliance of which the main condition was that neither party could make peace without the other, or even enter into negotiations for this object with the enemy. So a coalition of the two electors with the king was effected, which now actually succeeded in making a stand against the powerful foe and overthrowing him.

The result of the victory of Breitenfeld was, above all, that a permanent end was put to the restitution of ecclesiastical property—a gain for Brandenburg that cannot be too highly estimated. The king maintained, and with some truth, that he had saved Brandenburg from total destruction, though it cannot be denied that he inflicted upon the country a depressing subordination and proved a formidable bar to the house in the realisation of its greatest prospect.

The character that these relations were to assume in their further development depended less upon the resources and efforts of Brandenburg, which did not make much weight in the scale, than on the trend of affairs illustrated in the great episodes of the world's history. As long as the king lived a sound relationship was maintained. Gustavus Adolphus did not disguise the fact that he wished to retain the sea coast, especially the greater part of Pomerania: he contended that Brandenburg might be indemnified by secularisation, and that the spiritual authorities were the less entitled to oppose such a course since they were the source of the whole war trouble. From all that transpired later we may assume that there was some talk of an equalisation of the interests on both sides by the marriage of the electoral prince of Brandenburg with the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus.

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But neither in the lifetime of the king nor after his death was any definite arrangement made. Allied with Sweden, but again overshadowed by her; saved by her, but again subjected to her oppression—Brandenburg incurred the risk of losing through the Swedes that great province the acquisition of which emperor and empire had assured to her.

In the marks the position was similar to that in Prussia. Here, as well as there, it was Brandenburg's interest to withstand the encroachments of the Swedes, and yet at the same time a greater interest was consulted by submitting to them. For without the Swedes a re-entry of the Teutonic order into the marks must have been looked for, and in Prussia the church property must have been taken back. The position in the territory of Jülich and Cleves was in accordance with this; without the help of Holland and the advantages which Holland at that time gained over the Spaniards in Wesel and Bois-le-Duc, the imperial sequestration pronounced by Tilly would have been maintained and the elector possibly deprived of his title.

It was the states-general that prevented this; but in return they disposed of the country, of which they possessed the greater part, without much regard for the allies. The immediate interests of those concerned were thus far from simple. In certain aspects the allies again appeared as enemies. Owing to the relations of Jülich and Cleves and Pomerania with the German Empire, there was a constant need of having regard to the emperor, even after a certain balance had been restored in Germany to the contending parties by the battle of Lützen, in which the Swedes maintained the field but lost the greatest king and general that they had ever had. The relations of Brandenburg to the great European powers took a similar form of development. Again the intention was stirred in the Spaniards, who at that time had no longer anything to fear from England, of renewing the war against France with full vigour.

THE SECRET COUNCIL

It may be easily understood that under circumstances like this the policy of Brandenburg remained undecisive and wavering. The elector George William possessed enviable social qualities; he was humane, polite, bounteous; but, after the manner of the princes of his day, inclined to seek comfort in the small pleasures of life: a fine horse, a fleet greyhound could make him forget the cares of government. His intellectual endowments were not below the average standard; but in such tempestuous times it required extraordinary capacity to steer a safe course. George William was not without ambition: his thoughts dwelt on what history would one day say of him; and he wished above all to figure before his contemporaries as an honourable and trustworthy man. In the complexity of affairs which characterised the epoch, however, the careful control of one matter or of another fell chiefly to his secret council. But in this council two conflicting tendencies were to be observed: one was represented by the members who had come to him from the governments of his father and of his grandfather, among whom the chancellor Goetze enjoyed the most prominent regard; to his side rallied Knesebeck, Leuchtmar, and Pfuel, who formed a close bond of association among themselves on account of the distaste they conceived for the colleague whom George William had given them in Adam of Schwarzenberg, who was particularly favoured with his confidence. Schwarzenberg had made himself indispensable to the elector in the intricacies of the Jülich and Cleves affair; Catholic as he was, he held firm to Brandenburg. And so it happened that the universal conflict which split up the world penetrated to the secret council of the elector and disintegrated it. The older councillors were for Sweden, Schwarzenberg for

the emperor; nevertheless they all wished to have credit for keeping in view only the interests of their master. That such was the intention of the older councillors had never been questioned; they had a support in Luise Juliane, the mother of the electress, who belonged to both houses, the house of Orange and the house of the Palatinate, and who kept the elector, who was accustomed to listen to her, mindful of their interests. With opposing tendencies like these at court, how could men expect firm and energetic decisions? This court itself was invaded and rent asunder by the war-tossed elements dividing the world. Happily the association in imperial concerns with Saxony, to which Brandenburg had clung for a decade without intermission, exercised a certain check which George William would under no circumstances consent to abolish.

In the summer of 1633 the French ambassador Feuquieres appeared in Berlin to urge the elector to enter the Treaty of Heilbronn. In return, he promised him the support of France, especially in the matter of Julich. The elector gratefully took up this guarantee and entreated Louis XIII for his immediate intercession in the points of disagreement with the Netherlands, as well as for his support in the concerns of Prussia and Pomerania, especially if matters ever came to really serious negotiations for peace; with regard to the immediate alliance with him, however, which would have been sealed by entry into the Treaty of Heilbronn, he postponed a decision until the outcome of communications to be held with the court of Saxony. From this court he could not alienate himself, for Saxony was his neighbour, and in similar circumstances would be expected to act in a similar way towards himself.

Meanwhile everything took on a new colour from the fact that Wallenstein, who had again given a check to the emperor's cause before and after the battle of Lützen, and who acquired a still more independent position on the second assumption of his command than he had done on the first, proposed terms of peace in which the chief interests of the Protestant princes were assured; not only should they not be compelled to restore the property of the church, but also the joint constitution of the empire should be established on the lines of their scheme of government—either with or against the will of the emperor. More than once George William came into touch with the arms and designs of Wallenstein, in whom he placed little confidence.

THE MISSION OF ARNIM

When the plans of Wallenstein were matured, in the first weeks of the year 1634, Hans George von Arnim of Dresden (where there was a great tendency to favour the view of Wallenstein) was sent to Berlin in order to win the approval of the elector of Brandenburg. The majority of the elector's councillors met the envoy in an attitude of disinclination and contrariety, although the general plans for reform were chiefly their own; they insisted on first coming to terms with the Swedes, whom they still continued to regard as their allies. Schwarzenberg alone listened to Arnim, who then tried to win the elector himself to his side. The prince was at that time compelled by illness to keep his bed—a circumstance, however, which did not deter him from granting an audience to Arnim; the uncertain character of George William's policy is illustrated by this interview. He could not declare for Sweden, because he had been told that if he remained in alliance with this power he must cease forever to reckon upon the acquisition of Pomerania. But he had great scruples about entering into a closer union with Wallenstein on account of his unreliable nature; the man's policy in the end, said he, would be an alliance with France and Sweden; otherwise, if he fell out with the emperor, the em-

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peror might gain the upper hand and again become master of Germany. For himself, the one result was as insupportable as the other—the complete supremacy of the French and Swedes as intolerable as the return of imperial tyranny. To one thing alone he adhered—to his determination that the association with Saxony must be preserved. “No,” he exclaimed, “from Saxony I will not divorce myself!” The issue proved that George William, in spite of all his weak-kneed complaisance, had not judged wrongly. What he had probably foreseen actually took place: when the split came between Wallenstein and the emperor, it was the emperor who maintained the authority.

And herewith took place, as George William had prophesied, a general reversal of the situation. The army of Wallenstein joined the emperor; and so the imperial policy, ably supported by the Spaniards, acquired a preponderating influence. After a few months followed the battle of Nördlingen, which turned the tide in another direction. The defeat suffered by the Swedes robbed them of their popularity in Germany, which rested more upon fear than natural liking.

THE PEACE OF PRAGUE

The elector of Saxony, in consequence of this change, felt himself moved to conclude the Peace of Prague, in which, it is true, the emperor now allowed the Edict of Restitution to lapse; in religious matters a condition was to be restored similar to that existing before the issue of the edict in the year 1627. The accession of Brandenburg was reckoned upon, which at the same time comprehended a separation from Sweden, inasmuch as the association of the two princes with Sweden had been the outcome of the opposition to the edict. But was Brandenburg in this also to follow the example of Saxony? It is obvious that by the Peace of Prague no satisfaction was afforded to the just demands and claims of Protestantism which had begun to be oppressed long before 1627. But amongst other ideas the provisions of this treaty contained one of the most difficult questions which have ever been put to the policy of Brandenburg; they embraced the condition of the state and the essential quality of its being at that time, and they seemed to decide its future.

In the narrative of his journey Feuquières observes that George William would be the mightiest prince in Germany if his territories had not been taken possession of by others; Jülich and Cleves, so far as his claims to possession prevailed against those of the count palatine of Neuburg, were in point of fact withheld from him by the Dutch; he could draw no revenues from them. The same was the case in Prussia, held by the Swedes; in the chief territory, the mark, upon which the title of elector rested, several strongholds had been evacuated in favour of the Swedes: the elector was directing his whole attention to Pomerania, to which, in the event of the death of the frail old duke, his right of succession could not be disputed; he wished to live only long enough to conclude a treaty with Sweden. Instead of the Peace of Prague George William might have wished for another peace, which should have made possible a peaceable understanding with France and Sweden; he was terrified at the thought that he had to go over from one side to the other—that he had to fight against those with whom he had previously been in alliance. But the general circumstances did not make for peace, but most decidedly for war. As a result of the battle of Nördlingen the Spaniards were powerful enough to penetrate into France, where they terrified everybody, with the exception of the great cardinal and his trusted Father Joseph, who then succeeded in making France capable of resistance. In this war Europe was divided even more than before into two parties. Between them the elector of Brandenburg

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had to choose; the consideration of his situation drove him to the imperial side. It was still not possible to hope that Holland, in Jülich, or Sweden, in Pomerania, would renounce their claim to the position they had taken up; and from France in its present plight no successful interposition with regard to these two powers could be expected. The authority of emperor and empire was too deeply rooted to admit of being dispensed with. The estates of the mark were partly, at all events, sound partisans of the emperor; moreover, did not the claim to Pomerania rest upon a share in the reversion of the emperor and the empire? Only with their help could it be carried to a successful conclusion. By union with the emperor a tolerable situation in general German affairs might be expected. And what would happen if the demand



DETAIL OF FORTIFICATION, MIDDLE AGES

for agreement were repudiated and a breach opened with the emperor? The elector was told that Sweden could lay waste his country; the emperor could rob him of it: he was reminded of the events of the Palatinate—the destruction of the elector palatine, whom no foreign interposition had succeeded in restoring to his position.

So it happened that Schwarzenberg maintained the preponderating influence over the other members of the secret council who remained faithful to their Protestant sympathies. Undoubtedly the most important question was embodied in the article of the Peace of Prague which provided that if the elector of Brandenburg would enter the agreement he should be assured of the reversion especially of Pomerania and the feudal possessions going with it, and should receive the protection of the emperor. What offer had Sweden to set against this promise? Moreover, whatever might be said in the course of the negotiations, there was no doubt of the intention of this power which had established itself on the German coastlands. Its policy ran precisely

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counter to the claims of Brandenburg. It seemed an advantage of the peace, which could not be valued too highly, that the oldest and greatest reversion of the house should be taken under the protection of the emperor and the empire.

Brandenburg did not intend to make the interest of Austria entirely and absolutely her own. On entering the peace she added certain limitations, especially the repetition of the favourable reservation of the rights of the palatine family, as well as of the college of electors, and the proviso that she should not herself be compelled to contribute to the carrying on of war against those who were excluded from the amnesty.

In his reply, the emperor neither expressly repudiated these limitations nor expressly acquiesced in them. But from the demand itself we see that Brandenburg was not altogether inclined completely to abandon her own policy. The same intention was evident when it was determined, according to the emperor's wish, to raise his son, the king of Hungary, to be king of the Romans. In the charter which was drawn up and set before him, no opportunity was lost of guarding against encroachments similar to those purposed by Ferdinand II. Publications of bans, such as the recent one, were expressly forbidden if unaccompanied by the consent of the council of the electors, even in the case where there should have been a good excuse for them—that is, where the crime was notorious and undoubted. Also in the Pomeranian affair the assembled electors took sides for Brandenburg. They rejected the claim of Sweden to occupy a portion of Pomerania as security for the payment of the indemnity money; they condemned the treaty made by Gustavus Adolphus with Bogislaw XIV; they would hear nothing of satisfaction for Sweden: there was no ground for it; what Sweden herself had spent was very trifling.

GEORGE WILLIAM AN ALLY OF THE EMPEROR

On this basis George William joined sides with the emperor. His whole zeal was directed to the acquisition of Pomerania for his house in alliance with the emperor and the empire: to effect this he suffered himself to be seriously prejudiced in his territorial independence; he agreed to the demand that the troops which he had in the field should be immediately taken into the service of the emperor and the empire. But the results of the war which was undertaken under these auspices were far from satisfactory. The Swedes maintained themselves not only in Pomerania against the attacks of the imperial troops and of the Saxons, but they also penetrated into the mark itself. And here were evidenced the ruinous consequences which a change of political system always involves when it has not the support of the populace. While Schwarzenberg brought the elector over to the side of the emperor, the Swedes retained the sympathies of the inhabitants; this could be seen at the first military engagement, when Wrangel penetrated into the mark. Not only did he nowhere find any resistance, but the town of Berlin assured him that it had no share in the counsel and decisions of the court. So in Pomerania was to be observed also the conflict of religious interests opposed to the peace, with the authority of the empire which had led to it. The last years of the duke of Pomerania were deeply saddened and overclouded by this conflict. In his soul he struggled against the supremacy of the Swedes, whom nevertheless he saw plainly growing stronger and stronger in his country. His death (May, 1637) had chiefly the effect of causing the great subjects of contention, which occupied not only Pomerania but the whole empire, to stand out in full prominence.

POMERANIA

As a result of the first treaty the Swedes immediately laid claim to Pomerania. The elector of Brandenburg, who had never agreed to this treaty, published patents which assured the right of occupation, and raised recruits with which, in conjunction with the then advancing imperial army, to take immediate possession of the dukedom, where his claim had long been recognised. This time the star of good fortune rose upon the enterprise. The Swedes were repelled from the borders of the mark in every direction; they lost Havelberg, the Werbener, and Schwedt. In the spring of 1638, Klitzing appeared at the head of the Brandenburgers with a force of considerable magnitude for these times, two thousand infantry and four hundred dragoons; and succeeded in taking in a rapid assault the town of Garz, to the possession of which considerable value had always attached, and in carrying off the Swedish commanders as captives. In upper Pomerania the Swedes were confined to a few coast occupations, Stralsund, Anklam, and Greifswald: it looked as if there were still some likelihood of the country being acquired for the empire and Brandenburg. We are assured that it must have been possible at this juncture to bring about a treaty suitable to the interests of the two parties in Sweden.

But once more it became evident that the war, which had arisen from a general European combination, could not be terminated by provincial and local efforts. In the conflict of Spain and France, which governed the whole crisis, a moment was reached in which France would not have been averse to a suspension of hostilities: in that case she would possibly have abandoned Sweden to her fate. But when the conditions proposed by both sides came to be discussed, the impossibility of coming to terms was made clear. In order to satisfy Spain, the cardinal would have had to forego the most important results of his foreign policy; so far from doing this, he determined once more to rally all the forces at his command and to give a new impulse to the old alliances which had become slack. Most important of all was that with Sweden, by means of which, eight years ago, the supremacy of Austria in Germany had been shattered: it was not to be permitted that they should be chased from Germany. Thanks to the subsidies offered by France, the Swedish imperial council, which believed it had a right to maintain what had been won, was then also enabled to make fresh armaments.

It was of no slight advantage that Sweden, in consequence of the Treaty of Stuhmsdorf, had nothing to fear from the Poles. [This treaty between Sweden and Poland had been negotiated by the French diplomatist Count d'Avaux, and was concluded in September, 1635. By it the contracting parties agreed to an armistice for twenty years; the dukedom of Prussia was assigned to Poland and Sweden's right to Livonia recognised, the Catholic inhabitants being granted freedom of worship.] The treaty was so far favourable to Brandenburg, inasmuch as possession of the Prussian coasts was restored to the elector in exchange for the evacuation of Marienburg. But another great disadvantage was associated with this: the twenty years' suspension of hostilities was chiefly due to the efforts of France, which realised her ambition in enabling the Swedes to direct their forces to Germany. Thus Brandenburg, while seeking to remove the Swedes from Germany, in alliance with the emperor and the empire, committed the political blunder that enabled this very people by the treaty sealed in Prussia to concentrate their forces in that country. The Swedish general could then raise a superior force in Stettin (in the summer of 1638). He left the newly arrived troops in the fortified towns. With the veterans he plunged into the field; without much trouble he again took Garz and demolished it. It was of no use to think of reconquering Pomerania for

[1638 A.D.]

Brandenburg at such a moment: the Swedes were more formidable to the imperial troops than the imperial troops to the Swedes.

Once more the fate of Pomerania depended on the vicissitudes in the war that broke out between France and Spain and involved the world. The Brandenburg forces were completely disorganised when the elector sought safety for himself and his son in Prussia. Schwarzenberg, who remained behind as governor, now had the task of carrying to a conclusion the provincial war which had been undertaken at his instigation. On him depended the administration of the country and the organisation of the militia. The commanders in the fortresses, who fortunately still held out, were mostly his personal dependents. Yet he had no thought of yielding; from time to time there was talk of extensive operations with the co-operation of Saxony. The Brandenburgers made raids into the Swedish quarters in Pomerania; the Swedes retaliated by making plundering inroads upon the mark. In short, a bitter, devastating, desperate war was going on when George William died.

THE RESULTS OF GEORGE WILLIAM'S VACILLATION

Up till now the conflict, though of a universal nature, had broken out more in petty opposing tendencies in which but a small exhibition of force had played a determining part. Brandenburg had acquired the foundations for its power, united considerable territories in east and west, and entered upon the course of its own peculiar policy. In the Thirty Years' War, however, everything assumed larger proportions; a state like Brandenburg, composed of different portions remote one from another, could acquire no consistency, still less any practical influence upon the world: it was enough that it was not then and there annihilated. George William took his impulses from the dangers which threatened him. In the first years of his government he ran a risk of being involved in the ruin of the palatine house. His fear of coming under the ban of the empire, which at that time had again acquired fruitful authority, was not so ill founded as had been assumed. In avoiding everything which could provoke the publication of the ban, he was exposed to the misfortune of seeing the existence of his electorate and of his dukedom placed in jeopardy by the Edict of Restitution. Hereupon, not without a sense of the disaster which might result from his conduct, but under pressure of extreme danger, he went step by step to the opposite side, and joined the king of Sweden.


No doubt this was the only condition under which Brandenburg could continue in that singular configuration which it had acquired. But the Swedes were indeed a grievous burden—for none more grievous than for the house of Brandenburg, whose greatest prospects they blighted. It was cooped up between two powers which, like the Cyanean rocks in the old sea legend that continually crushed everything between them, threatened it with extinction.

At last George William, satisfied with the added prospect of safety, having obtained from the emperor an assurance for the subsistence of his territories and their Protestant character, entered into alliance with him against the Swedes and proceeded to indicate his chief territorial claim. It is not weakness, nor an undue servility to the emperor that are the vices ascribed to him by the Brandenburg statesmen of that time, but rather a reckless ambition: he wanted to win fame for himself by association with others, and by the raising of troops in person; but how little did the issue of events correspond with his estimate. His allies devastated his territory before his very eyes; he, the elector himself, had barely enough left to live upon and had to flee to Prussia. In the contest against the Swedes in Pomerania, which he accordingly under-

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took, he was struck by the blow dealt by its opponents to the allies of the house of Austria.

On the whole this mishap was due to the variety of his provinces and their remoteness one from another; the dissensions of his councils which he had not the personal capacity to overcome; but above all to the superiority of the great world-elements embodied in the struggle, and to deficiencies inherent in his own resources. Amid the storms and tempests in which the times were plunged George William saved at least the dynastic possession of his territories, not, it is true, without serious damage; he left them in extreme danger and misery. But in such a condition of affairs the state of Brandenburg was of little use to the world. These territories, peaceably and cautiously gathered together by the men of the past, offered no warrant that they would rise to a peculiar and fateful significance; the successor to them would have to be fashioned of harder metal, informed by genius, and favoured with a larger share of fortune.^c





CHAPTER II

THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF A KINGDOM

[1640-1740 A.D.]

AT a terrible crisis the German nation had sacrificed her position in the world and utterly ruined her old political unity. But the seeds of new life were in her and in the independence of those fractions which had now a national guarantee confirmed by imperial law. The pedantic imperial jurists might continue to see in this imperial constitution a marvellously wise mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; they might continue to prize the emperor as the legal successor of the Roman Cæsars: clear-sighted minds could see deeper. A Swedish publicist of Pomeranian origin, Bogislaw Chemnitz (*Hippolithus a Lapide*), sought as early as 1640 to establish the unlimited independence of the imperial estates on a historical basis, in the contention that these were original and that the empire rested upon usurpation; and the Saxon, Samuel Pufendorf, indicated as early as 1667, as the best aim for the political development of Germany, separation from Austria, annihilation of the spiritual princedoms, and a purely secular confederacy of states. As a matter of fact, all living forces were directed to the single states—upon them rested the fate of the nation. Certainly no one could as yet say how a new imperial constitution was to be developed from these contingent independent states, which were all guided by the reckless pursuit of their separate interests, by what they called the *Staatsraison*. But the fate of the imperial constitution, which still maintained a formal existence, overtook the organisation of the single states, based upon estates and confessions—it outlived itself. In the crisis of the great war their incapacity had received actual illustration. A general with absolute command on the field had won the greatest successes for the emperor, and he had trodden under foot all the rights that belonged to the estates. The evangelical estates had been saved from this dominion of force by a foreign king, whose authority was unlimited in the field as well as in his cabinet.

THE IDEAL STATE

In this way a new ideal state rose into existence—the state with a supreme prince at its head, based upon the concentration of all the powers of the state in the hand of the monarch, upon the subordination of the estates to his will,

and upon the economic isolation of the country, after the manner of the French mercantile system. In opposition to the close confessional system of the *Landeskirche* was the fundamental doctrine of the equal justification of all Christian confessions; that is to say, the doctrine of personal freedom of belief, which found strong support in the liberation of science from theological tutelage. True, this spiritual transformation took its rise entirely in the middle classes, but their lack of understanding, and so of active co-operation, made them none the less the natural opponents of the new absolute state. Its guidance was transferred to the nobility, which absorbed the man-of-the-world culture of the French. As a rule, these changes were chiefly effected in the Protestant states, especially in the greater ones, for here the inmost force of the nation was best preserved; whereas in most of the Catholic territories it had suffered heavily by the violence of re-catholicism. The small imperial estates, on the other hand, spiritual princedoms as well as imperial towns, were altogether incapable of solving the problems of the modern state.

So it came about that the political and economic pre-eminence, and soon also the superior guidance in spiritual matters, passed to the colonial east. It was on the border-land between upper Saxony and Thuringia, the old and the new Germany, that the reforms of Luther had already sprung into existence; but the southwest still weighed heavily in the balance, and at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War the politics of Kurpfalz had exercised a decisive influence. The south German imperial towns, however, had played out their political rôle since the war of Schmalkald; the whole of the southwest had taken little more than a merely passive part in the later progress of the great war, and the battle, so far as it was not conducted by foreign powers, had been fought out by east German powers, including Bavaria. Now the whole of the west had fallen into a number of impotent small states; it had lost its old economical significance by the removal of the trade routes of the world; the possibility for the formation of larger economic units was nowhere present; besides, the political supremacy of foreign powers was nowhere so narrowing and so oppressive, the national self-consciousness nowhere so small, as in these oldest German centres of civilisation. It was only towards the end of the seventeenth century that a considerable secular state was formed in the northwest—that of electoral Hanover; but this succumbed rapidly to foreign influence, owing to the personal union with England, which dates from 1714.

Considerable secular state organisations existed therefore only in the east. Side by side in the northeast were the lower Saxon-Thuringian colonial provinces of Brandenburg and electoral Saxony; in the southeast, Bavaria and Austria—that is to say, actually the countries of Bavarian origin. Of these four state organisations, two, Bavaria and electoral Saxony, were purely inland territories—that is, without any immediate interest in the great foreign problems of German policy, and so without any compulsion to gather all their powers tightly together. Only Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia were border states. But Austria's main stream, the vein of her life, the Danube, flowed out of Germany into an inland sea then almost inaccessible in view of its remoteness; it was connected with the north, it is true, by the Elbe and the Oder, but Bohemia was the site of a population that was foreign, although at that time half crushed; and only Silesia was in the main German territory. Furthermore, the border-lands in the east were under the same sway as Austria, so that a feeling of strong national pride was not allowed to rise into prominence, and the only great national ambition in the pursuit of which the Habsburgers were immediately occupied was the expulsion of the Turks from Hungary; they were interested in relationships with France only in so far as their remote western possessions extending up to the upper Rhine were con-

[1640 A.D.]

cerned. Finally, the reaction in the church had disturbed the mark of the Habsburg nations and interrupted their spiritual association with German culture, the nature of which was essentially Protestant.


THE TERRITORIES OF THE HOHENZOLLERN

It was otherwise in Brandenburg. In strips of land still territorially separated but of considerable dimension, the lands of the Hohenzollern stretched right across the whole breadth of north Germany and farther away, from the lower Rhine to the Memel; in their hands was the territory between the Elbe and the Oder, that is to say, the connection between the German interior and the coast; they had a share in the Weser as well as in the Rhine, and commanded portions therefore of the great streams which were the conduits of conveyance to the North Sea—now the most important of German seas—and by establishing a connection between the Elbe and the Oder they could acquire a great trade route from the southeast to the northwest, from Silesia to the mouth of the Elbe. And the same vital interests brought the states into immediate opposition to Poland, to whose feudal superiority the dukedom of Prussia was still subordinate; to Sweden, which separated the mouth of the Oder from the Hinterland; and to France, which threatened the ill-conditioned west of Germany. So the Hohenzollern were confronted with the greatest problems of German politics.

Finally, there existed in these preponderating lower Saxon races, accustomed for centuries to hard work on poor soil, a strong self-consciousness; and the attitude of the reformed reigning house to its subjects, of whom the great majority were Lutheran, begat a measure of tolerance that was far in excess of what the imperial law enjoined. Thus the Hohenzollern, by working for their state, unsuspectingly created the basis for the new unity of the nation—first a strong middle state, then a *Grossmacht*. At

the same time the Habsburgs, by conquering Hungary, founded an independent power of the first rank, half of which, however, lay outside Germany.

By the relation existing between these units of power—the north German and lower Saxon Protestant and the south German Bavarian Catholic—was the fate of the nation for two centuries immeasurably more determined than by its imperial constitution in its process of stagnation. Great as was the evil that their competition brought upon Germany, it was only the rise of great independent states which could insure the political endurance of a German nation and save it from foreign supremacy. For it was a time of the keenest struggles for supremacy. True, Spain as a leading power soon disappeared from the contest, but Bourbon France, under its unlimited monarchy,




WATCH-TOWER OF THE MIDDLE AGES

was a neighbour far more to be feared; England was on the ascent, forcing back the Netherlands into a secondary position—in trade and colonial enterprise she became supreme; in the whole of the north, Sweden exercised a powerful military influence; and Russia, with her czar, was slowly pressing towards the west behind a Poland that was sinking into hopeless ruin through the conduct of a sovereign nobility that had no one to lead it.

THE GREAT ELECTOR (1640-1688 A.D.)

A succession of great or at all events considerable rulers raised Brandenburg-Prussia from the depths of her former weakness. The first, Frederick William (1640-1688), who even in his own time was called the Great Elector (born 1620), owed far less to his weak father, George William, than to his witty and energetic mother, Elizabeth Charlotte of the Palatinate. It was she who gave him his decided leaning towards the line of opposition adopted by evangelical princes of the empire, while Count Schwarzenberg, the Catholic minister of his father, with much assiduity kept Brandenburg after 1635 on the side of Austria. The accession of the youthful elector to the throne, in December of 1640, marks an important political crisis.^f



CHURCH OF ST. LAWRENCE,
NUREMBERG

The situation of the young elector, at this time only twenty years old, was sufficiently gloomy. Of the countries of which he was lord by birth (Brandenburg, Cleves, and Prussia), he possessed only the legal title. He had not yet been invested with Prussia; Brandenburg and Cleves were in great part in the hands of foreign powers, and the hope of winning his hereditary Pomerania from the Swedes seemed almost unattainable. And even if he could establish himself in possession of his state—if we may apply the term state to territories dwelling under totally different conditions and only by chance under the same head—was it to be hoped he would guide it successfully through all the dangers which surrounded it? Yet Frederick William showed himself equal to the difficult task, young as he still was.

The perils of war, before which the elector's children had often been compelled to flee from castle to castle, had beat around Frederick William's earliest youth. When he was approaching manhood his father had sent him to the Dutch court to be under the care of the great soldier and statesman, Frederick Henry, son of William of Orange. He was already strong enough to flee from the allurements and pleasures of the Hague with as courageous decision as he sought the dangers of war—for instance, in the siege of Breda.

But it was not only his character that he steeled while in this distant country. Here he saw, under his own eyes, a little state which yet was at that time incontestably one of the first on the earth; he saw that this state had become so powerful by means of religious and political liberty, order and law at home, and, above all, through trade and navigation. To the keen, wide-open eyes of the young man this lesson was not lost. On the coast of his Prussia, also,

[1640-1654 A. D.]

beat the sea which unites the countries, and Pomerania with the mouths of the Oder must, according to an ancient treaty, soon be his hereditary possession; for his marks too—sandy, swampy, desert as they appeared, and indeed furnished with but scanty natural resources—prosperity and power might be won by strenuous diligence and the skilful utilisation of all available forces. So the prince, enriched with great views, returned first to Cleves and then to Berlin; then he accompanied his father to Prussia, where the latter died in 1640.

The young elector soon perceived what, in the deplorable condition of the country, was his first task: the erection of a standing army—the *miles perpetuus*, as they said in those days—by means of which Sweden and Austria had become powerful. To possess such an army was the object of all the considerable powers of the time. The first beginnings were small and insignificant. At first he was usefully served by Colonel von Burgsdorf, then by General von Sparr; but the true hero and leader of his continually increasing army was Field-Marshal von Derfflinger, a man of unknown origin who had risen from the ranks and had served his apprenticeship, first under Matthias von Thurn, then in the Saxon, and, most important of all, in the Swedish army. To promote his work Frederick William needed peace with the Swedes; in 1641 he concluded a peace with them, regardless of the emperor's indignation. Thus he maintained himself till the end of the great war.

By this peace the Swedes received Hither Pomerania with the islands and the mouths of the Oder, and he obtained only the greater part of Farther Pomerania, although, since old Bogislaw XIV had died in 1637, Frederick William should have inherited the whole of Pomerania. In compensation he received the archbishopric of Magdeburg with Halberstadt and the bishoprics of Minden and Kammin, beautiful, fertile districts, the first three of which were of great value for communication between Brandenburg and the Rhenish provinces; but yet they seemed to him no true equivalent for Stettin, the mouths of the Oder, and the sea-coasts, for he knew how to value the importance of a sea power. But the elector was a man who calculated on existing conditions. Hither Pomerania was lost for the present and it was of no use to lament; it was better to establish himself in the districts which he had, and to restore the wasted territories to prosperity. The elector accomplished this by means of a (for that period) wise method of taxation; instead of the old land tax he imposed the excise, that is, a percentage on articles of consumption, both native and foreign—a tax which was easier to collect and to which, of course, all classes contributed. By this means he gradually increased the revenues of his state (which at his accession had amounted to only 400,000 thalers) to 2,500,000 thalers, and yet the country quickly recovered itself. The elector, economical and prudent in the employment of all resources, soon had sufficient money to add to his army, which at the close of his reign amounted to twenty-seven thousand men. Soon the first laurels beckoned to the new army, the first important gain to the elector.

PRUSSIA CEASES TO BE A VASSAL OF POLAND

In Sweden, Queen Christina, the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, laid aside the crown (1654). Her cousin, Charles (X) Gustavus, had followed her, but was not recognised by King John Kasimir of Poland, in whom a scion of the house of Vasa still survived. Frederick William stood exactly between the two kingdoms, which now made war on each other. The elector had at first attempted to mediate a peace, but the Swedes, with the haughtiness of veteran conquerors, marched through his territories of Pomerania and Neu-

mark into Poland, quickly occupied the whole Polish kingdom, and then beset the elector (who had at first only attempted to protect his dukedom of Prussia) in his second capital, at Königsberg. But soon Charles Gustavus offered him peace, and even an alliance; for John Kasimir, with imperial assistance, had meantime won back his country. The elector now saw an opportunity to shake off the Polish suzerainty, which was exceedingly oppressive.^e

The king of Sweden (Charles (X) Gustavus), had taken Warsaw; the king of Poland had fled to upper Silesia; a large section of magnates did homage to the king of Sweden and joined his ranks. Facing him with his army and the estates of both countries—for West Prussia made with him common cause—Frederick William assumed an imposing attitude. At the same time, however, he did not consider it his duty, nor did he believe himself to be strong enough, to interfere in favour of the king of Poland and to try the fortune of battle against the victorious Swedes. Charles Gustavus, also, had scruples as to whether he should undertake to overpower him by force of arms. His own inclinations, apart from other considerations, would have counselled such a course of conduct. It may be easily imagined that since the Swedes had taken Finland centuries ago, Esthonia and Livonia in the reign of the last king, Hither Pomerania and Wismar by the Peace of Westphalia, they now thought to complete their supremacy over the coastland of the Baltic. They had a grievance in the agreement at Stuhmsdorf by which they had surrendered the harbours that had already been taken; Charles Gustavus held it to be almost a point of honour to regain them. His suggestion to the elector was to occupy Prussia forthwith, as the vassal of Sweden. Under the stress of the political situation and the immediate danger which threatened, Frederick William after much hesitation (he refused an extension of the country which was offered to him) agreed to this proposal; but he did so with the greatest reluctance—he had never before looked so melancholy. He had to surrender the coasts to the Swedes, to give up his alliances. Nevertheless, there was one consideration which made this agreement acceptable. The feudal duties exacted by Sweden were not so mercilessly definite as those formerly exacted by the Poles; certain other characteristics give this feudal agreement the appearance of an alliance; but the stupendous importance of the matter is signified in a moment of what may almost be called universal historical meaning; it rests on the common interests of the Germanic and Protestant powers in opposition to the supremacy of the Poles.

The common nature of their cause became all the more insistent when the fugitive king returned to awaken all national and religious feelings to the value of his aims. Charles Gustavus was not entirely wrong when he said that if the Poles were to win, both he and the elector were lost. In order to bind him permanently to his side, he offered to make him archduke, even king of the best-situated palatinates, which had for the most part been reduced to subjection. The elector did not refuse this, because in greater Poland he thereby acquired that independence which was denied to him in Prussia. However the negotiations and intentions of those concerned might shape themselves at different moments, the main result was the common reaction against that great Catholic power which had formerly reigned in the north. Waldeck, in opposition to the other councillors of the elector, continued a policy of Catholic supremacy. In this combination, which threatened a revival of the Polish and Catholic system to overpower the alliance of Protestant and German forces, Brandenburg, Prussia, and Sweden joined arms in order to bid defiance to the Poles, who in the mean while had again taken their capital.

Such is the historical significance of the three days' fight at Warsaw in which the Poles were defeated and dispersed. Since the Teutonic order had been overwhelmed by the Poles in the battle of Tannenberg, the Poles had

[1656 A.D.]

maintained the upper hand in German colonial territory on both sides of the Vistula; the first signs of the prevalence of an opposite tendency are to be observed, as we have shown, in the advantages maintained by Gustavus Adolphus against the Poles. If Charles Gustavus now took up this contest, at first with great success, which subsequently however became dubious again, it was of the greatest importance that the duke of Prussia, who had now acquired a supreme position of his own, should join the other side. It was from the very centre of the order that he gathered the necessary power and stimulus. The change in the times is apparent in the difference of the military organisation: the knighthood had not been capable of withstanding the fighting forces of eastern Europe, which the king of Poland at that day gathered round him; now, however, a different military system had arisen, before the representatives of which the masses of undeveloped disorderly Polish troops were bound to fall back. The military organisation, under which the natives of the territory belonging to the order joined forces with the fighting material of the German provinces, is the basis, no longer of the Brandenburg army alone, which numbered only a few regiments outside these, but also of the Brandenburg-Prussian army, as it was to exist henceforward. It is to be regarded as a remarkable achievement that this army, which first stood its ground against the encroachments of Charles Gustavus, inflicted in alliance with him a crushing defeat on the Poles. Not only by the interchange of diplomacy but also by these master strokes was the independence of Prussia founded: it is the first great military accomplishment of the Brandenburg-Prussian army. What a trifling rôle it had played but a short time ago, when Swedish forces were united with a Protestant army!

Frederick William stood now on an equal footing with the king of Sweden. True he was his vassal, but only for one province, which was far from including the power that was his in virtue of the development of Germany. It is less important to consider to what degree he thought at the beginning of these disturbances to raise himself—to the rank of an independent sovereign prince—than to reflect that in fact he acquired an independent position: in virtue of his fighting power, he was actually an independent prince before he was so called. But the name was to be his, too, as soon as the general circumstances had reached the point of development which could lead to this end. The first decisive turn in the affairs of the north was the attack of the Russians on Sweden. For it was even more difficult for the Russians than for other powers to acquiesce in the Baltic's becoming definitely, so to speak, a Swedish lake; and at this moment their entry into Livonia did not hurt the Poles at all. It made little impression upon them that the czar even brought himself to demand the feudal supremacy over Prussia; they saw in him at once a new ally, and proceeded with renewed zeal to oppose the Swedes and the elector.

THE TREATY OF LABIAU (1656 A.D.)

Worried by the claim of three powers at once to superior feudal relations, and depending on none of these in his actual position, the elector-duke most naturally hit upon the thought of dispensing altogether with a subordinate relation of that kind; this object, however, could not be forthwith accomplished in so far as the Poles were concerned; for, since the Russians had broken loose, they had again obtained the upper hand and made powerful advances in West Prussia; they already held the king of Sweden to be a man defeated and abandoned. The Prussian estates had wished for an armistice at least; but the Poles refused it. They would enter into a definitive agreement with the elector only if he would return to the old feudal dependence; his

alliance with the Swedes was regarded by them as felony in the sense of the feudal law, to say nothing of the peculiar position which he occupied. If the elector would not abandon this alliance and submit again to the supremacy of the Poles, whom after all he had defeated, there was nothing left for him but to continue an alliance with Charles Gustavus, and once more to face the Poles with all the might at his command. King Charles X, oppressed on all sides, saw his salvation in a renewed combination with Brandenburg, and so agreed to the proposals which the elector made to him in favour of the sovereignty of his dukedom. The subject had already been mooted before; the king had never wished to enter upon it: now, however, he saw himself compelled by his plight to do so. The feudal relation enforced upon the elector had less significance for him now than formerly, inasmuch as his great plan was ruined by the invasion of the Russians; his thoughts turned on peace with Russia, and to effect this he reckoned upon the co-operation of Brandenburg. In the Treaty of Labiau (November 10th, 1656), he consented to abandon the feudal connection and to substitute a league of alliance in its place.

PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE WITH SWEDEN

This agreement has not a very prominent place in the confusing whirl of episodes of which the times are composed; for the establishment of Prussian political relations it is of high importance for all ages: for not alone did the king renounce all his own claims, but it was established that Prussia should be made separate from Poland forever. The elector and his successors were never again to enter into a similar relationship with Poland or any other power: they were to be supreme, absolute, and sovereign princes, and to enjoy all the rights of sovereign princes. Once again, the elector linked his fate with the decision of the war between Sweden and Poland, by which yet another wide prospect was opened up to him. Great Poland signified its desire to be under his protection henceforward. No hope seemed to be too extravagant, for at this moment the Transylvanian troops broke into Poland under Prince Rákóczy: it was as if the old Bethlen Gábor, who had once belonged to the European coalition against Austria, had come to life again. Like Bethlen, George Rákóczy entered Hungary as the champion of the Protestants—as the restorer of this country's old-time freedom; the products of his mines made him a rich man: he is known as one of the greatest opponents the order of the Jesuits has ever had. A successful expedition of Transylvanians and Swedes would have exercised a crushing and retrogressive effect upon Poland, as well as upon the stability of Austrian power. Brandenburg-Prussia also belonged to this combination at the time.

Waldeck, whose sole efforts were always directed against the two powers, Austria and Poland, accompanied the king on the expedition. All-embracing as were the expectations based upon the campaign of 1667, the main results were of trifling significance. Certainly the alliance with Rákóczy was concluded; but it led to no decision, for the Poles evaded every serious attempt to bring about a meeting. Rákóczy was not so easily satisfied as people assumed; he was not for the king, and still less for the elector: on the contrary, when Brzesc had been taken, he appeared to be very much inclined to conclude an agreement with the Poles, especially as his country was threatened with a Tatar invasion; he offered King John Kasimir an alliance against Charles X, with whom he came to loggerheads. Not only had the Poles nothing to fear from the alliance of Sweden and Transylvania, but it was of service to them in that Austria was thereby moved to make common cause with them; at the same time they found a new ally in Denmark.

[1667 A.D.]

THE TRIUMVIRATE

Impatient to revenge the loss suffered at the last peace, and encouraged by the hostile intentions evidenced against the Swedes in every direction by the agency of the house of Austria and its influence, the Danes rose to a fresh attack upon this power. The participation of Denmark and Austria in the Polish affair may be regarded as the second great episode in this war. Charles Gustavus was compelled on the spot to turn his weapons from Poland to Denmark; but he saw no misfortune in doing so. All over the world, people began to regard him more and more as an object of fear; for it was not held to be probable that the Danes would offer any opposition. It was even thought he would acquire possession of the Sound, and would be put in a position to set new armies in the field by raising duties so as to gain the mastery over northern Europe; he was in league with Mazarin and with Cromwell. This triumvirate threatened the existing dynastic relations of Europe; an intention was formed of establishing in Germany an emperor who should not come from the house of Austria, to supply the new vacancy. The elector of Brandenburg was still regarded as one of her allies; should they prevail, he might hope to retain Great Poland, and even to conquer Silesia. But think of the consequences that might ensue from this! The king was far away—he already saw himself exposed without aid to the hostilities of his enemies; under stress of this danger he had no scruples, abandoned as he was by the king, against abandoning his cause. It was impossible for him to suffer Denmark to be completely defeated, or Sweden's aspirations of supremacy in the Baltic (doubly oppressive at this juncture) to be realised. Still less could he brook that France and Sweden should control the German throne. The great march of general politics and the prospects to which they led drove him every day more and more on to the other side: it would naturally be more agreeable to him to see the imperial authority continue unbroken in the house of Austria than to see raised to this dignity one of his opponents, even his neighbour in Jülich and Berg, the count palatine of Neuburg who was the competitor next favoured. That Sweden should dominate Poland had equally little interest for him, inasmuch as this power herself dispensed with his former dependence on her. All his present efforts were directed towards securing the recognition of the independence of his dukedom from Poland and from the other powers. At no cost would he any longer remain involved in the unstable internal concerns of Poland: besides, who could guarantee that the czar or the emperor would not take possession of the Polish throne? What would become of him then? The considerable army which he possessed in the field gave weight and effectiveness to his representations. Nobody did such justice to his ideas as the leading men in the states-general, especially Jan de Witt, in other respects



DETAIL OF THE WALL
OF HEIDELBERG CASTLE,
BEGUN LATE IN THE
THIRTEENTH, AND COM-
PLETED EARLY IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

an opponent of the house of Orange—which was so closely allied with Brandenburg—but a man of sufficiently wide perceptions not to regard the great political issues from this point of view. The interests of his own republic demanded the independence of the Prussian coastlands from Sweden as well as from Poland, in order to secure the safety of her trade in the Baltic and her connection with Russia.

Less determined was the declaration of the Danes; at first they were opposed to the whole suggestion—it would not be well regarded by the subjects in Prussia, and in the future the protectorate of Poland would always put a certain check upon the elector; the points of grievance in the relations hitherto subsisting might be redressed. The Brandenburg ambassador replied that Poland had abused her rights in an unbearable fashion, and made it impossible to return to a subordinate relation which, once for all, with good reason, had been broken: the elector observed that he had rendered a service to Poland; for it was owing to the resistance which at the beginning he offered to the Swedes, and which secured for him independence from them, that the Poles had been enabled to gather together and re-establish themselves in some measure. By this means the Danes were emboldened to tender their good services to the elector. Without doubt the favourable view of this policy entertained by Lisola, the ambassador of the house of Austria, contributed much to its success; because for this power everything depended on withdrawing the elector from the opposite side and from the alliance with an enemy. With the united co-operation of the allied powers, by which the Poles could hope to be defended from Sweden, it was brought about that the latter acquiesced in the condition which the elector made for his concurrence.

THE TREATY OF WEHLAU (1657 A.D.)

After long negotiations, shrouded in the deepest secrecy, no suspicion of which reached the ears of the French ambassador at the court, the Poles agreed at Wehlau on the 19th of September, 1657, that the elector, who on his part agreed to ally himself with them, should possess Prussia with its old boundaries, but with the right of supremacy under his absolute control and free from all burdens hitherto imposed upon it. The agreement applied both to himself and to his male descendents. These were practically the same stipulations as those accepted by the king of Sweden. But what a different significance it acquired by being acquiesced in by the Poles! The Swedish feudal supremacy had been imposed only latterly upon Prussia, while that of Poland was centuries old, and had been recognised by Europe as an unquestionable relation based upon constitutional law. At the personal meeting at Bromberg which took place between the king and the elector, who now withdrew to the marks, we are confronted with an unexpected internal relation. Without doubt it was the work of the queen of Poland, Ludovica Gonzaga, and of the electress Luise: they were both peaceably intentioned, and had come to an understanding with each other. A few points of minor importance had still to be settled here, and new difficulties did not fail to arise; but the main object—the recognition of the sovereignty—was established by form of oath in the open air. Such was the consequence of the change in the relative position of the world-powers. The feudal dependency which, after severe defeat, had been inflicted upon the masters of the order, and had been recognised by the last of them [Albert of Brandenburg, 1490–1568], who secularised himself and the country, was again thrown off, after the Poles on their side had not only suffered defeats, but had also fallen into difficulties out of which they could be extricated only by this admission. The abolition of the feudal relation had

[1657-1660 A.D.]

been demanded by the duke of Prussia, who might still have proved very formidable, as he was at the head of a considerable army and in alliance with the most distinguished enemy; it was the price paid for his transference from this enemy to the European powers, which had come to an agreement with the Poles. Truly an achievement of far-reaching historical significance! The great German colony in the east, which owed its foundation to the long continued efforts of the German nation, was thereby established in its original independence of the neighbouring powers—at all events, in so far that it acknowledged the elector of Brandenburg, duke of Prussia, as its head. For this prince himself, and for his house, what incalculable meaning lay in this achievement! In the midst of the large kingdoms which until now had imposed their will upon them, and thwarted the development of a policy peculiar to their interest, the prince and his country now appear on an equal footing, with equal rights, owing dependence to no one but themselves. It was the work of an able pilot who, in the political storm that rose around him, more than once changed his course and at last arrived safely in port. For the structure of the state, the value of what had been gained is immeasurable, in that it freed the elector from all consideration for the political future of Poland: henceforward he could pursue his own objects.^b

Charles X, now attacked by both Holland and Denmark, the latter of which had designs on Bremen and Verden, displayed indeed the most brilliant military qualities, drove the Danes from Holstein, Schleswig, and Jutland, even traversed the frozen belt to Fünen, then by Langeland, Laaland, and Falster to Zealand, and compelled his opponents to the unfavourable Peace of Roeskilde (in Zealand) in 1658; but when, immediately afterwards, he broke this peace and attempted to conquer Denmark and Copenhagen, Frederick William, with auxiliaries, marched against him into Holstein and even into Jutland and Fünen, where the troops of Brandenburg played a decisive part in the battle of Nyborg (1659). Charles X, relying on the assistance of France, was still unbent when, in February, 1660, he was overtaken by an early death. The regency which governed for his young son hastened to conclude at Oliva, a monastery near Dantzic, on the 3rd of May, 1660, the peace which had already been initiated. The Wehlau Treaty with Poland was confirmed and guaranteed by the great powers. Henceforth, Frederick William was sovereign prince in Prussia.

OPPOSITION OF THE ESTATES

Now, for the first time, Frederick William might turn his attention to amalgamating into one state the different provinces over which he ruled. It was the estates of the various districts which set themselves against the unity of the state. By it their "liberty," that is the unrestrained freedom with which they held sway in their circles, was endangered. Instead of ruling by the aid of the sovereign estates, the elector attempted to do so by means of his officials, and he chose these officials not merely from the narrow districts in which they were to labour—he also took them from "the stranger." The estates vehemently opposed him; but their day had gone by. Only those in Cleves maintained their general position, after they had abandoned to the elector the right to raise and maintain troops in the country and to appoint officials; the estates of Brandenburg and Prussia lost this right almost entirely. The prerogatives of the estates in Brandenburg were obsolete, their administration was clumsy, and since, thanks to the new tax on commodities, the elector had little need of the grants of money from the estates, henceforth he seldom called them together, until gradually they fell into oblivion.


The struggle in Prussia was more severe. The Prussian estates were accustomed to a certain share in the government, and showed themselves ill-disposed towards the severe order and discipline of Brandenburg. The example of the unbridled freedom of the Polish estates had a demoralising effect upon them. They had from the first maintained in the face of the Great Elector that Poland had not the power to hand over the sovereignty to him without their acquiescence; and they therefore persisted in a defiant attitude towards him; the most eager party among them even entered into treacherous negotiations with Poland, and Poland was not disinclined to utilise the insubordination of the Prussian estates for her own ends. At the head of the elector's opponents stood the *Schöppenmeister* of Königsberg, Hieronymous Roth, and Colonel von Kalckstein. But when the elector had failed to attain his object, either by mildness or by threats, he took his measures with an iron hand. Roth was accused of high treason and condemned to lifelong imprisonment (1662), during which he died unsubdued (1678). Kalckstein, who had uttered threats against the elector's life, and had been imprisoned, but afterwards pardoned, fled to Poland, in defiance of his plighted word. In Warsaw he gave himself out as a representative of the Prussian estates, and in their name and with vehement abuse of the elector demanded that Poland should resume her ancient rights. On this, Frederick William, through his ambassador, caused him to be secretly seized and conveyed out of the town; when he was brought wrapped in carpet to Prussia, and his head struck off at Memel (1672). Henceforth, all resistance in the estates was broken, and Frederick William was absolute monarch in his own state. If in this reckless method of procedure he resembled the type of the age, Louis XIV, yet the difference between the Prussian absolute rule and the French lay in this: it served the state, but did not sacrifice it to its own vanity and selfishness; and thus it was a blessing to the state whose unity it founded and which it freed from petty influences.

WAR WITH FRANCE AND SWEDEN

For twelve years Brandenburg enjoyed peace. It was not until 1672 that the Great Elector entered into the European struggle against Louis XIV, when, deaf to all enticements and promises of money on the part of the conqueror, he was the first of all the princes to hasten to the assistance of Holland, whose value for the liberty of Europe and the preservation of the Gospel he recognised. Hampered by the envy and disfavour of Austria, and attacked in Cleves and Westphalia by Louis XIV in full force, he found himself, in 1673, under the necessity of concluding with France the Peace of Vossem (near Brussels); but when, in 1674, the German empire entered into the war, he was speedily again on the Rhine, and this time with many more troops than he was pledged to put into the field—twenty thousand men. Then Louis XIV, by means of his influence in Sweden, roused a new enemy in the elector's rear. In the winter of 1674, the Swedes from Hither Pomerania fell upon Further Pomerania and Neumark, as well as upon Uckermark, Priegnitz, and Haveland. At first they behaved with moderation, but soon went about plundering, burning, and wasting, as in the worst days of the Thirty Years' War, and prepared to cross the Elbe and even to break into Altmark itself.

The elector had gone into winter quarters on the Main. As soon as he was sufficiently prepared he started with the army, soon left the infantry, with the exception of a small, picked body, behind him, and appeared in Magdeburg on the 21st of June, 1675. Here he had the gates closed, that no news might precede him, and rested two days. Then, with only six thousand horse

[1675-1678 A.D.]



HANGMAN'S FOOTBRIDGE, NUREMBERG, WITH THIRTEENTH-CENTURY FORTIFICATIONS

and twelve hundred foot, forwarded on carts, he hurried on. On the 25th he took Rathenow, and thus divided the hostile army, which was posted from Havelberg to Brandenburg. The left wing of the Swedes made haste to cross the Rhine, which forms the old boundary of Havelland and the countship of Ruppın and leaves only a few fordable places. At one of these, near Fehrbellin in the province of Bellin, a sandy plateau full of fir woods, the elector compelled them to give battle, June 28th, 1675. With 5,600 horse, which alone had followed his lightning speed, and 13 cannon, he attacked the Swedes, 11,000 strong (4,000 on horseback, 7,000 on foot, and 38 cannon). At the very beginning he espied, with the keen eye of a general, an unoccupied hill, which commanded the battle-field; thither he hastened with the cannon. It was here that the fight was hottest; here his faithful horsemen had to cut out a way for the elector himself from the midst of the foes who surrounded him; here his master of the horse, Emanuel Froben, fell at his master's side, and here the fate of the day was gloriously decided for the Brandenburgers.

The young power had conquered the Swedes, whose warlike renown had subsisted unshaken since the days of Gustavus Adolphus; the elector had performed the most glorious task which can fall to the lot of a soldier—he had freed his fatherland from foreign violence. Seven days later not a foe remained on the soil of the mark. The empire now declared war against Sweden, while Denmark, covetous of Bremen and Verden, which indeed were also Swedish, entered into an alliance with the Great Elector, as his contemporaries already called him.

Thus supported, Frederick William proceeded to an attack on the German provinces of Sweden. In 1676 almost all Pomerania, in 1677 Stettin, and in 1678 Stralsund itself had been conquered. In order to bring the last-named town to surrender, the Brandenburg troops had been transported by Danish assistance to Rügen, being supported at the same time by the little fleet which the elector already had on the Baltic. Soon Greifswald also fell. Not a foot

of German land now remained to Sweden. Then, whilst Frederick William himself was in Westphalia for the purpose of protecting Cleves against the advancing French, came the news that the Swedes had invaded Prussia from Livonia (November, 1678). With all speed, and in the bitterest winter weather, he set the army in Pomerania in motion, journeyed thither himself, although he was ill, and in January, 1679, held at Marienwerder a muster of his troops, which were nine thousand strong. The Swedes were already in retreat. The elector had sledges collected from the whole neighbourhood, and on these he sent forward his infantry, hastened after the enemy, cut off his retreat by risking the direct way across the ice of the Frisches and the Kurisches Haff, but overtook only the fragments of their flying army. Of sixteen thousand Swedes scarcely a tithe escaped the fearful cold and the eager pursuit of the Brandenburg troops, which penetrated as far as the neighbourhood of Riga.

Thus the war had been brought to an end in all quarters. But the elector's allies had already, independently of him, concluded a peace with Louis XIV (at Nimeguen). Envy had induced Austria to leave her ally in the lurch. The fear to which expression is so well given in the so-called "Stralendorf judgment" (Stralendorf was imperial vice-chancellor in the days of John Sigismund)—"It is to be feared that the Brandenburger will now become him whom the Calvinist and Lutheran mob yearn for"—grew with every success of the Great Elector, and entirely governed the Habsburg policy. Thus left alone against Louis XIV, who immediately occupied first Cleves, then Mark and Ravensberg, and laid siege to Minden, Frederick William could do nothing, and Louis demanded the restoration of all that had been taken from Sweden. Mournfully the elector at last acquiesced, uttering the wish that from him might descend the avengers who should repay the outrage to his faithful allies. In the Peace of St. Germain, in 1679, he gave back to the Swedes all the conquered country with the exception of the strip on the right bank of the Oder, and thus Sweden continued to preserve her German territories.

THE GREAT ELECTOR AND AUSTRIA AND SPAIN

In addition to this mortification the elector received another. In the year of his victory of Fehrbellin (1675), the ducal house of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau had become extinct, and in accordance with the old treaty of 1537 these provinces also should have fallen to Brandenburg. But Austria demanded them for herself as Bohemian fiefs, and marched into them without paying any heed to the legal claims of Brandenburg. It was openly said in Vienna, "It is not pleasing to the imperial majesty that a new Vandal empire should raise its flag on the Baltic." More than this, the aid against the Turks several times offered by the elector in the distress of Austria which now ensued, was rejected because it was feared that the opportunity might be taken for a military occupation of those provinces. Full of anger with his allies, Frederick William directly after the Peace of St. Germain had allied himself with Louis XIV—an unnatural relation which did not long subsist. Spain, which still owed him a subsidy for the last war, he attacked by sea with his little fleet. Even before the war, Frederick William, who well knew the importance of a naval force, had begun to create himself a fleet with the aid of Dutch shipbuilders; it then consisted of ten frigates which had already given the Swedes plenty of trouble. With this fleet he made prize of various merchant vessels, but, on the other hand, it had failed to capture the plate fleet, which annually carried to Spain the treasures of the American mines, and the

[1685-1686 A.D.]

ships of Brandenburg, driven by storms and pressed by a superior enemy, had to seek refuge in a Portuguese harbour.


But when in the Turkish wars the emperor had need of aid from Brandenburg in order that he might completely recover Hungary, he surrendered to the elector the circle of Schwiebus (in the east of the province of Brandenburg) as an indemnity for the Silesian claims (1686), and also resigned to him a claim he had on East Friesland, whereby Frederick William came into possession of Emden and Gretsyl as pledges. From here his ships went out to his colonies, for as early as 1683 he had occupied a strip on the Gold Coast of Africa, and had there erected the fort Gross-Friedrichsburg; besides this, he had acquired from the Danes a port of the island of St. Thomas in the West Indies. But these colonies, founded in unfavourable places and soon threatened by the jealousy of the Dutch, had no future, and were already abandoned by his second successor in 1721.

WORK AND CHARACTER OF THE GREAT ELECTOR

Thus Frederick William was ceaselessly active, even where circumstances proved too strong for his small forces. From Louis XIV, who was cast in such a different mould, he soon again fell off. In 1685 Louis had abrogated the Edict of Nantes, which secured toleration to the Huguenots, and had oppressed them in every possible way, in order to lead them back to the Catholic Church; for as he knew only one royal will, so he recognised only one faith in France. Far different was the Great Elector: "He first calls in the healing word into the disputes of the church and demands a general amnesty for all three confessions." How could he have looked with indifferent eyes on the necessities of his co-religionists in France? By his Potsdam Edict he opened his territories to the fugitives, who brought their industry and skill with them. Louis was already angered at this; but now the elector offered a helping hand to his wife's nephew, William III of Orange, in the acquisition of the English throne, from which William, in collusion with the great nobles of England, was preparing to hurl his father-in-law, the Catholic James II. Louis XIV, who kept James II in his pay and in subjection, drew from these transactions fresh hatred against Frederick William, who bequeathed the execution of his plans, from which he was himself prevented by death, to his son, Frederick III.

The Great Elector stands forth as the only really great ruler that Germany produced in the seventeenth century. It was by him that the melancholy Peace of Westphalia was first made to yield blessings to Germany. For when this peace dissolved the imperial form of government in Germany and made sovereign rulers of the princes, Frederick William was the first who in this capacity laboured for the good of Prussia and Germany; to him Prussia owes it that the provincial distinctions vanished before the sense of belonging to one state, so that every man, whether he were of Cleves or of Brandenburg, of Pomerania or of East Prussia, felt himself to be a member of one whole, and thus he built up for Germany the new power which was to take the place of the decaying empire. By means of the alliances which he concluded in and beyond Germany, he, with his insignificant forces, opposed the overwhelming power of Louis XIV, and was thus enabled to prevent the preponderance of one realm in Europe. He was the first who stood forth against Louis in 1672; the last to retire from the battle-field before him in 1679. Well-versed in the often faithless and violent statecraft of his time, he understood how to make his influence felt on all occasions. He was no less great as a soldier; with slight materials he founded a great state.

But the heroic figure of the Great Elector changes into that of the careful economist, when we consider his internal administration. Prudent and economical, he strengthened the resources of his country, and although he put a severe strain on the tax-paying forces of the population, yet their prosperity increased. For the cultivation of the soil, settlers were attracted into the depopulated villages, especially Dutch peasants, who might be regarded as the best teachers for the marks. By the reception of the French refugees, whom his son subsequently installed as a regular colony in Berlin, he advanced industry, which was still in its infancy. By means of a regular postal service, and especially by the construction of roads and canals, he increased communication and rendered it more easy. His principal work in this direction is the Friedrich-Wilhelms or Müllroser canal, which united the Oder and the Sprée and, consequently, the Oder and the Elbe. And this man, whose mind embraced the greatest conceptions, whose ambassadors and court appeared on



OLD GERMAN GATEWAY

ceremonial occasions in all the dazzling splendour consonant with the custom of the age, at home was simple, unpretending, *bourgeois*, and childlike. In Potsdam he fished in the carp ponds, in the pleasure-grounds of Berlin he watered his tulip-bulbs, raised the first cauliflowers in the marks, and himself carried home in cages the singing birds he had bought in the market. Though, as a political character he, like Gustavus Adolphus, was not always free from reproach, in his home life he was full of a deep, genuine piety. In worthy, amiable fashion, he was seconded by the wife of his youth, Luise Henriette of Orange; his second wife, Dorothea, also devoted to him her careful solicitude. When he died (April 29th, 1688) he left behind him in north Germany a political power which, though not cohesive, was still so considerable—greater than modern Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden together—that to be a kingdom it lacked only the name.

PRUSSIA BECOMES A KINGDOM

The Great Elector was succeeded by his son Frederick III. His father had rated his abilities as small, as even less than they were, and the two had not always been on the best of terms. Austria had contrived to use this disunion to the best advantage. In his distrust of his father, and because he regarded an adherence to Austria as absolutely necessary, the electoral prince had let himself be beguiled into promising Austria the restoration of the circle of Schwiebus as soon as he should enter on his reign. In accordance with this agreement, when he became elector he actually did give back the circle of Schwiebus (1695), but refused to make at the same time a formal resignation of the Silesian dukedoms, as was demanded of him. In his foreign policy he

[1688-1701 A.D.]

at first followed in the track of his great father. In accordance with the latter's intention he supported William III at his landing in England, and it was the troops of Brandenburg which conducted this consolidator of English liberty and power to his palace of St. James. When Louis XIV began his third predatory war, that of the Palatinate (1688), and the emperor Leopold, occupied with the Turkish war, was at a loss how to defend the empire, Frederick III proved himself worthy of his father; and uniting Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Cassel in an alliance, like the Great Elector in former days, he appeared in person on the Rhine and conducted the taking of Bonn, into which the French had thrown themselves.

Like his predecessors, he also cared for the enlargement of his state. But his most important achievement was the elevation of the electors of Brandenburg to be kings in Prussia. In this century of Louis XIV, an impulse towards splendour was, as has been said, manifested both at the greater and lesser courts, and to this no ruler was more susceptible than Frederick. It was only recently and, indeed, with Frederick's assistance, that William III of Orange and Frederick Augustus of Saxony had acquired kingly crowns, and the house of Hanover had a prospect of being raised to the English throne. Frederick desired a similar splendour for his own country, which, since the time of his father, whom Louis XIV is said to have urged to make himself king, was already equal in power to at least the lesser kingdoms of Europe. Circumstances were just now peculiarly favourable to this long-prepared and much-desired step. About the year 1700 Europe was shaken by two mighty wars. In the north, Russia under Peter the Great, Poland under Augustus II, and Denmark under Frederick IV had concluded an alliance against the young, heroically minded Charles XII of Sweden, who, with the impetuous military spirit of his ancestors, anticipating his enemies in the so-called Northern War (1700-1721), rapidly humiliated one opponent after another. But in the south the war of the Spanish Succession was preparing. The elector was therefore in the fortunate position of seeing himself the object of universal solicitation; and since Austria was especially zealous in her efforts to obtain his friendship and his help, Frederick seized the occasion to obtain, in exchange for the promise of supporting the emperor in the struggle for Spain, the consent of Leopold to his own assumption of the royal title—not indeed in his German territories, as that seemed out of the question, but in his extra-German, sovereign province, Prussia. Prince Eugene, who was not well disposed towards the Prussians, did indeed declare that the ministers who advised his imperial majesty to accede to the assumption of the royal crown of Prussia were worthy of the hangman, but in Vienna the momentary advantage prevailed. And so at Königsberg, on the 18th of January, 1701, Frederick set the royal crown on the heads of himself and his consort in the midst of the most tremendous pomp, and henceforth styled himself Frederick I, king in Prussia. It was only from the future that this step received its significance. "It was," said Frederick the Great, "as though by it he said to his successors, 'I have won for you a title; make yourselves worthy of it. I have laid a foundation for your greatness; you must complete the work.'"

It was in accordance with the king's temper to surround the kingly crown with royal magnificence. He made Berlin his capital, which was laid out according to the measure of the future. Schlüter's splendid buildings rose—the royal castle, the arsenal, Charlottenburg; the long bridge was adorned with the statue of the Great Elector from the hand of the same artist. The town was extended by a whole new quarter, the Friedrichsstadt, and the fine street "Unter den Linden" came into existence. The king's consort, the clever, accomplished Sophie Charlotte of Hanover, the friend of the great scholar Leibnitz, vied with her husband in the encouragement of science and

art. The academy of science was founded in Berlin in 1711. But institutions of immediate benefit also came to life in Prussia; such was the University of Halle (1694) beside which rose in the same place that pious work of Hermann August Francke, the orphan asylum. In accordance with his father's grand conceptions, Frederick I also continued to permit religious liberty to prevail, and to be everywhere a protector of the Protestants. It must be confessed that in his love of display he forgot the old wise economy which had characterised almost all the Hohenzollerns: the country groaned under a heavy pressure of taxation, and whilst until 1697 Brandenburg had owed much to Eberhard von Danckelmann, who had ingratitude for his reward, Frederick's finances, under the influence of the clever but light-minded Kolb von Wartenburg, were brought to the verge of ruin. The king's last years were also clouded by sickness and other severe dispensations. Fortunately, he had in his son a successor who was master in those very departments of finance and administration which the father had neglected.

THE FATHER OF FREDERICK THE GREAT

Frederick William I (1713-1740) was the counterpart of his father: strictly simple, soldierly, economical, and devoted only to the practical, he disdained the splendour which was then held necessary for a prince. In opposition to the immorality which prevailed in almost all courts, he desired to be a good, strict, generous housefather both in his own family and in his country; not fashionable French trumpery and magnificence, but pious German morality should rule with him. In the mere force of character with which he set himself in opposition to the tendency of his age Frederick William I showed himself great—greater still in the method and spirit in which he ordered the administration of his state. In 1723 he united all the different departments (supreme, finance, war, and demesne), into the General Directory; like a great landowner he superintended everything himself; he inculcated economy in everything. "*Quidquid vult, vehementer vult* [whatever he desires he desires intensely]; he sees all, concerns himself with all; he is sterner than Charles XII and Czar Peter"—so ran the reports of the foreign ambassadors at his court even in the early days of his government. According to a design of his own, he created a bureaucracy which, simple, severe, but conscientious, like the king himself, formed the system of wheels in the machinery of state administration in which Frederick William's great son himself found little to be altered. He simplified the judicial administration, stood forward for the rapid disposal of lawsuits, and made preparations to replace the "Roman law which is confused and partly unsuitable to our own country," by a special national code. Science, in so far as it was not, like medicine, directly useful, he did not promote; but, on the other hand, he spared neither trouble nor expense to improve the education of the people. Each of his subjects should be able to read the holy Scriptures, write what was required, and calculate. Thousands of village schools were opened, and the compulsory attendance which the king introduced furnished them with scholars. The foundation was laid for the regular system of popular instruction in Prussia.

In accordance with the views of his age, he sought to increase the industries and productiveness of his own country by strict exclusion and high taxation of foreign products. For instance, he forbade the wearing of garments made of fabrics which had not been prepared in the country, and with his family set a good example. He also improved agriculture, and, like his predecessors, invited foreigners into his land—for example, many Bohemians, who had been

[1713 A.D.]

compelled to leave their own country on account of religion; but he derived a peculiar advantage from the reception of seventeen thousand citizens of Salzburg whom he settled in East Prussia, which had just been desolated by a frightful pest. Not as serfs, but as free peasants, they established themselves in the newly founded villages; the king was well aware "how noble a thing it is for subjects to glory in their liberty." But his endeavours to abolish the existing serfdom came to nothing, and he had to content himself with at least protecting the peasants from being expelled from their farms and from extreme oppression.

What he accomplished, he accomplished in a consciousness of the supremacy of the royal will, which endured no opposition. The absolute form of government, as the Great Elector had established it, in contrast to the dreadful confusion of the estates, was brought by him into full play; he gave stability (according to his own expression) to the sovereignty, and settled the crown firm "as a rock of bronze." For relaxation he had recourse to hunting, of which he was passionately fond, painting, turning, and the unrestrained simple evening society which is known by the name of the Tobacco College. Eager in his patriotism and terrible in his sudden bursts of anger, he made many a one feel the weight of his Spanish cane; but in his healthy mind he generally discerned the just and useful, although he was not wanting in singularities. In his dealing with foreign powers he had little success. He attached himself to Austria with a zeal directed by an intention to keep faith and by patriotism towards the empire, and here his field-marshal Von Grumbkow and the crafty Austrian ambassador Von Seckendorf knew thoroughly well how to direct him, so that his sense of honour was often misused by the diplomatic arts of the time.

FREDERICK WILLIAM I AND HIS ARMY

His whole, often one-sided preference turned him to the army. His father, Frederick I, had also remained true to the example of the great founder of the state, in that he had unremittingly strengthened, improved, and drilled the army. Prince Leopold of Dessau, surviving in the popular recollection under the name of the "old Dessauer," was the king's most faithful assistant in the perfecting of the army. Under his leadership the Prussians had rendered decisive assistance at the battles of Blenheim and Turin, and had first made the name of the new kingdom respected. Frederick William I lived and



GERMAN NOBLE, CARRYING BANNER OF TOWN

moved in his soldiers. Indeed his preference for his "blue children" and for "long knaves," in his love for whom he forgot even his economy, was wonderful; but it was a very just idea that the little state could enforce its claims on the future only by means of a superior army. So he increased the army to eighty-three thousand men—a great parade for the little country, as many said mockingly; but later on, in his son's hands, this became the effectual means to the greatest ends. The Prussian officers, all appointed by the king himself, and treated by him as comrades, formed a body of men who had not their equals for their devotion to their military superiors, for ability, training, and capacity for sacrifice. The nobility of the marks, hitherto so intractable, now, when educated in the king's cadet school and accustomed to a strict obedience, became the first prop of the army, and consequently of the state. The Prussian soldiers were looked upon as a pattern for Europe; Leopold of Dessau, a military genius, introduced the bayonet, gave the infantry the disposition in three members, which was generally adopted, and especially accustomed them, by continuous drilling and by the use of the iron ramrod, to the greatest rapidity in loading and firing, and so made them troops of inestimable value in deciding a battle. The training indeed was barbarous, and necessarily so, for only the smaller half of the army was composed of children of the country who were taken from the enlistment circles (cantons) set apart for the different regiments; the majority were foreigners, collected from the countries of all princes. Only an iron discipline could hold together this motley crowd, in which there was plenty of barbarism.

Frederick William I did not often engage in war. When he came to the throne the war of the Spanish Succession was just ending, and in the Peace of Utrecht to which he acceded he received from the Orange inheritance a part of the duchy of Gelderland. Twice after this he made use of his army. First it was against the Swedes. Charles XII had made a brilliant beginning to his career in the Northern War; he had in particular made King Augustus II of Poland feel the weight of his anger, and had forced unhappy Saxony to pay for the ambition of her elector. In the year 1706 he had invaded Saxony, had fearfully bled it, and here in the heart of Germany had forced from Augustus II the Peace of Altranstädt (not far from Leipsic). Incidentally, faithful to the example of his great predecessor Gustavus Adolphus, he had interfered powerfully and successfully in behalf of the heavily oppressed Protestants in Sillesia and Austria. Thereupon he had plunged into the deserts of Russia, had been beaten at Pultowa by Peter the Great (1709), and had then wasted five valuable years among the Turks, whilst his enemies, Russia, Poland, and Denmark, attacked his country on all sides. In 1713, as Hither Pomerania was threatened by Russia and Denmark, the Swedish regency in the absence of Charles XII had itself requested King Frederick William, as a neutral power, to occupy the country. But as the commandant at Stettin would not hand over the town without a special order from his king, Saxons and Russians had conquered it by force of arms; but had afterwards resigned it to Frederick William for 400,000 thalers, to defray war expenses. When finally Charles XII returned from the Turks (1714), he would hear nothing of this whole transaction, nor of the repayment of that sum. Frederick William, therefore, went over to the enemies of the Swedish king, though he had a high respect for him personally. In conjunction with the Danes he immediately besieged him in Stralsund and took the city. Charles himself escaped with difficulty. Even before he met his end at the Norwegian border fortress of Frederikshald, in 1718, the power of Sweden had fallen to pieces. The Prussians once more occupied Hither Pomerania, with Rügen and Stralsund.

George I, who since 1714 had been king of England, but was still in his

[1719-1736 A.D.]


heart a far more zealous Hanoverian, bought for his hereditary territories the Swedish districts of Bremen and Verden, which had been occupied by Denmark and which he acquired permanently by the Peace of Stockholm in 1719. On the other hand Denmark obtained for herself the portion of Schleswig-Holstein which belonged to the house of Holstein-Gottorp, to which Charles XII was related by marriage.¹ In accordance with the Peace of Stockholm of 1720, Hither Pomerania as far as the Peene fell to Prussia; only the farthest point of the province, with Greifswald, Stralsund, and the island of Rügen (afterwards called New Pomerania), still remained Swedish (until 1814). Frederick William especially rejoiced over the acquisition of Stettin, for through this maritime city he had obtained a footing on the sea which would allow of participation in the commerce of the whole world. Thus, then, the one power which had intruded itself into the Thirty Years' War, was if not entirely expelled from German territory at least rendered harmless, and this had been accomplished chiefly by the Prussian arms. On the other hand, it was an undeniable fact that under the bold rule of Peter the Great a decided advance had been gained by Russia, who had received most of the Baltic provinces—Livonia, Esthonia, Karelia, and Ingermanland—resigned by Sweden in the Peace of Nystadt (1721); she was moreover already preparing the way for dominion in Courland: Russia was now a great power, and was acquiring in Sweden's place a threatening preponderance in the north of Europe. They were for the most part Germans—often mere desperate adventurers who, as generals and statesmen, assisted to found the new great state.

THE WAR OF THE POLISH SUCCESSION (1733-1735 A.D.)

The second war in which Frederick William I engaged was the war of the Polish Succession (1733-1735; final peace not till 1738). After the death of Augustus II (1733), Cardinal Fleury, the minister of France, endeavoured to recover the Polish crown for the father-in-law of his young sovereign, Louis XV, Stanislaus Leszcynski, whom Charles XII had on a former occasion caused to be elected king of Poland. The electors of Mainz, Cologne, the Palatinate, and Bavaria were on his side. On the other hand, Austria and Russia supported Frederick Augustus II of Saxony, the former on condition that Saxony should recognise the Pragmatic Sanction, the latter with the proviso that Courland, hitherto a Polish fief, should be handed over to Russia on the extinction, then imminent, of the German ducal house of Kettler. A Russian army advanced on Dantzic, which at this time belonged to Poland, and compelled it to capitulate; later on twelve thousand men marched through Silesia, Bohemia, and Franconia, as far as the Rhine. Thus the new great power began to play a part on German soil. Once again the veteran Eugene of Savoy proceeded to the upper Rhine with an army to which the Prussian king sent an auxiliary corps. His old opponent, Villars, led the French. However, no sanguinary encounter took place; France withdrew her demands: but Stanislaus Leszcynski received as compensation the duchy of Lorraine, which subsequently, at his death (1766), fell by virtue of the treaty to France. The young duke of Lorraine, Francis Stephen, who since 1736 had been the consort of the emperor's daughter, Maria Theresa, was indemnified with Tuscany. On her part France recognised the Pragmatic Sanction. Thus was Lorraine torn from the empire in the interests of the Austrian family.

¹ The eldest sister of Charles XII had married Frederick IV of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp. She died before her brother, leaving a son, Charles Frederick. On the death of Charles XII, Charles Frederick's claims to the Swedish throne were set aside in favour of Charles XII's younger sister, Ulrica Eleonora, who became queen of Sweden (1718).

King Frederick William, who in this instance as on previous occasions had adhered faithfully to the emperor, and had shown more patriotism than any other prince, had previously been encouraged to hope for the acquisition of the duchy of Berg, soon to become vacant by the expected extinction of the palatine house of Neuburg. But the emperor obtained its preservation to the palatine electorate and the palatine house of Sulzbach, which was next in succession to the Palatinate, and at the end of the war Frederick William saw himself deceived in his hopes, nay, more, wilfully and insultingly passed over. Like the Great Elector he too hoped for an avenger, and looked for one in his son, the crown prince Frederick.^c



MEDIEVAL WATCH-TOWER

THE KING AND THE CROWN PRINCE FREDERICK

The king's relations with his son at an earlier day had been anything but cordial. Indeed, there is scarcely a more singular chapter in history than the story of old Frederick William's treatment of his prospective heir. At least one of the tales that have found currency must be retold here; namely, the famous incident through which the life of a comrade of the prince was sacrificed and the life of Frederick himself endangered. This incident will bring out in strong relief the domineering, despotic character of the king,—who nevertheless always acted, when not under stress of temper, on what he conceived to be the dictates of conscience and a love of justice. It appears that Frederick William had so exasperated his son that the future hero of the Seven Years' War determined to forfeit his inheritance and escape secretly to England, where, it was rumoured, he intended to espouse Anne, the princess royal.^a

The greatest circumspection had been used to conceal the correspondence with England; and in fact the letters from London were forwarded by a commercial house in that city, under cover, to a magistrate held in high esteem, and a man the least calculated to meddle with political intrigues; but he had been assured that the correspondence related purely to private affairs and commercial subjects. The magistrate put the letters he received, and which were addressed to a merchant at Berlin, into the post-office; the merchant opened his cover, and found enclosures to the address of one of the aides-de-camp of the prince, both of whom were also confidants and favourites. These last had nothing further to do but to take off a cover, and deliver the letters to their intended destination. The despatches from Berlin to London were forwarded in an inverse order, so that the merchant at Berlin supposed these letters to relate to the pecuniary concerns of some of the young prince's household in Franconia, and believed the correspondence to be pursued agreeably to the advice of the magistrate of Nuremberg.

The magistrate at length, however, conceived some uneasiness on the subject, and became somewhat scrupulous: he was at a loss to imagine why two commercial houses should choose so circuitous a route for the discussion of fair and honourable proceedings, which for the most part must be supposed to

[1736 A.D.]

require despatch. His scruples soon became suspicions, next apprehensions, and at length ended in a breach of trust. He opened a packet that came from Berlin, and by a singular fatality it contained the plan for the prince's escape, and the steps that had been taken to ensure its success. It would be difficult to describe the alarm of the merchant on finding himself implicated in so serious an affair. It appeared to him that the most effectual way of securing his own safety was to send the letter to the king of Prussia, accompanied with the disclosure of all that had passed between himself and the two commercial houses.

Frederick William observed the most profound secrecy respecting this discovery, but took effectual measures for seizing the prince at the moment of his escape. The king went once a year, on fixed days, into the provinces, for the purpose of reviewing his troops. During his journey into Westphalia, he slept one night with his suite in a small village a short league distant from the frontiers of Saxony. In this village the young prince and his attendants slept in a barn on some straw; and from this village he was to make his escape, about midnight, in a cart that was to come from Saxony and meet them at that time near a certain tree in a field. As on these occasions it was customary for the king to set out early, he naturally went early to bed; and the fatigues of the day gave reason to hope that every eye would be closed by midnight. The prince accordingly left the barn while all around him seemed perfectly quiet; even the sentinels made as if they did not perceive him; and he arrived without accident at the fatal tree: but here no cart appeared, different patrols having stopped and detained nearly half an hour the man who conducted it; and when it at length arrived, and the prince was getting into it, the same patrols again made their appearance and stopped him. Frederick, perceiving himself surrounded, leaned upon his hand against the tree, and suffered his person to be seized and conducted back to the village without pronouncing a single syllable. Frederick William conducted his son to Berlin as a state prisoner, and had him confined in the palace of the prince of Prussia, while Katte [one of his attendants] was thrown into a dungeon. Different circumstances convinced the king that his eldest daughter was concerned in the intended escape; and he punished her by beating her with his stick, and kicking her so violently that she would have been precipitated from the window to the pavement if her mother had not held her by the petticoats.

Frederick William resolved that his son should perish on the scaffold. "He will always be a villain," said he, "and I have three other sons of better qualities than he." It was in this temper of mind that he ordered his ministers of state to put the prince on his trial. This order was a source of infinite perplexity to the ministers, since they knew not what means to devise to save the heir to the throne. One of them found at least a pretence that exempted him from being one of the judges in this affair: he represented to his majesty that, the prince being an officer, his crime was consequently aggravated, and that he ought to be tried by a council of war; and the more since the empire in that case would have no right of interference, the laws of the empire not extending to the discipline of the army.

Frederick William, unable to reply to these suggestions, but irritated by the occurrence of obstacles and suspecting his ministers of the desire to defeat his purpose, told them they were a pack of scoundrels; that he understood their project; but that, in despite of them, his son should suffer death, and that he should have no difficulty in finding among his officers men who were more attached to the true principles of the government. He accordingly appointed a council of war, composed of a certain number of generals, under the presidency of the prince of Anhalt-Dessau, known by the name of Anhalt with the Mustaches, the same who is often mentioned in the wars of Freder-

ick, and who in 1733 at the head of six thousand Prussians, succeeded in compelling the French to raise the siege of Turin. Frederick was tried at this tribunal; and, when sentence was about to be passed, the president, with his formidable mustaches, rose and declared that, on his honour and conscience, he, for his part, perceived no cause for passing sentence of death on the accused prince, and that none among them had a right to pass such a sentence; then, drawing his sword, he swore he would cut off the ears of any man who should differ from him in opinion. In this manner he collected the suffrages, and the prince was unanimously acquitted. Frederick William, rendered furious by this decision, substituted another council of war, which consisted of men of timid and docile tempers, who had no will but his own.

Seckendorf now perceived the prince's fate to be inevitable, without immediate assistance; and persuaded himself that, having rendered one essential service to the house of Austria in preventing a dangerous alliance, he should render it a second of no smaller importance if in the name of that house he should save the future king of Prussia, and thus attach himself to his employers by the bonds of affection and gratitude. To this effect, he undertook to suppose orders which had not had time to reach him, and in the name and on the part of the emperor demanded a private audience that Frederick William did not dare refuse. In this audience he announced, in the name of chief of the empire, that it was to the empire itself Prince Frederick belonged, and that he in consequence made requisition of the maintenance of the rights and laws of the Germanic body: he insisted that the accused should have been delivered up, together with the official charges existing against him, to this body; and finally declared that the person of his royal highness Prince Frederick, heir to the throne of Prussia, was under the safeguard of the Germanic empire. This was a terrible stroke for Frederick William: he dared not bring on himself the resentment of all the states of the empire at once, and thus involve himself in a destructive war. He was, therefore, obliged to yield, notwithstanding his ferocious choler and unrelenting temper.

The life of the prince was saved, but he was still detained a state prisoner for an indefinite period. He had been previously stripped of his uniform and dressed in a grey coat, such as is worn by the councillors of war. In this attire he was conducted to the fortress of Küstrin, in Pomerania.^b

Meantime Frederick William was obliged to content himself with exacting what he called justice from a minor offender. The council had decreed that Katte should be imprisoned for two years (or, as some authorities say, for life); but the king overruled this finding, and imposed the death penalty. The curious moralising with which he accompanied this verdict is worth quoting, as throwing a striking side-light on the character of the man. The shrewd commentary of Carlyle will appropriately finish the picture.^a

Frederick William asserts, then:

That Katte's crime amounts to high-treason (*crimen læsæ majestatis*); that the rule is, *Flat justitia, et pereat mundus*;—and that, in brief, Katte's doom is, and is hereby declared to be, Death. Death by the gallows and hot pincers is the usual doom of Traitors; but his Majesty will say in this case, Death by the sword and headsman simply; certain circumstances moving the royal clemency to go so far, no farther. And the Court-Martial has straightway to apprise Katte of this same: and so doing, "shall say, That his Majesty is sorry for Katte; but that it is better he die than that justice depart out of the world."

FRIEDRICH WILHELM.

(Wusterhausen, 1st November, 1730.)

This [says Carlyle] is the iron doom of Katte; which no prayer or influence of mortal will avail to alter,—lest justice depart out of the world. Katte's Father is a General of rank, Commandant of Königsberg at this moment; Katte's Grandfather by the Mother's side, old Fieldmarshal Wartensleben, is

[1730 A.D.]

a man in good favour with Frederick Wilhelm, and of high esteem and mark in his country for half a century past. But all this can effect nothing. Old Wartensleben thinks of the Daughter he lost; for happily Katte's Mother is dead long since. Old Wartensleben writes to Frederick Wilhelm; his mournful Letter, and Frederick Wilhelm's mournful but inexorable answer, can be read in the Histories; but show only what we already know.

Katte's Mother, Fieldmarshal Wartensleben's Daughter, died in 1706; leaving Katte only two years old. He is now twenty-six; very young for such grave issues; and his fate is certainly very hard. Poor young soul, he did not resist farther, or quarrel with the inevitable and inexorable. He listened to Chaplain Müller of the Gens-d'Armes; admitted profoundly, after his fashion, that the great God was just, and the poor Katte sinful, foolish, only to be saved by miracle of mercy; and piously prepared himself to die on these terms. There are three Letters of his to his Grandfather, which can still be read, one of them in Wilhelmina's Book, the sound of it like that of dirges borne on the wind. Wilhelmina evidently pities Katte very tenderly; in her heart she has a fine royal-maiden kind of feeling to the poor youth. He did heartily repent and submit; left with Chaplain Müller a Paper of pious considerations, admonishing the Prince to submit. These are Katte's last employments in his prison at Berlin, after sentence had gone forth.

CARLYLE DESCRIBES KATTE'S END (NOVEMBER 6th, 1730)

On Sunday evening, 5th November, it is intimated to him, unexpectedly at the moment, that he has to go to Cüstrin, and there die;—carriage now waiting at the gate. Katte masters the sudden flurry; signifies that all is ready, then; and so, under charge of his old Major and two brother Officers, who, and Chaplain Müller, are in the carriage with him, a troop of his own old Cavalry Regiment escorting, he leaves Berlin (rather on sudden summons); drives all night, towards Cüstrin and immediate death. Words of sympathy were not wanting, to which Katte answered cheerily; grim faces wore a cloud of sorrow for the poor youth that night. Chaplain Müller's exhortations were fervent and continual; and, from time to time, there were heard, hoarsely melodious through the damp darkness and the noise of wheels, snatches of "devotional singing," led by Müller.

It was in the grey of the winter morning, 6th November 1730, that Katte arrived in Cüstrin Garrison. He took kind leave of Major and men: Adieu, my brothers; good be with you evermore!—And, about nine o'clock, he is on the road towards the Rampart of the Castle, where a scaffold stands. Katte wore, by order, a brown dress exactly like the Prince's; the Prince is already brought down into a lower room, to see Katte as he passes (to "see Katte die," had been the royal order; but they smuggled that into abeyance); and Katte knows he shall see him. Faithful Müller was in the death-car along with Katte; and he had adjoined to himself one Besserer, the Chaplain of the Garrison, in this sad function, since arriving. Here is a glimpse from Besserer, which we may take as better than nothing:

"His (Katte's) eyes were mostly directed to God; and we (Müller and I), on our part, strove to hold his heart up heavenwards, by presenting the examples of those who had died in the Lord,—as of God's Son himself, and Stephen, and the Thief on the Cross,—till, under such discoursing, we approached the Castle. Here, after long wistful looking about, he did get sight of his beloved Jonathan, "Royal Highness the Crown-Prince," at a window in the castle; from whom he, with the politest and most tender expression, spoken in French, took leave, with no little emotion of sorrow."

President Münchow and the Commandant were with the Prince; whose emotions one may fancy, but not describe. Seldom did any Prince or man stand in such a predicament. Vain to say, and again say: "In the name of God, I ask you, stop the execution till I write to the King!" Impossible that; as easily stop the course of the stars. And so here Katte comes; cheerful loyalty still beaming on his face, death now nigh. "*Pardonnez-moi, mon cher Katte!*" cried Frederick in a tone: "Pardon me, dear Katte; O, that this should be what I have done for you!"—"Death is sweet for a prince I love so well," said Katte, "*La mort est douce pour un si aimable Prince*"; and fared on,—round some angle of the Fortress, it appears; not in sight of Frederick; who sank into a faint, and had seen his last glimpse of Katte in this world.

The body lay all day upon the scaffold, by royal order; and was buried at night obscurely in common churchyard; friends, in silence, took mark of the place against better times,—and Katte's dust now lies elsewhere, among that of his own kindred.

"Never was such a transaction before or since, in Modern History," cries the angry reader: "cruel, like the grinding of human hearts under millstones, like—" Or indeed like the doings of the gods, which are cruel, though not that alone?^e


RECONCILIATION; THE END OF FREDERICK WILLIAM

Frederick was for a time kept under strict watch, but gradually this was relaxed, and ultimately the prince was released, and father and son were fully reconciled.^a

The marriage of Frederick in a short time succeeded his liberation; his sister, the duchess of Brunswick, by dint of reasoning, and the most affectionate entreaty, having at length prevailed on him to gratify the king in a favourite project. He accordingly espoused Elizabeth Christina, daughter to Duke Ferdinand Albert, of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel.^d The marriage was entered into much against the inclinations of the prince, and it brought nothing but unhappiness to the future king. But the domineering father had had his way.^a

When, broken in his powerful physical and mental forces, Frederick William died, on the 31st of May, 1740, he left his heir an efficient army of 83,000 men, a state treasure (not counting uncoined silver) of 9,000,000 thalers, and a state of some 2,250,000 inhabitants. Frederick William had brought the revenues of the state from 3,500,000 to 7,000,000 thalers. Berlin had at this time about 100,000 inhabitants.^c





CHAPTER III.

THE EARLY YEARS OF FREDERICK II

[1740-1756 A.D.]

AT the death of Frederick William I in May, 1740, Frederick was only twenty-eight years of age; his essentially active mind, excited still more by incessant application to the sciences, and by constant communication with learned men, was adapted for the most profound subjects of research. The study of history had transported his thoughts far beyond the narrow confines of his own times, and had instilled within him the most elevated ideas of the dignity of kings, of which his first acts as sovereign gave immediate evidence. It was soon shown that he was resolved to be his own ruler; his activity in the administration of affairs, the attention he devoted to all subjects, from those of the most grave import down to those of the most trivial nature, his sacrifice of rest and pleasure, the strict distribution of his hours, so that not one should be lost in inactivity—all this excited the greatest astonishment in those of his court, who had never heard of, or been accustomed to witness their sovereigns imposing upon themselves so many sacrifices for the government of their dominions. The extraordinary effect thus produced is very aptly described by a resident ambassador when writing to his own court. "In order to give you a correct idea of the new reign," he says, "it is only necessary to state that the king positively does all the work himself, whilst his prime minister has nothing to do but to issue forth immediately from the cabinet the commands he receives, without ever being consulted upon the subject. Unfortunately,

there is not one at the king's court who possesses his confidence, and of whose influence one might avail oneself in order to follow up with success the necessary preliminaries; consequently, an ambassador is more embarrassed here than at any other court." In truth, the policy introduced by France into Europe, which consisted in envenoming all relations of sovereigns between each other, by employing every art of cunning and espionage in order to discover the projects of foreign courts, even before they had been matured by those courts themselves, could not be brought to bear against Frederick II; for he weighed over every plan within the silence of his own breast, and it was only in the moment of its execution that his resolution was made known.^b


CARLYLE ON THE OPENING OF FREDERICK'S REIGN

The idea of building up the Academy of Sciences to its pristine height, or far higher, is evidently one of those that have long lain in the Crown Prince's mind, eager to realise themselves. Immortal Wolf, exiled but safe at Marburg, and refusing to return in Friedrich Wilhelm's time, had lately dedicated a Book to the Crown Prince; indicating that perhaps, under a new Reign, he might be more persuadable. Frederick makes haste to persuade; instructs the proper person, Reverend Herr Reinbeck, Head of the Consistorium at Berlin, to write and negotiate. "All reasonable conditions shall be granted" the immortal Wolf,—and Frederick adds with his own hand as Postscript:

"I request you [*ihn*] to use all diligence about Wolf.

"A man that seeks truth and loves it, must be reckoned precious in any human society; and I think you will make a conquest in the realm of truth if you persuade Wolf hither again."

This is of date June 6th: not yet a week since Frederick came to be King. The Reinbeck-Wolf negotiation which ensued can be read in Busching by the curious. It represents to us a creaky, thrifty, long-headed old Herr Professor, in no haste to quit Marburg except for something better: "obliged to wear woollen shoes and leggings"; "bad at mounting stairs"; and otherwise needing soft treatment. Willing, though with caution, to work at an Academy of Sciences;—but dubious if the French are so admirable as they



FREDERICK THE GREAT (1712–1786 A.D.)

seem to themselves in such operations. Veteran Wolf, one dimly begins to learn, could himself build a German Academy of Sciences, to some purpose, if encouraged. This latter was probably the stone of stumbling in that direction. Veteran Wolf did not get to be President in the new Academy of Sciences; but was brought back, "streets all in triumph," to his old place at Halle; and there, with little other work that was heard of, but we hope in warm shoes and without much mounting of stairs, he lived peaceably victorious the rest of his days.

Frederick's thoughts are not of a German home-built Academy, but of a French one: and for this he already knows a builder; has silently had him

[1740 A.D.]

in his eye, these two years past,—Voltaire giving hint, in a *Letter*. Builder shall be that sublime Maupertuis; scientific lion of Paris, ever since his feat in the Polar regions, and the charming Narrative he gave of it. “What a feat, what a book!” exclaimed the Parisian cultivated circles, male and female, on that occasion; and Maupertuis, with plenty of bluster in him carefully suppressed, assents in a grandly modest way. His Portraits are in the Printshops ever since; one very singular Portrait, just coming out (at which there is some laughing): a coarse-featured, blustering, rather triumphant-looking man, blustering, though finely complacent for the nonce; in copious dressing-gown and fur cap; comfortably squeezing the Earth and her meridians flat (as if he had done it), with his left hand; and with the other, and its outstretched finger, asking mankind, “Are not you aware, then?”—“Are not we!” answers Voltaire by and by, with endless waggeries upon him, though at present so reverent. Frederick, in these same days, writes this Autograph; which who of men of lions could resist?

TO MONSIEUR DE MAUPERTUIS AT PARIS:

[No date:—dateable June, 1740.]

My heart and my inclination excited in me, from the moment I mounted the throne, the desire of having you here, that you might put our Berlin Academy into the shape you alone are capable of giving it. Come then, come and insert into this wild crabtree the graft of the Sciences, that it may bear fruit. You have shown the Figure of the Earth to mankind; show also to a King how sweet it is to possess such a man as you.

Monsieur de Maupertuis,—*Votre très-affectionné*,
FRÉDÉRIC.

This Letter,—how could Maupertuis prevent some accident in such a case?—got into the Newspapers; glorious for Frederick, glorious for Maupertuis; and raised matters to a still higher pitch. Maupertuis is on the road, and we shall see him before long.

And Every One shall get to Heaven in his own Way

Here is another little fact which had immense renown at home and abroad, in those summer months and long afterwards.

June 22nd, 1740, the *Geistliche Departement* (Board of Religion, we may term it) reports that the Roman-Catholic Schools, which have been in use these eight years past, for children of soldiers belonging to that persuasion, “are, especially in Berlin, perverted directly in the teeth of Royal Ordinance, 1732, to seducing Protestants into Catholicism”: annexed, or ready for annexing, “is the specific Report of Fiscal-General to this effect”:—upon which, what would it please his Majesty to direct us to do?

His Majesty writes on the margin these words, rough and ready, which we give with all their grammatical blotches on them; indicating a mind made up on one subject, which was much more dubious then, to most other minds, than it now is:

“*Die Religionen Musen [mussen] alle Tollerirt [tolerirt] werden und Mus [muss] der Fiscal nuhr [nur] das Auge darauf haben, das [dass] keine der andern abrug Tuhe [Abbruch thue] den [denn] hier mus [muss] ein jeder nach seiner Fassung Selich [Façon selig] werden.*”

Which in English might run as follows:

“All Religions must be tolerated [Tollerated], and the Fiscal must have an eye that none of them make unjust encroachment on the other; for in this Country every man must get to Heaven in his own way.”

Wonderful words; precious to the then leading spirits, and which (the spelling and grammar being mended) flew abroad over all the world; the enlightened Public everywhere answering his Majesty, once more, with its loudest "Bravissimo" on this occasion. With what enthusiasm of admiring wonder, it is now difficult to fancy, after the lapse of sixscore years. And indeed, in regard to all these worthy acts of Human Improvement which we are now concerned with, account should be held (were it possible) on Frederick's behalf, how extremely original, and bright with the splendour of new gold, they then were; and how extremely they are fallen dim, by general circulation, since that. Account should be held; and yet it is not possible, no human imagination is adequate to it, in the times we are now got into.

Free Press, and Newspapers the best Instructors

Toleration, in Frederick's spiritual circumstances, was perhaps no great feat to Frederick; but what the reader hardly expected of him was Freedom of the Press, or an attempt that way. From England, from Holland, Friedrich had heard of Free Press, of Newspapers the best Instructors: it is a fact that he hastens to plant a seed of that kind at Berlin; sets about it "on the second day of his reign," so eager is he. Berlin had already some meagre *Intelligenz-Blatt* (Weekly or Thrice-Weekly Advertiser), perhaps two; but it is real Newspaper, frondent with genial leafy speculation, and food for the mind, that Frederick is intent upon: a "Literary-Political Newspaper," or were it even two Newspapers, one French, one German; and he rapidly makes the arrangements for it; despatches Jordan, on the second day, to seek some fit Frenchman. Arrangements are soon made; a Bookselling Printer, Haude, Bookseller once to the Prince-Royal, is encouraged to proceed with the improved German article, Mercury or whatever they called it; vapid Formey, a facile pen, but not a forcible, is the Editor sought out by Jordan for the French one. And, in short, No. 1 of Formey shows itself in print within a month; and Haude and he, Haude picking up some grand Editor in Hamburg, do their best for the instruction of mankind.

In not many months, Formey, a facile and learned but rather vapid gentleman, demitted or was dismissed; and the Journals coalesced into one, or split into two again; and went I know not what road, or roads in time coming,—none that led to results worth naming. Freedom of the Press, in the case of these Journals was never violated, nor was any need for violating it. General Freedom of the Press Frederick did not grant, in any quite Official or steady way; but in practice, under him, it always had a kind of real existence, though a fluctuating, ambiguous one. And we have to note, through Frederick's whole reign, a marked disinclination to concern himself with Censorship, or the shackling of men's poor tongues and pens; nothing but some officious report that there was offence to Foreign Courts, or the chance of offence, in a poor man's pamphlet, could induce Frederick to interfere with him or it,—and indeed his interference was generally against his Ministers for having wrong informed him and in favour of the poor Pamphleteer appealing at the fountain-head. To the end of his life, disgusting Satires against him, *Vie Privée* by Voltaire, *Matinées du Roi de Prusse*, and still worse Lies and Non-sense, were freely sold at Berlin, and even bore to be printed there, Frederick saying nothing, caring nothing. He has been known to burn Pamphlets publicly,—one Pamphlet we shall ourselves see on fire yet:—but it was without the least hatred to them, and for official reasons merely. To the last he would answer his reporting Ministers, "*La presse est libre* (Free press, you must consider)!"—grandly reluctant to meddle with the press, or go down upon the dogs barking at his door. Those ill effects of Free Press (first stage of the ill

[1740 A.D.]

effects) he endured in this manner; but the good effects seem to have fallen below his expectation. Frederick's enthusiasm for freedom of the press, prompt enough, as we see, never rose to the extreme pitch, and it rather sank than increased as he continued his experiences of men and things. This of Formey and the two Newspapers was the only express attempt he made in that direction; and it proved a rather disappointing one. The two Newspapers went their way thenceforth, Frederick sometimes making use of them for small purposes, once or twice writing an article himself of wildly quizzical nature, perhaps to be noticed by us when the time comes; but are otherwise, except for chronological purposes, of the last degree of insignificance to gods or men.

"Freedom of the Press," says my melancholic Friend, "is a noble thing; and in certain Nations, at certain epochs, produces glorious effects,—chiefly in the revolutionary line, where that has grown indispensable. Freedom of the Press, is possible, where everybody disapproves the least abuse of it; where the "Censorship" is, as it were, exercised by all in the world. When the world (as, even in the freest countries, it almost irresistibly tends to become), is no longer in a case to exercise that salutary function, and cannot keep down loud unwise speaking, loud unwise persuasion, and rebuke it into silence whenever printed, Freedom of the Press will not answer very long, among sane creatures and indeed, in Nations not in an exceptional case, it becomes impossible amazingly soon!"—

All these are phenomena of Frederick's first week. Let these suffice as sample, in that first kind. Splendid indications surely; and shot forth in swift enough succession, flash following flash, upon an attentive world. Betokening, shall we say, what internal sea of splendour, struggling to disclose itself, probably lies in this young King, and how high his hopes go for mankind and himself? Yes, surely:—and introducing, we remark withal, the "New Era," of Philanthropy, Enlightenment and so much else; with French Revolution, and a "world well suicided" hanging in the rear! Clearly enough, to this young ardent Frederick, foremost man of his Time, and capable of doing its inarticulate or dumb aspirings, belongs that questionable honour; and a very singular one it would have seemed to Frederick, had he lived to see what it meant.

Frederick's rapidity and activity, in the first months of his reign, were wonderful to mankind; as indeed, through life he continued to be a most rapid and active King. He flies about; mustering Troops, Ministerial Boards, passing Edicts, inspecting, accepting Homages of Provinces:—decides and does, every day that passes, an amazing number of things. Writes many Letters too; finds moments even for some verses; and occasionally draws a snatch of melody from his flute.^c

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AS FREDERICK SAW IT

At that time the belief in a system of balance, as inculcated by William III of Orange, was still uppermost in people's minds, and fully prevailed in the conventions adhered to by the diplomatic world: namely, that the peace of Europe and the security of the different kingdoms rested on the recognition of France and Austria as the two great continental kingdoms, whilst the two sea powers, England and Holland, by inclining first to one, then to the other, maintained the balance. Frederick II rejected this view as now completely unsound; he discerned the true state of the powers, and evolved a very different system.

"The two chief powers," said he, "are France and England. I give

France the first place, because within herself she has almost all the elements of power in the highest degree; she is superior to all others by reason of the number of her soldiers, and of the inexhaustible resources which she has at command through the clever handling of the finances, through her commerce and the opulence of her private citizens. England is perhaps even richer, has an infinitely larger commerce, has a greater naval power; but the insular position, which serves her for protection, is at the same time a hindrance to her influence on the outer world, and her population hardly reaches the half of the population of France. Both powers are contending for the position of universal arbitrator. France seeks conquest and supremacy, to be law-giver to the nations. England seeks not conquests, but, by ever-increasing trade, to stifle other nations, to monopolize the traffic of the world, and to use the treasures so acquired as instruments for her ambition. France seeks to subdue, through force of arms, England by bribery and gold to purchase slaves. England," he adds, "has not yet the rank which she means to claim among the powers."

Besides these two—the only great powers, because they alone are able to follow an independent policy—are four others, who, as the king says, are fairly equal among themselves, but who are to a certain extent dependent on the first two: Spain, Holland, Austria, Prussia. He explains in what way, and for what reason each of these can move independently only to a limited degree.

Of Austria, he says: "It is stronger in population than Spain and Holland; but weaker than they through its faulty finances, and takes a lower place than either because it has no navy. By dint of taxes and loans it can raise the means for a few campaigns; but then again, suddenly breathless and exhausted in the midst of battle, it requires foreign supplies to enable it to mobilise its forces, and so becomes dependent. Paradoxical though it seems, Austria will hold its own longer in warfare if waged in its own territory, because while on the defensive strength may be derived from the invading army, but it is not possible without actual cash to carry war into an enemy's country. Enmity between the house of Austria and the Bourbons is perennial, because the finest conquests of the Bourbons have been provinces torn from Austria, because France works unceasingly for the humiliation of the Austrian house, and because France upholds the Germans in their stand for freedom against the emperor, so long as they are not strong enough to take the emperor's crown for themselves."

The characterisation of Prussia is no less remarkable: "Prussia is less formidable than the Austrian house, but strong enough to sustain alone the cost of a war that is not too heavy and does not last too long. The extension and intersection of its territory multiply its neighbours innumerable. Its policy in finance and trade permits it to use a situation and, if promptly handled, to snatch advantage from opportunity; but wisdom should counsel it to beware of becoming too deeply involved. On account of its numerous neighbours and the scattered nature of its possessions, Prussia cannot act except allied with France or England."

Then the others are represented as powers of the third rank, who cannot take action without the aid of foreign subsidy. They are, says the king, as it were machines, which France and England set in motion when they have need of them. He then continues: "It appears from this survey, that the two chief rôles in the drama of European politics will be played by France and England; that the four powers can only act on occasion, within limits, with a skilled use of circumstances, and that those princes who seek aggrandisement will, on a given opportunity, ally themselves with France; those who seek prosperity and well-being rather than glory, will hold to England."

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"Such," he concludes, "is the system which arises out of the actual state of affairs; it may no doubt fall out otherwise in isolated instances, or appear to fail through bad policy, through prejudice, through faulty logic, through corrupt ministers; but the system itself will in a short time always readjust itself, just as water and oil, poured together and shaken, will soon after separate themselves again."

Thus Frederick II had in his mind quite another system from that founded on the accepted balance, a system which, based as it was on real facts, proved valuable. On this system he grounded his policy.^a

FREDERICK'S REASONS FOR THE FIRST SILESIAN WAR

Frederick early resolved to reclaim the principalities of Silesia, the rights of his house to which were incontestable: and he prepared, at the same time, to support these pretensions, if necessary, by arms. This project accomplished all his political views: it afforded the means of acquiring reputation, of augmenting the power of the state, and of terminating what related to the litigious succession of the duchy of Berg. Before however he would come to a fixed resolution, he weighed the dangers he had to encounter, in undertaking such a war, and the advantages for which he had to hope for.

On one hand stood the powerful house of Austria; which, possessed of advantages so various, could not but procure resources. The daughter of an emperor was to be attacked, who would find allies in the king of England, the republic of Holland, and the princes of the empire, by whom the Pragmatic Sanction had been guaranteed. Biron, duke of Courland, who then governed Russia, was in the pay of the court of Vienna, and the young queen of Hungary might incline Saxony to her interest, by the cession of some circles of Bohemia. The sterility of the year 1740 might well inspire a dread of wanting supplies, to form magazines and to furnish the troops with provisions. These were great risks. The fortune of war was also to be feared; one lost battle might be decisive. The king had no allies, and had only raw soldiers to oppose to the veterans of Austria, grown grey in arms and by so many campaigns inured to war.

On the other hand, a multitude of reflections animated the hopes of the king. The state of the court of Vienna, after the death of the emperor, was deplorable. The finances were in disorder; the army was ruined, and discouraged by ill success in its wars with the Turks; the ministry disunited, and a youthful, inexperienced princess at the head of the government, who was to defend the succession from all claimants. The result was that the government could not appear formidable. It was besides impossible that the king should be destitute of allies. The subsisting rivalry between France and England necessarily presupposed the aid of one of those powers; and all the pretenders to the succession of the house of Austria would inevitably unite their interests to those of Prussia. The king might dispose of his voice for the imperial election; he might adjust his pretensions to the duchy of Berg in the best manner, either with France or with Austria. The war which he might undertake in Silesia was the only offensive war that could be favoured by the situation of his states, for it would be carried on upon his frontiers, and the Oder would always furnish him with a sure communication.

The death of Anna, empress of Russia, which soon followed that of the emperor, finally determined the king in favour of this enterprise. By her decease the crown descended to young Ivan, grand duke of Russia, son of prince Anthony Ulrich of Brunswick, brother-in-law to the king, and of the princess of Mecklenburg. Probabilities were that, during the minority of the

young emperor, Russia would be more occupied in maintaining tranquillity at home than in support of the Pragmatic Sanction, concerning which Germany could not but be subject to troubles. Add to these reasons an army fit to march, a treasury ready prepared, and, perhaps, the ambition of acquiring renown. Such were the causes of the war which the king declared.^e

The first important engagement of the war took place at Mollwitz on the 10th and 11th of April, 1741. This first effort of the Prussian king in a field where he was to become pre-eminent merits detailed attention.^a

THE BATTLE OF MOLLWITZ (APRIL 10-11, 1741)

Count Neipperg and his staff [says Oncken] were at dinner, his men were busy with their cookery, when at noon signal-rockets were seen to go up from the fortress of Brieg. Neipperg sent out some hussar skirmishers to see what was the matter, and before they had gone far they came upon the hussars of the Prussian vanguard under Rothenburg, and returned with the news that the whole of the enemy's army was advancing in order of battle to the attack. If the said attack had ensued immediately, Römer's regiments would not have had time to saddle their horses, to say nothing of moving into line; they must have been scattered and the village taken before Berlichingen and the infantry were across the brook.

But it did not. Rothenburg had been sent out to reconnoitre, not to attack; he turned back in conformity with his orders, and the king deliberately and methodically formed his columns in order of battle with the village of Pampitz on his left. The infantry was drawn up in two divisions, the first under Schwerin, the second under the hereditary prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau; the cavalry was on both wings and the sixty pieces of artillery at the head of the whole array. The left wing seemed to be sufficiently covered by the swamp of Pampitz, and Frederick had made a two-fold provision for the covering of the right wing, where the first cavalry division was to deploy and surround the left wing of the Austrian army; he had drawn two battalions of grenadiers up in line between the squadrons of the first division and had placed three more in perpendicular column between the two divisions. Thus the order in which his infantry was ranged resembled an elongated quadrangle, closed by the swamp on the left and the three battalions on the right.

The ranging of the troops took until two o'clock, and then, with beating drums and flying colours, the men advanced to the attack. The sixty guns opened a rapid fire on Mollwitz and the shells dropped with deadly effect in the midst of General Römer's half-formed squadrons.

Römer's Defence

These thirty-six squadrons dashed in a furious charge upon Schulenberg's dragoons, who were in the act of wheeling to the left, and now found themselves seized as by a tornado, driven back, flung into disorder, and scattered in every direction. The carabineers, whom the king sent to their assistance, were routed; some of the fugitives galloped across the front with the enemy in pursuit; others rushed into the gap between the two divisions and carried the king's gendarmes and the king himself along with them; others, again, sought shelter behind the second division. The cavalry on the right wing seemed to have been annihilated, the infantry was encompassed by dense swarms of horsemen, who charged them again and again; while on the right wing Count Berlichingen's cavalry had put Colonel Posadowsky's eight squad-

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rons to flight and even made a breach in the line of infantry. In the hideous tumult which raged along the whole line of battle, to right and left, in front and behind, within the ranks and without them, even brave men lost, not courage, but confidence in their ultimate victory.

"Most of the generals," says Frederick, "thought that all was lost," and it was presumably at this moment that he himself yielded to the urgent entreaties of Count Schwerin and rode hurriedly away from the field. Caught in the whirlwind of his own routed cavalry, he little thought that the grenadier battalions on the right wing, which he fancied had been borne down like the rest, had held their ground like a wall, and that their inflexible firmness and the frightful effect of their rapid fire had been to baffle the charge which the enemy five times repeated in vain. Like impregnable fortresses the two grenadier battalions on the right of the first division and the three on the flank had held their ground in the midmost tumult of the cavalry fight, had closed their ranks to resist the shock of the fugitives, had met and broken the onset of the pursuers with bayonet and quick musketry fire. Again and again General Römer's squadrons hurled themselves upon this hedge of steel in the hope of making a breach in it; they came within bayonet range and every time a crashing quick fire flung them back upon the plain in a torrent of blood. The gallant General Römer fell in the attempts to carry the position, and when they ceased the battle was decided.

Advance of the Infantry.

The Austrian infantry had not supported these heroic cavalry charges. When the cavalry came back, repulsed, shattered, in wild disorder, they were still on the spot where they had been ranged at the beginning of the battle. Austria had nothing but raw young recruits, who were filled with indescribable consternation at the quick fire of the Prussians, and abandoned themselves to despair when their wooden ramrods broke, making it impossible for numbers of them to shoot at all. They heaped their knapsacks on the ground to afford them cover from the fearful fusillade; each sought to shelter himself behind his comrades, the battalion gathered into a dense and disorderly mass. Nothing would induce this mob to go forward, but neither did they give ground until Count Schwerin, who took the chief command after the king had left, ordered the whole body of his infantry to fix bayonets and advance to the attack with drums beating.

An Austrian officer testifies to the impressive effect of such a spectacle on the heart of a true soldier, even when it is rent by the thought that the enemy offers it. A splendid parade march across a battlefield drenched with blood, not in sport but in grim earnest, yet carried out with the same strict order, with the same mechanical precision, the same attention to detail, as on the parade ground—such was the final act of the 10th of April. The Austrian battalions did not wait for the encounter, though the dreaded grenadiers had soon shot away all their cartridges and had nothing but their bayonets left. A couple of regiments in the first division wheeled round, one from the second took to flight. In vain did Neipperg and his generals endeavour to induce their men at least to stand; there was no stopping them, and a general retreat became inevitable. Neipperg began it at seven o'clock, got back to Mollwitz unpursued under cover of the darkness and Berlichingen's cavalry, and marched past the Prussian left, below Strehlen, to Grottkau and thence to Neisse, where he arrived in safety on the 11th. There were eight thousand men at Strehlen under the duke of Holstein, whose misfortune it was that his sovereign's commands never reached him at the critical moment, and who

on the 10th had been deaf to the audible thunder of the cannon of Mollwitz, which would have been more than a command to any other man. Just as he had let General Lentulus reach Neisse without impediment when he was stationed at Frankenstein, so he let Neipperg get back there under his very eyes, and even an Austrian who tells the tale judges this an unpardonable military offence.

In spite of this unmolested retreat the Austrian loss was very considerable; the cavalry loss numbered 638 killed, 30 of whom were officers; 1,017 horses were killed and 699 wounded. Of the infantry, 392 men (26 officers) had fallen, 2,328 (106 officers) were wounded, and 1,448 missing. The victors' loss was equally great if not greater. Frederick himself estimates it at 2,500 killed, among whom were Markgraf Frederick, the king's cousin, and General Schulenberg, and more than 3,000 wounded. Unless these figures are exaggerated we must explain the proportion by the fact that by their rapid and unmolested retreat the Austrian cavalry escaped losses which would have more than counterbalanced those suffered by the Prussians from the defeat of their cavalry. But the true measure of victory was not the comparison of losses, nor the seven cannons and three standards which the victors captured; it must be judged by the enormous moral effect of the issue of this first passage of arms between Austrians and Prussians.

None of the incalculable elements which come into play in warfare and so often frustrate the best-laid plan, no accident of any sort, and—what is more remarkable—no brilliant generalship decided the fortune of the day; the excellence of Frederick's incomparable infantry alone turned the scale of a battle already lost, and wrested from the superior strength of the enemy's cavalry the victory they had practically won. The secret of the dénouement is told by the same Austrian officer, who, his mind still full of the sight of the final advance of the Prussian grenadiers, says after describing it: "Then our army lost heart altogether, the infantry could not be prevailed upon to stand, the cavalry would not face the enemy again." The much-derided machine of the old prince of Dessau had seen its first glorious day. When Frederick speaks of these "living batteries," these "walking bastions," he is merely extolling the precision of mechanism which answered to the hand of its commander as a ship answers to the helm. At Mollwitz there was neither effective command nor definite plan of action left when these "animated machines" did their work, unflinching in defence, irresistible in attack, an offensive and defensive weapon which did not fail of its effect even when left to itself, and drew out of the wealth of its own power of resistance the means of compensating for the worst of strategical errors.

By the most whimsical of all accidents Frederick did not witness his grenadiers' baptism of fire. He had ridden away from the battlefield to Oppeln with a few attendants, and arrived there about midnight. The town had just been occupied by the enemy's cavalry, Frederick was driven back by their musketry fire; some of his suite, among whom was Maupertuis, were taken prisoner by the Austrians. He himself galloped away, crying, "Farewell, friends, I am better mounted than any of you!" When he reached Löwen early next morning he was met by an adjutant of Prince Leopold's with the news of victory. In his memoirs he passes over the whole incident without a word, and he never forgave Field-Marshal Schwerin for the precipitate retreat into which he had been beguiled.

"One should never despair too soon," was one of the lessons he carried away from Mollwitz. "Mollwitz," he says in his *History of my own Times*,^e "was my school; I reflected seriously upon my mistakes and profited by them later." It is worth while to set down here the ruthless criticism which Frederick himself passed upon his first campaign. "From the recital of these

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events it is evident that Herr von Neipperg and I vied with each other to see which of us could make the worst mistake. The Austrian seems to have out-done us in the plan of campaign, we out-did him in its execution. Neipperg's plan was judicious and well thought out; he invades Silesia, divides our quarters, relieves Neisse, and is on the point of getting possession of our artillery (at Ohlau). He could have seized me at Jägerndorf and thus have ended the war at a blow; when he arrived at Neisse he might have captured the duke of Holstein's corps which was encamped half a mile away from there; with a little vigilance he could have made it impossible for us to cross the Neisse at Michelau; or he might have marched day and night to cut me off from Breslau; and instead of doing any of these things he lets himself be surprised through his unpardonable negligence and is beaten by his own fault.

"My mode of action was far more blameworthy than his: I am informed of the plans of the enemy in good time and take no measures to oppose them; I disperse my troops in quarters too far apart to admit of rapid concentration; I let myself be cut off from the duke of Holstein, and expose myself to the risk of having to fight in a position where I had no line of retreat open to me in case of defeat and the whole army must have been irretrievably lost; when I reach Mollwitz, where the enemy is in cantonments, I neglect to make an immediate attack which would have separated the quarters of their army and split it in two; I waste two hours getting into methodical formation in front of a village where there is not a single Austrian to be seen. If I had made that prompt attack the whole of the Austrian infantry would have been caught in the villages about Mollwitz as the twenty-four French battalions were caught in the village of Blenheim. But there was no experienced general in the army except Field-Marshal Schwerin; the others groped about in the dark and fancied that all was lost if they deviated from ancient usage. What saved us in spite of everything was the rapidity of our resolutions and the extraordinary precision with which they were carried out by the troops." And in a later edition he says even more decidedly, "What really saved the Prussians was their own valour and discipline."

EUROPE IN LEAGUE AGAINST AUSTRIA

For Frederick's cause the consequences of the battle of Mollwitz were surprising; for the noble princess who sat on the throne of Hungary and Bohemia they were lamentable. The news of the victory of Prussia and the defeat of the Austrian army, once so much dreaded, spread with lightning speed; in France the sensation it caused was particularly great and gave the war party the victory over the party for peace. Spain took fresh courage and soon a great league was formed to deal Habsburg its death-blow and to dismember Austria.

At Versailles the German question was the subject of very serious discussion, it was known that Maria Theresa wished to secure the imperial crown for her husband. King Augustus of Poland, small though his mental gifts were, nevertheless considered his head worthy of the crown of Charlemagne, and he sent to Paris and Madrid for support. But it was the elector of Bavaria who was most urgent in suing for the help of the French cabinet to obtain the imperial crown. "I threw myself into his majesty's arms," he wrote to Fleury, "and shall always regard the French king as my only support and help."

Thus Versailles was called upon to occupy itself with the German question and did so with the proud feeling that the decision was indeed in its hands, since Frederick's advance reduced its dread of Austria. At first the Prussian king was not in favour; on the arrival of the news of his invasion of Silesia,

the king said, "Frederick is a fool, Fleury; he is a knave." But gradually his advance began to give pleasure. Amelot, Maurepas, and Belle-Isle, actually spoke in the king's council in favour of an alliance with Frederick and a war against Austria.

Belle-Isle, who was looked upon as the upholder of gallantry and military discipline in the army, was a lean man, hot-blooded still, in spite of his fifty-seven years. Cherishing the most audacious plans, and confident of his ability to perform the most difficult tasks in statecraft and war, he handed to the king at this time a treatise on the political situation of Europe. Certain ideas recur from time to time in the life of nations, and Belle-Isle's plan in this treatise is not something quite new, but merely the repetition of ideas already entertained by Henry IV and Richelieu—namely, to dismember Austria and make France the dominant power in Europe.

FLEURY'S TREACHERY

Fleury handed in an opposition report pointing out the poverty, the depopulation of France. In vain! The king was ruled by his mistress and she wished for war as a means of covering up the disgrace of her relations with the king and of winning over the nation, which hated and despised her, by a glorious war. When Fleury saw that his opposition to the war was being made use of as a lever to overthrow him in the king's favour, he gradually altered his course. His letters to Maria Theresa at first overflowed with protestations of devotion and with assurances that France would be faithful to the treaties. Now he excused himself on the ground of the necessity of his position; he would guarantee to Maria Theresa Tuscany only; he protested that the king must help an old friend, the elector of Bavaria; that the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction which Louis XIV had given to the late emperor could bind him to nothing by reason of the restricting clause: "without detriment to the rights of a third person." Thus at its close Fleury besmirched his meritorious and hitherto spotless career by falsehood and violation of faith, and laid the burden of a terrible war on his conscience, merely for the sake of retaining the power that had become so dear to him.

BELLE-ISLE'S POLICY

Belle-Isle was despatched to Germany as ambassador extraordinary of his most Christian majesty, with unheard-of powers and a sum of 8,000,000 livres. Received everywhere with royal honours, he made a triumphal progress through that country in order to weave the net in which that noble quarry, Austria, was to be snared and done to death.

In the beginning of March, 1741, Belle-Isle left Paris, proceeded up the Moselle to Cologne, Treves, and Mainz, then to Dresden, finally to the camp at Mollwitz, where Frederick remained for two months after the battle, to remodel his cavalry and render it fit to withstand the Austrian. The Frenchman came with an escort of a hundred and twenty horse, instead of a parade of troops. Frederick instituted in his honour an eight days' bombardment of Brieg, as the result of which the commandant, Piccolomini, was compelled, on May 4th, to surrender the town; the garrison was allowed, on a pledge not to serve against Prussia for two years, to depart with arms and baggage. The imaginative Belle-Isle was already quite certain of the dismemberment of Austria. Frederick II himself says scornfully: "To hear him you might have thought that all the lands of the queen of Hungary were under the hammer."

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One day when he was with the king, he had a more meditative and anxious look than usual, and the king asked if he had received unwelcome news. "Not at all," the marshal answered; "I am only perplexed because I do not know what we are to do with the Markgrafschaft of Moravia." The king suggested that it should be given to Saxony, so as to draw Augustus into the alliance by this bit of the booty. The marshal thought this an excellent idea and in fact tried later on to carry it out. Belle-Isle was overwhelmed with courtesies, but an alliance was only discussed, not signed. The sharp-sighted king of Prussia luckily saw through the French plan, for, if there arose out of the great state of Austria a little Bavaria, a little Saxony, a little Hungary, and Prussia, then France would be lord in Germany and Frederick would be dependent on her. She need only sow dissension among the little states and they would always have to appeal to her for help. But Frederick had no intention of working for France or Saxony or Bavaria, but meant to keep a free hand for his own advantage and, when the others had fought till they were exhausted, to come forward as arbiter in Europe. He therefore explained that his position was a difficult one, Neipperg was growing daily stronger, a Russian army was gathering in Livonia, a Hanoverian in Eichsfeld, a Saxon on the Elbe; an alliance with France would be the signal for all these forces to hurl themselves upon him. France must, therefore, send two armies to Germany forthwith, one to Bavaria with Vienna for its object, one to the lower Rhine to attack Flanders and Luxemburg, and keep the Dutch and George II in check; Sweden must be prevailed upon to declare war against Russia, Saxony must be won over to the league by the offer of Moravia; when all this had been accomplished, France might apply to him again. Belle-Isle thought this proposal reasonable, but Fleury, to whom he wrote, gave it as his opinion that Frederick was not to be trusted. He conceived that Frederick would sell himself to the highest bidder.

From Mollwitz Belle-Isle departed to Dresden, where his reception was equally brilliant. Opinion at court veered like the weathercock in varying winds; Augustus III was very ambitious, the queen was for Maria Theresa, Brühl was against Frederick, whose malicious tongue had loosed many a shaft at the extravagant minister, the growth of the Prussian power was looked on with disfavour. When the news of the defeat of the Austrians at Mollwitz arrived, Maria Theresa was regarded as lost and Saxony wished to share in the booty, although it continued negotiations with Maria Theresa and England and offered help—at an enormous price. Francis Stephen should be recognised as co-ruler, he should have the vote of Saxony at the election of an emperor, but Maria Theresa must in return pay within eighteen years 12,000,000 thalers, wrest the principality of Krossen from Prussia and give it to Saxony, together with a strip of land half a mile in width extending from Lusatia to Poland, in order to secure to Saxony an uninterrupted communication with that kingdom; in the event of Francis Stephen's election as emperor he must raise Saxony to the rank of a kingdom and designate the electoral prince king of Rome, if there was no heir of the Austrian house. But this was too much for Maria Theresa; the elevation of Saxony into a kingdom would, she thought, bring about the subversion of the imperial constitution, for other electors also would have to be created kings. This refusal wounded the sensitive feelings of the Saxon and it was at this moment that Belle-Isle and the Spanish ambassador came to Dresden, and the tempting bait of Moravia was offered him. Belle-Isle believed that he should soon clinch the matter and betook himself to Munich, where, political adventurer that he was, he was received as a protector. He was accorded royal honours, and was granted a private house in the city for his suite and apartments for himself in the elector's palace at Nymphenburg.

THE ALLIANCE OF NYMPHENBURG

It was in this castle that on the 22nd of May was concluded the celebrated Treaty of Nymphenburg between Bavaria, France, and Spain, in which the otherwise kind-hearted and amiable elector, infatuated by a fatal ambition, signed away his honour and brought disaster on himself and his country and on Germany at large. France promised money and an army to support Bavaria's so-called just claims to the Austrian succession, and Charles Albert's election as emperor; the elector undertook, if he became emperor, never to demand the restitution of the cities and lands occupied by the French army. Now since France intended to take Belgium and Luxemburg, the Bavarian would gain the imperial crown by treason against his fatherland. The chancellor Unertel had gone through the Spanish War of Succession and well remembered all the misfortune the alliance with France had brought upon that country and dynasty.

He received no summons to the council at Nymphenburg but, having a shrewd suspicion of what was in hand there and determined to save his prince even at the last moment, he tried to force his way into the chamber, but found the doors closed and admittance denied him. So he had a ladder set up against the wall of the council chamber, mounted it, broke a pane of the window with his hat, and putting his head through the opening cried with all the force of his lungs: "For God's sake, your highness, no war with Austria, no alliance with France, remember your illustrious father!" But Count Törring drawing his dagger cried, "War! war!" and the weak prince concluded the alliance; a few days later, on the 28th of May, he signed one equally disgraceful with Spain. Spain offered money for twelve thousand men, but demanded in return Milan and Tyrol. When the latter was refused, she demanded at least Trent and Friuli to round off the new kingdom of Milan she purposed founding. Six thousand Bavarians were at once to press forward through Tyrol against Milan. The Spanish envoy Portocarrero, Count of Montijo, paid down forthwith a million gulden.

DANGER CLOSES IN ON AUSTRIA

From Munich Belle-Isle betook himself to Versailles, where he was received in triumph and the treaty was ratified. Fleury absented himself from this sitting of the cabinet, so as not to be obliged to agree to the treaty. From Versailles Belle-Isle went to Frankfort, where he played the part of emperor-maker and claimed precedence over all German princes. He delivered his despatches in French, not, as had hitherto been customary, in Latin. The part he played cost France enormous sums, not only on account of the money he spent, the magnificence with which he staged his performance, but also on account of the banquets to which he issued invitations. "The Germans set a high value on good eating," he informed Paris, "and dainties are one of the best means of winning over and pleasing them." The French government established at this date a private postal service from Paris to Frankfort, by which every week during the years 1741 and 1742 the greatest delicacies were sent from Paris to the capital of the German empire. The negotiations between Saxony and Bavaria caused Belle-Isle many anxieties, for Saxony demanded in return for its adhesion, not only Moravia, but the northern half of Bohemia, and promised on its side to add twenty thousand men to the Franco-Bavarian army of conquest. The French cabinet finally decided that Saxony should have Moravia and a narrow strip of northern Bohemia from the Saxon

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to the Polish frontier. On the 4th of June Frederick II also joined the league on condition that the possession of lower Silesia was to be guaranteed to him, in return for which he would give the elector of Bavaria his support at the election of an emperor. About the same time French bribery and persuasion induced the "hats," at that time the stronger party in Sweden, to bring forward a motion for war in the council. After an hour's debate war against Russia was decided on and was declared at the end of June. In this way it was made impossible for the grand duchess Anna to give the hard-pressed daughter of Charles VI the help which was hers by right of treaty.

Thus in an ever-narrowing circle the danger closed in on unhappy Austria. Everywhere the die had been cast for her destruction. France, Spain, Naples, Sardinia, Saxony, Bavaria, Sweden, were arming. Frederick was already established with his victorious army in Silesia; one disappointment followed another, messengers of misfortune trod on one another's heels; when the news of Frederick's alliance with France arrived in Vienna, Maria Theresa's ministers sank back in their seats like men who had received their death-blow.^a

We have already learned (in volume XIV.) how the Hungarian queen rose to the occasion, and how unavailing were her efforts; but we must here follow out the story in greater detail, as its events marked steps of progress in the career of Frederick, and prepared the way for the future greatness of Prussia.^a

By one of those "miracles of the house of Habsburg" of which Frederick so often complained, the English subsidiary funds to the amount of £300,000, which for many months had been delayed by reason of the difficulties of transport, at last arrived in Vienna, and their arrival put an end to the more pressing financial needs.

CHARLES OF LORRAINE

The Hungarian contingent was at last raised and equipped, the reappearance of Frederick in the field having had a very accelerating effect upon the preparations. Thus the army in Bohemia received from Bavaria and Hungary reinforcements, which gave it an overwhelming advantage over each of the three foes, and at its head there was now a general from whose youthful force and fire Maria Theresa hoped for a fresh impulse and a new turn in the whole conduct of the war. This general was her brother-in-law, the stately Charles of Lorraine, who certainly showed in the first days of his command that one might be very young in years and temperament without having a spark of the gifts of a general.

The youthful general who wrote such fine military disquisitions showed a pitiful vacillation in the field. "Which shall I attack—the French, the Saxons, or the Prussians?" he incessantly inquired of Vienna, and regularly he received the only appropriate answer: "The general on the spot must decide that point; not to question but to strike is his duty." The prince assembled a council of war on the 4th of March, and it was there decided that the strongest foes, namely the Prussians and the Saxons, were to be attacked first.

But the prince was not yet at ease and sent to Count Browne, whom illness had detained from the council; the latter advised: "On the contrary, let us beat the twelve thousand men of Marshal Broglie, then the Saxons will retire of their own accord and the Prussians will follow their lead." "What was to be done?" thought the unhappy prince. In this strait, he applied again to Vienna, and there, in opposition to Bartenstein, who was for attacking the French, Count Königsegg decided with Maria Theresa's concurrence that the Saxons and Prussians should be attacked first.

But the courier bringing this command fell into the hands of the Prussians.

From his papers Frederick learned that the plan of the enemy was to attack him with the main force from Bohemia, whilst the Hungarian troops were to take him in the flank. As there was no reliance to be placed in the Saxons, there remained nothing for him but to quit Moravia and repair to Bohemia. This he did, while the Austrians slowly followed him. In the mean-time another change had taken place in the command of the Bohemian army. Prince Charles had hurried off to Vienna to beg for a strategical mentor, and this he obtained in the person of Count Königsegg, who by his proverbial caution was to temper the fiery nature of the old prince Lobkowitz, and with the treasure of his experience was to counterbalance the inexperience of the prince. Thus three field-marshalsh shared a post which from its very nature can be filled by only one.

On May 10th, 1742, the three generals decided at a council of war held in the cloister of Saar, close to the Bohemian boundary, to march without delay to Prague and to retake that city. They knew that Frederick was already in Chrudim and concluded that he would retire across the Elbe, and thus leave the way open to them; contrariwise they were determined to fight with him a decisive battle. This battle took place on the 17th of May in the plain between Chotusitz and Czaslau, north of the great road which leads from Saar past Chotieborz, Willimow, Czaslau, and Kuttenberg, to Prague. It was the first battle which Frederick directed to the end and decided in person; the first in which the cavalry of the Prussians proved itself equal to their infantry and superior to the Austrian cavalry. Herein lay the importance of the battle, and herein alone. In its results it was far behind that of Mollwitz; for both sides were already bent on peace, and disagreed only as to the conditions.

With thirty thousand men of the best troops of Austria, Prince Charles advanced to the attack on the morning of the 17th of May, on the gently undulating plains north of Czaslau. The infantry was in two divisions with the cavalry right and left, one side under General Count Batthyányi, the other under General Count Hohenembs.

With eighteen thousand men, Prince Leopold¹ reached in the night the village of Chotusitz; and in the morning, hearing of the advance of the Austrians, he straightway began to range his troops in the line of battle. The village formed his centre, the pond of Czirkwitz covered his right, and the park of Schusitsch his left wing.^f

THE BATTLE OF CHOTUSITZ (CZASLAU) DESCRIBED BY CARLYLE

Kuttenberg, Czaslau, Chotusitz, and all these other places lie in what is called the Valley of the Elbe, but what to the eye has not the least appearance of a hollow, but of an extensive plain rather, dimpled here and there; and, if anything, rather sloping from the Elbe,—were it not that dull bushless brooks, one or two, sauntering to northward, not southward, warn you of the contrary. Conceive a flat tract of this kind, some three or four miles square, with Czaslau on its southern border, Chotusitz on its northern; flanked, on the west, by a straggle of Lakelets, ponds, and quagmires (which in our time are drained away, all but a tenth part or so of remainder); flanked, on the east, by a considerable puddle of a Stream called the Dobrowa; and cut in the middle by a nameless poor Brook (“Brtlinka” some write it, if anybody could pronounce), running parallel and independent,—which latter, of more concernment to us here, springs beyond Czaslau, and is got to be of some size,

[¹ The son of the old Dessauer.]

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and more intricate than usual, with "islands" and the like, as it passes Chotusitz (a little to east of Chotusitz):—this is our Field of Battle.

Frederick's Orders, which Leopold is studying, were: "Hold by Chotusitz for centre; your left wing, see you lean it on something, towards Dobrowa side,—on that intricate Brook (Brtlinka) or Park-wall of Schuschitz, which I think is there; then your right wing westwards, till you lean again on something: two lines, leave room for me and my force, on the corner nearest here. I will start at four; be with you between seven and eight,—and even bring a proportion of Austrian bread (hot from these ovens of Kuttentberg) to refresh part of you." Leopold of Anhalt, a much-comforted man, waits only for the earliest gray of the morning, to be up and doing. From Chotusitz he spreads out leftwards towards the Brtlinka Brook,—difficult ground that, unfit for cavalry, with its bogholes, islands, gullies, and broken surface; better have gone across the Brtlinka with mere infantry, and leant on the wall of that Deer-park of Schuschitz with perhaps only one thousand horse to support, well rearward of the infantry and this difficult ground? So men think,—after the action is over. And indeed there was certainly some misarrangement there (done by Leopold's subordinates), which had its effects shortly.

Leopold was not there in person, arranging that left wing; Leopold is looking after centre and right. He perceives the right wing will be best chance; knows that, in general, cavalry must be on both wings. On a little eminence in front of his right, he sees how the Enemy comes on; Czaslau, lately on their left, is now getting to rear of them:—"And you, stout old General Buddenbrock, spread yourself out to right a little, hidden behind this rising ground; I think we may outflank their left wing by a few squadrons, which will be an advantage."

Buddenbrock spreads himself out, as bidden: had Buddenbrock been reinforced by most of the horse that could do no good on our left wing, it is thought the battle had gone better. Buddenbrock in this way, secretly, outflanks the Austrians; to his right all forward, he has that string of marshy pools (Lakes of Czirkwitz so-called, outflowings from the Brook of Neuhoof), and cannot be taken in flank by any means. Brook of Neuhoof, which his Majesty crossed yesterday, farther north;—and ought to have recrossed by this time?—said Brook, hereabouts a mere fringe of quagmires and marshy pools, is our extreme boundary on the west or right; Brook of Brtlinka (unluckily not wall of the Deerpark) bounds us eastward, or on our left. Prince Karl, drawn up by this time, is in two lines, cavalry on right and left but rather in bent order; bent towards us at both ends (being dainty of his ground, I suppose); and comes on in hollow-crescent form:—which is not reckoned orthodox by military men. What all these Villages, human individuals and terrified deer, are thinking, I never can conjecture! Thick-soled peasants, terrified nursing mothers: Better to run and hide, I should say; mount your garron plough-horses, hide your butter-pots, meal-barrels; run at least ten miles or so!

It is now past seven, a hot May morning, the Austrians very near;—and yonder, of a surety, is his Majesty coming. Majesty has marched since four; and is here at his time, loaves and all. His men rank at once in the corner left for them; one of his horse-generals, Lehwald, is sent to the left, to put straight what may be awry there (cannot quite do it, he either):—and the attack by Buddenbrock, who secretly outflanks here on the right, this shall at once take effect. No sooner has his Majesty got upon the little eminence or rising ground, and scanned the Austrian lines for an instant or two, than his cannon-batteries awaken here; give the Austrian horse a good blast, by way of morning salutation and overture to the concert of the day. And Buddenbrock, deploying under cover of that, charges, "first at a trot, then at a gal-

lop," to see what can be done upon them with the white weapon. Old Buddenbrock, surely, did not himself ride in the charge? He is an old man of seventy; has fought at Oudenarde, Malplaquet, nay at Steenkirk, and been run through the body, under Dutch William; is an old acquaintance of Charles XII's even; and sat solemnly by Frederick Wilhelm's coffin, after so much attendance during life. The special leader of the charge was Bredow; also a veteran gentleman, but still in the fifties: he, I conclude, made the charge; first at a trot, then at a gallop,—with swords flashing hideous, and eyebrows knit.

The Dust Tempest

"The dust was prodigious," says Frederick, weather being dry and ground sandy; for a space of time you could see nothing but one huge whirlpool of dust, with the gleam of steel flickering madly in it: however, Buddenbrock, outflanking the Austrian first line of horse, did hurl them from their place; by and by you see the dust-tempest running south, faster and faster south,—that is to say, the Austrian horse in flight; for Buddenbrock, outflanking them by three squadrons, has tumbled their first line topsy-turvy, and they rush to rearward, he following away and away. Now were the time for a fresh force of Prussian cavalry,—for example, those you have standing useless behind the gullies and quagmires on your left wing (says Stille, after the event);—due support to Buddenbrock, and all that Austrian cavalry were gone, and their infantry left bare.

But now again, see, do not the dust-clouds pause? They pause, mounting higher and higher; they dance wildly, then roll back towards us; too evidently back. Buddenbrock has come upon the second line of Austrian horse; in too loose order Buddenbrock, by this time, and they have broken him:—and it is a mutual defeat of horse on this wing, the Prussian rather the worse of the two. And might have been serious,—had not Rothenburg plunged furiously in, at this crisis, quite through to the Austrian infantry, and restored matters, or more. Making a confused result of it in this quarter. Austrian horse-regiments there now were that fled quite away; as did even one or two foot-regiments, while the Prussian infantry dashed forward on them, escorted by Rothenburg in this manner,—who got badly wounded in the business; and was long an object of solicitude to Frederick. And contrariwise certain Prussian horse also, it was too visible, did not compose themselves till fairly arear of our foot. This is Shock First in the Battle; there are Three Shocks in all.

Partial charging, fencing, and flourishing went on; but nothing very effectual was done by the horse in this quarter farther. Nor did the fire or effort of the Prussian infantry in this their right wing continue; Austrian fury and chief effort having, by this time, broken out in an opposite quarter. So that the strain of the Fight lies now in the other wing over about Chotusitz and the Brtlinka Brook; and thither I perceive his Majesty has galloped, being "always in the thickest of the danger" this day. Shock Second is now on. The Austrians have attacked at Chotusitz; and are threatening to do wonders there.

Prince Leopold's Left Wing, as we said, was entirely defective in the eye of tacticians (after the event). Far from leaning on the wall of the Deersitz Village for that object. So that when the Austrian foot comes storming upon Chotusitz, there is but "half a regiment" to defend it. And as for cavalry, what is to become of cavalry, slowly threading, under cannonshot and musketry, these intricate quagmires and gullies, and dangerously breaking

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into files and strings, before ever it can find ground to charge? Accordingly, the Austrian foot took Chotusitz, after obstinate resistance; and old Königseck, very ill of gout, got seated in one of the huts there; and the Prussian cavalry, embarrassed to get through the gullies, could not charge except piecemeal, and then, though in some cases, with desperate valour, yet in all without effectual result. Königseck sits in Chotusitz;—and yet withal the Prussians are not out of it, will not be driven out of it, but cling obstinately; whereupon the Austrians set fire to the place; its dry thatch goes up in flame, and poor old Königseck, quite lame of gout, narrowly escaped burning, they say.

And, see, the Austrian horse have got across the Brtlinka, are spread almost to the Deerpark, and strive hard to take us in flank,—did not the Brook, the bad ground, and the platoon firing (fearfully swift, from discipline and the iron ramrods) hold them back in some measure. They make a violent attempt or two; but the problem is very rugged. Nor can the Austrian infantry, behind or to the west of burning Chotusitz, make an impression, though they try it, with levelled bayonets, and deadly energy, again and again: the Prussian ranks are as if built of rock, and their fire is so sure and swift. Here is one Austrian regiment, came rushing on like lions; would not let go, death or no-death:—and here it lies, shot down in ranks; whole swaths of dead men, and their muskets by them,—as if they had got the word to take that posture, and had done it hurriedly! A small transitory gleam of proud rage is visible, deep down, in the soul of Frederick as he records this fact. Shock Second was very violent.

The Austrian horse, after such experimenting in the Brtlinka quarter, gallop off to try to charge the Prussians in the rear;—“pleasanter by far,” judge many of them, “to plunder the Prussian camp,” which they deservy in those regions; whither accordingly they rush. Too many of them; and the Hussars as one man. To the sorrowful indignation of Prince Karl whose right arm (or wing) is fallen paralytic in this manner. After the fight, they repented in dust and ashes; and went to say so, as if with the rope about their neck; upon which he pardoned them.

Shock Third

Nor is Prince Karl’s left wing gaining garlands just at this moment. Shock Third is awakening:—and will be decisive on Prince Karl. Chotusitz, set on fire an hour since (about 9 A.M.), still burns; cutting him in two, as it were, or disjoining his left wing from his right: and it is on his right wing that Prince Karl is depending for victory, at present; his left wing, ruffled by those first Prussian charges of horse, with occasional Prussian swift musketry ever since, being left to its own inferior luck, which is beginning to produce impression on it. And, lo, on the sudden (what brought finis to the business), Frederick, seizing the moment, commands a united charge on this left wing: Frederick’s right wing dashes forward on it, double-quick, takes it furiously, on front and flank; fifteen fieldpieces preceding, and intolerable musketry behind them. So that the Austrian left wing cannot stand it at all.

The Austrian left wing, stormed in upon in this manner, swags and sways, threatening to tumble pellmell upon the right wing; which latter has its own hands full. No Chotusitz or point of defence to hold by, Prince Karl is eminently ill off, and will be hurled wholly into the Brtlinka, and the islands and gullies, unless he mind! Prince Karl,—what a moment for him!—noticing this undeniable phenomenon, rapidly gives the word for retreat, to avoid worse. It is near upon Noon; four hours of battle; very fierce on both the wings together or alternately; in the centre (westward of Chotusitz) mostly insignificant: “more than half the Prussians” standing with arms shouldered.

Prince Karl rolls rapidly away, through Czaslau towards south-west again; loses guns in Czaslau; goes, not quite broken, but at double-quick time for five miles; cavalry, Prussian and Austrian, bickering in the rear of him; and vanishes over the horizon towards Willimow and Haber that night, the way he had come.

This is the battle of Chotusitz, called also of Czaslau: Thursday, 17th May 1742. Vehemently fought on both sides;—calculated, one may hope, to end this Silesian matter? The results, in killed and wounded, were not very far from equal. Nay, in killed the Prussians suffered considerably the worse; the exact Austrian cipher of killed being 1,052, while that of the Prussians was 1,905—owing chiefly to those fierce ineffectual horse-charges and bickerings, on the right wing and left; “above 1,200 Prussian cavalry were destroyed in these.” But, in fine, the general loss, including wounded and missing, amounted on the Austrian side (prisoners being many, and deserters very many) to near seven thousand, and on the Prussian to between four and five. Two Generals Frederick had lost, who are not specially of our acquaintance; and several younger friends whom he loved. Rothenburg, who was in that first charge of horse with Buddenbrock, or in rescue of Buddenbrock, and did exploits, got badly hurt, as we saw,—badly, not fatally, as Frederick’s first terror was,—and wore his arm in a sling for a long while afterwards.^c

THE TREATY OF Breslau AND FREDERICK’S COMMENT

After this decisive battle, a peace was quickly negotiated. We give the terms of this so-called Treaty of Breslau in the words of the conqueror.^a

1. The queen of Hungary ceded to the king of Prussia Upper and Lower Silesia, with the principality of Glatz; except the towns of Troppau, Jaegern-dorf, and the high mountains situated beyond the Oppa.

2. The Prussians undertook to repay the English one million seven hundred thousand crowns; which sum was a mortgage loan on Silesia.

The remaining articles related to a suspension of arms, an exchange of prisoners, and the freedom of religion and trade.

Thus [continues Frederick] was Silesia united to the Prussian states. Two years were sufficient for the conquest of that important province. The treasures which the late king had left were almost expended; but provinces that do not cost more than seven or eight millions are cheaply purchased. Circumstances particularly favoured this achievement. It was necessary that France should suffer herself to become a party in the war; that Russia should be attacked by Sweden; that timidity should cause the Hanoverians and Saxons to remain inactive; that success should be uninterrupted; and that the king of England, though an enemy of the Prussians, should, in his own despite, become an instrument of their aggrandisement. What most contributed to this conquest was an army that had for two and twenty years been forming, and by its admirable discipline rendered superior to all the soldiers of Europe. Add to this, generals that were true citizens; wise and incorruptible ministers; and, finally, a species of good fortune which often accompanies youth, and deserts age.

Had the undertaking failed, the king would have been deemed a rash prince, enterprising beyond his strength. Success made men consider him happy. In reality, fortune only bestows fame; and he whom fortune favours is applauded, while he on whom she frowns is blamed. After the ratifications were exchanged, the king withdrew his troops out of Bohemia; some of them marched through Saxony to return to their native country, others were sent into Silesia, being destined to guard this new conquest.^c

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FREDERICK II IN HIS RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

It was in November of 1805 that a French statesman passed the following noteworthy judgment on the policy of Frederick the Great. "Frederick's successors failed to grasp the spirit and guiding principles of his reign. This prince was perfectly well aware that, with his army and his treasury, he would always be in a position to maintain the power that he had created and the rank that he had attained in Europe. But he was also aware that nothing could happen on the Continent that did not concern him, and that he could not permit any political event of a certain magnitude to take place without his concurrence; that the existing balance of power would certainly be altered to his detriment unless he took energetic action towards the establishment of a fresh equilibrium. He knew that if other states enlarged their borders while his own obtained no corresponding accession of territory the latter would be relegated by the change to a subordinate rank; he knew that if all the other armies of Europe collected their forces, fought, and through victory and defeat grew more and more highly efficient he must not enfeeble his own by slothful inaction; in other words, he could not suffer his military strength to be reduced by a falling-off in experience, valour, or confidence. Doubtless there was no one of these truths to which the great Frederick did not give its due weight, and I fancy that he would have smiled if any minister of his had undertaken to instruct him by expounding them."

Unquestionably for a state which lays claim to the rank of a European power, and which is affected by every variation of relative strength throughout the Continent, neutrality in the midst of a struggle of each against all is a shackle which may almost force it to resign the position of a great power. For the rising power of Prussia, in particular, the rôle of spectator, which it thought to acquiesce in at the Peace of Breslau, was all the more difficult to play since the war in which it was to take no further part had to be fought on German soil, with German countries, and the very crown of the empire at stake.

At the commencement of his first war the king had aimed at nothing more than the rounding-off of the Prussian dominions. In return for the cession of Silesia he had been ready to give his voice in the election to the imperial crown in favour of the husband of the heiress of the house of Habsburg, daughter of the late emperor; that is to say, he had been prepared to countenance the continuance of the Austrian hegemony in Germany. As crown prince, Voltaire had indeed flattered him with the prospect of succession to the empire, and, on the death of the last male Habsburg, had greeted the king of Prussia as the man who would be an emperor or make one. At that time Prince Leopold of Dessau also wrote to his chief without circumlocution, expressing the heartiest good wishes for his elevation to the imperial dignity, since in Europe there was no man living who deserved it more or was better able to maintain it. And the idea of claiming for Prussia a leading position in the empire was not strange to Frederick's minister, Podewils, at the end of 1740, though the realisation of it appeared to him absolutely unattainable. The envy of Prussia's neighbours within the empire, the most distinguished of whom held sway over kingdoms in the rest of Europe, would always present insurmountable obstacles. So thought Podewils.

Then came a moment when, quite unexpectedly, Prussia practically held the fate of Germany in her hands. The elevation of the elector of Bavaria to the imperial purple was in the main the doing of Prussia. Thus Bavaria was bound to eternal gratitude towards her benefactor, while, after the elector of Saxony had joined the coalition, the Saxon ambassador pathetically bewailed

himself to Podewils, that now his court would throw itself blindly into the arms of Prussia. Podewils, reporting these words to his king, joyfully expressed the hope that "in future your majesty will be looked upon as the only great power in Germany, a good understanding with whom is to be preferred to any other alliance." During the Moravian campaign Frederick strove to make Saxony (which had been used by France to counterbalance Prussia within the coalition) dependent upon himself, so that, quit of French influence, he might arrange the affairs of Germany according to his own ideas. In the same spirit he recommended the new emperor to increase the Bavarian forces "so as to cut a figure among the allies," the meaning of which was that he should withdraw by degrees from a position of dependence upon France. And when Frederick passed in review the reasons in favour of a prosecution of the war against the queen of Hungary, it did not escape him that after the complete overthrow of Austria, and after the conclusion of a general peace under the arbitration of Prussia, the whole empire would enter upon a close connection with that country, and "the king of Prussia would then have the authority of emperor, and the elector of Bavaria the burden of empire."

These brilliant prospects Frederick had resigned at the Peace of Breslau. But his policy soon resumed the course it had abandoned, for he could not be blind to the consideration that the degradation of the emperor involved a moral humiliation for the king of Prussia who had set the emperor on the throne.

The pitiable insufficiency of the resources of the house of Wittelsbach to meet the demands of the imperial station to which it had been elevated by the result of the election of 1742 clearly demonstrated the emptiness of the imperial title apart from a powerful ruling family. King Ferdinand perfectly understood why, after the battle of M \ddot{u} hlberg, he had dissuaded the emperor his brother from exacting a "fixed revenue," which would have inaugurated a system of permanent public contributions to the expenses of the empire: a secure financial endowment of the imperial position (he warned him) would have made it possible for other princes besides the Habsburgs to undertake the charge of empire, which now their poverty prevented them from doing. And, as a matter of fact, it had been so, and as long as a male of the house of Habsburg survived the elective crown had never passed out of that one family. The empire had counted for something only when it was an appanage of the power of Austria.

As the heir to the Habsburg dominions in Bohemia, and as the ruler of an extensive and self-contained territory in south Germany, stretching from the Sudetic Mountains to the Alps, Charles Albert too might have wielded the imperial authority, but an emperor humbly dependent upon the French was to the members of the empire an object of pity or scorn, as the case might be, or a mere jest.

For if there was one point on which sentiment in Germany was unanimous, it was dislike of France. The king of Prussia, one of the few friends of his Gallic neighbours to be found among his countrymen, was astounded and absolutely nonplussed when, on his journey to the baths of Aachen in the mid-summer of 1742, he found fierce hatred of the French everywhere rampant. He declared that he could not comprehend this "frenzy," which went beyond the madness of Roland. And yet Frederick himself had had experience of the obstinacy with which his own advisers—Podewils above all—had opposed the conclusion of the French alliance. Less than seventy years had passed since the days of Mazarin's Rhenish Alliance. At that time the young Louis stood at the head of a confederacy of German princes, which his minister Lionne might well style the great driving-wheel of the Germanic policy of France. No man would then have inveighed against France as the enemy of the em-

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pire, or stigmatised it as the hereditary foe; at that time German liberty seemed a much more questionable factor in the situation than the French king, even to the emperor of Germany. Then Louis XIV's policy of conquest had thrown off the mask, and the Rhenish Alliance had fallen to pieces. Again and again the empire declared war against France, and matters soon came to such a pass that, instead of a well-organised body at the beck and call of France, there arose a distinct confederacy in favour of the Habsburg emperor and under his leadership. All the little states, temporal and spiritual, within the circles of the upper Rhine and the Palatinate, of Swabia and Franconia, each by itself so insignificant that its military resources were not worth the trouble of a summons or a bargain, together amounted to a body that had at least the semblance of power. It must be confessed that the leading states in these local leagues—the Palatinate, Würtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and in Franconia the Markgrafs of Brandenburg—could not forego the chance of carrying out a policy of their own, suited to their various circumstances, and of setting up or preparing the way for an independent system of defence within the bounds of the local organisation; but nevertheless this association was as valuable to the emperor Leopold and his two sons as the Swabian League of former times had been to the emperor Maximilian. But by the very law of its being this confederacy, formed to repel French invasions, could have nothing in common with the ally of France, the empire of the house of Wittelsbach.

THE COUNCIL OF PRINCES

Similarly the representative of the new dynasty soon became painfully aware that he had not that substantial majority in the diet on which the last emperors of the Habsburg line had always been able to reckon. In the election of January 24th, 1742, the unanimity of the electoral college had been mainly due to fear, and now that this constraint was removed the adherents of Austria ventured to raise their heads in the highest council of the land. The motley elements of this many-headed college shaped matters within the council of princes after a fashion very inauspicious for the newly-elected emperor.

In this assembly Austria, though shorn of her imperial state, could rely on the unconditional devotion of two separate groups, and on every division in a body of ninety-six voters these formed the solid nucleus of an Austrian majority. In the first place there were the so-called "pensioners" of the court of Vienna, who gave their votes in accordance with the notorious formula, *in omnibus uti Austria*, the small temporal principalities which owed their admission into the council of princes of the empire to the favour of the Habsburg emperors, families whose scions had been for generations courtiers or soldiers of the ruling house: Lobkowitz, Salm, Dietrichstein, Auersberg, Schwartzenstein, Aremberg, Hohenzollern, Fürstenberg, and Liechtenstein. The nine hereditary votes of these houses were generally reinforced by four representative votes from the "Grafenverbände" of the Wetterau, Swabia, Franconia, and Westphalia. The second mighty stay, when it was necessary to secure a decision in Austria's favour, was to be found in the compact body of "*Germania Sacra*," at least as far as the institutions entitled to a vote were not in the gift of the Wittelsbach princes. The archbishop of Salzburg, co-director with Austria of the council of princes, the bishops of Bamberg and Würzburg, of Eichstädt and Passau, of Augsburg, Constance, Coire and Bâle, of Brixen and Trent, of Strasburg, Worms and Speier, the prince-bishops and abbots of Fulda, Kempten, Ellwangen, Berchtesgaden, Weissenburg, Stavelot, Prüm and Corvei, the Grand Master of the knights of St. John, and the two *curiæ* of Swabian and Rhenish prelates, were all only waiting for the signal to cast their

votes, twenty-five in number, into the scale for the honourable archducal house, the guardian of Catholic truth in the realm. If the Viennese court added its own two votes (for Austria and Burgundy) together with the vote for the markgrafschaft of Nomeny which the husband of Maria Theresa had retained as a last reminiscence of his possessions in Lorraine, there were very few votes needed to make the forty-one who were thus in accord into an absolute majority, even when the benches of the council were full.

The house of Wittelsbach, on the other hand, had only fifteen votes absolutely at its disposal; five for the much-ramified Palatinate line, two in the Bavarian line, one for the dukedom, and one for the landgrafschaft of Leuchtenberg, and eight clerical votes. The elector Clement Augustus of Cologne, a brother of the emperor, voted for the bishoprics of Münster, Osnabrück, Hildesheim, and Paderborn, and for the Teutonic Order; another brother, Bishop Theodore, voted for Ratisbon, Freisingen, and (since 1743) for Liège. The king of Prussia might come to the rescue with the five votes of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Minden, Kammin, and Farther Pomerania, but every other ally had to be laboriously gained. And the chances that the emperor could successfully cope with his rival in securing the votes of the thirty or forty states whose attitude was still undetermined, were small indeed. Even with the Protestant courts the Hofburg maintained political and personal relations of various kinds, for the majority of them had steered a middle course amidst the clashing interests of the brief reign of Charles VII: the Ernestine line with a total of five or six votes, the Mecklenburg line with four, the houses of Brandenburg in Franconia and of Würtemberg with two apiece, the house of Brabant with three—for Cassel, Darmstadt, and Hersfeld, and the houses of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Anhalt, and Cirkseña each with one.

Among these Protestant families, however, there was one, possessed of fully six votes in the council of princes, which was actually allied to the emperor's great rival, and was assiduously and successfully striving to bring over a further accession from the Protestant camp. That was the royal and electoral house of Hanover, with the whole power of Great Britain behind it.ⁿ

THE SECOND SILESIAN WAR (1744-1745 A.D.)

Frederick had made good use of these two years, fortifying his new territory, and repairing the evils inflicted upon it by the war. By the death of the prince of East Friesland without heirs, he also gained possession of that country. He knew well that Maria Theresa would not, if she could help it, allow him to remain in Silesia; accordingly, in 1744, alarmed by her victories, he arrived at a secret understanding with France, and pledged himself, with Hesse-Cassel and the Palatinate, to maintain the imperial rights of Charles VII, and to defend his hereditary Bavarian lands. Frederick began the Second Silesian War by entering Bohemia in August, 1744, and taking Prague. By this brilliant but rash venture he put himself in great danger, and soon had to retreat.ⁱ

Battle of Hohenfriedberg

In 1745 another master-stroke was executed by General von Zieten, when, in order to carry an important message which had come by way of Frankenstein from Frederick to his cousin Markgraf Charles at Jägerndorf, he made his way through the Austrian lines, unsuspected in the new winter uniform. And what of the chief of these skilled and heroic commanders? The king gave the alarm, and sent, under General du Moulin, only the vanguard from

[1745 A.D.]

Jauernik towards Striegau against the duke of Lorraine, who had pressed forward as far as Bolkenhain. This manœuvre drew the foe down from his mountains into the plains; they encamped on the evening of the 3rd of June, resolved to surprise Du Moulin at dawn and continue their march upon Breslau. But Frederick stole in the night to Striegau, and, guided by the evening's camp-fires, drew up his army in readiness for battle. This enabled Du Moulin to remain in ambush at the foot of the Spitzberg, the summit of which had been taken by the Saxons under the duke of Weissenfels. Du Moulin attacked them towards four o'clock in the morning and, opening his batteries, gave a tremendous fire. Then the king advanced with the left wing by the Striegau River, his quickness and the difficulties of the ground throwing the enemy into disorder; Du Moulin succeeded, and the left wing under Prince Charles and the Saxons retreated. The Prussian cavalry of the left wing marched upon the enemy, and after six indecisive encounters drove them back as far as Hohenfriedberg; the king's infantry pushed their adversaries right and left with such impetus that the confusion became general; a cavalry charge of dragoons from Bayreuth made an end of the fight. Prince Charles withdrew to his old camp near Königgrätz, Du Moulin pursued him over the border, and the king pushed forward to Chlüm in Bohemia. Upper Silesia and Kosel were released.

In this splendid fight, which was won in five hours of one morning, between Jauer and Landshut, the infantry did wonders, the artillery distinguished itself; but the cavalry celebrate this day as that of one of their greatest triumphs, for the determined General von Gessler with a single regiment of Bavarian dragoons defeated 20 battalions, made 2,500 prisoners, and captured 67 flags and 4 cannon. As a proof of lasting gratitude, Frederick bestowed on this heroic regiment a letter of grace and a diploma and presented them with a new seal with a remarkable engraving. The dragoons were given the right to have a grenade in flames on their cartridge-boxes, to beat the grenadier march on their drums, and to sound the cuirassier march on their trumpets. Colonel von Schwerin, the head of the regiment, was promoted to the rank of general, Gessler was made a count, and both he and Major de Chasot, who had brought the news of victory, were given heraldic insignia of honour. On Gessler's helmet red and green ensigus were added with the numbers 20 and 67, on the lower part of his escutcheon a Roman shield resting on other weapons, on which Marcus Curtius is seen on his horse leaping into the open gulf, with the words, "It is sweet to die for the fatherland." Chasot had the Prussian eagle added to his arms, and two flags with H. F. and 66; to his mother Frederick wrote a very jubilant letter, accompanied by a costly casket.

In the *History of My Own Times* Frederick^k speaks of the event at Hohenfriedberg as being so rare, so worthy of fame, that it should be inscribed in the Prussian annals in golden letters. He adds of the whole army present on that day, "the world resting on the shoulders of Atlas is not safer than Prussia upheld by such an army."

Frederick wrote to the king of France in less flattering terms; he had changed the order of things at Friedberg; the battle of Fontenoy and the taking of Tournay were honourable to him and advantageous to France; but for Prussia's immediate advantage a battle won on the banks of the Scamander, or the taking of Pekin, would have been equally useful.

Battle at Soor (September 30th, 1745)

The want of means drove the king from one camp to another. The enormous number of troops needed for the transport from Silesia reduced his force to 26,000 men. Prince Charles saw in his own superior numbers this advan-

tage. He pushed on from Jaromierz towards Königinhof, and concealed his strength so well behind the clouds of light infantry, that General von Katzler came back to the king's camp on the night of September 29th without having seen the main body of the enemy's force. The next morning Charles stood in battle array, opposite Frederick's right wing, and bombarded the Prussian camp before daybreak. The king had commanded a march to Trautenau the evening before; he now ranged himself under the enemy's fire in such a way that he was parallel and opposite to him; but the right wing of his cavalry attacked the Austrians and overthrew them; the infantry, after three attempts, succeeded in storming heights which were protected by cannon. The enemy drew upon a second and a third height, but the impetuous onslaught of the Prussian cavalry forced them to retreat.

Up to now the king had held the cavalry of the left wing in reserve; now he brought up that of the right wing to reinforce it, and with these two attacked the foe. The Austrian infantry held their position near Prausnitz for some time, but finally the flight became general and the victor encamped at Soor.

Nadasdi had intended attacking the Prussians, in face, in the rear and on their left, whilst Prince Charles simultaneously engaged them on their right. But his light infantry pillaged the camp and baggage, and so assisted the king to defeat them. "Just imagine," wrote Frederick to Fredersdorf, "how we fought—eighteen against fifty, my whole transport in confusion. In all my life I have never been in such straits as on the 30th; and for all that, I emerged—you see no bullet hurts me." The camp library was also lost at Soor, and Duhan¹ had to make haste and send Cicero, Horace, Lucian, Voltaire, Bossuet, Rousseau, and Gresset, so that the study of the muses could continue. The same friend was also commanded to have a fine edition of Racine in readiness for the return.

Victory of Hennersdorf (November 23d, 1745 A.D.)

The advanced season necessitated the journey into Silesia by the difficult pass near Schatzlar. Frederick divided his army, which Prince Leopold was to command, between Schweidnitz and Striegau; and on the 28th of October, the day when his convention with England was arranged in Hanover, he went to Berlin, where, on the 8th of November he heard from Wülfwenstierna, Swedish minister to the Dresden court, of a scheme on foot, projected by Count Brühl, for the invasion of Berlin, which should force him to yield Silesia up to Austria; and Magdeburg, Halberstadt, together with Halle and the surrounding districts, to Saxony.

The court of Dresden had long hankered after its neighbour on the Spree, for Berlin, thanks to a new system of government, began to be of importance. Prussia, steadily growing in moral strength, was at last becoming a power of the first rank in Europe, and could hold her own against the house of Habsburg in matters both of church and state. With whom then should Saxony side? The Second Silesian War had made her hateful to Prussia, as she had been an adherent of Austria, and Frederick, during his progress through her territory, had not kept his troops under the strictest discipline; even at Hohenfriedberg the bitterest animosity had been shown towards Saxony.

The prince von Grünne led 10,000 Austrians through Saxony and marched on to Berlin; Prince Charles pushed forward with 40,000 men into upper Lusatia, joined issue with the allies, and intended carrying on the war in the

¹ The King's tutor.

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mark of Brandenburg. Then Prince Leopold with 35,000 men hurried to Naumburg on the Queis; Frederick went towards him from Berlin, and on the 23rd of November at the Catholic Hennersdorf defeated four Saxon cuirassier regiments and one regiment of infantry under General von Büchner, all taken greatly aback at his appearance.

He further took possession of the great powder magazine in Görlitz, and commanded the count von Grünne to retrace his steps and unite with the Saxon main body under Count Rutowsky near Dresden. Zieten begged for his regiment the silver drums which had been pillaged in the fight at Hennersdorf.

The happy result of this victory was seen in the fine public spirit created in Frederick's people. A candidate for the forest rights in Breslau, and Professor Stisser in Stettin, sang such stirring odes in honour of Frederick in the victories of Hohenfriedberg and of Soor that they sounded quite stately, even compared with Gleim's grenadier songs, when in their turn they resounded in the Berlin patriotic journals. The king's town was changing, as Count Grünne had threatened, into a fortified camp, and instead of a gay people, 16,000 citizens went armed. When the danger was over and Berlin was illuminated, the people indulged themselves in all kinds of witticisms—one design showed Grünne with many Austrian generals mounted on crabs, and Berlin in the distance inscribed

General Grünne
Will to Berlin.

Another showed many coaches drawn by four and six horses, also calashes and carts racing away from Berlin; in the middle was a hare in full flight, with under all the inscription—"In company."

The Battle of Kesselsdorf (November 29th, 1745)

The Saxon troops were already quartered for the winter round Leipsic when the king wrote, after the victory of Hennersdorf, to the old prince of Dessau, "I have beaten them in Lusatia, do you beat them at Leipsic; then we shall meet at Dresden." Then Leopold started out with his corps from Halle, captured Leipsic on the 29th of November, joined General von Lehwald on the 13th of December at Meissen, and marched on Dresden, whence Augustus had fled to Prague.

Rutowsky found himself in the most favourable position near Kesselsdorf—the chevalier de Saxe, his brother, commanded the cavalry; here they awaited Prince Leopold. Kesselsdorf lay at the foot of a hill, occupied by the left wing of the Saxons. In this village alone there were seven grenadier battalions; mountains, passes, even the great difficulty of attacking on slippery ice—everything was in favour of the Saxon. It was not till two o'clock in the afternoon that the Prussians advanced to the attack. General von Hertzberg moved with the grenadier battalions of Kleist, Aulack, and Münchow, who followed the three battalions of Prince Leopold of Dessau's regiment at 300 paces, supported by Bonin's dragoons. The first attempt was defeated by the locality and two of the enemy's batteries; many Prussians, among them Von Hertzberg, fell, and the prince drew the grenadiers to the rear. Then the Saxons came out into the open field to pursue them in their retreat. But now Von Bonin's regiment of dragoons rushed upon the seven Saxon battalions, so that they were instantly scattered and their batteries taken.

The Pomeranian infantry under Teetz took Kesselsdorf, with 20 cannon, 4 mortars, a flag and a pair of drums, and earned for themselves a new seal of

honour; all officers received the order of merit. Prince Leopold celebrated a splendid jubilee here, as it was in the spring of 1695 that he started his military career under the Brandenburg arms in the Netherlands.

The Peace of Dresden (1745 A.D.)

The defeated enemy joined in its flight with the prince of Lorraine who, the decisive moment over, was quite calmly betaking himself to Bohemia for safety. Frederick had been in Meissen during the fight; he inspected the battle ground, and on the 18th entered Dresden where he consoled the forsaken household of the prince and received Count von Harrach, who, delegated by Maria Theresa, began to negotiate with the Prussian, English, and Saxon plenipotentiaries for peace, which was concluded on the 25th; the Berlin Peace and division of territory were renewed; Prussia recognised Maria Theresa's husband as Francis I, emperor and head of the empire; Austria guaranteed to the king all his states, as also those privileges otherwise assured to him by Charles VII; Frederick agreed not to disturb the house of Austria in any of its German possessions; Saxony, Brunswick, Cassel, the Palatinate are all included in the Dresden Treaty of peace. The electorate of Saxony made a special treaty with Prussia; it paid to Frederick one million thalers, renouncing, as heir contingent to the house of Austria, all claim on Silesia, and agreeing to keep aloof from all differences and dissensions, such as there had been between Prussia and Saxony with regard to the customs at Fürstenberg on the Oder, and along the road to Schildau. In return for an equivalent to the country and its inhabitants, the town of Fürstenberg and its customs, together with the village of Schildau and lower Lusatia and all land in the electorate of Saxony on the right bank of the Oder, was to be abandoned to the Berlin court, so that the river with both its shores might be entirely Prussian. But so many difficulties were made by Saxony that this article of the Treaty of Dresden could not be arranged.

In this treaty of peace, Great Britain, warring with the Pretender, was again very useful to the king. The duke of Newcastle and his brother Pelham, who had replaced the friend of Austria, Lord Carteret, offered him in the Hanover agreement of August 26th, 1745, every security for Silesia, and persuaded the Vienna court to peace—a peace to which King George and later the emperor, as such, and the empire gave their especial guarantees.

Frederick was present in the Kreuzkirche in Dresden on the 26th of December when the peace sermon was preached; on the 28th, at midday, he drove in an open carriage, accompanied by his two brothers, back to Berlin in full state. The town was intoxicated with delight, and Frederick drove between double rows of citizens. The people called him "father of the fatherland" and "the great king." At the castle he was received on alighting from the carriage by Prince Ferdinand and the other princes, by the generals of the army and the nobles of the court. "Upstairs in the king's apartments there was the tenderest and most loving welcome from their two majesties, the queens." On this evening, in the midst of the shouts of triumph, the king left the joyful tumult of the illuminated city, to visit Duhan, who was dying in the Adlerstrasse!

The war had cost millions, without extending the confines of the country; the triumph was purely ideal. The pope sent congratulations to the king, and once more recommended to his protection those inhabitants of Silesia who still held the Catholic faith. The Catholic president of the head district in Oppeln, Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, freiherr zu Beuthen, was declared a forsworn traitor, and to have forfeited all honours and dignities, as well as the order of the Black Eagle: his hereditary sword was publicly broken by the executioner in Breslau.

[1745 A.D.]

France continued the War of the Austrian Succession with great energy, and with no small measure of success.¹

Frederick, however, wearied himself unceasingly in endeavours to reconcile the three powers; but this was accomplished only by the Treaty of Aachen, which gave back all conquered territory and once more assured Silesia and Glatz to the king of Prussia.²

THE FREDERICIAN SPIRIT IN GERMANY

During the period which intervened between the end of the Silesian and the beginning of the Seven Years' War, the great personality of Frederick as a ruler, legislator, guardian of justice, and furtherer of the common welfare in his states, but also as the introducer of a new era, not merely for Germany but for the whole of Europe, was more and more clearly manifested. At this time he made his first tentative measures for the reform of justice and legislation, which make Prussia's example in this field a guide not merely for the other German states, but even for many foreign ones.

We may mention as belonging to this time most of those remarkable decisions by which Frederick with one stroke of the pen now overthrew some fragment of mediæval intolerance, now gave wings to the administration for the benefit of some subject suffering under it; and again unhesitatingly made his own kingly prerogative bow to the higher authority of a uniformly impartial justice. To this time also belongs the revival of the Academy of Science, which under his father's reign had decayed and, worse, had fallen into contempt. Though under Frederick this institution was organised too much after the French fashion and was in great part filled with Frenchmen, yet it also assembled many German celebrities within its precincts and advanced considerably many sciences, especially the exact ones. Now for the first time Germany perceived what she possessed in this king, and with conscious pride named as her own the man whom foreign countries to the very borders of civilisation had admiringly praised. The influence of Frederick's personality and method of governing now began gradually to extend and manifest itself in wider circles.

The result was kindred to the operating cause. It was not merely that certain defined branches of intellectual life were advanced and strengthened by Frederick's power and influence, but it was above all the whole being, the very life of the nation itself, which underwent a favourable change and won new vigour and strength. As to those whose official occupations were performed immediately under the eyes and the control of the great king, who had to fear his uncompromising look, which nothing escaped, they soon saw themselves compelled to fulfil their offices in a more strict and faithful manner than had generally been the habit in these circles, and this partly by force, partly by the exciting influence of example given from so high a place. And yet they were no longer the mere machines of an often capricious and despotic will, as had been the case under the far too one-sided government of Frederick William I. They might on occasion assert their own independent views before a king who respected ideas and principles, and knew how to appreciate them because he himself governed according to them; and under the government of a monarch, who by a writ under his own hand had exhorted the *Kammergericht*, the highest court of judicature in the land, never to proceed except according to the law and their convictions as judges, and not to respect orders even from him, if they were in opposition to this legal attitude. The judicial calling in particular acquired a spirit of independence and devo-

[¹ See volumes XI. and XIV.]

tion to duty which did not fail when the king did actually, as in the notorious lawsuit of Müller, let himself be beguiled into the mistake of interrupting the independent course of justice, though it had been done with the very best intentions.

Thus from Frederick's school there proceeded a host of officials who were objects of admiration and envy to the whole of Germany, compared as they were with the venal, inert, lazy, and ignorant men, who formed the same class in all the other states. It was they who withstood, and in a great measure successfully, the corruption of the government which followed, and preserved for later days the traditions of a conscientious and punctilious administrative and judicial body, operating for the public benefit, and possessed of intellectual culture and thoroughness, which produced a rich harvest for the regeneration of the Prussian state.^k

The period of eight years which had been allowed to the different states of Europe from the Peace of Aachen until a new war broke out, did not produce in them the desired feeling of united firmness and security; but, on the contrary, all seemed unsettled and in dread of the new commotions which hovered over this brief state of repose. For it was but too evident that the inimical powers so recently roused up—not having as yet found their equilibrium—had only made a pause for the purpose of soon resuming hostilities against each other with renewed vigour. The empress-queen could not brook the loss of Silesia, and she felt this loss the more acutely, inasmuch as she was obliged to undergo the mortification of knowing that the king of Prussia, by adopting a proper course of administration, had been able to double the revenue of that beautiful country. Frederick, on the other hand, was too clear-sighted not to foresee that a third struggle with her was inevitable. Among the other European powers, too, there was a restless spirit at work; they entered into alliances, looked about them—now here, now there—for friends, and increased their strength by land and sea. Europe was at this moment divided by two leading parties: France, Prussia, and Sweden adhered to the one, Austria, England, and Saxony to the other; the rest had not yet come to any conclusion as to which party they should support, but their assistance was eagerly sought by both. Maria Theresa at first cast her eye upon the powerful state of Russia, whose empress, Elizabeth, appeared inclined to hurl back her bold northern neighbour into his former insignificance; and eventually both parties concluded an alliance by means of the grand chancellor of Russia, Bestuschef, who had a personal dislike to the king of Prussia, because the latter refused to gratify his avaricious disposition. In order to induce Russia to take active measures against Prussia, England found it necessary to act upon the grand chancellor with her money, and by this means a war was all but declared already between Russia and Prussia. George II of England more especially desired this, in order that he might by such war be relieved of the anxiety he felt for his principality of Hanover; for as he was already engaged in a maritime war with France, with the view of acquiring new territories in other parts of the world, it was to be expected that France in union with Prussia would forthwith attack his electorate. Maria Theresa, however, on her part, saw this storm preparing in the north of Europe without fear or inquietude, as she nourished strong hopes that it would give her an opportunity of reconquering her Silesian territory.^b

PRUSSIA, ENGLAND, AND THE NEW PROVINCES OF FRIESLAND (1751-1753)

England lost an ally in the fresh conflict with France which loomed, a perpetual menace, on the horizon, while the relations between the English royal family and their near kin of the royal house of Prussia grew more and more

[1748-1751 A.D.]

strained. Besides the personal influence of the monarchs and the unfortunate choice of a British ambassador, there was another circumstance which embittered the relations between the two countries. England, jealous of her uncontested supremacy at sea, claimed the right to confiscate contraband of war in neutral ships. But the question as to what fell under this description was no less difficult to determine then than now. To Prussia the whole subject had been of small importance as long as her maritime trade was confined to the few seaports of the Baltic. But in the course of the War of the Austrian Succession Frederick had gained possession of East Friesland. And as he planted his foot for the first time on the shores of the North Sea he had a vision of the whole maritime trade of north Germany in his hands. To his eager zeal it seemed a simple matter to divert the whole transatlantic traffic into new channels. The English right of search in merchant vessels was therefore extremely annoying to him, the more so as it was exercised harshly and without consideration. In 1748, the last year of the war, two Prussian vessels laden with planks and hemp had been captured. The British officials simply declared these articles contraband of war, and laid an embargo on the ships. Frederick made representations and demanded compensation, but to no purpose. Meanwhile peace was concluded, but the embargo was not taken off. It availed nothing that the king called together a court of arbitration which unanimously affirmed that planks and hemp were not contraband of war. The English government, for its part, referred the matter to a prize court and a special commission. Years passed and they came to no decision, while Frederick continued to make more and more urgent demands for his ships.

Thus matters stood when, in July of 1751, the young king of Prussia paid his first visit to his new province. The welcome which greeted him gave profound offence to George II, who considered himself the rightful heir to the territory of which (as he thought) his nephew had violently deprived him. And now he learned, into the bargain, that the latter was attaching his new subjects to his person by a series of far-reaching enterprises for the public good, and rousing in them a spirit which astonished themselves. One undertaking, in particular, on which Frederick built great hopes was the expansion of Prussian trade with eastern Asia. He declared Emden a free port, and the "Asiatic Trading Company" and the "Bengal Trading Company" came into existence there under his protection. In the following years each of these companies sent out two ships. But they had no luck, and they could not keep the field in face of the rivalry of the Dutch. Moreover, one of the ships had an affray with an English man-of-war in the Channel. The naval officers who searched it discovered and claimed some British subjects among the crew. Despite vigorous protests they were carried off and (in virtue of an Act of Parliament, it was said) pressed into the fleet. Thus on all sides obstacles arose in the way of these new ventures, and the outbreak of the Seven Years' War shortly after put a final end to them. Nothing remained to bear witness of the unfortunate attempt to divert the commerce of Asia to East Friesland except the numerous specimens of old Chinese porcelain which were still to be found there forty years ago. At that time costly red vases with quaint raised gilt figures, precious dinner services of transparent ware, and little cups decorated with intricate and inimitable arabesque, might be seen among the possessions of rich Frisian farmers in the fen land, even in outlying "places." These treasures have now grown extremely rare, and china lovers have to pay exorbitant prices for the few remaining pieces left by collectors and Jew dealers.

It was natural that the East Frieslanders should never forget the brief blossoming time of their commerce and prosperity which followed upon the union with Prussia. For the vigorous life which throbbed through all circles

of society when, in place of a degenerate line of princes and after centuries of internal dissensions, a young and able monarch seized the reins of power, carried everything before it. The inhabitants suddenly felt themselves members of a mighty state, nor was this feeling troubled by the imposition of new and onerous burdens. With a wise caution Frederick refrained from exacting the annual quota of recruits from the new province, foreseeing that such a measure would be regarded with peculiar abhorrence by the "free Frisians." He therefore contented himself with the annual payment of a money contribution.

Nevertheless the impartial historian is bound to confess that the reasons why the tide of wealth did not flow back into the old channels, nor the flourishing times of the Hanseatic League return, lay deeper than either king or people supposed. The gorgeous chambers of the Guildhall at Emden remain as empty as ever, and through the great rooms, which in past centuries were thronged with merchants of every land and clime, flows only the yearly tide of tourists who flock in summer to the health resorts of the North Sea, admiring the curious mediæval weapons and richly inlaid suits of armour so tastefully arranged on the walls. The harbour has been choked with mud, and in the islands of East Friesland curious fences made of monster ribs are all that testifies to the many merchantmen that once put out hence for the northern seas. It is unjust to make the war, which turned Frederick's energies into another direction, solely answerable for this mournful issue. It was not this circumstance alone which brought his masterly projects to such pitiable wreck. And it is peculiarly unjust to reproach the succeeding Hanoverian government because the commercial enterprises of the first period of Prussian rule developed no farther. Both Frederick and the East Frieslanders overestimated the effect which the long-desired harbour was likely to exert from afar upon Prussia. They both overlooked the fact that the existing means of communication were inadequate to ensure a sufficient market for their wares inland. Moreover, ever since the discovery of the ocean route to the East Indies, the two maritime powers, England and Holland, had held almost absolute control over the trade with the East. Hamburg and Bremen had long since monopolised the small traffic of Germany beyond seas. A long time would therefore necessarily have elapsed before the great mercantile houses of the Continent made up their minds to import their wares from other sources or distribute them through other channels. And again, the royal interference with the existing conditions, though the inspiration of a master mind, was too precipitate and too much bound up with the king's personality to produce lasting results. The Hanoverian government, practical and thorough, though systematically deliberate and far less showy, did much more for the real good of East Friesland than the first period of Prussian administration. It turned its attention to immediate needs, and to it the province is indebted for its network of roads, its new Emden ship canal, its railway, the fostering of the trade of Leer and Papenburg, and the revived prosperity of the merchant-service. And the credit of bringing the bog land into cultivation by the system of dikes is solely due to the Hanoverian government.

One of the improvements, however, and that perhaps the most beneficial of all, is unquestionably the work of King Frederick. He was the first to teach the people how wide stretches of fertile land could be recovered from the sea by means of embankments against the floods which had formerly swept the soil away. The many flourishing "swamps" along the shores of the Dollart and the North Sea are speaking memorials of his activity. With the same zeal, though not with the same success, he undertook the cultivation of the extensive areas of marsh land which he had passed on his progress to Aurich. But if in the execution of this project he made many mistakes, who shall take him to task for them? He had before his eyes no examples of marshes profit-

[1752-1753 A.D.]

ably planted, such as we now see in the district of Stade and other parts of East Friesland. For one thing, the lots which he gave to the colonists to cultivate were too small. The proceeds of agriculture in this niggardly soil were not sufficient to maintain a family, and hence the descendants of the unfortunate peasants whom he transported hither from remote provinces form to this day a degenerate proletariat, eking out a miserable subsistence by begging on the highway. But when we read of the stimulus given to improvements in agriculture, home administration, and even domestic life, by Frederick's brief visit, we cannot but marvel at the insight and the indefatigable energy of the man, and at his constant thought for his subjects. Through the medley of official receptions his keen eye noted what was amiss, and the few hours of leisure left him were devoted to the consideration and invention of remedies.

ENGLISH COMPLICATIONS

In England this energy was looked upon with suspicion, and the sudden expansion of the trade of Emden roused envy and apprehension. King George was not alone in his wrath when a province he had intended to win for himself flung itself with enthusiasm into the arms of his nephew; the whole British nation shared his exasperation. Frederick's care for the prosperity of this part of his dominions was interpreted as a link in a long chain of hostile demonstrations against England. The unfortunate affair of the captured ships was still pending, and added to the discord. The communications exchanged between the two cabinets steadily assumed a more acrimonious and insulting tone. Finally, in the year 1752, Frederick determined to bring the matter to an issue. He declared through his agents that it seemed to him that the English courts were maliciously determined to postpone their decision indefinitely, but that he neither could nor would wait any longer, and would attempt to compensate his subjects by other means. After the lapse of three months (April 23rd, 1753) he should cease to pay interest on the Silesian loan, the securities for which were mainly in English hands.

A perfect tempest of indignation broke forth in England. The duke of Newcastle could not have yielded if he would. In a fresh note (April 12th) couched in the mildest terms, Frederick tried in vain to justify the step he had taken. The temper of the London populace rendered a reconciliation impossible. The coercive measure he had used as a threat was actually put into force. Then there arose throughout Great Britain a clamour against the "unjust," "obstinate," and "malicious" king of Prussia. No meanness was too base to be imputed to him. His object was to ruin England; he had a secret understanding with France and with the Jacobite plotters. The appointment of Keith to the Prussian embassy in Paris, the summons of Tyrconnel to Berlin, were evidence enough. In the general excitement it was even thought not unlikely that he might land fifteen thousand men in Scotland to restore the exiled dynasty. The unfortunate Dr. Archibald Cameron, brother of the famous Lochiel, being captured about this time on the lands of the laird of Glenbucket, was taken for a Jacobite emissary of Frederick's, and six years after the rising under Charles Edward this noble-hearted man perished on the gallows amidst the rejoicings of the mob. Caricatures and lampoons of the king of Prussia were circulated in England, and even persons of position and influence gave credence to tales of the most extravagant political projects on the part of Frederick. The idea was very natural and excusable. For it was impossible that his contemporaries should know that a wise moderation in his aims was the king's greatest quality, together with a singular faculty for distinguishing between the near and attainable and the visionary in politics. On


[1753-1756 A.D.]

the contrary, from his earliest performances it seemed not improbable that he might develop into a ruthless and insatiable conqueror, such as Napoleon gradually became. And even the soberest politicians were convinced that in his alliance with France he contemplated the seizure of Hanoverian territory. When, about the same time, a project for the election of a king of the Romans came to nothing, the failure was regarded as a result of Prussian intrigues, and in the summer of 1753 matters had come to such a pass that hardly anyone doubted that there would be a speedy outbreak of hostilities between England and Prussia.

The fact made George II realise all the more keenly the necessity of knitting closer the ancient alliance with Austria. But, to his surprise and disappointment, he found that the overtures of his ambassador were received with increasing coolness at the court of Vienna. Maria Theresa did not even seem particularly interested in securing the election of her own son as king of the Romans. King George was clearly more "imperial" than the empress and mother herself. This indifference on the part of his "natural" ally stirred the ready choler of the British monarch. He felt his consequence as an elector and his greatness as king of England deeply wounded. To those about him he let fall angry words concerning this "vagabond stranger whom he had helped to the throne."¹

Meantime Frederick, taking quick advantage of the situation, formed and put into immediate execution a plan no less unexpected than extraordinary. Abandoning the lukewarm aid of France, which lay, as it were, in a state of political lethargy, and had afforded him but very trifling assistance in his two Silesian wars, he suddenly turned to England, now so much increasing in power and enterprising boldness, and claimed her alliance; and the English nation acceded to his proposal. Both nations needed this reciprocal aid against other adversaries; and, at the same time, required the confidence of each other in order that England might be at ease with regard to Hanover. Hence the alliance between England and Prussia, which based its security in the sympathy of both nations, might be truly termed a natural alliance, and was founded upon firmer grounds than those of mere state policy.

By this single turn the relations which had hitherto existed between the different states of Europe were altogether changed. Prussia had declared herself independent of France, and England of Austria; and through a singular capricious sport of fortune, France and Austria, who had been enemies for three hundred years, now found themselves, to their own astonishment, placed in close proximity, and called upon to give each other their hands; and all the rules of political calculation hitherto held as immutable were at one blow demolished. Luckily for Austria, she possessed in her prime minister, Prince Kaunitz, and in the empress Maria Theresa herself, two whose power of mind enabled them at once to perceive and avail themselves of the altered position of affairs, and who did not suffer themselves to be held in check by ancient custom. They sought for an alliance with France, and obtained it. On the 1st of May, 1756, the Treaty of Versailles was drawn up, after that between England and Prussia had been already concluded at Westminster in the month of January of the same year.²



CHAPTER IV

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

[1756-1763 A.D.]

To me it appears evident that a private person ought to be scrupulously tenacious of his promise, though he should have made it inconsiderately. If he is injured he can have recourse to the protection of laws, and, be the issue what it may, an individual only suffers. But where is the tribunal that can redress a monarch's wrongs, should another monarch forfeit his engagement? The word of a sovereign may draw down calamities on nations. Must the people perish or must the monarch infringe a treaty? And where is the man weak enough to hesitate a moment concerning his answer?—FREDERICK II.¹

THE union of the house of Austria and Bourbon, so lately formed, soon created a suspicion that the Treaty of London could not maintain the tranquillity of Germany. Peace might be said to be suspended only by a hair; some pretext was but wanting; and, when that is the sole thing necessary, war is as if declared. It soon appeared inevitable; for information was obtained that the politicians had all been deceived in their dependence on Russia. That power, over which the intrigues of the Austrian ministers prevailed, broke with England because of the alliance which the king of Great Britain had concluded with the king of Prussia. Count Bestüscheff for a moment remained undecided between his passion for English guineas and his hatred toward the king; but hatred was victorious. The empress Elizabeth, an enemy to the French nation after the last embassy of the marquis de la Chetardie, was better pleased to league with that nation than to preserve the least alliance with a power which had become connected with Russia. Active in every court of Europe, the

court of Vienna profited by the passions of sovereigns and their ministers, to attract them to itself, and govern them according to the purpose proposed.

During these sudden and unexpected changes of system the English ships no longer kept any measures with those of France. The vexations and infractions they committed enforced the king of France, in his own despite, to declare war. The French ostentatiously announced that they were preparing to make a descent on England. They lined the coasts of Brittany and Normandy with troops, built flat-bottomed boats for their transportation, and assembled some ships of war at Brest. These appearances terrified the English, and there were moments during which this nation, which has the character of so much wisdom, imagined its destruction near. To remove these fears, King George had recourse to Hanoverian and Hessian troops, that were brought into England.

The first thing necessary, at the commencement of the war, was to deprive the Saxons of the means of making themselves parties in it and of disturbing Prussia. The electorate of Saxony must be traversed to carry the war into Bohemia. If Saxony were not conquered, an enemy would be left behind; who, depriving the Prussians of the free navigation of the Elbe, would oblige them to quit Bohemia, whenever the king of Poland should please.¹

In the autumn of 1756, therefore, Frederick, unexpectedly and without previously declaring war, invaded Saxony, of which he speedily took possession, and shut up the little Saxon army, thus taken unawares, on the Elbe at Pirna. A corps of Austrians, who were also equally unprepared to take the field, hastened, under the command of Browne, to their relief, but were, on the 1st of October, defeated at Lobositz, and the fourteen thousand Saxons under Rutowsky at Pirna were in consequence compelled to lay down their arms, the want to which they were reduced by the failure of their supplies having already driven them to the necessity of eating hair-powder mixed with gunpowder.²

THE DEFEAT OF THE SAXONS AT PIRNA (1756 A.D.)

Whilst the chill October rain descended without intermission upon the wretched Saxon soldiers, their leader sat warm and dry in the impregnable fortress of Königstein. Through the floods that poured across the window-panes of the commandant's quarters he saw the long columns of his battalions cross the bridge and struggle painfully up the slippery footpath which led from the hamlet of Halbestadt to Ebenheit, above the precipitous river bank; he saw the exhausted horses toiling vainly to draw the light guns up to the plateau, the cavalry crowding in the narrow space between the declivity and the stream till their turn came to defile.

And when he turned his eyes from the dreadful throng, the hopeless confusion by the river, towards the spot whence, in fair weather, the domes and towers of his capital could be seen gleaming, he saw, to his dismay, the Prussian hussars already on the table-land where his own camp had stood during the past weeks. He saw the bold horsemen climb down the pass by which his own troops had just come, he saw his own men in terror cut the cables of the bridge and let it drift down-stream. Nor did the darkness draw a merciful veil over the mournful scenes at his feet. His camp had no rest. Far into the night he could not choose but hear, in angry grief, the shouts of the triumphant enemy, busy over the plunder of the abandoned tents and baggage wagons, and searching his own late headquarters at Struppen for spoil. But one ray of hope was still left to the unhappy elector. When the day dawned he fancied that he should see his army cut its way through the ranks of the enemy.

[1756 A.D.]

A message from Field-Marshal Rutowsky dashed this hopeful prognostication. He reported that his men were utterly exhausted and that the last provisions were gone. He had succeeded, though with difficulty, in forming the bulk of the infantry into three or four divisions on the plateau of Ebenheit, but half of the artillery had stuck fast in the river. The cavalry, too, was incapable of reaching the top. To add to these misfortunes, he had no news from Browne; the messenger who had undertaken, for a large sum of money, to convey a message to him by secret paths through the forest had in all likelihood been taken prisoner, and it was vain to count on the co-operation of the Austrians. Under these circumstances he was of opinion that nothing but useless bloodshed could result from an attempt to storm the Prussian positions alone.

This was too much even for the feeble Augustus III. His desperate plight did not, it is true, inspire him with the energy which of old hurled the last Palæologus out of the gorgeous halls of the palace of the Cæsars and from the luxury of an oriental despot, to die unrecognised among his warriors in the breach. He did not embrace the manly resolution of inspiring his soldiers by his presence in person, and of perishing with them if needs must be, but he sent strict orders to his field-marshal to cut his way out at all hazards.

It was two o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the 14th of October, when he despatched these orders. At the same time he sent down to the river one hundred and fifty horses from his own stable, plentifully fed with oats and hay, while the beasts in the camp were dying of starvation. These powerful animals were meant to draw the guns up the slope, but even their exertions were of no avail. The grey dawn was rising as they splashed and swam across the river. At the same time (about seven in the morning) Rutowsky received the message from Browne which he had almost ceased to look for. It had been given to the messenger at ten o'clock on the previous evening, but he had taken the whole of the stormy October night in getting back uncaught from Lichtenhain. The contents of the paper destroyed the last hope. The Austrian general wrote that since Tuesday he had been waiting in vain for the Saxon signal guns, and had therefore concluded that the enterprise had failed. His own position was one of extreme peril, as the Prussians were opposed to him in greatly superior numbers. The utmost he could do was to wait till nine o'clock Thursday morning; if then he had no news he must withdraw.

The hour he named was almost past already. To be ready to attack by that time was impossible, more especially as the Prussian force on the Lilienstein had been increased to eleven battalions, with twenty-two guns. Rutowsky sent again to the elector and begged permission to capitulate, and again he received an answer in the negative. Then the cannon of Königstein began to thunder, to stay the Austrians if possible; but wind and weather were unpropitious, and no sound of them reached Browne. He marched away as he had said he should. Rutowsky listened in vain for the rattle of musketry announcing the Austrian attack. Silence was over all.

That was the end. He summoned his generals to a council of war, and in one of the little huts of the hamlet of Ebenheit a brief consultation took place. All were agreed that escape was impossible. To lead the soldiers as they were, exhausted by unprecedented exertions and chilled by seventy-two hours of rain, against the enemy's entrenchments, was obviously to sacrifice them to no purpose. They had eaten nothing since the day before; for months they had been living on meagre rations. The ammunition was spoiled by the wet. There was nothing to be done but capitulate. Now at last Augustus III bowed to the inevitable, and a preliminary convention with General Winterfield, who was in command on the right bank of the Elbe, procured the first of necessaries, bread, for the miserable invested army.

The Capitulation

Next day (Friday, October 15th) Count Rntowsky went over to Struppen to arrange the details of the surrender with King Frederick, who had hastened thither from Bohemia. He found the monarch, to whom he submitted a draft of the terms of capitulation, in the worst of tempers. The unexpected delay which the obstinate resistance of the Saxons had imposed upon his military operations had embittered him. He would hear of no terms and demanded an unconditional surrender. In vain did Rutowsky try to save at least the Polish body-guard of the king and the Household Grenadiers from the general dissolution that menaced the army. Nay, even the status of prisoners of war was not assured to them in plain terms. On the contrary, Frederick with his own hand wrote on the margin of the document: "If the king will give them to me they need not become prisoners of war." Nor was it possible to obtain a promise that no one should be forced to serve Prussia. Arms, cannon, tents, and all military stores naturally fell to the victors. The small concession that officers might retain their swords and that the drums, flags, and standards should be placed in safe keeping at Königstein was obtained with difficulty. In a postscript to the deed of capitulation Rntowsky stated that he was empowered to let the troops lay down their arms, but not to absolve them from their oath. The elector, too, refused to yield this last point. But they could not hinder the king of Prussia from dealing as he pleased with the unfortunate soldiery. And Frederick feared that such a large number of prisoners of war, whom he could hardly expect to exchange, would be a great anxiety to him personally and an enormous drain on his military resources. These reasons impelled him to a course of conduct unprecedented in history and opposed to every law of civilised nations.

No one who has not experienced it can form any conception of the bitterness of feeling which such a dire catastrophe stirs in the breast of the soldier. To his last hour he is haunted by the painful memory of the fatal day that witnessed the destruction of the army to which he had devoted his life's service and dissolved forever more the bonds of comradeship which had grown dear to him; and every year that goes by makes the thought of the past more grievous. In proportion as the darker features and the little drawbacks of the old state of things recede from memory, the advantages of what is now lost to him shine forth more brightly. But the capitulation which annihilated the Saxon army took place under circumstances so peculiarly galling that they left a sting even to succeeding generations. It dated its fame from the earliest days of standing armies; it had fought with distinction against the terrible Charles XII, and even against its present opponent. Its present evil case was not the fault of its leaders, but of the wrong-headed policy of its master and (to a still greater extent) of his notorious minister, Brühl. And in spite of all, the soldiers had borne the disasters of the last weeks with exemplary discipline and unmurmuring subordination.

And for their reward they were spared none of the humiliating formalities which an ancient and barbarous custom imposes on the vanquished. The victors could not deny themselves the pleasure of seeing the captured army march past them on Sunday, the 17th of October. On that march there were only about twelve thousand left to give up their weapons. It is easier to imagine than to describe the sensations with which the disarmed warriors must have gone down the Elbe by the craggy valley (now the resort of thousands of tourists) which leads from Waltersdorf to Niederrathen. At the point where now the motley swarm of visitors to the *Bastei* flows to and fro through the summer weather, they found the bridge which was to have led them to

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liberty only a few days before; the Prussians had fished up the pontoons, and now it bore them not to prison but to a worse fate.

At Oberrathen, now a station on the Bohemian line, the officers and men were separated. Of the former, five hundred and sixty-eight were let go on giving their parole not to fight against Prussia; only fifty-three took service with Frederick. The non-commissioned officers and the rank and file were handed over to Prussian superiors. The king seems to have had no great opinion of the binding quality of the oath which still pledged them to the service of their old master. But, with an odd self-contradictoriness, when none of them would come over to him of their own free will, he obliged them to swear a new oath to him *en masse*. Then he formed them into separate divisions, to be transmuted into Prussian troops within the boundaries of the Prussian kingdom. Halle, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Frankfort, etc., were the stations assigned to them. Ludwig of Dessau, the Iron Prince, was charged with the troublesome task of supervising the transformation. But in spite of dismal experiences their loyalty to their hereditary prince proved stronger than the harshest coercion and the fear of punishment. Some actually deserted on the first march, and the rest were so inspirited by their example that hardly a third of the men reached their destination. They arrived as mere skeleton regiments, and to swell their ranks Frederick imposed a levy of twelve thousand recruits upon unhappy Saxony!

King Augustus, the princes Xavier and Charles, Brühl the minister, and a numerous suite of five hundred persons started on their journey to Warsaw on the 20th of October. Never again was the king to see Dresden, where the queen and the electoral prince had been left; he died in the Polish capital in the last year of the war.

The Saxon drama was at an end. In seven weeks Frederick had made himself master of that rich country. He now exploited its resources ruthlessly for his war, just as he had endeavoured to reinforce his army with its sons. His officials treated the people with extreme harshness; and Frederick wreaked on the palaces and gardens of Brühl, the minister, the personal grudge which he bore that statesman. To this day some of these properties bear traces of the ignoble vengeance which the Prussian monarch took in his own person upon his political adversary.

The king of Prussia was far less concerned about the justice than about the utility of his dealings with Saxony. To him the advantages resulting from the occupation of the country seemed greatly to outweigh the disadvantages that might ensue from leaving it in an attitude of doubtful neutrality in his rear. But he now realised with solicitude that his personal animosity had led his political sagacity astray. The resistance of Saxony had cheated him of six precious weeks. He had been unable to profit by the opportunity of winning great successes in Bohemia while the Austrians were still unprepared. The advanced season now put a stop to all military operations. Snowy and tempestuous weather set in unusually early; it was impossible to keep the troops under canvas. At the end of October, therefore, the Prussian army at Lobositz started on the march back to Saxony, and Field-Marshal Schwerin, who had pressed forward from Silesia as far as Königgrätz, retreated across the frontier. The king himself remained at Gross-Sedlitz till the 14th of November, and then removed his headquarters to Dresden.^c

THE BATTLE OF PRAGUE (1757 A.D.)

The preparations made for the ensuing campaign presented to the eyes of Frederick an aspect in prospective affairs of a character anything but encouraging. The great powers of Europe, infuriated by the stand he made, had

now become more firmly united than ever in their determination to destroy him, and combined together with all their armies to overwhelm him. Austria came forth with all the troops, together with all the wealth and resources furnished by her extensive territories; Russia contributed no fewer than 100,000 men; France supplied even a greater number, Sweden came forward with 20,000 men; whilst the Germanic Empire generally, regarding the invasion of Saxony by Frederick as a violation of the peace of the country, offered to the imperial court an additional aid of 60,000 men. Thus a combined army of at least 500,000 men stood under arms ready to march against the king of Prussia; whilst he, on the other hand, could oppose to this mighty and overwhelming force but 200,000 men, collected only at the sacrifice of every resource at his command. As allies he possessed only England, the landgraf of Hesse, and the dukes of Brunswick and Gotha, and he was obliged to leave them alone to carry on the war with France; with respect to the other powers, he hoped to make up for his inferior force by the ability of his great generals and by doubling his strength by rapid marches, thus swiftly passing with the same army from one point to another, to be enabled to fight his enemies one after the other. Thence, he resolved to direct his first and principal effort against Austria, whom he regarded as his chief enemy, whilst in the mean-time he left behind 14,000 men under the command of his old field-marshal Lehwald, for the defence of Prussia itself against the attack of the Russians, leaving only 4,000 men for the protection of Berlin against the Swedes; fortunately, however, for Prussia, the Swedish portion of the allies took no very serious share in the war.

Maria Theresa, influenced by an extraordinary predilection for her husband's brother, Prince Charles of Lorraine, appointed him, although he had already been twice beaten by Frederick, commander-in-chief of the imperial army; whilst under his orders she placed the talented and experienced soldier, General Browne. This arrangement proved of great service to the king. Browne, with his usual prudence and forethought, advised Prince Charles to anticipate the quick movements of the Prussians in the attack they contemplated, and penetrating into Saxony and Silesia, thus remove the seat of war from the hereditary states of Austria; Charles of Lorraine, however, although on other occasions too precipitate, resolved in this case to be the very opposite, preferring to adopt the defensive, and was anxious to wait until he had drawn around him all the forces he could collect. This was exactly what Frederick most anxiously desired, and he contrived to strengthen the prince in the belief that he himself, overmatched by so many powerful enemies, thought it most prudent to assume the defensive likewise. Suddenly, however, and whilst the Austrians imagined themselves in perfect security, the Prussians broke up; dividing themselves into four divisions, they poured forth in rapid marches across the mountains into Bohemia, and, like so many mighty and impetuous mountain rivers, swept all before them, taking possession of all the supplies of the imperials, which served to furnish them with provisions during several months, and reunited their forces at a certain hour on the morning of the 6th of May, at the appointed quarters in the vicinity of Prague.

The prince of Lorraine, hastily collecting together all his troops, had now taken a strong, intrenched position in the mountains, near Prague, where he considered himself secured against every attack. Frederick, however, to whom every hour which delayed the execution of the final blow appeared lost, resolved to give battle at once now that the enemy was within sight, and in this determination he was cordially seconded by his favourite officer, General Winterfeld, a bold and undaunted warrior. Accordingly the latter received orders to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and he reported that their right

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wing might be easily attacked, as in front of it were several green meadows which would facilitate the advance of the troops. But what he thought to be meadows were nothing but deep dried-up ponds, with slimy bottoms, which had been sown with oats, and after the harvest were again to serve as fish ponds. This error served ultimately to produce much injury to the Prussians in their attack. The venerable field-marshal Schwerin, who had arrived at headquarters only that morning with his fatigued troops, and was altogether unacquainted with the spot chosen for the scene of action, suggested that they should postpone operations until the following day; but the king, whose impetuosity was not to be restrained, and who, having now completely formed in his mind the plan of a glorious battle, was impatient to put it into execution, would not listen for a moment to any further delay. Upon this the old warrior, who, in his seventy-third year, still retained a great portion of his youthful fire, exclaimed, as he pressed his hat over his eyes, "Well, then, if the battle shall and must be fought this day, I will attack the enemy there on the spot where I see him!"

The battle commenced only at ten o'clock in the morning, so much time having been taken up in making the necessary preparations, as the ground turned out to be generally swampy and hilly. As the Prussians worked their way through and approached the enemy, they were received with a terrific cannonade; the carnage was dreadful, and whole ranks were levelled with the ground; indeed, it seemed impossible for human courage to hold out against such tremendously destructive odds. Each attack made was unsuccessful, and the ranks of the Prussians began to waver. At this moment the brave old marshal, Schwerin, seized an ensign, and calling upon his troops to follow him rushed into the thickest of the fire, where, pierced with four balls, the veteran warrior fell and died the death of a hero. General Manteufel released the gory standard from the firm grasp of the dead veteran and led on the troops, now burning with revenge at the loss of their brave commander. The king's brother, Prince Henry, sprang from his horse, and led on his men against a battery, which he captured; and Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick attacked and overthrew with the greatest courage the left wing of the Austrians, pursuing the enemy from hill to hill, and captured seven intrenchments.

Nevertheless, the victory remained undecided as long as Field-Marshal Browne was able, by his influence and command, to maintain order among the ranks of the Austrians; at length, however, he fell, mortally wounded, and with his fall vanished all fortune from the Austrian side. King Frederick, who with his keen eye surveyed the field of battle, quickly perceived that the enemy had begun to give way; seeing a large gap in the centre of their ranks, he at once advanced, with some of his chosen troops, and, dashing into it, completely destroyed all communication between them, putting them entirely to rout. Thus the victory was gained; the Austrians fled in every direction, the greater portion of the fugitives throwing themselves into Prague, and the rest hastening to join Marshal Daun, who was posted in Küttenberg with an army of reserves.

Dearly, however, was this victory purchased! Twelve thousand five hundred Prussians lay dead or wounded on the battle-field, and among them was included one precious corpse—that of Field-Marshal Schwerin; but the remembrance of his heroic death, and the blood-stained flag he bore in his nervous grasp, were regarded by the Prussian army as the most sacred legacy, serving them as a continual incitement to follow in the same path of glory. The Austrians, likewise, suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Field-Marshal Browne; he had grown grey in the wars of his country, and the experience he had gained rendered him the most distinguished general of his day.

The struggle in Bohemia was by no means decided by this battle, although

the actual position of the parties was such that the campaign bade fair to terminate gloriously in favour of Frederick; for he now kept the prince of Lorraine a prisoner in Prague, together with forty-six thousand men, without any resources left to enable them to hold out for any length of time. Their only hopes of relief rested in Field-Marshal Daun, who was then in the immediate vicinity with a considerable body of troops; but if he should be defeated by the king, the army hemmed in within the walls of Prague must be lost, the campaign itself won in the most glorious manner by the Prussians, and peace obtained, perhaps, already in the second year of the war; for Frederick desired nothing more than what he obtained at the end of the war—the retention of Silesia. Fate, however, had not decreed that he should obtain this object so easily, and it was decided that his career of success should receive a check, whilst his spirit was doomed to undergo bitter and painful trials.

THE BATTLE OF KOLIN (1757 A.D.)

He determined not to wait for the attack of Daun, but to anticipate it; and after he had remained five weeks before Prague he withdrew, with twelve thousand men, in order to join Prince Bevern, who had kept the army of Daun in observation, which army Frederick forthwith attacked, near Kolin, on the 18th of June. The plan of the order of battle adopted by the king was excellent; and had it been followed out entirely it would have given him the victory. Frederick decided upon this occasion to employ the same order of battle as that used in ancient times by Epaminondas, by which he overcame the invincible Spartans; this was termed the oblique line of battle. By this plan the weaker force, by promptitude of action, was enabled to operate with advantage over a superior body. If the general in command has recourse to such a bold manœuvre it is very seldom that he fails, but to ensure victory he must be certain of the perfect co-operation of his army, so that by the celerity and exactitude of its movements the enemy may be completely deceived and vanquished before he has even had time to perceive the plan of attack by which it has been accomplished.

Such was the manœuvre practised by the Prussians at Kolin, and the first onset made by generals Zieten and Hulsén upon the right wing of the Austrians put them entirely to rout. The centre and the other wing of the Prussian army had now only to follow it up forthwith, by falling upon the enemy's flank, battalion after battalion in succession, and thus complete its entire annihilation. Whilst, however, everything was thus operating in the right direction, the king himself, as if the usual clearness of his mind became suddenly clouded in impenetrable gloom, gave orders for the rest of the army to make a halt! In truth, throughout the whole of this important day, Frederick presented in his own person and manner something so unaccountably gloomy and repulsive that it rendered him totally incapable of attending to the ideas and observations suggested by those around him; he rejected everything they advised, and his sinister look, together with his bitter remarks, made them shun his presence.

When, at the most important and decisive moment, Prince Maurice of Dessau ventured to represent to the monarch the serious consequences that must result from the change he had commanded to take place in the plan of the order of battle, and reiterated his observations and arguments in the most urgent manner possible, Frederick rode up close to his side, and with uplifted sword demanded, in a loud and threatening tone of voice, whether he would or would not obey orders. The prince at once desisted and withdrew; but from that moment the fate of the day was decided. Through the ill-timed halt thus made the Prussian lines found themselves right in front of the position



THE BATTLE OF KOLIN, JUNE 18TH, 1757

(From the painting by Von Blaas, at Vienna)

[1757 A.D.]

held by the Austrians, which position they had strongly intrenched and made completely insurmountable; and when they made an attempt to take it by assault, the regiments were swept away one after the other by the destructive fire of the Austrian artillery. No exertion, no desperate effort, could now obtain the victory; fortune had changed sides. General Daun, already despairing of success at the commencement of the battle, had marked down with a pencil the order to sound a retreat, when, just at that moment, the colonel of a Saxon regiment of cavalry having perceived that the ranks of the Prussians changed their order of battle, resolved to delay execution of orders, and placed the official paper in his pocket. The Austrians now renewed their attack, and the Saxon regiments of horse were more especially distinguished for the desperate charges they made, as if determined to revenge themselves for the injuries endured by their country. In order that all might not be sacrificed, orders were issued to make a retreat, and Daun, too well pleased to gain this, his first victory, over Frederick the Great, did not follow in pursuit. The Prussians lost on this day 14,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and 45 pieces of artillery. This formed nearly the moiety of the Prussian army, for in this battle 32,000 Prussians had fought against 60,000 Austrians.^a

FREDERICK AFTER PRAGUE AND KOLIN

An interesting account of the battles of Prague and Kolin is given by Sir Andrew Mitchell who was ambassador from England and was in Frederick's camp. His letters are worth quoting in some detail because of the interesting light thrown upon the personality of Frederick. Whether as victor or as vanquished, he appears an heroic figure.^a

On the 6th of May, the day of the battle of Prague, Mitchell writes: "The whole of the Prussian army is in tears for the loss of Marshal Schwerin, one of the greatest officers this or perhaps any other country has produced, and one of the best of men."

"I had the honour" (continues Mitchell on the 10th) "to congratulate the king. He appeared in high spirits, but moderate at the same time, in the midst of his great successes. He said his brother Henry did extremely well on the right—that to him the success was owing there; that Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick also, who was on the left, went afterwards and flanked the Austrians, while they were engaged at our right; that Prince Frank (?) of Brunswick had greatly distinguished himself, and that he would make a great officer. The prince of Würtemberg also distinguished himself. In conversation, the king gave the preference to Prince Charles of Lorraine as a general, before Marshal Browne. At Friedberg, he said, Prince Charles did ill, but his disposition at Torr was admirable, though his orders were not obeyed. Prince Charles did not approve the disposition of Browne, and told him he would be flanked, which actually happened."

In another despatch of the 11th of May, Mitchell repeats his praise of the king's moderation: "The king appears unflushed with victory, and moderate in the midst of success. He highly commended to me the behaviour and conduct of Prince Henry, his brother, in the late battle, adding, 'I would say more if he were not my brother.' He likewise said that the princes Ferdinand and Francis of Brunswick had greatly distinguished themselves; and everybody is full of the praises of Lieutenant-General Zieten."

"The number of the wounded is very considerable on both sides, and soon after the battle, as there was a scarcity of surgeons and wagons, the king of Prussia sent to Prague, to desire they would send surgeons and wagons for the relief of the Austrian wounded, which was refused. So they remained several days on the field of battle without dressings; but they have since been brought

to this side of the river, and are treated in the same manner as the Prussian soldiers are."

After receipt of the despatches relative to the battle of Prague, Lord Holderness writes: "The admiration we already had for his Prussian majesty is raised to the highest pitch. Men, women, and children are singing his praises. The most frantic marks of joy appear in the streets."

Mere admiration, however, did not help the king out of his difficulties. He therefore said to Mitchell: "I see I have nothing to expect from England. The English are no longer the same people. Your want of union and steadiness has dissipated the natural strength of your nation, and, if the same conduct is continued, England will no longer be considered of that great importance in Europe."

Six days after these expressions (18th of June) the battle of Kolin was lost. "The morning after the battle," Mitchell writes, "the Prussian army retired to Nimburg, in perfect good order, with their baggage and artillery, having left behind them only some few cannon whose carriages had been damaged in the action. It is the unanimous opinion of all the officers I have talked with that, had the cavalry done their duty, victory was certain."

In a second letter of the same day he says: "The desire of the king to give immediate succours in lower Silesia, his impetuosity of temper, and, above all, the contempt he has conceived for the enemy, have been the causes of this defeat. He might have had more infantry with him, and there was no necessity to attack the enemy so posted."

On the 29th of June, Mitchell continues: "On Monday the 27th, the king of Prussia arrived at Leitmeritz with fourteen battalions; so we have here an army of fifty battalions and seventy-five squadrons, all in perfect good order and in great spirits. When the king rode along the front of the camp, the soldiers of themselves turned out of their tents, and said, 'Give us but an opportunity, we will revenge what has happened.' An Austrian officer said, 'We have repulsed the attack, but have not gained the battle.' The king bears his misfortune greatly, though it is the first of the kind he has ever met with. Since his arrival here he was pleased to describe to me the whole action of the 18th. He says the posts the Austrians occupied were indeed too strong, but he does not think them stronger than those he drove them from in the battle of Prague. He had too few infantry, and it was not the enemies' soldiers, but their artillery (upwards of two hundred and fifty cannon), well posted, that made his men retire.

"He imputes the loss of this battle to the ardour of his soldiers, who attacked the enemy in front, contrary to his orders; for by the disposition he had made his left wing only was to have attacked the right of the Austrians in flank. This they did with great success, took several batteries, advanced two hundred paces beyond them, and, having gained the flank of the enemy, put them in great confusion. From this right wing he had intended to draw troops to support the attack on the left, if there should be occasion; and by remaining in the position he had placed it in, the left of the enemy would have been kept in respect, and could not have acted. But the good effects of this disposition were entirely defeated by the too great ardour of his soldiers towards the centre, who, unhappily seeing the progress the left wing was making, and eager to share in the victory which they began to think certain, attacked first a village, which lay a little to the centre of the Austrian army, which they took, and then the whole Prussian wing engaged, and was by that means exposed to the dreadful fire of the Austrian battery and lines, whose artillery were all charged with cartridge shot.

"The cause of these misfortunes is chiefly owing to the great success the king of Prussia's army has had in eight successive battles against the

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Austrians, and particularly at the victory of Prague, which made his Prussian majesty sanguine that he could force them from the most advantageous position, and, indeed, one must be more than man to be so absolutely free from presumption after such a series of successes. I am informed that the king, unaccustomed to disappointment, was a good deal dejected after the battle. He has now recovered his spirits, and applies himself as usual to business. I had yesterday a very long conversation with him. He talks very reasonably and with great coolness upon the unhappy event. He sees, in the full extent, what may be the consequences to him, to his family, and to all Europe; but he fears them not, and has taken his party. He thinks another battle lost must end in his ruin, and therefore will be cautious of venturing; but he will not lose a favourable opportunity. What chiefly distresses him is the number of his enemies, and the attacks they are threatening in the different parts of his very extended dominions.

"The king said, 'I will now speak to you as a private man. You know my aversion to all subsidies—that I ever refuse them. I thought, and I think still, it is too mean a footing for me to put myself upon. Considering the great progress of my enemies, I wish, however, to know whether I may depend upon assistance, and how far, on the loss of my revenues. I have still good hopes to be able to do without any pecuniary assistance; and I give you my word that nothing but absolute and irresistible necessity shall make me be any burden to my allies; and the kinder their dispositions are, I will be the more cautious of abusing them.' For nine months together," adds Mitchell, "in consequence of the internal dissension of England, the king has been answered with fair words. But in the situation his affairs are now in, there is no time to be lost; if England will not endeavour to save him, he must save himself as he can."

THE DEATH OF SOPHIE DOROTHEA

On the 28th of June, ten days after the battle of Kolin, died Sophie Dorothea, the mother of King Frederick. Mitchell speaks in several despatches of Frederick's unfeigned and profound sorrow.

"The king" (he writes on the 2nd of July) "has seen nobody since he has received this news, and I hear he is deeply afflicted. His grief, I am sure, is sincere; for never did any man give stronger marks of duty and affection than he has done on every occasion to his mother; and no mother ever deserved better of all her children than she did. Yesterday," he continues on the 4th of July, "the king sent for me, which was the first time he had seen anybody since he received the news of the death of his mother. I had the honour to remain with him some hours in his closet: I must own to your lordship I was most sincerely affected to see him indulging his grief, and giving way to the warmest filial affections by recalling to mind the many obligations he had to his late mother, and repeating to me her sufferings, and the manner in which she bore them, the good she did to everybody, and the comfort he had to have contributed to make the latter part of her life easy and agreeable.

"The king was pleased to tell me a great deal of the private history of his family, and the manner in which he had been educated: owning, at the same time, the loss he felt for the want of proper education; blaming his father, but with great candour and gentleness, and acknowledging that in his youth he had been *étourdi*, and deserved his father's indignation, which, however, the late king, from the impetuosity of his temper, had carried too far. He told me that, by his mother's persuasion and that of his sister of Bayreuth, he had given a writing, under his hand, declaring he never would marry any other person than the princess Emilia of England; that this was very wrong

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and had provoked his father. He said he could not excuse it, but from his youth and want of experience. That this promise unhappily was discovered by the late Queen Caroline, to whom it was intrusted, having shown or spoken of it to the late General Diemar. He had betrayed the secret to Seckendorf, who told it to the king of Prussia. Upon this discovery, and his scheme of making his escape, his misfortunes followed.

"He told me, with regard to making his escape, that he had long been unhappy, and hardly used by his father. But what made him resolve upon it was that one day his father struck him, and pulled him by the hair, and in this dishevelled condition he was obliged to pass the parade; that, from that moment, he was resolved, cost what it might, to venture it; that during his imprisonment at Küstrin he had been treated in the harshest manner, and brought to the window to see Katte beheaded, and that he had fainted away; that ——¹ might have made his escape and saved himself, the Danish minister having given him notice; but he loitered, he believed, on account of some girl he was fond of.

"The king said the happiest years of his life were those he spent at ——,² a house he had given to his brother, Prince Henry. There he retired after his imprisonment, and remained till the death of the late king. His chief amusement was study, and making up for the want of education by reading, making extracts, and conversing with sensible people and men of taste. The king talked much of his obligation to the queen his mother, and of his affection for his sister, the princess of Bayreuth, with whom he had been bred. He observed that the harmony which had been maintained in his family was greatly owing to the education they had had, which, though imperfect and defective in many things, was good in this: that all the children had been brought up, not as princes, but as the children of private persons."^f

FREDERICK ASSAILED ON ALL SIDES

What a change of fortune was this to Frederick! After having been on the point of capturing an entire army in the very capital of the country, and thus extinguishing, at the first moment of its commencement, and in the short space of eight months, the most dreadful war, he found himself forced to raise the siege of Prague, and abandon Bohemia altogether. The allies of Austria, after this unexpected victory, resumed operations with greater activity than ever. The Russians invaded the kingdom of Prussia, the Swedes pursued their preparations more vigorously, and two French armies crossed the Rhine in order to attack the territories of Hesse and Hanover, and thence to march against the hereditary states of Prussia.

One of these armies, under the command of Prince Soubise, advanced towards Thuringia, in order to form a junction with the imperial forces under the orders of the prince of Saxe Hildburghausen; whilst Marshal d'Estrées, who commanded the leading French army, on entering Hanover, fought and beat the duke of Cumberland at the head of the Anglo-Germanic troops, on the 26th of July, near Hastenbeck, on the Weser. This defeat was produced through the inexperience of the English general; for his army, although limited in force, had, nevertheless, obtained considerable advantages through the courage and good generalship of the hereditary prince of Brunswick, and had forced the French general to sound a retreat, when the duke, to the no little surprise and indignation of everyone, abandoned the field of battle, nor halted in his shameful retreat until he reached the Elbe near Stade. Nay, to complete

[¹ The space for the name is left blank in the MS., but M. von Raumer thinks it may be Katte.]

² Without doubt, Rheinsberg.

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the disgrace, he was forced shortly afterwards to conclude at Closter Seven, on the 9th of September, a convention by which he engaged to disband his troops, and give up to the French Hanover, Hesse, the duchy of Brunswick, and the whole of the country situated between the Weser and the Rhine.

The duke of Richelieu, who succeeded D'Estrées in the command of the French troops, drained the country by every possible means. The bad reputation of the French army contributed not a little to gain over the hearts of the majority of the people throughout Germany in favour of the cause of Frederick. Indeed, it was almost inconceivable with what joy the people generally received the news of the victories he gained, although perhaps at the same moment their own princes, as members of the imperial states, were in arms against him. But much of this feeling was produced, likewise, through beholding how Frederick, with the aid only of his own Prussians, had to contend against hordes of barbarians from the east, as well as the hated and most formidable enemy from the west; whilst in the interior he had to face the Austrian armies composed of soldiers all differing in language, customs, and manners, but all equally eager after pillage, including Hungarians, Croatsians, and pandours. Had Frederick carried on the war merely against the Austrians and other Germans, true patriots would only have deplored the blindness of the hostile parties in thus contending against each other when they ought, on the contrary, to have sheathed the sword and held out to each other the hand of fraternal peace and friendship. The north of Germany was more especially attached to Frederick, ranking itself on the side of his own people, and participating in their joys and sorrows; for as that was the seat of war against the French, the cause of Frederick was regarded as that of Germany.

The convention of Closter Seven paved the way for the French as far as the Elbe and Magdeburg itself; and their second army, now united with the imperial troops, was already in Thuringia, and made preparations for depriving the Prussians of the whole of Saxony, whence the latter received their stores and supplies of provisions.

THE BATTLE OF GROSS JÄGERNDORF (AUGUST 30TH, 1757)

This was not the only side by which Frederick was hard pressed. The Swedes spread themselves throughout the whole of Pomerania and Uckermark, and laid those countries under heavy contributions, whilst they had only to avail themselves of their whole force in order to advance direct upon Berlin itself, and make themselves, with scarcely any opposition, masters of that city. The Russian general, Apraxin, had already entered Prussia with one hundred thousand men, and to oppose him Field-Marshal Lehwald had only twenty-four thousand men; nevertheless, he was forced to give the Russians battle, however great the sacrifice, as Frederick sent him strict orders to drive out these barbarians and put an end to their devastations. Accordingly the action took place at Gross Jägerndorf, near Wehlau; but the most undaunted and desperate courage displayed by the Prussians was employed in vain against a force so overwhelming.^a The Prussians advanced in three columns through the forests against the left flank of the Russians. They threw back the Russian cavalry and the first line of infantry and captured three batteries. The Russian artillery fire, however, broke the ranks of the assailant, and they yielded when General Romanzov brought into action twenty fresh battalions on the threatened Russian left.^a Lehwald was forced to retreat, after a loss of several thousand men, and thus Prussia now appeared irretrievably lost—when, to the astonishment of all, Apraxin, instead of advancing, withdrew to the Russian frontiers ten days after the battle he had gained.

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Thus we find, from time to time, the troubled path of Frederick illumined by a glimmering ray of hope, which appeared to lead him on to better fortune. This time it originated in the serious illness of the empress Elizabeth of Russia; and the grand chancellor Bestuschef, believing her death close at hand, and having his eye directed to her successor, Peter—son of the duke of Holstein and an admirer and friend of the Prussian hero—lost not a moment in commanding General Apraxin to withdraw his troops from the Prussian dominions. This enabled the army under Lehwald to march against the Swedes, who, on the approach of the Prussians, evacuated the entire country and retreated as far as Stralsund and Rügen.^d

BATTLES OF ROSSBACH AND LEUTHEN (1757 A.D.)

Autumn fell, and Frederick's fortune seemed fading with the leaves of summer. He had, however, merely sought to gain time in order to recruit his diminished army; and Daun having, with his usual tardiness, neglected to pursue him, he suddenly took the field against the imperials under the duke of Saxe-Hildburghausen and the French under Soubise. The two armies met on the 5th of November, 1757, on the broad plain around Leipsic, near the village of Rossbach, not far from the scene of the famous encounters of earlier times. The enemy, three times superior in number to the Prussians, lay in a half-circle with a view of surrounding the little Prussian camp, and, certain of victory, had encumbered themselves with a numerous train of women, wig-makers, barbers, and modistes from Paris. The French camp was one scene of confusion and gaiety. On a sudden, Frederick sent General Seidlitz with his cavalry amongst them, and an instant dispersion took place, the troops flying in every direction without attempting to defend themselves—some Swiss, who refused to yield, alone excepted. The Germans on both sides showed their delight at the discomfiture of the French. An Austrian coming to the rescue of a Frenchman, who had just been captured by a Prussian, "Brother German," exclaimed the latter, "let me have this French rascal!" "Take him and keep him!" replied the Austrian, riding off. The scene more resembled a chase than a battle. The imperial army (*Reichsarmee*) was thence nicknamed the runaway (*Reissaus*) army. Ten thousand French were taken prisoners. The loss on the side of the Prussians amounted to merely one hundred and sixty men. The booty consisted chiefly in objects of gallantry belonging rather to a boudoir than to a camp. The French army perfectly resembled its mistress, the marquise de Pompadour.¹

The Austrians had, meanwhile, gained great advantages to the rear of the Prussian army, had beaten the king's favourite, General Winterfeld, at Moys in Silesia, had taken the important fortress of Schweidnitz and the metropolis, Breslau, whose commandant, the duke of Bevern (a collateral branch of the house of Brunswick), had fallen into their hands whilst on a reconnoitring expedition. Frederick, immediately after the battle of Rossbach, hastened into Silesia, and, on his march thither, fell in with a body of two thousand young Silesians, who had been captured in Schweidnitz, but, on the news of the victory gained at Rossbach, had found means to regain their liberty and had set off to his rencontre. The king, inspirited by this reinforcement, hur-

¹ Seidlitz, who covered himself with glory on this occasion, was the best horseman of the day. He is said to have once ridden under the sails of a windmill when in motion. One day, when standing on the bridge over the Oder at Frankfort, being asked by Frederick what he would do if blocked up on both sides by the enemy, he leaped, without replying, into the deep current and swam to shore. The Black Hussars with the death's head on their caps chiefly distinguished themselves during this war.

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ried onwards, and, at Leuthen, near Breslau, gained one of the most brilliant victories over the Austrians during this war. Making a false attack upon the right wing, he suddenly turned upon the left. "Here are the Würtembergers, said he; "they will be the first to make way for us!" He trusted to the inclination of these troops, who were zealous Protestants, in his favour. They instantly gave way and Daun's line of battle was destroyed. During the night, he threw two battalions of grenadiers into Lissa, and, accompanied by some of his staff, entered the castle, where, meeting with a number of Austrian generals and officers, he civilly saluted them and asked, "Can one get a lodging here too?" The Austrians might have seized the whole party, but were so thunderstruck that they yielded their swords, the king treating them with extreme civility. Charles of Lorraine, weary of his unvarying ill luck, resigned the command and was nominated governor of the Netherlands, where he gained great popularity. At Leuthen twenty-one thousand Austrians fell into Frederick's hands; in Breslau, which shortly afterwards capitulated, he took seventeen thousand more, so that his prisoners exceeded his army in number.^b

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Four grand battles and numerous actions more or less important had combined to make the year 1757 one of the most sanguinary to be found in history. Both parties had sufficiently tested their strength against each other; and Frederick now offered at the court of Vienna terms of peace, manifesting by this the principles of ancient Rome—not to propose peace until after he had gained a victory. But the empress Maria Theresa still continued too much embittered against the conqueror of Silesia to admit of the acceptance of his proposals; and, in addition to this, every care had been taken to conceal from her the heavy losses sustained by her army at the battle of Leuthen, as well as the distressed condition to which the war had reduced her states. She was likewise influenced in her resolution by France who insisted upon the continuation of the war in Germany, otherwise that power would be obliged to contend alone against England. Hence the offers of Frederick were rejected, and preparations for a fresh campaign renewed on a more extensive scale than ever. Prince Charles of Lorraine, who had lost the confidence both of the army and of the country, was forced to resign the chief command. It was found, however, extremely difficult to meet with his substitute, for the brave field-marshal Nadasti, owing to the jealousy and intrigue excited against him, was completely supplanted; and eventually the choice was fixed upon Field-Marshal Daun, for whose reputation the victory of Kolin had effected far more than his otherwise natural tardiness of action and irresolution merited.

The French armies were likewise reinforced, and another general-in-chief, Count Clermont, was appointed instead of the duke of Richelieu. The latter, accordingly, returned to France with all the millions he had exacted, during the period of his service, upon which he lived in the most extravagant, gorgeous style, in the face of the whole world, and in defiance of all shame and disgust. Russia also joined in the desire for a continuation of the war, and the chancellor Bestuschef, who had in the previous year recalled the army from Prussia, was removed from office, and another leader, General Fermor, was placed at the head of the Russian troops; he, in fact, lost not a moment, but marched at once against Prussia, in the month of January, and conquered the kingdom without any resistance, owing to the absence of General Lehwald, who with the army was then in Pomerania, contending against the Swedes.

In order to oppose and make a stand against such serious and overwhelming danger, Frederick was forced to summon together the entire and extreme

resources of his own dominions, as well as those of the Saxon territories. Levies in money and troops were forthwith made with equal activity and rigour, and the king found himself reduced to the necessity of coining counterfeit money for the payment of his troops—a measure which such a case of extreme necessity alone can justify or excuse. He knew, however, too well that, since the feudal system of war had been succeeded by that of modern times, the grand principle upon which war must now be carried on was founded upon the employment of its influential agent—money. For as regarded allies upon whom he might place dependence, he possessed only England and a few princes in the north of Germany, and these were already paralysed by the disgraceful Convention of Closter Seven.

Fortune, however, served him very favourably at this moment in England; the British nation, always ready to acknowledge and appreciate patriotic achievements in every quarter, was inspired by the battle of Rossbach with the greatest enthusiasm for Frederick, whilst the most complete disgust was generally excited against the shameful Convention of Closter Seven. In accordance with these feelings, the celebrated William Pitt, who had just been appointed prime minister, caused this treaty, which had not as yet been confirmed, to be at once disavowed, and determined to continue the war with renewed vigour. The army was forthwith augmented, and the appointment of its leader was intrusted to Frederick himself. His eagle eye soon fixed upon the genius best adapted for its extraordinary powers to be chosen to co-operate with himself, and he accordingly furnished the allied army with a truly distinguished chief, Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick, who by his good generalship so well justified Frederick's choice that his name will ever continue to maintain its brilliant position on the side of that of the great king, in the records of this sanguinary war.

According to a plan agreed upon between Frederick and himself, the duke opened the campaign in the month of February, and, marching at the head of his small army, he surprised the French in their winter quarters, where they were living in abundance and luxury at the expense of the Hanoverians and Hessians; the odds between the two armies were great, for the duke had only 30,000 men against their 100,000. But with him all his measures were so well calculated, whilst on the part of his adversaries so much negligence and frivolity existed, in combination with the incapacity of their general, that in a very few weeks the duke completely succeeded in driving them out of the entire country situated between the Aller and Weser, and the Weser and the Rhine, their haste being so great that they abandoned all their provisions and ammunition, and more than 11,000 were taken prisoners by the allied army. They recrossed the Rhine near Düsseldorf, hoping there to be secure; in this, however, they deceived themselves. Duke Ferdinand pursued them to the other side of the Rhine, attacked them at Crefeld, and, in spite of their superiority in numbers, he put them completely to rout, causing them a loss of 7,000 slain. After this battle the city of Düsseldorf surrendered to the duke, and his light cavalry scoured the country throughout the Austrian Netherlands, even to the very gates of Brussels itself.

Frederick, during this interval, had not been idle. He commenced with laying siege to Schweidnitz, which strong and important place still remained in the hands of the Austrians, and carried it by assault on the 18th of April. Field-Marshal Daun meantime remained stationary in Bohemia, and used every exertion to cut off the march of Frederick into that country, for he fully expected to be attacked there by the king. But whilst he imagined himself perfectly secure, Frederick suddenly broke camp with his army, and instead of proceeding to Bohemia, advanced, by forced marches, to Moravia, and laid siege to Olmütz. In this expedition was shown the peculiarity of Frederick's



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FREDERICK THE GREAT SURPRISES THE AUSTRIAN OFFICERS IN THE CASTLE AT LISSA THE EVENING
AFTER THE BATTLE OF LEUTHEN, DECEMBER 5TH, 1757

(From the painting entitled *Bon soir, Messieurs!* by Arthur Kampf)

[1758 A.D.]

genius, which led him to undertake the most bold, extraordinary, and perilous enterprises, whilst his constant aim and glory were to take his enemy by surprise; and on this occasion he was more especially influenced by the idea that, if he once became master of Olmütz, he would then have the command of the most important position in an Austrian territory hitherto perfectly undisturbed, and thus be enabled to threaten the immediate vicinity of Vienna itself. Fortune, however, did not this time second his bold design; the place defended itself with the greatest bravery; the inhabitants of the country, faithful to their empress, annoyed the Prussians as far as was in their power, and conveyed intelligence to the imperial army of all their movements. By this means Daun was enabled to intercept and seize upon a convoy of three thousand wagons, upon the arrival of which the entire success of the siege depended; whence it was obliged to be given up. But now the retreat into Silesia was cut off; and Daun, having taken possession of every road, felt certain that he had caught the enemy within his own net. Frederick, however, suddenly turned back, and marching across the mountains, arrived in Bohemia, where the Austrian general did not at all expect him, without the loss of a single wagon; and he would not have been forced to leave this country so soon again had not the invasion of the Russians recalled him to Pomerania and Neumark. Accordingly he recrossed the mountains from Bohemia into Silesia, and leaving Marshal Keith behind to protect the country he hastened with fourteen thousand men to attack the Russians.^a

THE BATTLE OF ZORNDORF (1758 A.D.)

Clausewitz^b describes the battle as the most interesting of the whole war. And he is right: it is one of the most interesting in all history. We know of no other instance where two opposing forces have revolved about each other in such a vortex.

As it was impossible to outflank the right wing of the Russian army which had the Zabern hollow in rear, King Frederick determined to make a frontal attack. He had long recognised that he must not, as in his first war, rely so exclusively on his solid infantry, drilled by the old Dessauer; that, contending with the great numerical strength in artillery of the Austrians and Russians, he must overwhelm one point by multiplying his attacks in that direction. We see him here bringing up masses of artillery, and in the first place directing a continued fire of sixty heavy cannon against the spot he desired to attack.

In every account the effect of this terrible fire in the very heart of the Russian position is mentioned. The left Prussian wing was to lead the attack. According to custom, the king placed a vanguard of eight grenadier battalions in front of the two divisions of this wing, so that in the actual attack three divisions were there to support each other. Only here, as at Kolin, the instructions of the royal general were very indifferently carried out. It often happens in war that things easy in conception are extremely difficult to execute. The eight battalions of the vanguard remained as described with their left wing in the Zabern hollow, but the leader of the first division thought he ought to remain on the right with the reserved right wing. The battalion marched right and closed in. The second division followed the same direction, and remained far behind. The first ranged itself close to the right of the vanguard, and remained in exact line with it, and so eventually came upon the enemy, not in three divisions but in one thin line, with no reserve. After a brief fire on both sides, the whole left wing of the Prussian division was driven back in great disorder.

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It has been remarked that it was here King Frederick realised for the first time that his old and trusted infantry from Prague and Kolin was no longer adequate to his needs. This remark, however, hardly seems to apply just here, for it was the East Prussian regiments that gave way and fled—that is to say, those regiments that till this moment had suffered least, sustaining relatively insignificant losses and counting only a few recruits among their almost untouched ranks of seasoned men. It is indeed said that the king never forgave this regiment for its flight at Zorndorf.

It is known that the right wing of the Russians, probably without receiving any decisive word of command, started off amidst loud hurrahs to follow the flying Prussians, and seemed able to move forward only some few hundred paces without falling into disorder. Seidlitz, whose fame rests on this day above all others, used the moment, dashed with his squadrons across the Zabern valley, repulsed the Russian cavalry, who themselves were in pursuit, and so utterly routed the Russian infantry that those of their men who escaped the Prussian swords were not able to form again or to reappear on the field that day.

The left wing of the Russians stood on the farther side, in the east of the Galgen (Gallows) hollow, and so protected against a flank attack from the cavalry under Seidlitz was quite undisturbed; but it was obliged, after the defeat of the right wing, to await quietly, or rather inactively, any further events, since there was no possibility of turning the now doubtful result of the fight by means of an attack in the rear. Seidlitz, who could not start out with his cavalry on any further enterprise from the field of victory, led them back to Zorndorf, there to reorganise them and let the horses rest. An attempt was also made to reorganise the infantry of the left wing, and this apparently succeeded—but only apparently. In consequence occurred a pause of two hours' duration in the battle, which was occupied by a cannonade. During this, the king ordered the right wing of his infantry to press forward a little, so as to engage the enemy's attention.

About three o'clock began what may be called a second battle. This again came near being lost to the Prussians, and again it was Seidlitz who with his cavalry rode to the rescue and changed into victory what might have been defeat. This time it was the right wing of the Prussians which was to attack the extreme left of the Russians at Doppel (double) valley. The Prussian left wing, formed from those battalions which had suffered defeat earlier in the day, was held in reserve. The Russians made an unexpected rush, partly between the Zabern and Galgen hollows, partly between the latter and Doppel hollow. Those in this latter direction pursued, and after some initial success came to grief in attacking the Prussian infantry; the other division once more chased the Prussian battalions of the left wing till they fled in wild disorder as far as Wilkersdorf.

But Seidlitz closed with his cavalry the breach once more made in the order of battle and drove back the Russian cavalry, which was partly destroyed, into the swamps near Quartschen, and then fell upon the Russian infantry. The right wing of the Prussian infantry broke at the same time into the ranks of the Russians, and the end was a complete rout of all that remained of the Russian force which had taken the field that day. This was preceded by a final struggle with naked weapons, a mode of combat which has scarcely ever been resorted to in modern warfare. It was about ten thousand cavalry and nine battalions numbering not more than five thousand men, which defeated the entire Russian military force.

Late in the evening, the Prussian generals succeeded in getting their troops drawn up in line in fair order, in a position where the right wing had the river Mützel on its rear, whilst the left extended to Zorndorf. The Russians also,

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chiefly through the endeavours of General Demikov, or Demicoude as this Vaudois should really be called, sought to get some of their troops into order, and to muster them behind Gallows hollow. It is said that at first he could get together only about two thousand infantry and nearly one thousand cavalry; but these must have been quickly augmented. For the dispersed soldiers must soon have been impressed with the fact that their only safety from the embittered peasantry lay in holding together in force.

A last attack on the position, which five Prussian battalions were to undertake, failed, as the king himself relates, because the Prussian soldiers, finding the Russian war-chest in Gallows hollow, remained to plunder it, and laden with booty retraced their steps instead of pressing forward. The wounded general, afterwards Field-Marshal Panin, met with some troops which had been cut off from the main body, on the Drewitz heath. These troops used the night for the recovery of the baggage which had been taken along the Landberg road nearly as far as Great Kamin. Already in the morning, on the defeat of the right wing, General Fermor had been compelled with many other generals to flee before the Prussian cavalry. Where he had been wandering through the day is not known; it is certain only that it was late in the evening before he rejoined his troops.

The loss of the Russians was officially estimated at 21,529 men, among whom were about 2,000 prisoners. But when it is remembered that the four infantry regiments under Panin, which numbered before the battle 4,595 men, suffered a loss, according to this general's special report, of 3,120 men (1,389 dead and 1,725 wounded), and that after the fight there remained only 1,475 rank and file, one is tempted to believe that the entire loss was no doubt somewhat greater. The Prussians had also lost one third of their men, and the result of the battle had not quite answered the king's expectations, in spite of greater sacrifices than had been anticipated.

RUSSIAN TACTICS

The king had certainly not reckoned on so obstinate a resistance as he had here encountered. He had had no personal experience of the bravery and powers of endurance of the Russians, and here their staying power, on which he had not reckoned, was increased by many peculiar external circumstances. That with all their bravery even Russian infantry might in certain circumstances take refuge in flight was proved a year later at the battle of Kunersdorf, though in this case complete dispersal was as good as impossible. The tightly packed condition of the Russians was in itself sufficient hindrance, and still more the impassable swamp almost immediately in the rear of the army. The destruction of an enemy's army on the field itself is practically possible only in case of an enormous number of prisoners being taken. But the Russians would not submit; they carried resistance to the farthest possible point—not certainly out of principle or "Roman pride": their obstinacy had other reasons more peculiar to themselves; for instance, European war was new to them, and the soldier, not knowing that he could surrender himself prisoner, understood only fighting with the Turks, where men were simply mown down as soon as they ceased to defend themselves. In the Prussian officer's account of the plundering of the war-chest, it is plainly shown that the Russian resistance was no mere question of tactics, carried out under a tactician, but the resistance of desperate men who had no hope of rescue and who wished to sell their lives as dearly as they might. Finally, in the Russian reports, it was stated that part of the troops, having plundered the stores of brandy in the baggage, raged about the battle-field in the madness of intoxica-

tion; that the men shot at each other blindly and struck down their own officers.

At daybreak on the 26th of August the Russians from their position on the Zabern ground opened a lively cannonade, and went through some manœuvres as if they intended attacking—no doubt merely to impose on their enemy and save themselves from an assault, so that they might get safely through the day without further mishap, and under cover of the sheltering darkness venture on the dangerous retreat round the left wing of the Prussian force.

In order to attain this end, Fermor had recourse to another plan, which was really stupidly conceived, as it betrayed in what great danger he felt himself to be; he proposed a truce, ostensibly for the purpose of burying the dead. The truce was refused by the Prussians, but nevertheless King Frederick could not decide upon making a fresh attack. The Prussian army, drawn up in line as it now was between the Mützel swamps and the land surrounding Zorn-dorf, was to all appearances, compared with the forces the Russian generals had at the same time drawn up in line upon the Zabern ground, the superior in numbers; but still the king might have very good reasons for not renewing the fight.

After the enormous expenditure of ammunition the day before, his troops were no longer lavishly supplied, and this alone was an all-sufficient reason for not pushing matters to extremities. But besides this, the Prussian army being now on the march and in readiness for battle, a few hours of the night for rest under arms could be afforded. The men had so far eaten nothing, or as good as nothing, and were completely exhausted. It is natural enough that King Frederick, after his experience of the preceding day, should not be inclined under these circumstances to place great confidence in his infantry. Then, no doubt, the king reasoned with himself that the Russian army, even as things stood, was sufficiently disabled for the rest of the campaign, and scarcely yet in condition to hazard a decisive move; that it would therefore be unwise to place again in jeopardy the success of the previous day.

The Russians set against their unwilling detention in the Zabern hollow the advantage that the greater part of their troops, wandering desultorily in the neighbourhood, would be enabled to find their way back to their flag. Only about two thousand of these scattered men fell prisoners into the hands of the Prussians. During the following night the Russians marched back to their barricade of wagons near Great and Little Kamin, and intrenching themselves in this position had nevertheless already forsaken it on the evening of the 31st, in order to unite themselves on the 1st of September, at Landsberg on the Warthe, with the cavalry brought there by Rumäntzow von Schwedt. Here they remained till the 19th of September.^a

THE BATTLE OF HOCHKIRCH (1758 A.D.)

The four weeks from September 12th to October 14th in Lusatia, where Frederick the Great opposed Field-Marshal Daun, chiefly in his camp at Stolpen, have a sort of strategical reputation, because of the skill in manœuvring shown by both generals. The whole case was reduced to very simple elements. Frederick the Great advanced and took up a position near Dresden, where he could easily replenish his commissariat. Daun had several advance posts on the Bautzen road, the principal one being near Radeberg, under Laudon. Frederick the Great advanced upon him; Laudon retreated half a mile and took up his position. This he also yielded some days after, and so came to Bischofswerda. Thereupon the king encamped near Bischofswerda opposite Daun's right wing.

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In this way he kept open the road to Bautzen and slightly threatened Daun's connection in the Zittau. This, however, did not benefit him; Daun, whom he would have liked to see manœuvring towards Bohemia, stood fast; so the king now marched to Bautzen and despatched Retzau as far as Weissenberg. This was a gain. Daun set out and encamped at Löbau; the king supposed Daun to be behind Löbau, and encamped at Hochkirch, with the avowed intention of better concealment, wishing to unite with Retzau and fall upon the prince of Durlach. Probably the intention of obtaining more command over the Görlitz road was his chief reason for this step. There was nothing very intricate, very finely conceived or artistic in all this; and so it is with most of the strategical measures employed, which at best consisted in a scuffle for posts, where often obstinacy rather than actual necessity was the motive power. Frederick the Great had few outposts at this time. Retzau's corps, which he had detached to the left upon the Görlitz road, was almost the only one, although the distance from Dresden and the constant transportation of bread and meal thence was a great responsibility. He preferred this to losing six or eight of his battalions. Frederick the Great was almost always without an advance guard, and he acquired the habit of always pressing close to his enemy or his enemy's outposts, which answered so badly at Hochkirch. Daun, on the contrary, was never without four or five outposts.^h

On the approach of the king, he retired to a strong position he had selected in Lusatia. His object was to cut off the passage of the king into Silesia, in order that his general, Harsch, might have time to conquer the fortress of Neisse. Frederick, however, who perceived his aim, hastened to occupy the route to Silesia through Bautzen and Görlitz, and marched close past the lines of the Austrian army, in order to encamp upon an open plain situated between the villages of Hochkirch and Kotitz. This plan was anything but wise, although it showed great contempt for the enemy. Marwitz, his quarter-master, and at the same time a confidential favourite, represented to him the great danger to which he exposed himself by taking up this position, and, hesitating at first, he finally refused to pitch the camp there, in spite of the king's commands. He was, however, forthwith placed under arrest, and his duties were transferred into the hands of another. The army continued encamped here three days, completely exposed to the attacks of the enemy, so much superior in numbers; whilst Frederick remained obstinately deaf to all the representations of his generals. He considered that, as the Austrians had never attacked him first, he might easily calculate that Field-Marshal Daun would never think of such a bold step, and that he was quite incapable of accomplishing it; whilst, in addition to this self-deception, he was betrayed by an Austrian spy, whom the enemy had bought over, and who accordingly furnished him with false reports of their plans and proceedings.

On the morning of the 14th of October, before the dawn of day, the Prussian army was aroused by a discharge of artillery; the Austrians having, during the night, silently advanced to the village of Hochkirch, exactly as the church-clock chimed the hour of five, they fell upon the Prussian advanced posts, took possession of the strong intrenchment at the entrance of the village, turned the muzzles of the cannon against their adversaries, and by a murderous fire destroyed all the Prussians that attempted to make a stand in its defence. The slaughter committed was dreadful, for the troops poured forth in thousands to assemble in the principal street of the village as headquarters. The generals and principal officers endeavoured in vain, amidst the darkness, to form them in regular line of battle; the brave prince, Francis of Brunswick, had his head carried away by a cannon-ball, in the very moment he was about to attack the enemy on the heights of Hochkirch; Field-Marshal Keith, a venerable but equally brave and well-tried warrior, fell pierced

with two bullets, and Prince Maurice of Dessau was likewise dangerously wounded.

Generals Seidlitz and Zieten formed their squadrons of cavalry on the open plain, and threw themselves with all their usual bravery upon the Austrians; but the advantages they gained could not compensate for the serious loss already sustained. Hochkirch, the camp, together with all the baggage and ammunition fell into the hands of the enemy. The dawn of day brought with it no advantage, for an impenetrable fog prevented the king from reconnoitring the enemy's position as well as his own, otherwise he might perhaps have been able by a prompt movement to bring back to his colours that good fortune which had thus so unexpectedly abandoned him. Nevertheless, his regiments had now, through that discipline which was never so admirably displayed as at this moment, succeeded in forming themselves into regular order, and when towards nine o'clock the sun made its appearance, he perceived that the Austrian army had already nearly surrounded him on every side, and he accordingly gave orders for a retreat. This took place in such good order that the Austrian general, taken by surprise, found it impossible to attempt to oppose it, and returned to his old quarters. The king, however, had suffered the loss of several of his best generals, nine thousand good soldiers, and more than one hundred pieces of cannon; and, as he had lost all his baggage, nothing was left wherewith to supply his troops with clothing for the approaching winter.

Meantime, the king maintained the utmost tranquillity and firmness of mind throughout this period of trial, and his appearance inspired his troops with the same feeling. And in truth, if Frederick ever showed himself great in misfortune, he did so after this serious loss; for, although defeated, although deprived of all the necessary provisions and supplies for his army, he nevertheless was not less successful in accomplishing by hasty marches and masterly manœuvres his original plan: thus, deceiving the enemy, and circuiting his position, he forced General Harsch in all haste to raise the siege of Neisse. Silesia was now entirely freed from the enemy; whilst Daun, conqueror as he was, after being unable to prevent Frederick from entering Silesia, and obtaining, by his attack upon Dresden, no other result but that of forcing the Prussian general, Count Schmettan, in his defence to set fire to the beautiful suburbs of that capital, returned in mortification to Bohemia, where he established his winter quarters. Thus superiority of genius produced those results for the conquered which otherwise might have fallen to the share of the conqueror.

THE CONDITION OF THE ARMIES

At the end of this year Frederick found himself, in spite of the vicissitudes he had undergone, in possession of the same countries as in the preceding year, in addition to which he now had Schweidnitz which was not previously in his hands; whilst in Westphalia all his provinces, which had been captured by the French, were now reconquered by the valour of Prince Ferdinand. The latter had not certainly been able to maintain, with his small army, his position on the other side of the Rhine; but, at the end of the campaign, he forced the French to abandon the whole of the right bank of that river, and to establish their winter quarters between the Rhine and the Maas.

The following year, however, in spite of the perils he had already undergone and battled against, the heroic king found himself destined to encounter vicissitudes which rendered this period of the war more trying perhaps than any other. The hope of being at length enabled to crush him excited his enemies to strain every effort in order to effect this object. The Austrian army

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was completely reorganised and reinforced to its full complement, and indeed, with every coming year, it marched into the field with increased vigour and augmented numbers, because the ranks were filled up with the hardy peasantry of the hereditary lands, who were well drilled, and who, being intermingled with the more experienced and well-trying veterans of many a hard-fought battle—of whom, notwithstanding the heavy losses sustained, the army still retained a powerful body—were soon initiated in the rough and perilous scenes of the camp. In Frederick's small army, on the other hand, which had to contend equally with Austrians, Russians, Frenchmen, and Swedes, as well as with other troops of the empire itself, the number of those who had escaped the sword and disease formed but a small body, and consequently its ranks were principally filled with newly levied and inexperienced recruits. And however speedily these young soldiers, who often joined the army as mere boys, entered into the spirit and honour of the cause for which they fought, and in which they emulated, as much as possible, the acts of their more veteran comrades—sometimes, perhaps, even surpassing them in daring courage—still their number was far inferior compared with those levied in Saxony, Anhalt, Mecklenburg, and such as were collected in various other parts, consisting chiefly of deserters.

Thus, although the Prussian army was soon completed in all its numbers and appointments, it fell far short when compared with the Austrians in internal organisation and united strength.¹ Besides this, Frederick's own estates, as well as those of Saxony and Mecklenburg, suffered so much by oppressive taxation and the continual conscription, which thus seriously diminished the male population, that it seemed as if they could never recover from the sad effects. The duke of Mecklenburg, indeed, in his indignation, acted with such imprudence at the diet of Ratisbon as to place himself at the head of those princes who were most loud and bitter in their complaints against Frederick, and demanded nothing less than that the ban of the empire should at once be pronounced against him; for which act the duke's land was subjected to the most extreme severity of treatment, and, in fact, dealt with rather as that of an enemy than of an ally. The imperial ban, however, was not adjudged against the king, for as the same sentence must have been pronounced against the elector of Hanover, the evangelical states refused to condemn two such distinguished members of their body. Besides which this sentence, which in ancient times was more fatally annihilating in its effects than the sharp edge of the sword itself, had unfortunately long since become void of power and effect, and if pronounced would only have exposed more degradingly the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation.

Maria Theresa, however, by her urgent appeals to the sovereigns of France and Russia to carry on the war, endeavoured to effect the destruction of Frederick with far more certainty than could have been accomplished by all the bans pronounced against him by the imperial diet. The empress of Russia,

¹ A foreigner of rank and great wealth having requested to be permitted to serve in the campaign of 1757, as a volunteer, Frederick granted his wish, and the noble recruit arrived in a splendid carriage, attended by several servants—in fact, displaying an unusual lavishness of expense and luxury. He received, however, no mark of distinction, and, indeed, very little or no attention, being generally stationed in the wagon-train. He bore no part in any engagement, much less in any general battle, and had to experience the mortification of not sharing in the victorious action of Rossbach. He had often sent a written complaint to the king, but without any effect; at length, however, he had an opportunity of addressing the king in person, when, in reply to his representations upon the subject, Frederick said, "Your style of living, sir, is not the fashion in my army; in fact, it is highly objectionable and offensive. Without the greatest moderation, it is impossible to learn to bear the fatigues which accompany every war, and if you cannot determine to submit to the strict discipline my officers and troops are forced to undergo, I would advise you, in a friendly way, to return to your own country."—MÜLCHER.

in order to obliterate the stain of the battle of Zorndorf, sent fresh troops under the command of General Soltikoy, a brave and active officer. In Paris, the duke de Choiseul, hitherto French ambassador at Vienna, and the chief promoter of the war against Frederick, was now chosen prime minister, and he determined to employ all the forces at command, in order to reconquer Westphalia, Hanover, and Hesse. Had this design been brought into execution, these countries would have experienced the most dreadful persecution, and Hanover more especially would have been singled out by France as the object upon which to wreak her vengeance for the losses she had sustained both at sea and on her coasts, from the naval expedition of Great Britain. For the glorious victories obtained by the British men-of-war had greatly diminished the maritime force of France, whilst both in North America and the East Indies all her settlements and possessions were reduced or captured. Prince Ferdinand with his small army was, however, the only disposable power at command to oppose the enemy in his designs from this quarter against Germany.

Ferdinand was menaced upon two sides: on that of the Maine by the army of the duke de Broglie, whose headquarters were at Frankfort, which he had taken by surprise—for, in spite of its being an imperial free city, and although it had accordingly furnished, without hesitation, its quota of contributions to the confederation in men and money for the war against Frederick, it was not the less exposed to attack; and from the lower Rhine, Marshal de Contades advanced with the main body of the army, to invade and overrun Hanover. Ferdinand hoped to be able, like Frederick, to make a successful stand against both armies through the celerity of his movements, and marching at once against the duke de Broglie at the opening of the campaign, came up with him on the 12th of April at Bergen, near Frankfort. He immediately attacked him with his brave Hessians; but the position occupied by the French was too strong: they were enabled to replace the troops they lost by continual fresh supplies, while the Hessians were repulsed in three attacks. Ferdinand now prudently resolved not to expose his army to the chances of a total defeat, and accordingly made a retreat in good order. It required, however, the exercise of all the genius and experience he possessed to enable him to protect lower Saxony against the attack of Marshal de Contades. This general had succeeded in crossing the Rhine near Düsseldorf, and, marching through the Westerwald towards Giessen, formed a junction with Broglie, and took Cassel, Paderborn, Münster, and Minden, on the Weser. In all his operations thus far he had been equally prompt and successful, and Ferdinand found himself forced to withdraw as far back as the mouth of the Weser near Bremen, whilst the French general now regarded Hanover as already within his grasp.

BATTLE OF MINDEN (1759 A.D.)

In Paris all were in high glee at this glorious beginning, but the German hero soon changed that exultation into the opposite feelings of sorrow and depression by gaining a brilliant victory. Ferdinand, placing full confidence in his resources, marched to meet the French army, and found it, on the 1st of August, near Minden, occupying a position the nature of which offered him every advantage for the attack. Contades was forced to fight, inasmuch as his supplies were cut off, but he calculated upon his superiority in numbers; he however gave very few proofs on this day of his talent and experience, although at other times he had not shown himself wanting in ability. Contrary to all military practice hitherto, he placed his cavalry in the centre, and this very error in his tactics, which, no doubt, he expected must operate to

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his advantage, produced his defeat and Ferdinand's triumph. He ordered the British and Hanoverian infantry, whose steady firmness he had already tested, to advance and charge the enemy's cavalry—a bold and happy idea, which by the results effected was through its realisation an additional evidence of Ferdinand's superior genius, which at such a moment directed him to swerve from the ordinary course of operations. The French cavalry, forming the *élite* of the whole army, astounded at this daring attack of the allied infantry, met the charge with tolerable firmness at first, and endeavoured to force the ranks of their bold opponents and gallop over them; but every attempt they made against these solid and invulnerable ranks of bayonets was completely defeated, and at length the sweeping discharges of the artillery, together with the destructive execution made by the well-aimed muskets of the infantry, produced the greatest confusion among them, and put them completely to flight.

Ferdinand now gave orders to General Sackville to dash through the hollow space thus left in the centre of the French line, with his British cavalry, and to pursue the flying enemy; by obeying which orders he would have completely divided the two wings of the French army, and thus overpowered by the allies, its entire destruction must inevitably have followed. But whether it was through jealousy or cowardice—for his unaccountable behaviour has never been clearly explained—the English general turned traitor, disobeyed the order given by the duke, and thus allowed the French time to reassemble and make good their retreat. As it was, however, they lost eight thousand men and thirty pieces of cannon. But the results of this battle were still more important. Contades being now continually pursued, withdrew along the Weser to Cassel, and thence continued his retreat southwards to Giessen; whilst the army of Ferdinand captured successively Marburg, Fulda, and Münster, in Westphalia, so that, by the end of the year, this distinguished general found himself once more in possession of the same territories he occupied at its commencement.

King Frederick had not shown his usual eagerness to open the campaign this year, inasmuch as his advantage did not now, so much as at the commencement of the war, depend upon the results of prompt measures, but the main object of his plans at this moment was rather if possible to prevent the junction of the Russian and Austrian armies. He encamped himself in a strong position near Landshut, whence, by sudden incursions directed equally against the Russians in Poland and the Austrians in Bohemia, he wrested from them their most valuable magazines, and thus prevented both armies, for a considerable time, from undertaking any important enterprise; for when, according to the system pursued by the belligerent parties at this period, the armies remained quartered in a country for any length of time, they abstained as much as possible from depriving the inhabitants of all their provisions; whence much greater supplies were rendered necessary for the troops.

THE BATTLE OF KUNERSDORF (1759 A.D.)

At length, however, the Russians, consisting of 40,000 men, crossed the Oder, and Laudon was waiting ready to join them with his 20,000 Austrians. Frederick, in such an extremity, resolved in order to save himself to have recourse to extraordinary measures. Amongst his generals he had one, young it is true, but at the same time distinguished beyond any other for his daring courage in difficult circumstances: this was General Wedel. Him he held as best qualified to be intrusted with the command against the Russians; but he was doubtful whether or not the senior generals would submit to his orders. The king, however, decided at once to adopt the plan of the Romans, who in

extreme danger made it a rule to place the whole authority and direction of affairs in the hands of one man, whom they styled their dictator, and accordingly appointed General Wedel dictator over the army opposed to the Russians. According to the royal instructions he received, he was to attack the enemy wherever he came up with them.

These instructions the young dictator obeyed to the letter, but without reflecting upon what such orders presupposed. Accordingly he attacked the Russians on the 23rd of June, at the village of Kay, near Züllichau, but planned his attack so badly that, in order to make it, his army was forced to cross a bridge and march over a long narrow road, in single files, so that the battalions were able to reach the field of battle only in successive bodies; where, as they arrived, they were received by a murderous discharge of grapeshot, and were thus destroyed in detail by the Russians. The Prussians lost more than five thousand men, and the enemy being thus no longer opposed, effected a junction with Laudon without any further delay.

It was necessary now that Frederick himself should hasten with his forty-three thousand men to meet the combined forces of the enemy. He knew and felt the great danger to which he was about to expose himself personally, and summoning his brother Henry from his camp at Schmottseiffen, gave him strict charge to watch the movements of Field-Marshal Daun, and besides this appointed him regent of the Prussian dominions, in case he himself should either be killed or be taken prisoner in this expedition. At the same time,



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however, in the event of such a misfortune, he demanded from him the most solemn promise never to submit to a peace which in the slightest degree might bring shame or disgrace upon the house of Prussia. Frederick well knew how to live and die as a king, and he would willingly have lost his life rather than be made a prisoner; for he was too well aware what great sacrifices his enemies would have demanded for his ransom. On the 12th of August he found the united forces of the Russians and Austrians, amounting to sixty thousand men, strongly intrenched upon the heights of Kunersdorf, near Frankfort-on-the-Oder.^d

This time King Frederick abandoned his tactics of drawing his army up in line to be used as one instrument. A special corps under General Finck, formed of twenty-eight squadrons and eight battalions—not the best infantry—was to advance independently, face the left flank of the Russian force, dismount, and cover the flank movement of the army. As the king knew next to nothing of the front of the Russian army and its condition, or rather knew

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nothing at all, his forces could not be arranged beforehand in readiness for attack, but everything must be left to be decided on the spot.

However, as the predominating idea was that, in order to attack the right wing the left must remain "refused," as the technical expression is, we may well suppose that if the army were drawn up in line southward of the enemy, the right wing would, after Frederick's usual custom, have been guarded in face by eight grenadier battalions, and Finck's infantry would have been ordered to make a simultaneous attack on the Mühlberg. If this were all carried out it might well have been expected, seeing Frankfort also was held by Prussia, that the roads towards Crossen and Reppen would be cut off by the attack itself, and so a large part of the enemy's force would have been compelled to surrender.

At two o'clock in the morning the king ordered his army to march under cover of Finck's corps, hoping to engage the enemy about seven o'clock. But the difficulties entailed by every movement in active warfare, and for which it is impossible to allow even approximately, made themselves felt here in an extreme degree. The march through the sandy forests was slow; the day was well advanced when they were still far from their goal, and then the moving column came upon an obstacle to their progress of which they had known nothing—a break in the ground, which stretched out of the Neuendorf forest from south to north, as far as the village of Kunersdorf. In the boggy soil of this break several small lakes formed a chain, with only one road across—a ridge of earth between the Dorf See and the Blanken See, in the immediate neighbourhood of Kunersdorf, sometimes only half the width of the squadron, passable by artillery only with the utmost difficulty and great waste of time, if indeed passable at all. How much time must be lost if the army or even a considerable part of it was, according to arrangement, to be drawn up on the western side of this cleft! Another thought may also have made the king pause—namely, that his force must then be cut in halves and that one half would be of small support to the other. But nothing of all this is known. In any case the king altered his plans, ordered the army to form between the brook named Hünnerfliess and the recently discovered hollow, and decided to make the attack solely on the flank of the Russian army, directing it up the Mühlberg.

The march through the forest, the advance to its borders—all this again demanded time, was difficult, and could not be done without great fatigue to the men, the artillery teams being also exhausted. The attack on the Mühlberg was commenced by the artillery opening fire from all sides, partly firing downwards from commanding positions and so succeeding without any too great fatigue to the Prussian infantry. The Russian foot regiments completely broke up their lines and fled over a wide area, and eighty pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the Prussians.

Nevertheless, the Russian battalion of the line could not be "rolled up," as the tacticians of that time used to express it, from the left to the right wing. Within the Russian position there were several trenches lying parallel to the conquered flank, in the right corner touching the front line. These were suitable for defence and could be occupied efficiently without much loss of time. Just such a trench was the Kuhgrund ("cow-hollow"); farther westward was another on the so-called "Deep way" and a third at Laudon's hollow [as it was afterwards called].

Thanks to this disposition of the ground and to the direction of the attack, the length of this cover was equalled by its depth, and the right wing of the Russian horse became a complete reserve. Here, guided by circumstances, one troop after another defended these natural trenches as though automatically, for no tactician of that time would have been equal to arranging such a movement,

or would intentionally have directed it. To these successive struggles with continual fresh relays of troops the Prussian attack at last succumbed. It is only in later times that a sharp military eye has recognised the utility of the earth trenches, with which Laudon at the head of the Russian and Austrian infantry first gave check to the Prussians.

The Prussian attacks on the Spitzberg were of no avail. General Seidlitz led cavalry between the Dorf See and the Blanken See down through the plain to the foot of the Spitzberg, but these attacks, ordered by the king when the fate of the day became doubtful, came to grief finally at the fortifications by the "Wolf pits" at the foot of the hill (Spitzberg).

The Prussian artillery had not followed the foot regiments to support the attack; so that the Russian artillery, numbering at least four hundred and fifty guns, made all the greater impression. Because of the succession of forces engaged, the superiority in numbers told, as hardly ever before in any battle of any time; it became apparent that the disproportion in the number of the infantry told against the Prussians more than their general inferiority. In the Prussian infantry, at most thirty-one thousand men were opposed to the Austrians, without reckoning the Croats. Virtually, however, the Prussian attack doubtless failed through the exhaustion of the men. The Prussian army had marched the whole night of the 10th to the 11th, on the 11th had forded a river and endured a considerable march; passed the night of the 11th-12th under arms, and had now on the 12th for fifteen hours, mostly under a burning sun, marched along difficult sandy ground and fought without interruption, without having strengthened themselves by breaking their fast since the day before. Such exertion was too much. When strength is exhausted resolution also wavers.

Laudon recognised this moment of exhaustion and knew how to use it with sure tact. He sent his Austrian cavalry to chase the Prussian infantry down the "Deep way"; the Prussian foot regiments wavered, broke up, and fled; the battle was lost and turned into a complete defeat such as the Prussian army had never before sustained. Completely routed, scattered, discouraged, unfit at the moment for any further effort at carrying on the war, they all fled, bewildered, across the bridge of the Oder near Göritz.

LOSSES AND REORGANISATION

The Prussian losses were relatively enormous; they amounted to 18,500 (85 officers, 5,963 men killed; 425 officers, 10,676 men wounded; 38 officers, 1,316 men missing; altogether 548 officers, 17,955 men). The small number of the missing is noticeable. As the infantry regiment of Diericke was surrounded and "almost all" taken, the entire army can have lost hardly any unwounded men—a proof that neither Russians nor Austrians were very energetic in pursuit, or else one would suppose it would have been easy to take many prisoners among the over-exhausted Prussians, who could hardly have fled far.

It is said that Laudon called upon the Russian generals to follow up the pursuit immediately, but they one and all, having by no means through all the phases of battle felt sure of a victory, so lost their heads with joy that they were no longer to be depended upon. It is almost surprising, such being the case, that the fiery Laudon did not himself start off in pursuit with his own Austrians; ten thousand men of the line and six thousand Croats, whom he commanded, would no doubt have sufficed hopelessly to rout all the Prussians who had got together in the night by the Oetscher bridge.

The Prussian army had also lost many trophies; the greater part of its artillery, not less than 172 cannon, 26 flags, and 4 standards. The loss of the



GENERAL LAUDON ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF KUNERSDORF

(From the painting by Siegmund L'Allemand)

[1759 A.D.]

Austrians and Russians was also very considerable; it amounted in dead and wounded to nearly 16,000 men (13,480 Russians, including 559 officers, and 2,216 Austrians, including 118 officers; 15,696 in all). As the Russian army could not exactly boast of very great tactical ability, it might well for the next few days not be in proper condition—in consequence of its loss in officers—to undertake in energetic style quick and decided operations.

FREDERICK'S DESPAIR

It is well known what dangers to his own person Frederick the Great incurred towards the close of this eventful day, and how crushed he felt at first after such unheard-of defeat. He believed the cause of Prussia to be lost; in a letter written on the evening of that unhappy day he bade "Farewell forever" to Minister Finckenstein, declared his brother Henry governor-general of the army of Prussia, and left the special charge of the defeated force in the hands of Lieutenant-General Finck.

The orders which the general received the following day are noteworthy, because the king, in the very moment when he resigns the command, not knowing what next to advise, yet indicates what in his mind should next be done, and whilst he renounces all hope still appears to open a way for hope to come. The king says, in these instructions issued on the 13th: "The unhappy army, as I leave it, is in no condition to fight longer with the Russians; Hadik will hurry to Berlin, perhaps so Laudon will also; if General Finck follows them both up, the Russians will fall on his rear; if he remains stationary by the Oder, he will get Hadik on this side: nevertheless, I believe, should Laudon go for Berlin, he might attack him on the way, and try to beat him. If that went well it would make a stand against misfortune, and hold matters stationary; time won is much in such desperate circumstances."

The conclusion of the document—"This is the only advice which in these unhappy circumstances I can give; if I had had any resources I should have held on"—seems certainly again to abandon hope. But, as a fact, the king gave up neither hope nor the command of the army. Already during the night of the 12th-13th he had considered how he might bring such troops as were in any way within reach to the help of the defeated army. This night he even despatched an order to Count Hordt, who, returned from his skirmishing on the Vistula, was waiting with a small division on the Warthe, to join the army at Reitwein. On the 13th reports came in from Hordt and from the country round Meissen; the king certainly sent them to General Finck, but with the remark that he would like to speak with him on the subject.

During the morning hours the Prussian generals and officers succeeded in bringing about twelve thousand men into tolerable order at Oetscher. These flocked back across the Oder to Reitwein, where they were joined by the battalion under Wunsch, and the king saw himself once more at the head of a force of eighteen thousand. The day before he had already named Reitwein to Count Hordt as a place of meeting—a proof that he hoped to keep his division here for some days. The bridge across the Oder was of course destroyed; the scrap of an army which confronted the Swedes was brought over it. On the 14th the king formally resumed the post of command, and held it undauntedly with as firm a hand as ever.

On the day after the battle the Russian generals had not yet recovered from their fever of triumph; they held a solemn thanksgiving service and there was no question of practical activity. Nothing of all that the king had foreseen and dreaded in spirit came to pass, chiefly because what Frederick the Great from his point of view regarded as the inevitable consequence of a lost battle lay quite outside the ken of most of the strategists of his time.⁹

THE VICTORY OF LIEGNITZ (1760 A.D.)

This event led to Frederick's going in person to Silesia under very discouraging circumstances. On the 29th of June, 1760, he wrote to Prince Ferdinand not to be surprised if he should soon hear bad news. But on the 17th of August, he was able to report to the prince that "Thanks be to

heaven!" he had gained a great advantage over the enemy. Since his arrival in Silesia he had done his very best to reach Schweidnitz or Breslau; "but all efforts," he said, "were fruitless, all my plans were wrecked by reason of the position of the Austrians, and the alertness of Lacy and Laudon. Pressed by the Russians, who refused to advance into Silesia unless the Austrians first gained a battle, Daun determined to attack me. Laudon was to take up his position on the heights of Liegnitz on my left, whilst Daun was to attack me in front. Informed of this plan, I took the heights of Pfaffendorf which Laudon wished to take." We simply repeat the report which Frederick gave the ducal ally. To comprehend vividly the incidents of the conflict, one must mount the church tower of Liegnitz. Frederick then encountered Laudon, who was at that moment approaching. Whilst the king took the necessary steps to keep Daun where he was, he attacked Laudon, completely defeating him; Laudon had left under arms only six thousand men of the thirty thousand under his command.

The king could not sufficiently praise the courage of his troops; the whole matter was settled in two hours. "We have given a companion to Rossbach." The Russians had only waited for success to attend the Austrians in order to make common cause with them. After the battle they retired across the Oder, and the king was able to re-establish his connection with Breslau. But it would be quite false to

attribute to him the feelings of a conqueror who is certain of his cause and its triumph. All his letters show that his situation was not at all improved by the victory. He had counted on an agreement between France and England, and he was now convinced that this was out of the question. The affairs of France were so closely connected with those of Austria and Russia that a peace which would have reconciled England to France and Prussia to Austria was impossible. He had confidently expected a movement of the Turks against Austria, for they had actually spoken of an alliance with England and Prussia, but Laudon's advance into Silesia showed him that Austria no longer feared the Turk's movements. And if the Danes once betrayed any intention to unite with England and Prussia so that with their help the Swedes might be expelled from Pomerania and the Russians from Prussia, this hope also failed, as it was impossible for Denmark to break at the same time with both France and Russia.

Frederick said there remained nothing for him to do but to attack the foe that first appeared, beat him, and then hasten to the spot where the next danger threatened. To project and execute his own plans was to him impracticable. His movements always depended upon circumstances. "One does not know



PRUSSIAN COSTUME 1760

[1760 A.D.]

which way to turn; I meet everywhere the same hindrances, the same difficulties, the same superiority. May heaven support us, for human foresight is not sufficient for such a cruel and desperate condition as ours." When Frederick turned to Silesia he felt how much his position in Saxony and his own hereditary dominions were thereby imperilled. "I could never justify myself were I to deliver all my lands to the violence of the enemy. We shall destroy ourselves in our own midst without a battle."

He conjured Prince Henry, who showed some indecision, to take strong measures and not to waver—a bad decision being better than none. With all his activity and zeal Prince Henry in his letter had betrayed that he felt too weak to fulfil his duties under these conditions. In his answer the king drew his attention to the fact that it was easy to serve the state in bright days, but a good citizen devoted his services to the community in times of misfortune. "We fight for honour and our fatherland undismayed by the superiority of our enemies. My cheerfulness and my good humour are buried with the beloved and honoured persons to whom I was attached. I have a great machine to control and am moreover without assistance; I tremble when I think of it. No wonder the trouble and disquiet which I have gone through in these two years have undermined my constitution" (he suffered then from nervous attacks). "My motto is 'Die or conquer'; in other cases there is a middle course; in mine there is none."

"You set a value upon life as a sybarite," he wrote to D'Argens; "I regard death as a stoic. I will never consent to sign a dishonourable peace. I will be buried under the ruins of my fatherland, or, if fate presses me too hard, I shall know how to put an end to my misfortune when it becomes unendurable."

It is, as we know, not the first time that he gave expression to this thought. His non-fulfilment of it was due to the fact that events never took such a turn as to exclude all possible outlet. It was only in the case of the state being completely ruined that he thought of putting an end to his existence. We do not doubt that he would have done it.



PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA (1726-1802 A.D.)

THE BATTLE OF TORGAU (1760 A.D.)

In striking contrast to this despairing state of mind of the king was that of the empress-queen, who in spite of the misfortune of Liegnitz urged with growing courage a decisive step against him. In her, as we have already said, was centred the direction of military affairs, and the supreme military council met under her presidency. Occasionally Daun would send his generals' opinions to Vienna, without adding any of his own, waiting for a decision, and the answers of the empress were decisive for the policy followed in the field. She wished above all things to have another action against Glogau, at which place the union with the Russians could really become an accomplished fact, and moreover the latter were not disinclined to co-operate in such an action.

But Laudon, the general of the ordnance, usually so enterprising, declared against it because the transport of the necessary siege material offered an insuperable difficulty. In fact, the Austrians themselves would not have been pleased to see an effective union of the two armies in Silesia, for the Russians, by reason of their small pay, were almost compelled to resort to plunder, and their commissariat would have involved great inconvenience. The empress also thought of taking Schweidnitz, as only by its possession could she be insured against further invasions of the king. She demanded this undertaking even in the case of its causing a battle, of which she herself would take the full responsibility. To this Daun replied that it was impossible to carry on the siege and at the same time be protected from the attacks of the king.

In the mean while Frederick had effected a junction with Prince Henry's army, and taken up a strong position. Maria Theresa thought her troops strong enough to attack it; it was intolerable to her that the campaign should end without resulting in any important victory for her. And as far as we can see Daun actually decided one day on such an attack, but the king exchanged his position for a still stronger one, in which he was unassailable. As nothing could now be accomplished in Silesia, Laudon advised the removal of the scene of war to Saxony. Lacy conceived the plan of making an incursion in conjunction with the Russians into Brandenburg, he himself taking command of the enterprise. It was not his intention to take possession of the country, but rather to plunder it chiefly for the benefit of the Russians.

This movement as well as the critical position of affairs in Saxony determined the king to leave Silesia and to meet his foes elsewhere in person. For the sake of Brandenburg such a move was necessary, as it had already been vacated by the invaders. The empress felt it was of the greatest importance for the Austrian army to follow up the king to Saxony, and she ordered her field-marshal especially to hold Leipsic and Torgau, and if necessary to venture a battle for this. And so it happened. Daun had taken up a strong position on the heights of Süptitz near Torgau, and fortified it with numerous cannon. The king attacked it forthwith (November 3rd). It was here that Zieten gained his fame. Zieten still represented the sentiments and character of the times of Frederick William I. He had gained his reputation as leader of the hussars who so successfully encountered Nadasdi's Croats. His undertakings met with such success that everyone wished to serve under "Father Zieten" (as they called him), and the highest military posts came within his reach. The half of the army which Daun was to encounter was intrusted to him. It is not known whether the king attacked prematurely or whether Zieten tarried longer than was expected. At last he appeared. Then victory was assured to the Prussians. Attack and resistance were worthy of each other. "It was," says Frederick, who never lost his literary vein, "as if two thunderstorms driven by contrary winds came into concussion."

The Austrians retreated to Dresden. The king defeated them once more, but he did not thereby bring about any notable change in the situation. "I must," he said, "expel the Russians from the Neumark, Laudon from Silesia, and Daun from Saxony. I shall be in a no better position after the battle than in the preceding year." Thus he entered on the year 1761.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1761

It was felt in Austria, and during the winter the feeling was confirmed, that nothing could be done against the Prussian power, which had the best positions in Saxony and occupied the fortresses in Silesia; but yet the continuation of the war was desired as the country was sure of Russian support.

[1761 A.D.]

The Russian court, having its own great interests at stake, also agreed to war. It did not much signify that the chief command had passed from Soltikoff to Buturlin, as Fermor was and remained the soul of the undertaking.

The Russians' attention was now immediately directed to Kolberg. But they also wished to take part in the campaign of the Austrians in Silesia. Let Daun, said they, keep the king busy in Saxony, and they would co-operate with Laudon, who commanded almost independently of the field-marshal in Silesia. Hence the king intrusted the army in Saxony to his brother, in order that he might meet the greater danger in his own person. The Russians moved forward slowly. In the middle of July, 1761, they crossed the boundary of Silesia and struck their camp at Militisch. Laudon, strengthened very considerably from Lusatia, was preparing to join them. Although the union of the foes was at first prevented, it could not long be deferred. In the second half of August both armies came in direct touch in the vicinity of Liegnitz. Frederick then took up a strong position at Bunzelwitz, which, however, they could not decide to attack. When both the armies separated again, Frederick hoped by threatening Moravia to force Laudon to vacate Silesia. But Laudon, on the contrary, profited by the first withdrawal of the king from Bunzelwitz to deal a bold stroke at the badly fortified Schweidnitz, and to take the place on the 1st of October, 1761. So Frederick was powerless; he had to allow the Austrians and the Russian corps that had remained with Laudon to take up their winter quarters in Silesia.

In Saxony the Austrians, united with the imperial army, maintained good positions on the Elbe, in the independent portion of Saxony (Vogtland) and on the Saale. The campaign in lower Saxony was of great importance. The French had made fresh efforts to conquer Hanover. It has been maintained that an army as great as that now put into the field by them had never been collected in this war. The French had already gained possession of Cassel and Göttingen, places of little importance, but which were rendered tenable by the French with their capacity for rapid fortification. But Duke Ferdinand knew how to meet them with the cleverest manœuvres, even after they had crossed the Weser. By incessant small engagements he saved Hanover; they had pushed on even as far as Einbeck, but he obliged them to evacuate the place. Nevertheless the French held their own in Hesse; from Mühlhausen, which they held, they were in touch with the imperial army, which had advanced as far as Saalfeld. It was the common fate of the Prussian armies in Silesia, Saxony, and in the west of Germany to be attacked by a very superior power, against which each held its own in ever-renewed danger.

The three generals at the head of these armies formed a triumvirate of defence; they vied with each other in talent, application, and military capacity. For the Saxon lands intrusted to him Prince Henry had formed a defensive system which he brought into use both prudently and persistently, making the most of the smallest advantages offered by the topography of the country. Duke Ferdinand succeeded in uniting the Hanoverian interest with the Prussian and in opposing it to the French because it was north German. He was a pupil of Frederick, whose strategic principles he adopted. The defensive rôle which he was compelled to adopt he carried out by a system of continual attack. He also knew how to unite for a great aim the various divisions of his army advancing under different colours. By his tactful combinations he deceived the enemy, even though superior in number, and finally repulsed him.

Frederick was occupied with continual strategic encounters, ever appearing at the point where the danger was greatest, ever ready and alert, never broken by misfortune, summoning fresh courage after every defeat, inexhaustible in bold designs, showing equal skill in taking advantage of small oppor-

tunities and in seizing the great, decisive moments. His particular characteristic was the combination of politics with war, both uniting in maintaining the position which he held. Great men are not made by luck alone. Battles can be won by chance or by a one-sided talent. The hero is formed by maintaining a great cause under misfortunes and dangers. Frederick is frequently compared with Napoleon. The chief difference between them is that Napoleon was against all the world, but all the world was against Frederick; Napoleon wished to found a new empire, Frederick, during the Seven Years' War, only wished to defend himself. Napoleon set enormous forces in motion, Frederick was master of very limited resources. Napoleon fought for an authority embracing the whole continent, Frederick for his very existence. Frederick we see contending for long years with stronger enemies, always on the edge of the abyss which threatened to engulf him; Napoleon also passed long years in continual struggle, but always in view of a definite triumph, until the superior world powers overthrew the ambitious man at one blow. Napoleon's bequest was the military glory of the French; Frederick's bequest to his state was the salvation of its existence.

THE DEATH OF ELIZABETH OF RUSSIA (1762 A.D.)

When one considers the position of affairs—the still indissoluble alliance of France with Austria, the insuperable enmity of Maria Theresa, and the importance of the assistance which she expected from Russia for the next campaign—there was only one event which could materially change Frederick's position, and that event occurred: the empress Elizabeth died on the 5th of January, 1762. Although far-reaching political plans in Russia were connected with the war, the origin of the participation of Russia in the plans of Austria was of a very personal character, and the empress Elizabeth had another faction at her side, which only waited for her death to put an end to the war.

At the first news Frederick still doubted what the outcome of the matter would be. But on the 5th of February he wrote to Duke Ferdinand that he hoped in a few weeks to be at peace with Russia. The greatest danger with which he had to contend was the union of a Russian force with an Austrian corps. On the 5th of February he was able to announce that Chernichev, the leader of the Russians, would separate from the Austrians the following day.

The new czar, Peter III, was enthusiastically attracted to Frederick by the fame of his martial deeds. "All the news I receive of him," writes King Frederick, "shows me that he is well inclined towards me; I hope that the differences which I have with Russia will soon be settled and that the Russian troops will return home." Another prospect, for which he had long hoped, became more than ever probable. For he learned that an attack of the Turks was feared in Poland as well as in the Austrian domains. In the Divan there was, in fact, a party headed by the mufti and the grand vizier who desired an alliance with Russia. But the influence of Austria and France was exerted against this. The king still hoped to forestall a decision in favour of Austria by bringing about an alliance with himself; he had also some reason to count upon the support of the Tatars.

But these eventualities were, as subsequent events showed, very uncertain; and far transcending them in importance was the change in the relations with Russia. Strong assurances of friendship were exchanged between Frederick and Peter III; and Frederick considered it a good omen that the czar asked him to grant him the highest Prussian order. A truce was concluded, and peace negotiations set in seriously. Frederick, who regarded the matter pri-

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marily from the military point of view, remarked in his letters to Prince Henry that now the Prussian army had its back free.

It is in the nature of political alliances not only to affect the relation of one state to another, but also to be conditioned by the inner changes in the different states. Frederick had just experienced similar effects in England, when the ministry which was friendly to him was followed by a faction which manifested an aversion to him. That which in England was the result of parliamentary division was in Russia the consequence of a palace revolution which precipitated Peter III from his throne and put his wife in his place.

That which had been commenced in the year 1757 was carried out in the summer of 1762. The grand duchess had always had a party of her own, which would unite neither with the empress Elizabeth nor with Peter III. Soon after the accession of the latter to the throne, foreign ambassadors sought to establish connections with the grand duchess, who gave utterance to what she would have done had she not been destitute of all influence. The foolish actions of her husband which equally affected the Russian church and the Russian army, led to the catastrophe. Catherine placed herself at the head of a movement which had a national complexion. But those in Vienna who expected that she would revert to the system of the empress Elizabeth were doomed to disappointment.

Catherine recognised the peace which her predecessor and consort had concluded with the king of Prussia. Prussia and Pomerania, which were still in her hands, she returned to Frederick without enforcing upon him conditions in favour of Austria. She desisted only from rendering the aid which had been promised to the king, and she gave orders to her army to return to Russia. The old system of the empress Elizabeth was permanently abandoned. It was at the commencement of her reign that Catherine conceived the idea, to which she adhered to the end of her life, of taking up a position between Austria and Prussia. But this also led to a further change in the relation of the belligerent powers. Frederick profited by the last moment, in which it at least seemed as if the Russians were on his side, to take from the Austrians their position at Burkersdorf, which might have been menacing to him; and after some time Schweidnitz fell into his hands, on the 9th of October. A few weeks later Prince Henry succeeded in surprising the Austrian and the imperial troops at Freiberg and expelling them on the 29th of October from their strong position; so that the Prussians in the war with Austria, towards the end of the year 1762, were unquestionably in the ascendant. In the mean while Duke Ferdinand had unexpectedly attacked the French, and in a campaign full of vicissitudes he managed to besiege Cassel, the most important place still held by the French, and to force it to capitulate on the 1st of November. But this did not in any way conclude the great struggle. Austria and France still remained armed, and it was not evident how their alliance against Prussia would be broken. An unexpected change of affairs was then imminent.

PACIFICATIONS

The peace negotiations between France and England that had been often commenced and always interrupted were now formally entered upon. It cannot be asserted that England quite overlooked her obligations towards Prussia, for more than once reference was made to the Treaty of Westminster in the negotiations concerning the return of Wesel, Gelderland, and the Westphalian possessions of the king of Prussia. George III declared that he could not conclude the matter without the assent of Frederick. But far more decided was the consideration shown by France to Austria. Choiseul let the

empress know that he was ready to drop the negotiations with England if Austria did not approve of them. We do not venture to deny the truth of this utterance. For if Russia had declined further participation in the war, it could nevertheless have been continued by the French and Austrians, as in fact it was continued. But at that moment a crisis came which made the possibility of continuing the war extremely doubtful for both powers.

The declaration of the going-over of the emperor Peter to the enemies of Austria had just been made known. Galitzin had given official information of it to Prince Kaunitz on the 2nd of June. It was the moment in which England, if the peace were not concluded, could have taken a Russian army to Germany, and would thereby have dealt a decisive blow in favour of the Prusso-English and to the detriment of the Franco-Austrian interests. And it seemed always possible that Bute would be overthrown and the Great Commoner would again hold the rudder of England, an eventuality which the king of Prussia desired, but one which the French, who were now at one with the English ministry, regarded with horror.

At the moment of this all-threatening crisis it was thought in Vienna that above all things the good understanding of the French ministry with the English should be utilised in order to assure the peaceful settlement which was now attainable. The oriental complication had also advanced so far that the war in Germany could not be continued without imperilling Austria. It was under this pressure that Maria Theresa dropped the idea with which she had undertaken the war, and to which she had hitherto clung. She excuses herself for abstaining from showing the king of Prussia his proper place, necessary as this was for the welfare of her house, of the Catholic religion, and of Germany. She now abandoned her original idea of bringing about a state of affairs in which all danger from the Prussian side would be put an end to. She had no objection to a peace between France and England, provided the county of Glatz were given her and an indemnity to the elector of Saxony. It was this declaration, which was quite opposed to the purposes for which the alliance had been concluded with France, that rendered peace possible. The French accepted it with satisfaction, albeit not with the warmth which Maria Theresa had expected; moreover they attached to the proviso concerning Glatz the condition that indemnification should be given them on the Netherlands border, which caused astonishment and anger in Vienna.

A certain transatlantic event also placed difficulties in the way of a settlement of peace. The negotiations were powerless to prevent the blow already waiting to descend: Havana fell into the hands of the English. This event, like the entire naval war, was to the detriment of France and her allies. However, the conclusion of the peace was not thereby hindered; France gained some advantages from its stipulations, owing to the compliance of the English ministry. The preliminaries were signed on the 3rd of November, 1762.

In the above-mentioned declaration of Maria Theresa, and the conclusion of the preliminaries between France and England, lay the peace of the world. Both together manifest the signification and the result of the Seven Years' War. France abandoned the idea of staying the power of the Anglo-American development on the other side of the ocean, and although England had undoubtedly gained the maritime preponderance in North America, she abandoned the idea of destroying the French and Spanish colonial power, in which, as affairs stood at the moment, she might have succeeded. Austria also renounced the idea of freeing her old authority in Germany from the limitations imposed on it by the Prussian power.

She determined to grant the king of Prussia that safety the imperilling of which had led him to take up arms. If there were moments in which Fred-

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erick could have trusted himself to impose laws upon the Austrian power or to overthrow it, such a plan was perhaps not even formed, much less would it have been practicable. Austria had in the years of the war developed her own military forces, and was unbroken in power. The countries of the monarchy were bound together closer than ever by the danger and strain of the war.

The fact of importance in the history of the world is that North American independence of France and the undiminished existence of the Prussian state were not only contemporaneous, but there was a very close connection between the struggles attending them. The first opened up a measureless future, but the eyes of contemporaries were directed mostly to the latter. It was an event of eminently historical importance. All life is preserved by struggle. The Prussian state had been evolved upon ancient principles corresponding with those of the other powers, although not quite like them; and it had gained a position of real independence which represented a peculiar principle. But it was attacked by superior foes, and threatened with limitations which would have annihilated it. For its existence lay in its power. This immense danger was now victoriously withstood by Frederick; for the province, by the acquisition of which the rank of a European power had been attained, could be regarded as permanently secured. This was the position of affairs in the main; in detail there were still questions of a certain importance to be decided.ⁱ

THE PEACE OF HUBERTUSBURG (1763 A.D.)

The exchange of ratifications of the treaty was accomplished by the three ambassadors at Hubertusburg, on the 1st of March, 1763. On that occasion Fritsch delivered a protest against Article XVIII of the Austro-Prussian treaty of peace, touching the Jülich succession, which was accepted by Hertzberg and Von Collenbach with a counter-protest. This was the last time that Saxony disputed about the succession of Jülich.

King Frederick thereupon received the plenipotentiaries at Dahlen. Collenbach could not sufficiently praise the great consideration which the king had manifested for the empress at this conference. He sincerely wished to live henceforth at peace with Maria Theresa. At the Austrian court, also, there prevailed a conciliatory mood. Kaunitz felt compelled to speak highly of the attitude of the king throughout the peace negotiations. The evacuation of conquered territory, usually connected with so many disagreeable features, was soon accomplished, and the generals in charge easily came to an agreement with regard to the exchange of the prisoners of war.

The document relating to the inclusion of the allies was signed later, by Hertzberg at Berlin on the 12th of March, by Collenbach at Dresden on the 20th of the month. The delay sprang from the desire of the Austrian government to obtain the assent of the French court, which was given only reluctantly; the latter evinced some surprise at the readiness with which the imperial court had yielded to the Prussian demand in respect to the empress of Russia.

As soon as his presence in Saxony was no longer needed, Frederick departed for Silesia, in order to give affairs in that province his personal supervision. On the 30th of March he returned to the capital, which he had not entered since the 12th of January, 1757. The queen had returned from Magdeburg on the 17th of February, and was received with lively demonstrations of joy. The public rejoicing reached its height, when, one half-hour after her arrival a courier from Leipsic brought the news that the peace was consummated.

EUROPE AT THE CLOSE OF THE WAR

King Frederick avoided a solemn reception; he arrived in Berlin at a late hour, towards nine in the evening. At his side was Ferdinand of Brunswick, who had journeyed to meet him. The king was not in a happy state of mind. On the 25th of February he had written to D'Argens: "As for me, poor grey-headed man, I go back to a city where I know only the walls, where I find none of my old acquaintances; where immeasurable labour awaits me, and where my old bones will soon find a refuge that will be disturbed neither by war, nor by misfortune, nor by man's baseness."

The task which awaited Frederick he himself describes with sharp strokes. "The Prussian state is like a man covered with wounds, weak from loss of blood, and about to succumb to the weight of his sufferings; he needs fresh nourishment to raise him up, a tonic to strengthen him, balsam to heal his scars."

The nobility were exhausted, the lower classes ruined, a multitude of villages had been burned down, many cities laid waste, partly through sieges, partly by incendiaries in the service of the enemy. A complete anarchy had overthrown the administrative and police regulations, monetary conditions were deranged; in short, the devastation was universal. The army was in no better condition than the rest of the country. Seventeen battles had snatched off the flower of officers and soldiers. The regiments were ruined, and consisted, in part, of deserters and prisoners. Order had almost vanished, and discipline had become so lax that the old infantry regiments were no better than a raw militia. It was necessary to fill up the regiments to restore order and discipline, and, above all, to reanimate the young officers with the spur of fame in order to restore to this degenerate mass its former energy.

Great Britain, also, had heavy burdens to bear as a result of a war waged on three continents. The national debt was almost doubled and reached the amount of nearly £150,000,000. But the public credit remained unshaken, industry and commerce received a fresh start, the value of imports and exports during the war had increased by millions, and the new conquests more than compensated for the large expenditure of money. That the English people did not garner the fruit of its glorious achievements was the fault of its unwise and unjust government. It is true that Lord Bute was obliged to give way to the universal hatred: he gave up his office on the 8th of April, 1763, and stepped behind the curtain; but the narrow-minded and short-sighted governmental system of George III and his ministers was not thereby changed. The final result was that England stood alone among the European powers, without a friend, that the grievances of the colonies against illegal treatment and oppression rose higher from year to year, until the climax was reached in the open breach and the declaration of the independence of the American colonies of the mother country. However, even after the dissension and separation there still remained as a result of the Seven Years' War the prize of victory—not the least among those striven for on the German battlefields—that the future of America belonged to the Germanic race.

Wholly otherwise was it with the powers that were mainly responsible for the war—France and Austria. Louis XV had abandoned the most loyal colonies for the German war, shaken to its foundations the maritime position of France, and utterly exhausted the finances. True, Choiseul's diplomatic skill had isolated England, while France maintained her alliance with Spain and Austria. Charles III of Spain counted on France for a future reckoning with England, and as far as Germany was concerned, the French court directed its aim after, as before the war, to "binding the cabinet of Vienna to itself by the

[1763 A.D.]

fear of Prussia." But the inner rottenness widened and deepened as the result of a war conducted in opposition to every interest of France, and merely to please the obstinacy of Louis XV. The order of Jesuits had, indeed, been suppressed. The highest courts of justice, the parliament of Paris at their head, declared the statutes of the order to be incompatible with the laws of the realm, and pronounced the dissolution of the order. The government readily assented to the execution of the decision. This was a step in the direction of reform, but the ruin had spread so far that even Choiseul now foresaw a convulsion, yea, even a revolution of the existing political order.

By the dissolution and dismemberment of Prussia, Maria Theresa had hoped to make her house, and also the Catholic church, supreme in Germany. The wisdom and perseverance of Kaunitz enabled him to press for this purpose into the service of the empress the gold and the armed power of France, as well as the armies of Russia and the contingents of Sweden and the princes of the empire. But the system of the Austrian alliances was too artificially fashioned, and the mutually repellent peoples never worked harmoniously together. Thus the superior genius and indomitable perseverance of a Frederick, supported by the decision and faithfulness of a Pitt, and—when the latter had to give way to the intrigues of his opponents at court—by the sudden and complete reversal in the policy of Russia, had enabled him to keep the field against terrible odds. On the other hand, Maria Theresa saw her plans of conquest frustrated, and although she came out of the struggle with honour, yet her country could not so easily recover from the evil results of the war. The national debt, which in 1755 amounted to 180,000,000 florins, was raised to 271,870,164 florins—a burden so intolerable that it was no easy task to re-establish a balance between income and expenditure. The imperial authority in Germany more than ever was weakened, and the states of the empire that had remained true to the imperial house, above all Saxony, were estranged from it by their bitter experiences, and were completely exhausted. The Catholic powers had weakened, while the Protestant peoples had strengthened and matured.

Prussia had sunk low at the close of the Seven Years' War, yet her heart was sound. Under the heroic leadership of her great king her existence was saved, and the baptism of fire and blood which the Prussians received enabled them to rise to new power and prosperity. This was a blessing for the entire German race. As Goethe says: "Frederick saved the honour of a part of the Germans against a united world, and every member of the nation was allowed to share in the victories of this great prince by applauding and admiring him. He was the brilliant polar star around whom Germany, Europe, yea, the whole world seemed to revolve." When later Prussia was again crushed down, it was out of this glorious past that she drew the strength to steel herself for the great conflict, to demonstrate to all the world her moral and intellectual energy, and to approve herself the shield of the German name and honour. In the victories and in the perseverance of Frederick the Great lay the future of the German fatherland.^k

THE STRATEGY OF FREDERICK AND NAPOLEON

The difference, partly essential, partly the result of circumstance, between the armies of Frederick and Napoleon, lies in the fact that Frederick's army was much smaller, had no skirmishers, and was not an army of conscription. None of these characteristics is peculiar to Frederick alone, but all have their analogy in the armies of his opponents. Consequently a battle under the new

rules of war was considered from quite a different standpoint than a battle under the old rules.

Battle is the most efficient means for deciding the issues of war. It seems as though almost any mistake that can be made in strategy can be retrieved by a victorious engagement; and a general who decides upon a pitched battle, and in it comes off conqueror, appears, in no matter what circumstances, to have done well in war. Accordingly one might suppose that, at any rate, the stronger of two adversaries in war could have no other intention from beginning to end than to force an encounter, and by repeated victories convince his opponent that he has no resource but complete submission.

But this is not always unconditionally the case. There are also Pyrrhic victories. It may happen that the advantage to be gained by victory is so small that it disappears when compared with the losses involved and the danger—never entirely to be overlooked—that even after a battle is won there may come a reverse; and the general may count with safety upon serving the purpose of war better in some other way. A general with such a force as Napoleon or a general of our time in such a position and in such circumstances cannot act rightly in this way.

The number of his forces enabled Napoleon invariably to follow his victories to the utmost extent and to occupy whole countries. For his swift *voltigeurs* no position was impregnable, and if the enemy once in a way did find such a position, it was still easy for Napoleon, hampered by no anxious fears for his commissariat, to find a way round; and even if the enemy did not then come within fighting range, his army was so numerous that he could march past the force of the enemy and occupy so much of his territory that the latter was compelled to follow lest he should lose the whole.

Frederick could do nothing of this kind. The advantages which he might have expected from a victory were far fewer. For instance, it happened to him that, after his brilliant victory at Soor, in Bohemia, he had to go back to Silesia over the mountains. He could neither pursue in Napoleon's fashion, nor, owing to the smallness of his army, could he occupy the enemy's country as Napoleon did. And eventually he found the enemy collected in bands unassailable by the rigid lines of his infantry. He must feel the loss of a battle far more heavily than Napoleon. According to the nature of linear tactics, a battle for him was a much bloodier business than for Napoleon; he often lost a third, and more than a third of his force; for Frederick, also, losses were far more difficult to replace than for Napoleon.

For these reasons Frederick's strategic system, and not his only but the system of his epoch, of Turenne, of Eugene, of Marlborough, of Ferdinand of Brunswick, necessarily differed from Napoleon's. Let us next examine the leading features of the Napoleonic strategy, without personal reference to Frederick.

To call it "methodical warfare" is not a happy expression, nor is the meaning very clearly defined. It is an unfortunate phrase, for, after all, every war waged according to a plan, whether Napoleon's or Moltke's, is methodical; the method is only different from that of the eighteenth century. The idea is, besides, not sufficiently defined, because it is often used merely for a system which has become stereotyped. We have therefore called it the system of the old monarchy, which lasted from the Thirty Years' War and Louis XIV up to the time of the Revolution. The train of thought underlying this system is as follows:

The weapons of war at one's disposal are not sufficient completely to defeat the opposing power. We should not, even after the very greatest victory, be in a position completely to destroy his fighting strength, to take his capital, and occupy the greatest part of his possessions. Therefore he must be reduced

to submission and peace not so much by conquest as by being worn out. If we take one of his border provinces and several fortresses, and choose a strong position from which he cannot hope to drive us, he will, when the tension has lasted some time, and his finances are exhausted, quietly submit to our conditions of peace. The most direct way of obtaining such an ascendancy is of course a battle; but it is also possible in some circumstances to manœuvre back the enemy by skilful marching. One must try to win a position where one can protect both magazine and commissariat from the enemy, and at the same time try for a position so unassailable that the enemy will not venture to attack there.

It was in this manner that in the year 1744 the Austrian field-marshal Traun manœuvred Frederick out of Bohemia, without, so to speak, firing a single shot, and yet causing the Prussians terrible losses through hardship, want, and desertions. A very common and successful move in warfare was to lay siege to an enemy's position, and, with the force used for this siege, to cover an encamped post which the enemy would not venture to attack. If such a situation were successfully arranged, and thoroughly prepared with cunning and celerity, strategy conquered without either the danger or the loss caused by an encounter. All movements, aimed in this manner, at getting the better of the enemy without direct bloodshed, are called in the exact sense manœuvring, as opposed to those movements which are aimed at securing, by means of a pitched battle, the greatest advantage obtainable.

Manœuvring and the Pitched Battle

The strategical system of the old monarchy has therefore two opposite poles—manœuvring and the pitched battle. In the Napoleonic system, manœuvring, in the above sense, played scarcely any part, and was only rarely employed. On the other hand, two theorists of the eighteenth century, Lloyd and Bülow, went so far as to declare pitched battles to be quite superfluous. They brought "methods" to bear on the question; for example, substituted for the fact that the nearer you keep to your commissariat the safer it is, the "rule" that the army must be separated from its "base" (the district from which the commissariat is supplied), only in so far that, joined to the terminus of the "base," it should form a right angle; and declared, "skilful generals will always make knowledge of the country, science of position, encampments, and marching, the groundwork of their regulations, rather than let the matter rest upon the uncertain issue of a battle." Those who understand such matters can direct campaigns with geometrical exactness, and conduct a long war without ever finding it necessary to come to a "pitched battle." Here we have the point of departure of Frederick the Great from his contemporaries.

The natural warlike instinct prompts a general to let battle decide the issue. A victory—a victory in a great battle—lives forever; it not only destroys the material fighting power of the enemy, but destroys his confidence and energy. The changes in human fate which mark universal history move between the lines of battle. No truly great general can be imagined without the temperament to feel himself driven by a sort of passion to challenge the great issues of fate, to measure his own strength against the greatest that humanity can do, to crown himself and his cause with victory. This was the line followed by Charles XII, one of nature's great generals; and it led him to Pultowa. But Frederick was greater than Charles XII, because he did not abandon himself to this impulse, because he knew not only the strength of his power and his army, but also the limits of that strength; because he could control his own passion and abide by the strategical system of his time. But it was within the limits of this strategical system that his superiority to all his

contemporaries showed itself, because he so immeasurably excelled in the great military quality of boldness; and by virtue of this quality, to keep to our metaphor, stretched as far towards the pole of battle that, on the other hand, he closely embraced the opposite pole of manœuvring. It is clear that a general with such a grasp of mind might in practice easily make use of a stratagem whose difference from the Napoleonic is not to be recognised at first sight.

The system of the old monarchy demands battle not for its own, for mere destruction's sake; but there must be a still more particular, a still more definite reason. So far, good. Now if, during a lengthy period of war, such special reasons for battle are continually shown, and the general is determined on this account continually to strive for battles, he practically turns for the time in the direction of the Napoleonic strategy. Frederick the Great often turned in this direction, and this fact is responsible for a widespread historical misunderstanding. When Napoleon threw the rules and the system of war of the old Europe to the winds, it was not the least of his advantages that the generals opposed to him were still in the toils of the old strategy, which had become stereotyped as "method." They still believed in the "magical power of manœuvre," and before they saw their mistake the enemy was upon them and they were defeated. The archduke Charles, too, clung to the old principles: and in the campaigns of 1814, in his headquarters particularly, these principles caused the one general amongst all others who had most outgrown them, Charles' ally, Gneisenau (with Blücher) the greatest difficulties. The mistake Wellington made in 1815, entailing not only upon himself but also upon the Prussians the defeat of Ligny, also sprang from the old, now rather obsolete, strategical point of view taken by this otherwise great general.


It was in the first instance through Clausewitz's teachings that the old heaven was entirely worked out of the minds of the Prussian officers. But it was only actually adopted when a new view crowded out the old—namely, that battle must be understood as absolute, not relative. The disciples of the new did not say to those of the old, "You were in the right formerly, but times have changed"; but they said, "You spoiled it through folly and blundering." To us it now looks different. We regard the warfare of the eighteenth century as something historically authorised and inevitable.

This in no way teaches us that all salvation lies exclusively in tactical decision and therefore battle must always be striven for. It gave other means of the art of war into our hands. And it is not difficult for anyone to understand that even men who are found worthy to stand at the head of an army should, in the face of immeasurable responsibility and danger, evince a certain preference for the gentler way; and that even in moments when only the "proud law of battle" ought to have been invoked, even in moments when fate showed itself most favourably inclined to them, they should not always have known, like Frederick, how to snatch a fleeting opportunity.

We have even seen how Frederick's own greatness begins to lose its gloss, if we take him out of his own and measure him by the rule of the nineteenth century. Why had he not begun the war already in July, 1756? Why did he not storm the camp at Pirna? Why did he not continue the war in October? Why did he only let himself be persuaded to take the offensive by Winterfeld and Schwerin in 1757? Why did he avoid battle at Olmütz? Why did he not fight it out to the end at Zorndorf? Why, after he had beaten the army under Laudon at Liegnitz, did he not straightway fall upon Daun and his troops? Why, in 1761, did he not attack Laudon at Nossen? Why, in 1762, did he fight no decisive battle? Why did he, through the whole of 1778, never once go to battle?

A hundred such questions one could put from the standpoint of doctrinary

strategy, and by each the king would appear less great. It is as if one looked at him through the wrong end of a field glass. But it is otherwise, and it is truer, if we succeed in picturing the natural strategic system of the old monarchy as Frederick's system; and—against the monotonous background of the web of manœuvres that he spun year after year—we see standing out the victories of Prague and Leuthen, Rossbach, Zorndorf, and Torgau, and finally, only to enhance the glories of these victories still more, the dark shadows of defeat in Kolin and Kunersdorf. Then only, placing him where he lived, in his own century, you see that the figure of this great monarch towers, not above a host of pygmies, but even above a host of those we reckon in the first rank of the world's heroes.





CHAPTER V

THE LATER YEARS OF FREDERICK THE GREAT

[1763-1786 A.D.]

Frederick was a ruler in the noblest sense of the word. Whatever be the final word of investigation concerning him, one thing is certain: Frederick not only raised his country to the rank of a great European power, but he also lighted for it a torch of truth so powerful that the way to further light and glory can be missed only by the most reckless carelessness. But King Frederick is a historical giant not only to the Prussians: all nations, all princes, all philosophers can strengthen and edify themselves by the study of his life, of which even the small spots, like the spots of the sun, are instructive.—PREUSS.^b

REPAIRING A RUINED PRUSSIA

THAT story of Frederick's sitting wrapt in a cloud of reflections Olympian-Abysmal, in the music chapel at Charlottenburg, while he had the Ambrosian Song executed for him there, as the preliminary step, was a loose myth; but the fact lying under it is abundantly certain. Few sons of Adam had more reason for a piously-thankful feeling towards the Past, a piously-valiant towards the Future. What king or man had seen himself delivered from such strangling imbroglios of destruction, such devouring rages of a hostile world? And the ruin worked by them lay monstrous and appalling all round. Frederick is now fifty-one gone; unusually old for his age; feels himself an old man, broken with years and toils; and here lies his kingdom in haggard slashed

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condition, worn to skin and bone: How is the king, resourceless, to remedy it? That is now the seemingly impossible problem. "Begin it,—thereby alone will it ever cease to be impossible!" Frederick begins, we may say, on the first morrow morning. Labours at his problem as he did in the march to Leuthen; finds it to become more possible, day after day, month after month, the farther he strives with it.^o

AUSTRIA AND THE EMPIRE

Frederick had wrested Silesia from the house of Austria, but he did not fulfil his second intention, which was to detach the empire from this house and to re-establish the highest authority in the empire on a wider basis. The famous princess who lost Silesia conquered the empire by the force of her arms; she handed it over to her husband of the house of Lorraine, and, after his death, to her son. In truth she was the emperor: the empire was and remained a constituent part of the power of Austria. The seat of the aulic council was at her royal residence; the supreme imperial court was directed from Vienna, and the majority of votes at the diet of Ratisbon belonged to Austria. As of old, the ecclesiastical princes and Catholicism in general joined themselves to Austria; the conqueror of Silesia played in the empire only the part that his rank as one of the first princes of the empire allotted to him, although he was raised beyond all comparison by his military power and his fame.

But as the loss and gain on both sides resulted not only from a German but also a European war, and as both powers were not only German but also European, their opposition formed one of the most important moments in international relations.

Under all the disputes, especially those in regard to European affairs, the necessity and desire for an understanding became apparent. Nothing had ever made a greater impression on the young emperor, Joseph II, who in 1765 succeeded his father Francis I, than the fact that the prince of a territorial state should not only have been able to withstand the great powers who had hitherto only needed to threaten to find obedience, but should also have successfully resisted them when in unison they turned their arms against him, and compelled them to seek a disadvantageous peace with him; he was convinced by this that Austria required an inner regeneration before it would again be able to measure itself with him. He participated in the general admiration which the king aroused in the world, but at the same time he perceived in him an enemy who would at all times be dangerous. From his example he thought to borrow the means and ways to fight against him.

Eager to see the world and to instruct himself by travel, in the year 1766 Joseph visited the battle-field of Torgau, on which Frederick had compelled the Austrian army, far superior to his in number, to evacuate the strongest positions. When on the spot he was seized by the desire to know the powerful captain who had succeeded in doing so much. A high Prussian officer was present, and it would have required only a word from the emperor to bring about a meeting, for there is no doubt that the king also desired one. But at first there was much opposition to the idea in Vienna. Prince Kaunitz foresaw a thousand and one annoyances that might ensue; he was even afraid that the king might gain an influence over the emperor. He suggested to the empress to write to her son in this sense. Later, when advances were observed on Frederick's side, there was not so much opposition against it, as a refusal might have offended the king. But the emperor, meanwhile, had received instructions from his mother and had followed them. In a meeting with the Prussian general Kameke he did not pronounce the expected word; he sup-

pressed his wish, which was still very active, to learn to know the admired ruler. On continuing the journey which led to upper Silesia he sorrowfully perceived from a height the lost provinces which he was not to enter.

In the year 1768, on the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, by which Austria was very closely affected, it seemed advisable to the empress and to the leading statesman himself to concede to the desires of Joseph. Austria was then arming, in order to intervene, if necessary, in favour of Turkey. It seemed worth while to ascertain the attitude which King Frederick, the ally of Russia, expected to assume in this conflict. The Austrian general, Nugent, who officiated as ambassador in Berlin, made overtures toward this end. Frederick would have liked first to have certain questions answered with regard to Poland and the Franco-English relations; that this was refused in Vienna did not nevertheless prevent him from acceding to the proposal. The meeting was arranged for the last days of August, at which time the king would be in Silesia, where it could take place most easily. The emperor, who had just returned from a journey in Italy, expressed himself to the effect that nothing he had seen till now could compare with the acquaintance which he expected to make on this occasion. But whilst he looked forward to the gratification of his wishes, in which curiosity, admiration, and irrepressibly hostile feelings were strangely mixed, a political task also fell to his share: he was to inspire the king with confidence, to remove from his mind any anxiety about further hostile intentions on the part of Austria, and at the same time to show him that there was no jealousy felt on account of his alliance with Russia.

JOSEPH II VISITS FREDERICK

On the 25th of August Joseph entered Neisse. He had stipulated to remain under the incognito of Count von Falkenstein, under which he chiefly travelled, and to take up his residence at an inn (the Three Crowns). On his arrival, however, he drove straight to the residence of the king, who awaited him at the steps and immediately led him to the dinner table; the meal lasted long enough to form a first general acquaintance. The emperor was astonished that the princes present—the brother of the king, who was remarkable for his external insignificance, and his nephew, who excited notice by his tall figure and manly beauty—willingly observed a respectful silence towards the king. The latter spoke almost alone; but Joseph was by no means silent.

Soon after the dinner the king visited him at the inn, and they had a long interview, which extended over the next two days, occasionally interrupted and enlivened by military manœuvres. These pleased the emperor the most; the conversation gave him a feeling of embarrassment and discomfort. It must have been a curious sight, these two princes—the grey weather-beaten hero with a glorious past, and the young, aspiring emperor facing a brilliant future—on intimate terms with each other. The conversation touched upon everything, including the events of the late war. Joseph was astonished at the modesty with which the king spoke of his warlike deeds. Both in speaking and writing he was just to his opponents. Literature was lightly passed over; the principal object of both was political discussion. In the strongest terms Joseph many times repeated that Austria had no longer any thought of Silesia. The king was not completely convinced as to this; but it was of the greatest importance that the two princes should promise one another that, no matter what might happen under the prevailing uncertainty of European relations, they would always observe the peace restored between them. In this Frederick rightly saw a confirmation and strengthening of the treaties of Dresden and Hubertusburg.

[1768 A.D.]

The Franco-English complexities which affected the ascendancy at sea raised no difficulties, the relations with Russia were far more insidious. Joseph, though still the adversary of Catherine, praised her talent, saying that she had the genius of a born ruler. Frederick, her ally, did not fail to observe that the increase of Russian power was a danger in itself, which must be checked in time: for the empress would not conclude peace with the Turks, without having first made considerable conquests; after the war with Turkey she would begin one with Sweden. "Sire," said Joseph, "you are our advance guard against Russia; provided that you are at peace with us, you will easily have done with the Russians." The king rejoined that an alliance with Russia was a necessity for him, although he unwillingly paid it a subsidy. With this they touched upon the critical point of their politics. If they came to an understanding, they could prevent the increase of Russian power. Frederick called the attention of the emperor to the influence Russia might exert in the Austro-Hungarian provinces, and advised him to avert it by tolerance towards those of the Greek faith, for in Breslau it was said to have been observed that the merchants of this faith joyfully celebrated the Russian victory over Turkey.

Frederick's remarks were open enough in themselves, but they betrayed a greater interest in the welfare of Austria than he was given credit for. As he had once felt in regard to the French, so he now wished to see Austria hold herself erect against Russia: of course without disturbing his relations with that power. Informed by his ministers that the Viennese court was only seeking to undermine his treaty relations with Russia, he avoided everything that might further their aim. But the interview reached a point where both princes promised each other that they would not be carried away by the Russian war into any hostilities against each other. The king considered this quite consistent with his Russian alliance; he had no misgivings in promising it in writing to the emperor, who in like manner gave him the same assurance. The meeting at Neisse forms an important moment in German history, as the two most prominent princes promised each other to maintain the neutrality of Germany in the impending general embroilments in the east as well as in the west. Even under the altered circumstances a common policy seemed possible: common interests were spoken of and also the peace which was to be maintained within the empire and the world by both powers.

It is to be regretted that these inclinations were not more firmly established and of a nature to endure. Frederick never doubted that Joseph meant honourably by his promise not to attack him; nevertheless, the latter's personality did not inspire him with confidence. He was, said he, a young man full of aspirations, still held in check by his mother, whose yoke he bore with impatience. His mind was full of ambitious schemes. When once he came into power he would be sure to undertake something—perhaps against Venice or Silesia: "When he becomes master, Europe will be in flames."

Joseph, also, on whom the intellectual superiority of Frederick and his whole personality had made a deep impression, as can be seen by the letter which he afterwards wrote to him, distrusted his friendly feelings. To his mother he writes: "He talks a great deal, but there is some purpose hidden in every word which he says. He may desire peace, but not out of love for it—only because he sees that at the present he could not carry on war with advantage."

Thus did the two princes meet with an upright desire for mutual understanding, which attained an expression quite important in itself; but their mutual mistrust, which arose from the position and nature of both states, was not destroyed: on the contrary, it was rather strengthened by the personal acquaintance.

FREDERICK'S RETURN VISIT

In September, 1770, they met once more: King Frederick paid the emperor a return visit at his camp at Neustadt in Moravia. The danger of a rupture between England and France still hung over western Europe; on the other hand the East was convulsed by the progress of the Russians in the Turkish provinces. They had gained decisive victories on land and sea, and left no doubt that they intended to use their advantage for the establishment of their ascendancy in the East. They roundly demanded of the Porte the independence of the Crimea and of the principalities of the Danube. The chancellor-prince Kaunitz therefore thought it proper, thereby meeting the wishes of the king, to accompany the emperor to the new meeting.

In Neustadt Joseph was treated with all the personal regard due to his high rank and his qualities. The king rejoiced in his advanced knowledge of French and Italian poetry: thus, he said, should one begin, then philosophy should follow. Joseph had already raised himself above the superstition of the bigoted court; he made fun of the narrow-mindedness of the Viennese censorship, but at the same time was modest. Towards Kaunitz he behaved more like a son than a ruler.

The whole importance of the meeting lay in the conference between the king of Prussia and the Austrian chancellor. One day Kaunitz, in a long discourse in which he would not be interrupted, unfolded to the king the political system of his court as he had organised it after the peace: the alliance between Prussia and Russia formed a counterpoise to the alliance of Austria with France; and this balance suited Europe. He repeated that Silesia was now a healed-up wound, which must not be reopened. He added, however, that it was impossible for Austria to allow Moldavia and Wallachia to pass to Russia—such a neighbour would be intolerable to Hungary—or to stand by and see Russia unsettle Poland and seek to rule it. Kaunitz believed that he had made a great impression on the king by his "bold and candid" discourse, as he himself designated it. But Frederick was not exactly edified by the doctrinarian and self-satisfied tone which the prince adopted; later he often enough stated this. Nevertheless he remarked that with all his eccentricity and presumption Kaunitz was a man of good understanding, even of intellect: he certainly knew it himself and demanded that it should be acknowledged by all. In his main purposes he, the king, was quite at one with him, and these aimed at the maintenance of good feelings on both sides throughout the oriental embroilments and at the settlement of the Russo-Turkish War.^d

THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA (1764 A.D.)

Looking ahead after the Seven Years' War, Frederick saw no means of securing himself so effectually as by cultivating the good will of Russia. In 1764 he consequently concluded a treaty of alliance with the empress Catherine for eight years.ⁱ

A comparison of that treaty, finally signed on the 11th of April, 1764, with a draft Frederick had sent to Petersburg in August, 1763, makes it especially clear what concessions Frederick had to make if he wished to bring about any kind of alliance between Prussia and Russia. A first glance will show that whereas Frederick's draft contained only eight articles, the definite treaty consisted of fourteen; and in addition to these there were some secret separate articles and a secret convention.

A more thorough examination shows that the difference is still more

[1764 A.D.]

sharply defined. Frederick's draft enjoined both the contracting parties to close with no other proposal which in any way contradicted this alliance. Quite another state of things is shown in the actual contract. The freedom to make treaties with other countries is expressly reserved, certainly under the declaration that the aforesaid contract would in this way suffer no breach, but on the contrary would appear to gain in strength and practicability. It is even agreed that other courts, too, which were of the same mind, should be invited to join. At that time the statesmen of Petersburg were already occupied with that project the realisation of which Russian Poland so often desired—to form an alliance of all the northern powers. Whilst it was insisted that this point should be accepted in Petersburg, not only was complete freedom reserved with regard to forming new bonds, but a handle was obtained which might eventually enable Russia to claim the participation of Prussia in the furthering of her northern policy.

Both contracting parties guaranteed the integrity of their countries to each other, and promised each other mutual assistance, in the case of either being attacked by any power, and, if it should be possible, the support of infantry, ten thousand strong, and cavalry, twenty thousand. Should this support be insufficient, the amount of any further help was reserved for future agreement. In case of need the assistance of the entire army of either country could be claimed. Each party undertook to conclude no peace with enemies unless after mutual agreement, and to embark on no enterprise without the knowledge of the other. Should one of the two powers, whilst giving the support agreed upon, be itself attacked, it should be able to recall its troops two months after notice, but if it was itself engaged in war, it was free from all liability to give help. Joined to this chief contract were four secret articles, and two separate secret articles, which contained the most intrinsically important points. The first secret article set forth the conditions under which military help might be exchanged for a sum of money. If Russia had reason to expect an attack on the provinces along the Turkish or Crimean border, or if Prussia expected the same from Gelderland, Cleves, East Friesland, or from anywhere on that side of the Weser, they should be answerable for support, not in troops but in money. And a yearly sum of 400,000 roubles should be an equivalent for the ten thousand infantry and the twenty thousand cavalry.

Prussia undertook to assist in upholding the present constitution of Sweden, and even if, for the moment, this agreement should be confined to insuring concerted action of the Prussian and Russian envoys at Stockholm, there was a further arrangement for provisional measures of greater effect, should this arrangement be inefficient to deter from their purpose those working to render the kingly power more absolute. Frederick assured to the grand duke, as duke of Holstein, his present possessions in Germany, and promised in the event of negotiations with Denmark for the equalisation of certain differences respecting Schleswig, to use his good offices to obtain for the grand duke full satisfaction of his just claims. Further, the two contracting parties bound themselves to uphold the right of free election in Poland, in such a way that no one should be permitted to make the dignity of royalty hereditary in his family, or to acquire absolute power; any intentions in that direction were to be bitterly opposed, even by force of arms, so as to protect the republic from the overthrow of its constitution and of its fundamental laws. In what sense this general decision about Poland was meant, and what ideas underlay it, were explained in a secret convention and in the two separate secret articles.

Prussia and Russia were agreed as to the manner of choosing a king. Even the name, to place it beyond doubt, was mentioned in a second separate arti-

cle. And, as the empress had already a certain understanding with those of the nation who were favourably disposed, the king of Prussia promised to use every means in his power to support her in attaining her desires. Further, as Russia had already assembled a body of troops on the borders of Poland in case of emergency, the king of Prussia pledged himself to do likewise on the Prussian-Polish frontier. The envoys had already instructions to make public, immediately the choice was known, the name of the candidate recommended by the contracting parties, and to declare that in the event of any one's daring to disturb the peace of the republic, and to conspire against the legally chosen king, Prussian and Russian troops would instantly march into Poland and subject the inhabitants and their property, without exception, to martial law. Should this declaration be ineffectual to quell all opposition, Russia undertook to march alone to the subjugation of the confederates, whilst Prussia was to assist merely by concentrating troops on the border and by other movements. If, however, any foreign power should send troops to Poland, to assist the confederates, the king promised to despatch twenty thousand men to Poland to help the Russian force. In the event of this proceeding leading to any attack against either of the contracting parties, they mutually engaged to supply a further assistance of twenty thousand men.

Finally a decision was also agreed upon with regard to the dissenters. Russia and Poland undertook to protect the Greek (church) Lutherans, and reformers known as dissenters in Poland and Lithuania, by decisive though friendly representations to the king and the republic. They were to try to obtain for them the enjoyment of the rights, privileges, and freedom which they had formerly possessed in both spiritual and secular matters. Should these representations fail for the moment, they were to await a more favourable opportunity, but in the mean-time the dissenters were to be secured from all injustice and oppression.

Russia got all she wanted by the conclusion of this treaty. Frederick's utter isolation forced him finally to agree to all the conditions which in the beginning he had struggled against with all his might. As far as Sweden and the grand duke were concerned, the concessions were fairly innocuous. They imposed no obligation upon Frederick to involve himself in war. Therefore the article regarding Poland fell all the heavier on him.

It assuredly did not escape the keen penetration of the king that, whilst France and Austria certainly used fair words, they were slow to back their words with deeds. In the spring, the reports from Poland were tolerably favourable. Notwithstanding their great opposition to the Russian candidate for the throne, the anti-Russian party showed far too little inner coherence, and a great want of fertility in their plans. But the result could not be safely guaranteed. France and Austria, even at the eleventh hour, might wake to energetic action, or feel themselves, by Russia's sudden step, compelled against their wills to take to the sword. Then all the king of Prussia's hopes for peace would be at an end. Frederick could not even get one of the many far too hard conditions made more easy. There was always the cry, "The contract is difficult enough as it is," or they doubted in Petersburg whether the king ever seriously intended to help to bring Poland into order.

And when Frederick pointed out, and with justice, that throughout the contract Russia had taken the lion's share, the conclusive answer was always ready—that the new alliance was possible only if a belief could be aroused in Russia that it was for the good of the empire, because otherwise those who opposed it would all raise a cry of reproach that Prussia's assistance had been far too dearly bought.

All articles concerning Poland were formulated in Russia, giving the empire in their construction a handle for the government of Poland. Russia, unham-

[1770-1771 A.D.]

pered, would now enforce the imperial authority in Warsaw; the interference of foreign powers being unlikely, once the alliance with Prussia was settled.

However great Frederick's reluctance, under such conditions, to consent to the contract, he felt the value of an alliance with Russia to be sufficient to justify him in at last accepting it. Only one clause, that protecting the dissenters, was of his prompting. He had no *arrière pensée* in this, but only yielded to the entreaties of his comrades in the faith, who implored him to give them his support.^e

FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND

The conditions which Catherine II caused to be put before the king of Prussia as the price of her peace with the Turk compelled him entirely to abandon the business of mediation. His judgment foretold the immediate outbreak of war between Russia and Austria. This affected himself only in so far as the disruption between the Russians and Austrians also recoiled on Poland. Stanislaus Poniatowski, whom he was bound to uphold, was threatened by France and the confederates; Austria was more on the side of the confederates. And Austria had already taken possession of a part of Polish territory which she regarded as an ancient integral part of Hungary: but also on the Russian side men were convinced that the situation of affairs in Poland could not be maintained, and that Stanislaus would not be able to fulfil the obligations he had undertaken in favour of the dissidents. As early as March, 1770, the opinion had been aired on the Russian side that Austria as well as each of the other powers should take possession of a portion of Poland contiguous with her own territory. In this intention may be seen the beginning of the first partition of Poland; thus the basis of it was the conviction that the organisation made by the empress of Russia could not be maintained if Poland remained in its former condition. Frederick II, however, had not entered into this view.

From the Austrian side had already been made a plan to win over the king by offering an acquisition of territory at the cost of Poland; there were thoughts of offering him Courland and Semgallen, but this offer was never actually made to him, for it was seen from the start that he would not entertain it. Without himself taking any action he fell into a situation in which he had to decide between Russia and Austria; for neither the one nor the other of these two powers would have dared to expose itself to the hostility of Prussia. And if Austria had not Prussia on her side, she could not dare to assist the Turk with armed force. But more than this, what could Turkey offer the Austrians? They would have liked to have Belgrade and Widdin, that is to say, Servia. But at the first mention of such a project the Turkish plenipotentiary begged the emperor Joseph not to disturb this string of the political lyre; it might cost the grand seignior his head if he entertained a thought of it. On their side, too, the Turks at that time urged the court of Vienna rather to a policy of indemnity in Poland; they actually proposed a partition of the Polish kingdom in the first instance between Austria and the Porte.

Such an association, however, was impossible. Austria would have had Russia and Prussia at once against herself, and the help of the Turks would have been of little avail in their position at that time. It was at this juncture of affairs that Frederick II really dealt with the plan for the partial partition of Poland. He did not wish to alienate the good will of either Russia or of Austria, and thought that Russia would drop those of her conditions for the restoration of peace as were most displeasing to Austria, namely the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. It seemed to him as if peace might

be restored if only the three powers could come to an agreement in the Polish affair. It cannot be denied that the occupation of the Zips and of certain neighbouring starostas by the Austrians, who at once introduced an administration into the incorporated provinces, gave the first impulse to the serious treatment of the idea of partition. Catherine intimated that what was permissible to Austria must also be permissible to others, and who could not show similar claims to those produced by Austria?

Frederick II reckoned the increase in territory acquired by Austria in these *réunions* as of great importance; he saw in it a shifting of the balance of power between the two monarchies; to set off Austria's increase of strength he claimed an increased strength for Prussia. But it was not an equal extent in territorial possession that he coveted, but an actual expansion of his power. It seemed to him that the moment had come in which to push to its conclusion a policy of aggrandisement, which was made particularly desirable to him by the untenable geographical position in which he now found himself. He took up the idea which had already been conceived in the fourteenth century by the rulers of the Teutonic order—*i.e.*, to establish an immediate connection between the territory of the order, that is to say East Prussia, with Silesia by the acquisition of Polish districts, a project the execution of which at that time would have been of great importance to advance the German element in opposition to the purely Polish element. At that time the plan had been a complete failure; by joining with the Lithuanians the Poles had on the contrary become masters of the Teutonic order, and had repelled the German element. Without taking his lead literally from these ancient designs, which were altogether buried in obscurity, Frederick II, as sovereign of Prussia and now also of Silesia, saw, in the cementing of the two by the acquisition of strips of Polish territory, a sort of geographical necessity.

The Acquisition of West Prussia (1772 A.D.)

Already as crown prince he had declared it highly desirable from a Brandenburg-Prussian point of view to acquire West Prussia, which in former days had already been wholly under German influence; it was one of those thoughts that seemed to Prince Eugene, when he heard of it, to be a notable sign of the soaring genius in the young prince. But since then Frederick II had not seriously thought of this plan. He entertained no hope of carrying it through; he hesitated to raise a general storm. In the political testament of 1768 he describes this intention as a valuable policy for his successor. But now European complications set in, which tempted him to stretch out his hand towards the possession of this territory.

Very precise were the expressions of the empress Catherine on this occasion. "Why," she asked Prince Henry of Prussia, who happened to be paying a visit to St. Petersburg, "does not the king of Prussia also appropriate for himself the territory of Ermland?" At the mention of this there awoke in the king his old geographical and political reflections; Ermland, which the empress offered him, was too insignificant to be worth a rupture with public opinion on its account; but to take a large province by which East Prussia might be connected with Brandenburg and Silesia—this was a design which he now seriously entertained.

Of dynastic claims there was no question here, and the argument employed was not very far-reaching. The act was a purely political one; Frederick sought for his justification in the fact that it was the only means of avoiding a war between Russia and Austria, in which he would have had to take part himself and which might have become a general war, more especially as a new quarrel between France and England threatened to break out. For himself

[1772 A.D.]

he claimed those territories which the Teutonic order and the German Empire had lost to the Poles; it was in opposing the accomplishment of this that the old electors of the race of the burggrafs had won their chief title to merit. King Frederick was now in a position to make headway for a stream of the opposite tendencies; he wanted at once to win frontiers which he might possibly utilise as lines of defence against Russia and to preclude the danger of being overwhelmed by a Polish kingdom of the present considerable dimensions which might at some future date acquire an energetic sovereign.

He would have put up with a Polish kingdom of moderate extent. If the two great powers would concede him the territory which he regarded as indispensable to the consolidation of his country, he would have no objection to Russia's acquiring territory five times as large, and Austria acquiring territory three times as large. His sole aim was to strengthen his state geographically and to consolidate it. He knew well that this too must cost him much inconvenience and trouble, but it was his fundamental belief that man was born to work, and that there could be no better work than such as contributed to the welfare of the fatherland.

For the Prussian state the acquisition of West Prussia, which became an accomplished fact in September, 1772, was a condition on which depended its political existence in the future.^f

On August 5th the treaty of partition was signed at St. Petersburg. By this act Russia obtained the largest share—about 87,500 square miles, with 1,800,000 inhabitants; Austria took the most fertile and populous districts, Galicia and Lodomira, in all 62,500 square miles, with nearly 3,000,000 inhabitants; and Prussia received only the bishopric of Ermland, West or Polish Prussia, and the Netze district, without the cities of Dantzic and Thorn, in all 9,465 square miles, with a population of about 600,000. But this territory lay between Brandenburg and East Prussia, and its acquisition filled up a dangerous gap in Frederick's dominions; so that Prussia was probably more strengthened than either of her confederates. Poland was deprived in all of one third of her area and one half of her population, but the remaining territory was "guaranteed" by the powers.

The land thus acquired by Frederick was waste and ruined, with a poor,



MEDIEVAL FORTIFICATION

proud, and uncontrolled nobility, and a savage peasantry. There was scarcely anything like a city; and whatever there was of trade or manufacturing industry was in the hands of the Jews. Frederick gave careful attention to the improvement of the country. He constructed a canal from the Brahe to the Netze, connecting the waters of the Vistula and the Oder, and built up Bromberg, from a wretched little town of five hundred inhabitants into a flourishing city, which now contains sixteen thousand people. Other cities, too, grew up with surprising rapidity. He sent faithful officers to the province, trade was made honest and trustworthy, and even the peasants began to have something to live for. Before Frederick's death there was a new creation of German thought and labour in this region.^m

THE SILESIAN MINES

There has never been a ruler who was better informed as to the resources of his dominions than Frederick the Great. But nevertheless Frederick knew very little about the treasures contained in the Silesian mines, and it happened fortunately to be Minister Heinitz whom he despatched thither. He was accompanied by Gerhard, counsellor of mines, Rosenstiel, secretary to the mines, and Baron von Reden, who had been made chief counsellor of mines the preceding year, and appointed to the mining works and foundry department. Their sojourn in Tarnowitz was of the utmost importance. Here there were silver and lead mines which in the sixteenth century had proved extremely productive; but since 1598 the yield had been less, and in 1631 it had completely given out, chiefly in consequence of the miners' and working guilds having been driven from Tarnowitz by the intolerance of Ferdinand II. Since that time the Tarnowitz mining industry had never reached its former importance, and from 1754 it may be considered to have been practically at an end. The dread of the anti-reformation faded in time out of the minds of the people, and now if inquiry were made as to the reason of the falling-off in the mines the answer would be that the industry was too severely taxed. Tithes were claimed by the state, and, in addition, the ninth mülde and three Silesian thalers out of every silver mark had to be paid to Baron Henckel von Donnersmarck and Neudeck.

The visit paid by Minister Heinitz to the province of Silesia was fraught with important consequences. The greatest benefit he conferred on this country, so rich in minerals, was in giving the mining industry such a leader as Baron von Reden, who was not only an aristocrat but a thoroughly capable manager, devoted to the business from his youth, who had increased his knowledge by travel in England, France, Germany, and Poland. To the three mining deputies, established in 1778 in Giehren, Waldenburg, and Reichenstein, there was added later a fourth at Tarnowitz, all four receiving on the proposition of Von Reden the title of "mining officers."

It appears that Von Reden made a special examination of the state of affairs at Tarnowitz; and on the 4th of January, 1780, he delivered a report in Berlin, setting forth proposals for reopening the working of the Tarnowitz mines, and showing why the enterprise, if undertaken, would have good chances of success. At the time this report appeared to have been set aside, but some years later it led to important results. Heinitz no doubt took this opportunity of satisfying himself of the extent of the Silesian iron works. This metal was not in good repute. In consequence Frederick had taken an unusual way to dispose of the manufactures of the royal foundries to his subjects, introducing them gradually and under restrictions, endeavouring thus to wean them from their manifold prejudices and to encourage in some measure the principal works, and so increase the revenues derived from them.

[1781-1789 A.D.]

In the official document of the 6th of November, 1781, which contains these statements, we find later this proceeding of Frederick's described as "coercion for the sale and settled distribution." What are we to understand by this? Another official document (April 20th, 1787), probably issued by Von Reden, is entitled, "Pro Memoria, concerning the establishment of the Silesian mining works, products of the foundries, and their management." This document gives us the following information:

The Silesians cherished a prejudice against the copper found in their country and against black and white lead, preferring, as they did under the Austrian rule, the minerals of foreign countries. After the Seven Years' War the king had taken into the state management the important copper foundries of Rothenburg on Count Mansfeld's territories, so that the workmen might not be left to starve, and that the usual standard of living might be maintained. Tin forges were started in Neumark and among the Harz Mountains, and as the conviction grew that foreign copper and lead were not needed their importation was forbidden on the 24th of January, 1768, and again on the 5th of January and the 26th of April, 1769.

In order to evade this prohibition, the province undertook to use up a certain quantity of these metals annually, and the merchant company of Breslau were obliged to join in guaranteeing this sale, but they did no more. All that was further needed was brought into the country from Hungary and Saxony. Such a proceeding could not but be detrimental to the growth and prosperity of the home works. The manufacturers in Slawetzitz were allowed to sell no lead in the Breslau district, but were forced to seek a foreign market.

How could this be stopped? Heinitz decided upon introducing a new measure. He had seen how richly upper Silesia was stocked with iron ore and the wood necessary to its working; and he became further convinced that it would be possible to provide all iron and lead required for the provinces on that side of the Elbe. Thus in 1789 the importation of Swedish iron was forbidden; but, on the other hand, this would-be coercive measure was not enforced; delivery contracts aimed against it were formed with the owners of foundries in upper Silesia, with Blankenburg and Wernigerode; several dépôts were started in the provinces, and in connection with the many places of business to which the increased commerce was leading. A special "head iron bureau" was started in Berlin. The Breslau district resigned the management of the upper Silesian royal foundries and iron commerce into the hands of the chief mining council, which then endeavoured not only to increase the trade but also to raise the value of the products.^g

PRUSSIAN RULE IN SILESIA


If we compare Silesia as it was when Frederick the Great conquered it with the Silesia he left behind at his death, we are forced to confess an astonishing progress of development. The number of places of worship and of schools had remarkably increased, the fullest religious freedom had taken the place of narrow-minded intolerance; education in both the higher and the popular schools was noticeably improved; the people rejoiced in a sense of security which under the Austrian rule was undreamed of, even the poorest and meanest having grounds for hope that in a just cause he would gain his rights from justice, though his opponent should be a person of the highest rank. The situation of the lower classes amongst the agricultural population had been especially improved. The municipal commercial legislation protected them from extortionate demands on the part of the landowners. A network of pledges depending on reciprocity assured the whole country of

assistance in cases of misfortune, whilst for the landowners the model institutes upheld the credit of the province. In times when the crops failed, when prices were high, the king opened his storehouse, and he was not sparing of support when there were great fires. In spite of the many wants produced by war and the not entirely favourable condition of trade, the average welfare was greater, the number of inhabitants had risen more than half a million, the land was better cultivated, the towns had a more prosperous aspect, the number of solid houses with tiled roofs had everywhere increased.

As to trade, there is no doubt that since the beginning of Prussian rule Silesia had suffered no inconsiderable losses; more especially because the

tariff was rendered more and more prohibitive by the neighbouring imperial state. King Frederick's system of imposts had made many restrictions and difficulties, particularly in Breslau, where the transit and carrying business had till then played a great part; but there were many compensations for these losses. The old pillars of the commercial and industrial life, the Silesian linen goods and the products of Silesian wool-weaving, still maintained the foremost place on the world's market, and the rising industries in the different provinces played an active part in business, thanks to the protection of the state. In short, we have no right to speak of retrogression, but have to call attention to a continual though gradual rise.

The decrease of dependence on foreign countries, for which Frederick successfully strove, was not bought too dearly with an average lessening of commercial gains; and if formerly it was easier for individuals to amass a considerable fortune, there were now beyond computation more people who by industry and knowledge of trade, even if not without strenuous effort, could make a tolerable livelihood. This must surely be considered an economic gain. With all this the country was conducted from a condition of patriarchal government into the methods of a modern state, such as enlightened despotism creates. All that was done for the country came from



TOMB OF THE THREE KINGS—COLOGNE

above. All innovations were made by the king himself with his all-seeing eye, his never-resting providence as father of his country. The constitution of politics which he found existing had to give way before his word of authority, without anybody in the country being the worse, or having a desire that the old order might return. But there could hardly be a doubt that the institutions of a civilised state, such as Frederick dictated to Silesia, must be of incomparably greater value to a sound political development, even with the final end of political freedom in view, than the maintenance and amplification of the Silesian constitution could be as it before existed. It is quite natural that the happy results of the king's active administration in this province, added to the popularity which he had obtained by his victories, led to his being idolized by a grateful people.^h

[1778-1779 A.D.]

THE WAR OF THE BAVARIAN SUCCESSION (1778, 1779 A.D.)

Joseph II was eager to aggrandise Austria, and at least to obtain an equivalent for Silesia. For a long time Austria had been longing to acquire Bavaria, and there now seemed to be some reason to hope for success. The ancient line of electors of the house of Wittelsbach died out in 1777 with Maximilian Joseph (December 30th). The next heir was the elector palatine, Charles Theodore, also duke of Jülich and Berg, who was not eager to obtain Bavaria, since, by the Peace of Westphalia, he must then forfeit the electorate of the Palatinate, and must also remove to Munich from his favourite residence at Mannheim. Besides, Charles Theodore had no legitimate children, and could not leave to his natural sons either dukedom; so that he was eager to exchange some of his dignities for possessions which he could dispose of by will. Under these circumstances Joseph II made an unfounded claim to lower Bavaria, under a pretended grant of the emperor Sigismund in 1426. A secret treaty was made by him with Charles Theodore, by which he was to pay that prince a large sum of money for lower Bavaria; and soon after Maximilian Joseph's death Joseph II occupied the land with troops. Frederick II, who was ever jealous of the growth of Austria, resolved to prevent this acquisition. He instigated Charles of Zweibrücken, the next heir to Bavaria after Charles Theodore, to protest against the bargain, and pledged himself to defend Charles' rights. Joseph II offered to compromise, but Frederick would have no terms which enlarged Austria; and thus the war of the Bavarian Succession broke out (1778-1779).

Again the Austrian and Prussian armies marched to the borders of Bohemia and Silesia. No decisive battles took place in this war, and no memorable deeds of heroism are recorded. Frederick had a fine army, but held it back, and refused to take Austria by surprise, even when the opportunity seemed most tempting. The war is ever since known in the Prussian army as the Potato War, the only achievement in it being Frederick's stay of some months in Bohemia, living on the country. Neither he nor Maria Theresa wished to renew their useless conflicts; and she opened negotiations with him in 1778, keeping them secret from her son. They failed, but on May 13th, 1779, peace was concluded at Teschen, through the mediation of Russia and France; the empress Catherine declaring that, unless the Austrian claims were abandoned, she would support Frederick II with fifty thousand men. Austria gave up all claim to the Bavarian inheritance; but received the small district between the Danube, the Inn, and the Salzach, known as the Innviertel, containing about eight hundred square miles and a population of sixty thousand. Mecklenburg and Saxony received compensation in money and lands for their claims on Bavaria; and Austria agreed not to oppose the future union of Anspach and Baireuth with Prussia. But the inheritance of Bavaria, upon the death of Charles Theodore without legitimate sons, was secured to the Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld branch of the house of Wittelsbach, which succeeded to the dukedom of 1799, in the person of Maximilian (IV) Joseph, ancestor of the present king. By inviting the interference of Russia in this case, Frederick gave that power a new opportunity to interfere in German affairs.^m

The year after the settlement of the Bavarian dispute Maria Theresa died and was succeeded by her son, Joseph II. When news of this event was brought to Frederick, he exclaimed, "Now there will be a new order of things!" But, contrary to these expectations, Joseph maintained peace, and the years following the Potato War were for Frederick and all Europe years of quiet and of democratic progress. Therefore we may now take leave of

Frederick the warrior, and consider at some length the personality and influence of Frederick the reformer, the philosopher, the dilettante, the patron of science and of letters.^a

FREDERICK'S INFLUENCE ON THE AGE

The favourable influence of the great transformation which Frederick the Great, by his example and rule, effected on the whole life of his time supplies subjects extending far beyond his immediate sphere. Everyone in his states, and even in other German countries, felt himself spurred forward by the sight of a monarch who stood there an example of the most marvellous energy, perseverance, and versatility of thought and action. Everyone felt stronger at the thought of being recognised or praised by this monarch, perhaps even being called upon to assist in his lofty work. A new life seemed to breathe through the whole nation and showed itself by many unmistakable signs.

It was as natural as it was advantageous, in the light of the development of the German nation, that this thoroughness and striving, called forth in large circles by the example of Frederick, should first turn towards the positive and practical spheres of life. The Germans were then pursuing the very opposite of what Frederick qualified as the natural mode in the development of nations. They were striving after the highest aims in the arts and sciences, before they had accomplished the "necessary and needful," before they had taken a firm hold on the practical life of real and positive interests, and had acted accordingly. The example of Frederick drew, in a certain degree at least, the attention of the nation back to these neglected fields. It was a positive, realistic nation through and through; Carlyle calls Frederick in the highest sense of the words, "a crowned reality." He went straight up to his aim without any sign of romance or sentimentality. In him there lay no exaggeration, there was no soaring too high, nothing unrealised or unfulfilled. He knew at all times precisely what he wished, what he was able to perform. Familiar, even intimate with the most advanced ideas of enlightenment and humanity, he always put those ideas immediately into practice, fitting them into the circumstances of the moment and making them a part of everyday life. From his early days the watching of events and of people had been his favourite study. The useful, in the highest sense of the word—the amelioration of the material, civic, and public conditions of the people—was the field which he once again raised to honour, after it had been so long neglected by a great as well as by an intellectual people.

The effects of such a course upon the intellectual life of the nation were not lost. The political sciences encouraged by the toleration and support which the great king granted to them, strengthened by the practical spirit which breathed in all the public acts, rose to an activity which hitherto had not been known in Germany and had scarcely been contemplated. The gathering of statistics carried on by a government of the nature of Frederick's became a science most closely related to practical life and proceeding according to principle. The publicity which first relieved the public life of the German nation from thralldom, and thus lent a higher flight to the spirit of nationality, dates from those days. History, after having busied itself with the doings of the princes and the court, turns towards public life, and, in a more elevated sense, to the life of the nation itself.


This instinct for the practical and positive was also a useful corrective to the minds of the Germans, who were too much inclined towards the ideal. There was yet a second element which was aroused in the nation by the manner of thought and action of Frederick; or, if not aroused, it at least began to

develop more strongly or was encouraged to greater participation, having until then manifested itself only in timid endeavours. We refer to that truly civic trait of the German mind to which we owe the revival of art in the fatherland, of its sciences and customs during the last century: the truly civic spirit or the manly, earnest, self-conscious disposition which gradually developed among the citizen class who in Germany are the real representatives of national culture. This came about under the direct and unrestricted influence of the personality and government of Frederick the Great. It put a stop to that servile submission wherewith the people of the rank of burghers had submitted, not merely in politics but also in social matters and intellectual questions, to the pretensions of the leading classes of society. It further showed its beneficial influence upon the fields of science and art, and above all on those most lofty ones of philosophy and poetry.¹

FREDERICK AT SANS SOUCI

It is, perhaps, less as a victorious general or the wise administrator of his country, than as the philosopher of Sans Souci, the monarch of the flute, the tolerant friend of Voltaire, that the present generation delights to conceive of Frederick the Great.^a

The cause of rapprochement between Frederick and Voltaire was simple enough. Frederick had learned to hate in his father everything that was truly German; French literature commanded the civilised world and Voltaire com-



SANS SOUCI, POTSDAM

manded French literature; hence it is not surprising that the prince, when but twenty-four years of age, should have entered into a correspondence with the celebrated poet of fifty. In his very first letter he writes: "I feel that the advantages of birth, and those clouds of grandeur with which vanity surrounds us, are of little or no service. How much ought talent and service to be preferred to them!"

Frederick's income, however, was so small at this time that he could not entertain his correspondent. The year of his accession, on November 12th, Frederick met the poet at the castle of Moyland, and he describes in a letter to Jourdan the feeling this interview produced on him: "I have seen Voltaire, whose personal acquaintance I was anxious to make. He is eloquent as Cicero, pleasant as Pliny, wise as Agrippa. I have seen the two things nearest my

[¹ Dr. Franz Mehring,ⁿ in his *Lessing-Legends*, opposes the current view of Frederick's influence on German literature.]

heart—Voltaire and the French troops.” Under this impression the king invited the French poet to Sans Souci.⁸

Situated within a stone’s throw of Potsdam, Sans Souci, according to the original designs of Frederick, was to be only a place of repose, a resting place in a delicious spot. It is picturesquely situated on the top of a hill, at the foot of which flows a river. The main building is unostentatious and is but one story in height. The Italian roof is surmounted by a dome. The two wings are united to the main part by a colonnaded gallery, which suggests St. Peter’s, at Rome. The elevation of the terrace and the isolation of the castle produce a unique impression.

From the court one passes into a vestibule and thence into a round room lined with antique marbles and ornamented with two niches, one of which gives shelter to a figure representing Pleasure, the other to a poetical presentation of Epicurus—both by Adam. Columns of Carrara marble encircle this room, which is dominated and illumined by that gilded dome which is its ceiling. On the left is the dining-hall, adorned with pictures. Presently one comes upon a little room where there is a piano; this is where the king used to take his coffee and spend moments of solitude. Beyond is the large sleeping apartment, ornate and covered with gilding, upholstered in blue. The alcove and balustrading, rich as they are, are yet useless, for it is in a little bed hidden by a screen and drawn close to the chimney that the king slept—a modest bed, covered with old crimson silk on which his dogs were free to romp! For Frederick had a passion for dogs, and when travelling, or even on his campaigns, he kept a tiny levrette buttoned into his vest. This sanctuary has been preserved as it was at the time that Frederick’s great spirit passed away. One is shown the armchair where he died; the little clock which he used to wind himself, and which, according to tradition, stopped at the moment of his death, is still on the chest, sleeping its last sleep.

His library, round like the drawing-room, is at one of the extremities of the building. It is adorned with a bookcase of cedar, trimmed with garlands and festoons of gilded bronze, and surmounted by antiquities of white marble. The ceiling, done by Frederick’s famous painter, De Pesne, represents Apollo. The only pieces of furniture are a revolving desk, on which still lies open the *Art of War*, and a cabinet on which stand two glass cubes, one an inkstand, the other a powder box, and a pair of large scissors. If one may judge a man by the inspection of his library, these cases, which hold not only favourite books but practically the entire intellectual pabulum of the philosopher of Sans Souci, are a revelation. At the house of this German prince, not one German book! The collection is composed almost entirely of French classics, at the head of which stand the works of the illustrious author of the *Henriade*.

As one comes out the view is enchanting—at the left Potsdam, at the right a forest of oaks and maples. In front the garden descends by six terraces to the river; below is a great plain with fountains, lakes, cascades, columns, obelisks, pavilions, labyrinths—the troublous, perturbed architecture of princely gardens in the eighteenth century. Such as it was, Sans Souci was loved by Frederick with partiality and tenderness; here he came as to an asylum of peace, whenever he had a moment of leisure; and its portals opened only to the key of philosophy in the hands of disciples.

“It is sometimes Cæsar with whom I dine,” said Voltaire, “sometimes Marcus Aurelius or Julian. Here is all the charm of seclusion, the freedom of the fields together with all those luxuries of life which the lord of a castle, who is a king, can procure for his humble guests.”


The flavour of the king’s suppers can hardly be given again. Delicious they were and one can fancy the brilliancy, the sparkle of the conversation. Frederick knew how to kindle the fire of controversy by opposition. “He

loved," says Formey,^v "to take the negative, when others took the affirmative, and vice versa."

Frederick was a tease and somewhat malicious; he took pleasure in pricking and goading his guests. To these faults he joined other and graver defects—a monstrous egotism, and absolute though disguised indifference to all which did not directly concern him.

In order to gain an idea of the intimate society which surrounded Frederick, of that little kernel of free-thinkers grouped round the philosopher of Sans Souci, it would be necessary to study biographies. The five or six faithful friends, Pollnitz, Chacot, D'Argens, Algarotti, Maupertuis, La Mettrie, Lord Tyrconnel, are original spirits worth studying—most of them with a grain of folly and weakness, surprising in sages, in strong and sceptical minds. Moreover, we are in France—we find its usages, its fashions, its language, its quality of thought, its scholars, and its poets. At the intimate dinners of the king, it is true, a few Germans were allowed to slip in, on the condition that they leave everything German behind them. Such was the little group of disciples with whom Frederick was surrounded when Voltaire, his sails full, arrived in Berlin, and was received by his master with a ceremony, a devotion whose style was copied and exaggerated by a court disciplined like a regiment.^t

"The evenings," says Sophie Willemine de Prusse,^u "are consecrated to music. The prince holds his concerts in his own apartments, where nobody



ANOTHER VIEW OF SANS SOUCI, POTSDAM, GERMANY

may go who is not invited, and indeed such an invitation is a great favour. He generally executes a sonata and a concerto for the flute, an instrument which he plays with utmost perfection. He mouths it admirably, and his fingers are agile and his soul full of music. He composes sonatas himself. I have more than once had the honour to find myself beside him while he played and I was enchanted with his taste, specially for his skill in the Adagio. It is a continuous creation of new ideas."^w

FREDERICK, D'ALEMBERT, AND VOLTAIRE

One must read Fouqué's *Mémoires* to learn the details of the deeply tender and reverent friendship the great monarch felt for Voltaire and for that other great Frenchman, D'Alembert—two friends of his youth: but to understand

how great was the value he set upon friendship and interchange of thought we must turn to the famous letters left by these two men and observe in what fashion Frederick honoured their memory. D'Alembert died in 1783; Voltaire ended his long life, marked as by milestones with many works, at the age of eighty-four; he died in the capital of his own country, which he had so often been compelled to flee, on the 30th of May, 1778. No one can boast of a longer continued or more lively correspondence with the king than these two literati, who are as distinguished in their way as Frederick is in his; he held them both in highest esteem, although in point of character the poet was greatly the inferior of the philosopher. D'Alembert enjoyed Frederick's great respect as a thinker and an honest friend of truth; he never misunderstood his own or the king's value, never presumed on the bond in which inquiry and knowledge had united him and the king. If his distinguished countryman, whose pre-eminence as poet, whose wit, whose bold and free spirit Frederick always admired and loved, had but possessed the same wisdom, he would have ended his days at Potsdam giving and receiving the greatest delight; and even at a distance he would have escaped many scourgings from Sans Souci. Indisputably both men gained immeasurably through this noble and spirited communion with the king.

The relations between Frederick and D'Alembert remained unshadowed; therefore we may believe that his death caused the king much sorrow. Voltaire, on the contrary, inseparable as he also was from Frederick, constantly gave rise to misunderstandings, which for a time would interrupt the harmony of their relations. Still all these little quarrels were so transient that they scarcely had any lasting effect on the feeling Frederick cherished for Voltaire in his heart. The tone which underlies all superficial vexations is one of deep admiration, and this colours all that Frederick says, even in moments of bitterest indignation.

We can imagine what a loss Voltaire's death was for Frederick the Great. For twenty-seven years France had banished her greatest writer, on account of the tendency of his writings. At last Necker, early in the year 1778, obtained from Louis XVI a consent, though but tacitly expressed, to his return to Paris. Voltaire wished to see his latest tragedy, *Alexius Comnenus*, on the stage. The inhabitants of the capital were ready to idolise the long-exiled man; he was crowned on the representation of his *Irene* and died amidst the homage of the people; but the church refused him consecrated burial. Frederick was at that time in Bohemia, and amid the noise and stir of the camp he found time to write a eulogy of the dead man for the Academy of Science in Berlin:

"However your theological brood may strive to dishonour Voltaire now he is dead," so ran the king's letter to D'Alembert on May 11th, 1780, "I can see nothing in the attempt but the impotent struggle of envious rage which merely covers its authors with disgrace. Equipped with all the documents you have furnished me for the purpose, I now begin in Berlin the extraordinary negotiation for Voltaire's requiem; and although I have no convictions as to the immortality of the soul, we will nevertheless have a mass sung for his." So it was. On the anniversary of his death in 1780, the Catholic church in Berlin with all possible pomp and magnificence celebrated the mourning service which France had refused Voltaire; and through Thiebault Frederick had an article on the subject not only in the Berlin paper, but in every other important European newspaper. The Berlin library received a fine clay bust of Voltaire by the celebrated Parisian sculptor Houdon, from whom the king also ordered a bust of him in marble for the collection in the Academy of Sciences. An engraving, *The Apotheosis of Voltaire*, was further sent to his friends in Paris.^b

FREDERICK THE AGNOSTIC

The time at which Frederick began to question the teachings of his church and the influence these doubts had over him are not so authentically known to us as we could wish. Those discussions which, in obedience to the command of Frederick's father, Pastor Müller held with him during his imprisonment in Küstrin, and which were to convince him of the completeness of God's mercy, never overstepped the bounds of traditional dogma. But still, as the prince evidently desired to be instructed through his reason, and was not ready to accept unexplained statements merely because they are in the Bible, these conferences would seem to have been rather endeavours to clear up questions of so-called natural theology than concerned with the deductions of the church's teaching.

During the next few years, too, expressions are not wanting to show the warm interest taken by the subsequent free-thinker in matters of religion, and particularly in Protestantism, without, however, making any statement so definite as to betray how far the religious sentiment, undoubtedly earnest in him, and the Protestant feelings, which later he did not deny, were linked in those early days with belief in the positive dogmas of Christianity.

On the other hand, in the years during which we know him to have been occupied in philosophical studies, Frederick showed himself in his letters and pamphlets so widely and radically opposed to the positive Christian dogmas that we must suppose this opposition to have begun much earlier, and refer them to his studies of Wolf's philosophy and the letters he interchanged with Voltaire.

In any case, the writings of Voltaire, of Bayle, and Lucretius, and of the various English free-thinkers, must have influenced this turn in the young philosopher's thoughts. As Frederick, in March, 1736, already opposed objections to the belief in immortality, it is evident that those teachings which differ more widely from the pantheistic (*Weltansicht*) point of view, and which in most cases take belief for granted, had even before then appeared doubtful to him; and in fact he acknowledges some few weeks later that his faith was very weak, and proves it to be so by questions that clearly show he had ceased to believe in supernatural revelation, in the Old Testament teachings, and in salvation through the death of Christ; and that he believed the Apostles to have been merely enthusiasts. In a letter written in the following year, he expresses himself even more plainly. He even blames his idolised Voltaire because on one occasion he used the expression the "Man-God," and in his pamphlet against Macchiavelli Frederick reckons the introduction of Christianity as a factor in mediæval barbarism. In short, in everything that goes beyond his own deistic belief he can see only error and superstition. The historical part of the Christian religion consists, as he says, "of fables which—less poetical, more absurd, more ridiculous than the most monstrous inventions of heathendom"—only a "facile and foolish credulity" could accept. In his idea of religion, he seems not to differ from Voltaire and Bolingbroke.

"The belief in miracles," he writes to D'Alembert in 1770, "seems just made for the people. One gets rid of a ridiculous religion, and in its place introduces one still more dubious. One sees opinions change, but new ones come in the train of every cult. I feel enlightenment to be good and useful for mankind. He who fights fanaticism disarms the most cruel, most blood-thirsty monster. Philosophy has found more expression, has been attacked with more courage in the eighteenth century than ever before, but what has been the result?" Ten years later he writes: "I found the world steeped in superstition at my birth; at my death I leave it just the same."^k

THE COLOUR OF FREDERICK'S OPINIONS

A complete system of philosophy is not to be deduced from Frederick's works, written amongst and coloured by the events of his time. He had not yet mastered many of the most remarkable works of classical and modern literature; influenced by what he read, by the people he met; and by life in general, he wrote poems in which he often sought to forget the weariness of state affairs, or to subdue some painful impression. To regard him as an author, writing for the benefit or pleasure of his public, would be to mistake him utterly; his writings are entirely determined by the passing fancy—the individual impulse of the occasion and the moment.

No one was ever more imbued than Frederick with contempt for the inane life of courts and large cities. He was thoroughly content in his loneliness, for he found his only happiness in mental activity; in energetically perfecting the qualities nature had given him. He once confessed to his sister that he had a double philosophy: in peace and happiness he was an adherent of Epicurus, but in times of trouble he clung to the Stoic philosophy, which only means that he qualified or justified pleasure by reflection, and supported himself in trouble by leaning on his higher nature. In his letters and conversations, as in his poems, Frederick incessantly occupied himself with the gravest questions that men can set themselves—questions of freedom and necessity (which he declares to be the finest theme in “divine” metaphysics), of fate or providence, materiality or immortality of the soul; to which last he always returned.

Self-control, especially for one in his position, he considered one of the first duties of man; and he laboured unceasingly to perfect it. He admitted to his trusted friends that whenever he had an unpleasant, a disturbing experience, he endeavoured by reflection to master the first impulse, which was very strong; sometimes he succeeded, at other times he failed, and he would then be guilty of imprudent actions, for which he found it difficult to forgive himself.

He elaborated a system for personal happiness, which consisted in not taking life too seriously, being content with the present, without caring over much for the future. We must rejoice at misfortune escaped, enjoy the good that comes to us, and not permit sadness or hypochondria to embitter our pleasures. “I have rid myself of this passion of ambition, leaving cunning, misconception, vanity to those who wish to be their dupes, and only ask to enjoy the time heaven has granted me, to relish pleasure without debauch, and to do what good I can.” *f*

FREDERICK AND HIS FLUTE

Incidental reference has been made to Frederick's musical taste. We are told that, in early life, he applied himself in earnest to his flute playing, and had in Quantz a teacher who would not allow his illustrious pupil to pass over anything. Before the Seven Years' War he practised daily four or five times; after rising, during the morning after the lectures, after the mid-day meal, and in the evening. In the morning he practised steadily scales and solfeggios as arranged for him by Quantz, that is to say dry but indispensable exercises. A written copy of these was in every music-room; in one the king has filled the blank pages with solfeggios of his own, which require a long breath and great facility of execution whilst they furnish the best proof of his cultivated taste.

His flute was, indeed, the means by which he eased the mental tension and gave himself spiritual freedom. Quantz declared he could tell even from the quicker passages whether the king was cheerful and peacefully disposed or not. In the morning, before the cabinet ministers came to him, Frederick

[1742-1786 A.D.]

used to walk up and down his room, considering many things, and at the same time playing, as the fancy took him, on his flute; and it was in these hours, so he wrote to D'Alembert, that his happiest inspirations came to him, even about matters of state. Even in camp and in winter quarters the flute played an important part in the king's life.

Flutes and an unpretending looking travelling piano followed Frederick the Great into Silesia, Saxony, Bohemia, and Moravia. But in the Seven Years' War it was different, even with music, from the first two Silesian wars. How humorously he jokes in a letter from Breslau (1742) over a "broken-down piano" on which he had played; how merrily the conqueror of Soor writes to Fredersdorf that he must send him a new flute because the Austrians had taken his old one with the whole equipage, and how cheerily he describes the operas and festivities in Dresden at Christmas time (1745). His mood could not be otherwise—for "the commando is off and will bring back flags, drums, and standards enough!"

After Kolin there was a difference. In Küstrin the flute is the confidant of his miseries and his comforter in misfortune. And in Sans Souci from earliest dawn the care-laden king is heard improvising on his flute till the horse is saddled or the carriage ready. And when, in his memory, Sans Souci, "of which he knew little more than that it was somewhere in the world," rose in his mind; when he in spirit heard the beeches in Rheinsberg and the old lindens in Charlottenburg rustling, and sighed "like the Jews when they thought on Zion, and by the waters of Babylon sat down and wept," then he would catch up his flute and try to forget all the dreariness of his present. No mortal can tell what music and his flute were to the hero king in those years.

In winter quarters Frederick made music as usual, if in a more constrained manner. He played the old beloved sonatas, seldom concerted pieces. He would often send to Berlin for a pianist to come to headquarters and accompany him, as in 1760-1761 he commanded Fasch to Leipsic. The good man's account is a sad one: he found "an old man, shrunk into himself—the five years of war, tumult, tear, grief, and hard work having given a character of melancholy and sad gravity to his face, which was remarkably striking contrasted with what he was formerly, and which seemed hardly in accordance with his age. It has become difficult for him to blow his flute."

In the last campaign the whole quartette was ordered to Breslau. Scarcely had the artists got out of the carriage, before they had to appear at a concert. The king played a piece and exclaimed enthusiastically, "That tastes like sugar!" But a great difference was noticeable in his playing. He had lost a tooth, and his fingers had become stiff. Once more, in 1778, the old hero took the field, and again his beloved flute accompanied him. It was on its last service, for gout crippled his fingers increasingly. In winter quarters he tried it for the last time—in vain! When he returned to Potsdam in the spring of 1779 he ordered all his flutes to be packed away forever, and said to Franz Benda, "My dear Benda, I have lost my best friend."¹

THE DEATH OF FREDERICK

Let us turn at once from this picture to the closing scene of the artist-monarch's life, as narrated by his master biographer, Carlyle.^a

Friedrich to the Duchess-Dowager of Brunswick.

SANS-SOUCI, 10th August, 1786.

MY ADORABLE SISTER:

The Hanover Doctor has wished to make himself important with you, my good Sister; but the truth is, he has been of no use to me (*m'a été inutile*). The old must give place to the

[1786 A.D.]

young, that each generation may find room clear for it; and Life, if we examine strictly what its course is, consists in seeing one's fellow-creatures die and be born. In the meanwhile, I have felt myself a little easier for the last day or two. My heart remains inviolably attached to you, my good Sister. With the highest consideration, My adorable Sister,—Your faithful Brother and Servant,

FRIEDRICH.

This [says Carlyle] is Friedrich's last Letter:—his last to a friend. There is one to his Queen, which Preuss's Index seems to regard as later, though without apparent likelihood; there being no date whatever, and only these words:

MADAM: I am much obliged by the wishes you deign to form: but a heavy fever I have taken (*grosse fièvre que j'ai prise*) hinders me from answering you.

On common current matters of business, and even on uncommon, there continue yet for four days to be Letters expressly dictated by Friedrich; some about military matters (vacancies to be filled, new Free-Corps to be levied). Two or three of them are on so small a subject as the purchase of new books by his Librarians at Berlin. One, and it has been preceded by examining, is, Order to the Potsdam Magistrates to grant "the Baker Schröder, in terms of his petition, a Free-Pass out of Preussen hither, for 100 bushels of rye and 50 of wheat, though Schröder will not find the prices much cheaper there than here." His last, of August 14th, is to De Launay, Head of the Excise: "Your Account of Receipts and Expenditures came to hand yesterday, 13th; but is too much in small: I require one more detailed,"—and explains, with brief clearness, on what points and how. Neglects nothing, great or small, while life yet is.

Tuesday, August 15th, 1786. Contrary to all wont, the King did not awaken till 11 o'clock. On first looking up, he seemed in a confused state, but soon recovered himself; called in his Generals and Secretaries, who had been in waiting so long, and gave, with his own precision, the Orders wanted,—one to Rohdich, Commandant of Potsdam, about a Review of the troops there next day; Order minutely perfect, in knowledge of the ground, in foresight of what and how the evolutions were to be; which was accordingly performed on the morrow. The Cabinet work he went through with like possession of himself, giving, on every point, his Three Clerks, their directions, in a weak voice, yet with the old power of spirit,—dictated to one of them, among other things, an "Instruction" for some Ambassador just leaving; "four quarto pages, which," says Herzberg, "would have done honour to the most experienced Minister:" and, in the evening, he signed his Missives as usual. This evening still,—but—no evening more. We are now at the last scene of all, which ends this strange eventful History.

Wednesday morning, General-Adjutants, Secretaries, Commandant, were there at their old hours; but a word came out, "Secretaries are to wait:" King is in a kind of sleep, of stertorous ominous character, as if it were the death-sleep; seems not to recollect himself, when he does at intervals open his eyes. After hours of this, on a ray of consciousness, the King bethought him of Rohdich, the Commandant; tried to give Rohdich the Parole as usual; tried twice, perhaps three times; but found he could not speak:—and with a glance of sorrow, which seemed to say, "It is impossible, then" turned his head, and sank back into the corner of his chair. Rohdich burst into tears; the King again lay slumberous;—the rattle of death beginning soon after, which lasted at intervals all day. Selle, in Berlin, was sent for by express; he arrived about 3 of the afternoon: King seemed a little more conscious, knew those about him, "his face red rather than pale, in his eyes still something of their old fire." Towards evening the feverishness abated (to Selle, I suppose, a

[1786 A.D.]

fatal symptom): the King fell into a soft sleep, with warm perspiration; but on awakening, complained of cold, repeatedly of cold, demanding wrappage after wrappage ("Kissen," soft quilt of the old fashion):—and on examining feet and legs, one of the Doctors made signs that they were in fact cold, up nearly to the knee. "What said he of the feet?" murmured the King some time afterwards, the Doctor having now stepped out of sight. "Much the same as before," answered some attendant. The King shook his head, incredulous.

He drank once, grasping the goblet with both hands, a draught of fennel-water, his customary drink; and seemed relieved by it;—his last refection in this world. Towards 9 in the evening, there had come on a continual short cough, and a rattling in the breast, breath more and more difficult. Why continue? Friedrich is making exit, on the common terms; you may hear the curtain rustling down. For most part he was unconscious, never more than half-conscious. As the wall-clock above his head struck 11, he asked: "What o'clock?" "Eleven," answered they. "At 4," murmured he, "I will rise." One of his dogs sat on its stool near him; about midnight he noticed it shivering for cold; "Throw a quilt over it," said or beckoned he; that, I think, was his last completely-conscious utterance. Afterwards, in a severe choking fit, getting at last rid of the phlegm, he said, "*La montagne est passée, nous irons mieux*, We are over the hill, we shall go better now."

Attendants, Herzberg, Selle and one or two others, were in the outer room; none in Friedrich's but Strutzki, his Kammerhussar, one of Three who are his sole valets and nurses; a faithful ingenious man, as they all seem to be, and excellently chosen for the object. Strutzki, to save the King from hustling down, as he always did, into the corner of his chair, where, with neck and chest bent forward, breathing was impossible,—at last took the King on his knee; kneeling on the ground with his other knee for the purpose,—King's right arm round Strutzki's neck, Strutzki's left arm round the King's back, and supporting his other shoulder, in which posture the faithful creature, for above two hours, sat motionless, till the end came. Within doors, all is silence, except this breathing; round it the dark earth silent, above it the silent stars. At 20 minutes past 2 the breathing paused,—wavered; ceased. Friedrich's Life-battle is fought out; instead of suffering and sore labour, here is now rest. Thursday morning 17th August, 1786, at the dark hour just named. On the 31st of May last, this King had reigned 46 years. "He has lived," counts Rodenbeck, "74 years, 6 months, and 24 days."°

SOME BRIEF ESTIMATES OF FREDERICK

In view [says Curtius] of the unqualified superiority of Frederick's intellect and activity, which embraced the great as well as the small, he could say, with greater right than any other prince of the eighteenth century: "The state rests on me; I am the state." But it was just in this respect that he emancipated himself most decisively from the influence of Latin civilisation; not in the theory of the state, for in this he followed Rousseau, but in his activity, which was based on the opinion of the ancient philosophers that the state is an original and indivisible whole, to which the individual, as part and member thereof, must subordinate and adjust himself; and indeed he was, like that old king of Athens, prepared every moment to sacrifice his life for his country.º

The terrible school of extremes through which his youth passed [says Wiegand], stamped his nature with ineradicable, contradictory features. His eye found pleasure in bright figures and gay colours, but the world appeared to

him gloomy, the fate of man cheerless and black. He believed in the conquering power of free thought, yet he despaired of the extension of the boundaries of human knowledge and of the enlightenment of the masses. He was an enthusiast of thought, but not less so, as Voltaire has remarked, an enthusiast of action. He delighted in pretty externals, in the elegant phrase, in the graceful play of French culture, yet he descended to the bottom of things with German thoroughness. In contrast with his friend D'Alembert, he answered with a remorseless Yes the bold question whether it can be useful to deceive the people. Foremost and beyond his human consciousness was his royal consciousness, even though he himself, following the spirit of his age, may have confessed to the opposite. All the abysmal ruggedness of his nature was firmly enclosed by the consciousness of his royalty and his royal duty. The pure metallic voice of this imperative sounds above all the disharmonies of his nature. This is the sovereign feature of his character: the boundless, passionate devotion to the state, with the tendencies and interests of which he entirely identifies himself, and to which he means to be only the foremost servant. He puts his great kingly capacities in the service of his state and breathes his spirit into it: his iron will, which masters a world of difficulties; his penetrating intellect, which sees through men and things and knows the governmental machine even to its tiniest wheels; his belief in fate, which he shares with all heroes of action and which gives him the courage to lead his country proudly against the most menacing dangers. And in addition to all this there is the ever-present consciousness of his royal responsibility, which urges him to pay as much attention to the least important of daily administrative tasks as to the great decisions of critical moments, and restrains the impetuous impulses of his fiery temperament. For the age of enlightenment Frederick was the royal representative; for enlightened absolutism he created the completed model and perfect type.^q

Gustav Freytag's Characterisation of Frederick

In the flower of life Frederick set forth spurred on by ambition. All the high and splendid wreaths of life he wrested from fate: the prince of poets and philosophers, the historian, the general. But no triumph sated him. All earthly fame he came to regard as accidental, unstable, vain; only the iron, ever-present sense of duty remained for him. His mind had grown up amidst the dangerous alternations of warm enthusiasm and cold analysis, and while he had poetically transfigured a few arbitrarily chosen individuals, he had despised the crowd. But in the struggles of his life he lost his egotism, lost almost everything that was dear to him, and finally he came to regard the individual as of no weight, while the need of living for the whole became ever stronger with him. With a most refined selfishness he had desired for himself the attainment of the highest, and he finally came to devote himself unselfishly to the common weal and the welfare of the weak. He had entered life as an idealist, and despite the most terrible experiences his ideals were not destroyed, but were refined, elevated, purified. He sacrificed many to the state, but none more than himself.

Great and extraordinary he was to his contemporaries, but he is even greater to us, who can follow the traces of his activity in the character of our people, our political life, our art and literature, even down to our own day.^r



CHAPTER VI

THE REVOLUTIONARY EPOCH

[1786-1815 A.D.]

FREDERICK WILLIAM II

FREDERICK THE GREAT was succeeded by his nephew, Frederick William II. The new king (born 1744) was the son of Prince Augustus William, who during the Seven Years' war was treated harshly and perhaps unjustly by his royal brother, left the camp, and died at an early age in Oranienburg in June, 1758, during the most critical period of the war. This younger son of Frederick William I appears to have been of milder and more fragile spirit than the other scions of the strong and virile generations born to the house of Hohenzollern, from the time of the Great Elector to the time of the Great King. Perhaps the recollection of this dissension, perhaps the idea that the weak spirit of the father had descended to the son, was the reason why Frederick II was so long in treating his young nephew with kindness and partiality, why he scarcely admitted him to a share in the business of the state, and why it was only after the Bavarian War of Succession that he accorded him friendly recognition.

An unhappy marriage, the faults of which may be laid to both sides, had a devastating effect on the life of the young prince, whilst the unfortunate relation of the prince with a cunning woman of light character made the breach incurable. The daughter of the court musician Enke, who was first married to the chamberlain Ritz, then created countess of Lichtenau, ruled with all the arts at the command of an unscrupulous courtesan over the yielding disposition of the crown prince. The open connection with an acknowl-

edged mistress, a scandal which had hitherto been unknown to the Prussian court, was now forced upon it by the prince with such publicity that in this severely ordered and hitherto modest state one was reminded of the example of the French court. Frederick II's youth had also been full of errors; but the unhappiness of his early life had disciplined him, the association with distinguished minds had given him an impetus towards a noble ambition which obliterated the sad remembrances of his earlier days.

The weak, malleable nature of Frederick William succumbed to the bad influences which association with frivolous women and effeminate men exercised over him; and these influences prevented his better qualities from developing. Frederick William had a noble disposition: in spite of his ebullitions of violent temper he was naturally mild and full of benevolence, he was accessible to noble impulses, and was chivalrous and brave like his ancestors; but with a strong body, nature had given him so powerful a bias towards sensual desires that in their gratification the nobler traits of his character easily suffered shipwreck. Accustomed during an erratic youth to waste his kindness on women and favourites, thrown back in his isolation on the society of self-seeking and mediocre persons, his good-nature endlessly abused, now pushed into sensual excesses, now exploited by the pious hypocrisy of speculative mystics—Frederick William especially lacked the manly severity, discipline, and resistance by which the rule of his predecessors had been distinguished. A rule exercised by such a personality must have had an enervating effect on any state, but for Prussia in the situation of 1786 it was a calamity.

The public mood, however, showed itself ready to hope for the best from the new ruler. From the gentleness of the kindly and good-natured king, it was expected that the strictness which Frederick II had adopted more from necessity than from choice would be replaced by leniency; people looked for a government whose cheerful and free-handed indulgence should successfully outshine the results of the Great King's strict and meagre methods. Seldom has a new ruler been received with such acclaim, seldom has praise and flattery been so lavished on any successor; the "much-beloved" was the surname by which the public voice hailed him. Even contemporaries lamented the flood of flattery that gushed forth in the first moments of the new reign; and we can well conceive that Frederick William did not escape the deadening effect which is too often the fruit of such arts.

The rapidity with which this mood of extreme praise and rejoicing changed into its complete opposite is significant; under the influence of disappointment there was born a literature of abuse which is scarcely to be surpassed in any country, so that it is difficult to say which gives a more painful impression—the tactless flatteries of 1786, or the filthy pamphlets which only two or three years later were circulated concerning the king, his mistresses, and his favourites.

In these rejoicings which greeted the new ruler there was usually mingled a very strong element of Prussian self-assertion. In this mood, the admonitions of Mirabeau sounded almost like a false note. Although expressing much admiration for Frederick II, he disclosed the shady side of his political system, and insisted, in order to avert a great catastrophe, upon a peaceable reform of the entire machinery of government. According to Mirabeau's advice, "military slavery" was to be abolished; the mercantile system, with the disadvantages it entailed, done away with; the feudal division of classes made less sharp; the exclusive privileges of the nobility in civil and military offices abrogated, privileges and monopolies abolished; the whole system of taxation altered; the burdens which interfered with the freedom of the people in production removed; government, the administration of justice, and the

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educational system to be reorganised; the censorship to be abolished; and, in general, a fresh impulse in political and intellectual life to be imparted to the old military-bureaucratic state. More forcible lessons had to be given before the import of such advice could be understood. It was full twenty years later that the pendulum of state reform swung in this direction; the reform laws of 1807–1808 concerning the abolition of serfdom, the “free use of landed property,” the abolition of feudal distinctions, the municipal regulations, the new army organisation, and so on, were in effect in harmony with Mirabeau’s suggestions, given at the commencement of Frederick William’s reign. At that time such counsels were not listened to; the feeling of security was still too great for such advice not to be considered annoying—given, as it was, unasked.

For a moment it might indeed have appeared as though the new government might be moulded on the lines indicated by the French publicist, but scarcely because of his advice. It was merely the inclination of every fresh government to gain public favour by doing away with irksome restrictions which had been laid down by the preceding one, and this inclination naturally found favour with the easy good-nature inherent in Frederick William. So, first of all, the hated French regulations, together with the tobacco and coffee monopolies, fell to the ground; the French officials were dismissed and a new board, chosen from Prussian officials, was set to supervise the excise and customs and other kindred matters. But the oppressive taxes were more easily abolished than replaced; it was necessary to have recourse to other fiscal devices, partly to the taxation of the necessities of life, in order to cover the deficit created (January, 1787). It is easily understood that the popularity of the first of these proceedings suffered through this later measure. Further alterations in this direction—for instance, the facilitating of traffic and the lightening of the transit duties—were confined to timid alterations, which naturally failed by their results to meet either the hopes or the needs of the people. If abuses were to be remedied, a complete readjustment of the economic conditions throughout Prussia was necessary; such isolated measures, springing from short-sighted although well-intentioned benevolence, did not do away with the defects of the system as a whole, but simply attenuated the results of Frederick’s ingeniously contrived system. The new devices employed to hide the shortcomings were at times felt to be more irksome than the old.

The other reforms initiated by the new government were of similar character; concessions were made to the transient capriciousness to remove certain particular grievances, only to suffer matters soon to relapse into their former condition. In this way a judicious innovation was introduced in the shape of a military council, the direction of which was given into the hands of the duke of Brunswick and Möllendorf; this expedient being all the more necessary since until now everything had depended entirely on the personal supervision of the king, and Frederick, supported by a few inspectors and adjutants, had himself directed the whole conduct of military affairs. The method of recruiting in foreign countries was also better arranged, the forcible impressment of recruits was forbidden; many new rules were made for the division of districts; officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, were increased in number and their external equipment was improved. Moreover, the cruel and barbarous treatment of soldiers was to be checked, soldiers were to be treated like human beings, and the cunning self-seeking with which the superior officers took advantage of their control over the recruiting and enrolling of fresh men was put an end to. But none of these reforms, well intentioned as every one must admit them to have been, went to the root of the evil, which Frederick himself had perceived with misgiving; they touched it only on the

surface, and even within their own narrow scope demanded, if they were to be effective, more energy and watchfulness than pertained to the character of the new government.

The example which Frederick had left of observing attentively the public needs, of encouraging and supporting those whose business it was to meet them, seemed not to have been lost on his successor. The administration of law and order was supported by contributions from the state, industry was encouraged by subsidies, and the maintenance of the cavalry, that oppressive burden on the country, was paid for from the state coffers. The sum spent by the treasury during the first year of the new reign for these and similar purposes, such as building fortresses, laying out highways, erecting public buildings, provincial and local aids, amounted according to Hertzberg's estimate to 3,160,000 thalers. Public education was also more liberally endowed than under Frederick. The hope, indeed, that Frederick William would take an active interest in national culture and would foster German poetry with tokens of encouragement, such as were granted in many of the smaller courts, was disappointed. His efforts in this direction were limited to a few acts of royal liberality towards Prussian authors, among whom Ramler alone achieved a wider reputation. To offset this, greater system was introduced into the management of national education by the founding of a supreme school board, in February, 1787. Education in every grade, from the university down to the village school, was to be governed by this supreme school board, chosen for the most part from practical scholars; classical and practical education was to be more definitely marked, and education was to be given in accordance with the needs of scholars, citizens, and peasants. The minister Von Zedlitz, who, under Frederick, was indeed the minister of education, retained his position at the head of the collective system of instruction; this in itself seemed a guarantee that the direction taken by Frederick in these matters would still be followed in all essentials.

REACTION AGAINST FRENCH INFLUENCES

The dismissal of Zedlitz, and, more significant still, the nomination of his successor (July, 1788), taken in conjunction with all that it implied, proved the turning-point of this department of home policy. Even before Frederick's death the belief had been voiced that his successor was more inclined to strictness of dogma than to his uncle's point of view. The enlightenment or free thought (*Aufklärung*) of the day had, thanks to its latest exponents, taken a shape which easily explained a reaction in favour of orthodoxy; even a man like Lessing, who since the publication of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* had been hailed as the leader of the whole heterodox party, felt himself alienated and sickened by the repulsive mixture of platitude and triviality which, more especially in Berlin itself, claimed to be the true enlightened free thought. Hence a reaction to strict dogma was in the air; and if it had only found the way to combating the lax, "frenchified" tone of the capital, and to reawakening a spirit of earnestness and moral restraint, such a reaction would have been of great benefit to the whole life of Prussia. A homely generation, strong in simple faith, taking their religion in earnest and making a stand against the growing laxity of morals—was it not through this that Prussia, in contrast with the other German countries infected by foreign ways, had become great?

The life of Frederick William II and his surroundings led to quite another conclusion. The strict earnestness of old-time orthodoxy was not congenial to him, but he was rather attracted by that effeminate and affected piety which

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either goes hand in hand with weakness and sensuality, or follows closely upon them. In fact, the insistence on stricter orthodoxy chimed in just at the time when the king followed by a "left-handed" marriage with Fräulein von Voss his older connection with the Ritz woman, not to speak of the other little scandals by aiding in which the Ritz woman hoped to make herself indispensable. Such proceedings could give but a poor opinion of the sudden effort to revive the old simplicity of belief and sincere piety.

If we understand the mood of that time aright, the lively opposition which was aroused by the new tendency was aimed exactly at that contradiction between the morality and the religiousness enjoined from high quarters; it did not spring, as has been assumed, from a mere rooted distaste to all orthodoxy. People repudiated the new devotion, because in practice open scorn was habitually shown for it, because no one could credit the counsellors and friends of Frederick William with any true religious fervour. Among these advisers, contemporaries remarked in especial two men as supporters of the new movement—Major von Bischoffwerder and the privy councillor of finance, Von Wöllner.

Hans Rudolf von Bischoffwerder, born in Thuringian Saxony about the year 1741 and having served in the armies and courts of several masters, had been admitted to intimacy by the prince of Prussia ever since the Bavarian War of Succession, and by degrees had grown to be his inseparable companion and adviser. Of an intriguing mind and an impenetrable reserve, gifted with the courtier's talent for appearing insignificant, and yet capable of impressing people by means of a secretive, mysteriously solemn exterior, full of ambition for rule but never allowing it to manifest itself, this man had completely imposed upon Frederick William's unsuspecting and open nature, and it was only the influence of the Ritz woman that had a chance of even temporarily thwarting his mastery over the king.

Johann Christoph von Wöllner, born in 1732 at Döberitz near Spandau, theologian by education and, since 1755, rector at Behnitz, had resigned his calling in 1759 and become the companion of Itzenplitz, a nobleman of Brandenburg, formerly his pupil; soon the companion became joint farmer of the Behnitz property; later the brother-in-law of young Itzenplitz. Formerly known only as an author through some of his published sermons, Von Wöllner now threw himself heart and soul into the management of land and political economy, his literary attempts in this field even causing him to become collaborator in Nicolai's *Universal German Library*. Since 1782 he had been instructing the successor to the throne in these matters, and in 1786 was one of the many on whom the king lavished titles of nobility, and besides receiving the office of chief privy councillor in finance, he was created intendant of the royal buildings, and was made overseer of the so-called "treasury of distribution." This man's varied career proved him equal to Bischoffwerder in the art of managing and exploiting men and circumstances; but in Von Wöllner the character of an intriguer was further complicated by pious cant and a priestly desire to rule.

Bischoffwerder and Von Wöllner had long been allies, each having to thank the other for certain advancements in his career, both entangled in the mystic societies, whose secret meetings, spirit séances, and what else of uncanniness present such a curious contrast to the enlightenment-fad of those days. It will always be difficult to discover to what extent these men and their companions tricked the gentle mind and impressionable fancy of the king with their Rosierucian imposture; among contemporaries there was much talk of criminal juggleries of the sort, and they were said to have assured by these means their power over Frederick William's mind. A chief source of this talk was doubtless the Ritz woman, who strove with the mystic company for

the monopoly of influence over the king. That these two men were capable of such practices is highly probable, and there is no doubt their contemporaries believed them to be so capable. But criticism of the measures taken for the restoration of the church, and the moral impression produced, must have depended chiefly upon the view taken of the moral worth of the originators of these measures.

THE EDICT AGAINST "ENLIGHTENMENT" (1788 A.D.)

On the 3rd of July, 1788, Von Wöllner was appointed minister of justice, and the conduct of spiritual matters was intrusted to him; Zedlitz was the first of the ministers under Frederick the Great who had to give way. Some days later, on the 9th of July, an edict upon religious matters appeared, which might be taken as a manifesto of the new system of government. In this remarkable document, from which people derived but moderate opinions of the new statesmen, full freedom of conscience was indeed granted to individuals "so long as each one quietly fulfils his duties as a good citizen of the state, keeping any peculiar opinions he may hold to himself, and carefully avoiding any propagation of the same"; but this extraordinary promise was accompanied by invectives against "unrestricted freedom," against the tone of the teachings of the day, and the innovators were accused of reviving the miserable long-exploded errors of Socinians, deists, naturalists, and other sects, and spreading the same with much audaciousness and shamelessness under the ridiculous name of "enlightenment" among the people. "To spread such errors either secretly or openly will in the case of pastors and teachers be punished by certain loss of position and, according to discretion, by still severer punishment; for there must be one rule for all, and this till now has been the Christian religion in its three chief divisions, under which the Prussian monarchy has till now prospered so well. Even from political motives the king could not intend that through the untimely crotchets of the enlighteners alterations should be allowed." Individuals were then repeatedly assured of their continued freedom of conscience; indeed, thanks to the "partiality of the king in favour of freedom of conscience," those ministers whose inclination towards the new errors was matter of notoriety were still to continue in their office, provided that in the exercise of the same they adhered strictly to the old dogmas—that is to say, they were to preach doctrines with which their conscience was in complete contradiction. A strict supervision of teachers and preachers, together with the rejection of all candidates who were professors of other principles would, it was hoped, effectually check the new doctrines.

Few measures were ever taken which so completely failed of their purpose as this extraordinary edict. If it be always an unfortunate beginning to desire to support, by outward means and police regulations, a creed that has reached a period of decadence, still more hopeless was the moral influence here, owing to the example given by the zealous government. A court where a Ritz and a Bischoffwerder strove for pre-eminence was hardly fitted to introduce a new period of religious renascence; its belated pietism bore only too great a resemblance to the fruit of a nervous state, induced by sensual excesses.

And what an exposure was the edict in itself! How it lay open to attack and to gibes! How obvious the retort—that with such means true piety could never be awakened, but the most that could be effected would be to add a new evil to the general corruption, namely, the hypocrisy of Pharisaic formulas! The originators of these measures themselves could not but feel their futility; and this only pushed them to further extremes. The arrogant security, the indifference to criticism and attack which Frederick II manifested throughout

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his reign, were wanting in the councillors of his successor; even in the very beginning, when discussion was raised in the press over the government, they exhibited a sensitiveness which boded ill for the continued freedom of discussion. Now the edict of censorship of December 19th, 1788, followed; this put an end to that freedom of the press which had actually sprung up in the later days of Frederick, more, it is true, in literary and religious than in political matters.

With the usual glib excuse of misuse, always advanced in explanation of the suppression of the liberty of the press, the enforcement of the censorship was now re-introduced; it paid equal attention to current light literature and to the more important scientific utterances, and in no way fulfilled the purpose it proposed to itself. Frivolous and useless literature everywhere found loopholes from which it escaped to permeate Prussia, and whilst bonds were laid on the free-spirited and beneficent discussion of public affairs, the years which followed the edict were far from poor in productions of the foulest kind; to say nothing of the criminal chicaneries which were everywhere perpetrated against the book and publishing trade.

NEW ABUSES ADDED TO THE OLD

Whilst debate was thus put an end to, the sources of discontent were, of course, not choked up; on the contrary, they flowed through many pamphlets to which the charm of the forbidden assured a wide circulation. In these, the carelessness and extravagance of the government were especially blamed; the hope of lighter taxes, so it was complained, remained unfulfilled, various financial operations had been attempted without the right solution being found. On the other hand, in the coronation year there had been a useless increase of the nobility. The warehouse still exercised the same oppressive monopoly as formerly. The increased tax on wheaten flour oppressed everyone; from one and the same piece of land was taken, quite shamelessly, a double tax. Similar complaints were entered against the evil effects of the fiscal system, the stamp tax, and particularly the depressed condition of agriculture. The most pressing demands in this direction were the abolition of the distribution of forage, and the provision of the cavalry from the public storehouses; the doing away with the compulsory furnishing of relays of horses, and the speedier payment of indemnification money. Protection against the arbitrary methods of officials; simplification of the agricultural and village police, so that the poor peasant should not fall from the hands of the officials of agriculture and justice into the hands of the merciless clerks of the board of works, dike inspectors, and gendarmes; the earnest continuation of the regulation of feudal tribute in order to stop wanton oppression; the lightening of the hunting restrictions—such and numerous similar demands surged towards publicity: the censor could scarcely check the forbidden discussion, to say nothing of the discontent itself.

We have already hinted how far even a strong and far-seeing rule like Frederick's fell short of the goal it set before itself; one may, therefore, imagine how it must have been with a weak rule such as this. For example, Frederick II laboured unceasingly to fix a limit to the oppression of the peasants; among other things he had already decreed in the seventies that the services to be required of those in a servile state should be decided by proper regulations of service and tribute books—a task which, when the great king died, was still unfinished. An ordinance of Frederick William II provided that the registry of tributes should be continued only where there were disputes and litigation, so that one of the most beneficent provisions for the control of manorial

despotism was defeated. "If we had a village history," says an official of high position of that time, "we should see that compulsory labour had for years caused the greatest distress, that it was always rendered with the greatest repugnance by the peasants, and was the means of stifling all invention and desire for improvement."

Examined more closely, it will be found that the rendering of compulsory labour cost the villages immeasurably more than its equivalent in money; in many instances they were compelled to travel a mile or further, and should the weather be unfavourable to its performance they had to return from a fruitless journey without receiving compensation. Compulsory labour made the peasants' property of no value, and was of little use to those entitled to it, because it is inefficient by its very nature. Thus old abuses remained in force, whilst new material for discontent was added to them.

THE TRANSITION


In foreign politics the period from 1786 to 1790 was a critical one. The old traditions of Prussian politics, particularly Frederick II's, were still by no means obliterated, but they were no longer adhered to with the firmness and steadfastness of the great king; many personal and dynastic motives, notably in regard to Holland, carried great weight, and dissipated the power of the state in fruitless undertakings. Ideas which Frederick II had started, but the complete realisation of which was a legacy to his successor—for example, the League of Princes (*Fürstenbund*)—were neglected and died a slow death. In the cabinet, so long at least as Hertzberg retained a guiding hand, the anti-Austrian policy of Frederick II's last years preponderated, and in fact seemed in the Eastern Question about to lead to a peculiarly bold course; but with the failure of this attempt a complete reaction set in. The traditional Prussian policy suddenly veered round towards an Austrian alliance, in which Austria and Russia had the main advantage; and so began the alternations of self-distrust which drove Prussia backwards and forwards between eastern and western alliances, between opposition to the Revolution and alliance with it, till they led to the final catastrophe—the destruction of the old Prussian monarchy. We will examine the details of the most important moments of this time of transition, from the death of Frederick II till the convention of Reichenbach (July, 1790).

The confusion in Holland, which first gave occasion for Frederick William II's government to make its début in foreign policy, dates from the time of Frederick II. The old quarrel between the two elements, republican and monarchical, which in the constitution of Holland existed, unreconciled, side by side, had, under the stadholdership of William V, who was married to Frederick William II's sister, revived with fresh force. This revival may be attributed partly to the wrong-headedness of the stadholder himself, but also to the influence of the events of that day, more particularly to the effect produced by the American War of Independence. So for years individual provinces, powers, and classes had stood in opposition to each other. The bourgeois magistrates derived their support from some of the towns and provinces, whilst the house of Orange depended upon the nobility, the military, and a portion of the lower classes. European politics in general entered largely into these complications, the Orange party being traditionally allied with England, whilst their adversaries sought and found support from France. Since the passionate action of Joseph II against the republic, the influence of France, who bore the expense of mediation and peace, had made a remarkable advance, and the states-general seemed permanently bound to the interests of

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France by a closer alliance, whilst at the same time and in a corresponding degree the feeble conduct of the war in the years 1780-1784 increased the hatred of England and the distrust of the Orange party.

Prussia, which by political interests as well as the circumstance of relationship was bound to follow closely Dutch developments, had taken up a position of observation under Frederick II; the old king was little likely to disturb, by fighting for the house of Orange, a peace which he had unceasingly striven to preserve by his policy since 1764. He admonished both sides, warning them against unconsidered action and striving to awaken a spirit of greater moderation; but his advice gained more weight from the moral power of his name than from any idea that he would interfere with material force. Meanwhile in Holland small disputes and unfriendly demonstrations gave rise to



THE FORTRESS OF HOHEN-SALZBURG

(Founded in the eleventh century and now used as barracks)

increasing enmity, and there were frays resulting in bloodshed, the precursors of the civil war. The republican party sought to encroach upon the so-called *règlements* of 1674, which William III had formerly wrested for the house of Orange under the influence of the bloody catastrophe of 1672; on the other hand the Orange party, where they had power, did not fail to resort to provocative and violent measures.

The hereditary stadholder himself, since the command over the troops at the Hague had been taken from him, had forsaken the province of Holland and withdrawn to a part of the country where the nobles had the upper hand and the favourable disposition of the inhabitants guaranteed him support, namely, Gelderland. But even in this province, on which the house of Orange had hitherto been able to count, opposition made itself felt, especially on the borders of the districts inclined to republicanism, as for example Overijssel. Two northern towns, Hatten and Elburg, declared themselves openly against the old order; Hatten would not recognise a member sent there by the stadholder, because he was in the service of the prince; and Elburg refused to admit the publication of an edict issued by the states-general. It seemed as though the struggles of the sixteenth century were about to be renewed; the two towns, when threatened with the employment of force, declared them-

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selves ready to defend themselves to a man—even, in case of necessity, to burn the town; and from Overijssel and Holland, the anti-Orange provinces, bands of volunteers came, ready to support the threatened towns. It is true the result proved that times were changed since the sixteenth century; in spite of boasts and threats both towns were occupied in September, 1786, almost without resistance, whilst a large number of the discontented inhabitants sought shelter in the provinces which favoured republicanism. Isolated cases of excess on the part of the soldiers, and still more the emigrants themselves, furnished a violent means of agitation against the Orange interest. Everything wore more and more the aspect of a civil war; the province of Holland deprived the stadholder of his post of captain-general, levied troops, and made preparations to defend the threatened cause of the republicans or “patriots” at the point of the sword.

FREDERICK WILLIAM AND HOLLAND

It was about this time that Frederick William ascended the throne. No doubt he was influenced, more strongly than Frederick II, by personal interest in the fate of his sister, a powerful, almost masculine personality, full of decision and ambition for rule, who did not fail to represent the situation to him in its darkest aspect; but in the main the king was determined to pursue the policy of his predecessor, and not to be drawn into a war which would divert Prussia’s attention from its interests in the east. Even the important consideration that France, although herself on the eve of a revolution, secretly encouraged the revolutionists in the states of Holland and cherished an understanding with them could not alter the conviction in Berlin that an intercession without any menace of armed intervention would suffice. The mission of Count Görtz, a diplomatist who had formerly been employed in the Bavarian Succession affair, and later at the Petersburg court (in the autumn of 1786), had above all the intention to smooth the way for this peaceful result by mutual agreement. The plenipotentiary extraordinary arrived, indeed, at the critical moment, when the proceedings in Hatten and Elburg had raised the ferment to its height, when Holland armed herself and uttered the threat of separating from the union; he first visited the Orange court at Loo in Gelderland, and there was instructed in the latest news by the princess of Orange.

Despite this, the line of moderate policy and of mediation chosen by Frederick II was not yet abandoned in Berlin. A candid attempt was made to smooth over the difficulties by an understanding with France, and the proposals which were made all bear the marks of moderation. Rather, the endeavour was unmistakable on the part of France to regard the stadholder as bound to English interests and to push him entirely aside, and by favouring the anti-Orange movement to bind the republic still more closely to the French interest. Frederick William II was still so far from contemplating an armed intervention that on the 19th of September he wrote with his own hand to his ambassador: “The emperor would gladly see his rival enfeebled, if it cost him nothing, and awaits a favourable moment to attack him in a weak spot. I cannot commence a war merely in the interests of the family of the stadholder, and if I confined myself to mere demonstrations France and the opposition would know how to rate them at their real worth, and I should only injure myself if I first made demonstrations and then did nothing.” In the same way the king expressed himself two months later. “My interests,” he wrote on the 26th of December, “will not allow me in the present state of things to send arms to the support of the prince.” It certainly did not escape him that the stadholder was partly to blame, and the obstinacy with which the

[1748-1787 A.D.]

court at Loo also waived aside all reasonable means of adjustment visibly annoyed the king. At the end of December he commissioned his ambassador to persuade the prince and his wife to submit, and himself added to the despatches, "If the prince of Orange does not soon better his conduct, he will certainly break his neck."

The violent representations made by the princess would not have worked a change so easily in Frederick William's mind, but for two events which happened in the mean-time and materially changed the situation. First, in January, 1748, the Prussian attempt at mediation in concurrence with France came to nothing; Count Görtz left, and the party blazed hotter than ever. From preparations it had already come to violent measures on both sides and to a bloody affray between citizens and soldiers (May). Secondly, in this moment of violent excitement the princess undertook a possibly well-intentioned journey to the Hague (June), ostensibly for the purpose of personally interceding; she was stopped on the borders of Holland and compelled to return. That which all former representations of the stadholder and his wife and the counsels of Görtz and Hertzberg had failed to do, the court of Orange now succeeded in obtaining by the behaviour, clumsy rather than intentionally offensive, of the citizen militia towards the princess. With extraordinary skill, this incident, insignificant in itself, was exploited by the Orange party, and it was represented to the foreign courts as an injury and insult, though, in fact, such was neither intended nor given.

British diplomacy, represented by the astute Harris (Lord Malmesbury), found this chance incident of use for its own purpose, and Frederick William, till now immovable, however impatiently urged, allowed himself to be swayed by a feeling which, though in itself not blameworthy, was politically unfortunate. His kingly and knightly honour seemed to him to demand that he should not forsake his offended sister. He repeatedly demanded satisfaction, and when it was refused him, a body of Prussian troops, under the command of the duke of Brunswick, assembled on the borders of Holland. The "patriots" held to the fixed opinion that Prussia would not venture upon war, and they relied on the miserable and helpless policy of France; that support proved, in fact, just as worthless as their own military preparations were inefficient—their fortresses, troops, and generals unfit for any serious purpose.

THE INSURRECTION OF 1787

On the 9th of September, 1787, the Prussian ambassador presented to the states-general the ultimatum of the king: it received no satisfactory answer, and four days later the Prussian troops, some twenty thousand strong, crossed the border near Nimeguen and Arnhem. France played the shameful part of first inciting the "patriots" to resistance and then deserting them; this surprise, the long abstention from war, and the natural unfitness of citizens and volunteer troops to cope with trained soldiers procured for the Prussian force an astonishingly cheap success. Gorkum fell without resistance. Utrecht was abandoned; by the 20th of September the stadholder had returned to the Hague, and before the middle of October Amsterdam, too, was garrisoned by the Prussians, the whole insurrection being suppressed with incredible speed and correspondingly slight bloodshed.

The declaration of the king, that he had recourse to arms only on account of the offence to his sister, was faithfully adhered to throughout the war. With more generosity than is advantageous in politics, he renounced all claims to an indemnity for his war expenditures, and demanded neither political nor commercial advantages. Still, the advantage gained seemed commensurate


[1788-1791 A.D.]

with the sacrifice which Prussia had made in the war. The reputation of Prussia was increased, that of France lowered, and the way paved for a more friendly relation with England than that which had prevailed under Frederick. In Germany, Prussia had won precedence of Austria through the league of

Princes, and once more Prussia appeared as the arbiter of Europe, and the force of Prussian arms seemed invincible. The immediate result of the triumphal procession was a closer alliance with Holland and England, which was ratified by the treaties of April and August, 1788. The hope of these alliances had been Hertzberg's chief inducement for allowing himself to be drawn into the affairs of Holland, and we shall soon see what far-reaching combinations he built upon them.

The result certainly showed that these new alliances were of little use to Prussia. They did not even compensate her for the pecuniary outlay caused by the campaign, to say nothing of the moral prejudice to which the cheap advantage of 1787 led. In the republic of Holland no faithful ally was acquired; there the experiences of 1787 were the germ of an anti-Orange revolution. It was under the impressions left by an armed restoration, deeds of violence and revenge, that was fostered the spirit which seven years later won an easy victory for the Revolution. Prussia itself, through this bloodless victory over the Dutch "patriots," was lulled into too dangerous a sense of security. Instead of learning the faults of the existing military organisation, the triumphal procession in Holland soothed generals and army into that self-sufficiency which later proved so disastrous. For not only was the sense of their own invincibility increased by it, but the contempt for all civil and revolutionary move-

ments was also fed by it. The revolution of 1789 was later compared in men's minds with the Dutch "patriots" of 1787, and in 1792 they invaded France with the impressions which the easily victorious march from Arnhem to Amsterdam had left upon their minds.^b



CHURCH OF THE FRANCISCAN CLOISTER
AT BONN

PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA LEAGUED AGAINST FRANCE (1791 A.D.)

Prussia was, in her foreign policy, peculiarly inimical to Joseph II. Besides supporting the Dutch insurgents, she instigated the Hungarians to rebellion and even concluded an alliance with Turkey, which compelled Joseph's successor, the emperor Leopold, by the Peace of Szistowa (1791), to restore Belgrade to the Porte. The revolt of the people of Liège (1789) against their bishop, Constantine Francis, also gave Prussia an opportunity to throw a garrison into that city under pretext of aiding the really oppressed citizens, but

[1790-1792 A.D.]

in reality on account of the inclination of the bishop to favour Austria. When, not long after this, Prussia united with Austria against France, the restoration of the bishop was quietly tolerated.

A conference took place at Pillnitz in Saxony, in 1791, between the emperor Leopold and King Frederick William, at which the count d'Artois, the youngest brother of Louis XVI, was present and a league was formed against the Revolution. The old ministers strongly opposed it. In Prussia, Hertzberg drew upon himself the displeasure of his sovereign by zealously advising a union with France against Austria. In Austria, Kaunitz recommended peace, and said that were he allowed to act he would defeat the impetuous French by his "patience"; that, instead of attacking France, he would calmly watch the event and allow her, like a volcano, to bring destruction upon herself. Ferdinand of Brunswick, field-marshal of Prussia, was equally opposed to war. His fame as the greatest general of his time had been too easily gained, more by his manœuvres than by his victories, not to induce a fear on his side of being as easily deprived of it in a fresh war; but the proposal of the revolutionary party in France, within whose minds the memory of Rossbach was still fresh, mistrustful of French skill, to nominate him generalissimo of the troops of the republic, conspired with the incessant entreaties of the émigrés to reanimate his courage; and he finally declared that, followed by the famous troops of the great Frederick, he would put a speedy termination to the French Revolution.

Leopold II was, as brother to Marie Antoinette, greatly embittered against the French. The disinclination of the Austrians to the reforms of Joseph II appears to have chiefly confirmed him in the conviction of finding a sure support in the old system. He consequently strictly prohibited the slightest innovation and placed a power hitherto unknown in the hands of the police, more particularly in those of its secret functionaries, who listened to every word and consigned the suspected to the oblivion of a dungeon. This mute terrorism found many a victim. This system was, on the death of Leopold II in 1792, publicly abolished by his son and successor, Francis II, but was ere long again carried on in secret.

Catherine II, with the view of seizing the rest of Poland, employed every art in order to instigate Austria and Prussia to a war with France, and by these means fully to occupy them in the west. The Prussian king, although aware of her projects, deemed the French an easy conquest, and thought that in case of necessity his armies could without difficulty be thrown into Poland. He meanwhile secured the popular feeling in Poland in his favour by concluding (1790) an alliance with Stanislaus and giving his consent to the improved constitution established in Poland, 1791. Hertzberg had even counselled an alliance with France and Poland; the latter was to be bribed with a promise of the annexation of Galicia, against Austria and Russia; this plan was however merely whispered about for the purpose of blinding the Poles and of alarming Russia.

FERDINAND OF BRUNSWICK INVADES FRANCE (1792 A.D.)

The bursting storm was anticipated on the part of the French by a declaration of war, 1792, and whilst Austria still remained behind for the purpose of watching Russia, Poland, and Turkey, and the unwieldy empire was engaged in raising troops, Ferdinand of Brunswick had already led the Prussians across the Rhine. He was joined by the émigrés under Condé, whose army consisted almost entirely of officers. The well-known manifesto, published by the duke of Brunswick on his entrance into France, in which he declared

his intention to level Paris with the ground should the French refuse to submit to the authority of their sovereign, was composed by Renfner, the counsellor of the embassy at Berlin.¹ The emperor and Frederick William, persuaded that fear would reduce the French to obedience, had approved of this manifesto, which was, on the contrary, disapproved of by the duke of Brunswick, on account of its barbarity and its ill-accordance with the rules of war. He did not, however, withdraw his signature on its publication. The effect of this manifesto was that the French, instead of being struck with terror, were maddened with rage, deposed their king, proclaimed a republic, and flew to arms in order to defend their cities against the barbarians threatening them with destruction. The national pride of the troops hastily levied and sent against the invaders, effected wonders.

The delusion of the Prussians was so complete that Bischofswerder said to the officers, "Do not purchase too many horses, the affair will soon be over"; and the duke of Brunswick remarked, "Gentlemen, not too much baggage, this is merely a military trip." The Prussians, it is true, wondered that the inhabitants did not, as the émigrés had alleged they would, crowd to meet and greet them as their saviours and liberators, but at first they met with no opposition.

Ferdinand of Brunswick became the dupe of Dumouriez, as he had formerly been that of the émigrés. In the hope of a counter-revolution in Paris, he procrastinated his advance and lost his most valuable time in the siege of fortresses. [Longwy and Verdun were besieged and taken.^o] Ferdinand, notwithstanding this success, still delayed his advance in the hope of gaining over the wily French commander and of thus securing beforehand his triumph in a contest in which his ancient fame might otherwise be at stake. The impatient king, who had accompanied the army, spurred him on, but was, owing to his ignorance of military matters, again pacified by the reasons alleged by the cautious duke. Dumouriez, consequently, gained time to collect considerable reinforcements and to unite his forces with those under Kellermann of Alsace.

The two armies came within sight of each other at Valmy; the king gave orders for battle, and the Prussians were in the act of advancing against the heights occupied by Kellermann, when the duke suddenly gave orders to halt and drew off the troops under a loud *vivat* from the French, who beheld this movement with astonishment. The king was at first greatly enraged, but was afterwards persuaded by the duke of the prudence of this extraordinary step. Negotiations were now carried on with increased spirit. Dumouriez, who, like Kaunitz, said that the French, if left to themselves, would inevitably fall a prey to intestine dissensions, also contrived to accustom the king to the idea of a future alliance with France. The result of these intrigues was an armistice and the retreat of the Prussian army, a retreat which dysentery, bad weather, and bad roads rendered extremely destructive.

FRENCH IDEAS IN GERMAN SOIL

The people in Germany too little understood the real motives and object of the French Revolution, and were too soon provoked by the predatory incursions of the French troops, to be infected with revolutionary principles. These merely fermented among the literati; the utopian idea of universal fraternity was spread by freemasonry; numbers at first cherished a hope that the Revolution would preserve a pure moral character, and were not a little astonished on beholding the monstrous crimes to which it gave birth. Others

[¹ For other opinions as to the authorship of the manifesto, see volume xii, p. 278.]

[1790-1793 A.D.]

merely rejoiced at the fall of the old and insupportable system, and numerous anonymous pamphlets in this spirit appeared in the Rhenish provinces. Fichte, the philosopher, also published an anonymous work in favour of the Revolution. Others again, as, for instance, Reichard, Girtanner, Schirach, and Hoffmann, set themselves up as informers, and denounced every liberal-minded man to the princes as a dangerous Jacobin. A search was made for Crypto-Jacobins, and every honest man was exposed to the calumny of the servile newspaper editors. French republicanism was denounced as criminal, notwithstanding the favour in which the French language and French ideas were held at all the courts of Germany. Liberal opinions were denounced as criminal, notwithstanding the example first set by the courts in ridiculing religion, in mocking all that was venerable and sacred. Nor was this reaction by any means occasioned by a burst of German patriotism against the tyranny of France, for the Treaty of Bâle speedily reconciled the self-same newspaper editors with France. It was mere servility; and the hatred which, it may easily be conceived, was naturally excited against the French as a nation, was vented in this mode upon the patient Germans, who were, unfortunately, ever doomed, whenever their neighbours were visited with some political chronic convulsion, to taste the bitter remedy. But few of the writers of the day took an historical view of the Revolution, and weighed its irremediable results in regard to Germany, besides Gentz, Rehberg, and the baron von Gagern, who published an *Address to his Countrymen*, in which he started the painful question, "Why are we Germans disunited?" Most of the contending opinions of the learned were, however, equally erroneous. It was as little possible to preserve the Revolution from blood and immorality, and to extend the boon of liberty to the whole world, as it was to suppress it by force, and, as far as Germany was concerned, her affairs were too complicated and her interests too scattered for any attempt of the kind to succeed. A Doctor Fanst, at Bückeburg, sent a learned treatise upon the origin of trousers to the national convention at Paris, by which *sans-culottism* had been introduced—an incident alone sufficient to show the state of feeling in Germany at that time.

The revolutionary principles of France merely infected the people in those parts of Germany where their sufferings had ever been the greatest: as, for instance, in Saxony, where the peasantry, oppressed by the game-laws and the rights of the nobility, rose, after a dry summer, by which their misery had been greatly increased, to the number of eighteen thousand, and sent one of their class to lay their complaints before the elector (1790). The unfortunate messenger was instantly consigned to a mad-house, where he remained until 1809, and the peasantry were dispersed by the military. A similar revolt of the peasantry against the tyrannical nuns of Wormelen, in Westphalia, merely deserves mention as being characteristic of the times. A revolt of the peasantry, of equal unimportance, also took place in Bückeburg, on account of the expulsion of three revolutionary priests, Froriep, Meyer, and Rauschenbusch. In Breslau, a great riot, which was put down by means of artillery, was occasioned by the expulsion of a tailor's apprentice (1793). It may be recorded as a matter of curiosity that, during the blood-stained year of 1793, the petty prince of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt held, as though in a time of peace, a magnificent tournament, and the fêtes customary on such an occasion.

POLAND AND THE POWERS

The object of the Prussian king was either to extend his conquests westwards or, at all events, to prevent the advance of Austria. The war with France claimed his utmost attention, and, in order to guard his rear, he again attempted to convert Poland into a bulwark against Russia.

His ambassador, Lucchesini, drove Stackelberg, the Russian envoy, out of Warsaw, and promised mountains of gold to the Poles, who dissolved the perpetual council associated by Russia with the sovereign; freed themselves from the Russian guarantee; aided by Prussia, compelled the Russian troops to evacuate the country; devised a constitution, which they laid before the cabinets of London and Berlin; concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia on the 29th of March, 1790, and, on the 3rd of May, 1791, carried into effect the new constitution ratified by England and Prussia, and approved of by the emperor Leopold. During the conference held at Pillnitz, the indivisibility of Poland was expressly mentioned. The constitution was monarchical. Poland was, for the future, to be a hereditary instead of an elective monarchy, and, on the death of Poniatowski, the crown was to fall to Saxony. The modification of the peasants' dues and the power conceded to the serf of making a private agreement with his lord also gave the monarchy a support against the aristocracy.

Catherine of Russia, however, no sooner beheld Prussia and Austria engaged in a war with France, than she commenced her operations against Poland, declared the new Polish constitution French and Jacobinical, notwithstanding its abolition of the *liberum veto* and its extension of the prerogatives of the crown, and, taking advantage of the king's absence from Prussia, speedily regained possession of the country. What was Frederick William's policy in this dilemma? He was strongly advised to make peace with France, to throw himself at the head of the whole of his forces into Poland, and to set a limit to the insolence of the autocrat; but he feared, should he abandon the Rhine, the extension of the power of Austria in that quarter; and, calculating that Catherine, in order to retain his friendship, would cede to him a portion of her booty, unhesitatingly broke the faith he had just plighted with the Poles, suddenly took up Catherine's tone, declared Jacobinical the constitution he had so lately ratified, and despatched a force under Möllendorf into Poland in order to secure possession of his stipulated prey. By the second partition of Poland, which took place as rapidly, as violently, and, on account of the assurances of the Prussian monarch, far more unexpectedly than the first, Russia received the whole of Lithuania, Podolia, and the Ukraine, and Prussia obtained Thorn and Dantzic, besides southern Prussia (Posen and Kalish). Austria, at that time fully occupied with France, had no participation in this robbery, which was, as it were, committed behind her back.

THE FIRST COALITION AGAINST FRANCE (1793 A.D.)

The sovereigns of Europe prepared for war, and (1793) formed the first great coalition, at whose head stood England, intent upon the destruction of the French navy. The English, aided by a large portion of the French population, devoted to the ancient monarchy, attacked France by sea, and made a simultaneous descent on the northern and southern coasts. The Spanish and Portuguese troops crossed the Pyrenees; the Italian princes invaded the Alpine boundary; Austria, Prussia, Holland, and the German Empire threatened the Rhenish frontier, whilst Sweden and Russia stood frowning in the background. The whole of Christian Europe took up arms against France, and enormous armies hovered, like vultures, around their prey.

Mainz was, during the first six months of this year, besieged by the main body of the Prussian army under the command of Ferdinand, duke of Brunswick. The Austrians, when on their way past Mainz to Valenciennes with a quantity of heavy artillery destined for the reduction of the latter place (which they afterwards compelled to do homage to the emperor), refusing the

[1793-1795 A.D.]

request of the king of Prussia for its use *en passant* for the reduction of Mainz, greatly displeased that monarch, who clearly perceived the common intention of England and Austria to conquer the north of France to the exclusion of Prussia, and consequently revenged himself by privately partitioning Poland with Russia, and refusing his assistance to General Wurmser in the Vosges country. The dissensions between the allies again rendered their successes null. The Prussians, after the capture of Mainz (1793), advanced and beat the fresh masses led against them by Moreau at Pirmasens; but Frederick William, disgusted with Austria and secretly far from disinclined to peace with France, quitted the army (which he maintained in the field, merely from motives of honour, but allowed to remain in a state of inactivity) in order to visit his newly acquired territory in Poland.

The duke of Brunswick, who had received no orders to retreat, was compelled, *bon gré mal gré*, to hazard another engagement with the French, who rushed to the attack. He was once more victorious, at Kaiserslautern, over Hoche, whose untrained masses were unable to withstand the superior discipline of the Prussian troops. Wurmser took advantage of the moment when success seemed to restore the good humour of the allies to coalesce with the Prussians, dragging the unwilling Bavarians in his train. This junction, however, had merely the effect of disclosing the jealousy rankling on every side. The greatest military blunders were committed, and each blamed the other. Landau ought to and might have been rescued from the French, but this step was procrastinated until the convention had charged generals Hoche and Pichegru, "Landau or death." These two generals brought a fresh and numerous army into the field, and, in the very first engagements, at Wörth and Fröschweiler, the Bavarians ran away and the Austrians and Prussians were signally defeated. The retreat of Wurmser, in high displeasure, across the Rhine afforded a welcome pretext to the duke of Brunswick to follow his example and even to resign the command of the army to Möllendorf. In this shameful manner was the left bank of the Rhine lost to Germany.

The disasters suffered by the Austrians seem at that time to have flattered the ambition of the Prussians, for Möllendorf suddenly recrossed the Rhine and gained an advantage at Kaiserslautern, but was, in July, 1794, again repulsed at Trippstadt, notwithstanding which he once more crossed the Rhine in September, and a battle was won by the prince von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen at Fischbach, but, on the coalition of Jourdan with Hoche, who had until then singly opposed him, Möllendorf again, and for the last time, retreated across the Rhine. The whole of the left bank of the Rhine, Luxemburg and Mainz alone excepted, was now in the hands of the French. Resius, the Hessian general, abandoned the Rheinfels with the whole garrison, without striking a blow in its defence. He was, in reward, condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Jourdan converted the fortress into a ruined heap. All the fortifications on the Rhine were yielded for the sake of saving Mannheim from bombardment.

THE THIRD PARTITION OF POLAND (1795 A.D.)

Frederick William's advisers, who imagined the violation of every principle of justice and truth to be an indubitable proof of instinctive and consummate prudence, unwittingly played a high and hazardous game. Their diplomatic absurdity, which weighed the fate of nations against a dinner, found a confusion of all the solid principles on which states rest as stimulating as the piquant ragouts of the great Ude. Lucchesini, with his almost intolerable airs of sapience, as artfully veiled his incapacity in the cabinet as Ferdinand of Brunswick did his in the field, and to this may be ascribed the measures which

but momentarily and seemingly aggrandised Prussia and prepared her deeper fall. Each petty advantage gained by Prussia but served to raise against her some powerful foe, and finally, when placed by her policy at enmity with every sovereign of Europe, she was induced to trust to the shallow friendship of the French Republic.

The Poles, taken unawares by the second partition of their country, speedily recovered from their surprise and collected all their strength for an energetic opposition. Kosciuszko, who had, together with La Fayette, fought in North America in the cause of liberty, armed his countrymen with scythes, put every Russian who fell into his hands to death, and attempted the restoration of ancient Poland. How easily might not Prussia, backed by the enthusiasm of the patriotic Poles, have repelled the Russian colossus, already threatening Europe! But the Berlin diplomatists had yet to learn the homely truth that "honesty is the best policy." They aided in the aggrandisement of Russia, and drew down a nation's curse upon their heads for the sake of an addition to the territory of Prussia, the maintenance of which cost more than its revenue.

The king led his troops in person into Poland, and in June, 1794, defeated Kosciuszko's scythemen at Szczekociny, but met with such strenuous opposition in his attack upon Warsaw as to be compelled to retire in September. On the retreat of the Prussian troops, the Russians, who had purposely awaited their departure in order to secure the triumph for themselves, invaded the country in great force under their bold general, Suvarov, who defeated Kosciuszko, took him prisoner, and besieged Warsaw, which he carried by storm. On this occasion, termed by Reichard "a peaceful and merciful entry of the clement victor," eighteen thousand of the inhabitants of every age and sex were cruelly put to the sword. The result of this success was the third partition or utter annihilation of Poland. Russia took possession of the whole of Lithuania and Volhynia, as far as the Riemien and the Bug; Prussia, of the whole country west of the Riemien, including Warsaw; Austria, of the whole country south of the Bug (1795). An army of German officials, who earned for themselves not the best of reputations, settled in the Prussian division. They were ignorant of the language of the country, and enriched themselves by tyranny and oppression. Von Treibenfeld, the counsellor to the forest-board, one of Bischofswerder's friends, bestowed a number of confiscated lands upon his adherents.^d

NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO THE TREATY OF BÂLE


Both at Berlin and Vienna there had long been a desire to get rid of the burden of the French war. The Austrian Thugut refused to listen to any of Pitt's offers, Haugwitz and Lucchesini were out of humour with the British cabinet, and Möllendorf suggested negotiations with the French Republic; at first, indeed, Frederick William II would not hear of negotiations with the regicides, and rejected the idea of concluding a separate peace without reference to his allies as disloyal: but as early as July, 1794, Möllendorf, who commanded the Prussian army on the Rhine, had begun to treat for peace with Barthélemy, the French envoy in Switzerland.^e

France had another agent in Switzerland, the Alsatian Bacher, who had been born in the year 1748 at Thann, had spent his youth in Berlin, and been through his training as an officer. Hence originated his enthusiasm for Frederick the Great, and his acquaintance with Prince Henry and many other eminent men who were destined later to be of such use to him. From 1777 until the arrival of Barthélemy, he had been an envoy in Switzerland, and in 1793 had

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been given the post of first secretary and interpreter of the republic in Bâle, with instructions to guard the neutrality of Switzerland, to watch the movements of hostile armies, to supply the French generals with news, and to maintain an active correspondence with the secret agents who served the republic in Germany. Through this Bacher the committee of public safety received the most unvarnished disclosures concerning the internal proceedings of the coalition, and the constant friction of its Polish with its French policy; also concerning the conflict between the peaceable attitude of the Prussian ministers in general and the warlike attitude of King Frederick William; and concerning the impossibility, which was growing clearer and clearer, of Frederick William's avoiding the conclusion of a peace which would deliver him from unbearable pressure on two sides.

It was to this Bacher that Möllendorf, who had been field-marshal for seven years, dared, with unexampled presumption, to make behind the back of his king proposals for peace. This will show, in an example of astounding significance, what a Prussian general at that time dared to consider permissible when relying on the undisguised opposition of the army to the war. It is known by what construction of the Treaty of the Hague Möllendorf succeeded in establishing the exemption of the Prussian army from those services as *Landsknechte* to the English, for which the English believed they had purchased them. He allowed the secret engagement with France to follow upon the breach with England herein involved, and consciously involved. At his order a wine merchant from Kreuznach, one Schmerz by name, visited Barthélemy at the end of July, 1794, in Baden, and Bacher at the end of August in Bâle, to let Barthélemy know by letter, and Bacher by word of mouth, that "the Prussians" were ready to enter upon peace negotiations with France as soon as they could reckon on France's complaisance. Ochs, the burgomaster of Bâle, had taken part in the conference, and from that time he assumed the rôle of a go-between. As early as the 16th of September, 1794, Bacher was able to convey to Paris the news that "Field-Marshal Möllendorf has just sent me his confidential agent, who informs me that in a council of war the Austrians determined to throw themselves into Treves on the 1^e Vendémiaire (September 22nd) in order to reconquer this place by a vigorous onslaught. The Prussian generals were invited to co-operate in this undertaking. They were not able entirely to refuse the invitation: but their envoy was instructed to request me to inform General Michaud, commander-in-chief of the Rhine army, that the rôle of the Prussians would be confined to observation only. According to the view of the Prussians the attack on Treves would be a complete failure, while the French are strong enough to occupy the most important posts which they have to defend. So far as the Prussians are concerned they would not stir: this could be reckoned upon;



THE WOODEN TOWER, MAINZ

but they hope that they will not be forced to take up arms—the Prussians will only fight in order to defend themselves if they are attacked.” The brilliant part taken by the Prussian corps of Prince Hohenlohe on the 20th of September in the victorious battle of Kaiserslautern was entirely opposed to the programme of Möllendorf.

The dissension hitherto reigning between the king and his whole *entourage* ceased in October. England and Austria vied with each other in justifying the predictions of the peace party at court. On behalf of England Lord Malmesbury declared, on the 11th of October, that the subsidies due would not be paid; on behalf of Austria Prince Reuss declared that the auxiliary corps of twenty thousand men, demanded by the king for the war in Poland, would not be formed. It was impossible to oppose with any self-delusion the language of facts like these. On the 16th of October Frederick William gave orders to Field-Marshal Möllendorf to lead the army back to Prussia, especially the twenty thousand men who, in virtue of the treaty of alliance in February, 1792, were stationed on the Rhine. At the same time the English were informed of the subsidy treaty; and with the departure of Möllendorf to the right bank of the Rhine was completed the withdrawal of Prussia from the war.^f

The Empire and the Peace Negotiations

Henceforward Prussia considered her task to be the preservation of her own individuality and her union with the estates of the empire, many of which had already turned their thoughts to peace with France. In the electoral college Charles Theodore of the Palatinate and Bavaria was especially in favour of peace, and the elector of Mainz, Frederick Charles Joseph von Erthal, in collusion with Möllendorf, was also working for it.^e

The smooth-tongued Karl von Dalberg, coadjutor of Mainz, who had always hitherto given expression to his faithful adherence to the supreme head of the empire in the most touching words—he being prince primate of the German Empire, a French duke, creature and tool of the French emperor—was one of the first to urge the elector of Mainz, the *ex-officio* arch-chancellor of the empire, to deal the most decisive of blows to German patriotism. The Prussian ministers, Hardenberg, Schulenburg, Albin, the chancellor of Mainz, and Möllendorf, supported him. The senile and characterless elector of Mainz succumbed to the influence of these five men.^g

In spite, therefore, of the opposition of Austria and of Hanover, the diet of Ratisbon agreed to the opening of peace negotiations, and the imperial decree to that effect was passed with unwonted promptitude on the 22nd of December. Already in January, 1794, Hesse-Cassel had made offers of peace to France, and Hesse-Darmstadt, Zweibrücken, Leiningen, and Treves hoped to obtain peace with France through Prussia. The conquest of Holland by Pichegru had opened to the French a door through which they might invade lower Germany, and strengthened the desire for peace in Berlin.^e

The Attitude of Prussia

On the 4th of December, 1794, Merlin (of Douai) made a speech in the convention, in which he said of Prussia that it was undoubtedly the only one of all the states that in its own interest must hail with delight the erection of a great republic on the ruins of a monarchy, which through “the shameful treaty” of 1756 had exercised such a powerful check on the perfidious house of Austria; doubtless Prussia would soon see that in order to counteract the voracious ambition of Russia it could find a sound balance only “in a lasting

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peace with France, and in a close alliance with the northern powers which are her neighbours." Concerning the attitude to be adopted towards the states which were inclined towards peace, he said: "While the French nation with triumphant and withal generous hand draws the boundaries within which it is her pleasure to be confined, she will reject no offers that are compatible with her interests and her dignity, with her tranquillity and with her security. Such is her policy, which rejoices in its nakedness. She will treat with her enemies, even as she has fought with them before the eyes of the world, which is witness of her just intentions as it has been made witness of her victories. To sum up all in a word: at the point where the French nation shall find war no longer necessary to avenge insults to her dignity, or to protect herself from fresh aggressions dictated by cunning, there alone will she impose bounds on her victorious career, there alone will she enjoin peace."

The language of this declaration was inflated, but it was unequivocal, and consistent with the power which France undeniably possessed. The invitation to Prussia was perfectly comprehensible. But so was the announcement that no sacrifice of possessions was to be expected from a power which no one could restrain—to put it roundly, that to secure peace there was no other way than to make a voluntary renunciation of claims to new victories and acquisitions.

And so if Prussia determined to make peace with this power, the main and essential question was simply—What was to be done if, instead of relinquishing the German territory on the left of the Rhine, which was now occupied by her troops, France decided to cling to it? But it was on this very question that the Prussian ministry was silent when on the 8th of December it drew up instructions with which Major-General Count Goltz, the former ambassador in Paris, was to proceed to the opening of peace negotiations. Only when these were settled did the cabinet minister Von Alvensleben introduce this question for debate (on the 9th of December), when he proposed to embrace two conditions as an offset to the unavoidable consent to this unavoidable demand of France: (1) a guarantee of the Polish territory in occupation, and (2) indemnity for the Prussian territory on the left side of the Rhine by removal of the spiritual bishoprics. The reply of the minister Count Finckenstein to this was, "Such a course would be certain to infuriate the king, possibly to such an extent that he would refuse to hear any more of the embassy of Count Goltz." And this objection had its effect, as it was bound to have. The whole document of the 8th of December was apparently intended less for Count Goltz than for the king himself, whose approbation of the whole thing, inasmuch as it conflicted immeasurably with his personal inclination, could be won only if at least at the beginning he rested in the belief that he could have peace not only without sacrifice but even with a great increase of honour and reputation.

Before Goltz arrived at Bâle, news had been received by the ministry through Harnier, secretary at the embassy, that the committee of public safety wished to have an immediate explanation of the king's intentions, and had determined that these should reach Paris through Harnier himself. The 18th of December, the day of his arrival in Berlin, had not passed when he was already provided with instructions for Paris; he reached Paris on the 6th of January, 1795, and at the very first conferences in the committee their majority confronted him with an unwavering demand; this was for the whole territory left of the Rhine together with Mainz.

Any excitement, however, that might have been raised in Berlin by this demand would have been suppressed by the overwhelming news of the conquest of Holland by General Pichegru. The reaction was at once illustrated.

On the 30th of January, the ambassador Boissy d'Anglas informed the as-

sembly of the peaceable intentions of the committee of public safety, and gave still sharper expression to the programme developed by Merlin on the 4th of December, in these words: "Our previous dangers, the necessity for making it impossible for them to recur, the duty which we feel to compensate our fellow citizens for their sacrifice, our honest wish to make the peace solid and permanent—all this compels us to extend our frontiers, to compose them of great rivers, mountains, and the ocean, in order thus to protect ourselves from the beginning and for a long succession of centuries against every aggression and every attack."

Language of this kind could surprise nobody; as a matter of fact it contained nothing new, and the increased sharpness of emphasis with which what had long been known was here reiterated was easily explained in view of the triumph in Holland. Nevertheless the Prussian ministers were quite clear as to the sacrifice which must be made if they were not prepared to abandon peace, which Prussia was simply neither in a position to do without nor to impose. Only in their attitude towards the king was any change to be observed in them, inasmuch as the catastrophe in Holland justified them in exhibiting a frankness which had not been timely on the 8th of December. Determined at bottom to sacrifice the Rhine territory, they now sought only the most gentle means of winning the king to their side, and of saving as much of the honour of the state as yet remained to be saved. Before the end of January two points were agreed upon at Potsdam: first of all, the negotiations were not to be broken off on account of the Rhine territory; and secondly, there was to be no surrender before the general peace, and even then only at the price of indemnity.

THE TREATY OF BÂLE (1795 A.D.)

Bâle was selected as the place for the negotiations; here Goltz came on the 28th of December and Barthélemy on the 12th of January. The negotiations were first officially opened on the 22nd of January; they suffered unexpected interruption owing to the illness of Count Goltz, who died on the 6th of February: his place was taken by Harnier, who carried on the conference. On the 15th of February a despatch from the king was handed to Harnier, in which he was requested to demand of Barthélemy a proposal for a draft treaty, which he was to follow up at once with a counter draft in case the earlier one should be unacceptable. He did not conceal his astonishment over the contradiction which was involved by the committee of public safety's giving him assurances for the authority of the king under the solemn assertion of its good will, assurances which it could not fulfil without losing its own authority; but this is what would happen if, by assigning a portion of his provinces, he were to afford the precedent for mutilating the territory of the empire. The Prussian territory on the left bank of the Rhine could have no value for France unless France extended its frontiers altogether to the Rhine. But as this general question could be decided only at the general peace, so the decision concerning the special question of the Prussian territory must remain also undecided for the present. To this wish, which was emphasised very loudly on the side of the Prussians, the committee of public safety acceded, attempting to solve the difficulty in a draft treaty received by Barthélemy on the 11th of March, and constructed as follows: "Article 6. The French republic will continue to occupy the territories of Mörs, Cleves, and Gelderland on the left bank of the Rhine, and these territories will ultimately share the lot of the other states of the empire on the left bank of the Rhine, at the conclusion of a general peace between the French Republic and the rest of Germany." In order to comply with the wish of the king that a mediator for

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peace should be duly honoured, it was further added in a ninth article: "The French Republic will accept the good services of the king of Prussia in favour of the princes and estates of the empire which should desire to enter immediately into negotiation with her."

The text and contents of these two articles now formed the main subject of the decisive negotiations with which Freiherr Karl August von Hardenberg was occupied from the 28th of February, but which in consequence of the lateness of his arrival in Bâle were not commenced before the 19th of March. The delay to the conclusion of negotiations now incurred, in spite of the fact that Hardenberg was instructed by the ministry to yield to the committee of public safety in all important points, was due to the fact that Hardenberg thought that by an ingenious dilatoriness on the one side and by firm conduct on the other he could give to the whole business a more favourable turn for Prussia. This method, certainly an arbitrary one, secured him some advantages, it is true, in points of inferior import; but in the main his whole experience confirmed for him the observation that Prussia was just the element that could not risk a breach, because she stood between two fires, and no diplomatic skill could withdraw her from the necessity for extinguishing one of them with all speed.

In the original draft treaty which was signed by both plenipotentiaries on the 5th of April, 1795, the main contention on the subject of the Rhine lands was solved by giving another construction to the clause mentioned above as the Article 5 of the public treaty, and adding to it an important sub-clause in a secret article contiguous with it.

In the first part of the sentence the words "the French Republic will," were replaced by "the troops of the French Republic will hold in occupation," and this change denoted that the occupation which before had been purely military should still continue to maintain its military character until the imperial peace was settled. In place of the second part of the sentence, another sentence was introduced which ran: "Every final decision regarding these provinces is postponed to the general determination of peace between France and the German Empire." Furthermore, in the second of six secret contiguous articles, came the following provision: "If at the general determination of peace with the empire France keeps the left bank of the Rhine, the king will agree with the republic over the indemnity which he shall receive, and will accept the guarantee which the republic shall offer to him for the indemnity."

Such were the provisions of the treaty with regard to the left bank of the Rhine; a public and a secret article dealt with the position of the king of Prussia in regard to the imperial states, which were everywhere solicitous for peace. This article (the 10th), after expressing readiness to accept the good services of the king in the above-mentioned form, went on to promise "a three



HEIDELBERG CASTLE COURT

months' armistice to those states on the right of the Rhine, for which the king of Prussia should use his interest." And the third of the contiguous secret articles expressed "the neutrality of north Germany under the guarantee of the king of Prussia, and under the provision that the states lying within the line of demarcation should withdraw their contingents, and should in no way incur the obligation of providing troops against France." Both states promised to maintain sufficient forces to protect this neutrality.

One question only remained open, of which the committee of public safety was reminded as soon as it received the draft treaty—What would happen if the king of England in his position as elector of Hanover refused to enter the agreement for neutrality arranged for north Germany? To this question Hardenberg subsequently replied by a note of the 15th of April, in which he declared that in this case "the king of Prussia would make it his duty to take the electorate into his safe keeping (*prendre en dépôt*) in order to effect execution of the afore-mentioned conditions." Already on the 14th of April the convention had received the public treaty with loud enthusiasm for the republic, on the 15th the committee accepted the secret articles; no less was the satisfaction on the Prussian side. Hardenberg in his despatch to the king particularly described the peace as "safe, honourable, and advantageous."

The peace with Prussia had been preceded on the 9th of February by that with Tuscany; and in this same Bâle there followed, on the 17th of May, a treaty concerning the neutrality of one portion of the German Empire under the guarantee of Prussia, and on the 22nd of July, a peace treaty with Spain. The committee of public safety and the convention thus met the general wishes of the French nation with this peace policy, but this was the only ground on which they had the country with them.^f

THE ARROGANCE OF FRANCE.

During the conferences of peace with Prussia, and even afterwards, in the summer of 1795, as Austria and the Germanic empire appeared equally desirous for a pacification, both parties agreed to a cessation of arms, and the two armies retained their position in front of each other on the opposite banks of the Rhine, separated only by the waters of that noble river. This short repose was of great benefit to France, for the general scarcity of provisions which prevailed throughout this year—producing almost a state of famine—would otherwise have completely prevented the army from accomplishing any extraordinary operations. But as the harvest was now safely gathered in, Jourdan, on the night of the 6th of September, crossed the Rhine between Duisburg and Düsseldorf, which latter town he forthwith invested, and pursuing his impetuous course of victory, drove the Austrians from the banks of the rivers Wupper—the commencement of the Prussian line of demarcation—the Sieg and the Lahn over the Main. Field-Marshal Clerfayt, however, had reassembled his troops behind the latter river, and he now attacked the French at Höchst, near Frankfort, completely routed them, and sent them back over the Rhine with the same expedition that they had used in advancing across it; thus Mainz was delivered from its state of siege, and Mannheim retaken. The summer armistice had reduced the strength and spirit of the republican armies, and their zeal had become considerably diminished. A war conducted on the opposite bank of the Rhine was no longer regarded as a war in the cause of liberty, and many volunteers of the higher classes had now returned to their homes.

When, in 1796, the new order of things had become gradually consolidated in France, the directory resolved to force Austria and the Germanic Empire to

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conclude a treaty of peace by one general overwhelming invasion. It was determined that the armies should, in the ensuing spring, cross to the other side of the Rhine and the Alps, and penetrate from every point into the heart of Germany. Moreau was to march through Swabia, Jourdan through Franconia, and a third army was to overrun Italy. In the latter country, the Austrian troops were commanded by the old general, Beaulieu; in the upper Rhine, the old veteran, Wurmser, held the chief command; and in the lower Rhine, the general-in-chief was the archduke Charles of Austria; to the two latter armies were united the troops of the imperial states. The war commenced in Italy. But there the old and experienced general found himself confronted with a young, daring leader, filled with the most gigantic projects, who now on this occasion first came forth to develop his marvellous powers and indomitable perseverance before the eyes of astonished Europe.^c

The principal object of the policy of Bonaparte and of the French Directory, at that period, was, by rousing the ancient feelings of enmity between Austria and Prussia, to eternalise the disunion between those two monarchies. Bonaparte, after effectuating the peace by means of terror, loaded Austria with flattery. He flattered her religious feelings by the moderation of his conduct in Italy towards the pope, notwithstanding the disapprobation manifested by the genuine French republicans; and her interests, by the offer of Venice in compensation for the loss of the Netherlands, and, making a slight side movement against that once powerful and still wealthy republic, reduced it at the first blow, nay, by mere threats, to submission; so deeply was the ancient aristocracy here also fallen. The cession of Venice to the emperor was displeasing to the French republicans. They were, however, pacified by the delivery of La Fayette, who had been still detained a prisoner in Austria after the Treaty of Bâle. Napoleon said in vindication of his policy, "I have merely lent Venice to the emperor; he will not keep her long." He moreover gratified Austria by the extension of her western frontier, so long the object of her ambition, by the possession of the archbishopric of Salzburg and of a part of Bavaria with the town of Wasserburg.

The sole object of these concessions was provisionally to dispose Austria in favour of France, and to render Prussia's ancient jealousy of Austria implacable. Hence the secret articles of peace by which France and Austria bound themselves not to grant any compensation to Prussia. Prussia was on her part, however, resolved not to be the loser, and in the summer of 1797 took forcible possession of the imperial free town of Nuremberg, notwithstanding her declaration made just three years previously through Count Soden to the Franconian circle, that the king had never harboured the design of seeking a compensation at the expense of the empire, whose constitution had ever been sacred in his eyes!—and to the empire, that he deemed it beneath his dignity to refute the reports concerning Prussia's schemes of aggrandisement, oppression, and secularisation. Prussia also extended her possessions in Franconia and Westphalia, and Hesse-Cassel imitated her example by the seizure of a part of Schaumburg-Lippe. The diet energetically remonstrated, but in vain. Pamphlets spoke of the Prussian reunion-chambers opened by Hardenberg in Franconia. An attempt was, however, made to console the circle of Franconia by depicting the far worse sufferings of that of Swabia under the imperial contributions. The petty estates of the empire stumbled, under these circumstances, upon the unfortunate idea that the intercession of the Russian court should be requested for the maintenance of the integrity of the German Empire and for that of her constitution—the intercession of the Russian court, which had so lately annihilated Poland!

Shortly after this (1797) Frederick William II, who had, on his accession to the throne, found £14,500,000 in the treasury, expired, leaving £5,500,000

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of debts. His son, Frederick William III, abolished the unpopular monopoly in tobacco, but retained his father's ministers and continued the alliance, so pregnant with mischief, with France. This monarch, well-meaning and destined to the severest trials, educated by a peevish valetudinarian and ignorant of



FREDERICK WILLIAM III
(1770-1840)

affairs, was first taught by bitter experience the utter incapacity of the men at that time at the head of the government, and after, as will be seen, completely reforming the court, the government, and the army, surrounded himself with men who gloriously delivered Prussia and Germany from all the miseries and avenged all the disgrace which it is the historian's sad office to record.

Austria, as Prussia had already done by the Treaty of Bâle, also sacrificed, by the Peace of Campo-Formio, the whole of the left bank of the Rhine and abandoned it to France, the loss thereby suffered by the estates of the empire being indemnified by the secularisation of the ecclesiastical property in the interior of Germany and by the prospect of the seizure of the imperial free towns. Mainz was ceded without a blow to France. Holland was forgotten. The English, under pretext of opposing France, destroyed (1797) the last Dutch fleet, in the Texel, though not without a heroic and determined resistance on the part of the admirals De Winter and Reintjes, both of whom were severely wounded, the latter dying in captivity in England. Holland was formed into a Batavian, Genoa into a Ligurian, Milan with the Veltlin (from which the Grisons was severed) into a Cisalpine Republic. Intrigues were, moreover, set on foot for the formation of a Roman and Neapolitan Republic

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in Italy and of a Rhenish and Swabian one in Germany, all of which were to be subordinate to the mother republic in France. The proclamation of a still-born Cisrhenish Republic (it not having as yet been constituted when it was swallowed up in the great French Republic), in the masterless Lower Rhenish provinces in the territory of Treves, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Cologne, under the influence of the French Jacobins and soldiery, was, however, all that could at first be openly done.

At Rastadt, near Baden, where the compensation mentioned in the Treaty of Campo-Formio was to be taken into consideration, the terrified estates of the empire assembled for the purpose of suing the French ambassadors for the lenity they had not met with at the hands of Austria and Prussia. The events that took place at Rastadt are of a description little calculated to flatter the patriotic feelings of the German historian. The soul of the congress was Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Périgord, at one time a bishop, at the present period minister of the French Republic. His colloquy with the German ambassadors resembled that of the fox with the geese, and he attuned their discords with truly diabolical art. Whilst holding Austria and Prussia apart, instigating them one against the other, flattering both with the friendship of the republic and with the prospect of a rich booty by the secularisation of the ecclesiastical lands, he encouraged some of the petty states with the hope of aggrandisement by an alliance with France, and, with cruel contempt, allowed others a while to gasp for life before consigning them to destruction.

The petty princes, moreover, who had been deprived of their territory on the other side of the Rhine, demanded lands on this side in compensation; all the petty princes on this side consequently trembled lest they should be called upon to make compensation, and each endeavoured, by bribing the members of the congress, Talleyrand in particular, to render himself an exception. The French minister was bribed not by gold alone; a considerable number of ladies gained great notoriety by their liaison with the insolent republican, from whom they received nothing, the object for which they sued being sold by him sometimes even two or three times. *Momus*, a satirical production of this period, relates numerous instances of crime and folly that are perfectly incredible. The avarice manifested by the French throughout the whole of the negotiations was only surpassed by the brutality of their language and behaviour. Robert, Bonnier, and Jean de Bry, the dregs of the French nation, treated the whole of the German Empire on this occasion *en canaille*, and, whilst picking the pockets of the Germans, were studiously coarse and brutal; still, the trifling opposition they encountered and the total want of spirit in the representatives of the great German Empire, whom it must, in fact, have struck them as ridiculous to see thus humbled at their feet, forms an ample excuse for their demeanour.

The weakness displayed by the empire and the increasing disunion between Austria and Prussia encouraged the French to further insolence. Not satisfied with garrisoning every fortification on the left bank of the Rhine, they boldly attacked, starved to submission, and razed to the ground, during peace time, the once impregnable fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, on the right bank of the Rhine, opposite Coblenz. Not content with completely laying waste the Netherlands and Holland, they compelled the Hanse towns to grant them a loan of 18,000,000 livres. Lübeck refused, but Hamburg and Bremen, more nearly threatened and hopeless of aid from Prussia, were constrained to satisfy the demands of the French brigands. In the Netherlands, the German faction once more rose in open insurrection; in 1798, the young men, infuriated by the conscription and by their enrolment into French regiments, flew to arms, and torrents of blood were shed in the struggle, in which they were unaided by their German brethren, before they were again reduced to submission.

The English also landed at Ostend, but for the sole purpose of destroying the sluices of the canal at Brügge.

The French divided the beautiful Rhenish provinces, yielded to them almost without a blow by Germany, into four departments. Each individual was a citizen, free and equal. All ecclesiastical establishments were abandoned to plunder, the churches alone excepted, they being still granted as places of worship to believers, notwithstanding the contempt and ridicule into which the clergy had fallen. The monasteries were closed. The peasantry, more particularly in Treves, nevertheless still manifested great attachment to popery. Guilds and corporations were also abolished. The introduction of the ancient German oral law formerly in use throughout the empire, the institution of trial by jury, which, to the disgrace of Germany, the Rhenish princes, after the lapse of a thousand years, learned from their Gallic foe, were great and signal benefits.

Liberty, equality, and justice were, at that period, in all other respects, mere fictions. The most arbitrary rule in reality existed, and the new provinces were systematically drained by taxes of every description, as, for instance, register, stamp, patent, window, door, and land taxes: there was also a tax upon furniture and upon luxuries of every sort; a poll-tax, a percentage on the whole assessment, etc.; besides extortion, confiscation, and forced sales. And woe to the new citizen of the great French Republic if he failed in paying more servile homage to its officers, from the prefect down to the lowest underling, than had ever been exacted by the princes! Such was the liberty bestowed by republican France! Thus were her promises fulfilled! The German illuminati were fearfully undeceived, particularly on perceiving how completely their hopes of universally revolutionising Germany were frustrated by the Treaty of Bâle. The French, who had proclaimed liberty to all the nations of the earth, now offered it for sale. The French character was in every respect the same as during the reign of Louis XIV. The only principle to which they remained ever faithful was that of robbery. Switzerland was now in her turn attacked, and vengeance thus overtook every province that had severed itself from the empire, and every part of the once magnificent empire of Germany was miserably punished for its want of unity.^d


NEW PHASES OF PRUSSIAN NEUTRALITY

Let us now review the change produced in the general position of the Prussian state by the French occupation of Hanover. Prussia had some years before opposed the advance of the French both in the Netherlands and on the Rhine by the principle of neutrality and demarcation; and by preventing further invasions, notwithstanding her friendly relations with the French, had thus succeeded in gaining for herself a high reputation. Under the leadership of Prussia a new system was formed, by means of which the north of Germany was not only made secure, but also united internally more than ever before. An armed power, at the head of which stood the duke of Brunswick, was formed out of the contingents of the north German states, and standing as it did in the midst of the contending armies, this power possessed no small weight and maintained the authority of the Prussian crown. At the same time the continual strife of the other powers had a favourable effect on north German commerce and on the prosperity of the Prussian people. This system included Poland, the coasts of the Baltic Sea, and especially those of the North Sea, and contributed to the formation of a certain unity between foreign territories and the Prussian state. The temptation which had existed for a moment to take an active part in the conflicts of the second coalition was due to a desire to

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secure the position already gained through the liberation of Holland and a consequent affiliation with it; there was no thought, however, of interfering in the determination of the great European questions, and the danger of being entangled in hostilities, the issue of which could not be foreseen, acted as a restraint from even that very limited beginning. Prussia remained true to the system of peace and neutrality. This, however, was possible only so long as a certain equilibrium was maintained among the belligerent powers and the prospect of peace between them still remained.

But things were bound to take a different course after the peace negotiations at Amiens had proved unsuccessful and the war between England and France assumed a position so prominent as to put every other question into the shade, and after the friendly relations that had for some time existed between Alexander and Bonaparte had also ceased. Then came the occupation of Hanover by the French, which was an act of hostility directed against England, but



EHRENBREITSTEIN

(Frequently Assailed in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries)

from which Germany, and especially Prussia, suffered most. Those old coalitions directed against France had lost their value in consequence of the Treaty of Lunéville, which had given promise of a universal peace; but at the same moment the French had, under another pretext, taken the most violent measure conceivable against Prussia—the military occupation of a considerable territory in north Germany. At the same time the naval war between the two powers reacted on the foreign commerce of Prussia; the whole system adopted for the last ten years was shaken in its foundations.

For some time it seemed that it would be possible to conclude with France an alliance, which would safeguard the interests of Prussia. Bonaparte himself had been the first to create this impression by offering Prussia his alliance. This was certainly no hypocritical pretence on his part. He has himself stated his reasons for it: England might possibly again form a coalition with Austria, and he therefore wished to be allied with Prussia against Austria and England. But the question whether Prussia could enter into such an alliance was one demanding the most serious consideration. The minister Lombard was sent to Brussels, where Bonaparte was at that time, with the view of ascertaining from the sovereign himself, and not from one of his ministers, how far he was serious in consenting to peace and friendship; and it was no intentional deception on the part of Bonaparte, when he tried his best to convince Lombard of his peaceful and friendly intentions towards Prussia. In this he succeeded only too well. His intentions towards Prussia were dictated by the

general political conditions, and were part of a general plan for the conduct of the war against England, which had caused Bonaparte to disregard all previous alliances.

The idea of an alliance with France had once more called forth the feeling of independence. The hope of a possible resistance of the empire had not been given up in Germany, however limited the chief of the empire might be. The opinion existed that federalism was not at all a bad constitution for internal peace and development; both aristocracy and anarchy might be thus resisted and the free cities might become happy republics. Publications were issued and conferences held where these ideas were more precisely defined.

It was precisely in the first consul that Hardenberg perceived the most dangerous opponent. While accepting the federalist system, Hardenberg had in view the possibility of giving to the German Empire a suitable constitution. Based upon a federative system, this constitution would leave every prince and every proprietor in possession of his property and outward splendour, while everything pertaining to the general defence and external relations would have to depend solely upon the initiative of the two chiefs of the federation, who would be invested with the necessary authority and provided with the means for its execution in accordance with the laws and aims of the federation. It was the greatest German question that had now come more to the surface: whether room should be made for the influence of France, who now, more than ever, had taken up the old idea of control over Germany, or whether it would still be possible to bring about the union of the states of the empire with the two chief German powers and thus uphold German independence. The question, however, was not considered in all its comprehensiveness.

Before anything else was done those negotiations between Prussia and France were continued, whose aim it was to prevent the Franco-English war from spreading over German territory. With regard to north German affairs an approximate understanding had been reached. Hanover was to remain, indeed, in the possession of France, but the first consul declared that he would keep it only with a view to exacting compensation at the conclusion of peace. He promised to evacuate Cuxhaven and Ritzebüttel, but no English vessel was to be allowed on the Weser and the Elbe. Prussia's insistence that France should not overstep the boundary fixed at Lunéville was for the present of very little moment, as she had accepted the occupation of Hanover by the French, though with limited power. Bonaparte, on the other hand, demanded that Prussia should recognise the state of Italy as it appeared at this moment, after the new French seizures of territory. Prussia had recognised the changes made by Bonaparte in Cisalpinia, Tuscany, and Genoa, because Russia had recognised them. The political position of King Frederick William III was conditioned upon an understanding between Russia and France. After some time, however, since the differences between England and France which preceded the breach of the Peace of Amiens, misunderstandings had also arisen between Russia and France.

In accordance with his plan of attacking England wherever he could, the first consul had taken possession of Hanover and of the Weser and the Elbe; it was also for the same reason that he extended his arbitrary rule over the Abruzzi Mountains and Calabria, for he thought that otherwise he would have to fear the influence of England by way of Malta. But this occupation stood in direct opposition to the last agreements with Russia, which took Naples under her protection. Russia refused to allow the further existence of the ambiguity concerning Sardinia contained in the article of the agreement, since Bonaparte had refused the English any consideration on that island. Not only did Russia now demand the integrity of Naples, but also the recon-

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stitution and independence of Sardinia. The chancellor Woronzoff declared, in contradiction even to an expression of the emperor, that the affairs of the republic of the Seven United Islands [the Ionian Islands] were properly an affair of Russia. Russian troops and ships were kept there. The first consul, on the other hand, laid claim to the dominion of the coasts of Naples and Sicily.

THE PORTE

An important element in the diplomacy of the times was formed by the relations to the Porte, which gradually began to side with France, although the latter had visited the Porte with such hostilities as might have caused her destruction. It is necessary for us to refer briefly to these relations, since they entered, in spite of their remoteness, within the purview of Prussian politics to a considerable extent. The first consul had succeeded in concluding a separate treaty with the Porte (June 25th, 1802), whilst the impression prevailed that the Turkish peace should form only a part of the general pacification. This caused ill-feeling in England and increased the strain in her relations with France. In the treaty the two powers, France and Turkey, guaranteed each other their respective possessions. The Porte consented, not because she was sure of France but because she distrusted the other powers more.

The king of Prussia, who had acted the part of conciliator between France and the Porte to the satisfaction of both parties, was now invited by Bonaparte to guarantee on his part the integrity of the Porte. The Prussian court perceived in this a demonstration against those powers by which Turkey could be threatened: England, Austria, and especially Russia. The Prussian court therefore refused to accede to this guarantee.

The home and foreign interests of the Ottoman Empire were now intertwined. The English took the part of the mamelukes in Egypt, whom the Porte wished to destroy. The Russians maintained active commercial relations with the Greeks of the Archipelago. Great sensation was caused when Sebastopol was declared a military port, and a military connection was established between the Crimea and the Ionian Islands, where the Russian fleet continually remained. The French ambassador at Constantinople called the attention of the Prussian ambassador to the fact that the growing influence of Russia might easily lead to territorial extension of its power. It was supposed that Alexander [who had succeeded the emperor Paul in 1801 and had clearly stated that he would follow in the footsteps of Catherine II] also meant to follow her policy with regard to Turkey and the establishment of Russian empire in the Orient. The position taken up by Russia was pointed out to the Prussian ambassador as threatening the integrity of the Turkish Empire.

When, therefore, Prussia was now invited to guarantee this integrity, it was not a question of mere formality; she was required to declare herself for France also in the decisive points of general policy. As matters stood, it would in fact have meant a demonstration against Russia, an action which was beyond the intentions of the Prussian cabinet. Far from being drawn upon such a course, Haugwitz gave his attention only to the regulation of affairs in north Germany, which the presence of the French in Hanover had brought to considerable tension. He wished, as he said, to prevent injury to the prosperity of Prussia and the security of her neighbours to result from this occupation. It was with the same intention that Lombard had asked in Brussels for the evacuation of Cuxhaven and for the re-establishment of free navigation at the mouths of the German rivers. The first consul had refused to grant this request: he demanded a closer alliance with Prussia for that pur-

pose, as he wished to have a free hand on the Continent in his enterprises against England. Count Haugwitz thought he could not accept this proposal without the participation of Russia.

What he wanted was an alliance with Russia on the one side and with France on the other. Then he would be in a position to put a stop to all future usurpations of Bonaparte. Russia, however, refused, and accordingly nothing remained for Prussia but to initiate separate negotiations with France. She then proposed to limit her guarantee to the maintenance of peace in the German Empire, provided that the French troops were withdrawn from Germany. The first consul would not hear of a guarantee limited to Germany, for that would only serve to guard Austria in case she attacked him. He discussed this point with Lucchesini for two hours; he wanted Prussia's general guarantee, no matter whether this were called alliance or not: France would be content to leave an army of only six thousand men in Hanover, the sole object of her occupation being to be able, in the event of peace, to offer that country as a compensation. In his conversation with Lucchesini he made some more intimations, in consequence of which Prussia proposed a convention, in which she would consent to a general guarantee, while France must promise not to overstep the boundaries fixed at Lunéville; should one of the two powers be attacked by a third they would assist each other. France would also have to limit her troops in Hanover to six thousand men and evacuate Cuxhaven and the river mouths.

Prussia thought she had made the last step towards an understanding by this proposition, and was the more sure of its acceptance as the conditions had all been previously proposed by Bonaparte himself. The answer soon showed how completely mistaken this view was. The first consul now accepted nothing more than the evacuation of Cuxhaven. He renewed however the proposition of an alliance, by which Austria would be immediately threatened. He next demanded the immediate execution of the territorial guarantees, which had not yet been acknowledged by Austria. Prussia replied that stipulations of this kind would involve her in a war which she was trying to avoid, especially since France herself had been silent a whole year in presence of the attitude assumed by Austria. To proceed against her, the participation of the other mediator was also necessary. The first consul would not yield a step. He demanded that the guarantees should also include the military occupations which had been executed in Italy since the breach with England. With regard to the north, the first consul stipulated that he should have in Hanover an army of twenty-five thousand men, which might be increased in case of necessity to fifty thousand.

It is hardly probable that he counted upon the acceptance of these conditions, by which Prussia would have yielded to his plans in every possible respect, as concerned both southern Europe and the Orient. Moreover, Prussia alone would have to participate in the execution of the German territorial changes, and would be at the same time threatened by an increased army in Hanover. The origin of the differences between France and Prussia must be sought in these demands, since all other causes had been overcome. It must not be supposed that the attitude adopted by Bonaparte was in compliance with the ideas of the French nation. The latter had supported the first consul with all its power and helped him to establish at the Channel such an army as had perhaps never before been seen. It is certainly a mistake to ascribe these exertions to the influence of the government, which thought only of defending a personal cause. The enthusiasm was, on the contrary, natural and well grounded; the bishops, just re-established, encouraged it; the revolutionary and the clerical parties were united in this great purpose. It was a rivalry of voluntary efforts and offers for the war against England. But when

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it had gone so far that Bonaparte saw round his banner half a million soldiers, among whom he had time to establish a military discipline according to his own ideas, he considered himself the master of Europe.

FREDERICK WILLIAM IS PUZZLED

Bonaparte had believed that he needed the assistance of others; now he thought he could dispense with it. His negotiations were of a threatening nature and he brooked no contradiction. It had been said that Prussia ought to have joined this superior power and shared with it the domination of the world. But then she would have arrayed herself not only against England but also against Russia and Austria. A daring adventurer could perhaps have entered upon such a scheme with the resolve to withdraw when a suitable occasion arose; but a king, and especially such a king as Frederick William III, could not have acted thus. He had identified himself with the system of neutrality and peace. He was far from aiming at a usurpation of power in Germany or from falling out with Austria, much less with Russia—to whose emperor he felt himself attached by the bonds of personal friendship. Although little authentic information has come down to us about his meeting with the Russian emperor at Memel in June, 1802, there is not the least doubt that a personal relation of mutual confidence, which assumed the character of a friendship, was established between them—an unusual thing with independent rulers.

At this moment everything depended upon the identity of the relations of Russia and Prussia towards France. The agreement arrived at between France and Prussia concerning Prussian compensation was at that time accepted by Alexander, who had himself participated in the system adopted in Germany. In Berlin the continued understanding of the three powers had been dreamed of. How different were the circumstances now! To the Prussian cabinet France made propositions which were directed against Russia as well as against Austria, and which at the same time were entirely opposed to the system of maintaining the balance of power adopted by the king. Yet Frederick William III did not feel himself strong enough to break off the negotiations; he considered it necessary to assure himself beforehand of the consent at least of the Russian emperor.

Alexander had once said to the king that he might always count upon him in case of necessity. The king wrote now that he wanted his good advice, adding that it was his wish that he should never have to ask more than that: he foresaw however the case when he would have to do it, as the words clearly indicate. To drive the French out of Hanover would now be an undertaking that would lead to still greater misfortunes. However, should Bonaparte, deceived in his hopes of tying the politics of Prussia to his own, try to revenge himself directly or indirectly on Prussia, how far could he, the king, count in such an emergency upon the assistance of Russia and her allies? He would have no misgivings as to the destinies of Prussia, if he knew they were united with those of Russia; he could rely more upon the word of the emperor than upon solemn treaties.

The emperor replied to this on the 16th of March. He made no concealment in his letter of the fact that he did not approve of the policy which Prussia had hitherto adopted. He avoided, however, giving proper advice. It was a case in which each could take counsel only with himself. He remarks, however, that the honour and the true interests of Prussia were on the one side, on the other was the reproach, which she would have to make against herself, of having furthered the universal monarchy of a man who was not at

all worthy of it, and of having caused her own ruin—the ruin of the Prussian monarchy. He does not promise unconditional assistance; but he says that should the king take up the cause of Europe and her independence, he would immediately place himself on the side of Prussia. In such a noble struggle Russia could not leave Prussia alone.

NEGOTIATIONS ARE BROKEN OFF

It was thereupon definitely decided in Berlin to break off the negotiations hitherto conducted with France, and to be satisfied with a general friendly relation. This was notified by way of a formal declaration to the French ambassador, Laforest (April 3rd, 1804). Lucchesini was blamed for having ever accepted the French propositions. The king emphasised his expectations, which his consistent attitude and the former declarations of Bonaparte entitled him to entertain, that France would neither increase her troops in Hanover nor molest those princes who took no part in the present war. The king on his part pledged his word not to listen to proposals nor to form any plans by which France could be troubled.

Thus ended the negotiations about a Franco-Prussian alliance. Bonaparte's intentions became evident; for the purposes which he had in view he wished the alliance to be permanent and free from any limitation. If Prussia refused the alliance, it was not only out of consideration for Russia but also for the sake of Austria and Germany, and the interests of Prussia in particular. The king declared that if he accepted it he could not justify it before his own subjects. On the 8th of April this transaction with the French ambassador, which amounted to a complete rupture of all negotiations hitherto entertained, was made known to Russia.^h

THE THIRD COALITION, AND PRUSSIAN NEUTRALITY

On May 18th, 1804, Napoleon Bonaparte was elected emperor of the French, and thus, in the eleventh year of the republic, his imperial throne was erected upon the ruins of the royal and legitimate dynasty; nevertheless, his ambition was not yet satisfied. Immediately afterwards, he changed the Cisalpine Republic into a kingdom, and created himself king of Italy; and as a proof of his moderation, as he said, he appointed his stepson, Eugène de Beauharnais, viceroy of Italy. Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla were now altogether united with France, as was the Ligurian Republic. All these changes were contrary to the treaty of peace concluded at Lunéville, and gave great offence to Austria, who found sympathy in the emperor Alexander of Russia, now so much exasperated by the execution of the duke d'Enghien—shortly before effected by the cruelty of Bonaparte—and feeling himself called upon to aid in the protection of Europe. Accordingly these two powers now came forward and made known to William Pitt, the prime minister, their wish—by him long desired—to renew their alliance with England against France. A coalition was immediately entered into by these three governments, to which Sweden was added; and, according to their plan of war, the French power was to be attacked at every point—in Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and in France itself. Napoleon, however, overthrew this design, in his usual way, and by the celerity of his movements was enabled to anticipate the allies in all their operations, and was already in advance of them when and where least expected. Since 1803 he had stationed nearly the whole of his army along the northern coasts of France, in order to operate as a check upon England, where, indeed,

[1805 A.D.]

he contemplated making a landing. Now, however, the troops received marching orders; suddenly abandoning their present quarters, they proceeded by hasty marches to the Rhine, which they speedily crossed, and forced the princes of south Germany to form an alliance with France: whilst the Austrian army, now under the command of General Mack, remained completely inactive in its quarters near Ulm.

General Mack, otherwise an efficient leader, was on this occasion entirely deserted by his good fortune, and evinced a total want of resolution and judgment; for, imagining the enemy would advance upon him direct from the side of Swabia, he quietly awaited his coming. On his right flank he had at command the Franconian territories belonging to the king of Prussia, who took no share in the war; and he accordingly considered himself completely covered in that quarter. Such a bulwark, however, furnished but a poor means of defence in front of an army led on by Napoleon. Bernadotte, Marmont, and the Bavarians, disregarding the neutrality of Prussia, very soon advanced direct through Franconia towards the Danube, and attacking the Austrian general in the rear cut him off from all communication with Austria. Surprised and stupefied, he, after a sanguinary battle, threw himself into Ulm, where, instead of forcing for himself a passage with his sword through the very centre of his enemies, as any other brave and determined spirit would have done, he surrendered himself prisoner, together with the whole of his army, on the 17th of October, 1805. Napoleon, after this first part of the campaign, during which he had almost annihilated eighty thousand men, sent to the senate in Paris forty standards he had taken, saying that they were a present from the children to their fathers.

The French army marched on without any obstacle to the capital of Austria, and took possession of it on the 11th of November, 1805. The Russians and Austrians had retreated to Moravia, and on the 2nd of December the allied and the French armies stood front to front near Austerlitz, resolved to hazard a decisive engagement. The battle, called by Napoleon the "three emperors' battle," commenced on a beautifully sunbright, frosty morning. The allies, however, were not well supplied with leaders, and their movements, therefore, were not made in the best order; in addition to which they were unacquainted with the strength and position of the French army, whence the Russian line of battle was very soon broken through, and, in spite of all their bravery, the troops were put to rout. The left wing sought to save themselves by crossing a frozen lake, but Napoleon ordered the artillery to play upon the ice, which speedily dissolved and immersed all the fugitives within the deep waters of the lake, where they perished.

Nevertheless this victory was not so easily gained, nor would its results have been so decisive had not the emperor Francis, in his anxiety for his subjects, hastened to conclude a peace. He demanded, for this purpose, a rather premature conference with Napoleon in the mill of Saroschitz, for on the following day a body of twelve thousand Russians arrived to reinforce the army, which had now rallied. In addition to this the archduke Ferdinand had collected an army of twenty thousand men in Bohemia and completely routed the Bavarians, taking possession of the whole country; Hungary was arming everywhere; Archduke Charles was now marching from Italy with his victorious army to the aid of his country, and would arrive in a few days to deliver Vienna and harass the enemy's rear; whilst the Russians and English had now landed at Naples, and the Russian, Swedish, and English troops had already entered Hanover; finally, however, which was more important than all this, the Prussian troops were now assembling in order to revenge themselves for the violation of their territory of Ansbach. Nevertheless the emperor of Austria, in his anxiety for peace, signed a treaty for a suspension of

arms. The misfortunes of his country were a source of great pain to him, and he flattered himself with the hope that a peace, purchased as it must be from such an enemy at such heavy sacrifices, might still be rendered permanent; as if sacrifices, however great, could ever satiate Napoleon's inordinate love of conquest!

The Prussian ambassador, Count von Haugwitz, who had been deputed by his government to prescribe either the terms of peace or to declare war, found himself placed in a very embarrassing position after the resolution expressed by Austria, and, under the circumstances, he deemed it most prudent, instead of giving vent to menaces as instructed by his sovereign, to adopt a more moderate and pacific style of language. The French, when they discovered this, declared that they could not but praise the wisdom shown by the Prussian government, which had never possessed a more faithful and disinterested friend than France, although at the same time the French nation was wholly independent of every other, and that fifty thousand enemies more in the war would have tended only to prolong it a little longer.

The Prussian ambassador ought to have given the right interpretation to this language, and, feeling the dignity of his country wounded thereby, he was bound forthwith and on the spot to make known the resolution he conveyed from his government, especially as Austria had not yet signed the treaty—a resolution which, six months afterwards, his king was forced to carry into execution. Austria, had she seen that Prussia was really in earnest, would without doubt have preferred even a continuation of the war to a disgraceful peace. Instead of this, however, Haugwitz, without even possessing the necessary power, signed the Treaty of Vienna by which Prussia gave up the province of Ansbach to Bavaria, Cleves and Neuchâtel to France, receiving in exchange Hanover, to which England by no means renounced her claim. Thus Napoleon strewed the seeds of division between Prussia and England, well knowing that if united those two powers must be too formidable for him.

Five days after the drawing up of the treaty it was signed by Austria, at Pressburg, on the 25th of December, 1805; and by this peace, the terms of which were more severe than any hitherto made, Austria lost one thousand square miles of territory and three millions of subjects, constituting her most valuable possessions. The Tyrol,—ever faithful, and having especially shown its attachment to the house of Austria in the last war,—Burgau, Eichstädt, a portion of Passau, Vorarlberg, together with other lands in eastern Austria, were ceded to Bavaria; what Austria possessed in Swabia was given up to Würtemberg and Baden, and the Venetian states were yielded to Italy. In compensation for all this Austria received but a trifling indemnification—Salzburg; the electoral prince of Salzburg being forced to leave that territory, which he had only recently received, and accept Würzburg, which Bavaria renounced. All these countries with their inhabitants were treated like so much merchandise, passing from the hands of one into those of another, according to the state of the market. Such were the principles of the despotic conqueror, by which he sought to eradicate all love and attachment towards the ancient hereditary princes of the empire, and thus, by destroying all national patriotic feeling, to reduce the subject to a complete state of submission, alive only to the mortifying conviction of the service he had to render to whatever master he was placed under—whether native or foreign, of to-day or yesterday—whom he was born only to obey.

In order to complete the ruin of the Germanic Empire the electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg were created kings, and they as well as the elector of Baden were granted the uncontrolled government, or rather—to use the favourite expression of that period—the sovereignty of their lands. The emperor himself renounced all claim to the exercise of supreme power over their



HEGEL WRITING "THE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE" DURING THE BATTLE
OF JENA, OCTOBER 14TH, 1806

(From a drawing by Phillips Ward)

[1806 A.D.]

states, and thus the empire by this act paved the way for its eventual dissolution; and the storm gathered more and more fiercely, until it finally burst forth in all its fury, producing those sad effects which sealed the doom of Germany. The brother-in-law of the emperor, Joachim Murat, received the duchies of Cleves and Berg on the Rhine, the former having been ceded by Prussia, and the latter by Bavaria for Ansbach; and to Alexander Berthier, who was the emperor's confidential adviser, was allotted the principality of Westphalia.

THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE (1806 A.D.)

It was in the middle of this eventful year that the last blow was inflicted upon the constitution of the Germanic Empire; its dissolution, which already existed in fact, was now clearly and definitely confirmed. On the 12th of July a Rhenish league was formed, by which the kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the arch-chancellor of the empire (the elector of Mainz), the elector of Baden, the landgraf of Hesse-Darmstadt, and the duke of Berg (the last four as grand dukes), together with the princes of Nassau and Hohenzollern and other petty princes and nobles, separated themselves from the imperial alliance and acknowledged the emperor of France as the protector of their confederation. He commanded the right of naming the prince primate of the league, who presided at the assembly; of deciding upon the question of war and peace, and fixing the contingent to be furnished, so that each war of France must become a war of the Confederation of the Rhine, its members thus being forced to take up arms in her cause, even against their compatriots of Germany. By such sacrifices, the princes obtained unlimited authority without being dependent upon any tribunal to which their subjects in case of necessity might appeal, and without being bound to adopt any ameliorated measures of government. On all these points, the resolutions of the confederation were clear and precise; but in all the rest, everything was obscure and equivocal, in order that the protector's will might operate with all the effect of a law.

The emperor of Germany, laying aside the degraded crown of the ancient empire, more than a thousand years after Charlemagne had placed it upon his own head, declared himself, on the 6th of August, 1806, hereditary emperor of Austria. What protection, however, Germany had to expect from her new self-made guardian, when compared with that afforded her by the house of Austria, was immediately shown. For, at the very moment when the French envoy, Bacher, renewed the assurance that France would never extend her frontiers beyond the Rhine, the fortress of Wesel was arbitrarily taken possession of by the French and chosen as the headquarters of the 75th division of their army.

PRUSSIA MAKES WAR ON NAPOLEON (1806 A.D.)

The hostile designs contemplated by the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine were directed against Prussia as well as Austria; for both powers beheld those who had remained their natural allies during the existence of the imperial government, now changed into enemies, ready to declare their hostility towards them at the first outbreak with France. Napoleon had up to this moment tantalised the king of Prussia with the prospect of being able to form, under his protection, a confederation in the north, embracing the whole of that portion of Germany, after the model of that of the Rhine; now, however, such a confederation was completely repudiated, and even the restoration of Hanover to England was not withheld by France. Everything, indeed, was

done to mortify Prussia and to make it evident that the French emperor was resolved not to endure the existence of any independent nation other than his own. At length the indignant king felt himself called upon to protect his country against further insult and humiliation from the hands of the insolent invader, and in this determination he was supported by the voice of his army and the nation throughout. Accordingly he demanded that France should withdraw her troops from Germany, that she should no longer oppose the formation of a northern confederation, and that Wesel should at once be evacuated by the French troops. Compliance with these demands having been refused, Prussia forthwith declared war.

When he received this declaration Napoleon said that his heart grieved to see that the genius of evil swayed continually, and ever frustrated his plans for the promotion of the peace of Europe and the happiness of his contemporaries. He now assembled his armies, which were all ready for action, in France and Swabia, and he advanced with rapid marches towards the Thuringian forest. On the north side of this forest was posted the grand Prussian army under the orders of the duke of Brunswick, an intrepid but old soldier of seventy-two years of age, whose principal officers were in a state of disunion. Only a very small portion of the Prussian army had taken any share in the war of the Revolution, and thus been enabled to make themselves acquainted with the lightning-like celerity of movement now practised by the French armies in all their operations; the majority had abandoned themselves to ease and indifference during the long peace of three and forty years, and the fact that the outward form of the institutions of Frederick the Great still existed made their continued reliance upon themselves the more dangerous. Not that either courage or capacity was wanting in many individuals, but they were altogether without that energetic genius so necessary to unite the whole. Thence they were forced to realise, what indeed the most pusillanimous among them could never have thought possible, that, as in the wars of the ancient world, one unlucky day may decide the fate of a kingdom.

On the 10th of October, Prince Ludwig of Prussia, the king's cousin, in his impetuous, warlike ardour imprudently engaged the enemy in an unequal contest near Saalfeld, and was mortally wounded on the spot. This unfortunate affair laid open for the French the entire route of the Saale, and advancing now with a superior force they surrounded the left flank of the Prussian army and cut off all communication with Saxony; hence, on the 13th of October, Davout was already in possession of Naumburg. The supplies of the Prussians were lost, reducing the whole army to a state of the greatest want and unavoidably producing depression and disorganisation; and in this condition the troops were called upon to fight, with the Saale and the Elbe in front of them: thus the army was vanquished even before the battle.

From Jena to Tilsit (1806-1807 A.D.)

A portion of the Prussian army was at Auerstädt, under the command of the duke of Brunswick; and the other, under the orders of the prince of Hohenlohe, was stationed at Jena and Vierzehnheiligen; but they acted entirely independently of each other; and they were accordingly attacked and defeated on the same day. Marshal Davout fought at Auerstädt and Napoleon at Jena. The duke of Brunswick, at the very commencement of the battle, was killed by a cannon-ball; his death disarranged the plan of the battle and threw the army into confusion. The desperate courage of a few scattered regiments could neither compensate for the want of the co-operation of the army as a whole nor effect a general restoration of confidence. Being surrounded, the Prussians retreated in the direction of Weimar, where they hoped to find

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themselves reinforced by the corps under the command of the prince of Hohenlohe, not being aware that his army had met a similar fate at the same moment. They were, however, very soon undeceived; for the disorder was so general in both armies that in the course of the night, whilst the one army was retreating in all haste from Auerstädt to Weimar, it met a portion of the other which was in full flight from Weimar to Auerstädt.

Ten days after the battle of Jena Napoleon marched into Berlin itself; and in less than six weeks from the commencement of the war he had already advanced as far as the Vistula and made himself master of nearly the entire king-



ON THE PEGNITZ, NUREMBERG

dom, containing nearly nine millions of inhabitants and numerous fortified towns—the fruits of a single battle in which an army which had hitherto maintained its character as the most distinguished body of troops in Europe was completely annihilated.

This speedy conquest of the Prussian states—a conquest far beyond the expectations even of the emperor himself—had completely banished from the heart of the conqueror every feeling of moderation, and only served to excite within his ambitious soul a greater desire for unlimited dominion. Encouraged by his success, he declared in Berlin that he would never give up that city until he had compelled a general peace; and it was from the same city that he issued the decree of the 21st of November, 1806, against the English, by which the British Isles were declared in a state of blockade, British manufactures were excluded from all the continental ports, all British property on the Continent and vessels that had only even touched on the shores of Albion were to be seized. This unheard-of system [known as the continental system] might have crushed the commercial prosperity of England; but the results, as it turned out, were more injurious to the Continent. For England, now taking possession of all the colonies of Europe, cultivated their soil with great care and industry, and instead of importing the timber for the construction of her ships from the north of Europe, supplied herself therewith from Canada

and Ireland; whilst Europe itself found its commerce languish and sink, and although its industry furnished many articles which it would otherwise have imported from England, it could not compensate for the loss of its commerce on the seas.

The remains of the Prussian army under Kalkreuth and Lestocq, rendered wiser by the bitter experience of the last few months and made into a more select and organised body of troops, formed a junction with the Russians, who now entered once more the field of battle. After several skirmishes in Poland, all without any important results, the two armies, amounting to nearly two hundred thousand men, again met in Prussia, and on the 7th and 8th of February, 1807, during the most severe frost and amidst a continuous fall of snow, they fought another sanguinary battle at Eylau, near Königsberg. The *élite* of the French guard were here completely annihilated and the battle still remained undecided. The Russians fought with the most determined and unshaken courage, and the Prussians under the orders of Lestocq, arriving just in time to the aid of the right wing which was hard pressed, bravely repulsed the final attack of the French with complete success. Both armies maintained the field, each claiming the victory; the advantage, however, was on the side of the allies, and it was generally believed that a fresh attack on the third day must force the French to make a retreat. But Bennigsen, the Russian general, did not hold himself bound to exact from his army, already so much fatigued, such superhuman efforts, and he therefore retired to Königsberg. The French likewise withdrew to their old position on the Passarge, and an uninterrupted cessation of hostilities was preserved for the space of four months, during which the two armies strengthened their forces as much as possible; whilst, meantime, this overwhelming burden of several hundred thousand foreign troops dispersed all over her kingdom inflicted upon ill-fated Prussia incalculable suffering and distress.

Napoleon, during this interval, hastened, with all possible activity, to lay siege to Dantzic; this strong fortification was commanded by General Kalkreuth, and was bravely defended by him, until, finding all communication with the sea cut off, by which he was deprived of all hopes of relief, he was forced to a surrender on the 24th of May, although upon honourable terms of capitulation. The Russians and Prussians, after having neglected to avail themselves of the former favourable and decisive moment, now advanced and attacked the French intrenchments on the Passarge. They fought with the greatest bravery, but the enemy having been reinforced by the thirty thousand men who had just returned from the siege of Dantzic, and being likewise well protected by their strong intrenchments, they repulsed the allies, and were now, in their turn, enabled to act upon the offensive. A succession of severe and obstinate fights took place from the 5th to the 14th of June, on which day the decisive battle of Friedland was fought. This hard-contested action lasted from the dawn of day to the middle of night. The Russians fought with great bravery, and the advantage was decidedly on their side; but in their elation they neglected to exercise that caution which should always be observed, even by a conqueror. Thus, towards the afternoon, the divisions under Ney and Victor, together with Bonaparte's guard, marched into the field, and the fate of this sanguinary day was at once decided; the Russians were overthrown on all sides, and retreating across the river Alle they fell back upon their own frontiers and gained the river Niemen. On the 19th of June Napoleon took and entered Tilsit, the last of the Prussian towns, and on the 16th of the same month his army took possession of Königsberg.

A conference now took place between the emperors of France and Russia, on a raft erected on the river Niemen, at which a peace was speedily agreed upon, the dismemberment of Prussia was decided, and a compact for mutual

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support in the relations of Europe was concluded for a fixed period. Napoleon, always so happy in the employment of cunning and specious language, of which he was a perfect master, succeeded this time, likewise, in persuading the emperor Alexander that his sole object was the pacification of the Continent; whilst all his plans were uniquely directed towards protecting the coasts against the insolent arrogance of the English nation and to secure eventually the free dominion of the seas. He then pretended that his chief desire was to form a bond of lasting friendship with Russia, in order that, both united, they might be enabled to establish the prosperity and happiness of Europe, inasmuch as then, without their concurrence, no war could arise.

Accordingly, in this peace, Cattaro, Ragusa, and the Seven Islands (of the Ionian seas) were given up to France by Russia, who received in return, as compensation, large tracts of land, together with four hundred thousand subjects belonging to Prussian Poland; whilst Frederick William, who was scarcely able to call any part of his kingdom his own, was forced to submit to the most degrading and painful sacrifices, and ceded eventually the moiety of his possessions with five million subjects, including, amongst the rest, the city of Dantzic, which was now declared a free city, and the Polish territory, which was changed into a grand duchy of Warsaw, of which the king of Saxony was chosen grand duke. Thus Frederick Augustus, who had declared himself a neutral power three days after the battle of Jena, and soon afterwards joined in alliance with France, was now king of Saxony and a member of the confederation of the Rhine.

In addition to all this, Prussia lost the whole of her territories between the Elbe and the Rhine, the greater part of which Bonaparte converted into a new kingdom, Westphalia, which he gave to his youngest brother, Jerome; to which he added a portion of Hanover, the duchy of Brunswick, because its duke had been leader of the Prussian army, and the principality of Hesse-Cassel. Thus the terrible ban was now at once pronounced and executed against the house of Hesse, namely, that it should cease to reign, for having, as he said, always shown itself inimical to France, and for having further, in this war with Prussia, maintained so equivocal a position. Such was termed the neutrality which Hesse had so strictly observed of her own accord through the war. The entire country was forthwith invaded and conquered, and the elector driven from his capital and made a fugitive; whilst the new king, a complete stranger, entered its gates in triumph followed by a train of French officials, and, to the shame of Germany, mounted the throne of this ancient princely family, the descendants of the Saxons and Chatti.

King Frederick William was now left with only a small portion of his states and his subjects, yet in the latter he found himself surrounded by a firm and devoted body of men; whilst he had the additional gratification of knowing that at least three of his fortified cities in Prussia, Kolberg, Graudenz, and Pillau, bravely refused to accept terms of surrender from the enemy, and that two others in Silesia, Kosel and Glatz, likewise maintained a successful defence. Graudenz was commanded by a veteran, General Courbière, who, when summoned to surrender by the French who represented to him that the king had now lost his kingdom and had crossed the Niemen, replied: "Well, then, I will be king in Graudenz."

The king had placed Kolberg under the command of Colonel Gneisenau, well assured beforehand that in him he sent a pillar of strength to that city. In addition to this, a free corps of light hussars had been formed in the neighbourhood, under the sanction of the king, by a heroic young officer, Lieutenant Schill, assisted by others of equally daring character, which continually harassed and fell upon the enemy's troops everywhere around.^c Slight balm this, however, for the wounds of humiliated, almost annihilated, Prussia.

QUEEN LUISE

In this dark hour of Prussian history no one showed greater steadfastness and devotion than the beautiful queen Luise who had taken a prominent part in the negotiations for peace, and had endeavoured, though in vain, to induce Napoleon to moderate his demands. Even now, almost a century after her death, the enthusiasm of the admiration she roused in her contemporaries still survives to an extraordinary degree, and with a freshness of which the hosts of spring flowers annually displayed around her statue in the Thiergarten of Berlin, on the anniversary of her birth, are alike the type and the witness.^a

The princess Luise of Mecklenburg was the daughter of the duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who was governor for the king of England in Hanover; and in Hanover Luise was born in 1776. She was only in her sixth year (1782) when she lost her mother. Later on her father quitted the English service and went to Darmstadt, where Luise was handed over for further education and instruction to her grandmother, Marie Luise Albertine, widow of Prince George William of Darmstadt. In the spring of the year 1793 Luise and her sister Friederike on their way back to Darmstadt from Hildburghausen came to Frankfort, which King Frederick William II with the crown prince and Prince Ludwig had made their winter quarters during the French campaign. The sisters, in accordance with their own desire, were presented to the Prussian king and in the evening wished to continue their journey to Darmstadt, but remained because the king had invited them to dinner. At the moment of Luise's entrance Frederick William III, without suspecting that this was his first meeting with his future wife, was enchanted with her beauty. This impression was increased on a nearer acquaintance, and on the 24th of April, 1793, the betrothal of the two princesses to the two Prussian princes took place. The marriage ceremony was performed at Berlin on the following Christmas Eve.

Concerning the extraordinary beauty of Queen Luise there is but one opinion amongst her contemporaries. It was a beauty of expression, which is more enchanting than that of the features. She had speaking eyes, which betrayed the keenest feeling and the most susceptible imagination. This liveliness of feeling and fancy lent her her whole charm. She was one of those women by whom all other women as well as all men are irresistibly bewitched. Goethe, master in the description of female beauty and grace, saw the two princesses in the train of the grand duke of Weimar on the 29th of May, 1793, in the camp at the siege of Mainz, and records the following recollection: "Pinned in my tent, I could watch the ladies closely and unseen as they went up and down, passing close by, and truly these two young princesses must be regarded as heavenly appearances whose impression on me as well as on others will never fade."

In Queen Luise, the purely human was blended with the noble and the princely to an extent which is rare; she was not only a woman who won all hearts by the graciousness of her nature, but she was also complete mistress of the art of *représentation* [or of impressing others by a royal demeanour] and in this was most successful in aiding the king. The king cared little for effect—it was opposed to his natural inclination; he was sparing of words, generally expressing himself as shortly as possible, and employed a disjointed manner of speech, using only the most necessary syllables. The queen was consequently left to do the honours of the court, and she knew how to fulfil this duty in the most dignified fashion.

On a clear, fresh winter morning, Sunday the 22nd of December, 1793, the queen, then seventeen years old, made as crown princess her formal entry into

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Berlin with full display. The impression which Luise made, from the moment when she was drawn through the crowds of people surging through the gaily decorated streets of the capital, surpassed all expectations; it was increased at the nuptial ceremony where, in the spacious apartments near the Rittersaal, all classes of the people were admitted; and it was maintained in its full strength until her death in the year 1810. Queen Luise won for herself a popularity such as has been the portion of few queens. Everything was a source of happiness to her ingenuous and artless nature, and it won for her a sympathy and love which ever remained fresh in the hearts of all classes. It was her happy family life which especially brought her near to the people and its family life.

Queen Luise as a Political Influence

In the war of 1806 the most energetic person in the Prussian headquarters was Queen Luise. At Erfurt, Gentz had a conversation with her which lasted three quarters of an hour. She said to him: "God knows I have never been consulted on public affairs nor have ever striven to that end. If I had been asked I would—I confess it openly—have voted for war, for I believed that it was necessary. But I was firmly convinced that the great means of salvation lay only in the closest union of all those who can be found who boast of the German name. I always regarded the aid of Russia as a last resource." The queen spoke with a precision, independence, and energy which would have been marvellous in a man; and yet through all she showed herself so full of deep feeling that no one could forget for a moment that it was a woman's courage to which admiration was to be paid.

Until the day before the battle of Jena, Luise remained at the king's side both in the headquarters at Erfurt and during his stay in Weimar. She drove with him in a closed carriage followed by twenty others, amongst the troops, cannon, and gun-carriages. Not until the battle day did she quit the army. During the negotiations at Tilsit (June, 1807) Luise presented herself in that town that she might if possible ameliorate the fate of Prussia. Talleyrand had dreaded her arrival and had endeavoured to prevent it. Even Napoleon was affected by the queen's graciousness and hastened the conclusion of the peace in order that the regard with which Luise inspired him might not induce him, in spite of himself, to show a leniency which he judged to be impolitic.

Again at Erfurt (in 1808) Luise made an attempt to persuade Napoleon to restore at least Magdeburg. She appeared before Napoleon in Erfurt, petitioning him, so she said, not as queen but as the mother of her people. Napoleon sent her by way of an unfavourable answer the map of Silesia encircled by a golden chain to which was attached a golden heart.

The cruel misfortune which Prussia passed through was the bridge to a glorious revival; the royal family, crushed by the blows of fate, learned to see with their own eyes. By bitter experience they won the conviction that the foundations on which the Prussian state had supported itself were rotten to the core, and that a thorough renovation had become indispensable.

Queen Luise wrote from Königsberg to her father: "It becomes clearer and clearer to me that everything must have happened as it did. The divine foresight is unmistakably introducing new conditions into the world, and a new order of things is to be brought about, for the old has outlived its day. We have reposed on the laurels of Frederick the Great, who, the master of a new century, created a new epoch. We have not progressed with it, and it has consequently outstripped us. We can learn much from him. It were a crime to say, God is with the French emperor; but he is manifestly an instrument in the hand of the Almighty to bury out of sight the old order, which has no further purpose. I do not believe that the emperor Napoleon Bona-

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parte is firm and secure on what at present is so dazzling a throne. Only truth and justice are steadfast and at rest; he is politic, that is cunning, and he guides himself, not according to the eternal laws but according to circumstances as they are just now. Consequently he stains his rule with much injustice. He is blinded by his good fortune and he thinks he can do anything. Thus he is wholly without moderation, and he who cannot observe self-restraint loses his balance and falls. I believe steadfastly in God and therefore also in a moral ordering of the world. This I do not see in the reign of violence, and so I entertain the hope that better days will succeed the present evil ones."

Queen Luise died without having seen the morning of freedom. On a visit to her father at Strelitz she was suddenly seized with an illness, and died at the castle of Hohenzieritz on the 19th of July, 1810, at the early age of thirty-five years. The corpse was taken for burial to the cathedral of Berlin and then to Charlottenburg, on the 23rd of December, the sixteenth anniversary of her entry into Berlin. But this melancholy death was also to contribute to the restoration of Prussia. The hatred against Napoleon, "the evil principle" as the queen had called him, and against the French domination was augmented by this event to an incredible degree. The people firmly believed that grief over that domination had broken the queen's heart, and pilgrimages were made to her grave at Charlottenburg as to the grave of a saint."

SCHARNHORST AND HIS COLLABORATORS

Scharnhorst had long been recognised as the first writer on military topics and the best scholar among German officers, and in addition to this he had acquired, during a lifetime of vicissitudes, a vast fund of practical experience. He had been through every branch of the service; he had held appointments on the staff and in institutions for military training. At the outset of his professional studies, in the military academy at Wilhelmstein, he had made the acquaintance of the famous little model corps which that able old commander, Count Wilhelm of Bückeburg, had formed of all the young men capable of bearing arms in his little dominions. Afterwards, as a Hanoverian officer on the Netherlands theatre of war, he had become intimately acquainted with the English army, which retained more of the old mercenary character than any other European force.

He had taken the field against the raw levies of the republic and against the well-drilled conscript army of Napoleon, and in the war of 1806 he had been near enough to the chief command to perceive clearly the defects of the army Frederick had created and the ultimate causes of its overthrow. The stiff, soldierly bearing which the king liked to see in his officers was foreign to the temperament of the simple low-Saxon. He used to go about plainly, almost carelessly dressed, his head bent, his dreamy vision turned inwards upon his own thoughts. His hair fell in disorder over his forehead, his speech was soft and slow. In Hanover he might often be seen tapping in person at the bakers' doors, and then contentedly sitting down with his wife and children to an out-door supper under the trees of the Ellenriede. Such he was all his life, simple and unostentatious in all things. The simple directness of thought and expression in his private correspondence recall the men of antiquity; in his writings the substance is everything, the form nothing to him. And yet the superiority of a powerful, creative, and absolutely independent intellect, and the nobility of a moral character free from any taint of selfishness, invested this homely man with a charm of natural majesty, which repelled base souls and slowly and surely attracted the noble. His daughter,



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QUEEN LUISE AND HER SONS

(From the painting by C. Steffek, in the Museum at Breslau)

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Countess Julie Dohna, owed everything to her early-widowed father, and she was styled a queen among women and received into the highest society as into her rightful sphere.

The general's calm temper made him more acceptable to the king than Stein with his exciting and excitable spirit; he admitted no other counsellor to so close an intimacy. And Scharnhorst repaid the confidence of his royal friend with an unbounded devotion; he would have felt it base to remember past errors at such a time; he admired the unhappy monarch's fortitude, nor did his loyalty ever falter, even when the impatient patriotism of many of his friends made them distrustful of so discreet a prince. A genuine low-German in spirit, nature had made him modest, silent, and reserved, so much so that praise seemed to him almost an affront, and an endearing epithet a desecration of friendship. Then experience had brought him by a rough road, ever through hostile ranks: in Hanover the plebeian had to combat the jealousy of the nobles; in Prussia the progressive leader had to wrestle with the opinionativeness of the generals of the old school. And now, when the confidence of the king and the unanimous voice of the army had placed him at the head of military affairs, for five long years he had to ply the plotter's darkling trade, and arm for the struggle for liberty under the eyes of the foe. Thus he learned to command every word and look, and the simple-minded man who disdained to resort to artifice for his own advantage became for his country's sake a master of the arts of dissimulation, skilled in the ways of men, subtle, inscrutable. His rapid searching glance read the new-comer's thoughts in his eyes, and if it were a question of keeping the king's counsel he would lure friend and foe by shadowy hints on a false scent. Among the officers the saying went that his mind was as full of wrinkles as his face; he put them in mind of that William of Orange, who, in like case, had warily and silently made ready for war with the empire of Spain. Like the prince of Orange, too, Scharnhorst carried deep in his inmost soul the hero's strong passion and delight in battle, and by these qualities he had won in the late war the friendship of Blücher, himself a man of deeds. He did not know what fear was; he would not know how madly panic may work after a defeat; in courts-martial his sentence was ever the sternest; he was merciless to cowardice and treachery. Probably no one tasted the bitterness of the times with such fiery keenness as did this silent man; day and night he was tortured by the thought of his country's shame. All men approached him with deference, for they instinctively felt that he carried the future of the army in his brain.

Of the men who seconded him in the work of army reorganisation, four became, as it were, his spiritual heirs, each receiving a portion of the great endowments of their chief—the heaven-born commanders, Gneisenau and Grolman, Boyen the organiser, and Clausewitz the scholar; four men of one spirit with Scharnhorst, poor, simple, hardy, serving the cause without a thought of self; for all their outspokenness genuinely modest at heart, as is natural to able soldiers. For the solitary labours of the artist or scholar may easily lead a man away into vanity, while the soldier acts only as a member of a vast whole, and has no power to show what is in him unless inscrutable destiny lead him at the right hour to the right spot. Gneisenau, over-modest, speaks of himself as a pygmy in comparison with the giant Scharnhorst. He lacked the solid erudition of his chief, and, like many men of action, he felt the gaps in his knowledge as defects in his intelligence. On the other hand, he possessed a far greater measure of the inspiring confidence of heroic natures, the joyous fatalism which makes a great general. How proudly and confidently did he spread his sails when, after the vagaries of a passionate youth and the protracted dreary calm of subaltern employment, he reached the high seas of life. He set about any task that fortune designed him, with a

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happy levity; as an infantry officer he unhesitatingly undertook the command of engineers and the superintendence of fortifications. While Scharnhorst was deliberately weighing the perils of the coming day, Gneisenau's soul was on fire with eager anticipation of the hour of revolt, and he made even fools gladly welcome if only they would lend a hand in the great conspiracy.

Grolman was a kindred spirit, high-souled, clear-headed, and joyous; made to delight in the din of battle and boldly to seize the advantage of the fleeting moment, but destined to undergo the hardship of a soldier's lot and never to take the foremost place.

The one who in manner bore most resemblance to his chief was Boyen; a grave, reserved man from east Prussia, who had sat at the feet of Kant and Krause, and as a poet had participated eagerly in the literary activity of the new age. Fiery eyes under bushy brows alone betrayed the impetuous daring that slumbered in the breast of the simple, taciturn man. In his quiet fashion he worked out and perfected Scharnhorst's ideas of organisation, and after the wars it was he who gave the new national army its permanent constitution.

Lastly, Carl von Clausewitz, the youngest of this group of friends, was beyond the rest Scharnhorst's intimate and disciple, profoundly versed in the modern scientific theories of warfare with which the latter occupied himself. These Von Clausewitz subsequently elaborated on his own account, and insured for the art of war a place among political sciences by a series of works which in literary style far surpass Scharnhorst's own writings. A man of powerful scientific mind, a master of historical analysis, he was perhaps too critical and reflective to grasp the flying chance of battle as boldly as Gneisenau; yet he was by no means a mere bookworm, but a capable and valiant soldier, marking the turmoil of life with intelligent observation. He had been a prisoner of war, and at this time had just returned from sharing the captivity of Prince Augustus. In France his love for the youthful sincerity and vigour of the German race had risen to the pitch of enthusiasm, and he had brought home the firm conviction that at bottom the French were as unwarlike a people as in the old times of the Huguenot wars, when they had trembled before the German *Landsquenets* and *Reîtres*. How should the ingrained character of a people change in ten years—or how should the vanquished of a hundred fights rule permanently over an armed Germany?

THE REORGANISATION OF THE ARMY

Such were the resources with which the king undertook the work of restoration. The whole army was reconstructed. Of the old army of Frederick there remained only six brigades—two from Silesia, two from east Prussia, one apiece from Pomerania and Brandenburg. And this was the sheet-anchor of the hopes of Germany. The cue was dropped; the troops were supplied with more suitable weapons and clothing; evolutions on parade gave place to the strenuous labour of service in the field. Fresh stores of all sorts had to be laid in, for Napoleon's marshals had carried out the work of plunder so thoroughly that at one time the gunnery practice of the Silesian artillery had to be postponed for months for lack of ammunition. A commission was appointed to inquire into the conduct of each individual officer, and the guilty and the suspect were ruthlessly dismissed.

The fundamental idea of all the reforms was that henceforth the army should be the nation in arms, a national force to which every man capable of bearing arms should belong. Recruiting was abolished, the enlistment of foreigners forbidden, and only a few volunteers of German blood were admitted.

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The new articles of war and the order that regulated military punishments began with the statement that in future all German subjects, even young men of the upper classes, were to serve as private soldiers, and based on this declaration the necessity for milder treatment of the rank and file. All thinking officers were at one on the undesirability of the old exemptions from military service. The principle of a universal obligation to act on the defensive had been advocated, even before the war, by Boyen, Lossau, and other officers, and maturely considered by the king; during the ill-starred campaign it had silently gained ground, and by this time it was plain to all intelligent soldiers that if the unequal struggle were to be resumed it could be done only by calling the whole strength of the nation to arms.

Immediately after the conclusion of peace Blücher had begged his friend Scharnhorst to "take thought for a national army; no one must be exempted—it must be a disgrace to a man not to have served." From his captivity Prince Augustus sent a project for the reconstruction of the army, in which the universal duty of acting on the defensive stood forth conspicuously as the guiding principle. But Scharnhorst knew what most of his contemporaries had quite forgotten, namely, that this would be a mere revival of the ancient Prussian principle. He reminded the king that his ancestor, Frederick William I, had been the first European ruler to introduce universal conscription, that in old times this principle had made Prussia great, and that it had been merely borrowed by France and Austria. Now it seemed desirable to return to the old Prussian system and make short work of the abuse of exemption; by this means alone was it possible to create a standing army and to maintain it permanently at the same level. Scharnhorst began his draft scheme for the formation of an army reserve in almost the exact words of the old soldier-king: "All dwellers in the state are born defenders of the same."ⁱ

THE ADMINISTRATION OF STEIN; THE EMANCIPATING EDICT.

But the reforms did not stop with the efforts of Scharnhorst. About the king gathered other valiant, loyal, and great-souled men, Humboldt, Niebuhr, Stägemann, Boyen, Morgenbesser, Schön—who can tell all their names? Well may we say of them what was said of the soldiers of the Prussian army of liberation by a gallant contemporary: "It was a grand time, when a handful of noble men joined in noble fellowship by God's good providence and the inspiration of their own hearts, for the purpose of saving and liberating their country."

By these virtues of lofty self-denial and patriotism the new Prussia was built up. They first gave room for the active exercise of that knowledge, which, but for them, would have served only to nourish disaffection and acrimonious strife; they employed the progressive impulses of the young men, so long kept in check by the dead weight of circumstances and the mechanical traditions of public life, in behalf of that devotion to duty which had been aroused by the teaching of Kant, and stirred that moral indignation against abuses taught by Fichte. A saviour was found in Freiherr vom Stein; those who gathered about him found in him their leader, their centre of agreement. His fearless hand at the helm set the drifting ship of Prussia on a new course: his aim was, through Prussia to save Germany. He first taught Prussia, then at the lowest point of humiliation, to look far beyond the old dynastic and cabinet policy, to one that should be national and German. Annihilated as a power, she began to lay afresh her foundations as a state. He first taught the people of Prussia to feel that they were a nation—that they were German. With him began that great metamorphosis of all the internal affairs of the state which we may style the first attempt to combine civil liberty, such lib-

erty as England had preserved, with the political energy generated by the French Revolution, or, to speak more exactly, to supplement the sovereign authority of the throne by the political enfranchisement of the people; to conceive and outwardly realise the state in the truth of its moral function, and upon this foundation to base its historic significance.^j



F. VOM STEIN
(1757-1831)

The name of Stein will forever be most closely linked in the public mind with the publication on October 9th, 1807—five days after he had been intrusted by Frederick William with the post of chief minister—of the edict of emancipation, of which Seeley,^o Stein's great biographer, truly says that it was "the most comprehensive measure ever passed in Prussia, affecting every class and the whole framework of society." As a matter of fact, as Seeley points out, the edict was not the work of Stein, nor was he even the originator of the reforms therein enacted. He was named as the originator of the reform merely because he was at the moment the most conspicuous personality in the political field, and because the popular mind is wont to insist that its heroes shall stand

alone. In the case of Stein, as in that of nearly every other great political hero, a legendary personality to some extent takes the place of the actual man in the minds of posterity. The name of Stein, then, will always be associated with the law which revolutionised the country. Nor is this association by any means unjust. For even if Stein was not the actual enunciator of the terms in which the law was phrased, he was at least its chief instigator, and it is conceded that Hardenberg and Altenstein and the commission would scarcely have dared to recommend the reforms had they not assumed that Stein was to be the minister and would put the work into execution. They knew that he would not shrink from dangers which neither they nor the king dared to approach unsupported. Yet it remains true, as Seeley points out, that the emancipation edict was practically complete before it reached Stein's hands, and that two agencies, for which Stein was not responsible, had worked together for its production. These two agents were first, the *Zeitgeist*, i.e., the influences of the eighteenth century humanitarians; and secondly, and more directly, the Immediate Commission of state councillors appointed in the preceding April, and including such eminent statesmen and jurists as Schlon, Stagemann, and Niebuhr. But although the edict as published was largely the result of their deliberations, Stein's part in the actual achievement of the reforms was certainly not less than theirs. In addition to an important alteration in the phraseology of the edict, which extended its provisions to all the provinces of Prussia, Stein more than any other man was responsible for its actual promulgation. Seeley compares his share in the passage of the edict to that of Lord Grey in England in the passage of the Reform Bill; just as Lord Grey had to convince a parliament and a people, so Stein had to inspire with courage a king and his faint-hearted councillors. In a word, says Seeley, this is peculiarly an instance where we must not confound the reforming legislator with the jurist and parliamentary draftsman. In this

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transition of Prussia the inventiveness, or originality, or technical skill of Schön and his colleagues is not so much to be honoured as the "massive courage" of a man like Stein, "that moves freely under responsibility and lightens the burden of responsibility for all around."

But the edict of October 9th, 1807, was far more than an emancipating edict. Its aim was indeed threefold. Not only did it abolish personal serfdom in the Prussian monarchy, but it removed the principal restrictions that interfered with the free traffic in land, "the abolition of caste in land," as Seeley calls it, and furthermore, and not by any means of least importance, it granted to every noble, citizen, and peasant, the right of free choice of occupation. These last two provisions, Seeley says without exaggeration, were a sort of Magna Charta to the Prussians.

Stein's ministry lasted little more than a year. In this period, he co-operated zealously with Scharnhorst in the reconstruction of the army, instituted extensive financial and administrative reforms, and prepared the way for a complete reorganisation of the political framework of the Prussian states on a largely representative basis.^a

In August, 1808, an article on the text of an intercepted letter written by Stein to Prince von Wittgenstein—in which he spoke of the disaffection that grew from day to day in Germany, of combinations in Hesse and Westphalia, and of the plans of 1807, which might now be revived—appeared in the *Moniteur* and concluded with the words: "The king of Prussia is to be pitied for having ministers distinguished equally for clumsiness and perversity." By the end of November, and before Napoleon's notorious proscription appeared with the phrase, "*Le nommé Stein voulant exciter des troubles en Allemagne*," Stein had sent in his resignation, after publishing a statement of the main principles of his political administration in the *Sendschreibung an die oberste Verwaltungsbehörde Preussens vom 24 November, 1808* [Letter addressed to the supreme administrative body of Prussia on November 24th, 1808], which became famous under the title of his "political testament." An interval of a year and a half elapsed before Napoleon, after once more conquering Austria, assented to the appointment of Hardenberg to the office of chancellor, and on the 6th of June, 1810, the latter undertook the direction of the state.

HARDENBERG AS CHANCELLOR (1810 A.D.)

Men may say that he continued to guide it in the spirit of Stein, but how should he, a skilful diplomatist of the old school, a master of finance and administration, a cultivated and fastidious man of the world, walk in the same ways as the harsh, energetic, intellectual giant, filled with the pride and wrath of patriotism? Both of these men, if we may trust those who knew them well, exercised a singular fascination over those about them—Stein by the force of a strong character of moral grandeur and beauty together with the inspiring power of great ideas; Hardenberg by the charm of real kindness, the tranquillity and gentleness of his cheerful glance, his confidence in the best possible management, the greatest possible advancement. No doubt many of their measures presented a certain analogy, but they arose from completely different views of human affairs, of principles, and of purposes. Hardenberg, we may freely confess, was in all things inclined to the purely rationalistic and administrative conception of the state, which was the source of so many contemporary experiments both in Germany and beyond it; only, being of a less imperious temper than Montgelas for instance, and by nature cautious and forbearing, he gave way to anything that did not run directly counter to him and respected everything which could be made to serve his own schemes, or more correctly speaking to meet the demands of circumstances as they arose.

He never set himself in sharp opposition to the spirit which Stein had awakened in Prussia, and of which he was the representative; on the contrary he kept on good terms with it and made use of it. And on the other hand it might be argued that all the divergencies from Stein's policy introduced by Hardenberg were concessions to the needs of the moment, sacrifices for the sake of speedier attainment of the great end all men had in view; that the salvation of the Prussian name was due to Hardenberg's superior prudence, while Stein's inconsiderate violence might possibly have hurried it to irretrievable ruin; that Hardenberg rather supplemented than superseded Stein, by resolutely enlarging on the forms of civil liberty and administrative organisation for which Stein had prepared the way. But what he accomplished in this respect, though of great and vital importance, was merely an imitation of what had already been accomplished elsewhere; while something quite different, new, and prophetic was involved in the very elements of Stein's policy—nothing less indeed than the first lucid glimpse of the great vocation in which Prussia was to find scope for her energies and aims for her future; a lesson she will never unlearn nor need to learn again.

The thing to be done was to bring the civil liberty of England and the political energy to which the Revolution had given birth into positive combination. Of the peoples of the British Empire, how few had a share in the government, how many "in pitiable dissonance" were the subjects of joint-stock companies, oppressed on account of their religious opinions—mere slaves! Again, the Revolution had pronounced sentence of death on class differences, had fused the people into a homogeneous mass, and proclaimed its sovereignty; but while the French imagined that the character of the state and the guarantee of its political soundness were to be sought for mechanically by the division of power, France had merely shaken off the autocracy of the legislative authority to fall under that of the executive, and under the one as under the other remained destitute of civil liberty and of any moral existence apart from the state.

How should it be with Prussia? "The thing to be done," says the Letter, "is to put an end to the discord which prevails amongst the people, to abolish the internecine strife of class against class which is the source of our unhappiness, and to secure by law the possibility that every man may freely develop his powers in a moral direction, and in this fashion compel the people to love their king and country with a love which will gladly sacrifice life and living for their sake."^j

THE EFFORTS OF SCHILL AND BRUNSWICK (1809 A.D.)

Although Prussia had left Austria unsuccoured during the war of 1809, many of her subjects were animated by a desire to aid their Austrian brethren. Schill, unable to restrain his impetuosity, quitted Berlin on the 28th of April for that purpose, with his regiment of hussars. His conduct, although condemned by a sentence of the court-martial, was universally applauded. Dörnberg, an officer of the guard of Jerome, king of Westphalia, revolted simultaneously in Hesse, but was betrayed by a false friend at the moment in which Jerome's person was to have been seized, and was compelled to fly for his life. Schill merely advanced as far as Wittenberg and Halberstadt, was again driven northwards to Wismar, and finally to Stralsund, by the superior forces of Westphalia and Holland. In a bloody street fight at Stralsund he split the head of General Carteret, the Dutch commander, and was himself killed by a cannon-ball. Thus fell this young hero, true to his motto, "Better a terrible end than endless terror." The Dutch cut off his head, preserved it

[1810-1812 A.D.]

in spirits of wine, and placed it publicly in the Leyden library, where it remained until 1837, when it was buried at Brunswick in the grave of his faithful followers. Five hundred of his men, under Lieutenant Brunow, escaped by forcing their way through the enemy.

Of the prisoners taken on this occasion, eleven officers were, by Napoleon's command, shot at Wesel, fourteen subalterns and soldiers at Brunswick; the rest, about six hundred in number, were sent in chains to Toulon and condemned to the galleys. Dörnberg fled to England. Katt, another patriot, assembled a number of veterans at Stendal and advanced as far as Magdeburg, but was compelled to flee to the Brunswickers in Bohemia.

Frederick William, duke of Brunswick, the son of the hapless duke Ferdinand, had quitted Öls, his sole possession, for Bohemia, where he had collected a force two thousand strong—known as the black Brunswickers on account of the colour of their uniform and the death's head on their helmets—with which he resolved to revenge his father's death. Victorious in petty engagements over the Saxons at Zittau and over the French under Junot at Berneck, he refused to recognise the armistice between Austria and France, and, fighting his way through the enemy, surprised Leipsic by night and there provided himself with ammunition and stores. He was awaited at Halberstadt by the Westphalians under Wellingerode, whom, notwithstanding their numerical superiority, he completely defeated during the night of the 30th of July. Two days later he was attacked in Brunswick by an enemy three times his superior, the Westphalians under Reubel, who advanced from Celle whilst the Saxons and Dutch pursued him from Erfurt. Aided by his brave citizens, many of whom followed his fortunes, he was again victorious and was enabled by a speedy retreat, in which he broke down all the bridges in his rear, to escape to Elsfleth, whence he sailed to England.

In 1810 Napoleon annexed Holland and East Friesland "as alluvial lands" to France. His brother Louis, who had vainly laboured for the welfare of Holland, selected a foreign residence and scornfully refused to accept the pension settled upon him by Napoleon. Lower Saxony, as far as the Baltic, the principalities of Oldenburg, Salm, and Arenberg, the Hanse towns, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, were, together with a portion of the kingdom of Westphalia, also incorporated by Napoleon with France, under pretext of putting a stop to the contraband trade carried on along those coasts, more particularly from the island of Helgoland. He openly aimed at converting the Germans—and they certainly discovered little disinclination to the metamorphosis—into Frenchmen.

GERMAN TROOPS AID IN NAPOLEON'S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1812 A.D.)

In the spring of 1812 Napoleon, after leaving a sufficient force to prosecute the war with activity in Spain and to guard France, Italy, and Germany, led half a million men to the Russian frontiers. Before taking the field he convoked all the princes of Germany at Dresden, where he treated them with such extreme insolence as even to revolt his most favoured and warmest partisans. Tears were seen to start in ladies' eyes, whilst men bit their lips with rage at the petty humiliations and affronts heaped on them by their powerful but momentary lord. The empress of Austria and the king of Prussia appear, on this occasion, to have felt these affronts the most acutely. Ségur relates that the king was received politely, but with distant coolness by Napoleon. There is said to have been question between them concerning the marriage of the crown prince of Prussia with one of Napoleon's nieces, and of an incorporation of the still unconquered Russian provinces on the Baltic, Livonia, Cour-

land, and Esthonia, with Prussia. All was, however, empty show. Napoleon hoped by the rapidity of his successes to constrain the emperor of Russia to conclude not only peace but a still closer alliance with France, in which case it was as far from his intention to concede the above-mentioned provinces to Prussia as to emancipate the Poles.

For the first time the whole of Germany was reduced to submission—an event unknown before in the history of the world. Napoleon, greater than conquering Attila, who took the field at the head of one half of Germany against the other, dragged the whole of Germany in his train. The army led by him to the steppes of Russia was principally composed of German troops, who were so skilfully mixed up with the French as not to be themselves aware of their numerical superiority. The right wing, composed of thirty thousand Austrians under Schwarzenberg, was destined for the invasion of Volhynia; whilst the left wing, consisting of twenty thousand Prussians under York and several thousand French under the command of Marshal Macdonald, was ordered to advance upon the coasts of the Baltic and without loss of time to besiege Riga. The centre or main body consisted of the troops of the confederation of the Rhine, more or less mixed up with French; of thirty-eight thousand Bavarians under Wrede and commanded by Saint Cyr; of sixteen thousand Würtembergers under Scheeler, over which Marshal Ney was allotted the chief command—single regiments, principally cavalry, were drawn off in order more thoroughly to intermix the Germans with the French; of seventeen thousand Saxons under Reynier; of eighteen thousand Westphalians under Vandamme; also of Hessians, Badeners, Frankforters, Würzburgers, Nassauers: in short, of contingents furnished by each of the confederated states. The Swiss were mostly concentrated under Oudinot. The Dutch, Hanseatic, Flemish, in fine, all the Germans on the left bank of the Rhine, were at that time crammed amongst the French troops. Upwards of two hundred thousand Germans, at the lowest computation, marched against Russia, a number far superior to that of the French in the army, the remainder of which was made up by several thousand Italians, Portuguese, and Spaniards, who had been pressed into the service.


The Prussians found themselves in the most degraded position. Their army, weak as it was in numbers, was placed under the command of a French general. The Prussian fortresses, with the exception of Kolberg, Graudenz, Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Glatz, were already garrisoned with French troops or, like Pillau near Königsberg, newly occupied by them. In Berlin the French had unlimited sway. Marshal Augereau was stationed with sixty thousand men in northern Germany for the purpose of keeping that part of the country, and more particularly Prussia, in check to Napoleon's rear; the Danish forces also stood in readiness to support him in case of necessity. Napoleon's entire army moreover marched through Prussia and completely drained that country of its last resources.

The deep conviction harboured by Napoleon of his irresistible power led him to repay every service and to regard every antagonist with contempt. Confident of victory, he deviated from the strict military discipline he had at one time enforced and of which he had given an example in his own person; dragged in his train a multitude of useless attendants fitted but for pomp and luxury, permitted his marshals and generals to do the same, and allowed an incredible number of private carriages, servants, women, etc., to follow in the rear of the army, to hamper its movements, to create confusion, and to aid in consuming the army stores, which being, moreover, merely provided for a short campaign, speedily became insufficient for the maintenance of the enormous mass. Even in East Prussia numbers of the soldiery were constrained by want to plunder the villages. On the 24th of June, 1812, Napoleon crossed

[1812 A.D.]

the Niemen, the Russian frontier, not far from Kovno.^d The details of the disastrous campaign which followed and gave so fatal a blow to Napoleon's prestige and empire belong to the history of Russia and of France.^a

On the 5th of December, Napoleon, placing himself in a sledge, hurried in advance of his army, nay, preceded the news of his disaster, in order at all events to insure his personal safety and to pass through Germany before meas-



RUINS OF RHEINFELS
(Built 1245)

ures could be taken for his capture. His fugitive army shortly afterwards reached Vilna, but was too exhausted to maintain that position. Enormous magazines, several prisoners, and the rest of the booty, besides 6,000,000 francs in silver money, fell here into the hands of the Russians. Part of the fugitives escaped to Dantzic, but few crossed the Oder; the Saxons under Reynier were routed and dispersed in a last engagement at Kalish; Poniatowski and the Poles retired to Cracow on the Austrian frontier, as it were, protected by Schwarzenberg, who remained unassailed by the Russians, and whose neutrality was, not long afterwards, formally recognised.

The Prussians—who had been, meanwhile, occupied with the unsuccessful siege of Riga, and who, like the Austrians, had comparatively husbanded their strength—were now the only hope of the fugitive French. The troops under Macdonald, accordingly, received orders to cover the retreat of the grand army, but York, instead of obeying, concluded a neutral treaty with the Russians commanded by Diebitsch of Silesia and remained stationary in East Prussia. The king of Prussia, at that time still at Berlin and in the power of the French, publicly disapproved of the step taken by his general, who was, on the evacuation of Berlin by the French, as publicly rewarded. The immense army of the conqueror of the world was totally annihilated. Nearly half a million of men had crossed the Russian frontier; of these, scarcely twenty thousand returned.^d

THE WAR OF LIBERATION (1813-1815 A.D.)

By the war of Liberation the Germans mean those three memorable years in which, for the first time after the lapse of centuries, the whole German people fought and conquered in a common cause, animated by the lofty inspiration of a common sentiment of unity. It is too true that the country did not at once rise up restored from its ruins as the united German nation intended and expected it to do; nevertheless, thwarted, repudiated, and contemned as

the people were, bound and repressed by fresh ordinances—the great impulses which had led them to victory did not die; they still lived and grew, silent but mighty, irresistibly expanding in all directions.^j

Already in 1812 Napoleon felt that the foundations of his empire were losing solidity. The seat of war was transferred to the mark; in January of 1813 headquarters were at Berlin; General Scharnhorst, who had withdrawn to Silesia, now again stepped into prominence and appeared as the first councillor of the king in matters of war. This was the time at which was drafted that organisation which forms the basis of the present army. It was not solely the work of Scharnhorst; the king had sent him an anonymous essay in another's hand, and it is this which served Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as a basis for the new organisation. Reserve battalions were formed which were now to be provided with arms. The king was in Berlin between Magdeburg and Küstrin; in Berlin were the headquarters of Marshal Augereau. The king boldly determined to declare himself openly; he informed the French ambassador of his decision to move with his court to Breslau January 25th, as it was not in accordance with his dignity to remain in Berlin. The French were so impressed with the audacity of this announcement that they offered no opposition. Armaments were now made with that activity and determination indispensable to their execution; the French were so astounded that they dared not interpose.

The general appeal to the volunteers (*Freiwillige*) followed February 3rd, 1813; in Berlin seven thousand men of ages varying from youth to more than middle age took up arms under the eyes of the French. This was the state of public enthusiasm when on the 20th of February the Cossacks appeared before Berlin and made a marauding expedition into the town; they received numerous challenges from the town to penetrate into it; no one was afraid of the shooting that took place in the street. Confidence ran so high that it ignored the most threatening danger; the general sense of security made everything go well. Troops were formed in Silesia; the reserve battalions marched through Berlin. York's corps approached Berlin. In the beginning of March the French evacuated the town and crossed the Elbe.

Throughout all Germany, now, men of sound understanding worked to bring about a general rising. In Saxony especially generals Thielmann and Aster endeavoured to move the king to break with France. Dazed by his good luck, however, and blinded by conscientious scruples, the king left Dresden, went to Prague, and met all proposals with the sternest reprobation. The chief blame attaches to his miserable councillor, Herr von Senfft-Pilsach, for whom a favourable word from Napoleon was everything; he now looked forward to a French ducal title. But the king also lacked character. Many arguments were tried to convince him, but they met with his determined opposition. Had Saxony moved a step, it would have involved negotiations with Bavaria.

PRUSSIA ARMS HERSELF

In Prussia a general arming was set in motion, which exceeds anything that has been witnessed in recent history; in the process most provinces were plunged into confusion and ruined. After the Peace of Tilsit the country numbered only four and a half million men and was in a condition of abysmal poverty; the year 1812 had reduced East Prussia to complete beggary. The interest of the national debt could not be paid. The state had no money and no credit; but every single person who had anything to bring, brought it in order to equip himself or others: every man became a hero. A shepherd in the neighbourhood of Anclam sold his flock, bought a kit with the money, and

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went soldiering himself. Men set forward in the name of God. This sentiment extended through the whole of north Germany; in Hanover, Brunswick—everywhere the same readiness was manifest; but the same provision could not be made, because there was no government to lead the movement.

But as the best cause has unworthy champions, Herr von Tettenborn now set out on an unholy raid against Hamburg. He was earnestly entreated not to make the expedition: not to plunge a well-intentioned but unwarlike and unprotected town into destruction by rousing a rebellion with his few troops which would compromise the town. Tettenborn laughed: such an expedition, said he, might be a source of income. He brought about a sudden and general rising; it was resolved to proceed to extreme measures, but Tettenborn played the pasha; no preparations had been made when the die was cast; there was no centre of stability; the government refused to endanger its existence. Agitations for the saving of a fatherland are easiest excited in monarchical states. Hamburg might have been provided with another source of salvation, if the sentiment of Denmark, which was at the

time favourable, had been utilised. Denmark was not only very shabbily treated by England; a treaty had also been sealed in August, 1812, between Russia and Sweden, at a meeting of Alexander with the king of Sweden, whereby Norway was promised to the king of Sweden if he would declare himself against France. England had not taken part in this treaty immediately, and Denmark might have averted her catastrophe if she had made a decisive resolution in the winter of 1812. But the advice of those who recommended such wholesome policy was not listened to. The Danes offered Hamburg help, if the peace were so concluded as to preserve



NEUTHORGRABEN, NUREMBERG

Norway to them. But this conflicted with the designs of the crown prince of Sweden, Marshal Bernadotte, and a little while before England had confirmed the treaty with Sweden by her entry into it. The Swedish troops were in the neighbourhood, but did not enter the town; and so Hamburg again fell a victim to French supremacy and to the terrors of tyranny (May 30th).

The movement extended to the Dutch frontiers. On the Oldenburg border a popular movement introduced a provisional government; the people demanded their beloved duke. Two very respectable men, Von Falke and Von Berger, led the movement and inspired an uncommon degree of confidence in the inhabitants. Vandamme soon marched upon the place and had both of them shot.

The Russian army had made a very slow advance. Already in April, 1813, the Prussian troops had fought several successful engagements in the neighbourhood of Magdeburg; the army crossed the Elbe at Dessau and moved slowly forward through Thuringia. The feebleness of the Russian army was now regarded with terror. True, this did not diminish the confidence of Prussia; but things wore a very grave aspect. Thielmann and his friends strained every nerve to induce the king of Saxony to side with Prussia, but they received express commands to do nothing.

THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN OR GROSSGÖRSCHEN (MAY 2ND, 1813)

Meanwhile Napoleon had considerably advanced his armaments. All the old troops in France, all that could be spared in Spain, were collected, and Napoleon again crossed the Rhine with a very large army; it pursued its way partly through Cassel and Fulda, partly through Würzburg. York's corps was already reinforced by new recruits and united with a Russian detachment, but the French were incomparably stronger; the Russians were not so numerous as had been supposed. On the 1st of May heavy cannonading took place at Weissenfels; it was really a reconnaissance. On the 2nd of May opponents of the French determined to attack, but the necessary preparations were not completed. The smallness of numbers and the narrowness of the bridges had not been calculated, and so it happened that ground which the Germans expected to reach at eight o'clock in the morning was not reached until twelve. This decided the day. Napoleon had detached the viceroy of Italy with a strong corps and sent him to Halle; apparently he expected no attack that day. If the allies had not arrived too late, it might have been possible to dislodge the French from the whole position before the viceroy came up. This is what Scharnhorst wanted; the blame belongs neither to the troops nor to anyone else; the only mistake was in underrating the difficulties. The allied troops attacked the French, who were greatly superior in numbers, with indescribable courage and heroism; but the French had withdrawn into four rather massively built villages, which they defended with uncommon skill. The villages were twice taken and lost by the Prussians, and finally retaken. The superiority of the Russian cavalry could not turn the scale.

The battle, however, appeared to be won at two o'clock; great confusion had fallen upon the retreating French troops; at Kösen they had lost their way with their baggage in the pass; fugitives appeared here and there, so that the news was circulated that the French army was dispersed. At midday the viceroy returned from Halle. The allies could no longer think of victory; towards evening, however, they undertook an attack without any likelihood of success: many brave men were sacrificed without any result. The cavalry showed the courage of lions. In the matter of bravery they occupy a unique place in the battles of late years. Young men who had never been in action before fought like old soldiers; not less than three hundred and seventy volunteers from the schools of Berlin fought in the Prussian ranks. The Prussians did not lose a single trophy—not a flag, not an ammunition wagon, not one unwounded prisoner. The battle was lost, but not a battalion left the field in disorder; the withdrawal took place in compact masses. The army retired upon Meissen.

The French followed; but no engagement worth mentioning took place before the Elbe was reached. It is singular how little the French dared to harass the allied army in this retreat. Even the wounded were brought away, chiefly with the help of Saxon peasants and land-owners; this was in sharp contrast with the behaviour of the government. Thus the army reached Dresden and Meissen and crossed the Elbe (May 8th). It would have been possible and it should have been attempted to make some sort of defense at the passage of this river; that this was not done was due to a Russian commander who left his post at Meissen. In the battle the Russians had fought bravely, but had had the smallest share: many regiments were not engaged at all. Napoleon was in Dresden; the king of Saxony returned; and Thielmann received instructions to hand over Torgau and Wittenberg to the French. Thielmann, Aster, Carlowitz, and a few other brave souls now left the Saxon service and came over to the Prussians. In the meanwhile Russian reinforcements came up,

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and constantly formed reserves were added to the allied army; a position was taken up behind Bautzen. General Bülow moved constantly up and down the Berlin route. The French army was still on the increase.

THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN (MAY 20TH-21ST, 1813)

The battle of Bautzen, on the 20th and 21st of May, demands description in detail. The French described a semicircle; the line of the allies covered a much narrower segment, and their formation was very weak; it looked as if they were a mere handful against the enormous mass of French troops. On the 20th of May, thanks to their superiority, the French took several posts, but there was determined fighting; the Prussian army was full of dash and spirit, and the Russians, too, fought admirably, with far more decision than at Grossgörschen, for here they were on the defensive. On the 21st, the battle was decided by the French repulsion of the left Russian wing, which was so pushed out of place that it formed an angle with the Prussian army. The line of retreat on the great route over Reichenbach and Görlitz was now open to the French. This was at three o'clock in the afternoon; nothing now remained but to retreat, and the situation was very grave. The main road was fortunately won and a quiet retreat commenced under a heavy cannonade. It was a hot day; at noon, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew and Ney pressed forward, a short but sharp storm burst overhead. General Ney halted; it was as if he felt that he was fighting against a higher power. This halt was the salvation of the allied army, which otherwise must have been annihilated. On this day also not a gun-carriage was lost; a few prisoners were taken; the losses were about equal on both sides.

At Löwenberg was the Austrian, Count Stadion, who now appeared as mediator and brought about the discussion of an armistice. His personal inclinations lay in favour of the allies, and by his influence an armistice was now settled which was to be succeeded by peace. Austria wished to have peace; this was no cunning pretence: she wished to improve her situation in peace and to be withdrawn from the necessity of a war. So neutral was her attitude that she allowed Polish troops under Prince Poniatowski, who had separated from the French and moved from Warsaw upon Cracow, a free passage to Saxony; they were disarmed on entering and reinvested with their arms on leaving the country. Thorn and Spandau had surrendered to Prussia. As a consequence of the suspension of hostilities Lusatia and a part of lower Silesia were evacuated to the French for cantonment. The plight of the allied army was thereby rendered very serious; but they had gained time, and that was everything.

An immense loss at the battle of Lützen was sustained in the death of Scharnhorst. He had been wounded in the battle; no one thought there was any danger, though it was believed that his knee would become stiff: he betook himself to Prague and there died June 28th. He had performed the journey too rapidly. Before he left for Prague he placidly expressed his view upon the issue of the battle: "The battle is lost, but I have seen that it is no flash in the pan. From the way our people have fought we are certain to win."

THE ARMISTICE

During the armistice negotiations were commenced in Prague through the connivance of Austria. It had been thought desirable that England should also take part in them, but it was idle to think of this. Austria had imposed

a limit within which the peace must be settled, declaring that if Napoleon did not by that time comply with the conditions offered, she would join the allies. Napoleon did not in the least take this seriously. The nature of the peace was such that Prussia would not have acquired much, and Napoleon would have lost very little. Magdeburg and the old mark were to be restored to Prussia; the fortresses on the Oder and Dantzic were to be evacuated; Dantzic and Thorn were to become Prussian. France was to renounce her supremacy over Poland; what was to become of Poland was not clearly defined.

This was the price of peace with Napoleon. So few points were touched upon that for the Prussians the peace would have been a miserable one; it was apparent how little the Germans promised themselves success. But Napoleon refused this peace which involved no actual loss for him. The duke of Bassano (Maret), who guided negotiations in Prague, a man of very good qualities but horribly timid when face to face with his master, told the story after the battle of Waterloo of how he and many others, who in every other circumstance were the living echoes of Napoleon's will, implored him to accept the terms. The time limit had been fixed at midnight; if by that time the French had not accepted terms the Austrian plenipotentiary was to close negotiations and declare his secession to the allies. Napoleon asked Maret: "Do you believe that the Austrians have the courage? If they do not carry out their threats they make themselves ridiculous." Maret assured him they would do it. Finally Napoleon signed the peace warrant; but the courier was detained by him so that he arrived at five o'clock in the morning. Napoleon thought he knew with whom he had to deal; his reflections were: "If they have not broken off negotiations they have given themselves away; if they have broken them off, they will be only too delighted that I have set my hand to the warrant, and will revoke all that they have done." In this way he wanted to procure for himself a triumph before the eyes of the world from the weak compliance of his opponent. But at midnight Austria had actually declared her secession, and Napoleon received an answer of refusal: it may possibly have been given reluctantly. The armistice was prolonged another twelve days.

The army was set in motion. From the beginning of June to August it was materially increased by reinforcements. At first there had not been enough powder for one battle with Napoleon; sufficient stores had now been obtained. A number of English muskets had arrived; fresh strength from Russia, the Austrian army—everything came together. But Napoleon had not slumbered: some hundred thousand conscripts had been raised; everywhere the French armies were very numerous. The campaign was commenced with very varying expectations; great hope sustained the allies; the French were in low spirits, which were still further depressed by events in Spain.

During the armistice news of the great battle of Vitoria (June 21st), in which the French were completely defeated, reached Germany; in this engagement Joseph Bonaparte had commanded. The French artillery to the very last piece was taken. After this glorious battle Wellington undertook the siege of Pamplona and San Sebastian. Before this, however, the campaign in Germany had begun.

THE BATTLE OF DRESDEN

A Prussian army was situated in the mark under Bülow; a considerable corps under Blücher, made up of Prussians under York and of Russians, was in Silesia; the great allied army was in Bohemia; here were the Austrian army, the main army of the Russians, and the Prussian Kleist corps. General


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Moreau had been imported from America as a sort of talisman to the allies. All this did, however, was to excite some rancour in them and to make no impression upon the French. Their attitude of mind was misunderstood; they had to regard him as an enemy. Besides, there were generals of sufficient distinction in the German army, and not much wisdom was to be expected from Moreau: he was an indolent man, and had been quite inactive since 1800; moreover, he had lost, through want of practice, all aptitude for leading an army. The great blunder, however, consisted in changing the plan of campaign at the beginning. The right way would have been to march forward through Bohemia in order to move upon Leipsic. It was however feared that

Napoleon would allow the allies to advance, and having himself made a diversion through Silesia would cut off their communications, make havoc of everything, and then return. Accordingly it was determined to go over the ridge of the Erzgebirge to Dresden, for it was thought that he had been duly deceived and it was hoped that Dresden might be reached before he could come back from Silesia. But the difficulties were very great: it was a summer of much rain; the roads were very bad; the Saxon Erzgebirge are intersected by a number of small rivers, and the advance had to be made over hills and through valleys.

The convoys suffered much in this transit, and the advance was very slow, so that the allies arrived too late. Had they arrived a day earlier they might have taken Dresden; had they gone by Töplitz they would have gained one day. But in all these things Moreau was allowed to be the guide, and Moreau knew nothing of the ground.

Napoleon now turned from the road to Silesia, performing rapid marches with his guard, and crossed the bridge at Dresden August 26th, at the moment when the allies opened a cannonade on Dresden, instead of attacking the town with a bayonet charge. Nothing was accomplished. The following day the weather was much worse; an attack was decided



FOUNTAIN IN NUREMBERG

upon, which could not have been more madly conceived. General Mesko's division was cut off in the valley known as the Plauenscher Grund; the firearms refused to go off on account of the weather; the whole left wing of the Austrians was taken prisoner; the battle was entirely lost. The French had every reason to triumph. The losses were incredible; the whole army withdrew again to Bohemia in the most pitiable condition. Had the French pursued with all their forces they would doubtless have reached Prague, and the whole allied army would have been annihilated. Luckily for them, on the 23rd of August, Napoleon obtained news of the losses sustained at the engagement of Grossbeeren. This made him very pensive; he learned that a violent engagement was taking place at the Katzbach in Silesia, and just as he was about to set out news was conveyed to him of the defeat (26th of August).

He now foolishly halted and made a demonstration against Silesia in order to pick up the conquered troops. Here the elements had been of use to the allies in flooding the mountain streams; the French were defeated, it is true, by the bravery of their enemies' troops; but the extraordinary material losses sustained by them were due to the elements. General Vandamme now came to Bohemia and encountered the Russians, who formed the rear guard (August 29th). The confusion was very great; the Russians were about to carry off the cannon, when the Prussian king appeared: his arrival had a great effect upon the Russians; he commanded the artillery to withdraw. It returned, and he suspended the battle on the heights of Kulm until the Kleist corps came up. The French were now totally defeated and Vandamme was taken prisoner. This again robbed the French of the whole triumph of Dresden. The fate of the allies was decided by this victory.

THE BATTLE OF JÜTERBOG

The month of September was passed on the Bohemian frontier and in Lusatia without events of any importance; numerous movements and counter movements were made. Napoleon wished now to attempt a great onslaught on Berlin. The supreme command here was in the hands of Bernadotte, who was regarded as an ally. On the 6th of September the battle of Dennewitz or Jüterbog took place, in which Ney was defeated by the Prussians, for the Swedes did nothing. It was on this occasion that an officer turned to Bernadotte with the words:

He counts his loved ones head by head,
And lo! no head is missing.

This omen foreshadowed the issue of the war. Ney was clumsy and unlucky above all other marshals; Napoleon's patience with him is inexplicable. Ney was a sort of evil demon for him; he had already brought him ill-luck in the Spanish campaign and in East Prussia, and continued to bring him ill-luck until the last moment. Napoleon was well aware of it, but Ney clung to him like a fate from which he could not detach himself.

The battle of Jüterbog was a source of extreme glory for the allies, and particularly again for the young volunteers. At Möckern (April 5th) the Prussian *Landwehr* (militia) bore itself with excellent fortitude. Men who had never carried arms killed veteran soldiers on the church walls with clubbed muskets. After the battle of Jüterbog the Prussian troops dispersed in all directions. The Cossacks and other light troops made marauding expeditions as far as Cassel. In Mecklenburg Davout's troops were pursued as far as Lauenburg; the Elbe was crossed and Hanover penetrated. The heartiest good will prevailed everywhere; but only too often there was a lack of power to impose laws and to establish a point of concentration with its accruing advantages. The prevailing sentiment was such that, from the neighbourhoods occupied by the French during the armistice, many volunteers secretly came over to the allies.

General York, attended with much glory, crossed the Elbe at Wartenburg and moved upon Leipsic. An advance was now also made upon Leipsic from the other side by Marienberg, on the same road which should have been already utilised for an advance at the end of August. The Swedes followed General York; Bülow also crossed the Elbe and joined York: so the heart of the allied army, with an excellent Russian corps, stood in a northerly position before Leipsic. Napoleon poured from twenty to thirty thousand men under

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Gouvion Saint-Cyr into Dresden, and moved with the rest of the army by a concentric movement against Leipsic. The allies were unquestionably at this moment superior in numbers to him. In the French ranks were many who had been recruited when little more than children, and the rate of mortality amongst them was incredible, provisions being very inadequate; the Saxons gave nothing of their own free will; they concealed everything in order to be able to give it to the allies. Dysentery reigned in the French army, typhus already began to break out; a terrible loss of courage accompanied these signs. The fate of the armies was soon to be decided.

Worthy of admiration is the manner in which Napoleon had resuscitated his cavalry; he had considerable numbers under Murat, who was noted as an excellent cavalry officer. On the 14th of October the great cavalry engagement at Liebertwolkwitz took place, in which the French cavalry maintained the advantage under the superior guidance of Murat. This, however, did not interfere with a further advance, nor did it stop the French from becoming more and more narrowly shut in.

BATTLE OF THE NATIONS (OCTOBER 16TH-19TH, 1813)

On the 16th began the great battle which really comprises three battles: one at Möckern in the north, one at Wachau on the right wing of the great allied army, and one along the banks of the Pleisse. The position of the great allied army was singularly faulty. The left Austrian wing was separated by the river and low ground through which the wetness of the weather made it almost impossible to make way; the effect upon this wing, from which no very grave opposition was maintained against the French, was decidedly unfavourable. At Wachau, on the right wing of the great allied army, the Prussian troops (the Kleist corps) scored distinct success, took guns and prisoners, but as a whole did not maintain their position. The Swedish troops did absolutely nothing and part of the Russians were held in reserve; the troops engaged were too weak to press forward, for Napoleon directed his whole force to Wachau. At Möckern the corps of Marmont was beaten as badly as it is possible for anything to be beaten. But the ground on the banks of the Pleisse afforded a check, and at Wachau Napoleon maintained the victory.

The allies were coming nearer and nearer. Napoleon was now obliged to direct a corps against Blücher, who was within an ace of laying hands upon Leipsic. On the Prussian side the reserves moved into line. Peace reigned on the 17th. On the 18th, early in the morning, the great battle began. The main blunder consisted in Napoleon's accepting battle; for he could not have been doubtful that he must lose the day. The troops pressed forward, and in a few hours some leagues of territory were won. Then the German troops on Napoleon's side went over. One might have said to them what the Duke de Berri said to Bourmont when he went over: "*Monsieur, c'est trop tard ou trop tôt.*" They ought to have gone over on the 16th or to have accepted their humiliation with the others. The allies would have gained a complete victory whatever they did; the order to retreat had been given earlier in the proceedings. The Bavarian troops had been ordered to withdraw. On the 8th of October had been sealed the Treaty of Ried between Bavaria and Austria; otherwise the Bavarians would have advanced as far as Vienna. It was impossible at that time to consider what the consequences might be.

On the 18th of October everything was determined at Leipsic. The first troops of the French retreated, still in good order; but disorder soon ensued. The artillery had to remain where they were. Had Napoleon not accepted battle on the 18th, he would have been able to take up a position farther in

the rear, and the artillery would have been saved. From day to day the French army dispersed more and more; the retreat was covered, but only by the most disorganised hordes; thus they arrived at Hanau. Here the Bavarians under Wrede opposed the French to prevent them from reaching the Rhine. But Napoleon broke through and reached Mainz (October 30th); many of the Bavarians fell. But, as the bridge of Mainz was in the rear, the whole army was dispersed; even the old troops, which had hitherto remained together with irresistible solidity, scattered like guerrilla hordes. While they were resting a fearful pestilence broke out.

NEGOTIATIONS ARE DELAYED

The crown prince of Sweden soon turned in a northerly direction. The main army followed the French with no considerable rapidity: a halt was made at the Rhine. One party was distinctly in favour of making peace here; Napoleon immediately sent ambassadors to enter upon negotiations. In Frankfort was published (December 1st) that unlucky proclamation in which a just peace was announced to the French and a readiness to guarantee France to Napoleon "*dans un sens plus étendu que jamais sous vos rois*"—which meant the Rhine frontier with Belgium. Had Napoleon been willing to make peace then, he would have been able to conclude a very satisfactory agreement, for England would have been perfectly prepared to take her part in the negotiations as well; Spain would have been restored, and England's honour saved. But Napoleon would not hear of renouncing Holland.

He had left only five thousand men of mixed nationalities, troops and douaniers. Against these the Dutch were in revolt, without making any considerable efforts. The prince of Orange was summoned to be sovereign prince and he came from England. This disturbed the plans of several cabinets. Some had wished to indemnify Denmark with Holland, others to unite Holland with all Westphalia and Hanover into one great kingdom. All this was now made impossible. The French withdrew to two fortresses in Holland, Naarden and Gorkum; they had small garrisons at several points. General Bülow, the victor of Dennewitz, suddenly appeared and took the fortresses by a series of bold *coups de main*, and battered in the gates. Gorkum was very bravely defended, but was compelled to surrender; only in Naarden, a harbour of Amsterdam, did the French succeed in maintaining themselves.

Meanwhile much time was wasted on the Rhine without entering upon negotiations; notes were exchanged, until at last the patience of the parties fortunately gave out. Many trembled at the idea of trusting themselves behind the Rhine fortresses: but the counsel of the daring prevailed. The Rhine was crossed, Switzerland entered, Alsace and France were approached (December 30th and 31st). Napoleon's armaments were still considerably in arrears. The allies advanced through Lorraine—the right wing upon the route of Châlons, the left wing through Langres. At Brienne the French were encountered, and here the Bavarians distinguished themselves: the main glory of the victory is to be attributed to them. The French withdrew much disheartened.

Two corps now moved along the Aube and the Marne upon Paris; all went well until there followed a series of engagements in which Napoleon proved himself to be a greater general than ever. He drew all his forces together, but his power was small; he first overwhelmed one corps, then surprised a second, then wheeled round and encountered the corps of York and Sacken: through Sacken's blunders he inflicted a severe loss on them. In the midst of the engagement General Kleist drew up with his corps on the great

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route to Châlons. Napoleon threw himself upon this corps on the following day; Kleist had hardly had time to learn that a retreat had taken place in both wings. But the corps of Kleist maintained itself on this day, the 14th of February, 1814, against an overwhelming superiority in numbers and artillery, and withdrew to Quarrees; in brilliance of achievements this engagement is on a par with the battle of Lützen. But as soon as the allies united their forces Napoleon experienced the disadvantage of his weakness. He followed the allies as far as Chaumont. Here everything was in confusion; once more it was the personality of the Prussian king which saved everything. Many of the commanders thought only of retreat; it was he who brought discipline into the army, made the Austrians and Russians veer round, and directed a severe blow at the French. Confidence on the Prussian side was again to some extent restored.

The six weeks from the middle of February to the end of March are the most brilliant in the military history of Napoleon. Even in those defeats which he suffered his initiative was right. But the last blow miscarried; it was the ruin of everything.

Meanwhile Blücher had joined the corps of Kleist and proceeded through Châlons to Méry in order to reinforce Schwarzenberg; he scored a brilliant success at Méry; but the want of spirit in his troops was considerable—it amounted to despair at Austrian headquarters. The king was the first to turn the scale of depression at Bar-sur-Aube; he used his personality in order to impress them. All of the troops were much the worse for sickness and fatigue; the army of Schwarzenberg was quite broken up. Blücher had again retired over the Marne in order to cover the loss, while Schwarzenberg was thoroughly in favour of their retiring over the Rhine. Blücher succeeded in forcing the Prussian corps under Bülow, and the Russian under Wintzingerode, to abandon the crown prince of Sweden who, with treasonous designs, held them fast in the Netherlands. They broke away and joined Blücher in Picardy. A fine game of tactics was now played: Napoleon continued to be kept from pressing Schwarzenberg. The corps of Kleist held the communications. Once Blücher was close upon Paris; he fought a number of engagements with varying success. At Laon (March 9th) he was attacked and maintained his ground superbly; York replied to the attack in the night and took artillery. The French fell back on Rheims, but they did not despair. The headquarters of the great allied army were now again in Troyes.

Already, at the beginning of February, general negotiations for peace had been begun at Châtillon. Even England offered no obstacles to the recognition of Napoleon as emperor. But Napoleon's proposals were a monstrous joke: he demanded the Rhine frontier for France, indemnities for his brothers Joseph and Jerome, and a principality for Eugène Beauharnais. On a basis like this there ought to have been no negotiation at all; but there was. There was very little agreement amongst the allies. Determination was to be found only in the council of the king; but Prussia was entirely without support, and



BLÜCHER
(1742-1819)

Napoleon would have obtained a very favourable peace if he had not been too obstinate. England was very lukewarm in her attitude towards Germany; what did the Rhine frontier matter to her? Alexander had difficulties with his people because, with the Russians, war in such remote territory was unpopular. Had the peace been concluded Napoleon would have reopened war a year later. But he was obdurate, to his own ruin; the negotiations fell to the ground (March 15th).

THE MARCH ON PARIS (1814 A.D.)

Operations were accordingly continued. Napoleon was now misled through information concerning a movement that had never been made; he believed that the whole allied army was marching upon Paris, and so he made one last misdirected march in which everything was lost. The courier had arrived with despatches announcing that the crown prince of Würtemberg, afterwards King William I, with the advance guard of the grand army, was marching upon Paris—which was a complete falsehood. To outflank Prince Schwarzenberg Napoleon now held to be impossible, for he calculated that even by forced marches he could no longer reach Paris, so he wished to make a demonstration in order to compel his enemy to turn back. His position was such that he could touch the army of Schwarzenberg on its lines of communication, and, as he believed that it would not fail to answer his diversion by a retrogressive movement, he directed his march in order to set this in motion. The French peasants in his rear were everywhere in a state of rebellion and had already done the army great harm. The mistake of the allies was a different one; they believed that he intended to cross the Rhine and invade Germany. At first there was a desire on the part of the invaders to break up their camps and return. It was represented, however, that this would lead to nothing; Napoleon would have been everywhere before them, everything would be for him and against them. So it was determined to march on Paris.

This decision was really taken, as we may see, because it was not known what else to do. Wintzingerode was despatched on its execution; the great army moved forward. Meanwhile Blücher had remained north of the Marne; on receiving the news of the advance he went to Meaux. Napoleon had issued instructions to two army corps between Aube and Marne to follow him and to accompany him to Lorraine. But these corps were for the most part newly formed troops; they encountered the Russian corps of Wintzingerode at La Fère Champenoise (March 25th) and were totally defeated; Marmont's corps alone escaped for the most part and plunged towards Paris. There was no doubt now that a march must be made on Paris.

The national guard in Paris was armed; a few outworks were raised and Montmartre was easy to hold. The French adopted the proper and worthy decision of defending their capital. Public sentiment was already much inflamed against Napoleon. As his luck turned, all abandoned him; his own creatures had but one thought—to extricate themselves and to secure peace. Already, at Erfurt, Talleyrand had caused secret revelations to be made to the emperor Alexander, in which was apparent a desire that Napoleon's ambition should be pacified. The discontent that prevailed was extraordinary. In the year 1811 there had been a famine in France, and prices rose in 1812. Taxes were very high; the public treasury, hitherto a model of punctual payment, was in debt; there was a rush on the bank, which could not continue payment. The feeling of bitterness against Napoleon ran particularly high in Paris. A general ill will was felt towards him; he was constantly alluded to as "*cet homme*." This had already been the state of affairs in 1812; in the beginning

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of 1813 there had been a slight rally, but even before the battle of Leipsic the discontent had returned. Before, there had been parties for and against; now, all were against him. Yet the French, a brave nation, would not abandon their capital without a struggle, and to defend Paris could be no such difficult matter. Of course it might be destroyed; but no one would have wished to do this.

Unhappily Joseph, who had the command in Paris, was an incapable man, and there was treason on more sides than one: Monsieur de Vitrolles had already appeared at Talleyrand's suggestion in the headquarters of the allies. Napoleon's operations were certainly admirably conducted; he informed himself concerning the forces of the allies, but he neglected all opportunity of influencing the temper of the French. Certainly his words would have been all-powerful; had he roused in the Parisians their feeling of honour, they would have defended themselves as fiercely as the men of Saragossa. But he treated everything as a subject for command; resembling in this the earlier "legitimate" princes, as they were called. He had sacrificed all the weight of moral influence, or else was afraid to exercise it.

So it came to pass that on the 30th of March the heights of Paris were taken, after some loss had been sustained; Montmartre was stormed to the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets. The national guard drew back, and the town would have been immediately entered (for it had erected no regular defences), had it not been deemed preferable to conclude a treaty, which in the case of a town of seven hundred thousand inhabitants was a wise proceeding. This was the work of the army of the north; the southern army had no share in it. The allies were now masters of Paris, but what to do was a problem involved in a growing obscurity.

Napoleon again showed to what a pitiful extent he had lost his sanity. He had to turn southward towards Lyons; here he was able to attach to himself the corps of Augereau, and then he had again to cross the Alps. In Italy the army of the viceroy was intact, and all Lombardy declared in his favour. He was more popular in Italy than in France; the Italians were quite transformed; their constant cry was, "*Non è Francese, è nostro.*" In Carinthia and Carniola the Austrians had certainly performed admirable movements under Hiller; they had driven the viceroy across the Mincio; but here he maintained his ground. Had Napoleon made for Italy he would have pursued a wild game, but he could not have cut a worse figure than he did; he had nothing to lose and everything to win. Had he known how to work upon the sentiment of the people he would still have got through the spring. But it was as if his genius had absolutely forsaken him; he had become a dreamer.

He had reckoned that Paris would resist until he appeared, and so he proceeded to Paris. His soldiers were terribly harassed by these forced marches; they lay strewn on the roads by the hundreds, and this time he allowed himself to be driven, instead of riding on horseback at their head—an omission which cost him incredible loss of prestige with his soldiers, who did everything only for his sake. He returned too late; at Fontainebleau he learned that Paris was in the power of the allies; and he remained with his shattered army in Fontainebleau with that incredible folly which characterised his conduct in adversity: because good advice was hard to buy, he did nothing. The moment had not yet passed when the army might be stirred by an irresistible rhetorical appeal to their imagination and withdrawn to Lyons. Certainly Wellington was already advancing hard upon Toulouse in forced marches; but the battle had not yet been fought there, and he would have had to strain every nerve. In Italy Murat had shamelessly broken loose from him; he was offended, but he was offended because he wanted to be: he looked towards the throne on which he desired to remain, like Bernadotte on the

throne of Sweden. At Versailles Marmont agreed upon a convention with the allies, and stationed himself behind the allied army. It may be a hard thing to say of the adherents of Napoleon, but it is the right thing: he was despised by those who surrounded him in Fontainebleau—a natural fate for the man who abandons himself. In this way it became possible for the most devoted marshals whom he had promoted to honour, to end by themselves turning away from him and forcing him to resign. That he should have been given such favourable conditions defies explanation: he was allowed to retire to Elba with a large pension and promises concerning his family. People might well have supposed that this was a snare, that the result had been foreseen and intentionally provided for, were it not that such a supposition is incompatible with the incredible ruin in which everything was plunged on his reappearance.

The Count d'Artois now came to Paris; he became head of a provisional government committee (4th of May), acting as lieutenant of the kingdom. On the 4th of May, twenty-four years after the opening of the states-general, Louis XVIII came to Paris. But how changed was everything! The limit was fixed within which the charter had to be submitted; but it had already been perfected, and Louis did not submit it to discussion and offer it for acceptance, but presented it from the fulness of his supreme majesty.^k

THE FIRST PEACE OF PARIS (1814 A.D.)

On the 30th of May, 1814, peace was concluded at Paris. France was reduced to her limits of 1792, and consequently retained the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, of which she had, at an earlier period, deprived Germany. Not a farthing was paid by way of compensation for the ravages suffered by Germany, nay, the French prisoners of war were, on their release, maintained on their way home at the expense of the German population. None of the *chefs-d'œuvres* of which Europe had been plundered were restored, with the sole exception of the group of horses taken by Napoleon from the Brandenburg gate at Berlin. The allied troops instantly evacuated the country. France was allowed to regulate her internal affairs without the interference of any of the foreign powers, whilst paragraphs concerning the internal economy of Germany were not only admitted into the Treaty of Paris, and France was on that account not only called upon to guarantee and to participate in the internal affairs of Germany, but also afterwards sent to the great Congress of Vienna an ambassador destined to play an important part in the definitive settlement of the affairs of Europe, and more particularly, of those of Germany.

The patriots, of whom the governments had made use both before and after the war, unable to comprehend that the result of such immense exertions and of such a complete triumph should be to bring greater profit and glory to France than to Germany, and that their patriotism was, on the conclusion of the war, to be renounced, were loud in their complaints. But the revival of the German Empire, with which the individual interests of so many princely houses were plainly incompatible, was far from entering into the plans of the allied powers. An attempt made by any one among the princes to place himself at the head of the whole of Germany would have been frustrated by the rest. The policy of the foreign allies was moreover antipathetic to such a scheme. England opposed and sought to hinder unity in Germany, not only for the sake of retaining possession of Hanover and of exercising an influence over the disunited German princes similar to that exercised by her over the princes of India, but more particularly for that of ruling the commerce of Germany. Russia reverted to her Erfurt policy. Her interests, like those of France, led

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her to promote disunion among the German powers, whose weakness, the result of want of combination, placed them at the mercy of France, and left Poland, Sweden, and the East open to her ambition. A close alliance was in consequence instantly formed between the emperor Alexander and Louis XVIII, the former negotiating as the first condition of peace the continuance of Lorraine and Alsace beneath the sovereignty of France.

Austria assented on condition of Italy being placed exclusively beneath her control. Austria united too many and too diverse nations beneath her sceptre to be able to pursue a policy pre-eminently German, and found it more convenient to round off her territory by the annexation of upper Italy than by that of distant Lorraine, at all times a possession difficult to maintain. Prussia was too closely connected with Russia, and Hardenberg, unlike Blücher at the head of the Prussian army, was powerless at the head of Prussian diplomacy. The lesser states also exercised no influence upon Germany as a whole, and were merely intent upon preserving their individual integrity or upon gaining some petty advantage. The Germans, some few discontented patriots alone excepted, were more than ever devoted to their ancient princes, both to those who had retained their station and to those who returned to their respective territories on the fall of Napoleon; and the victorious soldiery, adorned with ribbons, medals, and orders (the Prussians, for instance, with the iron cross), evinced the same unreserved attachment to their prince and zeal for his individual interest. This complication of circumstances can alone explain the fact of Germany, although triumphant, having made greater concessions to France by the Treaty of Paris than, when humbled, by that of Westphalia.

From Paris the sovereigns of Prussia and Russia and the victorious field-marshal proceeded, in June, to London, where they, Blücher most particularly, were received with every demonstration of delight and respect by the English, their oldest and most faithful allies. From London, Frederick William went to Switzerland and took possession of his ancient hereditary territory, Wälsch-Neuenburg or Neuchâtel, visited the beautiful Bernese Oberland, and then returned to Berlin, where, on the 7th of August, he passed in triumph through the Brandenburg gate, which was again adorned with the car of victory and the fine group of horses, and rode through the lime trees to an altar, around which the clergy belonging to every religious sect were assembled. Here public thanks were given and the whole of the citizens present fell upon their knees. On the 17th of September, the preparation of a new liturgy was announced in a ministerial proclamation by which the solemnity of the church service was to be increased, the present one being too little calculated to excite or strike the imagination.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Towards autumn a great European congress, to which the settlement of every point in dispute and the restoration of order throughout Europe were to be committed, was convoked at Vienna. At this congress, which, in November of 1814 was opened at Vienna, the emperors of Austria and Russia, the kings of Prussia, Denmark, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and the greater part of the petty princes of Germany were present in person; the other powers were represented by ambassadors extraordinary. The greatest statesmen of that period were here assembled; amongst others, Metternich, the Austrian minister, Hardenberg and Humboldt, the Prussian ministers, Castlereagh, the English plenipotentiary, Nesselrode, the Russian envoy, Talleyrand and Dalberg, Gagern, Bernstorff, and Wrede, the ambassadors of France, Holland, Den-

mark, and Bavaria. The negotiations were of the utmost importance, for, although one of the most difficult points, the new regulation of affairs in France, was already settled, many extremely difficult questions still remained to be solved.^a

The congress was probably the most brilliant assembly that had ever gathered within the walls of Vienna; emperors, kings, and princes were so plentiful that Talleyrand was of opinion that the nimbus of monarchy would be dissipated. The mediatised princes also came, in the hope of restoration. In spite of his financial embarrassment, the emperor Francis was the most delightful of hosts; the congress cost him sixteen million gulden, and there were so many entertainments that the prince de Ligne said that the congress danced, but made no way. The order of business was settled on the 16th of September, 1814. Talleyrand dissolved the alliance between Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia without difficulty and secured a brilliant part for France to play. The czar favoured Prussia's desire for Saxony, that he might get Poland for himself; Talleyrand frustrated the plans of both and did all he could to create a feeble federal Germany. On March 7th, 1815, the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba fell upon the congress like a bomb; the allied princes stopped the withdrawal of their troops from France at once and armed for a fresh struggle; on the 13th of the same month Talleyrand drew up the blunt proscription launched by the eight powers against "Napoleon Bonaparte"; on the 25th the alliance of Chaumont, concluded between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia on March 9th, 1814, was again renewed, and diplomacy grew more intent than ever on concluding the work of the congress.

Metternich sought to secure the vital interests of Austria by the dismemberment of Germany and by checking German particularism, but he would never involve himself so deeply in German affairs as to oblige Austria to undertake hazardous duties or to expose her to German influence. Although he had talked to Münster about the imperial idea in December, 1814, he was equally averse to the notion of a German empire and of a Germany under the hegemony of Prussia; he held that the German states ought rather to coexist in complete autonomy, but nevertheless gave his assent to the views of his sovereign, which differed from his own, and favoured the formation of a confederation of independent and coequal German sovereigns under the presidency of Austria. Russia and Great Britain, like Austria, were ill-disposed to a strong Prussia, the minor German states were her natural enemies, and cared for nothing but their selfish interests. Nevertheless the prospect of a European war induced them to urge the long-delayed establishment of a German constitution, as Humboldt, Hardenberg, and Münster had ever done. Thereupon the remodelling of Europe was accomplished, and the final clauses of the Treaty of Vienna, preceded by the Act of Confederation, summed up the substance of all the other treaties.

FINAL CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF VIENNA OF JUNE 9TH, 1815

These were signed by Metternich and Wessenberg, Labrador, Talleyrand, Dalberg, Labour-du-Pin and Noailles, Castlereagh, Wellington, Cathcart and Stewart, Palmella, Saldanha and Silveira, Hardenberg and Humboldt, Razumovsky, Stackelberg and Nesselrode, and Lowenhielm. The greater part of Warsaw fell to Russia, and the czar assumed the title of king of Poland; but the grand duchy of Posen passed to Prussia and Wieliczka to Austria; the Poles in all three were promised a representative system of government and national institutions. Cracow became a republic under the protection of the

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three powers. Russia restored to Austria the portions of eastern Galicia she had conquered in 1809. Saxony made the sacrifices mentioned already. Prussia got back nearly all her old possessions between the Rhine and Elbe, with the addition of the duchy of Westphalia, the major part of the electorate of Cologne, the Nassau principalities of Diez, Siegen, Hadamar and Dillenburg, Wetzlar and the department of Fulda, and some departments on the Moselle and Maas; she received Swedish Pomerania from Denmark in exchange for Lauenburg; but ceded the see of Hildesheim, Goslar, East Friesland, inclusive of Harlingerland, the countship of lower Lingen and part of the see of Münster to Hanover, receiving in return part of the duchy of Lauenburg and a few administrative districts; and gave a district containing five thousand souls to Oldenburg. Oldenburg, the two Mecklenburgs, and Weimar assumed the style of grand duchies, Hanover became a kingdom. Prussia promised several districts to Weimar. Bavaria obtained the grand duchy of Würzburg and the principality of Aschaffenburg. Frankfort-on-the-Main became a free city with the same territory that it had held in 1803, and a member of the German Confederation; Hesse-Darmstadt gained one hundred and forty thousand subjects on the left bank of the Rhine; Hesse-Homburg regained everything that had been taken from it by the Act of the Rhenish Confederation; Coburg, Oldenburg, Strelitz, and Homburg each obtained ten thousand subjects in what had formerly been the department of the Saar; Isenburg came under the sovereignty of Austria, who ceded it to Darmstadt. In virtue of articles 53-57 the princes and free cities of Germany, inclusive of Austria and Prussia as far as the dominions which had formerly been part of the German Empire were concerned, Denmark as far as Holstein, and the Netherlands as far as Luxemburg were concerned, established the "German Confederation" in perpetuity, under the presidency of Austria, "for the purpose of maintaining the external and internal security of Germany and the independence and inviolability of the confederate states," which were all to enjoy equal rights within the confederation. The affairs of the confederation were to be directed by a Confederation Diet in which the plenipotentiaries were to vote singly touching the fundamental laws, the Act of Confederation (*Bundesacte*), etc., the diet was to meet in full session, and there Austria and the five German kingdoms were to have four votes apiece: Baden, the electorate of Hesse, Darmstadt, Holstein, and Luxemburg three; Brunswick, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Nassau two; and every other state of the confederation one; making sixty-nine in all (articles 4, 5, 6, 7 of the Final Act). This distribution of votes was afterwards taken as the standard for the present federal council (*Bundesrath*). The diet of the confederation was thus a permanent congress of ambassadors like the old diet of the empire. It was to sit at Frankfort from the 1st of September, 1815, onwards. By Article 63 the states pledged themselves to defend Germany against all attacks, guaranteed mutual assistance, and promised to enter into no negotiations with the enemy when once war had been declared. They also pledged themselves not to make war upon one another, but to refer their disputes to the diet of the confederation. Holland and Belgium were handed over to the house of Orange, as being the reigning dynasty of the Netherlands, and Luxemburg and Limburg were likewise added to its dominions; the integrity of Switzerland was guaranteed, the new cantons of Valais, Geneva, and Neuchâtel were added to it; the see of Bâle and the town of Biel fell to the canton of Bern; Sardinia obtained Genoa, Capraja, and the so-called imperial fiefs. Austria reassumed possession of Istria, Dalmatia, the islands of the Adriatic which had formerly belonged to Venice, the Gulf of Cattaro, Venice, the lagoons, the *terra firma* of the ancient republic of Venice, the duchies of Milan and Mantua, the principality of Trent, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Friuli, Montefalcone. Trieste, Car-

niola, upper Carinthia, Croatia on the right bank of the Save, Fiume, the Hungarian littoral, and Castua, and added the Valtelline, Bormio, Chiavenna, and the former republic of Ragusa to her dominions between the Ticino, the Po, and the Adriatic. The emperor Francis established the kingdoms of Illyria and Lombardy and Venice. The Austrian house of Este obtained Modena, Reggio, Mirandola, Massa, Carrara, and the imperial fiefs in Lunigiana; Tuscany fell to the archduke Ferdinand; Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to Napoleon's consort; Lucca to the Bourbons of "Etruria"; the pope and the king of the Two Sicilies regained their former possessions. Navigation was to be free along the various rivers which intersected all these countries and the slave-trade was to be abolished.

All other schemes for the remodelling of Germany were thrown overboard; Austria had conquered and riveted the fetters of the German Confederation on the German people. It was a league, an international union of sovereign states, an alliance of governments independent of the participation of the people, an instrument of Austria for repressing Prussia; and it mediated the German nation. The secondary states which Napoleon had created would have preferred at first not to enter into it, but to remain in the position of independent European powers; they flatly repudiated any limitation of their sovereign prerogatives, and resolved rather to bestow constitutions on their subjects out of pure magnanimity than to be compelled to do so by the confederation. The people regarded the result of the protracted negotiations with chill indifference or outspoken indignation; most of the German governments were ill content. A few "special dispositions" were added to those mentioned in the Final Act of Vienna, the most important of them being paragraph 13: "There shall be assemblies of estates in all countries belonging to the confederation." The circumstance that the first eleven articles of the Act of Confederation (*Bundesacte*) were guaranteed by the Final Act (*Schlussacte*) of Vienna subsequently gave rise to unjustifiable pretensions on the part of foreign powers to a European right of wardship over the confederation.¹

THE HOLY ALLIANCE (1815 A.D.)

Besides the territorial regulations, the general interests of the peoples were assigned but a modest sphere. The rulers themselves seem to have felt that these bald dispositions concerning restored thrones and exchanged provinces were out of proportion to the sacrifices made, and that too sharp a contrast existed between the enthusiastic spirit with which the struggle had opened and the disillusionment which all must feel at the results of the Vienna Congress. It was as though something must be done to give to the idealistic impulse of the period just past—and which was still affecting men's minds—if not good deeds, at least good words, and to nourish the first hopes with new ones. This spirit gave birth to that wonderful politico-religious alliance or programme, which, on the 26th of September, 1815, as the treaty of the Holy Alliance, was signed by the monarchs of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, without consultation with any minister.

The preamble to this document says that the three monarchs would scrupulously practise, both in the government of their states and in their foreign policy, the Christian principles of justice, clemency, and peace; the tenor of the three following articles was that the three monarchs would accordingly act towards and support one another as brothers, and would also rule their peoples—their peoples and armies is the extraordinary expression used—paternally in the same spirit of brotherhood; that accordingly they exhorted their peoples likewise to confirm themselves daily in the exercise of the Christian duties, in

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harmony with the one Christian religion, which they, the monarchs, representatives of its three chief forms, expressly recognised as the one true religion. At the same time they summoned to join this Holy Alliance all sovereigns who were of the same mind as themselves, with the exception of the sultan, who it could not be supposed would profess the Christian religion, and of the pope, who could not well join with schismatic and heretic princes in an alliance whose theological basis was of doubtful orthodoxy and would not entirely agree with the teaching of the one infallible church, of which he believed himself to be the head. Most of the princes joined: the English government acquiesced in the principles enunciated, in which, indeed, if they were adhered to, there was not much to object; but a formal accession to a treaty which was no treaty it refused.

In the times of dejection and disappointment which now followed, this Holy Alliance was treated as a secret, absolutist conspiracy against the securing to the people of constitutional rights, and it has been affirmed that it was meant from the very first in this spirit; similarly malicious voices have referred to the good intentions with which, according to the proverb, the road to hell is said to be paved. This condemnation on the part of an embittered age is just neither to the emperor Alexander, from whom the idea proceeded, and who was a high-minded, tender-hearted man, very accessible to religious sentiments; nor towards the king of Prussia, in whom misfortune and the heavy sacrifices entailed by the war had increased the religiosity which had always lain in his nature; nor to the emperor Francis, to whom it cost little to make a confession of so general a character, which after all accommodated itself to any policy quite as well as the revolutionary doctrine of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The same hard and condemnatory judgment as was passed on this, its coping stone, was meted out to the whole work of the Vienna Congress. It may be that here and there serious business suffered from the festivities; it may be that ill will, a petty spirit, frivolity, and every kind of trifling were active enough to spoil the work; but even the best will and the most earnest spirit, which were not lacking, would have found it difficult, in face of the enormity of the task, to effect more than the congress, such as it was, effected: namely, a new external form and arrangement of the European system. This the congress accomplished, no more; but if, on the one hand, it could get no more out of the great epoch, yet, on the other hand, neither could it prevent the effects on the future existence of Europe, which followed of themselves from the events of that great period."

THE RETURN AND DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON (1815 A.D.)

Meantime in France and Belgium the final struggle with Napoleon had been carried on to his ruin.^a The disputes in the congress had raised Napoleon's hopes. In France his party was still powerful, almost the whole of the population being blindly devoted to him, and an extensive conspiracy for his restoration to the imperial throne was secretly set on foot. Several thousands of his veteran soldiery had been released from foreign durance; the whole of the military stores, the spoil of Europe, still remained in the possession of France; the fortresses were garrisoned solely with French troops; Elba was close at hand, and the emperor was guarded with criminal negligence.

It was on the 1st of March, 1815, that Napoleon again set foot on the coast of France. He was accompanied by merely fifteen hundred men, but the whole of the troops sent against him by Louis XVIII ranged themselves beneath his eagle. He passed, as if in triumph, through his former empire. The whole nation received him with acclamations of delight. Not a single

Frenchman shed a drop of blood for the Bourbon, who fled hastily to Ghent; and on the 20th of March Napoleon entered Paris unopposed. His brother-in-law, Murat, at the same time revolted at Naples and advanced into upper Italy against the Austrians. But all the rest of Napoleon's ancient allies, persuaded that he must again fall, either remained tranquil or formed a close alliance with the combined powers. The Swiss, in particular, showed excessive zeal on this occasion, and took up arms against France in the hope of rendering the allied sovereigns favourable to their new constitution. The Swiss regiments, which had passed from Napoleon's service to that of Louis XVIII, also remained unmoved by Napoleon's blandishments, were deprived of their arms, and returned separately to Switzerland.

The allied sovereigns who were assembled at Vienna at once allowed every dispute to drop in order to form a fresh and closer coalition. They declared Napoleon an outlaw, a robber, proscribed by all Europe, and bound themselves to bring a force more than a million strong into the field against him. All Napoleon's cunning attempts to bribe and set them at variance were treated with scorn, and the combined powers speedily came to an understanding on the points hitherto so strongly contested. Saxony was partitioned between her ancient sovereign and Prussia, and a revolt that broke out in Liège among the Saxon troops, who were by command of Prussia to be divided before they had been released from their oath of allegiance to their king, is easily explained by the hurry and pressure of the times, which caused all minor considerations to be forgotten. Napoleon exclusively occupied the mind of every diplomatist, and all agreed upon the necessity, at all hazards, of his utter annihilation. The lion, thus driven at bay, turned upon his pursuers for a last and desperate struggle. The French were still faithful to Napoleon, who, with a view of reinspiring them with the enthusiastic spirit that had rendered them invincible in the first days of the republic, again called forth the old republicans, nominated them to the highest appointments, re-established several republican institutions, and, on the 1st of June, presented to his dazzled subjects the magnificent spectacle of a field of May, as in the times of Charlemagne and in the commencement of the Revolution, and then led a numerous and spirited army to the Dutch frontiers against the enemy.

Here stood a Prussian army under Blücher, and an Anglo-German one under Wellington, comprehending the Dutch under the prince of Orange, the Brunswickers under their duke, the recruited Hanoverian legion under Walmoden. These *corps d'armée* most imminently threatened Paris. The main body of the allied army under Schwarzenberg, then advancing from the south, was still distant. Napoleon consequently directed his first attack against the former two. His army had gained immensely in strength and spirit by the return of his veteran troops from foreign imprisonment. Wellington, ignorant at what point Napoleon might cross the frontier, had followed the old and ill-judged plan of dividing his forces; an incredible error, the allies having simply to unite their forces and to take up a firm position in order to draw Napoleon to any given spot. Napoleon afterwards observed in his memoirs that he had attacked Blücher first because he well knew that Blücher would not be supported by the over-prudent and egotistical English commander, but that Wellington, had he been first attacked, would have received every aid from his high-spirited and faithful ally. The duke of Brunswick, with impatience equalling that of Blücher, was the only one who had quitted the ball during the night and had hurried forward against the enemy. Napoleon gained time to throw himself between Wellington and Blücher and to prevent their junction; for he knew the spirit of his opponents. He consequently opposed merely a small division of his army under Ney to the English and turned with the whole of his main body against the Prussians. The veteran

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Blücher perceived his intentions and in consequence urgently demanded aid from the duke of Wellington, who promised to send him a reinforcement of twenty thousand men by four o'clock on the 16th. But this aid did not arrive. Wellington retired with superior forces before Ney at Quatre Bras.

THE BATTLES OF LIGNY AND WATERLOO

Blücher meanwhile yielded to the overwhelming force brought against him by Napoleon at Ligny, also on the 16th of June. Vainly did the Prussians rush to the attack beneath the murderous fire of the French, vainly did Blücher in person head the assault and for five hours continue the combat hand to hand in the village of Ligny. Numbers prevailed, and, the infantry being at length driven back, Blücher led the cavalry once more to the charge, but was repulsed and fell senseless beneath his horse, which was shot dead. His adjutant, Count Nostitz, alone remained at his side. The French cavalry passed close by without perceiving them, twilight and a misty rain having begun to fall. The Prussians fortunately missed their leader, repulsed the French cavalry, which again galloped past him as he lay on the ground, and he was at length drawn from beneath his horse. He still lived, but only to behold the complete defeat of his army.

Blücher, although a veteran of seventy-three and wounded and shattered by his fall, was not for a moment discouraged. Ever vigilant, he assembled his scattered troops with wonderful rapidity, inspirited them by his cheerful words, and had the generosity to promise aid, by the afternoon of the 18th of June, to Wellington, who was now in his turn attacked by the main body of the French under Napoleon. Blücher consequently fell back upon Wavre in order to remain as close as possible in Wellington's vicinity, and also sent orders to Bülow's corps, that was then on the advance, to join the English army, whilst Napoleon, in the idea that Blücher was falling back upon the Maas, sent Grouchy in pursuit with a body of thirty-five thousand men.

Napoleon, far from imagining that the Prussians, after having been, as he supposed, completely annihilated or panic-stricken by Grouchy, could aid the British, wasted the precious moments, instead of hastily attacking Wellington.

At length, about mid-day, Napoleon gave orders for the attack, and, furiously charging the British left wing, drove it from the village of Hougomont. He then sent orders to Ney to charge the British centre. At that moment a dark spot was seen in the direction of St. Lambert. Was it Grouchy? A reconnoitring party was despatched and returned with the news of its being the Prussians under Bülow. The attack upon the British centre was consequently remanded, and Ney was despatched with a considerable portion of his troops against Bülow. Wellington now ventured to charge the enemy with his right wing, but was repulsed and lost the farm of La Haye Sainte, which commanded his position on this side as Hougomont did on his right. His centre, however, remained unattacked, the French exerting their utmost strength to keep Bülow's gallant troops back at the village of Planchenoit, where the battle raged with the greatest fury, and a dreadful conflict of some hours' duration ensued hand to hand. But, about five o'clock, the left wing of the British being completely thrown into confusion by a fresh attack on the enemy's side, the whole of the French cavalry, twelve thousand strong, made a furious charge upon the British centre, bore down all before them, and took a great number of guns. The prince of Orange was wounded. The road to Brussels was already thronged with the fugitive English troops, and Wellin-

ton, scarcely able to keep his weakened lines together, was apparently on the brink of destruction, when the thunder of artillery was suddenly heard in the direction of Wavre. "It is Grouchy!" joyfully exclaimed Napoleon, who had repeatedly sent orders to that general to push forward with all possible speed. But it was not Grouchy; it was Blücher.

The faithful troops of the veteran marshal (the old Silesian army) were completely worn out by the battle, by their retreat in the heavy rain over deep roads, and by the want of food. The distance from Wavre, whence they had been driven, to Waterloo, where Wellington was then in action, was not great, but was rendered arduous owing to these circumstances. The men sometimes fell down from extreme weariness, and the guns stuck fast in the deep mud. But Blücher was everywhere present, and notwithstanding his bodily pain ever cheered his men forwards, with "indescribable pathos" saying to his disheartened soldiers, "My children, we must advance; I have promised it—do not cause me to break my word!" Whilst still distant from the scene of action, he ordered the guns to be fired in order to keep up the courage of the English, and at length, between six and seven in the evening, the first Prussian corps in advance, that of Zieten, fell furiously upon the enemy. "Bravo!" cried Blücher, "I know you, my Silesians; to-day we shall see the backs of these French rascals!"

Zieten filled up the space still intervening between Wellington and Bülow. Exactly at that moment, Napoleon had sent his old guard forward in four massive squares in order to make a last attempt to break the British lines, when Zieten fell upon their flank and dealt fearful havoc among their close masses with his artillery. Bülow's troops, inspirited by this success, now pressed gallantly forward and finally regained the long-contested village of Planchenoit from the enemy. The whole of the Prussian army, advancing at the double and with drums beating, had already driven back the right wing of the French, when the English, regaining courage, advanced, Napoleon was surrounded on two sides, and the whole of his troops, the old guard under General Cambronne alone excepted, were totally dispersed and fled in complete disorder. The old guard, surrounded by Bülow's cavalry, nobly replied, when challenged to surrender, "*La garde ne se rend pas*"; and in a few minutes the veteran conquerors of Europe fell beneath the righteous and avenging blows of their antagonists. At the farm of *La Belle Alliance* Blücher offered his hand to Wellington. "I will sleep to-night in Bonaparte's last night's quarters," said Wellington. "And I will drive him out of his present ones!" replied Blücher.

The Prussians, fired by enthusiasm, forgot the fatigues they had for four days endured, and, favoured by a moonlight night, so zealously pursued the French that an immense number of prisoners and a vast amount of booty fell into their hands and Napoleon narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. At Genappe, where the bridge was blocked by fugitives, the pursuit was so close that he was compelled to abandon his carriage, leaving his sword and hat behind him. Blücher, who reached the spot a moment afterwards, took possession of the booty, sent Napoleon's hat, sword, and star to the king of Prussia, retained his cloak, telescope, and carriage for his own use, and gave up everything else, including a quantity of the most valuable jewellery, gold, and money, to his brave soldiery. The whole of the army stores, two hundred and forty guns, and an innumerable quantity of arms thrown away by the fugitives fell into his hands.

The Prussian general, Thielmann, who, with a few troops, had remained behind at Wavre in order, at great hazard, to deceive Grouchy into the belief that he was still opposed by Blücher's entire force, acted a lesser but equally honourable part on this great day. He fulfilled his commission with great

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skill, and so completely deceived Grouchy as to hinder his making a single attempt to throw himself in the way of the Prussians on the Paris road.

Blücher pushed forwards without a moment's delay, and on the 29th of June stood before Paris. Napoleon had, meanwhile, a second time abdicated, and had fled from Paris in the hope of escaping across the seas. Davout, the ancient instrument of his tyranny, who commanded in Paris, attempting to make terms of capitulation with Blücher, was sharply answered, "You want to make a defence? Take care what you do. You well know what license the irritated soldiery will take if your city must be taken by storm. Do you wish to add the sack of Paris to that of Hamburg, already loading your conscience?" Paris surrendered after a severe engagement at Issy, and Muffling, the Prussian general, was placed in command of the city, July 7th, 1815. It was on the occasion of a grand banquet given by Wellington shortly after the occupation of Paris by the allied troops that Blücher gave the celebrated toast, "May the pens of diplomatists not again spoil all that the swords of our gallant armies have so nobly won!"

Schwarzenberg had in the interim also penetrated into France, and the crown prince of Würtemberg had defeated General Rapp at Strasburg and had surrounded that fortress. The Swiss, under General Bachmann, who had, although fully equipped for the field, hitherto prudently watched the turn of events, invaded France immediately after the battle of Waterloo, pillaged Burgundy, besieged and took the fortress of Hüningen, which, with the permission of the allies, they razed to the ground, the French having thence fired upon the bridges of Bâle which lay close in its vicinity. A fresh Austrian army under Frimont advanced from Italy as far as Lyons. On the 17th of July, Napoleon surrendered himself in the bay of Rochefort to the English, whose ships prevented his escape; he moreover preferred falling into their hands rather than into those of the Prussians. The whole of France submitted to the triumphant allies, and Louis XVIII was reinstated on his throne. Murat had also been simultaneously defeated at Tolentino in Italy by the Austrians under Bianchi, and Ferdinand IV had been restored to the throne of Naples. Murat fled to Corsica, but his retreat to France was prevented by the success of the allies, and in his despair he, with native rashness, yielded to the advice of secret intriguers and returned to Italy with a design of raising a popular insurrection, but was seized on landing, and shot on the 13th of October.


Blücher was greatly inclined to give full vent to his rage against Paris. The bridge of Jena, one of the numerous bridges across the Seine, the principal object of his displeasure, was, curiously enough, saved from destruction (he had already attempted to blow it up) by the arrival of the king of Prussia. His proposal to punish France by partitioning the country and thus placing it on a par with Germany was far more practical in its tendency.

THE SECOND TREATY OF PARIS (NOVEMBER 20TH, 1815)

This honest veteran had in fact a deeper insight into affairs than the most wary diplomatists. In 1815 the same persons as in 1814 met in Paris, and similar interests were agitated. Foreign jealousy again effected the conclusion of this peace at the expense of Germany and in favour of France. Blücher's influence at first reigned supreme. The king of Prussia, who, together with the emperors of Russia and Austria, revisited Paris, took Stein and Gruner into his council. The crown prince of Würtemberg also zealously exerted himself in favour of the reunion of Lorraine and Alsace with Germany. But Russia and England beholding the reintegration of Germany with displeasure, Austria, and finally Prussia, against whose patriots all were in league, yielded. The future destinies of Europe were settled on the side of

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England by Wellington and Castlereagh; on that of Russia by Prince John Razumowsky, Nesselrode, and Capo d'Istria; on that of Austria by Metternich and Wessenberg; on that of Prussia by Hardenberg and William von Humboldt. The German patriots were excluded from the discussion, and a result extremely unfavourable to Germany naturally followed: Alsace and Lorraine remained annexed to France. By the second Treaty of Paris which was definitively concluded on the 20th of November, 1815, France was merely compelled to give up the fortresses of Philippeville, Marienbourg, Saarlouis, and Landau, to demolish Hüningen, and to allow eighteen other fortresses on the German frontier to be occupied by the allies until the new government had taken firm footing in France. Until then, 150,000 of the allied troops were also to remain within the French territory and to be maintained at the expense of the people. France was, moreover, condemned to pay 700,000,000 francs towards the expenses of the war and to restore the *chef-d'œuvres* of which she had deprived every capital in Europe. The sword of Frederick the Great was not refound: Marshal Serurier declared that he had burned it. The Invalids had in the same spirit cast the triumphal monument of the field of Rossbach into the Seine, in order to prevent its restoration. The alarum formerly belonging to Frederick the Great was also missing. Napoleon had it on his person during his flight and made use of it at St. Helena, where it struck his death-hour. On the other hand, however, almost all the famous old German manuscripts which had formerly been carried from Heidelberg to Rome, and thence by Napoleon to Paris, were sent back to Heidelberg. One of the most valuable, the Manessian Code of the Swabian Minnesingers, was left in Paris, where it had been concealed. Blücher expired, in 1819, on his estate in Silesia.^d





CHAPTER VII

ASPECTS OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CULTURE

The German plains were the scene in which all nations engaged in mortal conflict. Situated in the centre of Europe, and too much divided into separate dominions to be able then to repel aggression by their native strength, the German states have alternately been the prey of internal discord and the theatre of external aggression. Such a state of things is inconsistent with the growth of a national literature, which, though it is often stimulated by the excitement and passions of war, can take root and flourish only amidst the tranquillity and enjoyments of peace. Religious freedom was extinguished in Germany by the victory of the White Mountain near Prague; and it never acquired domestic peace till the victories of Eugene and Marlborough had tamed for a season the ambition of France, and those of Frederick the Great had secured the independence of northern Germany.

That science had made great progress during the Middle Ages in Germany, the land which gave the art of printing and the discovery of gunpowder to the world, need be told to none at all acquainted with these subjects; and on the revival of letters she took an honourable place both in scholarship and the exact sciences. The country of Scaliger and Erasmus will ever be dear to the lover of classical literature. But the intellect of Germany at this period, bred in cloisters and nourished by the study of classical literature or the exact sciences, was entirely of a learned caste. Its productions were, for the most part, written in Latin, and addressed only to scholars. Its national literature did not arise till the middle of the eighteenth century.—ALISON.^b

THE course of literary life in the eighteenth century was an almost uninterrupted progression; in it we can distinguish three grades, each of which rises considerably above its predecessor. The first division reaches to 1750; the advance which was already traceable in the last decades of the seventeenth century continues in this period; individual retarding elements do not succeed in stopping the progress of the development. In the centre of the second division, which lasts till the beginning of the seventies, stand the first three of the six great new high-German poets, of whom Klopstock bestows on German poetry a forcible turn of poetic expression and elevation of sentiment; Lessing, fine logical arrangement of language and consistent sequence of thought development; Wieland, perfect grace. Then, after a short process of fermentation,

the new German poetry enters under Herder's guidance on the highest stage of its development, the age of Goethe and Schiller.^c

In the second half of the eighteenth century, poetry, science, the entire intellectual and literary life of the nation received such a mighty impetus that the productions of the Germans, whether in the field of the imagination or of mental activity, ranked with those of the English and French. In fact, they were often in advance in respect to depth, versatility, and genius. Men of the highest talents in various directions entered new paths, and, partly by attacking and vanquishing superannuated errors, prejudices, and false ideas, partly by inspired creations in the field of poetry or science, laid the foundations for a height of culture almost unequalled in modern history. Germany also lived through an epoch of reforms and revolutions, in which, however, the only weapons were those of the intellect, and where the highest goal to be striven for was the idea of culture and the refinement of humanity. Poetry and the taste for art progressed most rapidly of all, so that poetic culture stood at the head; philosophy and religion were allied with poetry; imagination and sentiment, the true foundations of poetry, were also carried over into the realm of science. The greatest minds of the nation devoted their talents to poetry.^c

KLOPSTOCK AND WIELAND

Far before German contemporary poets stands the German Homer, Klopstock. He it was who, by the powerful influence of his *Messiah* and his odes, established the supremacy of the antique taste; not, however, in defiance of German and Christian associations, but rather to their advantage. Religion and patriotism were with him the highest of all conceptions; but, in reference to the form in which they should be exhibited, he considered that of ancient



KLOPSTOCK
(1724-1803)

Greece the most perfect, and thought that he could unite the greatest beauty of substance with the greatest beauty of form by praising Christianity and Germanism when attired in the garb of Greece: a strange error, certainly, yet one which arose very naturally from the strange character of the progress of social development which characterised his age. It is true, indeed, that England exercised a considerable influence upon Klopstock, for his *Messiah* is a mere pendant to Milton's *Paradise Lost*; but Klopstock must not, on that account, be called a mere imitator of an Englishman; the services which he performed in behalf of German poetry are as peculiar as they are great. He repressed, by means of his Greek hexameters and with other Sapphic, Alcaic, and iambic classical metres, the French Alexandrines and doggerel verses which had hitherto been in vogue.

But Klopstock did more than this: though in form a Greek, he was, and wished to be, in spirit a true German; and he it was who introduced that patriotic enthusiasm, that reverence for everything German, which against all the new fashions that have arisen since his time has never disappeared, but, on

[1750-1800 A.D.]

the contrary, has often in its opposition to everything foreign been carried to an unjust and absurd height. However strange it may at first sound to hear him, the child of the French peruke period (*Perückenzeit*), styling himself a bard in his Alcaic verses, thus commingling heterogeneous periods, the modern, the antique, and the old-Teutonic, yet this was the commencement of that proud and manly confidence which urged on German poetry to cast off its foreign fetters and to lay aside that humiliating attitude which it had preserved even after the Peace of Westphalia. It was indeed necessary that someone should come who could smite his breast with his hand and exclaim, "I am a German!" His poetry, like his patriotism, was deeply rooted in that lofty moral and religious belief upon which such lustre was shed by his *Messiah*; and it was he who, next to Gellert, imparted to modern German poetry that dignified, serious, and pious character which it has retained in spite of all its excesses of fancy and wit.

It was Wieland who transplanted into German woods and Gothic cities the light and graceful spirit of Athens, though not without considerable admixture of the levity and playfulness of the French genius. Wieland combined in his own person the Gallomania and Grecomania. He was brought up in the former; he passed at an after period into the latter; yet he perceived how narrow was the path pursued by Klopstock and Voss; he led the Germans from their pompous stiffness back to the successful and easy motions of the graces of France and Greece. The German muse, moving with graceful, cheerful freedom in the days of *Minnezeit* (love-time), attired by the meistersingers in starched linen, disguised in a periwig and hoop-petticoat after the Thirty Years' War, no longer knew what to do with her hands, but continued to play lackadaisically with her fan.^f

Whatever may be the excellences of Wieland and Klopstock, both are essentially writers of the past. This cannot be said of Lessing, the third great German of this period; he is still a living influence. He is, indeed, the only writer before Goethe whom Germans can now read without feeling themselves in a world foreign to their sympathies. Throughout his career he strove to renew and fructify the intellectual life of his nation, and he achieved his aim by important creative activity, and by the clearest, freest, and most drastic criticism of the eighteenth century.^g

LESSING

Lessing combined in himself the study and culture of all the schools of his age; so that he passed through the Gallomania, the Grecomania, and the Anglomania, like the sun passing through the zodiac, without sacrificing any of



WIELAND
(1733-1813)

its freedom, and without inclining either to the right or to the left, but pursuing nobly his own course. In that age of foreign influences and of clashing tastes, great poets could not spring up as from the earth; they had to struggle with herculean strength through a circle of foreign hindrances, which both bewildered them and led them astray; they were forced to open up a path for themselves, by means of a sound, comprehensive, and incorruptible criticism. This was the reason that Lessing combined the critical with the poetical power, that the armed Pallas loved to walk side by side with him! He exercised this criticism in many and various fields—in those of theology, philosophy, philology, the history of art and literature, as well as in that of poetry. He opposed the unlicked rudeness, the gross fanaticism, and the spiritless pedantry of a cold faith, in his celebrated controversy regarding the *Wolfenbüttel Fragmente*, in which he avoided falling into the extreme of complete unbelief, as his excellent *Nathan* shows.

He exercised a no less important influence upon the rise and progress of profound comprehensive study and also of a better taste in philology; and, through his intercourse with Winckelmann, upon the revival of the fine arts. As soon, however, as he directed his attention principally to poetry, he became the true Hercules Musagetes, the vanquisher of all the remaining fragments of the Gallomania, and of all the prolixity and tedium inseparably connected with it, as well as the trusty Eckart before the Venusberg of the modern sentimentality and poetical licentiousness—to which, however, the gates and doors have, since his time, been opened. If we examine what relation he bore to the older and younger schools of his day, we find that he always saw the faults which they committed with the clearest eye, and pointed them out in the most decided language. No one could point out with such far-reaching acuteness as Lessing the difference between the true antique and its French caricature; and to him are the Germans indebted for being the first to purify their stage from the starched French Alexandrines and, above all, their language from its turgid and bombastic style. Even before the appearance of the Grecomaniacs, before Voss or Klopstock, Lessing had entered the lists; he was, however, far from making common cause with them. He did not rescue the antique from the French bombast merely to give it up to the German pedants. The Grecomania was as disgusting to him as Gallomania—a fact which he never attempted to conceal.^f

HEINE ON THE WRITERS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Lessing was the literary Arminius who freed our theatre from foreign rule. He demonstrated the vanity, the absurdity, and the bad taste of those imitations of the French drama which themselves had followed the Greek. But not only by his criticism was he the founder of a modern German original literature, but by his own works of art as well. This man followed all intellectual tendencies, all phases of life, with enthusiasm and disinterestedness. Art, theology, archæology, poetry, dramatic criticism, history—all were pursued by him with the same zeal and for the same end. In all his works lives the same great social ideal, the same progressive humanity, the same religion of reason of which he was the John the Baptist and of which we are still looking for the Messiah. He preached this religion always, but unfortunately he was often alone and in the desert; and, besides, he did not possess the art of turning stones into bread—the greater part of his life he spent in poverty and want.

That is a curse which weighs on nearly all great spirits among the Germans, and perhaps will not be abolished except by political liberty. Lessing was politically inclined more than anyone suspected, a characteristic which is

[1750-1800 A.D.]

found in none of his contemporaries. Only now do we perceive what he meant by his despotism of twelve in *Emilia Galotti*. In his day he was regarded only as a champion of intellectual liberty and as an opponent of clerical intolerance, for his theological works were easier to understand. The fragments *Ueber Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, which Eugène Rodrigue has translated into French, may perhaps give that nation some idea of the comprehensive breadth of Lessing's intellect. The two critical works which have exercised the greatest influence on art are his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* and his *Laokoon, oder über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie*. His most prominent dramatic works are *Emilia Galotti*, *Minna von Barnhelm*, and *Nathan der Weise*.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was born at Kamenz in Lusatia on January 22nd, 1729, and died at Brunswick on February 15th, 1781. He was a complete man, who, while he attacked the old with his disastrous criticism, at the same time created something new and better. "He was," says a German writer, "like those pious Jews who were often disturbed by the attacks of the enemy while they were building the second temple, and who finally fought with one hand while they built on the house of God with the other."

Another writer who worked in the same spirit and for the same ends and who may be called Lessing's direct successor, was Johann Gottfried von Herder, who was born at Mohrungen in East Prussia in 1744, and who died at Weimar in Saxony in the year 1803.

Although Lessing gave a mighty blow to the imitation of the borrowed French Hellenism, he himself, by pointing out the real works of art in Grecian antiquity, created in a way a new kind of foolish imitation. By his opposition of religious superstition he advanced the sober desire for enlightenment which spread in Berlin and which had its chief organ in Nicolai and its arsenal in the General German Library. The most deplorable mediocrity then began, more stubbornly than ever, to show itself, and emptiness and vanity puffed themselves up like the frog in the fable.

One is very much mistaken if one believes that Goethe, who had already appeared at that time, was as yet universally recognised. His *Götz von Berlichingen* and his *Werther* were hailed with enthusiasm, but so also were the works of the most common bunglers, and Goethe was given only a very small niche in the temple of literature. As has been said, the public received the *Götz* and the *Werther* with enthusiasm, but more on account of the subject matter than because of artistic excellence, which almost no one knew how to appreciate. The *Götz* was a dramatised cavalier romance, and that variety was popular at the time. In the

Werther, people saw only the elaboration of a real story, that of the New Jerusalem, of a youth who shot himself for love and thereby made a great deal of noise in that absolutely still period. People read his affecting letters with tears; it was noticed that the way in which *Werther* had been removed from a titled society had increased his disgust with life; the question of suicide



G. E. LESSING
(1729-1781)

made the book still more talked about; at this suggestion a few fools hit upon the idea likewise to shoot themselves. The book, through its subject matter, had the effect of a thunder-clap.

Wieland was the great poet of the day, with whom no one could compete except perhaps Mr. Ode-poet Ramler in Berlin. Wieland was worshipped idolatrously more even than Goethe at any time. The stage was ruled by Iffland with his noisy, bourgeois dramas, and by Kotzebue with his stale attempts at wit.^h

STURM UND DRANG

Borrowing the title of a drama of Klinger, a title extremely characteristic of the German poetry of that period, the historians of literature named the age of Lessing's pioneer work—which began with *Minna von Barnhelm* at the end of the Seven Years' War and extended to the classic purification which followed the collaboration of Goethe and Schiller, after the return of Goethe from his Italian journey and at the time of the outbreak of the French Revolution—the period of *Sturm und Drang*.

The starting point of this period is Herder; its zenith and centre, Goethe; its conclusion, Schiller. With Herder are associated, as isolated workers, Gerstenberg and Schubart. To Goethe succeed his pupils Lenz and Klinger, and their companions Müller and Heinse. Between Goethe and Schiller stand the members of the Göttinger society—Bürger, Voss, and their companions. Finally, side by side with the men of Sturm and Drang, calmer natures appear, such as Iffland and other dramatists; Hippel and others in the sphere of romance.

The common characteristic of the *Stürmer* and *Dränger* consists in a sovereign contempt, or at least in relegation to the background, of all rules of art, and in the delight of employing a language vaunting itself the direct outflow of a genius which has felt superior to all formal restraint. This language must be as abrupt, rough, and strong as possible; especially must it recall in its expressions, comparisons, and antitheses the striking speeches and counter speeches in the popular and carousal scenes of Shakespeare. Thus only the overgrowth was borrowed from the great Briton; his refinements and delicacies were departed from as much as possible. An especial enthusiasm was expressed for Rousseau's love of solitude and hatred of civilisation, though the poets did not make what is classical in this writer—his enthusiasm for nature—their own. Besides this there were numerous echoes of Klopstock, Wieland, and Lessing; further, and this is one of the chief merits of the *Stürmer* and *Dränger*, a revival was accomplished of the old German folk songs and popular humour, and a joyous reception given to the genuine and pseudo-popular poetry of foreign peoples, to which the Ossian craze especially belongs. The keynote is given by the numerous conceits and fancies of the poets themselves, and also by distinct and bold allusions to reprehensible deeds committed by those rulers who were inimical to the people and freedom. *Emilia Galotti* early sounded this note. The Sturm and Drang period was really a whirling thunderstorm in the rising German poetry, and an impulse towards freedom away from the restraint of rule and from foreign models, towards the popular development of conditions in the fatherland.


As patriarch of the *Stürmer* and *Dränger* we mentioned Johann Gottfried Herder. Both as poet and philosopher he took for his first model the Genevan apostle of freedom, Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose influence over him he however showed in a thoroughly independent fashion. He began his poetical activity by directing his attention to the popular poetry of all nations, without considering its stage of development; with this object he undertook wide and profound studies on the history of poetry. With a courage worthy of

[1767-1780 A.D.]

recognition in a theologian, he logically placed the miraculous tales of the Old Testament among great national poems, and thus set Hebrew poetry on the same basis with that of other nations. Thus Herder became a pioneer in popular poetry, as was Lessing in more artificial poetry, though Herder was as little or less a born poet than was Lessing. From this, his most important work in the poetic field, proceeded his *Stimmen der Völker in Liedern*, that ever-beautiful song book of the human intellect. A worthy companion to this is his later edition of the Spanish romance of the *Cid*. It was Herder who first made Indian poetry known in Germany (with the *Sakuntala*); and he was the first who turned his attention to Shakespeare in a penetrating and critical fashion, not merely as a man seeking a model. His own poems, on the other hand, of which the unrhymed *Legenden* were the best known, are purely scholarly, without any enthusiasm or imagination.

There is little more of the Sturm and Drang spirit to note in Herder's work, except in some of his lesser critical and æsthetic writings; he had his influence on the period which bears that name, through his labours in collecting and assimilating the unformed poetry of early ages.

There was more of the Sturm and Drang spirit in Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg, who went side by side with Herder as forerunner of that epoch and who was born in 1737 at Tondern in Schleswig. First a Danish officer and then a publicist in Holstein, it was as the latter that he began to give vent to his independent views of literature as early as 1766. Amongst these those on Shakespeare's works were of importance. He entirely rejected any judgment of this great poet which was based on the standards of the ancients, and would not even countenance the designation of his works as tragedies and comedies, since these antiquated appellations did not suit them; he called them only "living pictures of moral nature," and thus claimed for them, so greatly did he honour their author, a peculiarly individual and plastic character. Lessing besought him not to fling away utterly, in his enthusiasm for modern form, the laws of French tragedy and the classic tradition; but in 1767 Gerstenberg gave a practical illustration of his views in the tragedy *Ugolino*, suggested by the episode in Dante's *Hell*. This was wholly in the spirit of Sturm and Drang, causing wild agitations in the heart of the reader or listener by unchaining all the terrors of a death caused by hunger and despair. The fundamental idea of tragedy was ignored in sovereign fashion: the guiltless suffer a cruel death without any object except that of the most pitiful private revenge. That unrestrained titanic force from which the flower of the German classics has since blossomed was already dominant. The poet was



HERDER

(1744-1803)

silent after this youthful feat, except for some extremely insignificant productions having relation to music and philosophy. He did not die till 1823.

In the same wild spirit in which Gerstenberg wrote, Christoph Daniel Friedrich Schubart, who was born at Obersonthem in 1739, not only wrote but lived. After having attended the schools at Nördlingen and Nuremberg and the University of Erlangen, he came as a teacher to Geisslingen in 1763, but in 1769 was music director at the court of Ludwigsburg, where he led a frivolous existence and whence he was expelled in 1773 on account of a satire on the duke of the country. After fitful wanderings he wrote in Augsburg the journal called *Deutsche Chronik*, whose tone was in favour of patriotism and enlightenment, but with which he had to flee to Ulm. Scarcely had he begun a more steady existence here than the despotic duke, Charles of Würtemberg, had him enticed into his territory and placed in the fortress of Hohenasperg, where he spent ten years and temporarily lost his reason. After his liberation from the tyrant he was restored, gave himself up to a useful life, and died in 1791. An unbridled poetic impulse glows and flashes from his *Ahasver* and his *Fürstengruft*. He struck the popular note in his *Kaplied*, whose subject, indeed, was extremely lugubrious, namely, the sale of some hundred Swabians by the affectionate father of their country to the Dutch East India Company.

After these forerunners, after this stormy dawn, rose that man who, in the total development of a universal genius, became first the pride of the Sturm and Drang period, later the ornament of tranquil classicism, and finally, in old age, the ironical leader of romanticism. Thus Goethe lived through three periods of German poetry as a poet of the foremost greatness.ⁱ

THE COURT OF WEIMAR

The town of Weimar has played a brief but glorious part in the history of Germany. For fifty years it was "the dwelling-place of the muses," as the phrase still ran in the days when Duke Charles Augustus was reigning.

What was the town? One of its historians defines it in these terms: "If a hundred years ago anyone had opened a statistical work at the article *Weimar* he would have found something like this: a small town on the Ilm with a ducal palace; presents nothing worthy of note; at some distance a hill with a *Iustschloss* called Belvedere; a little farther the park of Ettersburg devoted to the chase." The author of these lines might have added: population, seven thousand; houses built of wood with high roofs, blackened by time; streets unpaved, no industry, the country ill-cultivated, ruined by wars. Such was Weimar.

Among the personages who assisted to render the town illustrious we must first make mention of the duchess dowager, Amalia. A daughter of the house of Brunswick and niece of Frederick II, she had been married in 1756 to the duke of Saxe-Weimar. She was then seventeen years old; two years later she was left a widow in difficult circumstances. She succeeded at first in removing from her country the traces of the ravages of the Seven Years' War; then she turned her attention to the education of her two sons. What particularly distinguished her was a great desire to learn, a natural curiosity whose eagerness age did not diminish. She summoned Wieland from the neighbouring University of Erfurt and confided to him the education of Prince Charles Augustus. Wieland was the earliest of the illustrious writers whom the hospitable little city united, and it was thanks to him that Weimar first became a kind of asylum for German literature.

The spirit of this amiable writer held sway at the court of Weimar when Goethe arrived there. The principle adopted was that of enjoying life peace-

[1773-1775 A.D.]

fully; wisdom was made to consist in avoiding all excess; ceremonial was gladly waived. The society was composed of a few dames of honour and a few court functionaries whose official employments were not burdensome. They read French and German verses; they improvised comic scenes; they obtained diversion from masquerades; they amused themselves with disguises and with petty intrigues of an uncompromising character; they told each other about the reviews; Wieland's *Merkur* enjoyed great credit. The Epicurean philosopher who was soon to take rank among the first German writers by his poem of *Oberon* was the worthy president and the inspiring soul of this society. There was a little theatre at the castle like the theatre at Versailles. French operas were chiefly given there, but there were also a few German plays. Wieland's *Alceste* was represented in 1773, a courtier named Schweizer having composed the music. These were amateur performances, but soon appeared real artists. The tragedian Eckhof spent some time at Weimar with his company. Corona Schroeter, the Leipsic singer, and Amalia Kotzebue, sister of the writer, arrived later. In short, it was a world of gentle animation, where absence of etiquette drew the various classes together, and where poets, artists, courtiers, amateurs lived in a sort of community of noble aspirations and delicate enjoyments.

At Weimar the distance between the princes and the poets, between patrons and patronised, was too small for the former to endeavour to exact flattery and the latter to offer it. Besides, similarity of tastes drew all together. Sometimes the duchess Amalia, who was a musician, collaborated with a composer or a poet for the arrangement of an interlude or lyrical play. The principal court functionaries all had some special talent which was utilised for the common entertainment, and some have left a name in literature.

CHARLES AUGUSTUS AND GOETHE

At the moment when Goethe and the young duke, the latter of whom had just been married, arrived at Weimar towards the end of the year 1775, they were already friends. Goethe had not yet laid aside the turbulence of his early years, and Duke Charles Augustus was not less impetuous than he. They came at first like two disturbing elements into the calm and elegant group amongst whom the aged Wieland was supreme. "The duke was then very young," says Goethe in his *Conversations with Eckermann*; "he did not know to what use to put his forces, and we were often on the point of breaking our necks. To ride over hedges, ditches, and rivers, wear himself out during whole days going up and down mountains, to spend the night under the open sky, camping near a fire in the wood—such were his tastes. To have inherited a duchy was to him a matter of indifference, but he would have liked to win it, conquer it, take it by storm."

With so much energy of temperament and such a desire to distinguish himself, what could he do in the duchy of Weimar? Charles Augustus recognised that even there he had a part to play. He surrounded his throne with men illustrious in the sphere of intellect, and Germany is not less indebted to him than if he had been a Charles V or a Frederick II. Charles Augustus, says Goethe again, was born a great man; he had many of the essential qualities of a prince: he knew how to distinguish merit; he sincerely desired the happiness of mankind; finally he was gifted with a species of divination which made him discover by instinct the course to be taken in difficult circumstances. Thus after a few years expended in follies he turned his attention seriously to the welfare of his state, and Goethe was then his adviser and almost his associate in the government.

Some historians maintain that his residence at Weimar was a bad thing for

[1775-1794 A.D.]

Goethe, that the years which he consecrated to the government of a petty state might have been more usefully employed for German letters. But Goethe had in him an irresistible bent towards risking all the chances of life, and plunging into it again even after deceptions and sufferings—a need to act and to let himself go which often turned him aside from his path and interrupted the poetic vein, but which also stimulated it and incessantly augmented the resources of his mind. For Goethe one thing was superior even to art and poetry, and that was life.



GOETHE
(1749-1832)

If we consider that the desire to do good should be natural to great minds and that all was inchoate in the duchy of Weimar, poor as it was in itself and further impoverished by the last wars, we shall understand how the government may have tempted Goethe. Moreover, he governed only as much as he wished, being sure that the least of his reforms would be accepted, and not fearing to compromise a crown by too much negligence or too much zeal.

In the midst of his life as an official and diplomatist, what became of the poet? The poet in Goethe was not dead, but slept, and when the hour should come was to awake. Even in the midst of the labours which seemed least in accordance with his true vocation, Goethe did not forget what Germany expected from him. All the literary group from the banks of the Rhine,

whose centre had been suddenly shifted, was attracted by him to Weimar. Klinger, the brothers Stollberg, Merck, came one after another, though without taking up their permanent residence there. Lenz himself came there to perpetrate a few extravagances. Finally Herder was appointed chief preacher at the court, in spite of the orthodox party.^p In 1786 Goethe left Weimar in order to travel in Italy, whence he did not return till June, 1788.^a

Meantime another power was rising at his side, a poet younger by ten years; this was Schiller, who had just made himself known by his drama of *Don Carlos*. What were to be the relations between the two poets? Were they to be rivals like Corneille and Racine, Voltaire and Rousseau? On the contrary, they were to be united, after 1794, in a close friendship which was often to be a collaboration, to which the one would bring the fruits of his experience, a genius already matured and tried; while the other on his side would contribute ardour, life, passion, a soul enamoured of all ideal things and filled with all noble ambitions. Goethe was to be a guide to Schiller, but in return he would receive from him a new impulse and as it were a second youth.^p

THE REACTION AGAINST RATIONALISM; GOETHE

The struggle against the shallow rationalism in state, religion, and literature is the distinguishing mark of the literary constellation at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies of the eighteenth century. In religion itself this rationalism threatened to explain away the fundamental ethical truths of Christianity; consequently, in those who opposed it, as Claudius,


[1770-1774 A.D.]

Hamann, Lavater, Fritz Jakobi, and to a certain extent in Herder also, we find an enthusiastic belief. In the political world an opposition was asserting itself against the enlightened despotism which in its government was not guiltless of treating historic growths in arbitrary fashion; in this it was opposed by Justus Möser. In poetry, finally, resistance was made to the restriction of rules. From the darkness of rationalism, so proud of the products of its own age, the eye turned back to the idealistic enlightenment of the nation's past; the merits of the old German architecture, the poetry of the sixteenth century were again recognised.

The intellectual guide, as we have seen, was Herder. It is wholly in Herder's spirit that the young Goethe soars, when life and love have once freed his genius from the bonds of an art which, though he exercised it with inimitable grace, was still conventional. With what marvellous harmony this, the most fertile spirit that Germany has produced, was developed from the storm and stress of his youth to the highest perfection, so that his life became the greatest work of art—to paint this would take too long. A stranger to no human feeling, accessible to every form of emotion, but yielding to none against his will, he has described his personal life, the joys and sorrows of his own existence, as poetically as the great questions which stir all humanity. Imbued in youth with the robust tone of the German art of the sixteenth century, influenced in manhood chiefly by the antique, in his old age attracted by the meditative poetry of the East, in face of these various influences he still preserved his independence, and if the ancient ideal of beauty best corresponded to the pure harmony of his intellect, yet he did not allow himself to be ruled by it, but created it anew in the German spirit.^c

SCHLEGEL ON GOETHE AS A DRAMATIST

Scarcely had Goethe in his *Werther* put forward something like a declaration of the rights of feeling against the restraint of social conditions, than he offered a poetical protest in *Götz von Berlichingen* against the bonds of all arbitrary regulations by which dramatic poetry had been limited. In this drama we see, not imitation of Shakespeare, but the enthusiasm excited by one creative genius in a kindred spirit. In the dialogue he continued Lessing's principle of naturalness, only with greater boldness; for, besides the verse structure and all elevating adornment, he also rejected the laws of a literary conception of speech to a degree such as no one had ventured on before him. He would by no means have any literary circumlocution; the representation must be the thing itself. And so with sufficient illusion, at least for those who are unacquainted with the historical monuments in which our ancient forefathers themselves speak, he sounded in modern ears the tone of a distant age. He has expressed the old German true-heartedness in the most touching fashion, the situations indicated with a few strokes have the most irresistible effect, the whole has a great historical import, for it represents the conflict between a vanishing age and one that is just beginning, of the century of rude but strong independence, and the succeeding one of



THE GOETHE HOUSE
Frankfort-on-the-Main

political tameness. In this the poet had no regard at all to the presentation on the stage, but rather appeared to defy its insufficiency with youthful arrogance.

In the main it was Goethe's object above all so to work as to express his genius in his writings, as to bring new poetical life and stir into the age; the form was indifferent to him, though he generally preferred the dramatic. At the same time he was a warm friend of the theatre, and at times worked according to its demands as determined by custom and the taste of the day; as, for example, when he produced in *Clavigo* a *bourgeois* tragedy in Lessing's manner. This piece has, in addition, the defect that the fifth act does not harmonise with the others.

Later on he sought to reconcile his own artistic views with the customary dramatic forms, even the subordinate ones, almost all of which he went through in individual attempts. In his *Iphigenia* he expresses the spirit of the ancient tragedy as he had conceived it, especially from the side of tranquillity, clearness, and ideality. With like simplicity, genuineness, and noble delicacy he wrote his *Tasso*, in which he turned an historical anecdote to the general significance of the contrast between court life and poet life. His *Egmont* is again a romantic historical drama, whose style hovers midway between his older manner in *Götz* and that of Shakespeare. *Erwin und Elmire* and *Claudine von Villabella* are, I might say, idealistic operettas, so light and airy that the only danger is lest they should become heavy and prosaic through musical accompaniment and acting; in them the noble and restrained style of the dialogue in *Tasso* alternates with the daintiest songs. *Jery und Bately* is a most charming nature picture in Swiss manners and in the spirit and form of the best French operettas, while on the other hand *Scherz, List, und Rache* is a true *opera buffa* full of Italian *lazzi*. *Die Mitschuldigen* is a rhymed comedy in bourgeois manners, according to the French rules. So far did Goethe carry his complaisance that he produced a continuation to an afterpiece of Florian, and impartiality of taste so far as to translate some tragedies of Voltaire for the German stage.

The *Triumph der Empfindsamkeit*, an extremely witty satire on Goethe's own imitators, inclines to the comic caprice and fantastic symbolism of Aristophanes, but it is a discreet Aristophanes in refined society and at court. Long before this, in some amusing stories and carnival plays, Goethe had made the manner of honest Hans Sachs entirely his own. We recognise the same free and powerful poetic spirit under all these transformations, to which may be applied the Homeric lines on Proteus:

First he is a lion with fearful, rolling mane,
Then flows down as water and rustles like a tree in the storm.

To the youthful period belongs his *Faust*, which was projected early but did not appear till late, and which even in its latest form is still only a fragment, and in whose nature it perhaps lay to remain of necessity always a fragment. It is hard to say whether we are more astounded in gazing upward at the height to which the poet soars, or more overwhelmed with dizziness at sight of the depths which he opens before our eyes. The wonderful folk-story of Faust is a very theatrical subject, and the marionette play from which, according to Lessing, the first idea of the drama was taken, answers this expectation even in the mutilated scenes and inadequate words with which it is represented by unconscious puppets. Goethe's version, which in some points adheres closely to the legend but in others leaves it entirely on one side, intentionally oversteps the dimensions of the stage in every direction. Many scenes are stationary delineations of Faust's inward state of mind and moods, develop-

[1772-1831 A.D.]

ments of his ideas on the inadequacy of human knowledge and on the unsatisfactory lot of mankind in long monologues or dialogues; other scenes, although in themselves extremely ingenious and significant, have the appearance of having only a casual bearing on the matter in hand; many, very dramatically conceived, are only slightly sketched. Some scenes, full of the highest dramatic power and of heartrending pathos—for instance, the murder of Valentin, and Gretchen and Faust in the cell—show that popular effect was also at the poet's command, and that he has only sacrificed it to more extensive objects. He often makes demands on the reader's powers of imagination, he compels him to give his fleeting groups a background of vast moving pictures which no theatrical art can bring before the eyes. In order to raise Goethe's Faust it is necessary to possess Faust's wizard staff and exorcisms. But even with this incapacity for outward representation, much is to be learned in connection with dramatic art from this strange work, both in the plan and execution. In a prologue which was presumably added at a late period the poet explains why in his fidelity to his genius he could not accommodate himself to the demands of a mixed crowd of spectators, and writes what is to some extent a farewell letter to the theatre.

It must be confessed that Goethe does indeed possess much dramatic but not quite so much theatrical genius. He is more concerned with a delicate unfolding than with a rapid external motion. The mild graciousness of his harmonious spirit itself holds him back from seeking a strong demagogic effect. *Iphigenia auf Tauris* is indeed more akin to the Greek spirit than perhaps any poetic work of the moderns composed before him, but it is not so much an ancient tragedy as a reflection of one, an epode; the violent catastrophes of those tragedies here stand only in the distance as a memory, and everything is gently resolved in the depths of the spirit. The strongest, most moving pathos is found in *Egmont*; but the end of this tragedy is likewise entirely removed from the external world into the domain of an idealistic music of the soul.^j

FAUST

In the Borghese garden at Rome German artists and travellers still show the place where Goethe composed the Witches' Kitchen of his *Faust*. In no work has the poet set forth his own inner life and his human and poetic development to the same extent as in the dramatic work *Faust*. This poem, whose main outlines had been already sketched in the author's earliest youth, and which was completed only a year before his death, drags through the whole of Goethe's long life; hence the great diversity, not only between the first and second parts, but between the different divisions of the first. That in it, however, the utmost beauty that poetic representation can give is set forth with enviable lightness and nobility, and that the poet dives into the depths of human existence in order to charm into the most beautiful manifestations of the world above the most secret things of human nature—on this subject the voice of the world has long since pronounced, only it has not generally been found possible to look with favour on the "spinning and weaving of obscure words round obscure conceptions," which really find their explanation in the profound thought of the idea.

Following the popular legend Goethe has made the figure of Faust the bearer and representative of the ideas of the age, of its intellectual tendencies and strivings, treating him in the first part rather as a personality, in the second more as an ideal conception. In the first part Faust appears as one of those mighty, demon-like human beings of the *Sturm* and *Drang* period, who has penetrated all the depths of knowledge without finding inward content, and, in despair at the deceitful and fragmentary character of all human

knowledge, plays with the idea of releasing himself by suicide from the trammels of the body, which hinder entrance into the inmost recesses of nature and knowledge of the essence of things. Then the Easter hymn awakens the sweet memory of the happy years of innocent childhood, when his soul found tranquillity in faith, and when the satisfaction of the corporeal needs of pure nature was the object of his wishes and effort, and the recollection holds him back from his design: "The tear rises, the earth possesses me again." To re-establish in his inmost spirit his belief in the divine revelation is his earnest aspiration; but as he has already tasted of the tree of knowledge he cannot again return to complete faith. In an attempt "to translate into his beloved German" the beginning of the Gospel of St. John, he begins questionings and now becomes the prey of the evil one, who already in the form of a poodle had drawn wide circles round him. In a compact with Mephistopheles he resigns the future life, resigns theory and speculation in a bold wager, and laying aside the pursuit of knowledge as a fantastic idealism, he turns, rejuvenated, to pursue the joys of life, pleasure in all its manifestations; the intellectual hero Faust follows the path of Don Juan, the hero of the world of sense, but here again without finding satisfaction. How should the solitary idealist, who in a titanic sense of eternity desires to be the whole of humanity, now satisfy himself with the one-sided realism, with a single form of activity? Human happiness, which he hoped to obtain in the possession of the pure feminine being (Gretchen) whom the poet has delineated with so masterly a hand, is spoiled for him by the evil one because it is founded, not on right and virtue, but on sensual human nature.

Gretchen, rent by love and seduction from her modesty and innocence, oversteps the limits of female morality, of childlike piety, of domestic propriety, of social regulations, and abandons herself entirely to the pleasures of forbidden love, whereupon one sin produces another. Her mother is hurried into eternity by a sleeping draught; her brother, the brave soldier Valentin, falls in a night duel at the hands of Faust and Mephistopheles; her own child dies by her hand. Her earthly happiness is gone, she is delivered up to justice as an infanticide; she expiates her misdeed and is admitted to the mercy of heaven. Disordered in intellect, but with the inborn sense of Christian virtue, she disdains flight from prison and is redeemed for heaven, so that in the second part she appears amongst the holy choir of penitents. But Faust's accusing conscience is deafened by the insipid dissipations of the Walpurgis Night on the Brocken.

If the Faust poem is to have a satisfactory solution an attempt must be made to reconcile intellectual freedom and development with the sensuous human nature; for only in this unison of the highest intellectual development with the powerful impulses of pure nature lies the ideal of a perfect human being. To effect this harmonious union and introduce the human being so organised, to make action follow on knowledge and pleasure, was to be the task of the second part of Faust. But neither the numerous continuations which Goethe had himself challenged, but which were nothing but repetitions, nor Goethe's own second part, in which the traces of age and a changed mood are not to be mistaken, can be regarded as successful fulfilments of this task. The idea of the Faust tragedy, in the sense of a symbolic universal human tragedy, cannot be comprehended within the compass of a self-contained work of art.

In *Famulus Wagner*, Goethe has immortalised one of his comrades of Strasburg and Frankfort—the dramatic poet of wild genius, Heinrich Leopold Wagner, who, like Lenz, gladly posed as Goethe's rival (*Prometheus*. *Die Kindesmörderin*, Gretchen's story translated into the commonplace); and in the delineation of Mephistopheles there hovered before his eyes the picture of the

[1770-1832 A.D.]

Darmstadt professor, Merck, a man whose own writings (novels, translations, critical essays) have won less renown than his influence on Goethe. The fundamental idea of his critical, atheistical judgment on his Frankfort friend culminates in the following expression: "Thine endeavour, thine irresistible tendency is to give a poetic form to the actual; others seek to realise what is called the poetic, the imaginative, and that produces only trash."^e

We cannot better close our short sketch of Goethe than by quoting the masterly words in which Robertson^k sums up the modern conception of this great man:^a

"Never was there a life so rich as his. Not only did he lead German literature through the stormy days of 'Sturm and Drang' to the calm age of classical perfection; not only does he form the end and goal of the movement of eighteenth-century thought, which had begun in England, and become Europeanised in France; but he was able to understand, as no other man of his generation, the new time. He was the spiritual leader of the romantic movement, and he encouraged all that was modern and healthy in the literatures of Europe, which sprang up under the influence of Romanticism. He looked on life, it is true, with the eyes of eighteenth-century humanitarianism; but, at the same time, he showed an understanding for modern conflicts, for modern ethics, for modern ideals in art and literature which made him, in the fullest sense, a poet of the nineteenth century. That Goethe was the most universally gifted of men of letters has long been recognised; but it is sometimes forgotten that he was also the representative poet of two centuries, of two widely different epochs of history."^k

SCHILLER

Schiller, at the beginning of his career, is rooted wholly in the tendencies of the period of Sturm and Drang. His first dramas, founded like the plays of the other Stürmer and Dränger on the conflicts most agitating to men—for example, deadly enmity between blood relatives—are inspired with a warm breath of the love of freedom which is in opposition to all existing winds. As Goethe had been led by the harmonious symmetry of his nature, so Schiller by the stern discipline of his moral personality was brought through the revolutionary ideas of the Sturm and Drang, and contributory to the same end was the influence of Kant's philosophy, to whose significance no one could any longer shut his eyes, and towards which everyone who shared in the intellectual activity of the times had to assume some attitude. A historical piece was found among his first dramas, and his historical studies led him further and further into the domain of historical drama, a form of art which after *Don Carlos* he handled not merely with the genius of a born dramatist, but also with a marvellous historical insight. The grand subjects of his early dramas reappear in his later pieces, as well as his enthusiasm for



SCHILLER
(1759-1805)

liberty, but both are enlightened and purified, and in the time of the greatest dismemberment he appears in *Wilhelm Tell* as the prophet of national unity. In the realisation of this object the thoughts and words to which he gave utterance and which found an enthusiastic echo had no small share.^c

Schlegel on Schiller as a Dramatist

Schiller wrote his first works while he was still very young and unacquainted with the world which he undertook to depict, and, although an independent genius and bold to insolence, he was nevertheless dominated in many ways by the examples of Lessing, Goethe in his earlier works, and Shakespeare as far as he could understand him without an acquaintance with the original.

Thus his youthful works came into existence: *Die Räuber*, *Cabale und Liebe*, and *Fiesco*. The first, wild and horrible as it was, had a tremendous effect, to the complete turning of sentimental young heads. The unsuccessful imitation of Shakespeare is unmistakable. Franz Moor is a prosaic Richard III ennobled by none of the qualities which in the latter blend disgust with admiration. The overstrained tone of sensibility in *Cabale und Liebe* can hardly touch us, but it can torture us with painful impressions. *Fiesco* is the most preposterous in its conception, the weakest in its effect.

So noble an intellect could not long persist in such extravagances, although they won for him an applause which might have made the continuance of the infatuation excusable. He had experienced the dangers of barbarism and of an unbounded defiance of all moderating restraint, and therefore threw himself with incredible exertions and a kind of passion into civilisation. The work which marks this new epoch is *Don Carlos*. Though in parts it goes deep into the delineation of character, it cannot yet entirely belie the old boasting monstrosity, which it only clothed in more select forms. The situations have much pathetic force, the plot is complicated even to epigrammatic subtlety, but his ideas on human nature and the social order which he had bought so dear were so precious to the poet that he described them in full instead of expressing them through the course of the action, and allowed his characters to philosophise more or less over themselves and others, so that the size of the work swelled quite beyond the limits of the domain prescribed for the theatre.

Historical and philosophical studies now seemed for a time to lead the poet away from the theatre, to the advantage of his art, to which he returned with an intellect ripened and enriched in many ways and at last really enlightened as to his aims and resources. He now devoted himself entirely to historical tragedy and sought by the renunciation of his own personality to attain to real objective delineations. In *Wallenstein* he worked so conscientiously in accordance with the historic foundation that he could not quite make himself master of his subject, and an affair of no great compass grew with him into two great plays and a more or less didactic prologue. In form he adhered closely to Shakespeare, only he endeavoured to limit himself more in the change of place and time, so as not to make too great a demand on the spectator's powers of imagination. He also paid more attention to consistent tragic dignity, allowed no mean personages to appear on the scene, or at least did not permit them to speak in their natural tone, and relegated the people, in this case the army, which Shakespeare allows to appear with so much life and truth in the course of the story, to the prelude.

With greater art and equally great attachment to the historic foundation, *Maria Stuart* was planned and executed. With a marvellous subject, such as the story of the Maid of Orleans, Schiller thought that he might permit himself more liberties. The last of Schiller's works, *Wilhelm Tell*, is the best ac-

[1755-1790 A.D.]

according to my judgment. Here he has entirely returned to the poetry of history. The treatment is faithful, sympathetic, and, considering Schiller's lack of acquaintance with Swiss scenery and national manners, of marvellous local truth. It is true that in this he had a noble model in the vivid pictures of the immortal Johann Müller.

Schiller was in the ripest fulness of his intellectual strength when an untimely death snatched him away; till then his health, long undermined, had been compelled to obey his powerful will and completely exhaust itself in heroic efforts. He was a meritorious artist in the true sense of the word, one who paid homage to truth and beauty with a whole heart, and who sacrificed his own individuality to them in ceaseless effort, far removed from the petty egoism and the jealousy all too frequent even among excellent artists.^j

KANT

"After Goethe had returned from Italy and Schiller had settled permanently in Jena, German literature seemed, after its 'Storm and Stress,' at last to have arrived at a period of tranquillity. But the classic beauty of the one poet and the noble aspirations of the other might have made little impression on the intellectual life of the nation as a whole, had not other forces also been at work, foremost among which was the philosophy of Kant. This thinker first shook the German people out of their easy-going provincialism, and taught them to appreciate ideals of life and thought as yet undreamed of in the philosophy of the eighteenth century." With these words Robertson^k brings forward the great philosopher of the eighteenth century.^a

Immanuel Kant, descended from a family of Scottish origin, who during his life was never far away from the environs of his native city of Königsberg, studied there theology, philosophy, and mathematics. In 1755 he became lecturer in the university, and received in 1770 the appointment and salary of professor of logic and metaphysics. At first he was influenced by Newton, the first epoch of his literary work being in the line of natural history, and his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* is absolutely a prophecy of Laplace's theory of the origin and continuation of the planetary system.

The change from natural history to logic and metaphysics did not take place until some time in the sixties, and was due to the directing influence of Hume, whose doubts upon the objective validity of the law of causality had made a deep impression on Kant. His researches were no longer in the direction of the theory and natural history of matter, but of the theories concerning the spirit of man.

The epoch-making works in which the results of the latter are shown are *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781; 2nd revised edition, 1787), *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788), and *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (1790).



IMMANUEL KANT
(1724-1804)

To these three foundation stones numerous other writings are added which in part serve to complete the system, and in part represent its application in regard to theology, doctrine of laws, ethics, and æsthetics, as, for example, *Die Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, *Rechtslehre*, *Jugendlehre*, *Anthropologie*, *Streit der Facultäten*, etc.

With such arguments concerning God and immortality, in fact, with this somewhat meagre definition of religion as "the recognition of all our duties as God's commandments," rationalistic theology began to operate at once, while certain elements of Kant's doctrine of religion which penetrated further, as, for instance, the celebrated chapter *Vom radicalen Bösen*, were disregarded or misunderstood. Not until it was combined with moral philosophy did rationalism attain a settled formation and stronger development, reaching some sort of solidity, comprising more than the usual vague commonplaces and phrases until then in vogue about human happiness and bliss.

Kant's theology is the first to reach true rationalism, while what preceded it might better be termed naturalism or explanatory theology. He himself had been of the opinion that the possibility of revelation could be neither proved nor denied, but he had also said that religion itself ought certainly not to be made dependent upon its acceptance or rejection, since in reality the only standard for judging any religion and any revelation was founded on their moral value. The theology of that time was greatly influenced by his opinions, and thus the *Praktische Vernunft*, with the accompanying *Postulaten*, has become primarily the starting-point of rationalistic thought. Consequently, dogmatic theology put aside all those teachings which contradicted the "autonomy of reason" from an intellectual standpoint (inspiration, for instance) or on practical grounds (as Augustinism), and put everything upon the basis of personal motives. Accordingly, in the domain of history especially, there was introduced in accordance with this view that vaunted "pragmatic method," in whose calculations the weakness and sensuality of the masses, the selfishness and ambition of the priests were raised to the importance of principal factors, and the different religions degraded into cunning contrivances of human cleverness. Even such an excellent work as that of Gottlieb Jakob Planck of Göttingen, *Geschichte der Entstehung, der Veränderung, und der Bildung unseres protestantischen Lehrbegriffs*, is still completely dominated by this conception.^e

Heine's Portrait of Kant

The life history of Immanuel Kant is hard to write, for he had neither life nor history. He lived a mechanically ordered, almost abstract bachelor life in a quiet, retired little street of Königsberg, an old city on the northeastern boundary of Germany. I do not believe that the great clock in the cathedral tower accomplished its daily duties more dispassionately and regularly than its countryman, Immanuel Kant. Getting up in the morning, coffee drinking, writing, giving lectures, eating, going to walk—everything had its appointed time, and the neighbours knew that it was exactly half past three by the clock when Immanuel Kant, in his grey coat, his Manilla cane in his hand, walked out of the door and went towards the little linden avenue which is still called after him the Philosopher's walk. Eight times did he go the length of it back and forth, in all seasons; and if the weather was dark or the grey clouds threatened rain, his servant, the old Lampe, was seen walking behind him in anxious care with a long umbrella under his arm like an image of providence.

Strange contrast between the external life of the man and his destructive,

[1755-1797 A.D.]

world-crushing ideas! Truly, if the burghers of Königsberg had dreamed the full import of this thinking, they would have stood in much more terrible awe of him than of an executioner—of an executioner who kills only men; but the good people saw in him nothing but the professor of philosophy, and when he passed by them at a certain hour they greeted him in a friendly fashion and timed their watches by him.

But if Immanuel Kant, the great destructor in the realm of ideas, far exceeded Maximilien Robespierre in terrorism, he nevertheless has many similarities with him which suggest a comparison of the two men. First we find in both the same inexorable, cutting, unpoetic, sober honesty. Next we find in both the same talent for suspicion, only that the one exercises it in regard to thoughts and calls it "criticism," while the other directs it against men and calls it "republican virtue." In the highest degree, however, is the type of the petty middle class manifest in both—nature intended them to weigh out coffee and sugar, but fate willed that they should weigh other things, and placed in the scale of the one a king and of the other a God. And they weighed justly.^h

Kant's Philosophy

In the system of Kant, one-sidedness was a characteristic rather of the principle than of its arrangement. He was as many-sided as he could find sides in the culture of the century. His mind was the philosopher's stone of his age. Paying homage to all the tendencies of the mind, he exercised a beneficial influence over all. He raised himself to the summit of that Protestant enlightenment and culture which characterised his whole age. After him it became necessary to fall, partly into one-sidedness, partly into the opposite—into the romantic Catholic element. The pure product of the Reformation, he comprised, in the noblest sense, its good and noble sides, just as at the same time in France the atheistical and material school of scorers fell into the dark side of unbelief and clever immorality. As all the culture which succeeded the Reformation was based upon criticism and empirism, so also was the system of Kant, which consequently had a beneficial influence upon theological exegesis, upon investigation into nature, and upon the inquiries into systems of government and education, and which mutually influenced and was influenced by the modern poetry which, imitating life and nature, had come into vogue after the age of Lessing, Wieland, and Goethe. The universal toleration which, after the death of Frederick the Great, had emanated chiefly from Prussia, the endeavour after a universal culture, the interest taken in everything foreign, the indulgent examination of the views of all parties, the predilection for the analytical methods of procedure, the striving after utility, popularity, and the enjoyment of social life were in the hands of the noble Königsberg philosopher developed and diffused to that great extent for which the eighteenth century was distinguished.

The anthropological and critical method had about this time begun to prevail in France and England. Rousseau's sentimentality, Voltaire's intellectual power, Swift's satire, and Sterne's humour, all appealing to human nature, overthrew old prejudices; these men, with Diderot, Goldsmith, and Fielding, having penetrated into the literature of Germany, the effects which they produced stand in direct relation to the anthropology of Kant. Stiff forms having been cast away, the human heart and the ties of social life having been more minutely examined, delineations of customs, psychological novels, idyls, dramas of domestic life (*bürgerliche Schauspiele*), satires, humorous extravagances were published, in all of which might be traced the echo of the fundamental principle of the Kantian philosophy—the examination of the human heart, humanity, and also attacks upon the false notions of past ages. This

might be called the Flemish school of philosophy, in contrast with the Italian school of the earlier mysticism and the later system of Schelling. This peaceful, happy period, from 1780 to 1790, foreboded nothing of the storm produced by the mad enthusiasm of the French Revolution, of the fortunes of the empire, and of the ultramontanism of the Restoration: prosaic, accommodating, prejudiced, and provincial, it saw a short world-historical idyl, which was, as it were, an interlude to be succeeded by a great tragedy; Kant was the ruling genius during this domestic peace of that good old period.

JACOBI

Jacobi, though proceeding upon a principle opposed to that of Kant, arrived at the same result. Kant addressed himself to those in whom the intellect was predominant; Jacobi to those in whom the sentiments: both, however, to the educated, to men imbued with the spirit of the humanity and social culture of the eighteenth century.

Everything connected with Kant and Jacobi belongs essentially to the culture of the eighteenth century, to that culture founded by the study of the classics, and that humanity promoted by a universal peace. The new century, in which the ideas of Fichte and Schelling began to supersede those of Jacobi and Kant, was disturbed by the political spirit of the age and by the revival of the ancient romantic and mystic spirit.

FICHTE

Fichte, as the representative of the French Revolution, or rather of its echo in Germany, forms the transition of the romanticists. He came immediately after Kant, as the stormy period from 1790 to 1800 succeeded the peaceful one from 1780 to 1790. The transition from the moral system of Kant, which, though no less pure, is moderate and tolerant, to that of Fichte, which is haughty, nay tyrannical, may be taken up here. Fichte's system can be properly explained only from the revolutionary spirit of his age and from the circumstance that the aim of that revolution, at least in the imagination of its originators, was to erect a utopian republic of virtue. Men were seized with a strange enthusiasm. They dreamed of a supreme moral order of the world, of a universal republic of free and equal citizens, all thoroughly honest and moral. Fichte had the same end in view. It is evident that he investigated the moral principle of revolutions more profoundly than any other philosopher.

Fichte, being altogether a moralist, all his works relate to real life; yet they are written in such a learned way that no one who does not belong to his school can understand even his *Addresses to the German Nation*. This bold and ardent mind longed for the dictatorship and terrorism of virtue. Opposing absolute virtue even to heaven, he would not permit it to accept the guarantee of religious authority. Succeeding generations were to be rendered independent of every adventitious support, by a giant-strong principle that "that alone exists, which man does; that alone deserves to exist, to which he compels himself by the power of his will; and that alone can man wish, which befits his independent Ego: honour to himself, justice to all!" Fichte's highest position—"Ego is God"—was unfolded to the world by Novalis, in that stupendous anthropomorphism which we have hitherto rather gazed at than comprehended, in his posthumous works. He added a second position, "God wills only gods" (*Gott will nur Götter*), so that the world appeared to

[1800-1821 A.D.]

him nothing less than a republic of gods; we must at least confess that Novalis, considering himself, in the sense of this system, as really a god (though only a poetical one) and king of the universe, has made the whole world the scene and object of his poem, in a more comprehensive manner than any of those poets who preceded him.^f

SCHELLING AND HEGEL

To Fichte succeeded Schelling, with whom the return of philosophy to religion and that of abstract studies to nature and history commenced, and in whom the renovated spirit of the nineteenth century became manifest. His pupils were partly natural philosophers, who, like Oken, sought to comprehend all Nature, her breathing unity, her hidden mysteries, in religion; partly mystics, who, like Eschenmayer, Schubert, Steffens, in a Protestant spirit, or like Görres and Baader, in a Catholic one, sought also to comprehend everything bearing reference to both nature and history in religion. It was a revival of the ancient mysticism of Hugh of St. Victor, of Honorius, and of Rupert in another and a scientific age. Nor was it unopposed: in the place of the foreign scholasticism formerly so repugnant to its doctrines, those of Schelling were opposed by a reaction of the superficial mock-enlightenment and sophistical scepticism predominant in the foregoing century, more particularly of the sympathy with France, which had been rendered more than ever powerful in Germany by the forcible suppression of patriotism. Abstract philosophy once more revived and set itself up as an absolute principle in Hegel. None of the other philosophers attained the notoriety gained by Schelling and Hegel, the representatives of the antitheses of the age.^l

Hegel, the Prussian philosopher, first gathered his ideas on the state into a system in 1821, in his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, published in Berlin. At the head of it he put, so to speak, his much-quoted and seldom-comprehended proposition, "Whatever is reasonable is real, and whatever is real is reasonable." It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that by "real" is not meant that which concretely exists here or there, but that which is worthy of reality in order that the proposition may have meaning. To make it appear as a glorification of the reaction is simply ludicrous, for the revolution was also repeatedly "real." In spite of the absolutism then prevailing in Prussia he had the courage to declare the constitutional monarchy to be the true form of the state, as being the rational medium between the absolute monarchy and an absolute republic. He did not even reject the sovereignty of the people if it did not conflict with the sovereignty of the monarch. He recognised three authorities: the princely, as individual representatives of the state; the ruling, whose members, the officials, represent the middle classes; and the legislative, in which the people as a whole found expression. Hegel had, however, no great opinion of the people, and designated it as that part of the state which did not know what it wanted!ⁱ

While the different sections of Hegelians opposed each other, Schelling developed the later phases of his system; and thought was turned into a new channel by Herbart, whose psychological work has been carried on at a later time by Lotze.

SCHOPENHAUER

Arthur Schopenhauer, although his chief book was written in the lifetime of Goethe, did not secure a hearing until long afterwards. German philosophers have, as a rule, been utterly indifferent to style, but Schopenhauer's prose is

clear, firm, and graceful, and to this fact he owes much of his popularity. He expressed bitter contempt for his philosophical contemporaries, and, going back to Kant, claimed to have corrected and completed his system. His main doctrine is that will is the fundamental principle of existence; but his importance arises less from his abstract teaching than from his descriptions of the misery of human life. History seemed to him but a record of turmoil and wretchedness; and there is high literary genius as well as moral earnestness in his graphic and scornful pictures of the darker aspects of the world.^g

JEAN PAUL RICHTER

The first rank among the authors of humorous romances is taken by Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, of Wunsiedel in Franconia, whose works, since they are the exact reflection of his inner life and his little confined world of feeling, are only comprehensible in the light of the author's own history and course of development. Having grown up in quiet provincial solitude, and in the poor circumstances of a provincial pastor without society and school, Jean Paul was left to his lively childish imagination and his rich world of feeling; thus was produced in him that bias towards a narrow and peaceful existence which accompanied him throughout life, and which, allied with the sensibility and warmth of feeling in his nature which never lost the character of youth, gives the tone to his writings. At the school at Hof he made rapid progress and already began to put together copious notes and to cultivate in himself the passion for the details of erudition. When he was about to attend the University of Leipsic, the death of his father reduced him to great poverty and compelled him to earn his living, at one time as a tutor, at another as a writer in the small establishment of a poor mother.

He now read principally such books as were congenial to him, especially Rousseau's works, which had the greatest influence in determining the direction of his mind; he absorbed whatever answered to his nature and his fashion of thought and feeling, and by one-sided studies arrested a progressive development and transformation of his mind such as we perceive in Schiller and Goethe. He modelled his whole life in the circle of thought and feeling proper to youth; and the omnipotence of fine feeling, the enthusiasm and craze for ideal conditions, which are predominant in youth and which in him existed in an extraordinary degree, were transferred to his writings. In them we find those principles of a lofty virtue, that feeling for the innocence and purity of early years, that elevated conception of friendship and love, and that violent pressure towards freedom which exhibit themselves in noble youth. This ideal world of his with its lofty characters stands in glaring contrast with the reality, and the presentation of this contrast forms the foundation of all Jean Paul's romances, which consequently bear a double character: the humorous, when they pursue the outer world with mockery and irony, but also penetrate the height and depth of human existence with a sun-clear insight; and the idealistic, inasmuch as the heroes are depicted as the models of all perfection and purity of soul. His later works indeed reveal an attempt to conquer the innate hostility and to reconcile the opposing principles, but he could not attain to the harmonious and beautiful human ideal of Schiller and Goethe.

Of action Jean Paul's romances contain little; their chief value consists in feeling and sentiment, and their charm in "miniature painting," in the idyllic description of petty conditions, as set forth in the monotonous life of country pastors, village school-teachers, and officials, or the society of small capitals. His fantastic manner of description, the out-of-the-way knowledge, the obscure images, comparisons, and allusions such as his overwhelming strength of im-

[1783-1809 A.D.]

agination and feeling and the learning he had amassed placed at his disposal and which are strewn through his pages, have excited against him the prejudice of all men of classic training and attachment to forms and rule.

He is most successful in his descriptions of nature, his landscape pictures, in which mountains and valleys, villages and parks, the quiet daily worship of nature, with sunrises to sunsets, the light and shade and tone of the landscape, are presented with great art and vividness; on the other hand, his love scenes are often mere sentimentality, distilled into the feeling of the heart without any underlying relation to the senses.

The "Poetry of Longing"

Jean Paul's first writings were satirical and show that he was deeply read in Swift. They give evidence of mental disturbance, of discontent with earth, "a dark chamber full of inverted and confused pictures of a fairer world." The small success of these satires led him to the humorous novel, the true field of his activity. In the unfinished *Unsichtbare Loge* we already perceive the vague world of feeling and the touching sentimentality which moves to tears side by side with the wit and humour which waken laughter, a mingling of jest and earnest which forms the characteristic element of the romances of Jean Paul and produces at once sadness and serenity. In the *Hesperus* the softer elements, the delight in the touching and the inclination to linger over human suffering, chiefly prevail. Many have admired this romance most of all, and in it the "poetry of longing" has found its fullest expression, and an inexhaustible horn of plenty full of images and ideas has been poured out over it.

The two next romances, *Quintus Fixlein* and the touching book *Blumen-, Frucht-, und Dornenstücke oder Ehestand, Tod und Hochzeit des Armen-advocaten Siebenkäs*, are devoted to the description of obscure life and belong to the order of humorous romances proper. In *Siebenkäs* the poet depicts his own melancholy circumstances from the time when he toiled at his first work in his mother's room in Hof, "crippled and oppressed from within and without, when after many trials he tears himself away, though with a bleeding heart, from every-day life, and soars into the world of poetry." *Siebenkäs* is a true reflection of the discordant nature of the poet himself, "enchanted sensitiveness for the poetry of the apparent commonplace, but morbid and spoilt by fanciful crotchets." But his nature impelled him to unite the diverse and contradictory; consequently we see the poet who possessed so decided a gift for the conception of real life busied in the *Kampanerthal* with philosophic problems, and occupying himself with the knowledge of God and immortality. Jean Paul's personality appears at the fullest in the *Titan* and in the *Flegel-jahren*, which are considered his most important romances. There he depicts with more comprehensive truth "the titanic nature of the age" according to the noble ideal as well as from the monstrous, vitiated side, with exaggeration, but none the less with depth and truth and a grand artistic execution. In these two works the poet appears to have spent the excess of his powers of imagination, and consequently his subsequent writings bring forward little that is new and are more restrained.

A yearly pension received from the prince-primate Von Dalberg, and after the fall of Napoleon from the king of Bavaria, removed from him the anxiety of supplying the means for subsistence which had embittered his earlier life. His last works are scientific in character, but as Jean Paul had no profound knowledge of any science they have little technical value, though rich in brilliant ideas. On the other hand, his idyllic pictures of German home life were warm vindications of the native world of feeling against the inclinations and

sympathies for Hellenism of the Weimar circle, and in the years of the Napoleonic domination and the succeeding reaction Jean Paul showed himself a courageous spokesman for German liberalism and patriotism.^c

THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL

The most important literary movement which originated during the lifetime of Goethe was that of the romantic school, whose leading members at first attached themselves to him, but gradually diverged more and more from his spirit. The rise of the school was in some measure due to the philosophy of Fichte, whose theory of the ego as the principle which freely creates its own world gave new importance to the individual as opposed to law and convention. Schelling still more effectually prepared the way for the romanticists by his poetic treatment of the relations between the mind and nature; and several of his disciples, especially Steffens, worked in the same direction by dwelling on the possibilities of mystery in human life and in the external world. The aim of the romantic school was to assert for modern feeling the right of a freer, more varied utterance than can be provided for it by the forms of classic literature. They were not in sympathy with their own time; they found it tame, prosaic, colourless; and to enrich it with new elements they went back to mediævalism, in which, as they conceived it, daily life had not been divorced from poetry. They drew enthusiastic pictures of the Middle Ages, of the charms of chivalry, of the loyalty of each class to the class above it and to society as a whole, of the devout piety which was supposed to regulate the conduct of prince and peasant alike, and which revealed itself in splendid architecture and a gorgeous ritual. With a like purpose the romanticists pointed to oriental life, and began the serious study of Sanskrit and Persian poetry. The chief writers whom they opposed to the classical poets both of antiquity and of modern times were Shakespeare and Calderon; but they also brought to light many mediæval authors who had previously been neglected, and stimulated the Germans to a systematic study of the whole of their past literature.^g

In a conversation between Eckermann and Goethe the old master, impatient with the alluring pretensions of romanticism, exclaimed, "I call classical that which is healthy, and that which is sickly, romantic." This title he would have applied to the works of the Swabian school, indulgent as he was to the first attempts of Uhland. They were, however, a pleasing apparition, these simple songs, natural and true, which were correct without seeking elegance, near to the people in their familiar style and the freedom of their language; it is true it was poetry of the second order, lacking sublime inspiration but the better preserving the taste for national memories and higher things in the class to which it appealed; for it required, to understand them, only a little intellectual culture united with feeling. They knew how to take from the romantic school all that was truly "healthy," leaving to it only its exaggerations and its faults. Goethe himself modified the excessive severity of his first judgments, and after having treated with more or less disdain the early publications of Uhland, he rendered him complete justice in his last literary conversations.^d

YOUNG GERMANY

Everyone knows the sway of Hegel's philosophy, how it influenced the highest intelligence, how, in fact, it controlled all Germany. Never had any doctrine gained such a strong position. Hegel combined all the work of German metaphysics, as Goethe represented all poetry since Klopstock. At last

[1830-1840 A.D.]

the higher poetry and the systems of the thinkers, for some time separated, could now meet. The unity of Germany was already formed in spirit: it was but necessary for this unity to be projected into the real world—to enter into active life after having exhausted all degrees of contemplation.

There now appeared a literature, light, frivolous, lively, which took its frivolous grace as an evidence of social liberty and looked forward to the best results.¹ This school was known as "young Germany," which played its part for several years with alternate periods of success and defeat. In the mean time, while the poetry of the preceding epoch was reduced to dust, the high philosophy of Hegel was demolished by the men who boasted of having rendered it accessible to all—much more accessible, indeed, as one could henceforth walk on its débris. This party called itself the "young Hegelian school." They were as hot-headed and unmanageable as their predecessors had been droll and affected. These were the ultra-revolutionists; more than one violent execution signaled their advent, and that the pretended Girondists of "young Germany" did not all perish is due to their elegant frivolity, which saved them.

HEINE

An unexpected event now occurred: one of the writers who most influenced young Germany, Heinrich Heine, joined with a brilliant manifestation the group of political poets. It was he who had commenced and hastened this moral revolution. With what irony, with what cavalier lightness he interpellated the serious philosophy at that time still so imposing! How laughingly he undermined the foundation of the edifice! He had no system, no definite intention; the political parties were not yet formed; his muse was often but a bird that whistling in the branches mocked at everything. Before this spirit of jest and mockery the old society fell; there commenced a rapid change which Heine could well believe was due to his influence.

It may well be believed that Heine's entrance into the camp of the belligerents was greeted with varying sentiments. The surprise was great at first, followed by fear and joy, pride and inquietude tempering each other. Heine was truly the poet of the new generation. Since the school of Uhland had waned, the author of the *Buch der Lieder* had monopolised popularity, and as audacious frivolity had already taken the place of serene spirituality, the poetry, capricious and scoffing, which broke forth on each page of this brilliant book suited marvellously this hostile disposition and helped to spur it on. Meanwhile, in 1840, Herwegh, Hoffman, and their friends held Germany with their political songs. Heine seemed surpassed and perhaps already forgotten, when with one bound he rejoined them; he threw himself into the mêlée, and by the unexpected evolution of his fantastic thoughts he troubled and disquieted his new friends as much as he caused fear among his adversaries.^m

Heine was a product of romanticism, from which he severed himself much more thoroughly, however, by his self-ridicule than Chamisso, Rückert, and Platen. The objective irony of the old romanticists became subjective with him; as they juggled with the outer world, so he with the ego, which contemptuously shed its own heart's blood.

Heine has become with Börne one of the founders of a new political controversy in the same way in which his book on the romantic school was the forerunner of a new critical history of literature; although scientific only to so small a degree and so filled with frivolity, it yet contains many passages of

[¹ It will be obvious that in what follows we are not adhering to the strict limitations of our chapter. But the period under discussion cannot well be marked off by arbitrary dates.]

beauty and truth. Meanwhile, in all his prose works he affected a great love for France, while he railed at Germany, not with the anger of love, like Börne, but in the language of an insolent boy. We now come to Heine's poetical works, and naturally those of the earlier, the German period. The first works of his still youthful muse contain *Das Buch der Lieder*, although it did not appear until 1826. The earliest period, 1817-1821, is entitled *Junge Leiden*. Almost immediately Heine's demon grins at us from the most sentimental and touching descriptions. Ghastly visions of death, the grave, and the devil betray an overwrought imagination and the influence of the romanticists, which latter, however, soon disappears. With the *Lyrisches Intermezzo* (1822-1823) appeared those pretty little poetic thoughts so peculiar to Heine, as though he intended to tease the world with them, as *Im wunderschönen Monat Mai*, etc.; but very soon these alternate with shrilly laughing frivolity, or trivialities which again have a thrilling conclusion, as the well-known *Es ist eine alte Geschichte*, etc., and finally appear the trivial endings of sentimental beginnings in the real Heine manner.

Grand and solemnly grave, however, are the *Nordsee Gedichte* (1825-1826), except a few particularly coarse Heineisms. Some fragments which if carried out might have turned out admirably are the *Florentinische Nächte* and the *Rabbi von Bacharach*. Heine's tragedies of 1823, *William Ratcliff* and *Almanzor*, which revel in horrors and are evidently unfinished, were not favourably received; they are strongly reminiscent of Byron.

Heine's second poetical period began in 1841 with *Atta Troll: ein Sommer-nachtstraum* (which appeared in 1843). This comic epic poem contains the story of a bear with interspersed literary maliciousness and various indecencies, in which, however, the cleverness of the metre and its wittiness must be admitted. To this succeeded (1844) *Deutschland: ein Wintermärchen*, in the preface of which Heine spoke a word in praise of Germany—that is, if he was in earnest about it! The poem relates a winter journey of Heine's to Germany, and, in spite of its frequently most trivial language, is excruciatingly funny, and many of the affecting thoughts contained in it are crushed the most by trivial jests. The *Neue Lieder* appeared in 1851. They contain wanton apostrophes to French women of the demi-monde, which give an insight into the amorous adventures of the poet, but are, however, mingled with elegiac passages which recall the German origin of his muse, and also various poems, among which are some romances which are reminders of the best German ones, as for example *Ritter Olaf* and acrimonious *Zeitgedichte*.

In the same year followed *Romancero*, a collection of romances and ballads, in which the Heine-esque note of triviality and self-ridicule is predominant. Yet here also are found truly poetical strains, as, for example, the touching song of the Silesian weavers. An annihilating scorn pervades the satire on a certain poetry-making king and on the Polish counts in Paris. As an appendix to *Romancero* the *Neueste Gedichte* appeared in 1854.ⁱ

RAPID GROWTH OF LITERATURE IN GERMANY

Such is a brief account of certain aspects of German literature of the period. Its merit and importance will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected that it has been entirely the creation of a century. Unlike the literature of Italy, which sprang up during two hundred years on the revival of letters, or of France and England, which have slowly evolved during the mental struggles of three centuries, it has all been produced by the mental effort of one or at most two generations. No long line of illustrious men marked its progress: they all sprang up at once, as Minerva fully armed from the brain

[1851-1854 A.D.]

of Jupiter. This circumstance is very remarkable, when the great extent and variety of literary excellence in Germany is taken into consideration; and it is fitted to inspire the most consolatory belief in regard to the permanent nature of human progress. Goethe says that the human mind is constantly advancing, but it is in a spiral line; and it may be added that in a spiral the curves are alternately in light and shadow. The annals of his own country afford the clearest proof of the truth of the observation. To appearance, the German mind was entirely dormant during the long winter of the Middle Ages; but on the return of spring the ceaseless progress appeared; it sprang up at once, like the burst of nature after an arctic winter. The luxuriance of intellectual vegetation which thus broke forth teaches us that, even when apparently lifeless, the human mind is incessantly acting; that it is during the long period of repose that error is forgotten and prejudice dies out; and that, under circumstances where reason might despair of the fortunes of the species, the beneficent powers of nature are incessantly acting and preparing in silence the renovation of the world.

MUSIC


No other art is so indebted to distinctively Teutonic influences, no other art has been so civilised and dignified by the German minds and by the German temperaments as music. A special office of the Teutonic soul seems to be the bringing of intellect to bear on all those things for which it possesses emotional receptiveness and creative power. It is true that this very tendency sometimes ties down the wings of Pegasus and dulls the lyre of this or that muse. Sensuous beauty can be the less in its being Germanised. But we can forgive the turgidness and clumsiness that come often as if in an intellectual extreme, when we think of Peter Fischer, of Albrecht Dürer, of the architects who have built the Cologne Cathedral or St. Stephen's, and of that sparkling galaxy of musicians whose names are peculiarly linked to Austria—Haydn, Mozart, Gluck, Beethoven, Schubert, and Brahms; and of the more strictly German group that shows us as central figures Bach, Handel, Mendelssohn, Weber, Schumann, and Wagner.

It is through a subtle appeal to the very core and essence of human nature just as it is, just as we meet it daily about us, as we know it to be struggling or repressed in our very selves, in our heart of hearts, that the German school has so influenced music. Its voice is the voice of mystical humanity in us, and something more. Haydn, Mozart, Gluck, Beethoven, Schumann, Schubert, and Brahms have not degraded music in relation to our merely artistic ideal of it. They have not laid violent hands on it as art, and wrested it away from its earlier mysteriousness. They have brought it near to us by a wonderful natural gift and insight. But they have made music psychologically as nearly an articulate and organic thing as it is possible to make it.⁹

The imitation of nature is not the object they pursue—it is ideal beauty to which they aspire; and it is the incessant striving after that elevated shadow which is the real cause of the greatness which they have attained. It is to this that is to be ascribed the extraordinary perfection to which they have brought the art of music, the one of the fine arts which has the least relation with the wants or appliances of present existence. Mozart and Beethoven stand alone in this respect; even Italian music must yield to the variety of their conceptions, the brilliancy of their expression, the pathos of their sentiment. It is the constant effort to express the ideal which has produced this excellence. "The impression," says Madame de Staël, "which we receive from the fine arts has not the smallest analogy to that which imitation, how perfect soever, produces. Man has in his soul

[1795-1824 A.D.]

innate feelings, which the real will never completely satisfy; and it is to these sentiments that the imagination of painters and poets has given form and life. The first of arts — music — what does it imitate? Yet of all the gifts of the Divinity it is the most magnificent, for the very reason that it is the most superfluous. The sun gives us his light; we breathe the air of a serene heaven; all the beauties of nature tend in some way to the use of man; music alone is of no utility, and it is for that reason it is so noble and moves us so profoundly. The farther it is removed from any practical application, the nearer it is brought to that secret fountain of our thoughts, which is always only rendered more distant by its application to any practical object."



BEETHOVEN
(1770-1827)

Beethoven

Beethoven is by common consent, and the universal opinion of the best judges, put at the very head of composers of his epoch. Sublimity and variety are his great characteristics; he is

the Michelangelo of music. Like that great master of painting, his conceptions are vast and daring, and his powers equal to their full expression. He is essentially, and beyond any other composer, sublime; but, like Milton, he knows how to relieve intense emotion by the awakening of softer feelings, and none can more powerfully thrill the heart by grandeur and melt it by symphony. Music in his hands exhibits its full powers and takes its place at once where Madame de Staël has assigned it, as the first of the fine arts, the most ethereal in its nature, the most refining in its tendency, the most severed from the grossness of sense, which penetrates at once, like a sunbeam from heaven, into the inmost recesses of the soul. Beethoven's pieces, however, like Milton's *Paradise Lost* or Michelangelo's frescoes, are not adapted for ordinary capacities nor are they calculated to awaken universal admiration. They are too complicated for an uninitiated ear, which is always most powerfully attracted by simplicity and melody. Beyond any other of the fine arts, the pleasure of music is felt by the most illiterate classes; you cannot see a military band go through the street without perceiving that. But a scientific education and no small proficiency in the art are indispensable to a perception of its highest excellences, which none feel entirely but such as are themselves capable of expressing them.



MOZART
(1756-1791)

[1781-1801 A.D.]

Mozart

If Beethoven is the Michelangelo of music, Mozart is its Raphael. Not less than that divine master of the sister art, his inmost soul was filled with the mysterious harmonies, the thrilling thoughts, which, emerging, as it were, through the chinks of thought, fill the minds of all who feel this influence with sympathetic rapture. They throw the mind for a few seconds or minutes into a species of trance or reverie, too enchanting for long endurance, which affords perhaps the nearest foretaste which this world presents of the joys of heaven. It is the peculiarity of the highest efforts and most perfect productions of the fine arts alone to produce this ephemeral reverie, and when it is awakened it is the same in all. The emotion produced by the *Holy Family's* of Raphael is identical with that awakened by the symphonies of Mozart, and akin to that which springs from the contemplation of the Parthenon of Athens, or reflection on the *Penseroso* of Milton. Mozart had the very highest powers; but though gifted with the faculty of producing the sublime, he inclined, like Schiller, to the tender or pathetic, and never moved the heart so profoundly as when his lyre rang responsive to the wail of affection or the notes of love.

Haydn

Haydn was a very great composer, but his character was different as a whole from either Beethoven or Mozart. His conceptions were in the highest degree sublime; human imagination never conceived anything more lofty than some bursts in the *Creation*. They have rendered into sound with magic force the idea, "Let there be light; and there was light." If a continued comparison is permitted to the great masters of the pencil, he was the Annibale Carracci of music. Like him, his powers were great and various, but he aimed rather at their display than the expression of genuine heartfelt feeling. Not that he was without sentiment, and could not, when he so inclined, give it the most charming expression; no great master in any of the fine arts ever was without it. But it was not the native bent of his mind; that led him rather to the exhibition of his great and varied powers. His reputation with the world in general is perhaps greater than that of Beethoven, because there is more simplicity in his compositions; one key-note is more uniformly sounded, and a single emotion which can be shared by all is more effectively produced. But for that very reason he is less the object of impassioned admiration to the gifted few to whom the highest powers and deepest mysteries of the art are familiar, and who know how that great master could wield the former and penetrate the latter.^b





CHAPTER VIII

THE LATER DECADES OF FREDERICK WILLIAM III

[1815-1840 A.D.]

The chief trouble with the Holy Alliance was, that it regarded the people as a senseless flock, to be driven by whatever measures the allied rulers might suggest. The treaty proved practically to be a dead letter; nor was even the brotherly concord of long duration. But liberal ideas were in the air now, and the strivings of the German people for a generation to come were to be towards their realisation.—HENDERSON.^o

GERMANY AFTER WATERLOO

GERMANY had hoped for three results from the uprising of 1813: the repudiation of the foreign yoke, the creation of a united people, and the introduction of a constitutional form of government.

The French dominion was successfully repudiated, not, it is true, to the fullest extent as the most enthusiastic patriots had desired, but in a considerable degree as men of moderate views had hoped, even as early as the close of 1813. At that time there existed a wide-spread inclination to rest content with the right bank of the Rhine, and to abandon to the French the entire district extending along the left bank, including Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) and Worms. The inhabitants of these districts would not have been dissatisfied with this arrangement on the whole. But the patriotism of a Blücher and a Stein could not endure so yielding a policy, and E. M. Arndt's pamphlet, *The Rhine Germany's River, not Germany's Boundary*, gave expression to the contrary inclinations of those who had decided against it. This danger was averted by the advance into France; but the wish to win back Alsace also miscarried in 1814 as well as in 1815, although at the Second Peace of Paris, German, and more

[1813-1814 A.D.]

particularly Prussian diplomacy put in a strong and well-grounded claim to it. It was frustrated principally through the desertion of Austria, although Germany was prepared to further special Austrian interests even to the extent of making the archduke Charles the future governor of the country.

But the policy displayed by Metternich in relation to the reconstitution of the German states was even more prejudicial. When in February, 1813, Alexander and Prussia swore to the alliance of Kalish, they thought they could set aside all the German princes who merely depended on the fate of Napoleon, particularly those in the confederation of the Rhine, and promised the people a constitution founded on the purest German elements in the national character. At that period a Prussian empire was not far from the thoughts of those who had taken the oath, but this was soon thrust into the background. In consequence of Austria's co-operation in the anti-Napoleon alliance, all prospect of it faded so completely that even before the battles of Katzbach and Dennewitz the three allies had agreed as to the impossibility of restoring Germany to the rank of an empire. Austria, acting as an independent power, went even further, by the Treaty of Ried assuring complete and unconditional independence to Bavaria (October 8th, 1813); and similar treaties followed with Würtemberg and Baden, Frankfort and Fulda.

Naturally Hanover, Hesse, Brunswick, Oldenburg, and other states could no longer be withheld from their exiled princes, and the continuance of the innumerable German principalities was assured, before ever the Rhine was crossed.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION

In such circumstances it was far from easy to find any constitution which would give to the German people more than the merest semblance of united political action. To endeavour to establish this was the task of the German commission at the Vienna congress, chosen from Austria, Prussia, and the principalities. Of course they did not occupy themselves with the fantastic plans which dilettante patriots had hatched—for instance, with Görres' idea of again raising Austria to the imperial dignity, whilst the Prussian ruler should at the same time be made king of Germany. The groundwork upon which they built was rather an idea of Stein's proposing a supreme directory for the federated countries, consisting of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Hanover; the assembly of the confederation to be formed of representatives of the princes and diets collectively. Direct revenues, as, for instance, border taxes, were allotted to cover the expenses of the federal body, which moreover guaranteed to all its members definite political rights.

These proposals on the part of Prussia (dated September 13th, 1814) were opposed by twenty-nine small states, probably not, however, because the propositions went too far, but rather because they did not go far enough. On the 14th of November they declared that a universally acknowledged sovereign head was needed to rule over the German nation, and that they in their departments—*viz.*, the several divisions—would be ready to bear their share in the making of laws and the settlement of taxes.

It is true that the originators of this declaration in a measure laid themselves open to the suspicion that by these amplifications of the more moderate demands of Prussia they desired to defeat the latter, particularly in the question of the directory; but in the main there is no doubt that they were in earnest. However, from the outset there was no chance of their being able to enforce their demands. The Prussian draft underwent, in the first place, sundry alterations by the advice of Metternich, principally consisting of the removal of its more liberal provisions. On the 16th of October the two great

powers laid the twelve articles before the three princes, who signified their assent.

Accordingly Germany fell into seven divisions—Austria and Prussia making two, and Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hanover counting as one. This was to be the dominating part, these three taking the lead in the confederation diets, assuming the duty of inspecting the confederate troops, and having the last word in all jurisdiction. They jointly formed the council of the head division and were given the executive power, the right of diplomatic representation, and the decisions as to peace and war. In the matter of law-making they were to be assisted by the council of the divisions formed out of the remaining states and mediatised houses. This plan was unquestionably of purely artificial growth, but as it had an historical foundation and as the force of circumstances pretty well tended in this direction, there was hope of its feasibility. Opponents, however, appeared on every hand. Metternich himself was the first to throw obstacles in the way. At any rate his faithful supporter F. Schlegel sowed broadcast a doggerel poem in fourteen stanzas, intended to sting the small states. There was not much wit discoverable in them, though some obscure and tolerably gross rhymes upon Prussia might pass for it.

The small states retorted with the address of November 14th already mentioned. But the most violent attacks proceeded from the secondary states; Bavaria and Würtemberg demanding with cool effrontery the same number of votes as Austria and Prussia, and moreover a change in the president. In spite of this, however, they had no intention of renouncing their independent rights in matters of peace and war. Indeed, their impudence went so far that Wrede hinted at French support, and Würtemberg, on the 16th of November, broke up the sitting.

Upon this, Metternich himself declared most emphatically that it did not lie in the power of any individual prince to settle whether he would or would not join the confederation, and that each one was bound to make any sacrifice which the good of the whole should require from him; but the only answer which the king of Würtemberg made was that he must persevere in his demand. That answer had the effect of driving the German section out of the sitting, and they never again assembled.

Strained Relations of Austria and Prussia

It is certain that the factor which principally contributed to this result was the increasing tension between Austria and Prussia on the Polish-Saxon question, which led to the secret alliance between Austria, Saxony, France, and England, and to which the secondary states were parties. It was not until this conflict had become somewhat milder in tone that the German question could again be discussed. The impulse was given by an address from thirty-two princes and towns, the "lesser potentates" as they called themselves, demanding a general congress representing all the German peoples. Prussia joined Austria in drawing up two new drafts; in one of which the arrangement of the divisions was superseded, whilst the second assigned to the lesser princes two seats in the upper council chamber, so that these would have nine representatives, without any increase in the number of the divisions.

Moreover, it rigorously maintained the demand that each country should have provinces with minimum rights exactly defined, and that these individual constitutions should come under the jurisdiction of the confederation. Certain fundamental privileges, as, for instance, right of emigration, freedom of the press, or suspension of serfdom, should also be provided for in the charter of the confederation.

The Austrian Draft

Besides these Prussian propositions there now appeared two other plans, one from Mecklenburg, which it is needless to particularise further, and an Austrian draft from the pen of Baron von Wessenberg. This latter was in all essentials taken as the basis of the new German Confederation. It gave to all its members absolutely equal rights, including the right to the presidency, assured a constitution to each state severally to be granted within the space of one year, and promised certain fundamental privileges to the entire nation. Whatever secret umbrage Metternich may have taken at this, he none the less declared Baron von Wessenberg's draft to be the more suitable, and revised it to his own mind, William von Humboldt doing the same from the Prussian point of view.

On the 11th of May new negotiations were opened upon these two drafts, and on the 23rd an agreement was arrived at which, whilst it closely followed the original Wessenberg draft, nevertheless evaded most of the more democratic concessions. But the secondary and minor states were at last invited to take part in the conferences. Eleven sittings, from May 23rd to June 10th, were necessary to complete the business. The alterations yet to be made were unimportant, several enlightened applications from some of the smaller states being simply disregarded. Würtemberg and Baden had taken no part in the councils and refused to append their signatures. It even cost the Prussian delegates a struggle before they decided to sign. They first made a solemn declaration that they had wished to give this charter wider powers and a greater facility and decisiveness in operation, but that it was, after all, better to have for the present a less complete federation than no federation at all, it being reserved for the federal assemblies to supply the aforesaid needs. This was in fact a bill drawn on the future, which could not avail the people much.

Moreover the agreement, according to which the assembly of the confederation was to meet not later than September 1st, 1815, was not adhered to. At first the continuation of the war gave a colourable excuse. Then all questions of boundaries between the different states had first to be settled, and this was no light task. Baden and Würtemberg took a long time to decide upon belonging to the confederation at all, and at the beginning of 1816 a war threatened to break out between Bavaria and Austria on the subject of the possession of Salzburg. Prussia would have preferred coming to an agreement with Austria, previous to the meeting of the confederation assembly, on the subject of Germany's future military constitution, and on this account showed no disposition to hasten events. Indeed, when in the summer of 1816 the different members gradually assembled in Frankfort, Prussia was among the last. The delegates of the smaller states were obliged to wait with what patience they might till their greater brethren joined them, and the first sitting took place on the 5th of May, 1816, instead of on the 1st of September, 1815.

Naturally, the national interest in the new order of things, which had never, even at the beginning, been very great, was by this time somewhat weakened. However, there had at that time been some high-sounding phrases bandied about which awoke confidence in natures blessed with trustful dispositions; but as no deeds followed these words, the nation fell for the most part into an indifferent and contemptuous mood. As Stein declined the offer of being either Austrian or Prussian delegate at the meetings, on the ground that a strong and sensible development of the constitution was not to be expected, public opinion was convinced that the diet would lead to no result and withheld the confidence demanded from it. This was unjust towards some of the states, and particularly in the case of several of the Frankfort delegates.

Among the representatives there was more than one who dedicated himself to the task with eagerness and hope, and who worked unweariedly to raise the diet in the eyes of the people and to make it the real axis of Germany's destiny.

But in the case of the greater states and their envoys, it must be confessed that the contrary spirit predominated. Würtemberg and Baden were dragged into it, so to speak, by the hair of the head, Bavaria and Saxony being almost as unwilling. Between Austria and Prussia the liveliest mistrust existed from the very first, and whilst the Prussian envoy, Von der Goltz, was partly through physical suffering disabled from taking more than a very insignificant part in the proceedings, and remained isolated in the midst of his brother delegates, Count Buol-Schauenstein, the Austrian, sought to unite his interests as closely as possible with those of his colleagues. He succeeded the more easily in that Prussia's never-ceasing purpose was to adjust the military concerns of the confederation in intimate connection with the armies of the two great powers, and to this end kept up negotiations with Metternich. Buol-Schauenstein skilfully allowed just enough of this plan to become known to the other envoys to make them distrustful, and untiringly repeated, on his own faith and that of his emperor, the soothing assurance that they intended to do all in their power to make the confederation strong and self-supporting.

CONSTITUTIONS IN THE VARIOUS STATES

Of popular representation in the diet of the confederation there was of course no question. At the Vienna congress, when the press had already hinted at some hope of the kind, the Prussian plenipotentiary, Wilhelm von Humboldt, expressed the opinion that they were a long way from that. All the more earnest was the desire among those in the diet who occupied themselves with politics that the individual states, at least, should send delegates from the provinces.

The charter of the confederation had indeed promised as much in Article 13, or, as the diplomatists wittily interpreted it, had at least prophesied this; for, out of the provision in the Wessenberg draft that, within one year, in all states included in the confederation a separate constitution should be established, the period mentioned (one year) was at first omitted, and eventually out of the "should be" a mere "would be" was made. The ardour for fulfilment raised by these prophecies was now very different in the different states. It was keen in the south German states, probably not out of enthusiasm for a liberal policy or from strength of conviction, but rather out of a just conception of their special needs. To these states nothing was more certain than the desire to keep themselves free from any interference on the part of the confederation. At this time the assembly was far from being sufficiently strong as an organisation to allow of its making any really dangerous attempt of that kind. For that, the deed constituting the confederation on which they must base all their actions was quite insufficient.

It was meanwhile necessary to lose no time in giving the individual states a weapon in new constitutions strong enough to defend them against future attempts of the kind. The more strongly organised were the separate states in their own division and the firmer their defences, the fewer gaps they would present through which the confederation might gain a footing. That it was this consideration which drove the princes of southern Germany to apportion the constitutions is shown by the time at which they took this step. As soon as the kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg became acquainted with the first Prussian draft of the 13th of September, 1814, and all the rights to Germans vouched for therein, they gave their ministers orders to work out plans for

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new constitutions and to seek alliance from the old provincial estates in order that, after securing their co-operation, they might oppose with effect any further demands.

As this danger became less threatening, their ardour grew less, but they were still cunning enough to adhere to the beaten way, and after a time could not have retreated if they would. Indeed, as the Prussian king took less and less interest in the diet of the confederation, the south German princes felt more and more inclined to foster theirs and thus win an advantage for themselves in public opinion as opposed to the north Germans.

After many years of such preparation, Bavaria gained a constitution for herself on the 26th of May, 1818, Baden following on the 22nd of August, on the lines of the liberal opinions of the day. The grand duke of Baden, further, linked with this an especial purpose. His only relative of equal rank with himself was his uncle, Ludwig—a collateral branch of the grand ducal house, the counts of Hochberg, not being reckoned in the same status. For this difficulty, Austria, in the Treaty of Paris of 1814, had provided for the event of the extinction of the direct line by assuring part of the country to Bavaria. But neither the grand ducal house nor the people were content with this prospect, and the constitution was to become one weapon the more with which to contest Bavarian claims. Thus in its first articles it provided that the counts of Hochberg, raised to the rank of markgrafs of Baden, should inherit.

Whether this decision would really have been of the expected efficacy if other and stronger influences had not come to the help of the hopes of Baden, may be questioned. As a matter of fact, Bavaria, urged thereto by Alexander, resigned her claims after 1818 in exchange for certain concessions and 2,000,000 florins; and after the death of the grand duke and his uncle Ludwig, the latter's half-brother, Leopold I (of the Hochberg line) actually ascended the throne of Baden.

The discussions and strife in Würtemberg excited the attention of Germany to an even greater degree than the Bavarian and Baden constitutions. Here, in 1806, the despotic Frederick I, a true prince of the confederation of the Rhine and a warm adherent of Napoleon, had on his own initiative broken up the long-established divisions. Now when, in 1815, he wished to give a new constitution to the country, he had to suffer the mortification of seeing the representative whom he had himself selected refuse his proposal and coolly demand the restoration of the former constitution. In spite of its defects, in spite of its antiquated decisions, it seemed more desirable to the Würtembergers to trust to the gradual development of a recognised and well-tried legal basis than to accept from the grace of a king favours which his caprice might sooner or later revoke.

With such a character as Frederick I this plan was certainly inexpedient, although, in either case, it meant everything to them. But their subsequent conduct appears both unpractical and impolitic; for in 1816, after Frederick's death, when his son William, a broad-minded monarch with true patriotic instincts, through his minister Von Wangenheim laid a very liberal proposal before them, the estates met him with the same persistent refusal.

Their alleged reason was that they must insist on the restoration of the Tübinger agreement, made in 1514. The constitution decreed was given by a trustworthy monarch and was better suited to the time and to their needs than the demands made by the Würtembergers, but nevertheless they persisted in their opposition and triumphantly joined in Uhland's verse:

No prince was ever yet so lofty placed,
So high elect above all other men,
That, if the thirsty world for freedom prayed,
He could assuage its thirst by his sole word;

So claiming by his sovereignty alone
To hold the balance of all right and wrong,
And weigh out justice to th' impatient world,
As much, or little, as seems good to him.

King William, in spite of the irritated mood which pervaded the people, did not break off the negotiations; and it was partly owing to his skill, partly to dread on the part of the estates that they might not eventually get back their old and evil constitution even should they succeed in trifling away the new and beneficial one, that on September 26th, 1819, just as the reaction was making itself strongly felt, an arrangement was reached which enabled the country to be included among the constitutional states.

Only two years later, in 1821, a similar state of affairs occurred in Hesse-Darmstadt; but with that the number of states in any way important was exhausted. Of the smaller countries, Nassau, Lippe, Liechtenstein, and the Saxon dukedoms were successfully brought into port. Their constitutions contained in certain ways very peculiar conditions; for instance, in Liechtenstein it was stipulated that the representatives should possess landed estates of a certain value and "conciliatory dispositions."

Saxe-Weimar was ahead of the other minor states; for Charles Augustus, Goethe's friend, was the first German prince who fulfilled Article 13 of the Act of Confederation, since he had conferred a constitution on this little state by May 15th, 1816, and, by the abolition of the censorship and the introduction of freedom of the press, had further practically evinced his liberal views.

THE CONSTITUTION IN NORTHERN GERMANY

In north Germany matters were so fundamentally different that in 1819 Joseph Görres, a man who, with no great love for the Frenchified south German constitutional forms, was yet willing to see representation introduced into every country, was justified in openly complaining that whilst one half of Germany was afflicted with St. Vitus' dance, the other half was lame with a bad foot.

The constitutions of some of the states might certainly be preserved as curiosities. The royal Saxon provincial diets fell into seven divisions, which never assembled as a whole, but of which two, that of the knightly order and that of the burgesses, were again subdivided after the divisions of the country; so that the public wit might with justice say, the diet were playing at puss-in-the-corner.

In Mecklenburg the government was, as in our own day, well disposed towards reforms; since it actually possessed in one part of its territory (the Domanium) unlimited power; but, as an offset, it was in another part absolutely powerless against the knights and land-owners, who would not hear of any innovation; refusing, for instance, every reform in taxation, because the imposts had been fixed, sixty years previously, for all time. In Oldenburg there was no representation of the people at all; they "preferred waiting to see how the new idea worked in other countries." In Hanover the nobles would have preferred restoration of the fourteen different constitutions which existed before the French régime; but here the government took energetic measures by convening a "general diet," the constitution of which assuredly did not correspond with the legitimate desires of the people, for whilst the nobility were represented by forty-three members the peasant classes had only three representatives. It can hardly be wondered at that the assembly was as reactionary as it could possibly be, refusing to make its proceedings public, objecting to the establishment of a uniformity in coins and measures as in Hanover, and scarcely permitting the introduction of an equitable scheme of taxation.

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To go into the constitutions of the remaining north German states would not be interesting. They all shared more or less the antediluvian character of those already described, and in no way showed any liberal tendency; they all clung to the ways of the Middle Ages, favouring the nobility and clergy rather than the citizens, and utterly subordinating the peasants. They were the exact opposite of the constitutions the time demanded—the so-called representative system which was to give to every citizen in the state who was a rate-payer, up to a certain amount, equal voting rights and, therefore, equal influence on the formation of the diet. But at least they fulfilled to the letter the guarantees of the Act of Confederation. In the largest states, even in Prussia, this remained unfulfilled, although by the solemn promise of the king it had acquired a new and higher value. This want was a circumstance which told heavily against Prussia's internal development as well as against her position among the states of Germany.^b

THE WARTBURG FESTIVAL (1817 A.D.)


The results of the measures soon showed themselves.^a The new patriotic spirit maintained itself only in the universities. Many volunteers had returned from the camp to the lecture-rooms, where they continued their former adherence to the high-flown ideas of the war of Liberation, and inspired the younger generation with enthusiasm for the same.

"They rejoiced in their reconquered fame," writes Heinrich Zschokke, "and wished to see at least as much liberty and justice for their own people as they had helped to conquer even for a hostile nation. The importance of the times had made them more earnest, more on fire for everything that had to do with German strength, greatness, and freedom. The result was that in the universities, among themselves, they laid aside their former dissolute ways, became more moral, industrious, and religious, adopted the simple dress of the thoughtful Middle Ages, and sought to banish everything strange, which had from the sheer love of imitation become associated with German life." A very important step for the improvement of manners in the universities was taken when they did away with the rude "code of students' law," broke up the different unions which until now had been the cause of endless brawls, and formed one general association of students. The high aim of this new great association was moral and scientific improvement in the service of the common fatherland.

Whilst the transformation of the unions into the association was being effected in the different universities, the year 1817 opened, closing the third century since the beginning of the church reformation. From various sides calls were issued to celebrate this anniversary with as much solemnity as possible, without provoking intolerance against the Catholic church. In Jena the students conceived the idea of the celebration of the secular festival by the entire German Students' Association on the time-honoured Wartburg, and making the same occasion also serve to commemorate the battle of Leipsic. This proposal met with universal approval. Berlin, Erlangen, Giessen, Göttingen, Halle, Heidelberg, Leipsic, and Marburg early sent to Jena their promise to take part in the festival. Thus on the morning of the 18th of October, amidst the ringing of bells, a long procession of students, whom the professors Schweitzer, Oken, Fries, and Kieser joined, wended its way from Eisenach up to the Wartburg. There, in the gaily decorated Knights' Hall, the student Riemann of Jena, a knight of the Iron Cross, made the address of the occasion, in which he exhorted all "to strive for every human and national virtue, and to stand at all times by the great German fatherland." Thereupon Pro-

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fessor Fries turned to those assembled and addressed them, concluding with the words: "Let, therefore, our motto be: 'One God, one German sword, one German spirit for honour and justice!'" Finally Oken also delivered a speech in which he laid especial stress on the idea that concord and patriotism must always be the bond uniting the German youth. The festive procession then descended to the town, where a service was held in the principal church, and the proceedings of the day terminated with a gymnastic display on the market-place and esplanade. Unfortunately, another rejoicing took place in the evening, which was to lead to the most dire results.



RUINS OF THE CASTLE OF GODESBERG

In order to light a bonfire on the Wartenberg, which lies opposite to the Wartburg, part of the students organised a torchlight procession to that place, and while the flames of the wood-pile were rising high youthful enthusiasm overflowed. Audacious and thoughtless words fell, and when the proposal was made to turn the bonfire into a sort of patriotic *auto-da-fé* and to burn all those pamphlets which sought to check the new ideas, there was loud rejoicing. From all sides pamphlets—or their titles merely—were brought forward: Ancillon's *Sovereignty and Political Science*, Colln's *Intimate Letters*, Dabalow's *Thirteenth Article of the German Act of Confederation* (in which the establishment of a constitution was promised), Von Haller's *Restoration of Political Science*, Janke's *The Cry for a Constitution of the New Preachers of Liberty*, Immerman's *A Word of Reflection*, Von

Kamptz's *Code of the Gendarmerie*, Kotzebue's *History of the German Empire*, and many others were cast into the flames.

This overflow of exuberance would probably not have been generally noticed had not Kamptz, Janke, Schmalz, and a few others made a great commotion over the "utter wantonness of such doings." The high diplomacy seized the opportunity for demanding accurate information from the government of Weimar, and when the report proved unsatisfactory a special embassy appeared at Weimar and Jena in order to take severe proceedings against these "unheard-of machinations highly dangerous to a well-ordered state." A great inquiry was instituted, the association was broken up, a strict censorship imposed, and social life subjected to sharp control. Everywhere a lookout was kept for political agitations, revolutionary attempts, and daring attacks on the dignity of the governments. Thus the movement was invested with a significance entirely foreign to it, while embitterment and a passionate longing for liberty were evoked amongst the young enthusiasts, who began to regard adherence to the association as a sacred duty and a heroic deed. The governments next sought to draw together in closer union, so as to be able to meet the "revolutionary endeavours" more effectually. In the autumn of 1818 a

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new congress met at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), and there the position of Germany was discussed by Metternich, Capo d'Istria, Wellington, Canning, Hardenberg, and Humboldt in the presence of Emperor Alexander, Emperor Francis, and King Frederick William III: not much concerning this gained publicity; it was known only that France had been solemnly admitted into the Holy Alliance.

MURDER OF KOTZEBUE (1819 A.D.)

Metternich showed himself highly pleased at the result of the congress; he had won a great influence over King Frederick William, and now hoped to exert an influence on the intellectual life of Prussia. The opportunity arose sooner than he had dared to hope. The winter was not yet over and a correspondence was still carried on between Vienna and Berlin concerning the measures to be adopted for banishing the evil spirit of revolution, when news spread through Germany that caused the deepest emotion in palace and cottage: August von Kotzebue, the well-known dramatist, had been stabbed on the 23rd of March in Mannheim by a student, Karl Ludwig Sand, and there was no doubt that a political motive was the cause of the crime.

Sand, born at Wunsiedel in Bavaria, had taken part in the war of Liberation, had then joined the association, and had become more and more embittered against the hindrances to a free political life. Carried away by enthusiasm, he determined to awaken his people out of their stupefying sleep by a great deed. Kotzebue had drawn on himself the hatred of all patriots, not only by the malicious defamation with which he persecuted such men as Arndt, Jahn and Oken, but also because he was thought to be a Russian spy. Sand therefore determined to make him the means of giving a warning to his brethren. He travelled on foot from Jena to Mannheim, and stabbed Kotzebue in his study with the words, "Here, traitor to the fatherland!" Then he descended to the street, knelt down, and stabbed himself in the breast, saying, "Long live my German fatherland." But the wound was not fatal; Sand was first taken to the hospital and to prison, then tried, and publicly executed on the 20th of May, 1820.

As soon as Metternich heard of Sand's act he was sure of his game. Immediately he represented to Berlin that passion and violence could be banished only "by severity and fear," and that the organisation of the German Confederation must be completed by a new congress. Prussia immediately consented to the proposal, the secondary states also agreed, and the congress met that very summer (1819) in Karlsbad. Before Metternich appeared at the congress in Karlsbad, he sought to assure himself completely of the king of Prussia; he obtained an audience of the monarch, who was undergoing a cure at Teplitz, and he quickly and completely won him over to his views and principles.

"You have come to visit me in a serious time," said the king on receiving Metternich; "six years ago we had to fight the enemy in the open—now he steals about in disguise. You know that I place every confidence in your views. You warned me long ago, and everything has happened as you foresaw."

The depressed spirits of the monarch were very welcome to Metternich; he replied to the king that the emperor Francis was also of the opinion that the disorder had reached an unheard-of height in Germany, and that it must be dealt with most energetically. Austria was prepared to help Prussia, but the latter must proceed with all severity, according to definite principles.

"You are entirely right," replied the king; "and it is also my desire that during your stay such principles should be laid down as can be carried out

inviolably. I wish you to lay them down with the chancellor of state, Hardenberg."

"The whole affair depends on one question," replied Metternich. "If your majesty is resolved not to introduce representation of the people into your state, the possibility of help is at hand; otherwise there is none."

"That was already my idea," replied the king. "Try to bind the delegates to the conference by writing."

THE KARLSBAD DECREES

These words sealed the fate of Germany for several decades. In his perplexity and depression the king of Prussia surrendered himself into the hands of Austria; and his chancellor, Hardenberg, who still wished to redeem the promise given to the people, was unconditionally handed over to the Austrian minister. Prince Metternich triumphantly sent word to the emperor Francis at Vienna, and then, certain of victory, appeared at the conference in Karlsbad. Here also he had free play, as Hardenberg's opposition was broken; all his proposals "for the radical cure of the revolutionary spirit" were immediately accepted. They were directed (1) against the "misinterpretation" of Article 13 of the Act of Confederation (concerning the introduction of a constitution); (2) against the insufficiency of the means for maintaining the authority of the diet; (3) against the "acknowledged defects" of the school and university system; (4) against the "abuses of the press"; (5) against the "criminal and dangerous agitation to bring about a revolution in Germany."^d

The Karlsbad Decrees abolished the freedom of the press throughout Germany, established a committee of inquiry for the confederation in Mainz to cope with the "demagogical intrigues"—such was the name applied to the still very indefinite efforts towards nationalism and liberty, especially those of the young students—and placed the universities under strict supervision.^e

Nothing has contributed more than these decrees to alienate the peoples and irritate them against princes, governments, and authorities. From such conditions, as Niebuhr prophesied, must arise a state of existence without love, without patriotism, without joy, and full of ill-feeling and bitterness between governments and subjects. Stein expressed himself on the subject of this policy in similar language.^f

In Prussia the immediate consequence of the Karlsbad Decrees was the resignation of several ministers, chief of whom being Wilhelm von Humboldt, brother of the celebrated author of the *Kosmos*. The name of Wilhelm von Humboldt had been intimately connected with the intellectual revival of Prussia; he had been one of the Prussian plenipotentiaries at the congress of Vienna, and subsequently a member of the Prussian council of state; but having become involved in political disputes with Hardenberg he had been sent into honourable exile as ambassador to London.^a

In January, 1819, he was recalled thence to take his place in the cabinet, and as "constitution minister" was intrusted with the direction of the affairs of the estates and communes. During the congress of Vienna the king of Prussia had issued as a "pledge of faith" the famous ordinance concerning the popular representation which was to be brought into existence. In accordance with this, and with the object of creating popular representation, provincial estates were to be organised or restored, and from them the assembly of the representatives of the country was to take its origin. The sphere of activity of the representatives of the country was to extend to the giving of advice on all subjects of legislation which concerned personal and individual rights, including taxation. For the organisation of the provincial estates and

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the representation of the country, as well as for the drafting of the constitutional charter, a commission was to be immediately appointed. In the succeeding years, these promises of a general constitution charter and representation of the estates of the realm were again repeated. The people, especially in the Rhine districts and the other newly acquired territories, demanded with increasing urgency the fulfilment of these promises. Humboldt's recall raised hopes that the work of constitution-making would now be begun in earnest, and it was not his fault that those hopes were deceived.

Although the pursuit of demagogues was already in full swing and the opening of the Karlsbad conference was close at hand, Humboldt had applied himself courageously to his task. Faithful to the principle he had developed in several memorials—that a representative constitution raises the moral force of the nation, strengthens the state, and affords a sure pledge both of its safety in regard to foreign countries and of its progressive development at home—he proceeded to draw up a constitutional charter. An inner committee was formed in the constitutional commission appointed two years before. But it soon became apparent that Humboldt and his views would not be able to prevail, although he modified them to a mere advisory competence of the estates of the realm. The ruling spirit in the ranks of the government, to which even the chancellor Hardenberg submitted, desired only the provincial estates. In this moment came the Karlsbad Decrees, and for the time being there could be no further question of representative government in Prussia. Humboldt designated the decrees as “unnational, disgraceful, calculated to enrage a thinking people,” and proposed their withdrawal; in this he was supported by the ministers Beyme and Boyen, but they were met by an unfavourable response from the king, and the three ministers retired from office.^f

General von Grolman tendered his resignation to Frederick William III because the present times and the sad years he had lived through since 1815 compelled him to do so. The celebrated professor of theology in Berlin, De Wette, was dismissed because he had written a letter of condolence to the unhappy mother of Sand; Ernst Moritz Arndt saw himself entangled in a long investigation during which he was suspended from his office; Görres fled to Switzerland to avoid annoyances; and Jahn, the founder of the gymnastic clubs, was arrested by night and taken to Spandau, and later to Küstrin and Kolberg, because he was accused of having first taught the highly dangerous doctrine of the unity of Germany. After many years of imprisonment he was at last liberated, but banished for life to Freiburg-an-der-Unstrut. Even Gneisenau was suspected and surrounded by spies, because he had said that the royal promise should be redeemed and the people given the promised constitution. But the government acted most rigorously against the youth of the country; in all the universities extensive persecutions of “demagogues” were started; a great number of students were arrested and put into prison. Everyone who occupied himself with the affairs of the fatherland or publicly uttered the word “Germany” was suspected of being concerned in political agitations, and ran the risk of being suddenly seized and put under lock and key.^a

The inquisitorial zeal led to the most absurd and malicious blunders, and the regular judicial forms were violated in the grossest fashion. The Prussian state newspaper published abstracts of documents which were said to reveal “the existence of a union composed of evil-disposed men and misguided youths, and having branches in several German countries,” a secret confederacy which aimed at creating in Germany a republic founded on unity, liberty, and so-called national spirit, and which proposed to realise its plans by open violence and the murder of princes and citizens.

Similar persecutions took place in other German countries besides Prussia.

The discovery of the Young Men's League *Jünglingbund*, with its vague fantastic projects, which had branches in various universities, gave a fresh impulse to the demagogue hunt and brought a great number of really harmless young men into captivity. The alleged Men's League, which was said to have conspired with the league of the young men, could not be discovered, in spite of every search. A word expressive of a national German patriotism sufficed to arouse suspicion of demagogical tendencies. Vile informers like the notorious Witt von Dörring found a rich field for labour and reward. But the persecuted members of the students' societies sang in sight of their "ruined citadel" Binzer's mournful, pious song:

The house may fall; what then?
The spirit survives in us all and God is our fortress.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY ACT OF VIENNA (1820 A.D.)

The course begun at Karlsbad of eluding the confederation diet was immediately continued. It seemed to Prince Metternich that the work of reaction had not yet been completed, and in particular that the blows struck at the parliamentary constitutions had not been sufficiently severe. All the states of the confederation were now invited to send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order to prepare decrees of the confederation on the general affairs of that body. The further development of the confederation, the abrogation of the fundamental law which the Act of Confederation had designated as the first business of the confederation assembly, was accordingly delegated to a conference of ministers, under the eye of the Austrian government. The decisions of the conference were then accepted by the diet, in open violation of form, as the Supplementary Act of Vienna (*Wiener Schlussacte*), and, as the second fundamental law of the confederation, were given the same force as the Act of Confederation (June 8th, 1820). The Supplementary Act of Vienna consists of sixty-five articles, and contains, in three sections, (1) general decisions concerning the constitution of the confederation, the rights and duties of the confederation assembly; (2) rules concerning foreign and military relations; (3) special decisions on the subject of the internal relations of the states of the German Confederation.

The amplification of the main features of the Act of Confederation as contained in this second fundamental law exhibited throughout the reactionary spirit of the times, and there was no attempt to meet the nationalist tendencies of the people. The international character of the confederation, the full sovereignty of the princes was everywhere brought into prominence, and there was no mention of extending the central power where it was a question of satisfying national demands, but only where development in the direction of liberty was to be baulked in the separate states. The Metternichian doctrines concerning the parliamentary constitutions were not indeed fully expounded in the Supplementary Act, but their traces were very plainly visible. The confederation marked out the farthest bounds to which the constitutions might advance in order not to prejudice the first object of the confederation, namely, the maintenance of the monarchical principle; and those bounds were sufficiently narrow.

Thus in the Vienna Supplementary Act it was laid down that as the German Confederation, with the exception of the free cities, consists of sovereign princes, the whole power of the state must remain concentrated in its supreme head, and a parliamentary constitution can bind the sovereign to co-operation with the estates only in the exercise of specified rights. The sovereign princes

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united in the confederation could not be limited or hindered in the fulfilment of their obligations to that confederation by any parliamentary constitution. If the internal peace of any state of the confederation is endangered by resistance on the part of the subjects to the authorities, and the government itself appeals for the aid of the confederation, the assembly is bound to render it the speediest help for the restoration of order. It is further to be insisted on that the legal bounds of freedom of speech shall not be overstepped in a manner dangerous to peace, either in the parliamentary discussions themselves or in their publication through the press.

If the Austrian views did not triumph to the same extent as at Karlsbad, if the articles concerning parliamentary constitutions were confined to vague generalities, if neither the rights of the estates to grant taxation nor the publicity of parliamentary discussion was abolished, yet the growing jealousy was prejudicial to the central states, which in their alarm at the influence of the great powers of Germany also found a support in foreign governments, and in spite of their dread of revolutionary upheavals could not wholly suppress their apprehension of an attack by the confederation on matters of internal politics. In strange contradiction the absolutist articles were here and there weakened by phrases of constitutional complexion, a monument of the wavering, self-conflicting, vague, and insincere efforts on the part of the central courts which really had long since abandoned their liberalism, but still wished to make capital of it in opposing the great powers.^f A spirited comment on the Austrian views and methods is given in a letter written by Vom Stein to the Freiherr von Gagern:^a

DARMSTADT, September 23rd, 1820.

In Vienna they have done, it must be admitted, only half the work; and, in their discussions over confederation and the confederation system, have not in the slightest realised "the nation." And then the shuddering and shrinking! We wished earnestly enough for harmony between Austria and Prussia—in the main—but we certainly never wished for such a welding together, such an assimilation of things that resemble one another hardly, if at all, as is represented by the relations now vainly established with the peoples of the different governments. Prince Metternich, a born misleader (*gewohnt zu verführen*), is herein misleading the Prussian cabinet, and so does harm to that and to our own cabinet—indeed to us all. Sit upon me (*Schmähen Sie mich*) if this is untruth and nonsense.^g

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY ACT

But the provisions of the Supplementary Act, whether advantageous or compromising in outward show, remained on the whole absolutely devoid of serious consequences. During great movements they were ignored or violated without protest; in the hour of reaction they were reaffirmed; in periods of order, when alone anything valuable or permanent can be created, the Supplementary Act had as little effect on the confederation as the Act of Confederation itself. When the great popular movements that took place in southern Europe from 1821 to 1823 had been completely suppressed, the triumph of reaction in Germany, as in the rest of Europe, was self-evident, quite apart from the new "exceptional and fundamental laws" (*Ausnahms- und Grundgesetze*). As long as the issue was undecided, the enforcement and results of this law were also very indecisive and very diverse, too, in different states.

In Hanover and Brunswick the altered tone and manner of the government gave evidence of how completely it was in accord with legislation of this character, and Count Münster and the Prussian government vied with them in enforcing it; for in practice the former went even beyond the letter of the Karlsbad Decrees, and that in a country which had not exhibited the slightest symptom of the popular commotion to which they applied.

In Nassau, again, these decrees in an aggravated form became the law of the land, and the government took advantage of the situation to browbeat the diet of 1820 even more thoroughly than its predecessors, and vied with Cassel in the diligence with which it enforced stringent measures against the machinations of demagogues.

In Bavaria, on the other hand, the most influential men were averse to allowing their national legislation to be altered by the Karlsbad Decrees and to delivering Bavarian subjects over to the Mainz commission; the government published the September decrees with a proviso safeguarding the sovereignty of the monarch and the inviolability of the constitution and at a later period the Supplementary Act, with the reservation "so far as consistent with the constitution of the country." The Supplementary Act was never published in Württemberg at all.

Neither was it published in Baden. In this country, where Sand's murderous deed had stirred up the most violent commotion, the Karlsbad Decrees were at first obeyed without reservation by the enactment of severe press regulations and strict supervision of the universities and the "democratic" party in the chamber. When the estates of 1820 were again convoked, some of the latter were refused leave of absence, and the publicity of debate was curtailed by reducing the size of the galleries. But immediately after, under the influence of events in Italy and Spain, the government completely changed its attitude: it withdrew the refusals of leave; liberated the Heidelberg bookseller, Winter, who had been arrested at the request of the Mainz commission, after granting him an acquittal in the *Hofgericht* (superior court of justice); proceeded to come to an amicable understanding with the assembled chamber upon financial questions; conferred a wider right of control over the sinking-fund on the committee of the estates; consulted commissioners from the estates in the negotiation of a voluntary loan; and acceded to the wishes of the chamber by reducing the period of military service and enacting a law dealing with ministerial responsibility. The chamber responded to this propitiatory behaviour by modifying its reforming zeal of a year before in harmony with present circumstances, and the diet closed with gratifying results and mutual satisfaction.

The unsettled condition of the world in 1820 stood Darmstadt in even better stead. The proposed constitution of March 18th, 1820, was quite too obviously cut after the pattern of Karlsbad principles. There the nation and the estates were presented with the contemptuous mockery of a proposal to grant a constitution, while at the same time maintaining the absolutism of the ruler in its full extent—to confer with the one hand the right of voting taxes, and take away with the other the right of refusing to vote them: for if the estates should refuse to vote the grant required for the discharge of the obligations of the confederation, the government was to retain the power of exacting nevertheless the necessary sum. The government was to issue police laws and regulations for the administration and the civil service without the concurrence of the estates; in case of need a law was to be valid if ratified by one chamber only; there was to be no right of petition in respect to questions of general policy; a threefold process was to be introduced at elections; and the qualification for eligibility for election was to be raised.

The Remonstrance

The disaffection aroused by these disdainful proposals promptly made the government adopt a half-conciliatory, though still half-menacing tone, in a rescript addressed to the government of the province of Starkenburg. Public irritation was not allayed by this; in speech and writing the mutilated

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concessions were mercilessly tried by the standard of constitutional consistency, with severity and vigour, but with admirable judgment. The limitations of the electoral law were powerless to prevent the election of liberals, most of them independent citizens and peasants (or farmers). Difficulties arose on every side. Of the fifteen *Standesherren*, whose position was determined to their dissatisfaction by an edict issued shortly after the proclamation of the constitution, only one appeared. Thirty-two of the deputies of the second chamber handed in a remonstrance drawn up by *Oberappellationsrath* Höpfner to the effect that the grand duke had promised a comprehensive constitutional charter, whereas the edict was a mere "body of regulations for the estates respecting the functions incumbent on them"; and that consequently, if the prince did not amplify the constitution according to his promise at Vienna, the signatories would refrain from all participation in the business of the estates and would refuse to take the oath. An unsatisfactory answer having been returned, twenty-seven deputies carried out the intention thus expressed, to the open approbation of their constituents. The twenty-three remaining members likewise declared that they had not the remotest idea of regarding the edict of the 18th of March as in any sense the final instrument of the constitution, although they were prepared to take the oath on the understanding that it did not prejudice their right to move resolutions adverse to the edict. The ministry yielded to these representations, and, as a result of protracted negotiation on the part of the government, most of those who had previously refused to take the oath appeared at the opening of the chamber of estates.

The government exhibited an extraordinarily placable and liberal temper. If, as many people averred, it meant to abet the intrigues of the demagogues and so to furnish itself with a pretext for arbitrary action, it had made a gross miscalculation; for the opposition consisted of men of unimpeachable character and moderate views, far removed from political trickery. The calm, dignified, and resolute bearing of the estates, by which even Stein was edified, appeared to produce an effect on the upright mind of the prince, who ended by getting out of humour with the nagging of the ambassadors of the great powers. The ministry made a good impression by the frankness, candour, and modesty they displayed in their statement concerning the condition of the country; the concession of publicity of debate and two speeches and statements made by Grolman, one of the ministers, on the subjects of ministerial responsibility and alteration in the laws of the constitution (which were to be made only by a majority of two-thirds), disposed public opinion much more favourably towards the government. But an absolute ecstasy of rejoicing was called forth by the declaration that the government conferred upon the estates the unconditional right of voting taxes, and that the grand duke, well pleased that Hesse should have a constitution adapted to modern requirements, called upon them to draw up a constitution to the best of their ability and submit it to him for ratification. And the general joy was enhanced by the declaration of the budget, which now showed no deficit, mainly in consequence of considerable economies in court and military expenses. The outcome of the negotiations was a new constitutional charter, which contained emendations, drawn up in a liberal spirit, of all the principal points of the edict of the 18th of March, and, though nominally conferred by the monarch, was really a joint production, the completion of which filled the whole country with satisfaction.


The resistance and repugnance of the small states of south Germany to the idea of being governed by a mandate from Austria was in marked contrast to the tractability of Prussia when she allied herself with Austria. From this time forward it was long an established maxim at Berlin that even ministers who found this alliance troublesome could do no more than tender advice

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which might serve to undermine it at some future time or to evade it by tortuous proceedings. The tone and manner in which—before, during, and after the Karlsbad meeting—Hardenberg's ministry vaunted its readiness to work on Austrian lines had the degrading character of the obsequious flattery of a dependent or satellite. And so sure did Metternich feel of the strength of his influence, in the first flush of officious zeal on the part of Prussian statesmen, that he had the hardihood to try to win over a man like Humboldt to concur in his schemes for the conference of Vienna, in the same way that he had won Hardenberg over at Aix-la-Chapelle.^h

THE ATTEMPT TO FOUND A SOUTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

While Metternich was absolutely sure of Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor was determining that Europe should, as it were, run in the tracks of his policy; and while the emperor of Russia, persuaded and surprised by him,



OLD CASTLE ON THE RHINE

allowed him to do as he liked, the diet at Frankfort, wonderful to relate, threatened completely to balk all his plans. It is interesting to take a look at the men who then sat in the diet—their capabilities, their efforts, the attitude of their states towards the great powers, and the mutual relations of the individual representatives.

With regard to the condition of Germany at that time, nothing had been accomplished with respect to the principal matter at the congress of Vienna which could have satisfied both of the great powers of Germany. Austria had not yet forgotten the German Empire, and looked upon her claim to be the first and leading power in Germany as a self-evident fact; Prussia had expected the supreme direction of affairs as a reward for her late great exertions and her victories over Napoleon. As neither of these two powers made any concessions to the other, they never came to a clear understanding as to their future conduct—as to whether they should divide the leadership of Germany between themselves, or whether they should, formally at least, stand on an equal footing with the other members of the confederation. Austria had kept to a do-nothing policy, till favourable events placed her in a position actually to play first fiddle.

So it happened that the first years of the diet passed by without any important indication of its independent activity. On that account the cabinet of Metternich, as well as that of Hardenberg, had hitherto laid no weight on the point as to which individual of this or that state represented it at Frankfort. Astonished, therefore, and amazed at the possibility of such a thing,

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Metternich, whose eye had been busy with affairs in lower Italy, the Spanish peninsula, Greece, and Turkey, was startled at the existence of an opposition right in the centre of the Frankfort diet—an opposition based, moreover, on liberal principles.

How angry he must have been when he came across the first sure indication of it—angry that he had had no inkling of it before! The Austrian representative in the diet had either quite overlooked this opposition in its very midst, or he had quite misunderstood its nature and importance. The Prussian representative had been to some extent aware of it, but had considered it too unimportant for particular mention in his despatches to his court.

The envoy representing Austria at Frankfort at that time was Count Buol-Schauenstein, a good-natured man, thoroughly imbued with the idea of the supreme greatness and power of his own court. Count Buol was the president of the diet. Besides him Austria had in Frankfort General Langenau, “a man of more than ordinary talent in the discernment and conduct of secret intrigues.” Langenau possessed the confidence of Prince Metternich, who consulted him in all matters specifically German. But Langenau was only imperial commissioner and president of the military committee of the diet, and so could exercise only a moderate influence on parliamentary business. Yet it was maintained that the president, Count Buol, had been obliged to say what Langenau and the other agents of Metternich wanted, and though he spoke vehemently he was unable to argue effectively, so that he was often obliged to participate in decisions that were contrary to his instructions. Count von der Goltz, the Prussian envoy, never contradicted Buol, but was never able to contribute in the least to the defence of any proposition.

THE DISCIPLES OF METTERNICH

Among those who served the policy of Metternich were Von Hammerstein and Von Marschall. Von Hammerstein was a man who on his first appearance had played the part of a liberal, seemed dangerous to Austria, and thereby drew attention to himself. He was considered to be a man of knowledge and understanding, with a certain capacity for intrigue. He also displayed that pride which takes no notice of inferiors. “Herr von Hammerstein,” wrote Langenau to Metternich, “does better every day. He will do us important service if you chain him fast in those fetters which he himself offers us.”

Marschall, the Nassau minister, was a blue-blooded aristocrat, hated vehemently every trace of liberalism, and had shown himself from first to last in such a light that Langenau said of him to Metternich that under all circumstances and for every purpose he could be firmly relied upon. Of the baron von Leonhardi Langenau said that he dared not open his mouth; neither was there any ground to fear the representatives of the so-called free cities: their votes might be reckoned upon, even though the majority of them might chafe in secret. “But in the majority of the representatives,” complains the secret informant of Prince Metternich, “there has sprung up a spirit of opposition which reveals itself in two-fold form under the mask of liberalism, although it is of an out-and-out political nature. The first form is that of legality. No motion is to be put to the vote without strict examination, and everyone is scrutinised in its relation to the letter of the law; each discussion is referred back to general principles—everything to be brought under the scrutiny of the diet. No law is brought forward without subjecting its meaning to an extremely artificial exegesis, so that there is nothing left to expediency. But it is not legality that is the ultimate aim of these sophists, but constitutionalism. The most important thing to them is to render the formal legal equality

of all members of the confederation so unendurable to the greater powers in the diet that the latter will see themselves compelled to play only a passive part in it, and to resist the smaller powers only by this passivity of action. The smaller states will thus win public opinion by their activity in the same proportion as the greater states will lose it by their inactivity, which appears as an obstructive principle.

"The second form is that of nationality. Under this guise they seek to bring to a compromise, by separate agreements, the various and often conflicting interests of the individual small states, and actually to organise leagues within the confederation for the maintenance of the common interests thus established. Why is so much done, and with such zeal and caution, for the organisation of the mixed army corps? Why are differences in rank sunk so easily in order to obtain unanimity on that subject? Why do the joint owners of these corps stand together as one man as soon as they see their independence even remotely threatened? Why, in those states which are ruled by Protestants, has there been shown so much determination in overcoming the difficulties in the way of organising a common system for Catholic church affairs? Has not Würtemberg, in order to bring about the system, subordinated its bishop to the archbishop of Baden? Has not Darmstadt renounced the dignity of metropolitan, which was for so long the ornament of Mainz? Has not the electorate of Hesse given place to the grand duchy of Hesse? Have not even the small states of north Germany been enticed into the south German union? Why are all financial considerations and all local interests put aside in order to bring about the south German commercial league, about which people in Germany are so busy just now?

"The answer is this: public opinion is to be won thereby; those diminutive peoples are to be made to believe in the possibility of their becoming a nation! They are to believe their welfare to be founded on such agreements. They are to take part against those who cannot follow in the same track, because they have other interests, and with this new cajoling of the people and public opinion these liberals wish to stem the influence which, to their intense irritation, they see the great powers exercise on the internal affairs of the German states, and which these great powers are peculiarly fitted to exercise. These men, who are often less liberal than they pretend to be in order to attain their ends, are divided, indeed, into two distinct classes—namely, idealists and realists; but, though looking at things from different points of view, they both strive for the same goal—namely, the organisation of a systematic resistance to the two great powers of Germany!"

THE WORK AGAINST LIBERALISM

In the opinion of the Metternichian diplomat the leader of the idealists was the representative of Würtemberg, Baron von Wangenheim. Von Carlowitz and Von Harnier were more or less of his opinion. Baron von Aretin and Herr von Lepel were looked upon as realists. Aretin let the idealists talk, and while apparently contending with them drew such conclusions as they wished against Austria. Lepel candidly and openly voted for everything directed against the great powers. Herr von Roth followed his lead, whenever possible. The representatives, counts Eybe, Grüne, Beust, and Baron Pentz, were personal friends of the idealists and realists, and though they did not actually undertake anything against the great powers, they could not be utilised for them. "They are not to be depended upon," wrote the secret informer to Metternich; "if any claim is made upon them, the one pleads the demands of honour, the other the law of *The Pandects*; in reality they also

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cater more or less to popularity. It is not clear what are the views of Baron von Blittersdorf; he seems to be at home with all elements."

This opposition was very inconvenient for the Metternich party. "Although we have good elements to rely upon," wrote the Metternichian diplomat, "the foundation of a system of stability and, therefore, the re-establishment of peace cannot be thought of unless both idealists and realists be banished. The diet must be purged. For that Austria and Prussia must work before all things."

The steps to be taken for this purpose were now agreed upon by the Austrian and Prussian cabinets. Austria and Prussia were to take steps in turn and by slow degrees to work against the envoy of this or that court in order to expunge liberal tendencies from the diet of the confederation. They would have liked to begin with Baron Aretin, but caution forbade them. He was the most obstinate and therefore the most dangerous member, and his removal was much to be desired. But Bavaria made a great point of her independence. It was feared that she would be the first to sound an alarm and that she would not be without strong support. Consequently the Bavarian government must not be irritated; it must be given an interest in the matter and be won over to the removal of certain members of the diet.

"Fortunately that is not so very difficult," said the Metternichian diplomat; "for the minister Rechberg forgets the Bavarian anti-Austrian system directly one shows him in a magic mirror the Revolution, and Prince Metternich as its subduer." Thus it was the policy of Austria as well as of Prussia not only to spare the baron von Aretin but even to praise him; Von Rechberg, the Bavarian minister, found this admirable. Every effort was made to keep the Bavarian government in this favourable frame of mind. "If we succeed in this," said Prussia and Austria to each other, "there will be no great obstacle in the way of eliminating the inconvenient members."

They adopted the method of working against one representative at a time, and attacked first one whose court, from one cause or another, it was most easy to isolate from the other courts. The game was considered won if only one envoy was to be recalled on account of his behaviour towards the great powers. For they reckoned thus: "If we show a firm resolve that if necessary the same process will be gone through again, we can certainly rely upon it that the evil spirit which is doing so much mischief in the diet will soon be expelled. It will not again so readily occur to any envoy to foster in his despatches ('which we can for the most part read at our leisure,' says the Metternichian diplomat) that spirit of opposition which is so easily aroused amongst the German princes; rather will they, in order to establish themselves firmly in their quiet and lucrative posts, contribute to induce their courts to meet the views and purposes of the Austrian court, and hence also the Prussian, out of loyal attachment to the old imperial house."

"This," thought Metternich, "is the only way to regain what we have, with most unaccountable carelessness, allowed to be snatched away from us."

The private despatch in which this system was laid down did not remain secret. It was circulated, without any signature, amongst the envoys to the diet. It is not certain even now whether it was from General Langenau or from the former Bavarian representative Von Berstett, who enjoyed the great confidence and consideration of the Austrian diplomats and was much thought of by Metternich. It cannot be contradicted or doubted by anyone that the method actually resorted to coincided with the one expounded in the report.

Several proposals made by Austria in the diet either fell through entirely or were deferred for a more thorough examination. Austria and Prussia were not a little surprised and offended at this. They did not seek for its cause in the nature of the proposals themselves and the manner in which they

were presented and pushed; but, unaccustomed to the failure of their proposals, they imagined the cause to be the hostile feeling of individual courts towards the great powers in the confederation, and still more the liberal tendencies of some of the representatives. Prussia complained in "circular remarks" of "the spirit of passion and arbitrariness which prevails in the diet," and Herr von Gentz set his pen industriously to work against a government which he did not mention by name, but quite sufficiently indicated. This government was that of Würtemberg.

WÜRTENBERG

King William of Würtemberg had for a considerable time been looked upon by Prussia and Austria with mistrust. The king was a convinced adherent of the free tendencies of the time. He took seriously both the constitution and the people, and neither Vienna nor Berlin liked it when he declared in a speech from the throne in the Würtemberg parliament that he had succeeded in winning the surest support of his government, the confidence of his people. Not only did Würtemberg cling to him with affection, but he whose name since the wars had become famous for knightliness and heroism in the mouths of Germans, as well as among other nationalities, was really revered throughout Germany for his patriotism, and in foreign countries for his liberal ideas. In the course of his travels through foreign lands honours were shown to him which fell to the lot of no other prince. In the opinion of many he was the man who ought to stand at the head of Germany, who ought to be German emperor. The king had other thoughts; at any rate they were the thoughts of men who were in daily intercourse with him or particularly intimate with him.

As the encroachments and domineering tendencies of Prussian and Austrian absolutism became more apparent and prominent, there arose spontaneously in the circles whose members were sincerely working to further the welfare of the people a moral and intellectual resistance to this absolutist power which threatened to engulf, with the freedom of the people, also the independence of the princes and states of middle and south Germany. This opposition found a public exponent of its views in the ready pen of a widely known publicist, Friedrich Lindner.

This writer had been living for several years in Würtemberg, and, it was said, on a considerable pension paid him out of the private purse of the king; he was a native of Courland and had come to Stuttgart through the instrumentality of the talented queen, Catherine. In the year 1820 the pamphlet, *The Manuscript from South Germany*, created much stir in diplomatic circles and much public discussion. This state paper was from Lindner's pen. Its fundamental idea was to bring about a sincere union and common plan of action in Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden—that is, a confederation of southwestern German states, which should form a defensive counter-balance to the superior power of Prussia and Austria, and oppose to absolutism the progress of constitutional life and public opinion. This idea at first sight might appear unnational, un-German, because it seemed impossible for Germany to become by its means more intimately united, but rather even more disunited. But when more nearly examined, it was the most natural road towards the unification of Germany. The basis of the idea was that the German people must attain unity through freedom and the development of its material interests. For this purpose there must first of all be founded in southwest Germany a firm centre, to which, in the course of time, the other secondary German states would be attracted by the power and charm of a free national life,

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as well as through the force of material interests. Let this extended confederation once exist, and Prussia herself, for material reasons, must acquiesce and join it. This scheme of a south German union was, under the circumstances, the only practicable one for the freedom and material welfare of Germany. Unfortunately it fell short of realisation at that time. Bavaria and Baden did not join heartily enough with Würtemberg. Neither in Bavaria nor in Baden were the men on the throne and the men in public life of the same calibre as those of Würtemberg. In Bavaria they thought much more of restoring old religious notions than of attaining political freedom and identifying themselves with the German national idea.

GERMANY AND THE GREEK INSURRECTION OF 1821

In the spring of 1821 a revolution broke out on the old classic ground of Greece, with the aim of throwing off the yoke of the Turks. This rising electrified almost the whole of Christian Europe without distinction of political creeds, for it was chiefly a rebellion of nationality and European culture against Asiatic barbarism—a struggle of Christendom against the *Koran*. But one section of the diplomacy of the time, foremost of all the Austrian, looked askance at the struggle, and saw in it only an uprising, a rebellion, a revolution like other revolutions. The Greeks fought heroically and conquered for themselves political independence, in spite of Christian diplomacy. Metternich persuaded the emperor Alexander that it would be the greatest of inconsistencies, after what had been resolved upon in the recent congresses against all and every revolution, to take now the part of the Greeks—of subjects rising in arms against their legitimate ruler, the sultan.

Public opinion declared tyranny to be always illegitimate; the European press repeated it. But the Holy Alliance, which had surrounded itself and its despotism with the incense of Christianity and had anointed itself with the oil of religion, could not, without violating the principles of its own existence, grant this; and it not only refused assistance to the Greek Christians in their deadly struggle, but declared itself hostile to them as revolutionists, and friendly to their unchristian murderers. It was particularly the Austrian and Prussian governments which at the congress of Verona carried through the sentence of condemnation, declaring that the Greeks must submit to their lawful lord, the sultan, and expect only mercy instead of justice from him. In the Greek insurrection Metternich feared a bad precedent and influence upon the Austrian Empire itself.

In Verona it was also resolved to suppress the constitution of the cortes in Spain, and if it did not submit, no longer to recognise the Spanish government—even to support by force of arms King Ferdinand and the reactionary party in Spain; ostensibly “to maintain peace, order, and security in Europe,” but in reality to restore and establish absolutism.

The behaviour of the great powers and the resolutions at Verona greatly injured their reputation in the public mind. In Germany there was great enthusiasm for the Greeks. Prayers, money, arms, volunteers, help of all kinds was offered them. Associations for relief arose everywhere, first in Stuttgart, through the enthusiastic efforts of Schott and Uhland, and in Zurich through Hirzel. Similar associations followed in rapid succession in Leipsic, Aarau, Freiburg, Darmstadt, Heidelberg, Munich, Bonn, and other places. Swabia and Switzerland showed the liveliest and most energetic sympathy, and it was a retired Würtemberg general, the brave Count Norman, who led the most important contingent of volunteers into Greece. Many governments opposed the enthusiasm of the people by prohibitions of appeals, assemblies,

recruiting, and embarkations. Yet some German princes were friendly to the Greek cause—the then crown prince, afterwards King Ludwig of Bavaria, and the king of Würtemberg.

Some of the men in the immediate entourage of the king of Würtemberg, at least one man, interpreted the unexpected rising of the Greeks from a quite peculiar standpoint. This interpretation was put into print, and the pamphlet, or rather the subject of it, seemed to Prince Metternich of such peculiar importance, so much more significant than any other production of the German press, that he sent a despatch of his own, together with an enclosure from Herr von Gentz, to every Austrian embassy at the German courts. Definite instructions were given in the despatch as to how the ambassadors were to act at the courts with regard to this pamphlet.

To quote Metternich himself: "I have felt myself compelled to devote some attention to this publication, which is undoubtedly hostile to us and to our principles, but for the rest is put together not without talent. In the enclosure you will find an analysis of the same, which will be sufficient to convince you that, with our sense of truth and justice, we shall not allow ourselves to be led astray either by sophistries or malicious attacks, if in a case like the present we find it not consistent with our dignity to take any further notice of the true author of this diatribe, whose identification would not be difficult."

The ambassadors, however, were enjoined to make no further use of this despatch and the enclosure than to impart its contents "in confidence" to the minister of foreign affairs at each German court. What sort of men—for one cannot say brains—must at that time have represented so calculating and far-sighted a power as Austria at the German courts! Metternich found it necessary to add to the despatch: "It is not difficult to decide against what and against whom the publication is directed, as the author attacks every existing institution, and notwithstanding his hypocritical apology for the constitution of the confederation every German institution acts quite consistently in particularly anathematising Austria. From his purposely obscure and enigmatical statements, it is not so easy for every reader to understand what he wishes to put in the place of the existing institutions, and how he intends to do it."

The publication bore the title, *On the Existing Condition of Europe: a Statement to Prince*.—It was from the pen of Lindner. He saw in the rising of the Greeks an event of world-historic importance, which had roused Europe from her stationary condition, as well as from her dreams of liberalism, and rendered her capable of a great political regeneration. In this respect Lindner appeared thoroughly revolutionary with a purely political purpose; but he had not so much the people in view as the princes, and particularly a certain class of princes, or rather one particular prince, the king of Würtemberg. Germany was the stage on which the new hero of modern times was to appear and labour. Austria, which had neglected to complete the building up of her supremacy in Germany as well as in Italy by the establishment of a popular system of government based on modern ideas—Austria was on the point, or, after the rebellion of the Greeks, at any rate not far from the point, at which she was to forfeit a great part of her old-time supremacy.

THE SEPARATION OF THE COURTS

Men who were hostile to Austria considered that this juncture should not be allowed to slip by unutilised. Now was the time for those who were oppressed by Austria to rouse themselves to a sense of their strength, to the maintenance of their dignity. According to their view there were at the

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moment only three states of leading influence in the settlement of European affairs, Russia, Austria, and England; all the rest were confined within the magic circle which the policy of these great powers had drawn round them. France had lost, for the time being, all political influence, because her enemies had been astute enough to impose upon her, as her sole task, the struggle with her own liberals; Prussia, these men said, had surrendered herself entirely to Austria, because she had not the courage to declare herself in favour of intellectual freedom, and to step forward as the champion of the peoples; the other German states had either no will or no strength: and so the whole of Germany had become Austrian through the bonds of intellect, friendship, or fear. The present political system had brought no essential or pronounced advantage to any other power. The harvest had been therefore all the greater for Austria. Under the protection of the Holy Alliance, and with a crafty interpretation of its principles, its court had secured to itself the guidance of the spirit of the time, or rather the suppression of it.

Austria ruled with unlimited power in Germany and Italy, because she proclaimed herself the bulwark of all the other states against the dangers which threatened their *status quo*; indeed she had partly invented, partly exaggerated these dangers, in order to get into her own hands the supreme direction of all European affairs. The principle of maintaining existing rights—the system of stability—had, with the help of politics and success, developed to such a degree as to give a decided ascendancy to one power, without either Russia or England having obtained any corresponding advantages. It was as much to the interest of the south German princes as to that of the peoples, to emancipate themselves and the rest of the world from both this system of stability and the ascendancy which Austria had acquired through an insidious application of it.

The rebellion of the Greeks seemed to have shaken to its foundations the system of government hitherto prevailing, and henceforth a separation of the courts was deemed unavoidable, nay, it was considered to have already set in, despite the public efforts of the powers to demonstrate to the world their complete diplomatic agreement. Prussia—so it seemed—could not possibly in future recognise Metternich's system as her own. The hitherto patient confidence of the less powerful states had been the principal support of the system of the greater powers. At a moment when the Greeks were struggling for their national independence it seemed as if Germany also might hope to awake from her stupor and to change the political system under the essentially changed circumstances. To shake off the dependence in which the German states and their governments had been placed by the all-powerful influence of Austria, in the confederation diet, seemed an object worthy of great effort, and even easy to attain, because the path to it had already been paved by the circumstances of the time. Until now Austria had been certain of her supremacy in Germany only through her alliance with the other great powers, particularly with Russia. If this alliance were dissolved through recent events and the consequent springing up of diverging interests, if Russia were to follow a path different from that of Austria, a path loudly demanded by the Russian people who were of the same faith as the Greeks, and dictated by the traditional policy of Russia which aimed at the Dardanelles, then Austria would be isolated, and, taking its ground on the Act of Confederation, Germany would be able to recover her lost dignity and independence. Every sovereign prince could be an example of encouragement. However small his military strength, public opinion could increase it a hundred-fold. A single manly explanation in the diet, made in the face of the world, was sufficient to dissipate the fog which hitherto had rested on the Frankfort proceedings.

The small party, for whose views in these matters Lindner was the exponent, shared the opinion that it must be the voice of a resolute prince in the diet which should give the signal for collecting and uniting all those who were of the same way of thinking. If Austria—as Von Gentz not incorrectly construed their ideas—with her antiquated legal scruples which never troubled either Gentz or Metternich, with her petrified policy, and her fixed opposition to new ideas, were once beaten in the diet, the legislation of the confederation entirely liberalised, and all so arranged that what could not formerly be attained by years of discussion might now be reached by a rapid series of bold motions, then the other barriers would fall of themselves. Then nothing could prevent the restorer of Germany from advancing ever further. This “malicious and clever conceit” from the inner circle of a south German court caused bad blood in all the higher circles of Vienna. Herr von Gentz, and with him Prince Metternich, plainly asserted that it was hoped there that the rising of the Greeks would pave the way for a rising of the Germans, even though the commencement of this rising was intended to be made in constitutional forms.

There was no proof that the king of Würtemberg personally shared these views, and even less that they emanated from him.

LINDNER'S POLICY

Lindner himself had ambition enough, and other individuals under whose influence he wrote had enough private aims to attempt to persuade the king of Würtemberg, under the pretext of a reform of the constitution of the confederation, to propose a dissolution of the confederation in the diet itself. This small party had reckoned rightly at least as far as this, that the king of Würtemberg, if he declared himself against Austria, would be welcomed on all sides as the champion of the fatherland. Public opinion far and wide looked upon this prince, on account of his distinguished personal qualities and disposition, as a ruler destined by Nature herself to become the restorer of Germany. Many a one would have invested him with the highest and undivided power, in order that he might gratify the demands of an enlightened century, of all friends of the people, and of freedom.

But however much the project of the Lindner publication was calculated to displease Austria and Prussia, it hardly succeeded in winning over the friends of the people, because the men who inspired it did not conceal their ulterior plans; at least their mouthpiece, Lindner, betrayed them.

And these ulterior notions were an offence to what the people wanted and what they thought. The project of placing the king of Würtemberg at the head of a south German confederation of constitutional states had scarcely been promulgated by these men in 1820, when, at the beginning of 1822, the same men, in indescribable self-deception, uttered the following to a people thirsting to attain constitutional freedom: “Representative government, under the countenance of which rhetoricians make a living, is already looked upon by the people as an unnecessary burden; the people have ceased to consider it a universal remedy for all political grievances; it has become evident that this expensive institution only serves for the nourishment of party spirit; that it can only weaken and cripple a good, and not ameliorate a bad, government; that it continually introduces a struggle without any result; nobody now imagines that the castle-in-the-air of the liberals is a dwelling place worthy of the century, much less that it can be its fortress.”

Thus greatly did they deceive themselves as to the views and wishes of the German people, and in the same state of delusion they imagined the most re-

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markable feature of the times to consist in this: that the two doctrines which had alternately antagonized and persecuted each other with party rage were abandoned at the same moment by public opinion; the political field was cleared of the weeds of revolution as well as of the poisonous plant of obscurantism. Neither of the two parties any longer found supporters. A new system must be discovered. The head of the new fanaticism, as well as that of the old obscurantism, must be crushed, and the representative system, as well as the system of stability, must be overturned. For this purpose a prince, a German Bonaparte, was necessary, who understood the needs of the times, who could by his own strength bring to bear that law of nature which calls superior genius to rule, and who would root out what still remained of the old privileges and regulations; not, however, to the end of allowing so-called representatives of the people to prescribe new regulations, but to the end of erecting, by his own individual and unlimited rule, a throne worthy of the enlightenment and civilisation of the century.

FAILURE TO FOUND A SOUTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

The adroit pen of the Metternich cabinet knew well how to emphasise before Germany this aim of the scheme as the one and only thing of importance; and, singularly enough, public opinion declared itself for once in accord with Metternich and Gentz. The people wanted something else besides the absolute rule of a prince, who, as the third great power of Germany, would by his care for agriculture and commerce, art and education, skill and talent, and by means of these through the increase of capital, and in general through the furthering of material and social concerns, content the people without popular representation.

If this little party wanted to win public opinion for itself and its plan, it should have taken up again the idea which had electrified the nation in 1814 and 1815, and announced a prince-protector for the German Confederation with a German parliament at his side. The prince who carried through this revolution in Germany had, in the then condition of things, the people of southwest Germany to back him, and even public opinion in the whole of Germany. To a German parliament the southwest German people would have quite willingly surrendered their old individual privileges and constitutions. But the people were repelled by the foolish, because inopportune, scheme to vault over the popular representations of the single states.

And Austria saw this with triumph. She had been startled and amazed at the practical idea of splitting up the parliament by separate alliances and forming a new body politic in Germany, under the protectorate of a south German prince; through their blunder her enemies played into her hands, and she now displayed overweening contempt.

The Viennese government declared: "The German princes are, God be praised, too clear-sighted not to treat this senseless advice as they formerly treated the disorganisation of the confederation through the admixture of democratic elements and afterwards the dissolution of it by disloyal separate alliances. The German princes know what the so-called supremacy of Austrian Germany means; they know whether Austria has ever striven for an unreasonable preponderancy in any one of her political or parliamentary relations; whether she has ever abused her political position for the suppression of the rights of others; whether she has ever injured the independence of the smallest state in the confederation, or ever disturbed the freedom of discussion in the diet by even the appearance of arrogance."

In this contemptuous tone Metternich and Gentz played with the German

princes. Gentz was well acquainted with the old classic saying that the highest degree of slavery is that in which the slaves are forced to appear free. The result showed that the calculations of that small southwest German party, at the end of the year 1822 at the congress of Verona, had completely failed. Contrary to all probability, the emperor Alexander was caught in

the net of Metternich's policy; Russia's government declared Metternich's system to be identical with her own, and what had been loudly proclaimed by the Metternich cabinet as likely to happen, came true; Metternich's political system, called by Gentz the last anchor of social order in Europe, the last bulwark of the civilised world against the invasion of the new barbarians (the revolutionists), stood firm and unshaken. Instead of sinking in the storm of 1820-1822 it allayed and victoriously dissipated the tempest.


"As long," said Gentz in Metternich's name, "as one stone remains upon the other in the European Confederation, no revolutionary imagination will dare to go so far as to wish to annihilate the nucleus of its life and strength, the German Confederation."

History has given the lie to this prophecy.

The cabinet in Vienna did not conceal its indignation against the government in Stuttgart. It maintained that it could scarcely be supposed that the project and the publication had emanated from an individual author; both showed what hopes and schemes occupied the minds of men in certain circles, and though this was no new discovery it was always beneficial when presumptuous confidants brought into

circulation the immature proposals of their party and their unreasonable and impracticable efforts, for they then serve as a warning and instruction to better men.

With such effrontery were Gentz and Metternich emboldened to publish their views on the subject. The king of Würtemberg simply ordered the article, which had appeared in the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, to be reprinted in the newspaper of the Stuttgart court.



DETAIL OF CHURCH OF ST. ULRICH,
AUGSBURG

THE PURIFICATION OF THE DIET

From Vienna and Berlin the governments hastened to change and renew the personnel of the representatives of the diet, whose spirit of opposition threatened to become injurious. The Austrian government exchanged notes with Berlin. It was impossible, Metternich declared, for Austria and Prussia, the governments of which were influenced by the same principles, pa-

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tiently to endure in the smaller German states a spirit of opposition, which was all the more dangerous, because it was called forth or caused by liberal humbug. Already it had reached such a point that the most important offices in certain states were filled by men whose principles were by no means a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of the *status quo* and the assurance of peace and order. It was almost impossible to remove all these men from office. It was, therefore, for Austria and Prussia to work by means of the diet to keep within bounds these unseemly efforts and to remove all opposition. In order thoroughly to attain this object, the sole efficient means was a change in the membership of the diet itself, for there were more than sufficient indications that the official opposition was strengthened and extended through the influence of the views of the opposition members of the diet.

This was evidently aimed at the Würtemberg representative, Von Wangenheim. Prussia agreed with Austria in all these matters, and it was resolved to press forward the renovation of the personnel of the diet.ⁱ

In the winter of 1822-1823 Metternich summoned a number of statesmen, including Count Bernstorff, to Vienna and laid before them a memorial which was the Viennese court's declaration of war against Wangenheim's party. The south German governments, it said, had allowed the democratic elements to make such headway that within a short time even the shadowy image of a monarchical form of government would have slipped through their fingers. That the mere idea of an opposition in the confederation assembly was possible, was sufficient evidence as to how far the latter must have already diverged from its original intention. The diet itself must first be purged from such elements; its methods of carrying on business must be simplified; digression into abstract theories and tribune oratory must be banished; the proceedings must be kept secret. The purified confederation diet should then so interpret the German constitutions "as the highest of the state laws prescribes," for above all secrecy was to be the rule at the discussions of the estates. Steps against the "license of the press" were also to be undertaken on behalf of the confederation, and the period during which the Karlsbad Decrees were to remain in force was to be indefinitely prolonged. It was with difficulty that Bernstorff obtained a few modifications of this plan of campaign, and in particular got rid of the "interpretation" of the south German constitutions.

Wangenheim foresaw his fall. In a malicious pamphlet which excited a great sensation, he characterised the opposition in the confederation diet and the envoys in Frankfort in a few words as "an effort of his student arrogance." The document is known as the *Langenau'sche Note*, because it was attributed to the Austrian general Langenau, the president of the military commission. The court of Stuttgart, which had been profoundly angered at the insignificant rôle to which the lesser German sovereigns had been condemned by the great powers of Europe, for a time still attempted to offer resistance, as did also the other governments guilty of the crime of opposition. But finally they had to give way to Austrian, Prussian, and Russian pressure, not, however, before the great powers had withdrawn their ambassadors from Stuttgart. Wangenheim and others of the less submissive envoys to the diet were recalled. Within a short time the diet was completely reorganised in accordance with the ideas of the two great powers. They themselves appointed fresh representatives in Frankfort; Austria, Baron von Munch-Bellinghausen, an extremely able statesman of the Metternichian school, Prussia, Von Nagler, who, as general postmaster, rendered greater service before and after to the postal system than in his unskilful work at the confederation diet. Soon after, the Würtemberg foreign minister, Count Wintzingerode, had to bow before the hatred of the great powers.

THE ZOLLVEREIN

In the German nation the political system imposed by Metternich had produced at once deep despondency, hopeless resignation, and a pessimism which despaired of attaining by peaceful means a satisfactory state of affairs, of ever seeing the dawn of any other relation between rulers and governed than one of irreconcilable opposition. The aspiration towards national and political unity, towards the transformation of the multiplex state into one great whole, towards an honourable position and firm attitude in regard to foreign countries, probably still passed through the best brains and hearts; but only dreamers and visionaries could believe that these national strivings would ever be capable of being realised. The deep contrast between the eager wishes of the patriots and that which seemed attainable, had so depressing an effect on their minds and rendered the outlook so gloomy that they were reduced to despair and failed to perceive the germ of a better future—when one did at last come into existence. This manifested itself in the foundation of the Zollverein or customs union, which the Prussian government carried through with patriotic perseverance, not only against the opposition of particularism, but also against the short-sighted resistance of liberal and public-spirited men. In the gloomiest period of modern German history and the most profound dejection of national aspirations, the foundation stone of German unity was first laid in the domain of economy, but with the prospect of a grand future and great consequences to the general political life of the nation. The Prussian Zollverein was the “chief nail in the coffin of the German Confederation.” The present age can scarcely form a conception of the fetters and restrictions which a short-sighted administration imposed on commercial intercourse in most German countries; of the petty character of those tolls and frontier barriers at every few leagues; of the chicane and vexation with which the governments mutually annoyed one another; of the immorality of the luxuriant growth of smuggling, which was often systematically encouraged; and of the enormous harm done by all this to the material and moral prosperity of the whole nation.

In this desert of contradictory petty interests, of short-sighted restriction, of the mistrust and self-conceit characteristic of petty states, to have realised a great and sound idea in spite of all difficulties is a lasting merit of Prussian statesmanship, which alone in this field recognised and fulfilled its vocation. Steadily was stone after stone contributed to the structure of German commercial unity, regardless of the malicious counter efforts of hostile intrigues abroad, of the sullen resistance of particularism, of the short-sighted opposition of German liberalism, which, from dread of the absolute northern state in union with Metternich, declared its condemnation of the Prussian plans. Thus the importance of a national policy of tariff unification was cried down by the patriots more than by their adversaries.^f

The League of German Princes

In 1785 Frederick the Great had formed the league of the German princes (*Fürstenbund*) to preserve the rights of the various states of the German Empire then threatened by the combined policy of Russia, France, and Austria, the latter of which was at that time represented by Joseph II. The immediate cause of this league was the attempt of the three powers in question to force the duke of Zweibrücken to resign his claims to the reversion of the electorate of Bavaria, which Joseph hoped to acquire for himself.

The story of the War of the Bavarian Succession which followed has been

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already told in an earlier chapter. The league fell to pieces after the death of Frederick, but it was not without its sequel.^a

In the house of Habsburg and the league of the German princes we see two powers opposed to each other. Neither pursues patriotic objects for the empire; the one desires the unity of Germany, but only so as to possess it as a part similar to other parts of a polyglot monarchy; the other opposes itself to all attempts at unity, but at its head stands the state whose interests are mostly identical with national German interests. That this state for the first time headed an organisation is the point of importance in the league of princes.

Contemporaries already had a dim presentiment of this. For how could it be otherwise explained that the German patriots enthusiastically greeted the alliance, which in its aim promised only a perpetuation of the German plurality? The league fell, but its object remained. With the decay of the empire the idea of Prussian hegemony again came to the fore, the plan of a north German empire was conceived. Prussia became an essentially German state after the terrible catastrophe which then followed and the renewal of the war of Liberation. She was certainly pushed back from the coasts of the North Sea, but her position in the interior of the country was all the more firmly secured. Her irregular frontier in central Germany brought her into direct contact and gave her a community of interests with the small states. Prussia had scarcely begun to regulate her administration anew by the table of rates of 1818, when these joint interests asserted themselves.

The first influence was apparent in those small states, the "Enclaves," which were entirely, or for the greater part, surrounded by Prussian provinces. If Prussia had wished to carry out the frontier tariff in all its severity, it would have meant either the taxation of foreign subjects or a complete suspension of international as well as of the neighbouring commerce.

Deliberations on both sides led to the result that these detached fragments were acknowledged to be what they were—foreign and subordinate dominions under Prussian rule. A year after the issue of the Prussian tariff, Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen, with its subordinate the Wipperthal, at the foot of the Kyffhauser, came under the frontier tariff. As forming part of Prussia, the merchandise of the subordinate states crossed into Prussia and *vice versa*, free from duty; the share of the revenues which fell to the princes was calculated according to the population of the country, and settled once for all. Later on, this treaty was of the highest importance. The introduction announced that Prussia was ready to conclude similar treaties with the other states, but willingness to participate was slow in following. Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, only, joined with its subordinate districts. With Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Gotha the proceedings had to be carried on in individual and small districts. The greatest difficulties were raised by Anhalt. From the sources of the Elbe in the Harz, where Anhalt and Brunswick are contiguous for a very short distance, the province extends in narrow winding strips to the heights of the Fläming, hemmed in by three Prussian districts; Merseburg on the one side, Potsdam and Magdeburg on the other. In acknowledgment of the situation Bernburg, after having for three years proved the blessing of a custom's policy for the states in the Ballenstedt part of the "upper duchy," also introduced the same tariff into the "lower duchy," and thus for the first time, in 1826, an entire state joined.

But the two kinsmen in Dessau and Köthen still held aloof from one another. Not until Prussia seriously set to work to erect barricades on the frontiers of her states, to encompass both duchies with a line of custom houses, to blockade the upper and lower parts of the Elbe, and the results of an eight years' opposition proved that the geographical position of their territory ne-

cessitated a customs agreement, did they decide to follow the example of Bernburg.

It is evident that such a proceeding, though doubtless justifiable, would call forth the same hatred for the strong as that awakened by compulsion against the weak. Because the Prussian government was induced to believe that up till now the agreement had been to the advantage of both sides, during the Anhalt dispute it became convinced that in future facts might speak for themselves, and that it would be advisable to await further development.

In these proceedings, which had to be carried on in various directions at the same time, Prussia had to avail herself of various means for the same object. Warned by the aimless debates of the Frankfort diet, she dealt with each state individually; the customs union between Bavaria and Würtemberg was acknowledged; all negotiations ceased with the Thuringian states until the eleven rulers (one of whom was the king of Prussia) should have come to some agreement. Thus, by a highly ramified system of state treaties, unions, declarations of accession, and separate articles, a whole series of connections was formed which all found expression on the 1st of January, 1834, in the great German Zollverein or customs union.

In the course of the next decade the blessings of a free and unimpeded commerce drew the outstanding states, one after the other, into the union. That Austria held aloof in the southeast was the necessary result of political conditions; but it was still more striking that in the northwest the maritime countries separated the halves of the Prussian monarchy.

Nevertheless, it was of undeniable importance that from the Austrian to the Hanoverian frontier, a province of more than eight hundred square miles with thirty millions of inhabitants had become part of a uniform customs district; even the intervening wedges, such as the kingdom of Hanover, could not entirely avoid the imposing influence of this union, nor could they prevent the baggage of railway travellers from passing through their province free of duty.

Intercommunication and Currency

The immediate results were of still greater importance. As in Prussia itself, the removal of inland duty had turned commerce into its natural courses, and imposed on the government of the state the task of opening out a road for it; in the tariff union, the results of the freedom of trade continually gave rise to new tasks. No sooner had the first Saxon states joined the union than Prussia saw the necessity of establishing a connection between the northern and the southern members of the confederation. In the Middle Ages, and even long before then, north Germany and north Europe, south Germany and south Europe were much more closely united than were the two divisions of Germany to each other. Now the two small countries of Meiningen and Gotha, by forming a union, completed the chain between Prussia and Bavaria. Thereupon a new road was agreed on, which, by connecting the Langensalza to the north German road, crossed the Thuringian Forest, united Gotha with Meiningen, and after crossing the river between Werra and Mainz, reached the old Bamberger road at the Bavarian frontier town of Lichtenfels—which up to the present day has remained the junction of the Prussian and Thuringian railways. A great network of commerce between the North Sea countries and Switzerland, which until now had taken its course through Hanover and Frankfort, as that had been the only available route, was to open up trade between the north and south by Magdeburg and Nuremberg.

The great German waterway, the Rhine, was then, as now, far more conspicuous than the overland road. The Vienna Congress had decided that the

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navigation of the Rhine should be free "to the sea." In spite of this, the Dutch raised duty on the wares before they entered the sea; for the agreement said "to the sea," and not "into the sea"; and even if one wished to admit the latter interpretation, navigation was not possible beyond Katwyk on the Old Rhine, on account of its sandy bed, and the Waal and the Lek were not the Rhine. Thus for a long time the Dutch obstructed the natural harbour of the German west, whilst they themselves advanced up-stream and continued their commerce unhindered.

Now the states belonging to the Zollverein had a common interest in the opening of the Rhine. As experience had proved that amicable proceedings were not to be successful, Prussia without a moment's hesitation checked the navigation up-stream at Cologne, so as to force toleration for it down-stream. With the sole exception of Nassau, which according to the traditions of Orange adhered to the Netherlands, Prussia had all the Rhenish states on her side, and immediately proceeded with the opening of the Rhine. Since then the general authority of the river has been the Rhine Navigation Commissioner.

Here also, in consequence of the intercommunication, there had to be an understanding concerning currency. The Dresden Convention for regulating the coinage included the lands of the thaler and gulden; the Zollverein pound was already a factor of German unity in the measure system. But besides trade, the union also intrenched upon the internal and political life of the individual states. The connection between all branches of finance was then indissoluble. When certain taxes were suppressed on the frontier, no duty could be imposed on the corresponding produce in the interior of the land, which prejudiced it against the stranger. On the other hand, when the union taxed wine and tobacco, the states belonging to the Zollverein had to levy an equalising tax to prevent one state from overreaching the other. Such stipulations were made by the Treaty of Darmstadt; the grand duke bound himself to endeavour to obtain Prussian excise on articles of consumption. Even questions concerning the internal rights of the state were affected by the Zollverein. The exemption from taxation which the nobles enjoyed here and there became a thing of the past when the frontier taxes were raised for the profit of the union. On the other hand, the union began to assert itself internationally.

Not only did the Prussian agreement become valid in the smaller states, but it also resulted in a uniform policy for the entire union. The treaty concluded between Prussia and Greece was open to all the other states belonging to the union. The agreement with England was signed by the leading power, as all the confederates collectively had given their consent.

Prussia's Gains from the Zollverein

Thus the Zollverein already appeared in the likeness of a state. It fulfilled functions for all its members. By it and through it the smaller states had first received the possibility of a real system of state customs. Geometry teaches that the smaller the surface, the greater in proportion the periphery; thus with political science, the smaller the customs district, the more expensive the guarding of the frontier. In the dwarf states this was too expensive; it was there that the smuggling dens first had their mathematical existence.

On the other hand, the great state derived its natural benefits from this union. Its province was no geometrical square; it was a truly irregular surface, with a crookedly drawn frontier line requiring to be rounded off. Therefore Prussia could overlook financial losses. Such was the case when Darmstadt with its one hundred and fifty-two square miles increased its frontier

line to one hundred and sixteen, and the electorate of Hesse with its one hundred and fifty-four square miles increased it to fully one hundred and fifty-four more. When, in spite of the expensive frontier guard, the receipts were to be divided according to simple proportion, this could be done only at the cost of the Prussian taxpayers; but that which was sacrificed in individual cases was to be made good some day by the great readjustment of the whole. When the Zollverein was formed it was already apparent that Prussia and her allies had a smaller frontier line to guard now than formerly.

The league of princes, the imperial project, and the Zollverein are three degrees of the same period of development, which led from a particularistic alliance to the transitory plan of a union of states, and thence to the beginnings of a real organisation. This result was brought about by the Prussian statesmen; it had been they who had led the young state ever deeper and deeper into German interests, and had matured the identity of these interests in the first German union, under Prussian guidance.

The importance of the Zollverein for German unity was quite clear to contemporaries. In a lively strain Hoffmann von Fallersleben sings of the wares on the table of rates from sulphur matches to "radish, rape-seed, brandy, salmon, wax," and greeted them as the founders of German unity—

For 'tis you have formed a band
Round the German Fatherland.
To you let the fame redound
That our hearts are closely bound.^f

Thus Prussia had won for herself an influence over Germany in the sphere of economics, which prepared the way for her political supremacy. Industry in Prussia developed with unusual rapidity and strength; from the ancient military state a commercial state was being imperceptibly developed. The central states prospered to an extraordinary extent, and the mediæval system of estates became an impossibility, because the third estate was, in fact, the nation. In addition to this, Prussia encouraged science and the intellectual cultivation of the people. Thus she brought the people slowly but surely to true political maturity and thus directly aided the principle of popular progress. This made it all the more injudicious of the government obstinately to refuse to admit a representation of the people and even to renew the mediæval machinery of the estates.^h

PRUSSIA UNDER THE KING'S DIRECT RULE (1822-1840 A.D.)

The withdrawal of Humboldt and his friends after the promulgation of the Karlsbad Decrees had been a turning point in Prussian home politics. For the sake of soothing popular anxiety, fair promises were for a time held out concerning the question of a Prussian constitution. As late as the 20th of January, 1820, in an ordinance concerning the public debt reference was made to a future assembly of the estates of the realm. The constitution committee continued its labours, but the members who entertained liberal views were removed from it.^f

After the death of the chancellor Hardenberg [which took place at Genoa on the 22nd of November, 1822], the feudal party in Prussia expected to hold the reins of government for a long time to come, since its deputy, Von Voss-Buch, had been intrusted with the conduct of affairs. But after a few weeks the grey-headed leader of the feudalists followed his adversary to the grave (January, 1823), and Witzleben immediately put forth all his eloquence

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to move the king to the recall of Wilhelm von Humboldt. The crown prince also wished the return of the dismissed minister, hoping that with him new spirit and life might enter into the cabinet. The Berlin coterie of scholars spoke for him with one voice, and even a part of the feudalists were ready to welcome Hardenberg's opponent.

Humboldt himself stood aloof from these plans. In his lonely Tegel castle he had for a long time enjoyed the peace of quiet meditation, which was dearer to him than all the honours and ambitions of active life. The tranquil happiness of his Roman days overcame him again, when in the unpretentious noble castle, which Schinkel built for him, he wandered among casts of beautiful antique statues, or when in the evening he walked with his wife along the banks of the blue lake, and saw the Tower of the Four Winds glitter from among the old trees. Here he lived, in himself and for himself, as one removed from the world. "I am very happy; so at one with myself that I have no wish which I cannot reach through myself."

From the height of his philosophy of history he saw all that is human shrink into insignificance; he saw "the stream which bears things away, rather than the things themselves," and the limitations by which the power of the individual is restricted he accepted with serene composure:

This life is to the possible bound,
Its limits often tightly drawn.

In such a frame of mind the failure of Witzleben's counsels to take effect could neither surprise nor wound him. The king had never wholly withdrawn his favour from his fallen minister, whom he regarded as the ablest of his statesmen: but the same objection which five years ago had prevented Humboldt's appointment to the foreign office appeared to be still insurmountable. Prussia's peace policy stood and fell with the alliance of the eastern powers, and Frederick William distrusted his own ability to maintain at the head of his cabinet a man who was hated equally at St. Petersburg and at Vienna.

In his perplexity he appointed the old field-marshal, Kleist von Nollendorf, who, though holding aloof from political life, had yet as adjutant general won the personal confidence of the monarch by his uprightness and calm repose. But he also died suddenly before he had assumed office, and the king, knowing no other suitable man, reverted to an idea he had conceived after the death of Voss. This idea was to govern in the future without a leading statesman, with only heads for the different departments. The regular report to the king was assigned to Count Lottum, who remained in the cabinet, but he relinquished the administration of the finances to a minister of finance.

The count proved himself an industrious, conscientious reporter; his calm air of distinction, his straightforwardness and inaccessibility to intrigues of any kind pleased the monarch, and he held his office until Frederick William's death. He did not cherish great political ambition, and never received even the title of cabinet minister. For the rest the cabinet remained unchanged, although Hardenberg, in a posthumous memorial to the king, had emphatically advised the calling to office of new men.

Thus the day of the state chancellorship was followed by the king's direct rule. The will of the monarch alone held the ministers together, and everything depended on his decision. Only his confidential advisers, Wittgenstein, Witzleben, and Albrecht, were occasionally allowed to influence his decisions, while, still more seldom, Schilden, the chief marshal of the king's household, who every morning presented a brief report concerning the court, would sometimes be permitted to offer his advice on matters political. Such a government could suffice only during a period of profound peace; strength,

unity, and the power of forming rapid decisions were rarely manifested. Owing to the king's reluctance to adopt radical measures and his inability to oversee the whole of the administration, the old besetting sin of the bureaucracy, red-tapeism, soon revived in full force. Every minister went his own way, as far as he could, in direct opposition to his co-workers: and the same state which boasted of the best administration in Europe and was the founder of the unity of the German market followed the contemptible practice of persecuting demagogues. And yet this personal government with all its obvious weaknesses preserved the Prussian state from a dangerous reaction, such as could hardly have failed to come under a cabinet headed by Voss-Buch. Now it was first made manifest how far the laws promulgated during the preceding years were in advance of the political education of the people; a strong reaction began, very much like that movement which stirred the German empire in the year 1878. Not merely the feudal nobility, but even wide circles of burghers and peasants felt hurt in their interests, customs, and prejudices, and complained of the freedom of migration, the agrarian laws, and the curtailment of guild restrictions. Frederick William, however, never surrendered the basic principles of his social reforms, and although he was now rapidly growing old and could with difficulty resolve on any innovation, he understood in his quiet fashion how to stand as king above the factions. In order to calm the hotspurs of reaction he did, it is true, grant them certain concessions, principally in personal matters; but he did not allow them to become too bold, and they never attained their last aim: the abolition of the Hardenbergian legislation.

Once in the summer of 1825 the unqualified adherents of Austria fancied that they had already attained a decisive victory, as their leader, Duke Charles of Mecklenburg [half-brother of the beloved Queen Luise], was intrusted with the presidency of the council of state, an office which until now had been held only by ministers of state.

In the castle of Monbijou, where the duke dwelt, Kamptz and General Müffling were the leaders in debate; there the Haller doctrine of salvation was far more impressively preached than in the palace on the Wilhelmstrasse, where the crown prince gathered about him his romantic friends. The king, however, who did not rate highly the statesmanship of his brother-in-law, held him with a tight rein; he allowed him to take a silent part in the sessions of the cabinet, thinking thus to keep him informed and to enable him in case of necessity to recommend a bill to the state council. Seat and voice in the council of ministers he was by no means allowed to have, although the duke urgently besought the king and attempted by repeated requests for dismissal to effect his purpose. The office of the prince, thus limited, was not much more than an honorary position.

THE PRUSSIAN PROVINCIAL DIETS

This policy of compromise, which kept all parties quiet and proceeded with extreme caution in legislation, sprang not merely from the character of Frederick William, but also from the strange mixture of political contrasts which were brought to light in the proceedings of the new provincial diets. On the birthday of the king, August 3rd, 1823, the general laws governing the provincial diets of the 5th of June and the special laws for Brandenburg, Prussia, and Pomerania of the 1st of July were promulgated. Then followed on the 27th of March, 1824, the laws for the remaining five provinces. In the years 1824 to 1827 the provincial diets were convoked, first in Brandenburg, then in Posen. Of the correctness of the decisions reached the king was deeply

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convinced, and what he had recently learned of the performances of the south German chambers of deputies, of the vacillations of the Stuttgart court, and the constant calls of anguish that now issued from Bavaria and Baden could but strengthen him in his conviction. He caused the new laws to be communicated to all ambassadors, with the explanation that the prevailing confusion of ideas and the great variety of conditions in the provinces had delayed the conclusion of the work. The courts and the diplomats naturally rivalled one another in expressions of grateful admiration.

Berstett was quite as delighted as the old king of Saxony; Rechberg praised especially the strong representation of the nobles. The Badenese ambassador expressed the hope that now the universal opinion concerning constitutional government would be changed, and Bunsen portrayed, in a report full of unction, the joy of all right-thinking Romans: how easy to make such laws in Germany, how difficult in Italy; "who, when such things are considered, will not bless the spirit of reformation!" Only the old Franco-German Reinhard in Frankfort could not refrain from indicating, in a malicious memoir, the discontent of the Rhineland population.

Public opinion in the smaller states received the result, which was so far removed from their own constitutional ideals, with an icy silence. The *Journal des Débats* was the first paper which discussed the new laws at length; then the German papers took the matter up, and their decision was almost unanimous; the expectations of the nation had been disappointed; in Prussia all was to remain as in the past. The Prussians themselves did not share in these feelings. Among the mass of the people the desire for representation had never taken deep root, and even the men who at first hoped for greater things were so completely imbued with monarchical sentiments that they received most thankfully what was offered and regarded the provincial diets as the basis for a future constitution. This was the thought of Stein, Humboldt, Vincke, and Schön. Even in the circles of the liberals, to which General Pfuel and the father of Theodor Körner belonged, all greeted hopefully this beginning "of an organic constitution of the nation." To be sure, even among the high conservative party there was no lack of far-seeing men, who anxiously weighed the question as to what would be the course of procedure in case of war, since only the national diet had the right to increase the national debt. General Müffling felt impelled to advise that the king should convene, perhaps in the year 1828 after the provincial diets had twice assembled, a national diet to consist of one hundred and twenty members and two chambers, in order to obviate the necessity of a sudden and forced summoning of the estates of the realm in the future and in time of need. The king, however, would not consent to the proposition; he reckoned on a long continuance of peace and wished the provincial diets to be first given a thorough trial.

THE FIRST PROVINCIAL DIET

The elections to the first provincial diet proceeded without disturbance, although a lively interest was everywhere manifest. The knighthood of the old territories accepted the new order of things without reserve. The feudal-ist particularist opposition vanished with one stroke; the Prussian constitution at last stood on a foundation of recognised legality. Among the feudal nobility there were undoubtedly many individuals who secretly mourned over the half victory and the destruction of their old privileges; all diets, however, unanimously expressed their thanks to the monarch, and nowhere was the least effort made to defend the rights of the abrogated provincial estates. Only in Saxony, Prussia, and Pomerania, the provincial diets proposed that the Crown

should authorise the holding of special municipal or parish diets in the various districts of the land; but they calmed down at once when the king refused their request. Though the new order of things failed to arouse a higher feeling for the state, it at least drew more closely together the population of the separate provinces, and poor old Marwitz was obliged to see a "foreigner," a lower Lusatian, presiding over the first provincial diet of Brandenburg. He grumbled over the nonsense that the bureaucratic demagogues had brought into the legislation of the estates of the realm. Nevertheless he yielded, since he saw his old markish "state" partially restored to its former position, and the inflexible feudalist handed over triumphantly to the new diet the key to the treasury of the old estates, which fourteen years before he had saved from the bureaucrats of Hardenberg.

The interest which greeted the first diet moderated quickly as the new institution gave but little promise of full and free development. The Crown to be sure manifested confidence in the loyal estates by returning to the Kurmark its old estate house and, with some restrictions, also the administration of the poor-laws. In order to confer honour on the provincial diets it made all their marshals members of the council of state, so that Stein was at last exalted to the position due him, being called to the council at the same time as Marwitz—after the king had made careful inquiry through Duke Charles as to whether or not the proud baron would receive such a proof of favour.

The constitutional committee which had created the provincial diets continued to exist with a slight change of organisation under the name of "Immediate (*i.e.* Royal) Commission" for the regulation of all affairs relating to the diets, the endorsement of all legislative proposals to come before them, the decisions of the government on their prorogation, and the examination of elections to them.

The crown prince occupied the chair, while its records were kept by Privy Councillor von Voss-Buch, nephew of the former minister and a believer in the same political faith. He had won the entire confidence of the heir to the throne, and with his ready pen projected the political memorials of the prince. For twenty-three years, until after the convocation of the United Diet, this "Immediate Commission" acted as mediator between the Crown and the diets. It was not deficient in good intentions, for the crown prince dearly loved his German law diets.

But all this could not replace active personal intercourse with the provincial estates, from which the government was cut off; partly because of bureaucratic anxieties; partly because of the unnatural division of the diets themselves. It was impossible for the ministers to appear personally in eight different diets, and it was equally impossible to intrust the provincial authorities with the defence of the proposed legislation, since the laws affected, directly or indirectly, the entire country. Hence the propositions of the Crown were merely laid before the provincial diets at their opening by the royal commissioner, and after that the bodies were left to their own deliberations. By this arrangement the most necessary element in the proceedings of a diet, the free and immediate interchange of thought between crown and estates, was completely lacking. Only at the close of the diet did the Crown announce its decisions, and these announcements were unduly delayed, frequently for a whole year or more, because the king could not give answers to the petitions of his Rhinelanders or Brandenburgers without having listened first to the opinions of his Westphalians or Silesians. Thus did that artificial doctrinarianism avenge itself on those who would destroy the unity of the state by dividing it into eight parts.

And the diets had as little relation with those below as with those above. The short review which the marshal of the diet published at the close of the

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sessions was altogether inadequate; the actual proceedings themselves the members were to keep secret. Even the harmless and indispensable right of a national assembly to receive and to discuss petitions was denied to these provincial diets; evidently it was because it was feared that a storm of petitions in Posen or on the Rhine might be made to serve the ends of subverters of the existing order. Hence the people remained in almost total ignorance of the course pursued by their representatives. The transactions of the diets educated a small nucleus of politically experienced men, but their influence was hardly perceptible over wider circles, and for a long time there existed but a single party in Prussia which had well defined aims—the feudalists.

The Outbreak of Hope in Prussia and Westphalia

In Prussia and Westphalia the good results of the diets were most marked. In the east was once more awakened the proud recollection of the diet at Königsberg and of the active life of the estates during the time of the Teutonic knights. A fresh breath of youthful hope and provincial independence was perceptible in the speeches. Many, like Schön, loved to speak of “the kingdom of Prussia and his majesty’s other states!” The estates rejoiced in having gained once more the old Prussian freedom, and would have liked to hold their meetings in the refectory of Marienburg castle (the sanctuary of the province), instead of alternating in Dantzic or Königsberg. The patriotic disposition of the nobility and the provincial pride that was common to all did not allow any special class spirit to arise. When a delegate of the cities once threatened to resort to the *itio in partes*, all the other delegates became fiercely indignant and silenced him, and the diet declared to the king that the diet of the kingdom of Prussia would never make use of the right to separate, the Prussians being quite able to raise themselves above the interests of the separate estates and districts. On the occasion of its very first sitting the diet proposed—unfortunately without success—the publication of all the transactions, so that the country might learn to know its diets. Schön, the royal commissioner, staked his honour on being able to make the diet of his province a model for the entire country. When the diet was in session at Dantzic the president would move to a country house in Pelonken and cross over daily into the city, that he might by personal threats and admonitions keep the malcontents in check. The remote province held together like one great family. In the diet hall, Count Alexander Dohna (the first militiaman of 1813), was honoured as a patriarch, and the whole land mourned with him when, during the diet of 1827, the news arrived of the death of his sister-in-law, Julie Dohna (Scharnhorst’s daughter). The brave Prussians crowded around him with tears in their eyes when he closed his farewell speech with the words of Paul Gerhardt: “May God give us all a happy heart!”

The dignified behaviour of the Westphalian diet was pre-eminently due to the influence of Stein. Rather than remain in beautiful Nassau where all things reminded him of the loss of his freedom, and where the meddlesomeness of the Rhenish bureaucrats perpetually irritated him, he now resided at Cappenberg, his Prussian estate; here he felt at home. The church of St. Norbert stood in the midst of the court of his lonely castle, and when he strolled over the terrace he could gaze beyond the old oaks of his forests away into the valley of the Lippe, even to the far-off mountains of the land of the red soil to which he had dedicated the powers of his early manhood. On Vincke’s proposal, he was selected, as the first man of the province, to be marshal of the diet. Afflicted with the infirmities of age and blind in one eye, he nevertheless accepted the position and opened the first diet in the magnificent hall of peace in the council house at Münster, with an address wherein he

set forth the moral aim of political freedom. He welcomed the new constitution, because it would help to educate the people in independent activity: "It will unite, educate, upraise; it will bind all hearts, because all will strive towards one aim—the glory of the fatherland; it will impart to the individual a knowledge of his own worth, inasmuch as it will call into activity his nobler and higher powers." It was no easy matter to meet under Stein's presidency, as his vehemence had not softened with years. As soon as he entered all speech was hushed, and woe to him who with useless talk retarded the proceedings. The old leader could also be unjust if he thought any "peasant lawyer" was instigating the people against the approved old Saxon laws. He even got into a dispute with Vincke (the commissioner to the diet), over the keeping of the land-register, and neither one of the two obstinate old men could ever afterwards become quite reconciled to the other.

But the moral stature of the powerful statesman uplifted the entire assembly, and in every word he uttered was expressed the warmest love for his adopted home. In the conduct of affairs he still manifested his former ability. He was acquainted with every detail of the life of the country, and the peasants understood well that in all the world they possessed no better friend than this haughty aristocrat, who now in his old age sometimes expressed himself with the most wounding severity.

There was much intelligence and practical knowledge of life displayed also in the other diets, and their adherence to the king was often expressed with a childlike simplicity that by no means precluded honest candour. The administration of various municipal institutions that were intrusted to them was conducted by the provincial diets with happy enthusiasm. This was ground in which the German ideals of freedom—from which Stein's city ordinances had sprung—had struck deep root. And in how surprisingly short a period had this state drawn the people round its standard! Against compulsory universal military service, which only ten years ago had called forth so much passionate resentment, there was not now raised a single voice in all the diets; indeed, the diets of Brandenburg and Posen begged the king to make the Jews all pass through the school of the army for their own improvement.

CASTE FEELING IN THE PROVINCES

In Posen, however, harmony was impaired by national enmity; and on the Rhine the antagonism between the old and the new society, which manifested itself though with less rancour in the other provinces also, resulted in several serious outbreaks. The division into estates, so artfully contrived by red-tapists, appeared nowhere so unjust as in the entirely modern, bourgeois conditions of life of the Rhine province. It was reckoned that the order of knighthood possessed only about four per cent. of the land of that province; several of the largest landed proprietors found themselves either entirely excluded from elections or obliged to cast in their vote with the cities if, as very frequently happened, they lived in the city and let their scattered estates. The caste spirit of the Rhenish nobles still further increased the discontent. This canonical race, now that the Crown was so favourably disposed towards them, again displayed dynastic tendencies, which to be sure as quickly vanished when afterwards the state became involved in a quarrel with the church. They spoke haughtily of their vocation to protect the throne against a revolution, and took an oath with one another to elect to the diet only nobles of true canonical blood. It can therefore be easily understood why many middle-class landowners strove, in defiance of the law, to enter the rank of knighthood. Adroit jurists lent them the service of their pens, and even during

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the election a violent quarrel arose concerning the prerogatives of the nobles, which broke forth anew in the diet.

Everything considered, the spirit of the Prussian provincial diet was directly opposed to that of the south German chambers of deputies. The contrast between north and south appeared indeed sharper than it really was, because the double-chamber system of south Germany set closer limits to the influence of the nobility than the division into estates of the Prussian diets. In the south the aristocracy possessed, according to law, the full half of the power of the diet; but they carried on their deliberations in the chamber of nobles, and could venture only in exceptional cases opposition to the decision of the other chamber, which was upheld by the will of the people. In Prussia, on the other hand, the nobility could directly control the diets by their influence and their votes. The Prussian system of representation had one great advantage over the diets of south Germany; the peasant class was indeed poorly represented, but it was represented by real peasants, not by officials and citizens as in the south. The indestructible power of what is essentially German rests principally on the sterling qualities of this class, and it might, in the diet of the estates, express itself with a freedom denied it under the general elections of the representative system. Though they had scarcely yet attained to the stature of perfect freedom, the peasants were not in the least backward about asserting their rights: on the contrary, they often opposed with much boldness and characteristic obstinacy any undue pretensions on the part of the knights.

THE SILENTLY GROWING POWER OF THE BOURGEOISIE

On the other hand the learned professions, the officials, lawyers, professors, and writers who preponderated in the south German assemblies, were almost entirely absent from the Prussian provincial diets, and there was a totally inadequate representation of that influential and growing class that was rich in other property than land. Herein lay the worst defect of the new order, for in these strata of society had struck root the new liberalism whose power and rights could no longer be ignored, and it was the opinion of this class that for a long time had been in practical control of the press. This class being excluded from representation, the diet but poorly reflected the true spirit of the nation, and by degrees there grew up outside the diets a dangerous opposition, which, developing in the stillness for years, suddenly burst forth into the light of day, with the majority of the educated *bourgeoisie* on its side.

The great landed proprietors, who alone were allowed to express themselves in the provincial diets, represented in their great majority a strongly conservative spirit. Until the year 1830 not a word was heard in the eight diets of the promise of a national diet. In the press of the smaller states an isolated voice occasionally recalled the old promise; thus the young Heinrich von Gagern in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* warmly greeted the diet of Westphalia, and expressed the expectation and hope that with the Prussian national diet might be ushered in a new period of Prusso-German greatness. But in the provincial diets themselves these hopes found as yet no echo. The freer spirits considered themselves bound by their loyalty to forestall the resolutions of the Crown, but to wait until it could be observed how the provincial delegations would conduct themselves. The great majority, however, scarcely looked beyond their native province. In the first south German diets, liberalism at once declared itself with a long programme of half-ripe measures, but in Prussia the Crown had constantly to fight the tenacious particularism of the provincials and their mistrust of every innovation. Thus was fulfilled what

Humboldt had foreseen, that the diets would always represent the principles of conservatism; the government, those of progress.

The very first diet, that of Brandenburg, vehemently deplored the innovations which the so-called spirit of the bloody, turbulent times had called forth. "Strangers as we are to the theories of both old and new times, we can offer nothing but the truths of experience," declared the Brandenburgers. Experience, however, teaches how thousands are deluded "by the dazzling hope of independence" to demand the abolition of guild restrictions, and how the landowner, "oppressed by the destructive influences of free trade on the frontier," looks in vain for help. Though less loudly expressed, similar complaints were heard in all the diets. The king, however, had effectually checked the accomplishment of such wishes by his directions to the "Immediate (Royal) Commission": that the principles of the legislation of 1810 must not be overthrown, since that would be to disturb "relations which were fashioned as a result of legal obligations, and have more or less taken root." He would consent only to certain isolated alterations if the diets wished them for good reasons, but in no case would he allow a diminution of the newly-acquired revenue from taxes, so long as no compensation could be found. It was thanks to the Crown alone that Hardenberg's reforms were upheld and cautiously introduced into the new provinces. In the small states, the Berlin court was condemned as a reactionary power, because the political dilettantism of the Germans did not consider it worth while to study the conditions of the greatest of German states. In truth, King Frederick William thought and acted more liberally than did his faithful diets.¹

GERMANY AND THE JULY REVOLUTION

Anyone taking a survey of Germany as a whole could not have failed to perceive a certain progress. In its hard fight with the reaction, the popular cause was gaining ground, though slowly. The question of constitutions had originally been brought forward from the west. France had introduced popular representation; and she afterwards also gave a powerful impulse to the demand for it in Germany and in Europe.

For whilst absolutism was labouring with apparent success for the suppression of popular liberty, suddenly, in the year 1830, an event took place in France which from its very nature was bound to exercise an important influence on constitutional life in Germany. This was what is known as the July Revolution. The French government had paid too much heed to the whispers of the Roman Jesuitical party which, there as elsewhere and even in Germany, boldly maintained that the sole salvation for governments lay in their submission to the Roman church; that nations would be most securely led if they were rendered stupid and so held back from that striving towards an ever-greater reasonable perfection which has been implanted in every human breast. The then king of France, Charles X, and his ministers, willingly followed this teaching; they especially sought to limit the freedom of the press and freedom of election: two things which stood in the closest connection with each other. But the French people rose in righteous anger and expelled the king for having infringed the most sacred rights.

The example of the French people had a great effect on the Germans, because the same causes which in France had produced the revolution of July, 1830, also still existed in a greater or less degree in several German states. For many promises still remained unfulfilled; instead of the desired freedom of trade, an unintelligent, harmful tariff system still subsisted in most of the states of the German Confederation; instead of the promised freedom of the press, there was the detested censorship. In many states indignation at

[1830-1832 A.D.]

the maladministration was added to this. The first to rise (September, 1830) were the Brunswickers, who had suffered severely from the insupportable, almost insane rule of violence under Duke Charles: for this man simply mocked at the people. They stormed his castle and set it on fire. Charles fled and his brother William, who recognised the estates (which Charles in his stupid insolence had refused to do), assumed the government. A similar rising of the people took place in Saxony, where in September, 1830, King Anthony was obliged to appoint his nephew, Frederick, co-ruler, and the latter then granted a moderate constitution. The same thing happened in the electoral principality of Hesse, where the people were in the highest degree enraged as much against the elector's mistress as against the customs system. Here, too, the prince had to accept a co-ruler in the person of his son, the electoral prince, and a comparatively liberal constitution was secured (1831). A year later a similar agitation broke out in Hanover, where, to the general dissatisfaction, the minister, Count Münster, attempted to restore obsolete conditions, and in especial the "squirearchy" (*Junkerherrschaft*). The popular commotion resulted everywhere in the erection of a more or less liberal constitution; in the electorate of Hesse Prof. Sylvester Jordan rendered the most essential service towards the introduction of a constitution which was distinguished above the other German fundamental laws by many superior features.

Thus a real advance had been made: the constitutional principle had even penetrated to north Germany; only Prussia and Austria, with a few other states like Mecklenburg, still did homage to the absolute form of government. The states which had already been in possession of a constitution now continued their constitutional development with fresh energy. This was especially so in the grand duchy of Baden, where the grand duke Leopold, a mild prince and one who was well disposed towards the people, had assumed the government in 1830.

In those days, besides their share in the transactions concerning their own constitutional existence, there was another great cause which stirred the hearts of the German people. In the year 1831 Poland had risen against Russia in the hope of winning back her ancient independence, but had succumbed after an heroic struggle; and many Poles now passed through Germany as homeless refugees, everywhere received with the true old German hospitality, with respect for their misfortunes and an enthusiasm which sprang from the interest in the cause for which they had fought—the cause of nationality and freedom.

The Hambach Festival (1832 A.D.)

Then, first in south Germany, the newspaper press spoke out freely and boldly and addressed powerful admonitions to all Germans; in Rhenish Bavaria an association was founded for the liberty of the press; and at the celebration of the grant of the Bavarian constitutional charter a great popular assembly was held on the 24th of May, 1832, at the castle of Hambach near Neustadt on the Hardt, when the black, red, and gold standard was planted and speeches were made which called for the unification of Germany and the erection of a common German constitution, based on the sovereignty of the people. But this democratic movement was confined to Rhenish Bavaria and was easily suppressed by the Bavarian government. The excesses of the small democratic party only furnished the reactionaries with a welcome pretext to cast further reflections on the constitutional principle. Metternich declared with fresh energy that the states were in danger, and again compelled the confederation diet to take steps against the popular cause. Thus not only

were measures against the movement taken in Rhenish Bavaria, the Press Association prohibited, the boldest orators and newspaper writers put in prison, but, on the 28th of June, 1832, the confederation diet passed several resolutions directed principally against the effectiveness of the estates in south-west Germany, and their privilege of granting taxes; the latter was almost entirely abolished, and the governments were exhorted to permit nothing which might stand in the way of the resolutions of the confederation; it suppressed all unions and popular assemblies, as well as all papers expressive of liberal opinions, and did away with the freedom of the press in the grand duchy of Baden. The wearing of the German colours was forbidden, and a pursuit of all democrats and zealous liberals was instituted.

Frankfurter Attentat (1833 A.D.)

In consequence, many men who entertained the idea of a violent alteration of existing conditions fled from Germany, some to France and some to Switzerland, where they continued to maintain secret communications with their fellows in Germany who shared their opinions. For, to exaggerated reaction, they wished to oppose revolution. Their resources were insignificant; the people were not behind them; they were really merely a few visionaries enraged by the disappointment and persecution which the liberal element had to endure. In the erroneous idea that something might be done against absolutism by conspiracy and sudden action, they drew up a comprehensive plan which came to an insane, ineffective issue in 1833. In the night of April 3rd some seventy democrats, mostly students, made an attempt to get possession of the town of Frankfort-on-the-Main with the intention of dispersing the confederation diet. Of course the attempt failed. A conspiracy in Würtemberg which was connected with it was also discovered and easily put down. Most of those concerned were seized, and after a long imprisonment pending trial, received severe punishments; but subsequently, of those who did not succeed in making their escape, several individuals were restored to freedom, either unconditionally or with the stipulation that they should emigrate to America.

Metternich eagerly seized the opportunity to incite the German governments still further against the popular spirit. Revolution and constitution were regarded by the retrogressive party as meaning the same thing. The monarchs of Russia, Prussia, and Austria united still more closely to contend against the revolutionary spirit. The Russian emperor Nicholas, who had succeeded Alexander in 1825, stood forward beside Metternich as the pillar of absolutism, and the Russian influence increased in consequence to an extraordinary extent, whilst on the other hand it gave the strongest support to the reaction. Thus it came to pass that Metternich was able to make the confederation diet more and more the instrument of his enmity to the existing constitutions. More and more encroachments were made on the constitutional system. Soon after, reaction won a complete victory in an important secondary state.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN HANOVER (1837 A.D.)

In Hanover, in the year 1833, a new constitution was completed, and on the 26th of September it was confirmed by William IV, king of England, who was also king of Hanover.¹⁶

William IV died on the 20th of June, 1837. The succession to the throne in the female line was valid in England, but the throne of Hanover descended to the younger brother of the dead king, the duke of Cumberland, Ernest

[1837 A.D.]

Augustus. It had been omitted to procure from him as the heir to the throne consent to the fundamental state law established in the year 1833. The duke, an obstinate Tory, and even regarded with disfavour by this party for being more autocrat than aristocrat, had immediately declared that he would never give his consent to this constitutional measure; but these declarations had reached the knowledge of only a few people. On the 28th of June, 1837, Ernest Augustus celebrated his entry into the capital. The estates sent a deputation to welcome him: it was not admitted. Two days later an order was issued to the estates pronouncing their adjournment, but, according to Article 13 of the fundamental state law, the king was obliged on his accession to swear to observe the constitution of the country. This had not been done, and while the first chamber received the announcement of the decree for the adjournment in silence, in the second chamber, after the announcement had been made and the president had put the question whether anybody had any observation to make, a member, Dr. Stüve, Burgomaster of Osnabrück, rose with the words: "I do not believe that his majesty has yet assumed government." The chamber was silent; the speaker seated himself; the president declared the sitting closed.

Tame indeed was the opposition which was raised thus at the beginning of a shameless violation of the law; but it was universally recognised that if in this case the mere non-acquiescence of the successor to the throne in a constitution, united in its aim and legally valid as well as in full working power, was enough to upset such a constitution, then there was not a constitution or a law in Germany that was any longer safe. The king meanwhile went his own way. As cabinet minister he nominated the secret councillor, Von Schele. This man was bound to the constitution by no express oath, and the king made of him a tool in the *coup d'état* which he meditated. In a patent countersigned by Von Schele he informed the country of his accession, further declaring that the fundamental state law which he had never recognised was also not binding on him, but he promised none the less to submit this question to a careful and conscientious examination. For this conscientious examination of a question which was no question, but which like everything in the world could be made into a question by the juristic quibbles of sophists and prince-servers—a question over which the dust of many deductions and clauses could be raised—a commission was appointed with Von Schele as president. Relying on the results brought to light by this commission, Ernest Augustus published a proclamation on the 11th of November, 1837, in which the assembly of the estates was declared to be dissolved; at the same time he issued a patent abolishing the fundamental state law of 1833 and establishing a new constitution which should meet "the true needs of the country," and be assimilated by the estates of 1819. Of the real needs of the country this wily despot, who had never troubled himself about them, knew little; he thought of the more real necessities which lay upon himself in the form of his debts, the solution of which was to be found in the profit accruing from the Hanoverian domains which the constitution of 1833 had declared to be state property and replaced by a civil list.

The shameless violation of law provoked great excitement in the German chambers and even in the German governments, most of which had still preserved a juristic conscience. The national chambers, not only of Baden, but also of Bavaria, Saxony, electoral Hesse, Darmstadt, Brunswick, and Württemberg, declared more or less vigorously and without much opposition from the governments, for the restoration of constitutional law and order in Hanover.

In the country itself, as was to be expected from the phlegmatic nature of a population chiefly of peasants, the excitement was not inordinate. The

elections were completed without material opposition. Only seven professors of the university of Göttingen, which according to the constitution of 1819 had also to elect a representative—Albrecht, Dahlmann, the two brothers Grimm, Gervinus, Ewald, and Weber—had the courage to declare to the curators of the university that, inasmuch as they were convinced of the legal impossibility of abolishing the constitution of the country by royal patent, they held themselves bound by the oath that they had taken to the constitution; as tutors of youth it would ill befit them to play with oaths; and so they refused to take part in the election of a representative of the university. It was a word spoken at the right time that confronted tyrannical power with the sense of duty belonging to honour, expressed by men whose name was a guarantee that this determination owed its source to pure conviction, without motives of ambition or the thirst for notoriety. For this reason, their decision met everywhere with lively appreciation, and the names of these men were endeared to the remembrance of the nation in later times. The king, who regarded science and scientific conviction with the cynical narrow-mindedness of an ignorant country bumpkin and a rough soldier, made short work; his command, which was preceded by no inquiry, dispossessed the seven of their offices, and banished three of them, Dahlmann, Jacob Grimm, and Gervinus, from the country, for having “published” the protest and thereby made themselves peculiarly responsible for the crime of incitement to rebellion.

THE DIET OF THE CONFEDERATION

On the 20th of February, 1838, the new assembly met; a few towns, like Osnabrück, had refused to elect, or had elected under protest. The assembly conducted itself in a vacillating manner, sought to evade a discussion of the new constitutional scheme, and, after the opposition had been strengthened by the elections of those corporations which until now had refused to avail themselves of election, determined, on the 25th of June, at the motion of Conradi, the member for Göttingen, that “the constitution which had subsisted legally before the accession of his majesty could be neither satisfactorily abolished nor amended, otherwise than with the consent of the electorate established according to the fundamental state law.” This was decided by thirty-four against twenty-four votes. On the 29th twenty-eight of the majority handed in a petition to the assembly of the confederation, to which several corporations of the country, amongst others the magistrate of Osnabrück, had already lent their sanction, with a deduction drawn up by Von Stüve.

On the 6th of September, 1838, the diet of the confederation decided to return this document on account of a deficiency in the legal basis of the petitioners, but challenged the Hanoverian government to make a declaration on the subject. This, together with the repeated declarations of the German chambers, encouraged the constitutional party in Hanover, which could not find such encouragement in the masses of their own people—the peasantry being of opinion that the king understood everything best and should be allowed to go his own way; the isolated attempts to refuse to pay the taxes failed miserably. On the 15th of February, 1839, the king simply declared the legal conditions of 1819 to be re-established, wiping away the progress of twenty years with a stroke of the pen. But the estates which had been summoned on this day had lacked a quorum wherewith to make decisions; the absent members protested, and, on the 29th of March, handed in a new petition to the diet of the confederation. But it was idle to hope for simple justice from this assembly which had two standards. Certainly the Bavarian ambassador moved on the 26th of April that the diet of the confederation should declare that in the conduct of the royal government it missed the ob-

[1834-1840 A.D.]

servation of Article 56 in the Final Act of Vienna—according to which parliamentary constitutions could be altered only in a constitutional way, and that it recommended that government to preserve the existing constitutional forms and to introduce changes only in a way agreeable to those forms; but when finally, after the requisite time had elapsed, a division was taken on the 5th of September, it was determined by nine votes against eight not to yield to the proposal for the interference of the confederation, “as in the existing state of affairs there was present no adequate motive for the interference of the confederation in this internal difficulty.” In the majority were the two great courts and the votes for Holstein and for Luxemburg, that is, Denmark and Holland. In this voting crisis the scale was turned by none other than the miserable government itself, that is to say, the vote of Hanover—not the least shameful episode in this shameless transaction. The satisfaction was not universal; there were some princes acute enough to see that in this instance monarchy in Germany was digging its own grave.

With this vote the last support of the opposition in Hanover fell to the ground. The king carried his point. On the 19th of March, 1840, the quorum assembly of the estates took place, and after much deliberation a new constitutional law was established of which the publication followed on the 6th of August, 1840.^m

LAST YEARS OF FREDERICK WILLIAM III. (1834-1840 A.D.)

The misguided men who, mistaking the temper of the times, undertook to bring about a national rising in Germany in 1834, drew down unspeakable misery upon those who shared their opinions and upon the whole of Germany. The diet of the confederation immediately (June 20th) nominated a fresh commission of inquiry, gave orders for the suppression of all liberal papers in south Germany, and subjected the universities to the most rigid supervision. In the fury of their persecuting zeal the assembly did not hesitate to trample on the most obvious juridical principles which commonly obtain among civilised nations. They were not satisfied with prohibiting countless works, most of them perfectly harmless. Whole publishing firms were laid under an interdiction, and not only were such of their publications suppressed as had already seen the light, but an embargo was laid on all those they might publish for years to come, and thus a massacre of the innocents wholly without precedent was perpetrated upon these unborn works. The practical results in this as in all similar cases was to double the demand for the prohibited books, which were far more greedily devoured than they would otherwise have been. The persecuted publishers made an enormous profit. So high did public indignation rise against this intellectual tutelage that reading circles were formed for the express purpose of studying the prohibited books.

But it was not only or chiefly against the literary world that the effort to suppress free speech of any description was directed; representative bodies were even more hardly dealt with. The diet of the confederation, acting on the advice of the ministerial conferences held at Vienna, appointed a confederation court of arbitration on October 20th, 1834, consisting of thirty-four assessors nominated by the sovereigns, who were to decide all disputes between governments and representative assemblies—invariably, of course, in favour of the latter. By keeping their forces on a war footing and by the ruthless exercise of the censorship the ruling powers contrived to prevent any open resistance to their decrees; but thousands of hearts were seething with silent resentment of the oppressive measures which were more arbitrarily enforced from day to day, and day by day the conviction that no good could come of the confederation diet at Frankfort as long as it represented the

sovereigns only to the exclusion of the people, gained ground and gathered strength.

In Prussia the legal proceedings at Frankfort had awakened no apprehensions. The people were quiet in all parts of the kingdom, and the friendly relations between the king and his subjects remained undisturbed. In spite of this, the Kamptz crew succeeded in inspiring the monarch with such a terror of secret societies, student associations, and the like, that he revived the old persecution of demagogues. It is a dark blot on the history of the reign of Frederick William III that after having had ample opportunities of assuring himself that exaggerated importance had been ascribed to the youthful follies of 1819, he again allowed a large number of persons, most of them excellent men of great intellectual ability, to fall into the hands of such scoundrels as Kamptz, Dambach, and Von Ischoppe, who treated their unfortunate victims with ruthless severity, partly out of pure malice and partly in the hope of gaining favour and consequence for themselves.

Legislation was entirely in the king's hands, and as the exercise of this supreme prerogative was delegated in part to the minister of justice, there were ways of forcing the law courts to obey the instructions and rescripts of the Kamptz party. The interpretations and perversions of the law they put forward were absolutely revolting. Certain unfortunately indefinite terms in the criminal code were so interpreted as to allow of the infliction of the heaviest penalties of imprisonment and death on the "suspicion of attempted high treason." Confessions were again extorted from accused persons by false promises of future pardon; young men were sentenced to twenty or thirty years' imprisonment and loss of civil rights—some of them even to death—of whom it was literally true that (as Fritz Reuter, who was condemned to thirty years' imprisonment, says of himself) they had been guilty of nothing but having once been seen wearing a tricolor ribbon in the streets of a university town. The wearing of this symbol of rebellion was enough to give rise to the "suspicion" which furnished sufficient grounds for the infliction of the heaviest penalties. It is absolutely incomprehensible that there should have been no one about the king to open his eyes to this abominable abuse of the criminal law. To the day of his death he regarded these unhappy young men as persons who had plotted to rob him of his people's love, which in his eyes was rightly adjudged the worst of crimes.

All prisoners who did not succeed in effecting their escape remained in custody, more or less strict according to the temper of the commandant of the fortress, until Frederick William IV, shortly after his accession, published a general amnesty for political offences. Fritz Reuter, whose liberation the Mecklenburg government had with difficulty obtained a short time before, had to wait four weeks before he was set at liberty through the personal intervention of the grand duke Frederick Paul.

In all these melancholy incidents it was Frederick William III's good fortune that public indignation was not directed against him personally, but against his advisers. He himself remained the darling of his people. The 3rd of August, the anniversary of the day on which he first saw the light in 1770, was kept as a holiday now no less than before, and with such warmth of feeling that it seemed a family festival to every one of his subjects. The streets of Berlin and many other towns were illuminated on "the king's birthday," wealthy citizens feasted their poor neighbours, especially the invalid soldiers of the war of Liberation. Everyone was pleased to see the erect and vigorous figure of the aged monarch as he took his daily drive in simple state through the streets of the capital.

After the spring of 1840, marked symptoms of declining strength conveyed to all men's minds the presage of the sovereign's approaching end. When,


[1840 A.D.]

on May 30th, the foundation stone of the monument to Frederick the Great was laid, the king could only watch the scene from his window. A malady which was not at first thought dangerous consumed his vital forces, and on the 7th of June death set a term to his troublous days. The fortieth year of the century, ever big with fate for the Hohenzollerns, was again to witness the opening of a new reign in Prussia.

The full extent of the unexampled popularity of Frederick William III was manifested when the news of his approaching end was bruited abroad. For three long days, from early morning till night, the wide space between the palace and the arsenal opposite was crowded by a silent throng of thousands upon thousands of men and women with anxious eyes all fixed upon the windows where the king was wont to be seen. They were as children awaiting in dismay the moment that was to deprive them of a father.

One touching incident of those days must not be passed over without mention. The entrances to the royal residence were absolutely blocked by the dense throng, when a servant appeared at the foot of the staircase, and, being unable to get any farther, informed those nearest him that the king was asking for an orange. The message passed from mouth to mouth to the outskirts of the crowd. One of the hindmost hastened to buy the fruit the king wished for, and it was handed over the heads of the silent multitude to the palace and taken to the king, who was profoundly touched by this simple token of his people's affection.

On June 7th, 1840, the king passed away at the age of seventy, surrounded by his children and his sons- and daughters-in-law. The emperor of Russia and his consort had also come to him from St. Petersburg. Well might they gather with reverence round that deathbed, for he who lay there was the last of the kings. Since that day nations have ceased to look upon the ruler as a father, to pride themselves upon his virtues and talents, and to treat his weaknesses and defects with reverential indulgence. Frederick William III had been one with his people in great sorrow and great joy, and there was none, no, not the least among them, who forgot it. Since his eyes were closed [concludes Eberty] the word of Frederick the Great has been fulfilled, and kings are henceforth only the first servants of the state.ⁿ



CHAPTER IX

FREDERICK WILLIAM IV

[1840-1857 A.D.]

THE accession of Frederick William IV was an event of serious consequence. It was generally and rightly felt to mean more than an ordinary change of sovereign, but none could guess what it might bring forth.

To his people the new monarch was an unsolved riddle, a figure which enticed them to the boldest hopes and gave cause for grave apprehensions. No one doubted that he was a man of lofty soul, inspired by noble ideals, animated by passionate enthusiasm for religion, science, and art; that in tractability and suppleness of mind, as in intellectual gifts, he was greatly superior to his father, and far more finely susceptible to great ideas; that he cherished the ambition of taking a glorious place in the line of Hohenzollern kings by a vigorous constructive policy and the virtues befitting his great office.

On the other hand, whether he possessed sufficient firmness of character to tread unfalteringly a path on which he had once entered, whether the effervescent fancy and jovial temper of the prince might not stifle the ardour and conscientiousness that became the sovereign, whether his lively imagination, his extravagant notions of the royal office, and his romantic tastes had not clouded his clear vision of present necessities, were questions which only time could answer. One thing alone was certain: many changes were to come. Even if they had not been so imperatively called for by the condition of the whole body politic, as was in fact the case, even if the dilatory old age of a ruler by nature cautious, and the reverent consideration which public opinion had rendered to the late sovereign, had not retarded so many inevitable reforms which must now necessarily occupy the forefront of affairs, the mere contrast between father and son would have brought about a significant revolution. The precision of a rigid sense of order yielded place to the capricious turns of a gifted temperament; prosaic and economical utilitarianism to an

[1840 A.D.]

idealism warmed by poetry and tinged with philosophy; a simple and reasonable piety to a fervid religiousness, mystic and mystery-loving; while the reserved and monosyllabic manner which covered genuine kindness of heart was replaced by a flow of conversation fascinating in its careless ease, and the strict temper of a martinet by the susceptible and cultured spirit of an artist.

THE PERSONALITY OF FREDERICK WILLIAM IV

The attractive personality of the sovereign was of the utmost service in the first weeks of his reign; his speeches to the deputations to which he gave audience, the written communications he had several times occasion to make, displayed the soaring flight of his sentiments, and his skill in expressing them, in the splendid promise of dawn. The words in which he made known the contents of his father's will evoked a burst of enthusiasm. The will consisted



FREDERICK WILLIAM IV
(1795-1861)

of two documents: the one a retrospective survey of the reign of the deceased, the other, which bore the superscription "*An meinen lieben Fritz*" (to my dear Fritz), exhorting him particularly, among other precepts, to be on his guard against the prevailing lust of novelty as well as against an exaggerated preference for the old ways. The king had these writings communicated to the nation, saying that it was worthy to hear such words, and in this enactment expressed himself with a warmth and cordiality which could not but charm. "No secretary would write so," men said, one to another, "no minister would venture to adopt such a style; these vigorous and noble words were the outpouring of the grief of a son and the pride of a king."

The same spirit inspired the monarch's first acts. Arndt, who had been suspended since 1820, was reinstated in his professorship; Boyen, who had

gone out of office with Humboldt and Beyme in 1819, once more received an appointment to the privy council, and subsequently became minister of war; Jahn, the aged father of gymnastics, was allowed to leave his place of exile at Freiburg; the two brothers Grimm, the victims of the arbitrary measures at Göttingen, were appointed to posts at Berlin; and the appointment of other men whose reputation stood high in science and art followed by degrees—Tieck, Rückert, Schelling, Cornelius, Felix Mendelssohn. Some of these were by no means popular with the general public—to say nothing of such men as Stahl and Hassenpflug.

*Wir wollen ihn nicht haben,
Den Herrn von Hass und Fluch,
Wenn gleich die Schaar der Raben
Zum Adlernest ihn trug—*

(We will not have him, the man of hatred and cursing, no, not though the whole crew of ravens should carry him to the eagle's nest.)

So the song went in the streets of Berlin, and by the king's own confession he owed to these verses the first sorrowful day of his reign. For not even the elder men who shared his confidence were spared in them; Alexander von Humboldt was the only one who found favour in the eyes of the populace, for the Bunsens, Radowitz, Thile, Rochow, and the rest were regarded as men full of mediæval notions, and their very piety was impugned as dishonest and worn only for show.

However great the injustice thus done to individuals may have been, the public soon learned to form a correct judgment of the position and person of the king, though they fell into the pardonable and even creditable error of trying to exonerate Frederick William himself from the unlovely sides of his character and to lay the blame of them upon his favourites. Every good thing was imputed to him and to him alone, more especially the pardon of the 10th of August, which restored to life, among other political offenders, the unlucky students who had fallen victims to the commission of inquiry of 1834. The animated, cordial, and direct manner in which the king addressed his people at the ceremony of homage at Königsberg and Berlin was received with great jubilation, the hearts of his audience were irresistibly drawn to him, and filled with amazement and



A. VON HUMBOLDT
(1769-1859)

hope at this new and unprecedented line of action; even those who could not hear were carried away by enthusiasm, for his very gestures were impressive and the spectator could not but imagine them accompanied by heartfelt and

[1840 A.D.]

vigorous speech. And yet upon an acute observer the question would obtrude itself whether this effective manner of speech could be maintained; whether affairs of state did not demand a different tone.

THE CONSTITUTION

In any case such exciting and animating eloquence, with all the hopes it aroused, could act beneficially only if followed up by act. And the act required of Frederick William was the fulfilment of the promise of 1815 and 1820—the grant of a constitution to the whole state. The king was first seriously confronted with this demand in the diet of Königsberg which he had convoked to receive there the homage of the provinces of Prussia and Posen. On the motion of a Königsberg merchant named Heinrich the Prussian estates resolved, by a majority of ninety votes against five, to submit to the king the request for a constitution. His answer, which was given in writing on the 9th of September, was kind and conciliatory in tone, but contained nothing that could be construed into a definite promise; for all that it made a good impression and nourished the hopes that had already been conceived. But a perfect fury of enthusiasm was evoked by the words which the king uttered next day. The estates had done homage to him, the courtyard of the Schloss was packed with a throng of fifteen thousand souls, a solemn silence reigned over all. Then, rising suddenly from his throne, he advanced to the edge of the platform, raised his right hand as if taking an oath, and swore before God and the well-beloved witnesses there assembled that he would be a just judge, a faithful, watchful, and merciful prince, and a Christian king, as his father of never-to-be-forgotten memory had been. He prayed that God would bestow upon him the blessing of princes, whereby the hearts of men are inclined to him whom he has blessed, and would make of him a man after his own heart; he implored the divine blessing upon his beloved country. “Among us,” he exclaimed enthusiastically, “there is unity among the head and members, sovereign and people; broadly speaking, a glorious unity in the common striving of all estates for noble ends, for the common weal, in sacred loyalty and true honour. Thus may God preserve our native land of Prussia, Germany, and the whole world; manifold and yet one, like that precious metal, which, made by the fusion of many, is but one and that precious—subject to no other rust than that of the centuries which renders it fairer still!”

There was not a word of the constitution in all this, and yet men still pinned their faith to it. The disappointment was all the greater when a royal decree of the 4th of October explicitly repudiated this misconception. The mood of the nation grew bitter; the homage at Berlin which took place on October 15th was looked forward to without pleasure. The king was expected to make a speech, but what was there to say now that the first serious demand had been rejected by anticipation? The loftier its phrases, the sharper would be the contrast between word and deed. This time the solemn act was divided into two parts; the knights and clergy first did homage within the castle, the cities and provinces in the courtyard. Before the oath was administered the king, bareheaded in spite of the wind and rain, took up the word. As he had already told the knights within doors that they were to expect from him no so-called glorious reign with thunder of cannon and blare of trumpets, but a simple, paternal, true German and Christian rule, so he vowed to the people without that, so far as in him lay, he would maintain peace in his time. He sued for the love of his people, which he could not do without, for the path of kings was lamentable and full of lamentation (*thränenreich und thränenwerth*) if the hearts and minds of their people did not helpfully keep pace with them. By the sweetest, simplest sound in their mother tongue, by an honest honour-

able "*Ja!*" (Yes) he prayed them to promise that they would loyally hold with him through good and evil days, and with uplifted right hand he repeated—as God was his help—his vow of Königsberg. "It is for you to consummate this solemn act," he said, "and may the rain of God fructifyingly descend upon this hour!"

The deeper the impression which the king made by his presence and manner, the greater waxed the dissatisfaction that on the great question of the hour he was so completely out of accord with public opinion, which held tenaciously to its demand for a constitution—and a constitution, moreover, after the French model. Frederick William, as it happened, was by no means averse to a further development of the system of provincial estates; on the contrary, in 1842, he summoned deputies from them to Berlin to consult them in the capacity of combined committees (*Vereinigte Ausschüsse*) upon laws which were to obtain throughout the whole monarchy. Nor did the matter rest there, for he was constantly turning over in his mind the scheme of a united diet (*Vereinigter Landtag*). But, on the one hand, he was incapable of arriving at any steadfast resolution, exhausted himself in disputes with the adverse elements about him, among which the influence of his brothers must be reckoned, and frittered away his interest on subordinate and sometimes ridiculous questions—such as the place of assembly, the division of the diet into *curiæ*, the uniform to be worn by the members, and so forth; and, on the other hand, he got stuck fast in an imaginary contradiction between national estates of historic growth and an un-German representative assembly imported from France. In his eyes the estates of 1823, arbitrary, unhistoric, and barren of memories as they were, seemed to furnish an organic and therefore conservative basis; while he was incapable of understanding that the French representative system was something more than French; that it was, in fact, the expression of modern political consciousness. Hence he fought for his idea and against the constitutionalists with firm conviction, but he lacked courage to put his views promptly and fully into practice and so to form a party in their favour.

The Press and Frederick William IV

It was therefore more excusable if there gradually grew up a doubt whether the king were absolutely serious in his scheme for the estates, or whether his interest in the subject were not really feigned. Still more excusable was the view that pressure must be brought to bear upon him, and that, possibly by means of the press, sufficient influence might be exerted over a man so sensitive and excitable, to thrust him into the sphere of liberal ideas. Two pamphlets in particular were intended to have this effect upon him, and they produced a profound impression on the educated public, though not upon the sovereign. The author of one, entitled *Woher und Wohin?* (*Whence and Whither?*) was the venerable *Oberpräsident* von Schön; the author of the other, *Four Questions: Answered by an East Prussian*, was a Jewish physician from Königsberg, Johann Jacoby by name. Besides being circulated far and wide, discussed, and treated of in the newspapers, they evoked rejoinders and corroborations, and Jacoby's pamphlet in particular proved a veritable arsenal to the constitutional opposition in years immediately following.

The longer this went on the more convinced must the king and his ministers have become of the need of creating a powerful weapon on their own side by means of the press; but they stopped short of carrying the conviction into effect. In August of 1834 a *Deutsche Zeitung* was projected, to be managed by Dahlmann and to champion the cause of the government in grand style; but at the last moment the dread of Dahlmann's iron independence of spirit overcame them, and they refused to give him unrestricted freedom from cen-

[1842 A.D.]

sorship. The blunder was all the more foolish since they were well aware that it was impossible to gag the press to the same extent as before, and that by the relaxation of the censorship introduced in 1842 they increased the virulence of the opposition, without providing any sufficient counterbalancing force. Their adversaries had no lack of subjects for attack, even if the person of the king offered vulnerable points enough, which were beyond the reach of the Prussian police. It was not enough that Heinrich Heine should launch forth with genuine delight into biting and scornful satire upon this—

Mittelding,
Das weder Fleisch noch Fisch ist,
Und von den Extremen unsere Zeit
Ein närrisches Gemisch ist—

[This hybrid thing, which is neither flesh nor fish, but a foolish mixture of the extremes of our time]—

or, looking back upon the promises of 1815 and 1820, should mockingly exclaim

Ja, Königsworte, das sind Schätze
Wie tief im Rhein der Nibelungshort—

[The words of kings! they are treasures indeed! Such is the Nibelung treasure at the bottom of the Rhine]—

even the king's childlessness, the taste for drink which was attributed to him, and similar matters were treated with the grossest freedom.

The literary world of Prussia was of course obliged to refrain from such personalities, but it did not fail to aim many more or less covert hits at the "romanticist." And what could not be said in Berlin was said abroad; Swiss publishers printed and published whatever would not pass the Prussian censorship; and they were sure of a ready sale. Even in Germany more than four hundred journals catered for the requirements of the reading public; some scientific papers—more especially the *Hallische Jahrbücher* of Ruge and Echtermeyer—set the fashion of liberal politics; they waxed wroth over Schelling's philosophy and struck at the royal patron through the protégé; they issued a manifesto against romanticism, and in romanticism branded the policy of Prussia. The political lyrists exercised a great ascendancy over public opinion, Herwegh first of all, with his daring method and eloquent language, and next to him Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Robert Prutz, Dingelstedt, and Freiligrath.

For a long while the attitude they took up was by no means hostile to the king, and they sang to him many words of encouragement and incitement. But one after another grew weary of fruitless speech, and it was not long before Herwegh turned against him. *Du könntest deiner Zeit die Banner tragen, und trägst ihr nur die Schleppe nach!* ["Thou mightest bear the banner of thy age," he cried to the king in his disappointment, "and art content to be its train bearer!"] Hoffmann, Prutz, and others followed his example, some of them wounded by personal affronts; and even Freiligrath recanted the statement which had once moved Herwegh to anger, "*Der Dichter steht auf einer höhern Warte als die Zinne der Partei*" [The poet stands upon a loftier watchtower than the battlement of a party], and allowed his laurel wreath to be woven by the party which did indeed represent an overwhelming majority of the educated classes of the country.

ECCLESIASTICAL ENTANGLEMENTS

A very large number of points obnoxious to attack were presented by ecclesiastical affairs, over which a singularly unlucky star was certainly in the ascendant, whether the king managed them himself or left them to his favourites, or to Eichhorn, the minister of public worship (*Cultus-minister*). Two of the king's enterprises, in particular, were a godsend to mockers, though by no means devoid of serious meaning—the bishopric of Jerusalem and the completion of Cologne cathedral. The idea of founding an episcopal see at Jerusalem in conjunction with England was suggested by the oriental crisis of 1840. If it inspired such a fantastic visionary as that enthusiastic Phil-Hellene Eyraud with the desire that King Ludwig of Bavaria in concert with other Christian rulers should command the Porte to deliver up the Holy Sepulchre on pain of a fresh crusade, and if Ludwig undertook to press this desire upon his well-beloved brother-in-law, whose soul he knew to be open to all great and noble ideas, we must allow that it was a sign of good sense in the latter that he curtailed the extravagant project as he did.

The desire that Protestantism, no less than Roman Catholicism and the Greek church, should be represented in the holy places by a dignitary of high rank, could not but appeal to a devout Christian, and the fact that the king endeavoured to associate the Anglican church with his project is explained not only by his own predilections and those of his confidential adviser, Bunsen, but by the very reasonable consideration that without the assistance of England he would find his object hard to attain.

There was no question, however, that the whole scheme would appear singular and visionary in the eyes of his sceptical contemporaries. The same was the case, with a difference, in the matter of the completion of the cathedral. Regarded as a purely artistic work it could hardly have failed to command the approval of the nation; what displeased them was the fact that the king looked upon it as an act of piety, and intended it as a symbol of the harmony of all confessions and the unbiassed good-will of the sovereign towards the Roman Catholic church. The ceremony of laying the foundation stone, which took place on the 4th of September, 1842, nevertheless assumed something of the character of a national festival. In glowing language the monarch hailed the doors of which he laid the foundation as doorways of a new and better time, through which dishonourable endeavours to undermine the concord of German princes and peoples and to disturb the peace of religious confessions might never pass. "Through ages of peace among men, rich in the peace of God," he cried, "may the cathedral of Cologne tower above this city and above Germany to the end of time." At the banquet one of the German sovereigns who were about him on that occasion, the king of Würtemberg, called for a cheer for the great common fatherland of them all, and Archduke John of Austria foisted upon popular parlance the toast, "No Austria, no Prussia! A great united Germany, firm-set as her own mountains!"

The nation, no less than the king, flattered itself with pleasing dreams when it talked of peace among the religious confessions. The various sects could not keep the peace among their own members, to say nothing of keeping it with one another; in the Roman Catholic as in the Protestant camp tendencies pertinacious and irreconcilable were gathering force and gaining ascendancy; and in the coming years quarrels were to run higher over religion than over politics.

In the Roman Catholic church the signal for combat was given by Arnoldi, the new bishop of Treves. In the August of 1844 he ordained that the seamless coat of Christ, which was one of the treasures of his cathedral, should be

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solemnly exhibited. From the Roman Catholic districts on the Rhine, from Belgium and France, there at once began a monster pilgrimage to Treves, swelling to vaster dimensions still when Freifrau von Droste-Vischering, a niece of the archbishop's, who had gone thither on crutches to adore the holy coat, came back without them. More than a million pilgrims poured into the ancient city on the Moselle within a period of six weeks, and some of them, at least, maintained that they likewise had found healing for physical ailments.

CHRISTIAN CATHOLIC CONGREGATIONS

The loud rejoicings of the clericals over these miracles of divine grace naturally gave rise to contradictions from the enlightened. The fable of the seamless coat was exposed in all its absurdity by Protestant scholars; they demonstrated that there were twenty specimens or more of this miraculous garment; they lashed the superstition which made sport with it. Contradiction even arose from the bosom of the Romish church. A Catholic priest Johannes Ronge by name—suspended, it is true, and enjoying by no means the best of reputations—declaimed fervidly against the idolatry at Treves in an open letter addressed to Bishop Arnoldi, the Tetzels of the nineteenth century. Driven to extremities by the excommunication pronounced upon him by the prince-bishop of Breslau, he began to agitate in a series of pamphlets the reform of the church and a German-Catholic national church. The loud applause with which he was greeted by Protestants, as well as his own co-religionists, gave him fresh courage, and it seemed as though the exorbitance of the claims of Rome, which had steadily increased ever since the year 1830, was about to lead to an absolute breach and a new reformation. The path which Ronge was to tread had already been pointed out to him. In August of 1844 another priest—likewise suspended it is fair to say—Czerski, of Schneidemühl in the province of Posen, had seceded from Rome with his whole congregation, not because he rejected the dogmas of the church, but because he repudiated her constitution and the celibacy of the clergy.

Following the precedent set by Czerski, Ronge founded a "Christian Catholic" (*Christ-Katholisch*) congregation at Breslau at the beginning of March, 1845, and within a few weeks the same thing was done in about twenty north German towns. At a council held at Leipsic about Easter deputies appeared from fifteen different places. Ronge undertook great progresses through the whole of Germany, and increased the number of his adherents, especially in the south; men whose opinion carried weight like Duller and Gervinus rallied to him, court and government circles were not ill-disposed towards the movement; he had the honour of a long audience with the prince of Prussia, and the king himself seemed determined to place the new sect on an equal footing with the old Lutherans. Austria and Bavaria, indeed, would tolerate no German-Catholic congregations within their borders, and in other states, such as Saxony, the electorate of Hesse, and Würtemberg, restrictions were placed upon their public action. At Leipsic, where Robert Blum had founded a congregation of quite respectable numbers, a sanguinary riot arose out of the question in 1845.

Prince John, afterwards king of Saxony, who in spite of his great learning and artistic accomplishments had the reputation of being narrow-minded in religious matters, was regarded as the soul of the prohibition issued in July of that year. On the 12th of August he came to Leipsic to review the militia (*Bürgerwehr*). He was everywhere pursued by the liveliest demonstrations in favour of the German-Catholics, hurrahs for Ronge alternated with the cry of "Down with the Jesuits!" In the evening the prince seemed to be in actual personal danger from the crowds in front of his residence, the

stones thrown at the windows, and the pressure of the throng against the doors; the soldiers therefore appeared on the scene and made use of their weapons. More violent scenes were prevented only by the speedy flight of the prince, the withdrawal of the troops from the town, and, above all, by the moderation displayed by Robert Blum, who practically held the mob in his hand; then the prestige of the government was gradually re-established.

But internal dissensions were a far more serious danger to the German-Catholic cause than the enmity of the Saxon government and like-minded persons in authority. While Czerski's followers refrained from any great divergence from Roman Catholic dogma, and so fully secured the approval of orthodox Protestants, mainly by their acceptance of the divinity of Christ, that they were in many cases allowed to hold their services in Protestant churches, the followers of Ronge took up the standpoint of modern theological criticism, rejected the Apostles' Creed as the freethinking party among Protestants had done, and thereby drew upon themselves the same persecution.

The new sect maintained its outward unity with difficulty in its synods and councils, and more than once had to smooth over or hush up quarrels that could not be kept from public knowledge. Moreover, before long it became evident that this new religious community was animated by no genuine religious force, but that, on the contrary, it was to a great extent maintained by political malcontents who used it to cloak democratic and socialistic aspirations. When the events of the year 1848 made such a cloak superfluous, many of the leaders appeared in their true colours, and German-Catholicism (*Deutschkatholicismus*), instead of profiting by the liberty it now enjoyed, began gradually to decline. It reached its zenith at the end of 1846, when its adherents numbered about sixty thousand, half of whom were in Silesia, and one hundred and fifty-one congregations sent representatives to the council of Berlin held at Whitsuntide, 1847. During the next few years, though it may have increased numerically by extending its sphere into Austria and Bavaria, it completely lost its distinctive character, and confessed the fact by attempting to amalgamate with the free Protestant congregations at the councils of Leipsic and Köthen, in 1850, thereby undermining still more its own vitality and that of its confederates.

HISTORICAL CRITICISM OF CHRISTIANITY

Nevertheless German-Catholicism and the free congregations were analogous phenomena, inasmuch as both were impelled by the spirit of the age to secede from their mother church, and the strength of both lay in negation rather than in creation. In the preceding generation Protestantism had passed through a great crisis. The older rationalism, which had endeavoured to arrive at a rational comprehension of the Biblical narratives of Old and New Testament alike, and to interpret them with prosaic baldness in a sense accordant with the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, had spent its force. It was so absolutely devoid of religious vitality, and at the same time offered so many weak points to dispassionate critical reasoning, that its adherents split up continually into smaller parties; on the one hand the devout acceptance of divine mysteries, even when they consisted of miracles or incomprehensible dogmas, regained its lost ascendancy; while on the other the historicial criticism of the younger generation began to treat the Bible like any other book and to try to extricate the historical facts of Christianity from the extraneous matter in which the first centuries had embedded them, a task which called for years upon years of laborious study. But from the very fact that study of this sort was no child's-play, that it could not all at once produce definite results, because, amongst the many pros and cons, criticism itself was

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frequently contradictory and nugatory, it had no power to attract the crowd, which had been open enough to the influence of rationalism. But rationalism found itself abandoned in favour of orthodoxy, which grew bolder from year to year and developed a combative and persecuting temper.

It is true that among those who held fast to the supernatural dogmas of Christianity there were men who combined with them the spirit of toleration and unbiassed inquiry, and, as theologians of moderate views, maintained a conciliatory attitude. But desirable as it was, in view of the state at which both the evangelical church and scientific theology had arrived, that such should come forward as leaders, the pacific temperament of the most distinguished among them fitted them ill to wrest the ascendancy from the combative chiefs of aggressive orthodoxy, especially when they had to deal with such a man as Frederick William IV.

The king, although Bunsen, one of the moderate party, was among his intimate friends, was personally too much inclined to the rigidly orthodox view to concede the right of free inquiry within the Protestant church. He was not blind to the necessity of remodelling the constitution of that body, and would gladly have witnessed a transformation which should intrust its management to more competent hands than those of the sovereign; but until this came to pass he did not feel justified in permitting any derogation from the binding character of the old religious formulæ by the exercise of such toleration as his father had extended to more liberal opinions, and therefore drew the rein tight.

Eichhorn's Measures

The fanatical adherents of orthodoxy baited their opponents to the best of their ability—Professor Hengstenberg being much to the fore with his *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* [*Protestant Church Times*], and Eichhorn, minister of education and public worship, in earlier days a friend and disciple of Schleiermacher's, promoted the interests of the party, unembarrassed by his own past, and zealously favoured pietism and outward conformity to the church—acting in this matter in harmony with the king's personal sentiments. It was not enough that the theological professorships at the universities should be occupied more and more exclusively by adherents of the new school of orthodoxy; their very method of teaching was to be altered; scholastic instruction and regular examination were to be substituted for open lectures, and the German institution of *Privatdocenten* [teachers who hold no professorship] thus undermined. By this measure the minister incurred boundless unpopularity, which was all the more furious and the more certain to culminate in the charge of hypocrisy, because he was the last man from whom anything of the kind was expected, and his appointment had been hailed with joy by the liberals. In a little while everyone was against him; even his friends accused him of dissimulation, while the so-called "pious party" did not consider him trustworthy, holding that, though he promoted the well-being of the church, he did so out of "weakness." His plans for reforming the constitution of the church were a perpetual stumbling-block to them, and yet they did not go far enough to satisfy the liberals.

None the less what he did was by no means deserving of reprobation. He began by instituting synods in the various provinces and circles, consisting of clerical and lay members, and in 1846 he convened a general synod, in which, as was to be expected, the moderates had the advantage. It repudiated the binding authority of the ancient symbols by a large majority (forty-eight to fourteen), and drew up a confession of faith involving no dogmatic definition.

THE EDICT OF TOLERATION

This, however, was its undoing as far as the king and his minister were concerned; its decrees were not ratified nor was a new synod convoked.

Frederick William was of the opinion that he who either could or would not reconcile the binding authority of the symbols with his conscience was bound to secede from the national church, and as such secession had not hitherto been sanctioned by law he made it possible by the so-called "*Toleranz-Edict*" [Edict of Toleration], which merely required a declaration before a magistrate. As matters stood, he certainly rendered a service, though a bad one, to the freethinkers. They were now at liberty to form religious societies of their own whenever they chose to resign their rights in the great national church. If they had unanimously availed themselves of this opportunity, the national church would have suffered most in the long run; for it would have shrunk more and more into a rigid sect within which there would year by year have been less room for any form of belief except the literal acceptance of doctrine.

This was not what actually happened; the future of the church was not imperilled, for the great majority of the clergy resolved to hold by their just rights and not to secede voluntarily. None but those who were forcibly ejected by the ecclesiastical authorities availed themselves of the edict of toleration, after having, in some cases, previously gathered their adherents into congregations, which, however, were not as yet recognised by the law. Rupp was the first to do so, at Königsberg in January, 1846; a few months later his example was followed at Halle by Wislicenus, and at the end of 1847 at Magdeburg by Uhlich, whose congregation numbered five thousand. Liberal opinions were strongly represented among the clergy of Saxony, and that province took the lead in the movement in all things. Uhlich, Wislicenus, and others had held assemblies of preachers and laymen, more especially at Köthen, since 1841, and had provided themselves with a widely circulated organ in the *Papers for Protestant Friends* (or Friends of Light, as they were afterwards called). Even in these circles there were great divergencies of opinion; for many of the free congregations, such as those of Marburg and Halle, were prepared to give up even the name of Christian, while the Magdeburgers in their *Document of Foundation* expressly declared—"We remain what we are and have been, evangelical Christians; and we are prepared to rejoin the established church of our country when it returns to the liberty of the Gospel."

But with them, as with the German-Catholics, the old experience was repeated; in course of time the more advanced and negative elements grew stronger and stronger, and completely undermined the attractive force and power of development in the free congregations. In the years of revolution, being then about forty in number, these congregations meddled in political affairs and were consequently treated as political associations and dissolved in the period of reaction. The revivals in subsequent years are wholly insignificant.

German-Catholicism and the free congregations bear striking testimony to the endeavours of public opinion in the forties to employ itself in religious matters, since it was excluded from the domain of politics. But there is no lack of other tokens to demonstrate the same thing. The struggle against the Prussian union was zealously taken up by the strict Lutheran party, some of them seceded from the national church and gathered together at Breslau to form, in 1841, a separate congregation, unrecognised by the state. Others remained in the union and strove to destroy it from within.

A more pleasing event was the founding of the "*Gustav-Adolf-Verein*,"

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which, without narrow-minded insistence on points of doctrine, endeavoured to support Protestantism by building schools and churches wherever it was endangered by the neighbourhood of Roman Catholicism.

It originated from small beginnings in the kingdom of Saxony, and after 1842 spread into Protestant non-Prussian Germany; in 1844 it amalgamated with itself the separate association which the king had wished to found for Prussia only; and in 1848 penetrated into Bavaria, where King Ludwig had begun by taking the lead in a counter-demonstration and founding a "Tilly-Verein."

In 1846 the exclusion of Prediger Rupp, who had been sent to the general assembly as a deputy from Königsberg in spite of his suspension, threatened to impair the peaceful co-operation of the various schools of thought, but had no permanent ill effect. Even the Protestant governments were ambitious of displaying their activity in the department of the church, and in 1846 instituted the Protestant church conference, an assembly of plenipotentiaries which met every two years to prepare or pass common ordinances for all the national churches of Germany, but brought forth no results of any importance.

THE PROJECT OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

All these things, however, could not expunge from the orders of the day the real problem which that decade had to solve, the question, to wit, whether the Prussian constitution of estates should be reduced to a form more suitable to the requirements of the times or not. There was no doubt that the king himself was resolved in the main to answer this question in the affirmative, but it was no less certain that the form which he had in mind did not answer to the demands of the liberals. What they wished for was a representative constitution, a parliament selected by the free choice of the people; the king could not shake himself free of his fancy for class representation, and therefore wished for a national assembly consisting, like the provincial diets, of representatives of the gentry, commonalty, and peasantry.

If he were to grant such a constitution the inevitable result would be a conflict between himself and the diet, a prospect sufficiently deplorable for members of the government and court to make them hostile to any innovation; for they knew the king's character well enough to be aware that he lacked the balance and tenacity required to carry such a conflict to a successful issue. The leader of the opposition was no less a man than his brother and heir-apparent the prince of Prussia, who, though he did not disguise his conviction that Prussia, like other nations, must enter on the path of constitutional government, thought the king so little fitted to take the first step therein that he implored him to leave it to himself, the prince, or to his son, and threatened to enter a solemn protest when his expostulations proved of no avail.

The year 1844 witnessed the most animated discussions on this point. The king had made Bunsen, Radowitz, Canitz—the ambassador to Vienna—and others submit to him schemes and opinions on the subject of a constitution; he declared that he felt himself bound by his father's promises, that his brother's opposition wounded him to the heart, but could not have the slightest effect upon his judgment; he had already confidentially communicated his intentions to the courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg, and yet he was once again unnerved by the general opposition, and postponed the question. Fresh negotiations, interrupted at times, and then taken up with renewed vigour, ultimately led to a kind of compromise; the prince withdrew his opposition, and in return the king took his wishes into consideration on some of the chief points at issue.

The Patent of February, 1847

The necessity for raising a great loan for the promotion of railway construction was mainly instrumental in breaking down the opposition of the king's opponents. By the edict of Frederick William III, 1820, this could be done only on the security of the estates of the kingdom. The united committees of the provincial diets could not possibly be regarded in that light, and would probably have refused to take any such responsibility upon themselves. Consequently, to everybody's surprise on the 3rd of February, 1847, a royal patent appeared, convoking the United Diet of the Kingdom to meet at Berlin on the 11th of April. This, as its name proves, was not a new creation, but merely a combination of the provincial diets. All the members were to sit in one chamber when taxation and loans were under consideration; in deliberations on other matters they were to be divided into two *curiæ* (an innovation for which the prince of Prussia was responsible), one of which, the *Herren-curia*, was to consist of princes of the blood-royal, noblemen, and certain other classes; the second, the *Dreiständecurie* (*Trois-États*), of representatives of the knighthood, municipalities, and peasantry. In legislative affairs the united diet had only a consultative voice, in domestic policy it had the right of petition. Its meetings were to be determined by circumstances, and to take place only when called for by fresh loans or increased taxation. The united committees, on the contrary, were to meet regularly every four years, and a special commission was to be convoked annually to deal with the debt.

Such were the pledges given by the patent of February 3rd. They marked an advance upon previous conditions, but lagged sorely behind the needs of the time. Apart from the strong disfavour with which the composition of the diet and many separate provisions were received, public opinion felt justified in requiring regularly recurring sessions and the right of deliberation, instead of the bare right of consultation. The publication of the patent was therefore the signal for a public debate upon the worth of the royal concessions, which was brought to a head by Heinrich Simon in his *Annehmen oder Ablehnen?* [*Acceptance or Rejection?*] Although this "bad" book with its "malignant" preface was seized by order of the king and a prosecution instituted against its author, it produced the effect intended and was supported by a whole literature of similar pamphlets (by Gervinus, Bülow-Cummerow, Jacoby, amongst others). Amongst liberal members of the estates the question was vehemently discussed in word and writing; there was no lack of adherents to Simon's opinion that the concessions ought to be declined; and the opening of the diet was looked for with the utmost excitement.

After a solemn religious service, the king opened it on April 11th with the first speech from the throne ever made by a king of Prussia. He spoke extempore, according to his usual custom, Minister von Thile behind him with notes of his speech, and he spoke for more than half an hour. There was no lack of high-flown passages, but the impression they made was not that of 1840 and 1842, and his hearers listened not for good things only, but also for evil. The estates were convoked—so the king declared—not to champion the opinions of the age or of the schools, but to maintain the rights of their constituents; his own independent judgment, not the will of majorities, should be his rule of conduct; he would never change his relation to his people for that of a constitutional sovereign; never should a written paper be interposed as a providence, so to speak, between the Almighty and this country. He referred to that happy country whose constitution had been the work of centuries and of a hereditary wisdom without parallel, as a shining example; and, after a violent attack upon the spirit of destruction and unbelief which dominated a

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portion of the press, he rose from his throne, and, standing erect, he made the passionate affirmation: "As for me and my house, we will serve the Lord!"

The United Diet in Prussia (1847 A.D.)

The whole tenor of the speech from the throne practically cut off all hope of an understanding with the constitutionally-minded deputies. Hermann Beckerath wrote: "In profound grief we went down the stairs of the Schloss, and the question that now arises is what we ought to do as men of honour, representing the sacred rights of the people." A great many deputies, especially among those from Prussia and the Rhine, were inclined to take their departure instantly as a protest, but this unparliamentary ebullition of annoyance and immature political feeling was fortunately prevented. Numerous private meetings took place the same day in the houses of prominent members, and it was resolved to reply to the speech from the throne by an address.

Count Schwerin undertook to request permission to move an address: they desired, he said, besides expressing their thanks for the step the king had taken, respectfully to explain their objections to certain points in the patent of February 3rd. Although this patent did not grant the estates the privilege of moving an address, the *Landtagsmarschall* [Marshal of the diet], Prince von Solms-Lich, acceded to the request; the motion was adopted and a commission appointed, which deputed Beckerath to draw up the address.

A two days' consultation led to the first brilliant debate, in which, beside Beckerath, Hansemann, Camphausen, and Mevissen from the Rhine province, Vincke from Westphalia, and Auerswald and Saucken from east Prussia, took a prominent part. They insisted again and again that everything depended upon their acquiring a juridical basis, that they could no longer live upon favour and confidence, and that the assembly had an inalienable right to all the privileges which Frederick William III had promised to the estates in future. They were opposed by Bodelschwingh, the minister, who maintained that the juridical basis of the assembly was the patent of February 3rd and that alone, denied that the convocation had anything to do with the late king's promises, and moved as an amendment the address of his former colleague, Count Arnim-Boitzenburg, which simply struck out all the promises which Beckerath had enumerated in his address. Ultimately a kind of compromise was arrived at, Beckerath's list being abandoned, on the motion of Alfred von Auerswald, and replaced by a proviso maintaining all privileges up to that time acquired.

In this form the address secured a majority of four hundred and eighty-four against one hundred and seven, even the princes of the blood-royal voting in its favour, with the single exception of the heir-apparent.

The king's reply was moderate in tone; he held to the patent as the only juridical basis of their privileges, but promised further improvements in the constitution and another session of the diet within the next four years. In other respects likewise the opposition gained many desirable concessions, such as the promise of freedom of the press.

The government was obviously in a very difficult position; it was not clear as to its own standpoint and was frequently convicted of self-contradiction in debate. On its two most important proposals it was completely defeated. In the first place it asked that the diet should warrant the interest of about one hundred million thalers for a *Rentenbank* [rent-bank], which was to advance money to peasants who still owed their landlords the money for their redemption for forced labour and other burdens. The project deserved every encouragement, especially from the liberal point of view. But unfortunately the ministers declared that they did not seek the permission, but only the ad-

vice of the diet, as a warrant for interest was not a loan, and it was only to the latter that their assent was required. The consequence was that the diet not only rejected this proposal by an immense majority, but refused to vote the thirty millions needed for railway construction; for, as Georg von Vincke explained, as long as the rights of the assembly were called in question, it could protect them only by exercising them and refusing every demand for money. The more protracted the debates were, the bitterer they became. The diet passed more and more beyond the control of the government, and still neither it nor the king had any thought of yielding. All the talents were undoubtedly in the ranks of the opposition; there was hardly an orator of any distinction on the ministerial side except Arnim-Boitzenburg, and the attitude of the ministers themselves was awkward and unconciliatory. The opposition itself could take up no strong position, could not be really sure of itself; it remained in the diet because it had political insight enough to know that it ought not to abandon its post; and yet it could not but confess that it thereby recognised the diet under its present conditions, while at the same time holding fast to the conviction that, without the rights which were withheld from it, it had no claim to be regarded as the assembly of estates promised by Frederick William III. Its whole previous conduct was put to the severest test immediately before the close of the session.

The United Committees

On the 24th of June three royal messages were sent to the diet, refusing the request that the government would refrain from forming united committees, such committees being prejudicial to the rights of the diet, and requiring them to proceed to the election of the committees and of the commission for the national debt. The question then was, should they elect or not? After long discussions at party meetings only a few of the opposition, fifty-eight in all, among whom were Hansemann, Mevissen, and Vincke, summoned up courage to refuse to elect; several chose the easier middle course, and proposed to proceed to the election with the proviso that the committees should take no steps detrimental to the rights of the diet. Camphausen and Beckenrath were the leaders of these protesting electors, who amounted to one hundred and fifty-six in all and included almost the whole of East Prussia. The great majority, to the number of two hundred and forty-eight, elected without reservation. There is no doubt that the method adopted by the one hundred and fifty-six was most in accordance with public opinion; unconditional election seemed cowardice in the eyes of the people, but refusal was regarded almost as a revolutionary measure.

The king had no better opinion of the protest, and dismissed the diet very ungraciously. He did not pronounce the closing speech himself, but was represented by a deputy in the person of Bodelschwingh, while he himself took a journey to Breslau. In his contradictory fashion he had let it be understood before the election that he should insist upon having his own way in this matter, but was prepared to meet the wishes of the diet in other respects, and, in particular, contemplated regularly recurring sessions. Bodelschwingh might therefore have sweetened the bitter words he had to say to the opposition with this concession, and so softened by a note of conciliation the discord in which the first parliamentary assembly of Prussia broke up on June 26th, 1847. But the desired word remained unspoken, and the members went their several ways under the mournful conviction that the king regarded as his enemies the men who unquestionably had the majority of the nation behind them, and who alone could render him support in great stress of circumstances.^e

On the 17th of January, 1848, the king summoned the elected committees

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to Berlin, where the scheme of a new penal code was laid before them. But it contained so many severe and cruel provisions that the estates almost universally demanded vital ameliorations. On the 6th of March, 1848, the king in person closed the assembly of the committees of the estates. His speech already betokened the influence of the rolling thunder that, rumbling from France, announced those violent shocks which were to overthrow the political constitution of Europe. Its words were conciliatory enough. "I gladly make use of the present opportunity," he said, "to declare to you that in accordance with the almost unanimous request of both curiæ I will transfer the periodicity conferred on the committees to the united diet, and will limit the sphere of the committees in corresponding fashion."

Had Frederick William IV, even on this 6th of March, made up his mind to really magnanimous and liberal concessions, had he created popular representation, furnished with rights and full powers, which would have answered to the general wishes—who can say whether the king of Prussia, surrounded by a faithful and attached people, might not have been able in the midst of the confusion which was increasing about him to stand unshaken as the most powerful prince in Germany, a firm refuge round which the other races would willingly have sought safety? It was not to be. His reluctance to abandon the smallest portion of the unlimited power which, according to his own conviction, he had received directly from God, was too deeply rooted.

"Bending low, with outstretched hand," as the deputy Camphausen expressed it, "the estates had met him. He had repulsed them."

When Tarquinius Priscus refused to buy the nine books of the Cumæan Sibyl for a high price, and then, after three of them had been burned, was still less willing to grant the same sum for the other six, he was yet wise enough to pay just as much for the last three as the whole collection would have cost at the beginning. But Frederick William IV refused his people when they came to him for the last time with what were really very modest requests. Twelve days later he was compelled to pay the hundredfold, yea the thousandfold, of what had been demanded of him, and he received nothing for it. Of the supreme royal power to which he had so obstinately clung, one precious fragment after another was torn from him.^d

POLITICAL SITUATION OF GERMANY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1848

The German revolutionary year of 1848 has been dealt with in a step-motherly way in the literature of history; hence it lives only in the vague reminiscences of contemporaries, according to their various political standpoints, either as a time of humiliation and disgrace or of bitter disappointment and the destruction of the brilliant hopes which were entertained of the "glorious" rising of the people. The most interested parties, the royalists and the democrats, have reason enough for this one-sided conception of the events of that year, and indeed neither of these two parties can acquit itself of active or passive complicity in those events. Accordingly it seems that it has been preferred to throw the veil of forgetfulness over the true course of affairs, rather than to subject it to a close examination. Historians have confined themselves to a registration of general facts, and even the moderate party quietly submitted to the general condemnation.

No matter what one may think concerning the inner justification or necessity as well as concerning the immediate results of that stormy time, it is nevertheless bound to remain for all future times one of the most significant, and when rightly acknowledged and valued, one of the most instructive epochs of modern history, inasmuch as it forms a decided turning point and landmark between the past and the future of German political life. The year 1848 set

up a warning tablet for the governments as well as the peoples, on which were engraved in concise style the words: "Wisdom, Moderation, Order!" Never before, in so short a space of time and with so small an expenditure of force, had governments so great and seemingly so firmly established, been overthrown, and never before had the popular zeal for unbridled liberty proved itself more powerless to form healthy and lasting creations out of its own sheer force.

First of all, this year with the voice of a great nation in thousandfold echo proclaims to the governments immediately responsible the truth that all outward political power, however strongly intrenched behind a well-drilled bureaucracy and a numerous army, refuses at the decisive moment to do service unless backed up by a heartily satisfied and therefore reliable people. This simple truth has been stated long ago in the Prussian song, and has only too often been ignored in responsible places:

Neither steed nor horseman
Do the steep heights insure
Where princes stand.

But this year proclaims a no less earnest truth to the people: that true manly freedom has no more dangerous enemy than the prostitute usurping its name, licentiousness; and also the further truth, that the highest benefit of this freedom is not to be seized in a frenzied onset, but must be won in earnest labour, in the patient and continuous exertion of all good elements, and in the moral regeneration of the people. This truth had long ago been recognised by the great leader and founder of the Jewish nation, inasmuch as he trained the latter to freedom by the forty years' journey through the desert; but in Germany this record of Holy Scripture, as well as many another, was long forgotten and lost in vain presumption. It was only necessary for a large number of horny-handed political philosophers to trumpet forth freedom, and again freedom, from the barricades; and the magic rightly belonging to this word did not fail, even in its abuse, to rouse the great masses and carry them away with it. They became simply the plaything of the demagogues, after they had become tired of being the plaything of the governments.

But this was not the case with the masses only, but largely also with those extensive circles who with great self-assertion style themselves the "educated classes," because they have studied some science, without—to use Bacon's expression—having tasted or kept the salt of it—religion. These educated classes also revelled "with little wit and much comfort" in the new possession of freedom, like unto the beggar who comes into an Indian inheritance or wins a lottery. And, indeed, this new German freedom of 1848 was far more the work of chance and the weakness of the enemy than the result of earnest work and noble endeavour, which, according to the Greeks, has precedence over every virtue. Certainly here and there, especially in the capital of Prussia, there had been fighting in the streets and behind the barricades for some hours; but this fight was entirely out of proportion to the results striven for and did not even lead to an apparent victory. The troops stormed the barricades soon enough, and after obtaining the victory were commanded out of the capital—at whose order, is not known to this day—so that the conquered revolution remained alone on the spot and could consider itself conqueror. Then it not only shook the state to its foundations, but, as we shall see, subjected the unfortunate and noble monarch to the roughest ill-usage. And this humiliation of royalty was not brought about by the malice or treachery of its servants and counsellors, but simply through their complete bewilderment by a distant event, which event had quite the opposite effect on the people, elec-

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trifling it and filling it with a lively enthusiasm and the hope of a better future. The inner psychological explanation of these phenomena on both sides is by no means wanting. The mere sight of the Gorgon head of the revolution had benumbed and paralysed the governments lulled in the supposed possession of power, because the voice of their long-suppressed conscience suddenly brought before them that chain of political sins of commission and omission which weighed too heavy even on the patience of the most patient of peoples. In the place of this proverbial German forbearance, there now came, as if urged on by a natural force, not only an impatient impulse for the definitive improvement of matters, but also that "*furor teutonicus*" to which many an old page of German history, especially during the Peasants' War, bears witness.

The fatal catastrophe thus brought about may be greatly deplored, since every excess of passion is only able to destroy, but not to produce, vigorous and enduring creations; but at the same time it must be acknowledged that in the normal ways of reform improvement could hardly be hoped for. The state in Germany was benumbed and hardened throughout, and estranged from the spirit of the people. Little was to be perceived of that living organism which alone coincides with and fills the conception and being of the state, so that even the official language could speak only of the "state machinery" (*Staatsmaschine*). As soon as one wheel stopped or one stone fell in between its cogs the whole machine had to stand still or break. The chief responsibility for these conditions weighs therefore less heavily on the people than on the governments, who, ignoring their sacred duties as well as their own interests, had omitted to educate their citizens to political activity and responsibility, and to grant at the right time those reforms which had become necessary or admissible; had they done this they would have been enabled to oppose the excessive demands of political fanatics by the help of all well-intentioned citizens. To understand this complete and staggering transformation of things, and to explain the German revolution, it will be necessary to present a short sketch of the history that preceded them.

Causes which had Produced Discontent

In the glorious Wars of Liberation of 1813 and 1814 the German people had, indeed, thrown off the disgrace and oppression of foreign rule; but the wishes and hopes, under which the leadership of patriotic men such as Stein and Görres gave the irresistible impetus of enthusiasm and success to that gigantic struggle, were not realised even in the most moderate measure. After the victory, there was no thought in authoritative circles of achieving the promised and confidently expected re-foundation of national unity and political freedom. Every advantage of this victory was pocketed by the princes, who through the German Act of Confederation of June 8th, 1815, were united in a "permanent" confederation, and who in Clause 11 bound themselves "not to wage war against one another under any pretext." They also had the graciousness, in Clause 13, to announce to their faithful subjects that, "in all states belonging to the confederation a representative assembly, consisting of the estates of the realm, would be established."

From the very beginning this German Confederation, on account of its one-sided dynastical character, could not gain the sympathies of the nation and could not fail to provide ever new occasions for the general discontent. But it is with injustice that invective and abuse alone have been hurled against it, while its relative value has been scarcely considered. This value indisputably consisted in this: that it put under restraint the lust for aggrandisement of both the great German powers as well as the conquest-seeking neighbours in

the west and east, and thereby made possible for the first time a thirty years' peace both within and without, the blessings of which stood out prominently in all branches of economic activity, and were increased and multiplied by the ever-extending Prussian Zollverein (Customs Union).

Nevertheless, the ideal strivings of the nation could find no satisfaction in the confederation, inasmuch as the idea of German unity lived not in it, but alongside of it, and even struggled for external representative realisation in antagonism to it. To this was added that this German Confederation, excused to some extent by the unripe chimeras of students and professors which led to isolated deeds of violence and vengeance, developed ever more into the actual seat and fortress of every reactionary and tyrannical policy of the government, and that it did not at all intend to execute the terms of Clause 13 of the Act of Confederation in a magnanimous or even a conscientious way. This draft on the future, which, moreover, did not even imply a national representation in the German Confederation itself, was cashed by the governments only after long delays—in Prussia not until 1847, and even then in an unsatisfactory manner. In the last-mentioned country the ordinance of the 22nd of May, 1815, had promised even before the adoption of Clause 13 of the Act of Confederation that a representation of the people should be formed from the present or future provincial legislative assemblies, whose efficaciousness, however, was to be confined to the right of "deliberation" on subjects of legislation which concerned the personal and property rights of citizens, including taxation. By the ordinance of the 17th of January, 1820, this merely deliberative representation of the people to be called into life at some future time was at least awarded a real right, inasmuch as it was irrevocably ordained—not in acknowledgment of the political rights of the people, but "in order to strengthen confidence in the state and its administration"—that a new national loan could be contracted only with the advice and guarantee of the future assembly of the estates of the realm. The law of the 5th of June, 1823, first brought to life those provincial diets from which this representation of the people was to issue, and it was not until the patent of the 3rd of February, 1847, that the provincial diets, under the name of the United Diet, were given the character of a representation of the whole land; inasmuch as the patent provided that new loans could be raised or new and higher taxes introduced only with their consent. With regard to legislation the United Diet was given only the right to advise, and a periodical meeting every four years was assured, not to this body as a whole, but to a committee of the diets to be formed for the purpose of advising the government.

It was not to be wondered at that this patent little satisfied public opinion. According to rumour it was dictated less by the acknowledgment of a political necessity than by the desire of the government to obtain a loan for the construction of the eastern railway; and the subsequent bearing of the government towards this amalgamated diet must have increased the dissatisfaction. Even the most modest proposals and petitions met only with a cold and often an insulting refusal, from the government as well as from the crown.

In the first session of the United Committees on January 18th, 1848, the deputy, Ludolph Camphausen, gave an eloquent and almost prophetic expression to these feelings of the Prussian people. He said: "The government will yet know that the discord which exists between the actual circumstances and the legislation of former days is not settled—notwithstanding the protestations of its organ. All the more, therefore, do I consider it my duty not to leave the government in doubt concerning this, as the course which it took at the conclusion of the United Diet and after it filled me with deep sorrow and anxiety for the future. A great deed had been accomplished: after thirty years of delay, the representatives of the whole land had assembled in one

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hall, and all who know how rarely and with what difficulty great assemblies succeed in self-mastery, looked forward to its doings in suspense and anxiety. What was the result? In foreign lands they were astonished and surprised at the moderation of the assembly, at its true devotion to the prince; they did not know whether to praise its reserve or to blame its weakness; they found enviable the lot of a king who could under such circumstances convoke such an assembly, who could present such a brilliant manifestation of the fidelity and devotion of his subjects before the eyes of the world. In Prussia, however, where the estates advanced to the extreme verge of the admissible, and bending far forward held out a reconciliatory hand, this hand was rejected with anger. In Prussia the estates met with reproach and disrespect from the side of the government and with expressions of dissatisfaction and anger, which are little in accordance with a monarchical state that asks the estates only for advice and concedes to them only the right of giving advice. One word would have sufficed to put an end for all time to the constitutional strife in Prussia; that word was not spoken, but history will judge between the government and us!"

Yes, history very soon passed a fearful judgment; after a few weeks Camphausen was called to be the head of the government and to save the state. But he could not stay the avalanche in motion.

In the rest of Germany, Clause 13 of the Act of Confederation was carried out in a somewhat better spirit. In the south German states especially constitutions based on the principle of representation had been introduced, and they answered more or less to the liberal doctrine. Nevertheless, they were far from creating satisfactory conditions. They left much to be desired in the political sphere and everything in the national sphere.

What wonder that dissatisfaction should have grown everywhere, since, in spite of all zeal on the part of the censorship, it continually received fresh support and vigour not only from the daily press, which had taught their public to read between the lines, but also from the official proceedings of the diet of the various states, which were struggling for extension of power. This deep-seated dissatisfaction, which had already become apparent in 1830 after the fall of the Bourbons, had been outwardly kept down by some shedding of blood and by the cold-water stream of the Karlsbad Resolutions; but the embitterment of the minds, the striving for political and national reform, could not be abolished by such means, and in the course of the following years became deeper and wider.

The governments of the various states did not understand how to direct this new wave of thought into the right channel, although they did not quite overlook the ever increasing and ever more threatening movement. The Prussian government, which knew itself to be most in arrears in the payment of the popular debt, resolved to open the United Assembly of the provincial diets in Berlin on the 11th of April, 1847. But even this representation of the people, based as it was on the highly conservative estates, bore loud witness to the untenableness of the existing conditions. This was made evident not only in the vigorous speeches of the liberal speakers; it made itself felt even more forcibly in the refusal of the proposed national loan of twenty-six million thalers for the construction of the eastern railway by three hundred and sixty votes against one hundred and seventy-nine, inasmuch as the avowed reason for this refusal was that the United Diet must, before all, come into possession of the fundamental constitutional rights, and especially the quadrennial periodicity of its meetings. It was not until the 5th of March, 1848, when the revolutionary flood was beginning to rise visibly, that this quadrennial periodicity was granted. In the grand duchy of Baden, that so-called model of a constitutional state, there was beside the liberal also a radical

party, which, under the leadership of Hecker and Struve and in defiance of the censorship, published the *Zuschauer* (*Spectator*) in a revolutionary spirit. In September, 1847, a meeting of this party at Offenburg proclaimed "the self-rule of the people, the right of all to bear arms, progressive income taxation, and the guarantee of work by the state." At a meeting of liberal opposition, members of various chambers which the Baden deputy, Von Itzstein, had called at Heppenheim, the representation of the German people at the confederation diet was discussed, and on the 12th of February, 1848, fourteen days before the Parisian February revolution, Basserman formally made a motion to this effect in the Baden chamber. Foreseeing the approach of the destructive storm, he closed the address in support of his motion with the words, only too soon to be fulfilled: "On the Seine and on the Danube the day is approaching its close."

The expansive power of these political movements was greatly enhanced amongst the most patient sections of the people by the unbearable pressure of a severe agrarian legislation; while in the middle classes, who had found their intellectual food in the disintegrating literature of Young Germany, both of Christian and Jewish extraction (Börne, Heine, and others), as well as in the pantheistic philosophy of Hegel, it was augmented by the immeasurable presumption of the bureaucracy, which embittered all the more, because the higher offices of the state were treated as the private property of the poorer nobility. This bureaucracy had long since accustomed itself to consider the citizen not as the bearer of public rights, but, according to the scornful language of Rochow, only as the ratepayer with the "limited understanding of the subject," whose sole duty it was to obey. It thus violated the feeling of right and honour as well as the real interests of all classes of society, without distinction.

The serious effects of this system, in spite of the ligature of the press by the censorship, could not altogether escape those in power. But instead of remedying this condition or at least reconciling the moderates, they knew no better counsel than to draw in the reins ever more tightly and to suppress the symptoms of the evil. The warning motto which is to be read on the wooden bridge at Lucerne under the statue of the shooting Tell, *Tensus rumpitur arcus!* never occurred to them. The natural, the inevitable result of this shortsighted, cynical policy was that the long-existing discontent was transformed ever more into a hostile and desperate bitterness, combined with a sinister longing for an all-destroying catastrophe, and that the governments were not only held responsible for their real faults, but also for all the troubles of this world, for the fact is the earth is no paradise and men are no angels.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN FRANCE

Thus over town and country, north and south, there lay a portentous and oppressive calm, as before the burst of a hurricane. Nor was the catastrophe slow in arriving, although it did not immediately follow in Germany, but in France, that luxuriant breeding place of revolutions. Certainly, in France there could be no question of the chief complaints which were raised against the governments in Germany; nevertheless the ruling bourgeois liberalism had long turned its sympathies from the bourgeois monarchy, its own revolutionary botchwork, because the citizen king Louis Philippe could not satisfy all the inordinate desires of the various party leaders, and even thought of opposing a dam to the destructive revolutionary under-current in the person of his energetic minister, Guizot. The party of this minister bore the name of "the doctrinaires," but in its whole policy scarcely a trace of earnest political doctrine was to be recognised. It only provoked by petty measures, while it

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gave fresh support to the general corruption instead of undertaking the moral and religious regeneration of the deeply disordered popular mind. The party of Guizot's opponents, who aimed only at the capture of the ministerial bureaux, had not to look far for the lever which would suffice to overthrow the ministry. Owing to the high property qualification of the electorates there were only two hundred thousand electors who exercised the solemnly proclaimed sovereignty of the people and received their share of the booty in the distribution of places and orders. The reform of the elective law was therefore demanded, and this called forth a stormy agitation which was sure to find the requisite energy in the so-called Fourth Estate of the politically disinherited. Guizot thought he could spoil a petty ephemeral triumph of the liberal opposition by prohibiting the arranged reform banquets; but a comparatively unimportant collision of a mob with a commando of troops sufficed, to the utter dismay of both the men of the opposition and the doctrinaires, to open up the abyss of the revolution, which engulfed the ambitious rivals, together with the throne and the monarchical constitution. It is true that as a measure of precaution an army of eighty thousand men and four hundred cannon had been gathered together in the capital; but the Parisian National Guard interposed between the insurrection and the army "*pour donner une leçon au gouvernement*," in spite of the oath of allegiance, as not disposed to direct its weapons against the "sovereign people." The terrified king in vain sought to stay the storm by a change of ministry; he first called the intriguing Thiers, then the witty Dupin, who was paid in his own coin by the people when they shouted, "*Nous ne voulons pas Dupin, nous voulons du pain*," and finally the originator of the reform banquets, Odilon Barrot himself, to form a completely liberal ministry. But all these announcements were received with shouts of scorn against the swindlers "who would lull the people to sleep" by the true sons of the convention arisen from the depths, who, encouraged by the jubilant shouts of the "people," first demanded the abdication of the king; then the proclamation of the republic; and finally a few more trifles, which, however, were not at all respectably bourgeois, such as the organisation of work, the equalisation of capital and labour, more wages and shorter hours.

In virtue of this almost inconceivable proceeding and almost without a blow, the citizen king was in February, 1848, swept away from a throne won by faithlessness and supported by corruption. With the indispensable umbrella he fled in a hackney coach and thus acquired the leisure to reflect on the old truth that every revolution, like Saturn, devours its own children. Without any real conflict and without any expression of will on the part of the "sovereign nation" *La belle France* was suddenly transformed into a republic at the command of the Parisian populace and under the leadership of a fantastic poet—Lamartine, a naturalist—Arago, a workman—Albert, a few turbulent advocates—and a journalist, Louis Blanc, who was to be the chief of the national workshops to be organised.

It might have been expected that a revolution called forth by such petty causes and carried through by means so utterly devoid of glory or dignity, which was only a loathsome caricature of that of July, 1830, would everywhere, especially in Germany, have aroused antipathy rather than sympathy—notwithstanding the empty phrases of liberty, equality, and fraternity, which, of course, were trotted out in order to furnish the required halo. But the very opposite took place in Germany, for people longed for a revolution, and were glad to receive the impulse to it from outside. Thus the revolutionary hurricane swept unimpeded over the whole continent and shook the thrones and states even to their foundations. The unchained demon of the revolution especially seized the most patient and contemplative nation on the

face of the earth, for the latter was equally prepared for it by the governments and the demagogues. Those in possession of political power, hitherto so secure, were transfixed by this new apparition and gave no sign of life—scarcely in conscious imitation of the wanderer, surprised by a bear, who holds his breath because the latter disdains a corpse, but because they were in fear and perplexity.

SUCCESES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

In striking contrast to the inertia of the governments was the activity of the revolutionary party, which was clearly aware of its purpose, and struck the iron while it was hot. On the 27th of February Itzstein held on the open field at Mannheim a meeting of the people, which in an address to the grand duke demanded a German parliament, freedom of the press, trial by jury, and especially the institution of a popular militia. Struve, who on this occasion produced his programme of the equal right of all to well-being, education, and freedom, arranged a popular procession to Karlsruhe for the presentation of a petition *en masse* to the grand duke. The ministry granted all the demands of the petitioners with the exception of the German parliament, the granting of which lay beyond its power, and in opposition to the still-existing confederation law promised the immediate abolition of the censorship. Similar developments took place in Würtemberg and Bavaria, in the grand duchy of Hesse, in Oldenburg, in Nassau, in Hohenzollern, where the republic was not only proclaimed but actually introduced, in free cities, and also in the electorate of Hesse, after some faint resistance on the part of the government.

Even the confederation diet was awakened from a long sleep by the raging storm, and considered it its duty, if not to act, at least to speak in such a manner as might have stirred some human feelings, had the evil days on which it had fallen been susceptible of such. On the 1st of March it issued an address to the German people in which it was declared that the maintenance of the internal and external security of Germany depended on the unanimous co-operation of the governments and the people. "The German Confederation Diet," so it said, "therefore urgently calls upon all Germans who have the welfare of Germany at heart—and there are no other Germans (!)—in the name of the united Fatherland, to exert each one his strength in his circle, so that this concord may be maintained and that legal order be nowhere violated. Germany shall and must be raised to the rank due to it among the nations of Europe; but it is only concord and legal progress and uniform development which lead to this. The confederation diet confidently trusts in that respect for law which was never lost sight of in times of trouble, and in the traditional fidelity and discernment of the German people." Thus the diet, whose thirty years' work was known to all, ventured to speak to the ill-used German people! It is indeed difficult to think of a more crushing self-condemnation and, at the same time, a more unfortunate formula for appeasing the just wrath of the German people.

On the 3rd of March, 1848, the diet resolved that every German confederate state was free to raise the censorship and to introduce the liberty of the press, but only "under guarantees which would secure the other states of the German Confederation and the whole confederation against the abuse of the liberty of the press." Another resolution of the 9th of March designated the German Imperial Eagle as the escutcheon of the confederation, and black, red, and gold—the colours hitherto so much persecuted—as the colours of the confederation. On the 18th of March the confederation diet further resolved that "the necessary revision of the constitution of the confederation" should immediately be taken in hand, and that the governments should be called on

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to send men who commanded general confidence to Frankfort to take part in the deliberations concerning this revision. On the 25th of March the diet renewed its invitation for an "immediate" delegation of men enjoying the public confidence to deliberate on the revision of the constitution of the confederation "on a truly opportune and national basis."

All these tardy views and attempts, by which the diet, in breathless haste, sought to overtake the agitation, were outstripped by the terrible logic of facts. In the small and secondary states the ever-increasing storm had already landed the chiefs of the liberal party in the ministerial bureaus; yet the movement was not thereby abated. In Munich the clamorous popular anger at the mere rumour of the reappearance of the notorious Spanish dancer, Lola Montez, caused King Ludwig to abdicate. But even in both the great German states the authority of the government succumbed miserably to the first attack of a comparatively weak insurrection of the people. In the kingdom of Prussia, this time as in former years, the first cry for a reconstruction of the state and of the German Confederation was raised in the Rhenish provinces, but it must be said to their honour that the procedure there was comparatively prudent and statesmanlike. The address presented to the king by a Cologne deputation under the leadership of the chief burgo-master, Von Wittgenstein, on the morning of the 18th of March, received his approval in its essential purport and secured the fulfilment of all just demands without any violent revolt having taken place. In the other provinces, just as in Austria, the storm signals appeared even more pronounced and violent; but the reform agitation first received its true revolutionary character only through the subsequent events in both capitals. "Good-natured" and "easy-going" Vienna led the procession in a manner that altogether belied its reputation. On the 14th of March the inhabitants of that city, with the prominent co-operation of the *Aula* (that is to say, the professors and students of the university), destroyed the assembly house of the estates and the villa of Prince Metternich, and, not without the shedding of blood, compelled the retirement of that statesman, whose policy was comprehended in the words, "It will last my time!" On the 15th of March the well-meaning but sick and weak emperor Ferdinand was "moved" to proclaim the introduction of the liberty of the press and of a national guard, as well as the convocation of the estates for the adoption of a constitution. To characterise the misery of the times it may here be noted that the official Prussian *State Recorder*, which had only a short while previously announced the meeting of Austria and Prussia for the orderly settlement of German affairs, announced the Viennese revolution and the flight of Metternich in these words: "To judge from this, Austria has now joined the reform movement which it had obstructed for so long!"

These Viennese laurels deprived Berlin of sleep for sheer envy, for the latter town order had not yet been materially disturbed.

THE BERLIN REVOLUTION OF 1848

Even to this day complete darkness reigns over the most important facts of the Berlin revolution, especially over the question from whom the most fatal mistakes and blunders in the action of the government proceeded. The general course of affairs, which one must understand in order to follow the subsequent developments, is summed up in this: that the agitation was carried on in the capital in a more stormy manner than in the Rhenish province. As early as the 7th of March, a meeting of the people in the Zoological Garden set up the regular, stereotyped demands, whereupon on the 10th all further assemblies were prohibited and actually prevented. On the 14th of March a

royal patent appeared, which convoked the "United Diet" for the 27th of April (that is, after six weeks), and stated that in conjunction with Austria the governments of the other states of the confederation were invited to a general conference, which was to bring about a regeneration of the confederation. Isolated street disturbances were not wanting, but became of a serious nature only when, on the 15th, news of the Vienna revolution arrived. The Committee of Public Safety, consisting of citizens, was ill-treated in front of the palace of the prince of Prussia and fled to the new guard house, the guard of which fired in defence of the post, and a student and a merchant were killed. On the 17th meetings of the people were held in all wards, and on the 18th the king, acting on the urgent advice of the Cologne deputation, published two edicts, in which a liberal press law was given and the United Diet was convoked for the 2nd of April. In the latter document it was explicitly declared that the endeavours of the government were directed to the transforming of Germany from a league of states into a federative state; that in all German lands a constitutional government would be introduced, and a federal representation would be formed; that the German army would receive a federal banner and a federal commander-in-chief; that a supreme court of the confederation would be instituted; all internal customs boundaries would be done away with; and that a common standard of coinage and common weights and measures, as well as the right of free migration and domicile and the liberty of the press, would be introduced.

For these considerable concessions the king, who had twice appeared on the balcony of the castle, was at first greeted with loud cheers, but presently there arose from the multitude the cry, ever louder and more threatening: "Away with the military, let the king trust himself to his citizens!" An attempt was made to drive back the ever-growing, cursing, and threatening mob with cavalry and infantry, which advanced at a slow pace and without the use of arms; suddenly two shots, apparently unintentionally, rang out in the inner court of the castle; no one was wounded, but the people rushed through the streets calling out, "We are betrayed! To arms!" Within half an hour, in all streets even the most distant, barricades were raised, as if it had been all prearranged. Armourers' shops were plundered, individual guard houses stormed, convicts and imprisoned debtors freed—and then there began a fight in the streets and houses which raged until three in the morning. Fortunately for the capital petroleum was not yet at the disposal of the revolution! In this fight the troops were victors, but they were ordered to retire from the field without having restored peace, and thus the insurrection was given, to a certain extent, the character of a victorious revolution.

Certainly the country would have been spared many a subsequent disappointment and humiliation if the majority of its representatives, instead of continually speaking of the "glorious revolution," had not forgotten this simple fact, but had said to themselves that an opponent who had thrown away his arms can raise them up again just as easily; and that in virtue of the newly-won knowledge of the true relation of power and because of the humiliation experienced he would then stand stronger and more menacing than before. In forgetting this early, and learning it late, lies the solution of the riddle of the great fiasco of this year of passion and frenzy.

Early on the 19th of March there appeared a proclamation written during the night by the king himself, "To my dear Berliners," in which it was set forth that all the desired concessions had already been made, and that the troops, "your brothers and countrymen," made use of their weapons only when compelled to do so by the numerous shots fired at them.

"Now it lies with you, inhabitants of my dear native city, to avert a greater evil. Your king and best friend conjures you by all that is sacred to

recognise the unfortunate error! Return to your homes satisfied! Remove the barricades which are still standing and send to me men imbued with the true old Berlin spirit, with words such as are proper in the presence of your king, and I give you my royal word that all streets and squares shall be evacuated by the troops, and the military occupation shall be limited to the necessary buildings, the palace, the arsenal, and a few others, and even there only for a short time. Listen to the fatherly voice of your king, inhabitants of my true and beautiful Berlin, and forget what has occurred, as I will forget it in my heart for the sake of the great future which shall commence under God's blessing for Prussia, and through Prussia for Germany. Your loving queen and true mother and friend, who is prostrated with suffering, joins her inmost and tearful supplications to mine."

The Castle is Besieged

The gratitude of the Berliners, more correctly of a mob of the Berlin populace, expressed itself soon enough in return for these more than fatherly words. The military left the town at eleven o'clock before the clearing away of the barricades—almost as a proof of a sustained defeat—and it is not established to this day at whose command this was done. A new ministry was formed, which included some liberal members (Count Schwerin and Alfred von Auerswald). Then towards mid-day a procession of people still bearing their weapons in their hands, with nine uncovered corpses on biers, the bodies of the barricade fighters, wended its way to the court of the castle, which was deserted by the military. From the midst of this armed mass a deafening cry arose for the king to appear. The ministers Arnim and Schwerin appeared on the gallery and sought to appease them, but ever louder and louder came the cry: "The king! The king must come!" Then the monarch, greatly bent, leading on his arm the sick and weeping queen, who was pale as death, stepped on to the open gallery and made a sign with his hand that he desired to speak, and in fact did begin several times with the words, "An hour ago you gave me the promise—" the terrible noise drowned the words and from below they called out "Hat off!" The king silently bared his head—then the bearers of the biers raised them up towards the king with the demoniacal cry, "Give us back our brothers and our fathers!" and then to crown the infernal act they intoned the chorus, "Jesus, my trust," at the end of which the king led the queen, who could scarcely stand, back to her rooms.

On the 20th of March there was proclaimed a general amnesty, and on the 21st the ill-counselled proclamation, "To my people and the German nation," was published, in which the king declared that the salvation of Germany could proceed only from the heartiest union of the princes, and that he assumed their lead during the time of danger. This proclamation was followed by a cavalcade through the town, led by popular men and the king wearing the German colours, during which he several times addressed the partly jubilant and partly murmuring crowds and declared that as new constitutional king he wished to become "the leader of the free, regenerated German nation." This action, scarcely suitable to the situation, may indeed have caused a certain patriotic change of sentiment among a portion of the Berlin population, but throughout the whole of Germany, for apparent reasons, it was received with dissatisfaction, even with scorn, and only sharpened the otherwise existing antipathies.

On March 22nd, in a great triumphal procession, the obsequies of those who had fallen and were resting in one hundred and eighty-seven coffins took place, and their sacrificial death was praised in numerous orations by ecclesiastics and laymen. Not a few may have deserved this honour on account of

their good faith, but in the glorification of those martyrs there was no want of exaggerated adulation. It is reported that one of the court chaplains announced from the pulpit that those who had fallen had escaped from earth, and, blessedly transfigured, entered heaven in white raiment and with palms in their hands.

On the 29th of March the ministry of Count Arnim-Boitzenburg was dismissed and a purely liberal one appointed, which consisted of Ludolph Camphausen, Alfred von Auerswald, Von Reyher, Hansemann, Count Schwerin, and Heinrich von Arnim. With the appointment of this liberal ministry the victory of the revolution and all its subsequent successes were regarded as assured, as it was only a trivial, unimportant matter to build up the new constitution on the ruins of the absolute state, out of which, according to the firm conviction of those excited times, all the blessings of freedom, justice, and welfare were to proceed.

The further course of affairs brought the inevitable disillusionment, and again confirmed the old experience that violent revolutions, by releasing all evil passions, can only destroy, but not build up. Such revolutions may under circumstances become unavoidable through the fault of the rulers as well as of the ruled; but even then the result remains just as great an injustice and misfortune as the cause itself. Nor should it be said that the condemnation so loudly pronounced by ethics and politics on revolutions imparts the guarantee of inviolability to every tyrannical government. Even Dr. Martin Luther thought that in spite of the commanded obedience of subjects in Holy Scripture there would ever be baptised heathens who would not shrink from revolution and of returning evil for evil. And Stahl warningly remarks, "It is written, 'The nations shall not rise in rebellion,' but not, 'The nations will not rise.'"^f

THE FUTURE EMPEROR AN EXILE IN ENGLAND

The prince of Prussia, who was beside the king, his brother, in that night of sorrow of the 18th of March, was deeply distressed at the downfall of rule and order in the state. But almost the hardest part for him to bear was that he himself was also involved in the catastrophe in the most unjust manner. The insurgents, knowing and fearing him as a firm leader of the troops, attributed to him the first energetic action of the soldiers: regarding the combat numerous tales were carried about of the prince having roused them to fight by giving the signal with his handkerchief from a window of the castle—in a word, of his having led the insurrection, though he had no command and had not given a single order. The anger and hatred the ringleaders opposed to their adversaries was turned therefore, not against one of the distinguished officers of the Berlin troops, not even against the king, but solely against the prince of Prussia.

Thereto may be added that there was a serious misunderstanding between the prince and his royal brother, as there was between him and the people. It is true that he had constantly encouraged the king to show a bold front, and when Frederick William, notwithstanding that peace was already assured, through his own weakness allowed it to escape from his hand, he, like many other soldiers—as for instance, General von Prittwitz—was scarcely able to refrain from expressing his indignation. According to the testimony of persons present, violent words were exchanged between the king and the prince, and it seems very credible that in a sudden impulse he may have laid his sword at the feet of the monarch, being no longer able to make use of it.

Of this naturally there could be no serious question, since the prince would be the last to give up the cause of the kingdom; but meanwhile he had to

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bend before the storm of national hatred, partly for his own security, partly to deliver the king from his presence which excited the ringleaders. He also, having been ordered to retire with the troops which evacuated Berlin, left, on the 19th of March, the place of his birth and of his long and unblemished activity.

At first he did not go far from Berlin, but only across Spandau to the "island of peacocks." Here the wish of the king that he might leave the country for some time was suggested to him. He did not feel justified, in order not to expose himself to misconstructions, in fulfilling the mere wish. He asked for a formal order, which he received in the shape of the command to give an account to the English court of what had happened in Berlin. On the 22nd of March, which was his birthday, he left his home in the midst of dangers, enemies being on the watch for him, to gain the seashore and at last England by boat. The exile he thus entered upon recalls the remembrance of another banishment which was imposed eleven years before upon excellent Germans, the best professors of the university of Göttingen, and this not by angry multitudes, but by a tyrannical prince. Those "savants" were honoured in song by the nation, but the proudest verse destined for them might also fit the case of the chivalrous prince of Prussia. Assuredly, in the country from whence such men travel as fugitives, you must point reproachfully to those who reside in the country, not to those who have left it.

The prince at that time was already fifty-one years old. The long life of continual work spent in the conscientious fulfilment of his duties seemed to have been useless. A weaker nature than his would have broken down under the awful blow which struck him—but the prince's clear head and his valiant heart remained unchanged. After the storm which had almost destroyed his country, sunshine must follow; then the time would come to reclaim that which was lost, and even to be more active than ever in the cause of Prussia and Germany. Thus without pusillanimity and bitterness of heart, but with a head proudly erect, he was ready to meet the dark future. His wisdom and kindness, the composure which he maintained notwithstanding the sorrow which filled his heart, proclaimed him a man, and not only cheered but roused the admiration of all who met him.

Before leaving the Continent, he held in Hamburg a long conversation with an officer, Major von Vincke, who was one of his friends. With undisguised annoyance he then rejected the very proposal his adversaries had repeatedly attributed to him—that of taking up arms against his country, as the Stuarts and Bourbons had done, or of engaging other powers to do so. He said, moreover, that he was quite disposed to accept and even anxious himself to help on the free constitutional form of government which was on the point of developing, and that he was determined to adhere as closely to the new as he had to the old one. Major von Vincke was so deeply impressed by these words that later he openly declared: "According to my inmost conviction, the prince, after having with his usual industry and perseverance learned to understand fully the constitutional form of government, will, conscientious as he is, become its strongest and surest guardian."

Having reached England the prince took up his quarters at the house of Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador, and at once entered into the warmest relations with the royal family, as well as with the most distinguished statesmen of the island. As to the latter, he rendered the German nation a real service by dispersing by means of his sound political views and his imposing personality "the stock disbelief of Englishmen regarding the future of Germany." He charmed his guests, striving as he did to banish the anxiety they felt on his behalf. He struck at once the chord of easy, familiar intercourse, inasmuch as, at the very beginning of his stay in the ambassador's house, he put on one

side the arm-chair which, at the general breakfast table, had been put for him in the place of honour. Drawing up another chair he said smilingly, "The thrones shake; it is the moment to exercise humility." Notwithstanding all this, he must naturally have felt great sadness.⁹ But his exile was not of long duration. In the following June he returned to Prussia, and a year later he was invested with the supreme command of the Prussian army sent to restore order in Baden.^a

"MARCH MINISTERS" IN THE LESSER GERMAN STATES

In Hesse-Darmstadt a calm had followed on the political persecutions of the thirties, and the political spirit of the people had sunk so low that Georgi, the torturer of the unhappy Pfarrer (Pastor) Weidig, was returned to the chamber. But when the breath of revolution blew from France an agitation began to stir among the Hessians, especially among the vivacious inhabitants of "golden Mainz," who still loved to look back upon the time when they formed part of the Franco-Rhenish republic. Zitz, the leader of the Mainz democracy, promptly drew up an address to the chamber at Darmstadt, putting forward the well-known demands; other towns joined with Mainz; and on the 2nd of March the address was discussed in the chamber in the presence of an immense throng. Deputy Reh, an eloquent Darmstadt advocate, demanded the abolition of the bureaucratic system and the removal of reactionary ministers; Deputy Heinrich had already demanded national representation for Germany some days before. The government took a long time to deliberate, and consequently, in a great public meeting at Mainz, Zitz declared: "Fellow-citizens, our bill has been due for thirty years. We will allow yet three days of grace, and then we will go to Darmstadt with the whole province at our backs, to give effect to our wishes in person." Thereupon the authorities at Darmstadt yielded, and Heinrich von Gagern, who up to that time had been the leader of the constitutionalist opposition, was made "March Minister." The grand duke also associated his son with him as co-regent. These and a few similar measures gave the government of Hesse-Darmstadt breathing-space for a while.

In the electorate of Hesse a certain amount of excitement prevailed in consequence of the political prosecutions and the elector's unremitting endeavours to destroy the constitution of 1831. The elector Frederick, who had been on the throne since 1847, cherished hopes of overcoming the feeble resistance of the estates and discarding all the good points of the constitution, when the news of events in Paris threw the whole country into a state of agitation. The elector's subjects, usually past masters in the art of legal opposition, called to mind the long ignominy in which they had lived; they remembered how their forefathers had been sold by herds into the service of foreign powers, and how they themselves had been tormented by the police and the bureaucracy. The popular demands were asserted with violence. Popular wrath rose to such a pitch against Scheffer, whilom director of the ministry of the interior, who had used his power harshly and ruthlessly, that he fled across the frontier, urged on by the dread of being lynched. Resistance to the rule of the elector came to a head at Hanau, where the whole populace flew to arms, resolved to fight if the elector refused his consent to the well-known demands. The men of Hanau even breathed the frightful threat that they would secede from the electorate and become subjects of Hesse-Darmstadt unless the elector gave way. But a vigorous movement was in progress behind this theatrical parade, and when the elector ordered the military to advance upon Hanau, thousands of armed Hessians streamed into the menaced city to defend it against the Hessian soldiery. The soldiers hesi-

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tated, and many officers openly declared that "no citizen blood should be shed." At Cassel one deputation followed hard on the heels of another in unbroken succession, all petitioning the elector "to concede" (*zu verleihen*), and prince and deputations exhibited the edifying spectacle of buyers and sellers in the market place, perpetually parting in anger, and promptly returning to the charge with fresh offers. At Hanau meanwhile the danger of a sanguinary collision came nearer and nearer. The citizens, led by a Committee of the People, refused to yield. Some six thousand armed men were prepared to repulse any attack from the military outside the town. In Cassel itself passions ran high, a crowd of twenty thousand souls surged round the electoral palace, the erection of barricades was taken in hand—nothing but the attitude of the Town Guard (*Bürgerwehr*) prevented fighting in the streets. At the eleventh hour the elector gave way. The men of Hanau had won a bloodless victory, and had no need to transfer their allegiance to the grand duke. Their courageous action produced a profound impression throughout Germany. The victors did not abuse their late-won victory; some particularly obnoxious bureaucrats were favoured with a serenade of cat-calls, and the notorious whipping machine known as the "wolf" was brought from the police station by the citizens in solemn procession and then destroyed. This instrument was in itself a sufficient explanation of the hatred the people of the electorate bore against the dominant bureaucracy.

"March Ministers" were placed at the head of the administration, Wippermann and Eberhard being the chosen candidates. These much persecuted men acted after the manner of all March ministers, and persecuted everyone else whose aspirations went farther than their own, till they were swept aside when the reaction set in by the notorious Hassenpflug, nicknamed "Hassenfluch" (curse of Hesse). But for a moment the whole of Hesse was brimming over with joy and gladness, for the men of Hanau had won a complete victory.

In Nassau the storm broke on the 1st of March. The people had suffered frightfully from the oppression of nobles and bureaucrats, and the smiling province had become a scene of poverty and servitude. The constitution was an empty form, for the property qualification for the franchise was so high that there were only seventy-three qualified voters in the country. The "demesnes quarrel" had done much to inflame the wrath of the people, for Duke William, with the help of his minister, a certain Herr Marschall von Bieberstein, had added the public lands, which brought in a revenue of two million gulden, to his private property. The peasantry were grievously oppressed, and they rose *en masse*. The duke was away, the citizens of Wiesbaden, led by Advocate (*Rechtsanwalt*) Hergenbahn, forced the authorities to open the armoury and allow them to arm themselves. They put forward the usual demands, and added that the public lands must be restored to the state. The peasants, realising that the opportunity had arrived for getting rid of their feudal burdens, came down from Westenwald into the town in armed bands. On the 4th nearly thirty thousand armed men were collected in Wiesbaden. It was evident that the military had no mind to meddle with them. The government made lavish promises, but could give no guarantee in the duke's absence. The tension grew more severe, till at length the duke appeared and averted a catastrophe at the last possible moment by granting everything that was required of him. But the men of Nassau had grown suspicious, and demanded that they should pay no taxes until the duke had made all his promises good. That was granted too. The duke bore a special grudge against the revolutionaries for having made him disgorge the public lands. The peasants were appeased, Hergenbahn, the "friend of the people," pacified the citizens. Every peasant was now free to cut wood and to shoot

game on his own fields, and the feudal dues were abolished. The peasants of Nassau then did what those of Swabia had done; they left the "townsmen" alone to "come by their rights" ("*zu ihrem Sach*") as best they could. The citizens, here as everywhere, thought that in winning political concessions they had won everything.

Saxony and Hanover

In Saxony, which had at that time become the happy hunting-ground of liberal and radical factions, Leipsic was the first place to be affected by the agitation that followed on the news of the revolution in Paris and the various provinces of Germany. At the head of the democratic constitutionalist party there was Robert Blum, a man who had worked his way up from the proletariat to the position of a well-to-do citizen and bookseller, and was famous far and wide as a demagogue. His influence with the masses had been shown as early as 1845, at the time of the notorious massacre in front of the Hôtel de Prusse at Leipsic.

Biedermann, who represented the liberal *bourgeoisie*, and Arnold Ruge, then a red republican, were working in concert with him. Although socialistic demands were put forward in Saxony, yet for the moment all currents of political feeling coalesced, and it was resolved to present an address of the usual tenor to the king. As drawn up by Biedermann it read tamely; Blum infused a little fire into it. The town commissioners (*Stadtverordneten*) approved the address and forwarded it to the king. At nine o'clock of the evening of the 2nd of March the answer came. An enormous and excited crowd, which relieved its feelings by singing the Marseillaise, had collected in and about the town hall. The excitement rose higher still when the king's answer arrived. "The king," Biedermann said, speaking from the balcony of the town hall, "received us very kindly, listened to us with great emotion, frequently with tears, and gave us an answer written with his own hand, on the paper of which the traces of tears are plainly to be seen."

This was no doubt extremely touching. The king's answer, however, was less so, for he flatly refused all demands, asserted that the town commissioners of Leipsic had not the support of the people behind them, and simply rimanded them for the step they had taken. The crowd was stung to fury, and first rushed to the residence of Deputy Brockhaus, where they serenaded him with cat-calls and broke his windows. Brockhaus turned aside the tide of popular indignation by calling for a cheer for the freedom of the press, and promised to vote against the reactionary ministers in future. Blum succeeded in pacifying the tumultuous mob for the moment. The town commissioners resolved to send another deputation to Dresden. The dismissal of the censors was one of the popular demands, and these gentlemen themselves, becoming aware of the fact, were seized with terror and made a public declaration in which they, the censors, asserted that "the censorship would lead to the ruin of the state." How long had these gentlemen, on their own showing, been labouring at the "ruin of the state"? Truly the kaleidoscope of revolution reveals many comic pictures.

The king would not yield; he lamented that "a single commune" had entered upon the course of "petition" which did not become it; he would treat with no one save the estates of his kingdom, which he promised to convoke within the next two months. But the men of Leipsic, who had wrung free tobacco and a town guard from their government, and abolished the drawn swords of the police, were not to be so easily put off. They resolved to insist upon their demands and provide themselves with arms. If the king would not yield they would start *en masse* for Dresden.

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The agitation rose high in all parts of the country when the king refused addresses from six other towns and replied to a speech made by Schwedler, Mayor of Meerane, with the words, "I have nothing more to say to you except farewell." The citizens of Leipsic made arrangements for proceeding *en masse* to the opening of the diet at Dresden, and it was evident that half of Saxony would join them. This seemed a serious matter even to the king, especially as Dresden itself was beginning to take part in the movement. There were tumults and street mobs in the capital, and at length the king made up his mind to give way. The reactionary ministry was dismissed, and Saxony too had her "March Ministers." Braun and Oberländer, two liberal deputies, received appointments in the ministry, so likewise did Von der Pfordten, who promptly set to work to prepare the way for a new reaction. His appointment gave great offence, but the people consoled themselves when they found that the ministry had made the well-known popular demands a part of their programme. This did not prevent the after effects of the agitation from being felt in Saxony. The starving operatives of the Erzgebirge and various towns revolted. The castle of Waldenburg was burned down in April; the Schönburg peasants were furious that the heavy and oppressive dues they had to pay to the *Rezessherrschaften* (lords whose relative rights were determined by a *recessus*) were not entirely abolished, and they therefore attacked the castle and burnt the title-deeds, setting the castle itself on fire during the process. It was natural that the movement should result in such demonstrations where the need of the people was sorest, for neither oppressed peasantry nor starving weavers could live upon the "ideas" of liberalism, a German parliament, and freedom of the press.

Hanover had not yet recovered from her constitutional struggles and the subversion of her constitution *de haut en bas* when the flood of the great movement rolled into the dominions of that absolutist monarch, King Ernest Augustus. On the 6th of March the popular demands were submitted to this sovereign in his turn, and were simply refused by him, with the remark that popular representation in the German Confederation was incompatible with the monarchical form of government. This brusque reply was intended to show that the king was inflexible. The agitation assumed formidable proportions; the towns presented addresses; there were disturbances and student demonstrations at Göttingen; and the king answered all petitions by declaring that the disturbances must be ascribed to foreign agitators. At length the disorder spread to the town of Hanover. Several thousand citizens surrounded the castle and sent in a deputation; a cabinet councillor, Münchhausen by name, appeared with the king's answer. He could not get a hear-



MOUSE-TOWER OF HATTO (969), SCENE OF THE LEGEND OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF BINGEN ON THE RHINE

ing at once, and shouted, "Are you going to yell or am I going to speak?" The citizens were enraged at the courtier's tone and aristocratic arrogance; they compelled him to address them as "gentlemen." The answer he brought was unsatisfactory; particularly as the king refused to concede the reform of the obnoxious police administration. The mob wreaked its fury on the houses of unpopular ministers and police officials and broke their windows; the same treatment was meted out to a court lady of anti-liberal views. The military, who were greeted with howls and hisses, were in no hurry to interfere. The tension continued to increase, till in the end Ernest Augustus gave way. He dismissed the ministry, allowed the people to bear arms, promised police reform, and appointed Stüve of Osnabrück, who, as the defender of the constitution, enjoyed the confidence of the liberal party among the citizens, to be his "March Minister." Count Bennigsen (son of the celebrated Russian general of that name), who passed for a liberal, entered the ministry at the same time, together with some men of no particular political dye. Stüve played the unbeautiful rôle of all "March Ministers," and consequently the reaction was able to make as thorough a clearance of the "gains" of 1848 in Hanover as anywhere.^h

The Frankfort Preliminary Parliament

Meantime at Frankfort-on-the-Main about five hundred men from Germany had assembled (March 31st) and formed a Preliminary Parliament (*Vorparlament*); the confederation diet gave its sanction. It was resolved that a national assembly, proceeding from general free elections by the whole German people, should determine the future constitution of Germany. The preliminary parliament thereupon took east and west Prussia and Schleswig into the German Confederation, and the same was then to be done with Posen. The elections took place with the approval of the governments; on the 18th of May the German National Assembly held its first sitting in the Paulskirche at Frankfort-on-the-Main. But discord had already broken out in the relations between the governments and the governed. The former had everywhere (except in Austria where all was still undecided) guaranteed the in part very tumultuous demands of the people; Germany had thus won important victories; not only that such feudal burdens and special privileges as still subsisted had been overthrown, but freedom of the press, right of association, juries, and publicity of the administration of justice, and even the arming of the people, had been secured and liberal ministers accepted. But now arose many visionaries who perverted and incited the people by republican teaching and communistic follies. This was especially the case on the Rhine, where the advanced democrats under Hecker plotted a rising in Baden (12th of April), which was indeed quickly suppressed, but called forth great bitterness between the moderates and democrats, and drove the former nearer than ever to the governments. In Berlin, also, the democracy destroyed unity; it kept the people in perpetual excitement and also acquired great influence over the Prussian national assembly, which, chosen by direct elections and summoned by the government (the Camphausen ministry), met at Berlin on the 22nd of May. The people, full of vague desires, allowed themselves to be lured into making fresh disturbances, and on the 14th of June stormed the arsenal. Thus the tension increased to the ruin of the whole.

Great enthusiasm for liberty and unity were exhibited throughout Germany; there was universal jubilation over the victories of this young "Spring of the Nations" (*Völkerfrühling*); but no one was clear about the means; men were undecided as to what they wanted; and it was therefore not easy to come to an understanding. The parliamentary life of the Germans was so new, it had previously moved within such narrow limits, that it was entirely

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without a fixed programme or leaders equal to their task. Liberals, constitutionalists, republicans, absolutists, aristocrats, besides ultramontanists, Prussophiles, Austrians, all were jumbled together, engaged in mutual contention and blustering.

This chaos of opinions found its expression in the German national assembly. Heinrich von Gagern presided; the parties were measured against each other; the moderates (liberals) had the advantage in numbers, the democrats the greater boldness. To the latter, liberty was more important than unity; they contrived that the fundamental rights of the German people should be first considered; this led to a long war of words; valuable time was expended by the hundreds of long-winded speakers. Meanwhile the tottering governments were able to strengthen themselves and so make the whole work of the assembly fruitless. But the need of a central power was only too keenly felt; and in consequence, on the 29th of June, 1848, by four hundred and thirty-six votes to one hundred and ten, the archduke John of Austria, a noble friend of the people, was chosen *Reichsverweser* (imperial vicar); he was to execute the decisions of the parliament, have the supreme command over all the German armies, and represent Germany abroad. The governments agreed, and on the 12th of July the confederation diet laid its authority in the hands of the *Reichsverweser* and dissolved itself. The *Reichsverweser* chose a responsible imperial ministry. But as in all this the princes had co-operated but little, so they were without a real inclination to support the new central power; and just the most important person, the king of Prussia, regarded the proceedings at Frankfort with great and indeed not unfounded mistrust. This led to a lamentable defeat of Germany abroad; to the disgrace in Schleswig-Holstein.

THE ORGANISATION OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

Since 1460 Schleswig-Holstein had been united both legally and nationally; it was a German country by custom, speech, and the inclination of the inhabitants; situated on the frontiers of the united German Fatherland, in it a keen sense of German nationality had been preserved. The ruler of the country was at the same time king of Denmark; but the two duchies had their own constitution. Now in the northern part of Schleswig a Danish population was settled, and though it was continually losing ground to the more cultivated and stronger German element, still it had this advantage, that Schleswig had not been received into the German Confederation with Holstein in 1815, but had been committed to the king of Denmark as a separate duchy. Thus the latter won the desired pretext forcibly to make this country Danish.^b

Under Christian VIII of Denmark, who ascended the throne in 1839, the old conflict between the Germans and Danes which was suspended for a time again broke out. The national feeling which had awakened throughout Europe also came to the fore here, and led to a sharp antagonism between the Danes and Germans, who for long had been united under one government. The superiority to which the Danish element laid claim, the interference of the Danes in the affairs of the duchies, the violation which their rights and interests experienced, the endeavour to separate Schleswig from Holstein and to unite Schleswig with the kingdom, awakened aversion in German lands. But the Danes feared a separation of the duchies, especially of Schleswig; for the male line of the reigning house threatened to die out, and owing to the differences in the law of succession in the various lands a dissolution of the long-standing union was to be expected. Hence they thought it necessary to provide against such a consummation. "Denmark to the Eider," that is to say, the union of Schleswig with Denmark and its separation from Holstein,

was the aim of the national party, which entered upon the struggle with passion and fanaticism. The new king, a man of high education and noble qualities, but without definiteness of aim and strength of character, seemed at first disposed to adopt a compromising and conciliatory attitude. The appointment of the prince of Augustenburg-Noer to the governorship and chief command, also the appointment of Count Reventlow Criminil, a patriotic and well-meaning but weak man, to the presidency of the chancery, caused satisfaction in the duchies. An improved organisation of the finances and provisions for welfare and education were also favourably received. But the maintenance of the union existing between Holstein as well as Schleswig with Denmark lay more at Christian VIII's heart than anything else: without separating them from each other, he aimed at binding both more firmly to the kingdom. First of all he intended, by individual measures, to strengthen and extend the bonds of union.

A new organisation of the army, which deprived the Schleswig-Holstein regiments of their old names and banners and removed some of them to Denmark; the introduction of Danish cockades for the civil officials; the attempt to bring into use the Danish system of coinage and Danish coins, and to establish branches of the Danish Bank in the country, all these deeply affected the existing conditions. The bank first established a branch at Flensburg, a thoroughly German town, but in which the commercial union with Denmark and Danish colonies called forth sympathy for union with the kingdom. Other plans were frustrated. The plan of a common ministry of worship and education with Denmark, the intention to form common committees from the provincial diets of the duchies and the kingdom after the model of an institution then introduced into Prussia, fell through because of the decided opposition of the estates. The question as to the official standing of the respective languages caused much agitation. The introduction of Danish as the official language of the courts of law in the northern part, in obedience to the king's decree, caused anxiety, and the estates pronounced themselves against it. There were lively disputes as to the use of Danish in the proceedings of the diet, which the king sought to settle by compromise. Christian saw himself obliged to issue a declaration (December 14th, 1843) that he just as little thought of uniting Schleswig or part of it to the kingdom as of placing it in a political union with Germany by joining the German Confederation—for which act individual voices clamoured; he promised to maintain the independence of the duchy and the union with Holstein: he certainly meant to add, under the Danish crown.

THE "PUBLIC LETTER" (1846 A.D.)

The agitation became all the more active as the succession question, which occupied the public mind more and more, and to which the government in the last days of Frederick VI had already turned its attention, came to the fore. A second marriage of the crown prince had also remained childless, and like the first had to be dissolved. Thus the possibility of a separation did not lie so far off. Then the matter was taken up in Denmark and the proposal moved at the assembly of the estates of the islands: that the king should solemnly proclaim that the Danish monarchy, namely, the kingdom of Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, would be inseparably transmitted according to the provisions of the royal law, and that every attempt on the part of subjects to dissolve the union existing between the various divisions of the states would be frustrated. This invasion of the rights of the duchies awakened intense indignation. The voice of the people expressed itself in numerous addresses to the Holstein estates simultaneously

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assembled; they summed up the law of the land in the statement: the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein are independent states, firmly united to one another and ruled in the male line. But the government shared the Danish view of the matter. A commission of high state officials was to investigate the question of succession. As a result of their work, the so-called Public Letter was published (July 8th, 1846), which announced: that the hereditary succession of the monarchy was equally valid in Denmark and in the duchies of Schleswig and Lauenburg, but that with regard to individual parts of the duchy of Holstein circumstances prevailed which made a similar declaration impossible; the king, therefore, promised to remedy these latter, so as to bring about the complete acknowledgment of the integrity of the whole Danish state. The communication of this decree to the Holstein estates was accompanied by the prohibition to make it the subject of remonstrance to the government.

It was a one-sided decision, which by no means conformed to the law; neither did it agree, as became known later, with the results of the investigation instituted by the commission; and it was at the same time an insult to the rights of the estates. It was met by the most decided opposition. The agnates protested to the German Confederation. The prince of Augustenburg, the duke of Glücksburg who was the head of the second branch of the legal line of succession, and many members of the Schleswig knighthood gave up the offices which they held. In spite of the prohibition the Holstein estates issued an address, and when it was not accepted they laid the matter before the federal diet and dispersed; others, who were convoked in their place, did not appear or joined their predecessors. The people made known their consent to the acts of the estates in addresses and in the press. An extract from the findings of the commission issued in defence of the Public Letter, found complete refutation by nine professors of the Kiel university.

GERMANY INVOLVED IN THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION

The agitation resounded throughout Germany. Then for the first time did the Schleswig-Holstein affair appear in all its importance as a German question. In addresses, pamphlets, in the chambers, the rights of the duchies were espoused, and they were promised all necessary assistance for the protection of the same: Germany took over the task of maintaining them inviolate and unrestricted.

The confederation diet also did not escape the influence of public opinion and the weightiness of the matter. It did not accomplish much, but more than usual. King Christian had declared that he had never thought of encroaching upon the independence of the duchy of Holstein or on its constitution, or on any other relation based on law and tradition, or to interfere with well-established rights of the agnates, and that he also wished to maintain the constitutional right of petition of the estates. Upon this the Federal Assembly announced (September 17th, 1846) that they saw themselves strengthened in their most confident expectations; that the king, by the final determination of the relations spoken of in the Public Letter, would observe the rights of one and all, especially those of the German Confederation, of the rightful agnates, and the legal representation of the country of Holstein; at the same time they reserved for themselves their constitutional competence.

A declaration of the ambassador at the confederation diet acknowledged that Holstein and Schleswig had all public legal rights in common, and promised to leave this union inviolate. A proclamation was issued by the king (September 18th) which was meant to be reassuring, inasmuch as it announced that his intention had not been to injure the rights of the duchies and to dissolve their union. But at the same time the indissolubility of the Danish

monarchy was emphasised, the acknowledgment of which was the question at issue. The king held firmly to this; towards this end all his efforts were bent. Schleswig was also to serve as a means of holding Holstein.

Negotiations for this purpose were taken up with the European powers, papers and pamphlets were prepared and circulated which sought to give a forced interpretation to the law, and as much as possible to prevent the spreading of the opposite views. The goal was to be reached by cajoling public opinion and curbing the opposition in the duchies. There were Germans who offered their services in aid of this scheme: Count Karl Moltke, who became president of the chancery in place of Reventlow, and by devotion to the idea of royal absolutism disowned both his native country and his own past; and Scheel, a violent, ambitious nature, who, at the head of the Schleswig-Holstein government, sought to establish a rigid police régime. The federal laws against assemblies and unions, which formerly had not been promulgated in the country, were now put into effect.

But the duchies did not cease their opposition. When the Schleswig assembly of the estates met October 1st, 1848, under the presidency of Wilhelm Beseler, they took the matter up: an address expounded the rights of the duchies; three petitions proposed the separation of the administration of the duchies from that of the kingdom, the introduction of a common constitution with Holstein—this being presented by the duke of Augustenburg—and the acceptance of Schleswig into the German Confederation. As the government refused to accept these petitions, the majority of the assembly dispersed.

Then the knights, chiefly led by the prior of the convent of Preetz, Count Fritz Reventlow, raised their voices, demanding that the rights of the land should be established in a constitutional document and provided with the requisite guarantees (January 19th, 1847).

All organs of the land had spoken. Tendencies and parties which otherwise went different ways were united here. Even men of more democratic tendencies, who laid greater stress on Holstein's connection with Germany than on the former union with Schleswig, the so-called New Holsteiners under the leadership of Th. Olshausen, joined in the movement. The approach of a crisis was felt and preparations were made to meet it.

A more active life had awakened in Germany: an endeavour for greater unity prevailed among the people. In Holstein and Schleswig it was recognised that they must join this general movement, and thereby find a support for their special rights.

The king, however, thought to give his aspirations a new foundation. A common constitution for the kingdom and the duchies was planned; by granting constitutional rights, such as had been widely and actively demanded in Denmark since his accession, a new union was to be assured, which was to supersede the personal union hitherto prevailing. Christian VIII was occupied with these plans when death suddenly overtook him, January 20th, 1848.

FREDERICK VII AND THE FIGHT FOR SCHLESWIG

As the last of the male line of Frederick III, who by the royal decree separated the succession in Denmark from that in Schleswig-Holstein, Frederick VII became ruler. By his ways of thinking and habits he belonged more exclusively than any other of his race to the Danish people, and therefore looked as a stranger upon his German lands, whose rights he encroached upon heavily, violating their national feeling and so increasing the inner antagonism that the outer separation, which the course of history brought along, became all the more unavoidable.

Good-natured but uneducated, without a sense for justice or morals, de-

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pendent on a woman of low birth to whom he was morganatically married, the king soon became a mere tool in the hands of the parties, incapable of resisting the demands of the Danish national pride and passionate infatuation. He began by proclaiming (January 28th, 1848) the constitution which his father had planned and which was to unite Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark under forms which promised a certain equalisation of right, but which nevertheless assured superiority to the Danes. It satisfied no one. If in the duchies they decided on entering into a preparatory deliberation of the same, it was only in order to fight the whole scheme and to demand the right of an independent constitution.

At this moment the great convulsion took place in France which shook all Europe: the ancient order of the states wavered and in a fierce onslaught a new one was trying to establish itself. Long-felt wants, justified and necessary demands, but also extravagant theories and revolutionary passions, asserted themselves.

Schleswig-Holstein was the most strongly affected. Whilst endeavouring to protect the ancient right and union with Germany, a fresh and more heavy attack had to be resisted. It was not possible to persevere in the peaceful attitude that had been maintained until now. But although driven to the employment of force, the law was adhered to, order was maintained, and every outbreak of unbridled passion was checked. Whilst the national party in Copenhagen urged a union of Schleswig with Denmark and its separation from Holstein, a meeting of the members of the Schleswig-Holstein estates, which assembled in Rendsburg (March 18th), proposed the union of the estates of both duchies, the admission of Schleswig into the German Confederation, and the granting of free rights such as were demanded and granted everywhere. Before the deputation which had to convey these desires had reached Copenhagen and gained an audience of Frederick VII, the latter was induced by a popular movement to dismiss the ministry and to call to his counsel the leaders of the party who demanded the annexation of Schleswig (March 21st). He then declared himself willing to grant Holstein a free constitution, to support the endeavours for a German parliament, but on the other hand to consolidate the inseparable union of Schleswig with Denmark by a common and free constitution (March 24th). The ancient rights were thereby abolished, the union of Schleswig and Holstein destroyed, the foundation on which the dominion of the king in the duchies rested undermined. This was to be carried out by the force of arms.

The duchies had to concert measures against this, and they did not hesitate to do so. In Kiel, the most influential men of the land united themselves, the prince of Noer, Count Reventlow-Preetz, Wilhelm Beseler. A provisional government was formed (March 23rd-24th), which also included Schmidt in Kiel, Bremer in Flensburg, and later Olshausen, who was absent as member of the deputation, "for the maintenance of the rights of the land and of the hereditary duke"; the latter, as being in the hands of a Danish party, was considered not to have been free in his resolutions. The whole land joined in, even officials—those in Copenhagen gave up their posts—and the military, in so far as they belonged to the duchies by birth. Rendsburg was taken possession of by the prince, who became commander-in-chief (March 24th).

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN WARS (1848-1850 A.D.,

Soon the fight broke out. The Danes marched into Schleswig, occupied Alsen, and advanced into the mainland. The duchies opposed to them all the fighting men that could be assembled in haste. But insufficient armament

and defective leadership resulted in a defeat at Bau (April 9th); almost all Schleswig fell into the hands of the Danes.

The sole dependence of the duchies was now the protection of Germany. The king of Prussia, to whom the duke of Augustenburg applied for aid, pronounced himself decisively in favour of their rights (March 24th). The preliminary parliament declared itself in favour of the entry of Schleswig into the German Confederation. The confederation diet decided to protect the rights of Holstein to unite with Schleswig and acknowledged the provisional government (April 4th, 12th). Prussian troops under Bonin invaded Holstein, followed by the tenth federal corps under Halkett. Wrangel took over the command with the order to clear Schleswig of the Danes.

The Dannevirke was taken by storm (April 23rd), but the Danish army was not pursued; the mainland was taken, but Alsen left in the hands of the enemy; then Jutland also was occupied, and contributions laid upon it as compensation for captured German vessels; but it was soon evacuated; even the north of Schleswig had to be given up, as the Danes from Alsen threatened the Germans in Sundewitt. At Nübel the latter had to retire from the field with losses (May 28th), and a fresh attack brought no success (June 5th). In the beginning the force at hand was not energetically turned to account, but now it no longer sufficed, and the necessary reinforcements were slow in arriving.

In the land itself everyone was full of devotion and willing to make sacrifices; firm and resolved, the people were united in the chief cause, but were checked through manifold considerations, and not sufficiently energetic. The task they had set themselves was most difficult to perform: that of protecting the ancient rights by force of arms against a sovereign who was still recognised by them as their lawful lord, and of union with the powers of Germany, who were themselves in the midst of a process of reorganisation. The relation of the volunteers to the regular troops, of the natives to the strangers, caused much embarrassment. Political antagonisms arose in the ancient estates, which were united in one assembly, and especially in a provincial assembly convened on the basis of a general election: a new organisation of internal conditions was discussed. In Schleswig itself, which was the chief bone of contention, certain Danish influences made themselves felt. The government was urging forward the admission into the German Confederation, but to this some of the people were still disinclined, and it was opposed by the European powers.

The latter showed themselves favourable to Denmark, fearing an increase of German influence. England recommended division of Schleswig in accordance with the nationality of the population, but this met with opposition in the land. Germany had given only insufficient help; Austria did not favour the cause of the duchies. In Prussia the disturbance of commerce caused by the ascendancy of Denmark at sea was soon severely felt; there they also feared a conflict with foreign powers, and complained of being obliged to bear the burden alone, and of the attitude of the rest of Germany. In Frankfort decision and strength were wanting.

The Truce of Malmö

Political and diplomatic influences paralysed the military measures. Negotiations concerning a settlement of the dispute were first undertaken in London through the mediation of England, and then in Malmö through that of Sweden. Prussia was moved to accept the terms of an armistice (July 8th) which were so unfavourable and to a high degree even discreditable, and met with such general opposition that they were not carried out: fresh negotia-

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tions at Bellevue, near Kolding, led to no result, although the provisional government, from which Olshausen then withdrew, made important concessions. Taken up again at Malmö by Prussia, in the name of the authority of the national assembly at Frankfort, they led to a settlement which did not fulfil the conditions of the Frankfort ministry and threatened the duchies with great disadvantages, but which nevertheless the former resolved to sanction. The people of the duchies, however, rose up against it, and by its firm attitude the provincial assembly supported the popular sentiment: a new constitution, which insured the rights of the land, was adopted and promulgated (September 15th). The Frankfort national assembly had also from the first declared itself against the fulfilment of the terms of this treaty. But as some of the most unfavourable provisions had been removed, it gave its consent after a severe struggle and with certain reservations (September 16th). Another decision in this case might have altered many things; but it would have been favourable only if it had been unanimous and if it had been adopted in agreement with the central authority. As it was, it led to a fight and a victory against the revolution at home, but also to dependency and impotency abroad. Even in the duchies the matter became endurable. The new government, appointed in accordance with the provisions of the armistice, fell to patriotic men (October 22nd). The new constitution and the newly decreed laws were acknowledged; the command of the army was taken over, in the place of the retired prince von Noer, by the Prussian general Bonin, who worked with success for its further improvement. On the other hand Frederick VII soon refused to acknowledge the new government, and the stipulated evacuation of Alsens by the Danes did not take place. Only an actual suspension of hostilities ensued.

Meanwhile negotiations for peace were in progress. The duchies desired independence and a firm union. In Denmark all stress was laid on the separation of Schleswig from Holstein: only a so-called independence of Schleswig was to be granted. Prussia, and for a time also the Frankfort authorities, agreed to this; but they could not come to terms over the *modus operandi*.

Denmark gave notice of a discontinuance of the armistice. When it expired a governorship, composed of Count Reventlow and Beseler and established by the Frankfort authorities, took over the management of the affairs of the country (1849, March 26th). The war was reopened by the brilliant fight of Eckernförde against Danish men of war (April 5th), the storming of the Düppel Heights by the imperial troops (April 13th), and a victory of the Schleswig-Holstein troops under Bonin at Kolding (April 23rd). After some delay, the army composed of troops from various German states entered Jutland under the Prussian general, Von Prittwitz. After a new victory at Gudsö (May 7th), Bonin undertook the siege of Fredericia. But the chief command was deficient in strength and earnestness: and the war was carried on, as it were, only in seeming. Peace was desired in Prussia and negotiations were pursued to this end. Both the national assembly and the imperial government went to destruction in the vain endeavour to obtain unity in Germany. A reaction against the agitations of the previous year made itself felt, which also exercised its influence over the cause of Schleswig-Holstein.

The army of the duchies, deserted by Prittwitz, was beaten, in spite of the bravest defence, in a sortie of the Danes from Fredericia (July 6th). Immediately thereafter Prussia concluded an armistice (July 18th), which limited the governorship to Holstein and subjected Schleswig to the authority of a Danish-Prussian Commission and to the occupation of the greater northern half by Swedes and Norwegians and of the southern by Prussia.

With the consent of the German member there now began a despotic government for the carrying through of Danish views; officials and ministers of

religion were dismissed, persecutions ordained, and steps taken in favour of the Danish language. But the German population powerfully resisted this; in one part of the land they were able to check all the aims of the administration. The peace negotiations led to no agreement concerning the situation at Schleswig, which Denmark sought to hold in a strong political union. An understanding sought by the duchies met with as little success now as in the previous case. Therefore Prussia decided to conclude peace for herself and Germany, but it was without decided purport and satisfied none, July 2nd, 1850. The majority of the German states entered into it; but there was no acknowledged supreme authority which could confirm it and it had no binding force for the duchies.

The duchies now undertook the fight single-handed. In the place of Bonin, who would not give up the Prussian service, Willisen became commander-in-chief. A considerable number of officers, who had occupied the higher positions in the army, left with the former. Their departure, for which only insufficient substitution could be found, and a new organisation attempted by Willisen, combined with all sorts of evils to weaken the otherwise well-equipped army of about thirty thousand men.

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN SUBDUED BY DENMARK (1850 A.D.)

When it invaded Schleswig, a decisive battle was fought at Idstedt (July 26th). After a hot fight the troops, who were victorious on the right wing and unbroken in the other divisions, were compelled to retire and leave almost all of Schleswig to the enemy: the want of confidence and the lack of a general control turned an almost certain victory into a fatal defeat.

After a considerable reinforcement of the army, which took place too late, efforts were made in vain to regain what had been lost by an attack on Midsund (September 12th) and by an attempt to storm the strongly fortified Friedrichstadt (October 4th). Here also the leadership proved itself inadequate. A further advance of the Danes was alone prevented.

They did not conquer Schleswig-Holstein. Germany, which had first relinquished it, now demanded and compelled its subjection. The confederation diet, re-established by Austria and in which Frederick VII's ambassador participated for Holstein-Lauenburg, demanded the suspension of the war (October 25th); Prussia, which for a time had held back and thus caused a delay, submitted to the Austrian policy at the conference at Olmütz. The conclusion of the business was left to the two great states. Their ambassadors demanded subjection January, 1851; for the first time in many years Austrian troops advanced to the north to execute this order.

Resistance seemed impossible. The leaders of the army—Von der Horst had taken Willisen's place—declared themselves against it; likewise the majority of the assembly: Beseler left the governorship, which placed the rights of the country under the protection of the German Confederation and soon made way for another government in Holstein, in the name of Frederick VII and the German Confederation (February 1st).

The constitution was annulled; almost everything which the late agitation had created was destroyed, the army was disbanded, and the officers were dismissed. A so-called amnesty made numerous exceptions: the governors appointed by the imperial authorities and the members of the house of Augustenburg had to leave the country; others were deprived of their offices. The representatives of the confederation promised the restoration on the old legal relations; but nothing was done in that direction.

In Schleswig an exclusively Danish government under Tillisch ruled, which violated and destroyed the rights and interests of the country. Every

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union with Holstein, even the common high court of appeal, was put an end to; a customs boundary was established along the Eider; the Danish language was forced on the churches and schools in the towns of Hadersleben, Tondern, Apenrade, Sonderburg, and upwards of thirty parishes, for the greater part quite German districts (language rescripts 1851, February 7th and 8th, March 4th); Danish clergy and teachers were appointed; everything German, in a word, was persecuted.

When the proposals of the Danish government concerning the new organisation of the relations of the duchies to the kingdom had been sanctioned by the great German powers, the government of Holstein was given over to the minister of Frederick II (February 18th, 1852). At the same time all the costly war materials of the army, together with the vessels which the country had procured for its protection, were delivered up and brought to Denmark as the spoils of victory.

A commission for the establishment of the frontier between Schleswig and Holstein, which had become doubtful owing to the fact that for a long time past there had been only one Schleswig-Holstein, remained without result: here, also, the Danish claims were not opposed.

Thus ended the struggle against Denmark, in the saddest and most inglorious manner. That which the duchies had undertaken in conjunction with Germany was pronounced an unjustifiable rebellion, for which the country and individuals were to suffer. The union of Holstein with Schleswig, the protection of which had been undertaken, was severed, and the way was cleared for a union of both with Denmark into one state.

THE ATTEMPT TO FORM A CENTRALISED DANISH STATE

Christian VIII's desire was to bind Schleswig-Holstein with Denmark under one constitution: this plan had been taken up in the last negotiations, and was received favourably by the European powers; even Germany yielded, although it little answered to the ancient rights of the duchies. It was not even insisted that Schleswig and Holstein should remain united as of old, and thus join the kingdom: it was only a question of the autonomy of the individual duchies, including Lauenburg. By this the annexation of Schleswig to Denmark was to be prevented. But though the name was given up, the cause was not relinquished. A close political union was urged in the negotiations. Proposals were made which were placed before a meeting of notables at Flensburg (May, 1851); but as they did not come to an agreement, the affair met with no success. In Denmark there was a change of ministry, which for a time removed the party of the Eider-Danes and brought men who represented the idea of a centralised Danish state, Örstedt and Bluhme, to the government: Karl Moltke entered for Schleswig, Reventlow-Criminil, the brother of the former president, for Holstein (July 31st, October 16th, 1851).

Some of the former demands were given up and an agreement thus brought about with the German powers. But the separation of Schleswig from Holstein in all political affairs was carried through; the union with Denmark, which until now had been based on the possession of a common ruler (personal union) became a lasting political union (real union). To this change two members of the Schleswig-Holstein knighthood extended a helping hand; they denied the rights of which they were sure, the home to which they belonged.

On the ground of arrangements agreed upon with Austria and Prussia, Frederick VII issued a proclamation concerning the future organisation of the monarchy (January 28th, 1852). The army, the finances, and the foreign

affairs of the duchies were to be regulated in common with those of Denmark, and to these ends there were to be common ministers, a common state council, a common constitution, and a common customs system; in other affairs Schleswig and Holstein, as well as Lauenburg, were each to be governed independently. Schleswig and the two duchies in the German Confederation were to receive special ministers, Schleswig and Holstein, special estate representations with the right of assent; only non-political institutions, such as the university, knighthood, the canal, jails, and other matters of subordinate importance, were in future to be common to the two duchies. In Schleswig the equal rights of the German and Danish nationalities were promised, also an extension of the amnesty.

With this, the German powers considered their task accomplished. Consent was also given by the confederation diet (July 29th); some of the individual governments gave theirs with expressions of regret that the rights of the duchies had not been better protected; only a few of the smaller ones refused to give their adhesion.

In reality the rights of the duchies were not protected but destroyed when these provisions were executed. The new organisation was to be sealed by a community of the law of succession to the throne. The succession question had had an essential share in the antagonisms and dissensions of the last years; without its settlement no peace seemed possible. In Denmark the absolute validity of the old law of succession had been repealed, but the right of succession of women, which it fixed, was maintained. The constitution which the duchies gave themselves adhered to the succession of the male line according to the law of primogeniture. This was an essential support for their independence. If Denmark and the duchies were to be politically united, this, above all, had to be done away with.ⁱ

REACTION AGAINST DEMOCRACY (1848 A.D.)

As mentioned above, the terms of the truce of Malmö by which the Schleswig-Holstein war was suspended in August, 1848, had been agreed to by the Frankfort assembly only after a severe struggle. Violent disputes took place between the moderates and the democrats, and two conservative deputies, the brave Prussian general, Von Auerswald, and Prince Lichnowsky, were torn to pieces by the mob (September 18th). This crime still further roused the indignation of the governments against the popular movement, especially since in Baden, also, the foundations of all order seemed to be shaken by the republican insurrectionary troops under Strüve's leadership, and in Vienna, by the insurrection of the 6th of October. Both these attempts of the democratic party were choked; though the victory in Vienna was won only after a hard struggle.

Prussia was endangered by no conflicts between contending nationalities, such as those which Austria had to face. For here the vast majority of the inhabitants were Germans; only a small section was Polish. The Poles, dwelling for the most part in the south-east portion of the grand duchy of Posen, also rose in April, 1848, urged on by their nobility; but the revolt was easily suppressed (May), and in spite of much agitation on the part of the nobles their efforts against Prussia became daily more hopeless; because the German settlements irresistibly advanced eastward; because the Poles were only conquered by civilisation; and because the Prussian government acted in strict accordance with the laws, exercised justice towards all, oppressed no man.

More serious convulsions seemed to threaten the Prussian state through the

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democracy, and the king therefore determined to put an end to its baneful influence. He dismissed the liberal but too yielding ministry, and appointed an energetic one under the presidency of the count of Brandenburg (November 9th). The reactionary minister, Mantenffel, soon became its real head and began his long career of retrogression. The first blow against the Prussian national assembly was struck by the removal of the latter to Brandenburg; a portion of it did, indeed, oppose this measure and declared for a refusal of the taxes, but royalty had far stronger roots in the people than the democracy which was working for this resolution in the national assembly. It therefore received scant respect and the national assembly was dissolved by the government (5th of December).

THE KING OF PRUSSIA ELECTED EMPEROR OF GERMANY (1849 A.D.)

The re-establishment of the Prussian monarchy, in itself a piece of good fortune, was well calculated to strengthen the moderate party in the German national assembly. The greatest obstacle to German unity had been, and still was, the existence of the imperial Austrian state, for, composed as it was of various nationalities, its acceptance into a German federal state, which was now the solution advocated by all well-disposed persons, could not possibly be effected—and yet many persisted in the idea, especially amongst the south Germans (“the party of great Germany”). Only the decided refusal of the Austrian government to allow itself to be amalgamated with Germany or to recognise the superiority of any sort of German central power enlightened many as to Germany’s true relation to the mixed kingdom, which is by nature so essentially un-German. The only thing possible was to unify Germany, without Austria, and to place Prussia at her head. But this plan, which was advocated by Gagern, was combated by the ultramontanes, Austrians, and other enemies of Prussia, and by all adherents of the system of many states and the old separate existence, quite as much as by the democrats, who dreaded a strong monarchy. In order to preserve the votes of these opponents, the moderate party conceded them a great influence in the drawing up of the German constitution; so it came about that the “fundamental rights” (*Grundrechte*) which were published by the national assembly at Frankfort on the 27th of December, 1848, contained many democratic elements. After a long struggle the “imperial party” finally conquered. On the 28th of March, 1849, the German national assembly elected the king of Prussia hereditary emperor of Germany. The imperial constitution had been prepared the day before, and it was now signed by the ministry of the empire and the national assembly. According to it the individual states of Germany were to remain as they were, but a portion of their political greatness was to be surrendered to the imperial power; the emperor was to govern by means of a responsible ministry, to have the right to decide on questions of war and peace, to have the whole military forces at his disposal, to represent the country abroad. He had the greater part of the executive power: the legislative power was to be exercised by the imperial diet (*Reichstag*), which was to consist of a state house (*Staaenhauſ*) composed of representatives of the princes and parliamentary bodies (*Volkvertretungen*) of the individual states, and a house of commons (*Volkshauſ*), delegated through the medium of direct elections by the whole German people, according to a universal suffrage. An imperial supreme court of justice was to determine the disputes of the different states. These were the main provisions.

The fate of Germany now lay in the hands of Frederick William IV, and the world waited with anxiety to learn whether he would accept the German imperial crown.^b

The deputation of the national assembly, which had been commissioned to convey to the king of Prussia the news of his election as German emperor, travelled slowly, so as to give the king time for mature consideration. On the 2nd of April it reached Berlin.

On the same day the two chambers voted an address to the king, wherein they requested him to assume the guidance of the destinies of the Fatherland in accordance with his election; but they also referred to existing difficulties. On the 3rd of April the king received the deputation, which entered full of expectation, rather anxious than joyful. The king stated that he recognised in the vote of the German national assembly the voice of the representatives of the German nation; this call was bestowing upon him an honour which he well knew how to value; and he added that he thanked them for the trust shown. "But," he proceeded, "I would not justify your confidence; I would not respond to the ideas of the German nation; I would not establish the unity of Germany were I to intend, in violation of sacred rights and my former most distinct and solemn assurances, without the consent of the crowned heads, princes, and free towns of Germany, to take a resolution which will be of the greatest consequence to them, and to the German races governed by them. It will, therefore, become a duty for the separate German states to consider in a joint conference, whether the constitution is to the advantage of the individual states, as well as of the whole nation; if the rights accorded me will enable me to guide with a strong hand the destiny of the great German Fatherland and to realise the hopes of its peoples in the way in which such an office requires me to do. Nevertheless, Germany may rely on one thing, and let this, gentlemen, be known in every subdivision thereof: if the Prussian shield and sword are needed against enemies at home or abroad, I shall not be wanting, even though not summoned. Full of confidence, I shall then walk in the way of my house and my people, the way of German honour and fidelity."

This declaration was a painful disappointment to the Frankfort deputation; though they had been prepared for reservations and objections, they had not expected that the king would so completely deny the right of the national assembly to formulate the German constitution without the princes. But to one member of the deputation this refusal did not come unexpectedly. E. M. Arndt had written to the king, reminding him of his assurance of the 21st of March, 1848, and appealed to the fact that he had declared himself in favour of a real, strong German Confederation in place of the former dishonest and weakly league of states, and that he was pledged to stake all his power and the strength of his people to establish the strength and power of Germany. The only means to save the honour and glory of Germany were this kingly assurance and the firm knitting of the bond which should make Prussia and Germany one. Only if the king of Prussia would put himself at its head as the support and saviour of Germany was it possible to meet and overcome the cunning wiles of Austria, which had squandered and wasted the honour and power of Germany for the last three hundred years and was now again trying to take it in tow. Thus, also, could be avoided the red republic, which seemed unavoidable under a directory. Like one of the prophets of old, he conjured the king and represented the acceptance of the charge offered to him by the national assembly as a sacred duty. In a document dated March 18th, which we reproduce in the main points, the king, fully recognising in what spirit Arndt had spoken to him, thus replied: "The great assembly which styles itself the Assembly of the German Empire or National Assembly, and in which there are men who belong to the best in the great Fatherland, has no crown to give nor to offer. It has to draw up a constitution and then to open negotiations with all rulers and towns of Germany which are rec-

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ognised throughout Europe. Where is the commission which entitles these men to set a king or an emperor above the authorities to whom they have sworn allegiance? Where is the council of the kings and princes of Germany which, according to a tradition a thousand years old, elects a king for the holy empire and submits its choice to the nation for confirmation? Your assembly has ever opposed the formation of this council, the representation of the German authorities in the new centre of the nation. This is an immense fault—one may call it a sin; the consequences of this sin are now being felt; every man at Frankfort, even those for whom cause and effect are not clear, feels at this moment that even with so much merit, so much labour, and motives so pure in part, he is labouring at an absolutely impossible task. Do you believe that heart-rending scenes, words, and decrees of the parliament may render possible what in itself is impossible?

“But let us suppose, my dear Arndt, that the sin had not been committed, or that it were remedied, and the real and unanimous council of princes and of the nation were to hold an election in the old town where kings were chosen, and to offer me the old, true, lawful, thousand-year-old crown of the German nation—then it were possible to consider whether to refuse or accept—but I would reply as a man must reply when the greatest honour the world holds is offered to him. But alas! matters do not stand thus. To a message such as I am threatened with from Frankfort silence alone becomes me. I dare not and shall not reply, so as not to insult men whom I honour and love, and upon whom I look with pride, yea, with gratitude—for consider, what is it that would be offered to me? Was the fruit of the horrible labour of the year 1848 a crown? The thing of which we speak does not bear the sign of the holy cross, does not press the seal ‘by the grace of God’ upon the head—it is no crown. This is the iron collar of servitude by which the son of more than twenty-four rulers, electors, and kings, the head of sixteen million people, the master of the most faithful and bravest army in the world, would be made a serf of the revolution. Far be it from me! And, moreover, the price of the jewel would be the breaking of my promise given to the [Prussian] diet on the 23th of February, ‘to try conjointly with all German princes to bring about an understanding with the German national assembly as to the future constitution of the great Fatherland.’ I am not one to break this, or any other pledge. It almost seems to me, my dear Arndt, as if you were labouring under a mistaken idea, which, however, you share with many others; as if you only saw a revolution to contend with in the so-called red democracy and the communists—that would be a great mistake. For those creatures of hell and death can operate only on the moving soil of the revolution. The revolution is the abolition of the divine order of things, the contempt for and abrogation of the true order; it lives and breathes its breath of death as long as the low is high and the high is low. Therefore, as long as the German authorities have no place in the centre at Frankfort and do not sit at the head of the council, whose task it is to give a future to Germany—just so long this centre stands under the reflector of the tide of the revolution and follows the same course—it has nothing to offer which clean hands can touch. As a German and as a German prince, whose yes is a yes full and true, whose no is a cautious no, I give my hand to nothing which might debase my noble Fatherland and deliver it to the just scorn of its neighbours and the condemnation of universal history; I accept nothing which is unworthy of the duties laid on me at my birth or which might ever be in opposition to them.”

After this declaration nobody could have expected from the king an affirmative reply to the message of the imperial delegation. Arndt, however, was not permitted to tell his colleagues anything either about his inquiry or about the letter from the king, who had laid it upon him as a duty to keep the

matter strictly private. Only after the death of both was the correspondence published. Besides, it may be surmised that Arndt, even after this, had not quite given up the hope that the king would agree, though upon conditions. It was rumoured in Berlin at the time that the king had hesitated and was even disposed to accept, but that on the preceding day at a hunting party, in which the Austrian ambassador Baron von Prokesch had taken part, he had been dissuaded from doing so by the latter. To judge from the above letter, this is more than improbable.^j

UTTER FAILURE OF THE ASSEMBLY

Thus the hopes of the national assembly were frustrated; its support in public opinion crumbled to nothing. Twenty-eight German governments did indeed declare their consent to the imperial constitution; but the rest, and they were the kingdoms (with Austria), refused it and recalled their deputies. Most of the other moderates also withdrew, and the democratic residue of the assembly, which was still willing to deliberate in Stuttgart (as the "rump parliament"), was there dissolved by the government (June 18th, 1849). Such was the lamentable end of the great German assembly which was to have brought about the renaissance of Germany.

Meantime, popular revolts had taken place in various quarters with the object of bending the governments under the rule of the Frankfort parliament in spite of all that had occurred. The first was in Saxony. Here on the 3rd of May the democratic party rose in Dresden and won possession of the greater part of the town; the king fled and appealed to Prussia for aid. The Prussian troops defeated the fighters of the barricades (6th-9th of May), though after an obstinate struggle, and restored order. More dangerous were the rebellions in the Palatinate and Baden. In the former, the democratic insurrectionary troops occupied almost the whole country, in the latter the soldiers themselves went over to the people. The grand duke fled and the democrats of Baden elected a provisional government. King Maximilian of Bavaria, successor of Ludwig, who had abdicated on the 21st of March, 1848, and the grand duke of Baden turned to the king of Prussia for help; in June the Prussian troops under the prince of Prussia marched up and quickly subdued the rebellious countries.

PRUSSIA ATTEMPTS TO ASSERT HER HEGEMONY

Prussia now took in hand the ordering of German affairs generally; Frederick William declared that he would take up the work of constitution-making and unification which had been begun in Frankfort, and in union with the other princes would bring it to a satisfactory issue. He aimed at erecting a German federal state under Prussian leadership and with a common parliament, and Hanover and Saxony supported him. Thus arose the "alliance of the three kings" (*Dreikönigsbündnis*) of the 26th of May; the other states also joined in this union, with the exception, however, of Bavaria and Würtemberg, and it was against their opposition and Austria's hostile attitude that the enterprise suffered shipwreck. For Frederick William, with complete frankness, laid before the princes the choice whether they would stand by him or not, and as the kings saw that Austria was again recovering her power, they went over to her camp. They were unwilling to resign their sovereignty. Austria had meantime arrived at a position in which she was prepared to give strong support to all the open and secret enemies of Prussia. She had subdued all the revolted nationalities and was powerful enough to win back her lost influence in German affairs also. When Prussia and her adherents (espe-

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cially the lesser states) set to work in earnest to realise the idea of a federal state and convoked a German imperial diet at Erfurt, the emperor of Austria protested, and so far prevailed with the king of Prussia that the latter agreed to a provisional confederation government in which the two states were to have an equal share. The Reichsverweser, Archduke John, then formally resigned his power to this government. Austria now offered a menacing protest against the Erfurt imperial diet which met on the 20th of April, 1850. Finally, in conjunction with the kings of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, Austria rejected in the most open and decisive manner the imperial constitution proposed by Frederick William. The whole party, which saw something revolutionary in the unification of Germany, likewise worked against the Prussian "Union," and Frederick William, seeing his disinterested intentions, his magnanimous procedure rewarded with such ingratitude, finally lost heart—the more as many distinguished officials and noblemen at the court, as well as the foreign ambassadors who dreaded a strong Germany, continually increased his disfavour towards the innovations introduced in 1848. This made it all the easier for Austria and Bavaria to accomplish their designs; and in particular to compel the restoration of the old confederation diet. In this they were assisted by affairs in Schleswig-Holstein and in Hesse.

AUSTRIA RESTORES THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION (1850-1851 A.D.)

We have already related how, after the defeats of the Schleswig-Holsteiners in the summer and autumn of 1850, the revived confederation diet—Austria and her adherents—interfered and compelled the duchies to submit to its will. In Hesse, also, Prussia and the cause of the German people suffered a bitter defeat. In February, 1850, the elector had installed a reactionary ministry under Hassenpflug, had then withdrawn from the union, tampered in numerous instances with the constitution, and found himself, in consequence of all this, at strife with his people. The chambers stopped the supplies, and in the beginning of September the elector declared the country in a state of war. But the whole people, true to their constitution, refused obedience to such illegal measures; the authorities, the troops, all declared unanimously that they would not break the oath which they had tendered to the constitution; for the estates had acted according to law. The elector now demanded help of the confederation diet, and Austrian and Bavarian troops readily marched in, whilst Prussia stood forward for the Hessian constitution and also sent troops to Hesse (beginning of November).

Thus Germany was divided into two camps: the union, that is, Prussia with most of the minor states, and the confederation diet, namely, Austria with the secondary states; the former represented the popular cause and wished to help the Hessians and Schleswig-Holsteiners; the latter desired to restore the situation as it had existed before 1848 and to pave the way for a thorough reaction. In the background Russia, the pillar of absolutism, threateningly offered her mediation. Frederick William gave way; he sent his minister, the count of Brandenburg, to Warsaw to a conference with the Austrian minister Schwarzenberg and the emperor Nicholas. There he was met by arrogant demands; Prussia must cancel all the steps she had taken to the benefit of Germany. The agitation so affected the count that it brought on a mortal illness, and he died on the 6th of November, after his return home, shortly before the noble minister Radowitz had laid down his office and Manteuffel had taken over the conduct of the foreign as well as of the home affairs of Prussia. Yet for a moment the king made up his mind to armed resistance; army, chambers, and people joyfully assented. But he found that Prussia was not sufficiently prepared for a great armed contest, and abandoned the idea of war, for which he

had in any case little inclination. On the 15th of November Manteuffel dissolved the union, and on the 29th of November he went to Olmütz to meet Prince Schwarzenberg, who then accomplished all the essential objects of Austria.

In April, 1851, Prussia again recognised the confederation diet in Frankfort and abandoned her efforts for the reform of German affairs. From the 12th of June, 1851, the confederation diet sat in Frankfort in the old way and restored as far as possible the situation previous to 1848. This was then done in Hesse. The Austrian and Bavarian troops ruled the country and forced Hassenpflug's will upon it; by the end of July, 1851, the electoral government was completely master of the people; in conjunction with the confederation diet it abolished the liberal constitution of 1831 and introduced another which encroached considerably on the rights of the people. At the same time the diet took the Schleswig-Holstein question in hand. Schleswig was delivered to the vengeance of the Danes, who once more subjugated it; Holstein had also to do penance.^b

THE LONDON PROTOCOL SETTLES THE SUCCESSION IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN (1852 A.D.)

On the 18th of February, 1852, the delegates of the German Confederation handed over the government of Holstein to the king of Denmark, and at the same time all the munitions of war belonging to the Schleswig-Holstein army, which had been brought together for the struggle against foreign rule, were given up to Denmark. In consequence of the disbandment of the army, many officers who had served in it before the revolt against Denmark were exposed to trial by court martial, and in any case lost their rights to a pension, so that they were compelled to seek a living abroad. Outside the military, also, a great number of families of position who had taken part in the revolt were compelled to leave the country. Officials, clergymen, and teachers were, unless they had left the country, dismissed from office and taken into custody, and the diet made no efforts to intercede for them.

At the same time the powers of Europe took steps to prevent the tearing away of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark, because of the various claims to succession of the ruling houses concerned. To them the preservation of the full territorial area of the Danish monarchy seemed a European necessity, much more so than the national unity of Germany. Looking at it from this point of view they decided that if, by the death of the reigning king, the ruling branch of the Danish royal house became extinct, the existing succession laws, which were different for the kingdom and for the duchies, should not be allowed to come into operation, but that the next heir to the kingdom must also inherit Schleswig-Holstein. Thus, after lengthy negotiations which took place in London, England, Austria, France, Russia, and Sweden signed a document on the 8th of May, 1852, which has become known under the name of "the London Protocol," and which declares under the guarantee of the above-mentioned powers that after the death of the reigning king, Frederick VII, his relative, Prince Christian of Glücksburg, shall succeed to the whole kingdom, with inheritance to his descendants in the male line.

Von Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador in London, had for a considerable time refused to sign the treaty, which seemed to him an arbitrary settlement by a number of parties not directly interested against the rights, the requirements, and the wishes of many of those concerned, and artificially devised quite against the nature of things. He signed the document only on being expressly ordered to do so by his king. Thus Schleswig and Holstein were torn away from Germany against the wishes of their inhabitants and subjected to Danish rule.

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FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A NATIONAL GERMAN FLEET (1848-1852 A.D.)

The dissolution and sale at auction of the navy, created in 1848 by German enthusiasm, was the most unpopular act upon which the reactionary spirit which ruled the diet of the confederation resolved. In the spring of 1848 the necessity for protecting the German shores and ships against the attacks of Denmark had brought into execution the plan long formed by German patriots in the seacoast towns for creating a German navy. Associations had been formed for the purpose of getting up an agitation and for collecting voluntary contributions to defray the expenses. Thousands gave up their jewels as contributions for the fleet; the old confederation diet, the committee of fifty, the national assembly, and the provisional central power developed an activity in which they vied with one another for the purpose of organising the new arm for the defence of the fatherland. The central power repeatedly levied considerable sums upon the German states for buying and fitting out ships and hiring good sailors for them, and at the beginning of 1849 there was the foundation of a German fleet, consisting of four steam frigates, five corvettes, two sailing ships, and six gunboats. At Bremerhaven the new creation of united Germany was exhibited with pride and was regarded as a basis for the foundation of a united German military power. But lo! when the ships were built and fitted up, and the crews to a certain extent trained, the empire had vanished and the ships had no master. For since the empire had not been able to obtain recognition from the European powers there was no German flag recognised, and in the summer of 1849 the boats were not even able to make any trial trips, since, had they done so, they might have risked being captured as pirates by foreigners not well disposed towards them. They were obliged to lie idle in the harbour, the crews became sensible of their ill-fortune, the vessels were damaged, and the payment of contributions came to a standstill.

Immediately on the reopening of the diet the question was raised, What was to be done with the fleet? A part of the states doubted its indispensableness, denied the duty of contributing towards it, and even kept back former contributions; up to that time, moreover, Austria had sent no contribution. They were disposed to consider the fleet as the property of the confederation, but not as an organic means to fulfil the purposes of the confederation. Prussia and Austria proposed that the diet should pronounce against the further maintenance of the fleet as the property of the confederation; and that the states which had a real permanent interest in its preservation should speedily come to an understanding as to the means to be adopted for the purpose. As a beginning, a commission of experts was to be formed which, whilst taking into consideration the Prussian and Austrian marine, was to examine into the requirements of the fleet. The experts met in the autumn of 1851; at the same time the proposal was put forward by Austria to divide the fleet into three sections: Austria was to protect the Adriatic, Prussia the Baltic, and the remainder of the German states the North Sea. This proposal was taken up with acclamations from various quarters and was adopted by the commission of experts. Prussia, which thus had a secondary part assigned to her and would have been excluded from the chief portion, the North Sea, could not be pleased at this scheme and retired from the whole project. Most of the remaining states also were not enthusiastic for a North Sea fleet. The inland states brought forward all kinds of objections: the keeping up of a fleet on the North Sea was beyond their strength; it was difficult to protect the commerce of three or four commercial groups, whose interests might differ, and unreasonable to make the whole confederation answerable for the protection of the commerce of the states on the coast. Hanover, Oldenburg, Hamburg, Lübeck,

and Bremen alone showed great interest in the matter. Mecklenburg, though she had to defend the coasts of the Baltic, pronounced against the fleet; Denmark and the Netherlands, as members of the confederation for Holstein and Limburg, proved themselves antagonistic to German interests, also, in this matter. The opinions of the confederate states, as the naval committee declared on the 31st of December, 1851, varied so much that nearly every vote had a different tendency, some even from the very beginning entering a protest against any remaining solution.

The diet now resolved not to consider the fleet on the North Sea as the property of the confederation after January 1st, 1852, but either to hand it over to a "Naval Union" which was just being formed, or to dissolve it. To form such a "Naval Union" the government of Hanover issued on the 20th of March an invitation to a congress which was to assemble at Hanover. Prussia and Austria, however, as great European powers, were excluded from this invitation; Hanover, as a state bordering on the North Sea, intended to manage the whole thing in order to win over Prussia; but was in its turn obliged to learn by experience that nothing could be done in German affairs without the aid of Prussia, notwithstanding that Bavaria and Saxony were upholding the Hanoverian plans with all their might, and that the former flatly demanded the exclusion of Prussia as the condition of its own participation. Würtemberg, Baden, the electorate of Hesse, and Frankfort refrained from all participation. The naval congress separated on the 24th of March without any result, and on the 2nd of April, 1852, the diet resolved to break up the fleet and to sell the ships singly. The two best vessels, *Barbarossa* and *Gefion* (the latter was taken from the Danes), Prussia took over for 713,700 gulden. For the task of winding up the whole sad business of the dismissal of the crews and putting the materials up at auction, a man was found in the person of Laurence Hannibal Fischer, ex-state councillor in the grand duchy of Oldenburg, whose reactionary tendencies made it a real enjoyment to him to destroy a work which was the outcome of national enthusiasm. The proceeds of the whole fleet, which down to July, 1851, had demanded an expenditure of about eight million florins [gulden] were 1,600,000 florins.

But the task of founding a new German fleet was now assumed by Prussia, and the first steps towards it were taken in 1854 by the purchase on the Jade Gulf, in the government of Jever in Oldenburg, of the strip of land required for the building of a naval port. A Prussian memorial expressly stated at that time that Prussia considered this acquisition a continuation of the endeavours to protect German trade and German navigation.^j

BIRTH OF THE PRUSSIAN CONSTITUTION

The Austrian reactionary influence ruled from the Tyrolese Alps to the North and Baltic seas. There was but one thing which it could not undo. Prussia had entered the ranks of the constitutional states, and remained on the whole faithful to this advance; and this was, in spite of everything, a great gain to the German nation. The national assembly at Berlin (and Brandenburg) had not completed the work of drawing up the Prussian constitution; it had gone to pieces in the democratic wreck. On the 5th of December, 1848, Frederick William IV on his own initiative "granted" his people a constitution which was liberal, in consonance with the spirit of the times, and partially modelled on the British constitution; the diet (*Landtag*) consisted of two houses; a house of peers (*Herrenhaus*), composed of representatives of the old established landed proprietors, of the larger towns, of the universities, and the trusted servants of the crown; and of the house of deputies, which the people were to elect in accordance with a new electoral law. In August,

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1849, the new chambers met at Berlin, and according to the king's direction revised the constitution; this "revised constitution" was then made a fundamental law of the state (January 31st, 1850), and sworn to by the king on the 6th of February. Nevertheless, the Manteuffel ministry did not allow the liberal ideas which formed the foundation of this constitution entirely to penetrate the administration; the liberal party, led by the deputies Schwerin, Vincke, and Patow, had to carry on a long and difficult struggle with the conservatives in the diet; but the main point was attained, namely, that the constitutional spirit spread from the estates to the whole people.^b

THE FAILURE OF GERMAN LIBERALISM IN 1848

During the first half of the nineteenth century liberalism in Germany enacted the part which had formerly belonged to rationalism. Hence the half belief, the uncertainty, the shuffling, inherent in it. But as we must look upon rationalism as a necessary stage in the transition from the theological chrysalis condition of the nation to its new birth in humanism, so we must regard liberalism as a necessary stage of transition from absolutism to democracy. Wherever by anticipating the mission of the latter it demonstrated a real energy, it was intensified into radicalism. This was the case in the civilised cantons of the Swiss confederacy, which since 1830 had been reorganised on a democratic basis in such a thorough manner that, in spite of all the drivel and talk of reactionary scribblers in France and Germany, it is quite certain that no country on the continent could equal this small republic in general prosperity, in the flourishing state of its agriculture, of its industry and commerce, the condition of its schools, its care of the poor, its roads, and the efficiency and economy of its government. In Germany at first liberalism was not permitted to prove itself practically active; it could exercise only a negative influence. The revolution of July in some measure cleared the way for it, and now came a time when public opinion in Germany was swayed by the liberal-constitutional doctrine such as had been especially commended by Rotteck in his *Universal History* and laid down at great length in the *Political Dictionary* edited by Rotteck and Welcker. This abstract liberalism, which was too superior to trouble itself about details concerning the material, intellectual, and moral condition of the people, and which throughout represented only the opinions of the bourgeoisie, succeeded here and there—as for instance, in Baden, its headquarters—in obtaining a momentary fulfilment of some of its demands; thereupon, in its smug self-satisfaction, it prated endlessly at the sittings of the chambers, whilst German absolutism gradually recovered from the fright of July and prepared at ease the measures which were to stop the mouths of these liberal phrase-makers.

A small fraction detached itself from the liberals and pursued revolutionary aims. It was recruited chiefly from the young students who were ready to exchange the romanticist hatred of the French for the French republicanism; but a few men also belonged to it, such as Johann Georg August Wirth, whose journal, the *German Tribune*, again taught his countrymen the accents of patriotic anger; who, in the spirit of the War of Liberation, had no sympathy with France, and wished to see the idea of a republic realised on a national basis. This fraction based exaggerated hopes on the well-founded discontent of the German people, on the excitement caused at that time by the events of July, the Belgian revolution, and the tragic and heroic struggles of Poland. It believed that the German people, who, men and women alike, had been so extremely enthusiastic on behalf of the "noble Greeks" in 1820 and were not less so now for the freedom of the "noble Poles," could surely without very great effort be brought to be enthusiastic about their own

freedom. The demagogues—that was their official designation—were cruelly deceived and were to learn to their bitter cost that history takes a leap occasionally in France, but never in Germany. The great majority of the people were completely indifferent to the doings of the demagogues, and the country people in particular had not the faintest conception of what the whole business was about.

As an illustration of this, we will mention an instance which would be droll if it were not so sad. One of the Würtemberger demagogues had set himself the task of winning over the peasants to the great German revolution. The result of his eager efforts was the conversion of two peasant proselytes; but observe! one of them was a pietist, who had been drawn into the matter only because he believed that “a great revolution would herald the appearance of antichrist”; through the revolution he wished to hasten the coming of the antichrist, and through the latter the millennium.

The *Hambach* festival, in 1832, was a very empty demonstration by the revolutionary party. The diet of the confederation replied to it by its resolution of the 28th of June and the 5th of July, which drew still tighter the iron threads of a network of police regulations for the maintenance of law and order. The only answer to this by the revolutionary fraction was the unsuccessful attempt at *Frankfurter Attentat* (April, 1833), and the abortive military plot in Würtemberg. This gave the reaction the desired pretext for carrying through the resolutions of the conference of Vienna and for initiating an extensive persecution of “political criminals.”

Things now became very quiet in Germany, and liberalism dared to utter its opposition only in the mildest form, even in the parliaments of the smaller states, the proceedings in which had sunk to a comedy of the most pitiful kind. The hopes of the liberals were again encouraged by the passive resistance of the Hanoverians to the violation of the constitution by King Ernest Augustus; by the opposition of the German national feeling against the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein into Denmark; by the accession of Frederick William IV of Prussia; and lastly by the attempts at emancipation in the domain of religion. Not a little to their own surprise, they saw these hopes suddenly fulfilled in March, 1848. Absolutism, equally surprised, in its first shock of terror announced officially that it was ready to “merge” itself into liberalism. The helm of the state came everywhere into the hands of the hitherto liberal opposition, which summoned a German parliament, interred with all honours the apparently defunct confederation diet, and put into requisition the political wisdom of countless professors, metamorphosed all of a sudden into statesmen, to formulate imperial and other paper constitutions—and waste paper at that.

The Liberals Arraigned

On account of the way in which the liberals had conducted the affairs of the revolution in 1848–1849 they had been accused of cowardice, treason, and corruption; and certainly facts enough have been brought to light which do not exactly speak for their incorruptibility and disinterestedness. We are reminded in this money matter of that leader of the liberals, who had made so many thundering speeches against the accumulation of offices and written so many violent articles in the *Political Dictionary* against the squandering of public money, and did not hesitate to pocket the customary pay of an ambassador of the confederation diet to the amount of 16,000 gulden, when he was appointed plenipotentiary of the new “Central Power.” We also remember that other big liberal gun who, when appointed undersecretary, found a salary of 4,000–6,000 gulden by no means too high a remuneration; nor did he object

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to an additional allowance as member of the imperial diet; and he even claimed an extra allowance of 40 gulden a day for his expenses when travelling as imperial commissioner, a duty which any postman could have done equally well. But yet, in our opinion, injustice was done to the liberals in expecting them to achieve any good out of the agitation in Germany in 1848. They acted entirely in accordance with their own peculiar character. As soon as they saw the achievement of their demands in the separate states they were entirely satisfied, for their sole aim was the participation of the "bourgeoisie" in the government. They were too stupid, too intoxicated with delight in their ephemeral participation in the government, to recognise the illusory character of these achievements. When they looked abroad from their more petty fatherlands it seemed to them the height of political wisdom to introduce the forms of the English constitution into the German empire yet to be founded. They wished to consider the common people only as a substratum of parliamentary power, which was to be so divided between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, or middle class, that the former might be organised as a house of peers, and the latter as a house of commons. This had become a fixed idea with the liberals.

The absolutists allowed them to amuse themselves with this idea and even to act as policemen against the rising democracy till they themselves had completed their military preparations. Then the parliamentary puppet show suddenly came to an end; the marionettes of professors in the national assembly and March ministers, who had so faithfully obeyed the supreme wire-pullers, were thrown on one side; and a completely justifiable laugh of scorn was heard when the dupes, who never tired of praising one another as the best and noblest men in Germany, found this treatment "inhuman." It is undeniable, however, that liberalism was the creed of the undoubted majority of those inhabitants of Germany who were at all desirous of a share in public life and possessed any sort of political education. Indeed, we must blush to acknowledge that the majority in the Frankfort parliament, made up as it was of county squires and bishops, bankers and superintendents, privy councillors and generals, Catholic and Lutheran Jesuits, impecunious lawyers and unsuccessful journalists, mummy professors, conceited students, petrified members of the *Tugendbund*, and pensioned gymnasts, completely answered to the political views peculiar to the majority of the German people at the time of the February revolution. In the short period of a year, by means of the lever of a free press and free associations, great strides were certainly made in political education; but when the nation at last began to recognise the true character of their "noblest and best men," it was already too late. A democratic party had indeed been formed, but before its organisation had gone far enough to make possible a general German revolution the blow which was to shatter it fell. On the 2nd of September, 1850, the resurrected confederation diet, over which so many pathetic funeral orations had been held, again took possession of its house of assembly, on the crest of which for a year and a half the standard of black, red, and gold had fluttered and waved. "The rest is silence."

NATIONAL DELIRIUM

The German towns presented at that time a singular appearance. A proportionately small minority forming the democratic party kept things going, whilst the old liberals went over openly from day to day to the ranks of the conservatives and time-servers, who on their part pleased their new confederates by their profuse use of the liberal catch-phrases. It was quite comical to hear how all, from time immemorial, had wished to be liberal. People

regularly swam in a sweet broth of patriotic emotion. Councillors never went into the streets without wearing the German cockade in their hats, and consistorial members marched in the ranks of the town militia. There was a cry of confidence everywhere: confidence in the nation; in the princes; in the good cause; in the victory of right; in the wisdom and virtue of the March ministry; in the permanence of the achievements of March; in German loyalty; in honesty and honour—a confidence without end. Recognised court journalists found it advisable to be silent for a while, or to allude only very timidly to the love of the German people for their hereditary ruling families. Newspapers which had always been ready with excuses for every absolutist meanness paid homage to the “constitutionalism on a broad democratic basis” with a border of red ink. Cavaliers, officers, officials, privy councillors, and lackeys of all kinds were polite, overwhelmingly polite, and went about arm-in-arm with the citizens, yea, even with the lowest classes, like German brothers. All was apparently, to use a vulgar expression, “one cake.” And yet nobody knew exactly what he wanted, with the exception naturally of the reactionaries, who were on the watch behind their mask. They knew quite well and they played to perfection the game which they were to win a year later. The most serious confusion of ideas and views existed in the genuine party of progress. The most decided of them cast sheep’s eyes on a republic, but at a respectful distance. There were few men at that time really conscious of decided republican opinions. Even honest patriots had not been able to withstand the epidemic of monarchical fever caused by the blind confidence in the March ministry.

National arrogance made itself heard also in the silliest fashion. Alsace, Denmark, and the Russian provinces on the Baltic, were spoken of as though they had been already taken possession of. One man discussed with the profundity of a statesman how the three colours should be arranged on the national flag and how the future national seal should be fashioned; another invented high-sounding names for the men-of-war in the German fleet of the future; a third memorialised in print how it would be possible to recover Switzerland for the empire; a fourth expressed himself in English parliamentary phrases; a fifth invented a pyramidal constitution for the empire, of which the base was republicanism and the apex the emperor; a sixth conceived a national costume for men and women; a seventh was of the opinion that, above all, woman must be emancipated and receive a vote; an eighth constructed steam guillotines; a ninth discovered in himself the combined field-marshal’s genius of Cæsar, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. There was such a jumble of shouting, buzzing, story-telling, boasting, and toasting that one was almost blinded and deafened. It was a glorious state of things.

It may be thought [continues Scherr] that I have used pessimistic spectacles in looking back on the spring and summer of 1848; but that would be unjust. I should be the last to wish to deny the nobility of the national impulse of those days; but I think events have fully justified the opinion that neither the political education of the nation nor its energy was equal to the great moment, the more than favourable opportunity. The mass of the people had at the beginning not the faintest idea of the game which was to be played with them, and when they began to be aware of it, fettered as they were by the bonds of reaction, they succeeded in rousing themselves from despair only by isolated attacks, which sometimes degenerated into brutalities, such as the assassination of Auerswald and Lichnowsky—a brutality on the part of the people which, to be sure, may be confronted by many a one carried out by the servants of the government. But so much fuss is never made about the latter, because the lower class has been accustomed to them as every-day occurrences for centuries, and those in authority regard them as a

[1848-1865 A.D.]

justifiable exercise of inherited "divine right." It is absurd to measure with the common plebeian rule the morality of the circles in which a legal decision founded on fraud and falsification is only a further recommendation to the premiership; and it is barely just to recognise that the "common people," with very few exceptions, have shown in the agitations of 1848-1849 a moderation, a kindness, a generosity, and an uprightness without parallel.⁷⁶

THE TRIUMPH OF PRUSSIA

The movement of 1848-1849 had proceeded in the main from the middle classes, and therefore its failure redounded to the advantage of the victorious elements, which, socially speaking, were the interests of landed estates, and thus of the nobility in the first place. But it was beyond the power of this reaction wholly to do away with either constitutional government or the relief of peasant grievances; and though the fundamental laws (*Grundrechten*) were abrogated by the confederation diet on August 23rd, 1851, many of them passed into the legislative code of the various states, and the Roman Catholic church availed itself of the principle of ecclesiastical liberty therein enunciated to shake off a number of legal restrictions upon the old canon law. In Prussia more particularly, the constitution of January 31st, 1850, which was in the main modelled on that of Belgium (though the king himself would have preferred a return to the ancient system of estates), remained in force, though in 1853 the upper chamber was converted into the *Herrenhaus* (House of Lords), and the great landed proprietors thus acquired a determinative influence upon the whole course of legislation. The new regulations of the judicial system likewise remained in force, as did the abolition of *Patrimonialgerichte* (manor courts), which dated from 1850. On the other hand, the old administrative system of provinces, circles, and municipalities was restored, together with a manorial police and local government, by the lord of the manor. The Protestant national church had gained a larger measure of independence by the institution (in 1850) of an *Oberkirchenrath* (High Consistory) in accordance with a favourite idea of the king's, but in church government and preferment the orthodox party was still in the ascendant by reason of its reputed conservatism, and the Stiehl regulations re-established clerical supervision in the national schools. The paltry spirit in which the press and associations were often treated was a fruitful source of irritation. Much was done to further the economic prosperity of the country, especially by the construction of railways; hardly anything, on the other hand, to prepare it for a wider sphere in politics. In spite of grievous defects, the army system remained in all things as it had been, and everything that was required for the nascent navy (the need of which was as clear as daylight), such as the fundamentals of organisation, the supply of ships, and the acquisition of a North Sea naval port on the Jade (1853), had to be laboriously wrung by that farsighted statesman, Prince Adalbert, from military prejudices and conservative repugnance to this "democratic institution."

In Saxony, the leading minister for the time being, Von Beust, restored the old estates of 1831, the so-called *reactivierte Stände*, as early as 1850, because the "Opposition Diet" (*Widerstandslandtag*) refused to abandon the Three Kings' Alliance, and materially restricted freedom of speech in the press and associations. But under the government of King John (1854-1873), a monarch as distinguished for learning and culture as for ability and devotion to duty, the judicial system was metamorphosed as it had been in Prussia in 1856; a new penal code was introduced at the same time and a new code of civil law in 1865; the army was substantially augmented and thoroughly reformed; and economic development fostered the happiest results by freedom

of trade (*Gewerbefreiheit*) (1861) and the thickening of the meshes of the network of railways. In Nassau and Hesse-Darmstadt, Hanover and Mecklenburg, the reaction did away with the new constitutions. Mecklenburg reverted to its feudal system of estates (1850); Hanover under George V (1851-1866) to the constitution of 1840 (1855). Excellent as the government might be in other respects, this continual alteration of the fundamental laws destroyed public confidence, and the blind king's incapacity for seeing matters as they really were led him into an exaggerated estimate of his sovereign power and prerogative which had the most mischievous effect.

In south Germany constitutional order was more firmly based than in these secondary states of the north. Maximilian II of Bavaria made it a point of conscience to respect the rights of popular representation, and therefore dismissed the Von der Pfordten ministry, which came into collision with the diet over an increase of military expenditure (1859); after which the judicial system and the circle administration were regulated afresh and the network of railways brought to much greater perfection. But the king's chief personal ambition was to make his capital of Munich, which his father had transformed into a home of German art, a great centre of German learning, notably by giving appointments to Protestant scholars from north Germany. In this he was successful. Both Würtemberg and Baden had a severe struggle with the new claims to supremacy advanced by the Roman Catholic church. Both states at first tried to adjust the situation by a concordat, Würtemberg in 1857, Baden in 1859; in both the diet refused its assent, and ecclesiastical questions were settled by the secular law; in both the Protestant church, reverting to the original idea of the Reformation, began to draw the laity to co-operate in church government by parish councils and the institution of synods. In the process a good part of the Frankfort fundamental laws were transferred to the Würtemberg statute-book; while Baden, under the grand duke Frederick (regent from 1852 to 1858), having recovered from the shocks of the stormy years in which she had suffered more than most, and having completely reformed her army, became the much-lauded model of a liberal state.

AUSTRIA AFTER METTERNICH

In Austria affairs took a very different course. After the storms of the revolutionary years and Metternich's policy of balance, men of note like Prince Schwarzenberg (1852), K. L. von Bruck, A. von Bach, and Count Leo Thun, brought the absolutist but enlightened policy of Joseph II into the ascendant with almost revolutionary violence. Not content with abrogating the whole Kremsier constitution—perhaps the most grievous error of Austria's domestic policy, because it deprived reform of the possibility of parliamentary support—they did away with the diets of all the *Kronländer*, including the Hungarian *Reichstag*, Hungary having "forfeited" her rights by rebellion. In truth the pride of Magyardom seemed wholly held in check by the systematic favouritism shown towards the nationalities in Hungary and by a German-speaking bureaucracy, mostly of Czech or Romaic origin. But the emancipation of the soil (*Grundentlastung*) was now carried through; after the 1st of October, 1850, the whole empire formed a single economic district; Trieste rose to splendour and importance, particularly through the agency of the Austrian Lloyd; the construction of the first Alpine railroad over the Semmering was completed in 1857; the fleet was provided with a new organisation, chiefly by the exertions of the noble Archduke Maximilian; German became the official language; and the beautiful port of Pola its naval base, in place of Venice. At the same time Count Thun, the first and last minister of education for the whole of Austria, took up the thread of the great reform

[1851-1857 A. D.]

period of Maria Theresa, introduced compulsory education and put the national schools under state control, remodelled the public schools (*Gymnasien*) after the pattern of north Germany, laying especial weight upon the use of the German language in all the *Kronländer*, and conferred corporate autonomy upon the universities, with liberty of instruction and study.

But in strong contrast to this emancipation of the intellect, his idealistic conception of the church led him to allow the state, in 1851, to renounce its ancient sovereign placet; and by a concordat of the 18th of August, 1855, Cardinal Rauscher, prince-bishop of Vienna, the emperor's former tutor and a stern absolutist, ecclesiastic, and pedantic bookworm, unused to the ways of the world, secured the complete liberty of the Roman Catholic church, put the whole educational system under its supervision, and conceded to it all jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. Clerical opposition was gradually extirpated by educating the young men destined for the church in episcopal seminaries; and by remodelling the theological faculty upon lines wholly scholastic; and in the lay world, especially among the nobility and peasantry, a strong ultramontane party was formed by numberless societies and an active press. But this sort of clerical tutelage was repugnant to the whole spirit of the younger generation of the middle class, especially those of German extraction, and they consequently lapsed into a sort of undenominational latitudinarianism, the result of which was to estrange the ultramontane nobles and clergy still farther from the German middle class. Thus a fresh element of discord was introduced amidst the opposition of nationalities, which was repressed only in name. For years nearly half of the empire could be governed only by exceptional measures, Hungary and Transylvania until 1854, Italy until 1857. In addition to this, though the army had glorious traditions and was without doubt the most aristocratic institution in the state, it was by no means equal to the task required of it, either as regards equipment, education, or leading, nor could the deficit in the finances or the paper money with its constant fluctuations in value be got rid of.

Such a state could have no moral justification for keeping two highly civilised nations like Germany and Italy under its political supremacy. Nevertheless, the confederation diet was more than ever the tool of Austria. By leaving the show of sovereign rights untouched in the German middle states and securing the docility of the courts by personal relations, etc., Austria created a staunch majority in the diet, by means of which she strove, contrary to all precedent, to keep Prussia permanently in a minority and decrease the power of the diet for the furtherance of her own interests.

BISMARCK BEGINS HIS CAREER

From August of 1851 onwards, this policy on the part of the presiding power was most strenuously opposed at all points by the new Prussian deputy in the diet, Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen. By birth a Pomeranian nobleman (born April 1st, 1815), he had managed his own property as a practical farmer since the conclusion of his studies and his brief career in the public service. He began his political career as a deputy in the Prussian diet and the parliament of Erfurt. By openly appearing as the champion of the historic monarchy against the liberal tendencies of the day and the opponent of the Frankfort constitution, he earned both the reputation of a reactionary *Junker* and the confidence of the king, who called him from his parliamentary duties to the diplomatic service—a course of promotion most unusual in Prussia as he had had no previous diplomatic training. None the less he despatched business at once with the assurance of perfect mastery, supporting the policy of a good understanding with Austria only upon the condition that

she should yield to Prussia a practical equality in the direction of the confederation, as had been the case before 1848, otherwise her resolute opponent.

On his advice Prussia successfully struck out an independent line of policy in two matters of primary importance: she frustrated Austria's project for obtaining admission to the *Zollverein*, though it was favoured by the middle states, merely granting her a commercial treaty upon favourable terms; and on the other hand, she induced the *Steuerverein* of northwest Germany, which had become altogether unworkable, to join the *Zollverein* from the 1st of Jan-



PRINCE BISMARCK
(1815-1898)

uary, 1854, and renewed the latter for another twelve years. The Hanseatic towns with Holstein and Mecklenburg still stood aloof, but with these exceptions the whole of Germany beyond Austria, an area of more than nine thousand square miles with thirty-five million inhabitants, had become a single economic and political entity.

THE DAYS OF NAPOLEON III

Meanwhile the face of Europe had changed. The establishment of the second Bonaparte empire had elevated a natural enemy of the Vienna Treaty of 1815 to the throne, in the person of Napoleon III (1852-1870). He, with his reflective and comprehensive, though too doctrinaire policy, desired to restore the ascendancy of France, not as his uncle had done, by wars of conquest which were opposed to the whole tendency of European development,

[1854-1858 A.D.]

but by artfully promoting this development, and, first and foremost, by means of the "principle of nationality." It is true that these ideas brought him into conflict with the temper of the nation which he ruled and which ever saw its own greatness in the impotence of its neighbours, and—his government being a democratic *tyrannis* based on the constitutional and actual sovereignty of the people—he ultimately perished in the conflict.

He began by allying himself with parliamentary England, first, for the protection of Turkey against fresh menaces from Russia, and second, when this danger was warded off, for the destruction of the sea-power of Russia in the Euxine. In the Crimean war which ensued (1853-1856), liberal public opinion in Germany was certainly on the side of the western powers, because Russia was dreaded as the stronghold of the European reaction. For this very reason the extreme conservatives in Prussian diplomatic circles were urgently in favour of an alliance with Russia against revolutionary France; while wary patriots like Prince William and Bismarck were in favour of neutrality. The king ultimately took their view, and in this matter the German Confederation followed Prussia's lead. Austria, on the contrary, constrained Russia to evacuate the Danubian principalities by invading them herself, and in the compact of December 2nd, 1854, went far towards an armed alliance with the western powers. The peace concluded at Paris on March 30th, 1856, insured the existence of Turkey and the neutrality of the Euxine, but prepared the way for a different grouping of the powers. For Prussia had earned a right to the gratitude of Russia without abandoning her own interests or incurring the enmity of France, while Austria by her "historic ingratitude" had excited the profoundest resentment at St. Petersburg; and France assumed without challenge the leading place in Europe.

Hence Napoleon took it on himself to interfere in the quarrel over the principality of Neuchâtel, which had been Prussian since 1707 but had joined the confederation on its own account in 1848, and had put down a rising of the loyal party by force of arms in September, 1856. To save the loyalist leaders who were impeached for high treason from the extreme penalty, King Frederick William demanded their release, and when this was refused made preparations for a campaign against Switzerland. Napoleon III, however, intervened, and so far adjusted the quarrel that the confederation let the prisoners go unpunished and the king resigned all pretensions to Neuchâtel by the treaty of May 26th, 1857. Shortly afterwards, in the following July, the monarch, who had been violently excited, was smitten with his first paralytic stroke, a symptom of long standing and serious brain disease. A second attack followed in September, and then his brother William, prince of Prussia, took his place, first as proxy for the king, and afterwards, when the incapacity of the latter became evident, as regent "with no responsibility to any but God" on the 8th of October, 1858. Most men expected or feared a liberal government; none dreamed that Germany stood on the threshold of a new and great period in her history—on the verge of a fresh and this time a successful struggle for unity.¹

RANKE ON FREDERICK WILLIAM IV

Among the rulers of the world King Frederick William IV shines out brightly, by reason of his noble bearing and his habits of thought which we must not neglect to represent as objectively as possible in their main features and general relations.

He comprehended the community of all Christianity from a standpoint more liberal than that of the Roman pope; he considered the Latin and Greek churches as equal members of the same, having the same rights as the various

Protestant churches. The episcopacy of the English, the independent church organisations of North America, the Lutherans and Calvinists of the European continent, and particularly of Germany, were to him constituent parts of one homogeneous fellowship, irrespective of their unions and divisions. In the faith of the Evangelicals, which stood above the contingencies of national error or transient events, he saw the purest expression of the thought of the divine founder, in whose worship he became engrossed with fervent ardour.

Frederick William's Political Opinions

The political opinions of the king had their root in the struggle against the first French emperor, against whose oppressive over-lordship Prussia revolted in alliance with the other European powers, and who succumbed to the general effort, which was the most popular and intense in Prussia. In the emperor, the king did not so much hate the person, as the representative of the revolutionary principle, which destroyed all existing, historically-developed arrangements and opened every door to usurpation and violence. Legitimacy had for him a value lying outside of his right, inasmuch as it had constituted the centre of the resistance and had united the forces of the nations around itself. He considered it necessary to adhere to the ancient arrangements which had been founded at the origin of the European states, had grown and developed under manifold forms, and seemed capable of still further development. He saw their most distinguished expression in the German Empire, to the idea of which he adhered and paid homage even during the dissolution of unity; to this idea he was devoted; a Germany united and armed for the conflict was his ideal, especially since Prussia had to play in it almost the first part. As the extent of its territory and of the German league had been determined in consequence of the great struggle, he was determined to maintain it in union with the allied powers, not seldom in opposition to the revolutionary forces.

For scarcely had the emperor fallen when the tendencies, which he shared in the main, but which he understood how to curb in special instances, asserted themselves in full freedom, owing to the shortcomings of the attempted restoration, and on all sides awakened the analogies of their former long and successful action. Russia and England were not immediately affected by this; Russia made the attempt to shut itself off from the agitation and to ward it off as an external enemy; England, actuated by the two-sided nature of its constitution, desired to remain neutral.

The new struggle was fought out in continental Romano-Germanic Europe. In the restored Romance countries a widely-spread revolutionary agitation was in progress, which by the event of 1830 gained a general preponderance and an immeasurable influence over Germany.

Against this movement Austria and Prussia took up divergent attitudes. The former, threatened in its European relations, consistently adhered to its policy of absolute resistance, for which it utilised its old reputation in Germany. The object of the Prussian government, on the other hand, and above all of Frederick William IV, was to mould the old institutions in a sense conforming to the requirements of the times, so that no motive would remain by which the land could be driven to the other side. The king might perhaps have come to an understanding with a modified form of the liberal ideas, which, indeed, had already gained an entry into the Prussian state through the municipal laws and the legislation concerning landed property; but in their train there followed another movement which seemed to him to be fraught with general ruin: that of radicalism and socialism which threatened to undermine the whole social organisation, and whose adherents rejected the

[1840-1861 A.D.]

belief in revelation of any kind and even faith in the living God. He considered it as his chief duty to oppose these as prince, as Christian, and as man; he repudiated the liberal system, as he could discover no palpable limit between the fundamental ideas of the liberals and radicals; in the union of the two he saw the danger of the educated world.

Whilst Frederick William IV was occupied in raising an insurmountable bulwark against these elements, he was overtaken by them and obliged to give way. By the 18th of March his reign was divided into two distinct periods; in which, nevertheless, he maintained the identity of his opinions. For even in the second period he was far from yielding to the revolutionary tendencies which are so frequently allied to constitutional forms. Otherwise, he would simply have taken over the Belgian constitution and accepted the views of the Frankfort assembly. That he did not do so may be considered the foremost, at least the most effective, action of his life.

On both sides he maintained the "self" of the Prussian state. In the constitution he asserted the strength of the monarchical principle; with regard to the German Empire he subdued his ambition and did not let himself be seduced by the secret wish of his heart to deny the principle which he had accepted and inscribed on his banner.

This could be done only by a man who, although an idealist, was yet severe; who could make concessions as to details, but would never yield in matters of principle; who could have an intelligent conception of the world, but whose views were deeply rooted in the institutions and the life of olden times. A conviction as lasting and deep as his was necessary, so as not to allow the conservative principles, which descended from a distant past, to become extinct for the future and humanity.

It must, nevertheless, be admitted that under the entirely altered circumstances there was a wide interval between his ideas and their practical fulfilment; his mind, which aspired in many directions, formed a new difficulty for the government. With the deserving bureaucracy which he found in existence he could never come to terms, as he incessantly wished to bring the ministers to his ways of thinking, which were not theirs. This opposition stamped upon his reign a character of uncertainty and hesitation; but the development of the inner forces of life did not suffer through this.

Recalling the circumstances under which he took over the government—ruling at first with patriarchal solicitude, but at the same time domineering in a dry, one-sided fashion—one perceives how everything became altered under him, filled with new life and activity, after a process of active fermentation. In politics two kinds of talent can be distinguished: the conception of ruling ideas, and the administration of current affairs. Fortunate the ruler in whom both are combined to form one whole. Contemporaries reproached Frederick William IV with not having utilised the circumstances of the times resolutely enough, so that with all the means at his disposal he accomplished nothing; his doctrine, which was founded on circumstances of the past, prevented him from attacking the questions of the day energetically, and gave a false turn to his actions; his constant vacillation made success impossible and deprived him of general confidence. So, indeed, it may seem to one who conceives the transactions, as much as is known of them, in their isolation, and judges them accordingly.

In the midst of the powers of the world struggling with and counterbalancing one another, a neutral policy was a necessity to the Prussian state, not with a view to maintaining the balance, but, above all, in order to maintain its own existence. Considerations of religious and moral purport concerning the right and wrong of the opposing parties or states exercised an influence on the decisions of Frederick William. But apart from this, he had all the

time the liveliest consciousness of his own position which imposed on him the need of consideration and even of indulgence. And the importance of the present moment on the future was ever before him. In his conduct the world saw much characterless oscillation and indecision, and not the uniform direction which predominated in it. At the present day it is possible to turn one's view from the momentary impression to that which was constant in the politics of the king. For if we do not deceive ourselves, the effects of this on the Prussian state and Germany appear everywhere important; the conditions of the present day are largely based on it.

It was an extremely important step when he brought the absolute monarchy, as he received it from his predecessors, into connection with a representative and deliberative institution, which, whatever its future development, was bound to curb at all times the monarchical power. This did not lead him to the goal he had dreamed of; the liberal and even the democratic ideas gained the upper hand. But it was his especial intention to save the essential conditions of the monarchy in the new constitution. To him, before all others, is due the credit for the provisions of the constitution which made the financial existence of the Prussian state independent of the fluctuation of parties and the passing preponderance of the opposition; it assured to royalty the immediate authority over the army; therein one may recognise the two main pillars of monarchy in constitutional Prussia.

Frederick William's Permanent Influence

Although Frederick William IV refused the imperial crown under the conditions and circumstances under which it was offered to him, yet he made possible and even paved the way for its acquisition under other forms and under a different state of affairs. His fundamental thought, to create a confederate state, independent of Austria, but not hostile to that power, was eventually realised after the great struggles which have been fought since his time. At present that thought dominates the situation of Germany and of Europe.

Frederick William IV carefully and considerably avoided an immediate quarrel with the second French emperor; but in the latter's appearance on the ground of revolutionary and military traditions, and in the inner drift of the forces in which the powers of the ruler originated and which might carry him away against his will, he saw a danger for the continuance of the territorial arrangements of Europe and Germany, above all of the Prussian state. Foreseeing a conflict, he sought to uphold relations with Russia corresponding to the old alliance. The service which he rendered to Russia at a critical moment¹ bore the richest fruit for the Prussian state when the anticipated attack at last came.


Throughout the whole of his life Frederick William IV endeavoured to keep up friendly relations with England, without being repelled or carried away by the passing changes in the politics of the various ministries. This endeavour found its conclusion in a fortunate dynastical union; it led to a better understanding between the nations and the governments.

With all this Frederick William IV did not find himself in a firm and secure political situation. After the agreement of Olmütz, the relations of Prussia and Germany to Austria in the restored confederation became unbearable. If the aim to which Frederick William IV aspired was to be reached, namely, the formation and direction of a confederate state, the prevailing opinions had to be approached a step nearer, for on their side also they had

[¹ Ranke alludes to the attitude of Prussia during the Crimean War.]

an historical justification, and they were too deeply rooted and too powerful to be left out of consideration; but to do this it was necessary to break with Austria. If we are rightly informed, the king was inclined to this towards the end of his days. He had tried every means to gain the favour of Austria, but in vain. Austria refused consent to the project of an expedition to Switzerland, even if it aimed at nothing further than the restoration of the Prussian royal house in Neuchâtel. In German affairs matters came to such a pass that the king had to declare in Vienna that his indulgence had its limits; if the conduct of Austria collided with the duty which as king of Prussia he had towards Germany, he would not give way. He had pronounced that significant word to the effect that the day may yet come when the two powers will measure their strength at the White Mountain—referring to the battle of 1620. His journey to Vienna in 1857 was calculated to put an end to the differences. The impossibility of this was one of the painful impressions of his last days. Men who were close to him assert that he seriously thought of taking up the struggle. But he was not destined to bring to an issue the old antagonism, the outbreak of which he had held back; for an individual life is but a moment in history.^c





CHAPTER X

THE SEGREGATION OF AUSTRIA

[1858-1866 A.D.]

SCARCELY had Frederick William IV laid the reins of government in the hands of his brother and heir, afterwards William I, when immediately evidence of a completely altered temper was manifested in the country. It seemed as though a fresh morning wind had risen, and the heavy dark cloud which had lain so oppressively on the hearts of all had fled before it. Once again it was felt in Prussia that a new and better epoch had begun.

On the 20th of October the chambers met to give the regency constitutional recognition. Five days later, in the presence of the assembled representatives of the people, the prince took the prescribed oath to the constitution. The chambers were dissolved and writs for new elections issued; whilst the regent, to the great satisfaction of all citizens, exhorted the officials to abstain from bringing any illegal pressure to bear on the electors. On the 5th of November the detested Manteuffel and most of his colleagues were dismissed. Prince Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen undertook the formation of the new ministry which included Flottwell, Von Schleinitz, Von Patow, General von Bonin, Count Pückler, and Professor von Bethmann-Hollweg—men who were known as moderate liberals and with the choice of whom the people were well satisfied.

The effect on foreign powers of the beneficial turn which had taken place in the views of the Prussian government was also at once manifested. The wavering course of the Prussian ship of state, bending as it did to every puff of wind, had accustomed people to infer that this once proud vessel no longer possessed the power to cut through the waves of events on its own predesigned way. But its opponents were soon to learn their mistake. The state structure was there in all its essential parts; all that had been wanting was a strong hand to guide the helm. Now the contempt into which Prussia had fallen

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seemed suddenly to give way and the old splendour of the Prussian name began to revive. The evidence of this was soon to be shown in astounding fashion before the eyes of all Europe.

GERMANY AND THE ITALIAN WAR OF 1859

The emperor Napoleon III was about to begin the struggle with Austria for the liberation of upper Italy. It was of the utmost importance to him that Prussia should either stand by him or at least remain completely neutral. Therefore in the last days of the year 1858 the Prussian cabinet was confidentially informed that Prussia was regarded as a rising state to which the future of Germany belonged, whilst Austria seemed to be on the decline. If the prince regent would pledge himself not to abandon, during the approaching struggle, the part of an inactive spectator, then France would without interfering suffer everything to be done which Prussia might think good for her own aggrandisement within Germany.

The prince refused the offer without further parley; and when, in June, 1859, after the great battles of Magenta and Solferino, it seemed as though Austria must completely succumb in Italy, Prussia endeavoured to prevent such a consummation. In union with the rest of Germany, the Prussian army was placed on a war footing and sent to the Rhine. In consequence of this threatening movement Napoleon deemed it best to make peace as quickly as possible. On the 8th of July was concluded the hasty armistice of Villafranca, followed on the 10th of November by the Peace of Zurich. For the time Austria, in consequence of Prussia's determined action, remained in possession of Venetia and her famous Quadrilateral. Lombardy fell to Sardinia; and France, as the reward of her trouble, compelled the cession to herself of Savoy and Nice.^a

The idea that this war furnished Prussia with an opportunity to bring about the long-desired unification of Germany and build her own supremacy on the ruin of Austria had not been without advocates amongst the Prussians themselves. At the outbreak of the war the socialist agitator, Ferdinand Lassalle, supported this view in a pamphlet entitled *The Italian War and Prussia's Task*. The following is an extract from this pamphlet:^a



OTTO THEODORE, BARON DE MANTEUFFEL
(1805-1882)

LASSALLE UPON THE CONSEQUENCES TO GERMANY OF THE WAR

Let us now examine the practical political consequences for Germany [of this war of 1859]. Is it not evident that the practical political consequences of this war benefit no one in a higher degree, hardly any one in the same degree, as Germany? Is it not evident that Napoleon, doomed by history, in spite of his apparent successes, to accomplish everywhere the very opposite of what he strove for, accomplishes nothing through this war but—however

paradoxical it may appear at first sight—the clearing away of the difficulties which ruined the German revolution of 1848 and the efforts for German unity? If any fact can be absolutely certain, it is that hitherto German unity has been



FERDINAND LASSALLE
(1825-1864)

foiled entirely by the dualism of Prussia and Austria. The German Confederation was a strictly logical creation. It was not an organisation of German unity; it was only the organised form of German disunion. It was and could be nothing else. Austria joined the German Confederation with twelve millions. Prussia, in order to stand on an equality with Austria, was also allowed to enter with twelve millions only, and for this purpose left East and West Prussia out of the confederation, although the German character of these provinces is a recognised fact in the consciousness of the nation. Austria alone, with the twenty-five millions of her non-German population, outweighed the whole German Confederation. On the other hand, Prussia, with her total population of sixteen millions, with her purer German character, her more liberal traditions, her preponderant influence on the population of north Germany—partly by material and partly by moral means—outweighed Austria.

How, then, could any German unity be established? It was impossible, owing to the actual balance of power between these two states.

The revolution of 1848 dissolved the confederation, against which, as the supposed real cause of their want of unity, the Germans were specially embittered—that is to say, the revolution removed the external results and effects of their want of unity; but the intrinsic cause of it, the real political power of these two states, their balance of power, it did not remove. That revolution had not the strength to clear away this true, real, effective cause of disunion, the source whence disunion was sure to spring over and over again. Nay, the majority did not even possess the intelligence to comprehend this true cause. The plans of the Gotha party—the “little German” party—were but a confession of their incapacity to restore German unity and to break the actual power of those two states. German unity remained a hope and a theory, whilst disunion was founded on the actual circumstances. Hence the unity of the revolution was humbug.

The German revolution failed precisely because it had not the power and the courage to abolish the force founded in facts of these two states. The revolution, therefore, had effected nothing towards German unity. Throughout its duration the Germans were just as much separated into two divisions, they were just as dualistic as before. This was amply proved by the execu-

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tion of Blum, the imperial commissary sent by the parliament of the empire to Vienna, whose head Austria threw at the feet of the parliament of the empire.

A counter-revolution took place. The greatest curiosity was excited as to what the princes would substitute for the confederation diet. They had so solemnly abjured it; Prussia particularly seemed bound to maintain this renunciation, both as a matter of duty and in her own interest. None the less, however, followed the restoration of the old confederation. And in spite of all shilly-shallying and hesitations and exceptions, in spite of a college of princes and a union, a firmer and a looser league, and the like wearisome and laborious schemes—all was of no avail, and Prussia again entered the confederation. The indignation of the people was indescribable. They had never imagined that reaction would go so far.

And as the Austrian reinstallation of the diet was the necessary consequence of the incapacity and superficiality of the revolution of 1848, so were the necessary and logical consequences of the actual state of things, of the insuperable dualism which really existed, seen in the assembly of princes at Bregenz; in Olmütz and Bronzell; in the Austrian executions in Hesse and Holstein; and the cession of the duchies, unconquered by the Danes, through the invasion of an Austrian army.

Smarting but instructive memories! So long therefore as the balance of power between Prussia and the non-German state of Austria exists, so long is disunion inherent in the actual conditions and cannot be conjured away by mere change of forms. Does anyone suppose that things could be altered if a national parliament were to meet again at Frankfort? Is a chamber of elected representatives to be regarded as an assembly of magi who can unite divergencies, combine oppositions, and make impossibilities possible? Is the word "people's parliament" a magic formula by means of which we can at our own pleasure change black into white? So long as Austria is a non-German state with twenty-six millions of non-German inhabitants, so long as Austria is forced by her character of a non-German power into non-German tendencies, and so long as she can, if need be, counterbalance the combined power of Prussia and the confederation—so long would a parliament at Frankfort, whether composed of representatives of the princes or of the people, present for a second time the cheerless spectacle of the powerlessness of the delegates over the concrete nature of their states and governments; or the members themselves, impelled by the concrete nature of their states, would present the far worse spectacle of transferring the disgrace of disunion from the cabinets of the princes to the German races themselves.

How, then, is the promised land of German unity to be attained, and will our wanderings through the wilderness never come to an end? How can we get there? We shall say it, and this time we shall appeal to very conservative authorities. A king and an archduke in convivial meeting have revealed to us the secret of German unity. "No Prussia and no Austria" was the toast to which a king of Prussia and an archduke of Austria clinked their glasses in Cologne long before 1848. Yes, certainly—no Austria and no Prussia!

No Austria, No Prussia!

But this toast was only the illusory and idealistic expression of the secret. The real condition of things, the basis of disunion, was to remain as it had been. Unity was to exist solely in the "good will" of the princes, the voluntary renunciation of diverging aims. It is astonishing to notice what contradictory appearances things assume when they are divested of their visionary and utopian form, and are looked at in the clear light of reality. It fared

with this imaginary unity of the two princes, based as it was to be on "good will," as it fared with Maximilien Robespierre's idea of equality based on "virtue."

To attain German unity [continues Lassalle] we need only translate the words of the royal toast into actual fact. In a visionary utopian form everything looks beautiful, rose-coloured, poetic; but in its actual accomplishment how gloomy, hard, full of tears, bloody! How enthusiastic and inspiring sounded that toast as the glasses rang! Translated into reality, that "No Austria, no Prussia," means nothing else than this—Austria, the Austrian state, must be dismembered, torn into shreds, crushed, annihilated, her ashes scattered to the four winds of heaven! We by no means utter these words as partisans of Prussia, we are moved by nothing but the consciousness that we are German. We should say the same if we were Austrian; we should wish the same thing to happen to Prussia, if circumstances were altered and the latter were in the position of Austria.

This is the real way of carrying out "No Austria, no Prussia," and the only path to German unity. The independent position in the world which Austria takes up, relying upon her possessions outside Germany—that is the inevitable cause of German dualism and of the impossibility of German unity, a cause which no palliative measures can remove. With the dismemberment of Austria, Prussia as a separate state will fall of itself, just as antithesis and thesis cannot exist apart. Austria annihilated, Prussia and Germany become one. On the day when the provinces outside Germany, Italy, and Hungary shall be torn away from Austria, and she is reduced to the 12,900,000 inhabitants (including Bohemia) which belonged to the confederation; when in consequence she is reduced to a position in which she can compete with Prussia neither in population, nor in intelligence, nor in authority; on the day when Austria is changed into a simple German province, not only will 12,900,000 inhabitants, who for the first time will feel themselves to be Germans, be restored to Germany, but German dualism itself will be blotted out, and German unity will be able to assert itself with the real force of the circumstances and, therefore, will become inevitable.

On the day when the separate state of Austria is destroyed, the standards of Bavaria, Württemberg, etc., will pale. On that day Germany is reconstituted. All the rest will naturally follow according to the law of gravitation. For unity lies already in the actual circumstances, and these will as undoubtedly find an adequate form for expressing themselves as dualism had found in the form of the diet.

The destruction of that actual constellation of power—that is, the annihilation of Austria, her separation from her possessions outside Germany—is, therefore, a necessary preliminary, which must be carried out before or during the agitation which is to succeed in establishing German unity. This preliminary must therefore be wished for by all those who ardently desire unity. Whatever form one may wish this unity to assume, whether that of a German republic, a German empire, or even a compact federation of independent states—all these questions may remain open for the time being. All these parties must in any case, if they have the intelligence to understand their own purposes, work together for the indispensable preliminary condition to any of these schemes, namely, the destruction of Austria.

Well then! Like a galley slave, wild self-seeking in his heart, but weighted by the chain and ball of that historical fatality which determines his cause of action, Napoleon is about to execute this preliminary to the formation of German unity, to remove the great and only obstacle in its way, and spare us the odium, the blood, and the civil war which the task would one day inevitably cost us if we took it into our own hands. By rousing the Italians to the

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war and binding himself in his proclamation not to end it until he had purged the peninsula of the Austrians; by thus enabling also the Hungarians, on their part, to rise in arms, which they will doubtless do during the second Italian campaign, Napoleon carries out an essentially German task, and removes by the partition of Austria the real obstacle to German unity. The Italian war, therefore [concludes Lassalle], is not only hallowed by every principle of democracy, but it is of the very greatest advantage to the German nation. It is the very life interest of German policy.^c

GERMAN INFLUENCE FINDS ITSELF PREJUDICED

The democratic challenge had, however, passed unheeded; the end to the rivalry of Prussia and Austria had not yet been reached in 1859; and if, on the other hand, the Prussian action had saved Austria from heavier losses than those inflicted on her by the Peace of Zurich, still she issued from the war with serious diminution of both territory and reputation.^a

Thus the Italian war had ended to the detriment of Germany; the troops of the first German power were conquered and forced to a detrimental peace. The German governments, like the German people, must have said to themselves that the authority of Germany had once more been prejudiced. The knowledge of this could only lend fresh support and fresh violence to the general desire to put an end to this unworthy situation. But the German people possessed no state organ, by which it could have given expression to its will; on the other hand, it no longer found itself in the same position of culture it had occupied thirteen hundred years before, for otherwise the people would have banded together in hundreds of thousands in order to cross the Rhine or the Alps and give vent to their anger in robbery, murder, and arson. They did otherwise: they adapted themselves to the progress of civilisation, which not only clearly set forth its will but also astonished and frightened foreign lands.

In the same year (1859), on the same day (November 10th) which by the Peace of Zurich broke off the former relations of Germany to Italy, the German people celebrated in the festival of Schiller their material and intellectual unity—a festival such as no other people had ever held before. It was celebrated on every part of the earth where Germans dwelt. And it was not the poet whose laurel wreath they wished to renew; it was the hero of liberty and the patriot who was praised in Schiller before the eyes of the whole world, and who was recommended to the present and to future generations as a marvellous model.

No matter how energetically this national and general feeling revealed itself, so long as it did not succeed in giving expression to a state organisation it remained a phantasmagoria without any practical significance. But where was the strength and the power which would help this necessity to conquer? The attempts of the German national assembly to establish a better constitution for all Germany had been so completely shattered that for long nothing similar had been thought of. Apart from the insufficiency of their power, the secondary and small states were too divided in their opinions and interests to be able to undertake anything. This was proved by a long experience with Austria, which moreover since its last defeat was inextricably involved in constitutional struggles. In Prussia conditions were more simple. Prussia was almost a pure German state, and it was for this reason that the majority of the national assembly and that of the German people had been in favour of Prussian leadership, which Prussia had itself rejected. Meanwhile the same party relations existed, and the "little German" or Prussian party made use of the new experience gained to form, under the name of "national union," an

association of men who announced the union of Germany under the leadership of Prussia as the goal to be reached, although they still rejected the complete exclusion of Austria from Germany. The situation in Germany, and especially in Prussia seemed to give no small support to these endeavours, whilst affairs in Europe called too loudly and earnestly for a closer union of the German forces for them not to be heard.

The revolution begun in Italy in the year 1859 had continued unrestrainedly, and had led to results which the great leaders of the Italian people, Garibaldi and Mazzini, had only aspired to, but the quick fulfilment of which no one had



WILLIAM I
(1797-1888)

expected. Not only had Austria been banished from Lombardy, and her allied princes of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena from their states, but the ecclesiastical states had lost part of their provinces to Sardinia, which was allied to the revolution; and in 1860 the hero Garibaldi, landing in Sicily with a handful of volunteers, within a few months had the whole kingdom of Naples in his hands and ceded it to the king of Sardinia, who now assumed the title of king of Italy. But this was far beyond the goal which Napoleon III, the prime mover in the revolution, had set himself, and over which he had to agree to the Peace of Zurich with Austria. To stay the flood of events was no longer possible; nevertheless Napoleon had accepted payment for his support of Italy by the concession of Nice and Savoy to France, although at the beginning of the war he had refused every acquisition.

The German nation had contemplated this revolution, that bordered on the marvellous, with the greatest astonishment, but also with a variety of other feelings. The feeling which outweighed all the rest, amongst princes as

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amongst nations, and this not in Germany alone, was that of mistrust in the rulers of French politics. Indeed it seemed their intention to weaken and discourage all the powers of Europe. On the 16th of June the German princes, like a brood of frightened chickens under their mother's wing, assembled at Baden Baden, seeking protection with the prince regent of Prussia, at which meeting the emperor of the French appeared in order by his presence to quiet the alarm. Only the emperor of Austria was missing in the circle of German princes; nevertheless, in the following month, the king of Bavaria arranged a meeting of the Austrian monarch with the prince regent, and in October both met the emperor of Russia in Warsaw. All these friendly relations of the princes led to no other result than that of making the uncertain position of Europe all the more apparent. This position was the most dangerous to dis-united Germany, and now more than ever the wish made itself felt to put an end to this condition once and for all. The small states now as before sought reform in joining Austria, as in this only did they see a guarantee for their privileges; the German people on the other hand, especially those of the north, showed themselves, as became apparent in the increasing importance of the national union, more and more favourably disposed towards the Prussian leadership; nevertheless the greater part of the people, in the north as well as the south, were made to waver in their convictions.^f

The programme put forward in the speech with which the prince regent greeted the new popular ministry he had formed after Manteuffel's dismissal in 1858 excited jubilation among the people. The results of the new elections were everywhere favourable to the government, a liberal era seemed to be commencing; but gradually the humour changed as it became apparent that none of the hopes of the liberals were passing to fulfilment. A complete breach took place when the scheme for the reorganisation of the army appeared. In the session of 1860 the gulf was bridged over by a compromise, which, however, by reason of its diverse interpretation, became the source of the conflict. The government carried out the reorganisation, the funds for which had been granted for one year only, as though it had been definitive, and on the new session an open struggle began; but once more the expenditure was authorised as an extraordinary one.

THE ACCESSION OF WILLIAM I (1861 A.D.)

Meantime, on the 2nd of January, 1861, Frederick William IV died, and in October the coronation took place. The new elections, in which the newly formed party of progress for the first time came into prominence, were in favour of the opposition; after a short session the house was dissolved and a change of ministry ensued. The elections of the 6th of May, 1862, furnished another defeat to the government; the house refused the whole cost of the organisation, and the king now sent for Bismarck, who, after the close of the session, formed a new ministry.

Ovations were made to the deputies by their constituents, whilst the government was not backward in administering punishments. The king himself was much shaken by the conflict, but unbending. On the 14th of January, 1863, the new session was opened; at the debates on the address and on the question of the convention with Russia excited scenes took place, and the contest over the disciplinary powers of the president brought the conflict to its height. The government issued press ordinances, and, on the 2nd of September, dissolved the house. Nor did the new elections change anything, and meantime the Schleswig-Holstein question had become acute; on the 9th of December the government demanded authority for a state loan of 12,000,000 thalers, "in view of the present aspect of the questions in dispute between

Denmark and Germany"; instead of which the house directed an address to the king, requesting him to withdraw from the London Protocol, recognise the prince of Augustenburg, and endeavour to procure him help from the German Confederation (December 18th). On the 27th the king answered by a refusal: he could not withdraw from the treaties concluded in 1852 without taking national relations into consideration, the succession question would be weighed by the confederation, and he requested the grant of the loan, concerning which Bismarck declared in the committee that he hoped it would be granted—"otherwise we must take it where we can get it." The committee recommended a refusal, and after a warm debate the loan was rejected by two hundred and seventy-five to fifty-one votes, and resolutions were taken which protested against the occupation of the duchies by Austria and Prussia as great powers, and declared for all time that every loan raised without the sanction of the chamber was opposed to the constitution and not binding. On the 25th of January, 1864, the session was closed.

The Danish war exercised no influence on home affairs. The session which began on the 14th of January, 1865, passed fruitlessly; a majority, besides rejecting the military law and the budget, also refused the ratification of the war expenses, the scheme for the foundation of a fleet, and the Schleswig-Holstein policy of the government; the debates were so bitter that Bismarck sent Virchow a challenge, which the house forbade him to accept. On the 17th of June the session closed. The punishment of officials, of associations, of the press, by the minister Eulenburg, continued; confirmation of communal elections was generally refused, and the municipal authorities abstained from any loyal demonstrations. In the new session, beginning the 15th of January, 1866, the union of Lauenburg with the crown was declared illegal, since the consent of the diet was lacking; indignation rose still higher when the deputies Frentzel and Twesten were impeached for certain speeches uttered by them in the house, and a decision of the superior tribunal, after appointing two auxiliary judges, declared by a majority of one vote that the impeachment was justifiable. On Hoverbeck's motion the house declared that Article 84 of the constitution had been infringed. Bismarck refused to accept these resolutions, and on the 23rd of February the session closed.^j

Even under the retired ministry, in the politics of the Zollverein the Prussian government had gained a decisive victory over Austria, as over the small states, inasmuch as it compelled the latter under the threat of the breaking of the Zollverein to give up their opposition to the commercial treaty formed with France and opposed by Austria. The secondary and small states, terrified at the condition of Europe and the plans of Prussia, adopted many courses more theoretical than practical in order to bring about a reorganisation of the constitution of the confederation. The emperor of Austria also came to their assistance in so far as to assemble the German princes around him on the 16th of August, 1863, at Frankfort, and lay before them his plans of a constitution for the confederation. The king of Prussia, being in no position to use force, held aloof; and thus the whole plan fell through. A few months afterwards it was followed by another to which circumstances granted a greater importance.

THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE POWERS

The duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, through the European diplomacy in the London Protocol, had been intruded upon by conditions which neither their own estates nor the German Confederation had acknowledged. On the basis of this protocol the king, Frederick VII, by means of the so-called March Patent (March 30th, 1863) had given a constitution by which Schleswig and Holstein were subjected to quite different political laws and condi-

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tions, inasmuch as the patent annexed Schleswig to the Danish monarchy, but reduced Holstein to provincial dependence. The parliament called together by the deputies of Denmark and Schleswig accepted this constitution on the 14th of November. The king died on the 15th, whereupon his successor appointed by the protocol, the prince of Glücksburg, ascended the Danish throne as Christian IX. He also, building on public opinion in Copenhagen as well as on the sympathy of the European powers, ratified the constitution. This gave cause for fresh agitation in Germany, which, better supported by circumstances than the former ones, was in the end to bring about the liberation of the duchies.

The proceedings in Denmark and the duchies just described had naturally fanned into fresh flame the oft-suppressed sympathies of the German people for those provinces under the yoke of foreign rule. In order to give active expression to these sympathies, the German people resorted to the same means which up till now had been of so little use to them, namely the press, the union, the chambers, and the individual lands. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, neither the German Confederation nor the estates of the duchies had recognised the London Protocol. And in spite of this apparent similarity of the present relations to the former, the condition of Germany like that of Europe had wholly changed. The oriental and Italian wars and also the exchanges of provinces, which had been the result of these wars, had fundamentally displaced the relations of the powers to one another; a state of reciprocal mistrust had succeeded the concord of the western powers. Under the present complications the jealousy of Prussia and Austria was also to be conducive to the national sympathy of the German people. For in the contest of their respective influences in Germany they had now reached a point on which the support of their efforts by the German nation and its princes might be of the utmost importance, and they must therefore acquire it. But a great difference existed between the two great states as regarded their ability to accomplish this.

BISMARCK AND MILITARY REFORM

Austria was embarrassed by serious constitutional troubles, increased by financial difficulties, whilst Prussia could enter into the combat with the energy of a new flight. At her head stood a new king, who, although in many things he adhered to the ideas of his predecessors, kept nevertheless a keen eye on modern progress. He might have little understanding and still less care for parliamentary affairs; but, on the other hand, from his youth he had grown up with and been intrusted with the army, had often seen its action decisive in state affairs, and therefore wished to develop it so as to be armed for every danger. The organisation of the army undertaken by him brought him into serious collision with the people's representatives, but in Bismarck he found a man who was capable of removing even this obstacle for him. Bismarck, highly gifted by nature, having as envoy to the confederation diet learned to know and despise the action of the small states, having seen the effects of the causes of the Austrian weaknesses and success, and investigated the higher politics of St. Petersburg and Paris, had come to the by no means new conclusion that men are usually ruled without great wisdom, but that a rough hand is generally more successful than a gentle one. This knowledge henceforth increased his efficiency in internal as well as foreign affairs. The plan for the reorganisation of the army, which his royal master clung to with all his heart, he carried through in spite of the representatives of the country, and when he had done this he proceeded to deal with Schleswig-Holstein.

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN WAR OF 1864

The German Confederation, as often remarked, had not acknowledged the settlements of the London Protocol. On the 23rd of December, 1863, a federal army of six thousand Saxons and Hanoverians, under the command of the Saxon general Hake, invaded Holstein, whilst an Austrian and Prussian corps of five thousand men formed the reserve. On the 30th the duke of Augustenburg, summoned by the inhabitants of the duchies, took up his residence at Kiel. As the affair went so smoothly, Bismarck resolved to take another step. He had no difficulty in winning Austria, which had its hands full with its own affairs, over to his opinion. He persuaded the Austrian cabinet to take the lead in the affair by circumventing the confederation conjointly with Russia. On the 11th of January, 1864, the two great powers proposed to the confederation that in case the Danish government did not recall the November constitution Schleswig should be forfeited; to which proposal the confederation assembly could not agree, as it contained an acknowledgment of the London Protocol. Then the two great powers declared they would take the matter into their own hands. The protests, threats, mobilisations of the small states remained without success. On the other hand Austria and Prussia acted with greater decision and force. On the 16th of January they produced their ultimatum, which was the suppression of the constitution in Copenhagen; and on the refusal of the Danish cabinet, the allies, namely, twenty-eight thousand Austrians and forty-three thousand Prussians under the command of the Prussian general Wrangel, invaded Holstein. The attempts at pacification made by Bismarck in the Prussian senate as well as at the confederation diet met with no success either there or amongst the German nation; nevertheless the "first powers," as Austria and Prussia liked to call themselves, were not misled by this: Bismarck closed his refractory diet after the Prussian troops had advanced into Hamburg, Lübeck, and Oldenburg as if they were hostile countries. On the 25th the German standard planted in Kiel had to make way for the Prussian, and on the 1st of February the allies crossed the Eider. The war was successful to the allies. From victory to victory they advanced to Jutland.

English diplomacy had made every effort imaginable to save the London Protocol and the integrity of the Danish state; but the sole price at which Napoleon conjointly with England would venture on the strife, the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, seemed too high, and so it satisfied itself by inviting the subscribers of the protocol to a conference in London. The latter met, for no other purpose than the rupture of the protocol, from which the German powers also detached themselves, and to confirm the overthrow of the Danish state, which at the close of this diplomatic tournament saw itself thrown on its own resources. Under these circumstances Danish bravery could accomplish nothing. Alsen was conquered, as was also Jutland. In days gone by German banners had floated at the northern extremity of this peninsula, which is known in German history by the spear throw of the emperor Otto I. Denmark sought for peace, which was concluded in Vienna on October 30th. By it Denmark ceded Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia. This was a highly dangerous provision; for must not the two possessors naturally enter into dispute over the right of possession, and the object of strife in the end be lost to both?

The danger was imminent, the strife of the two possessors unavoidable; and a fatal issue was prevented only by the persons who stood at the head of the Prussian state. They had already given the whole affair its energetic *dénoûment* and now led to a further happy decision. They arrived at this through their precise knowledge of the position of European affairs, and by

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the hasty doing away with the weakness of this position, which allowed them to obtain their goal without great hindrance. The chief obstacles to be overcome lay in Germany itself and in Austria. Until now Austria had accompanied her old rival in her victorious campaigns, and shared her fame and the advantage gained. But although in peace the trophies of victory were equally promised to both powers, there was so great a difference in the situation of the allies that equality existed in appearance only. Prussia had raised more troops and had the military lead; this important conquest was close to the Prussian frontiers, and was far from the Austrian boundaries: therefore it was natural that Prussia should have taken the lead throughout the adventure, which Austria, occupied by internal dissensions, was by no means in a position to do. If possible Austria must be reduced to still greater dependence. In this success was attained as it had already been attained in the economical sphere.

The negotiations concerning the renewal of the Zollverein had dragged on for more than two years; finally even the Bavarian government saw itself compelled to join the treaty drawn up by Prussia, which on the 12th of October, 1864, was signed by all governments under the Zollverein, whilst Prussia rejected the conditions imposed by Austria and thereby cut off all her chances of a future entry into the Zollverein. The victory of Prussia was complete and well adapted to help her settle the question of the duchies.

Immediately after the peace, when the Austrian troops were slowly withdrawing, Prussia, regardless of the German Confederation and the rights of the duke of Augustenburg, had also taken possession of Holstein. Austria, although the defects in her former policy were now realised, and although in consequence of this Count Rechberg had had to retire, found herself so deeply engaged in the blind alley that it was thought advisable to decide the question in dispute before the confederation assembly in favour of the Prussians. Thus, on the 7th of December, the assembly declared the action at an end, the Hanoverian and Saxon troops retired, the committee of the confederation handed over the province to the Austrians and Prussians, and Prussia now saw herself mistress of the duchies, the possession of which could no longer be seriously threatened by far-off Austria.

There was but one right which could be established, namely, that of the integrity of Germany, which in this instance might be taken as identical with the Prussian. To establish herself in the full possession of this right was henceforth the sole endeavour of Prussia. But Austria resisted. In its note of the 22nd of February, 1865, the Prussian government stated its demands, by the granting of which alone the formation of a new state of Schleswig-Holstein was not to be contemplated as a danger for the interests of Prussia and Germany. These demands were the blending of the Schleswig-Holstein military and naval organisation with the Prussian, the cession of certain provinces, and the concession of some important sovereign rights.

THE CONVENTION OF GASTEIN (1865 A.D.)

But neither Austria, nor the duke of Augustenburg, nor the confederation would grant these requests. Prussia now negotiated all round, but prepared powerful armaments; even Bismarck no longer made it a secret that he desired war. But he first assured himself of the diplomatic position and by a conference with the Bavarian minister, Von der Pfordten, he sought to make the secondary states decide on neutrality in the event of a Prusso-Austrian war—which he did not succeed in doing. Meanwhile the bursting of the storm was once more averted. Austria, occupied with troubles at home, agreed in the Gastein Convention (August 14th) that the rights of both governments in the

duchies should be reserved until a final issue of the affair; but Prussia took over the government of Schleswig, whilst that of Holstein remained to Austria, which on the other hand yielded her rights over Lauenberg to Prussia for two and a half million Danish reichsthalers. The harbour of Kiel as well as the right to garrison Rendsburg were to be handed over to Prussia by Austria. Thus disposed, Prussia prepared herself for the inevitable war.

As the Prussian cabinet had made sure of the Russian and French neutrality, the other powers were scarcely taken into consideration. Nevertheless, Austria was such a formidable adversary that it seemed dangerous to go against her, in spite of her unsettled condition, without allies. These could be found only in the revolution or in Italy. Prussia, in defiance of the secondary states, had just entered into a commercial treaty with that country. The political question had also been discussed between the two cabinets. These negotiations advanced side by side with the armaments, and in the spring of 1866 both were complete. That it might be left undisturbed, on the 23rd of February, 1866, the Prussian government dismissed its diet, which was in favour of the rights of the duchies and the duke. Everything combined to urge on a war in which Bismarck wished to assure himself of another confederate—the German people.

PRUSSIA AT ODDS WITH THE CONFEDERATION

At the outbreak of the Schleswig-Holstein development the adherents of all the German chambers, and those from Austria and Prussia as well as from the small states, had assembled in Frankfort to declare, in the face of the opposing interests of the various German states, that under existing conditions the "right of the Germans to a general representation of the people, a parliament," was no longer admitted. After the Gastein Convention, as the outbreak of intestine war appeared more and more inevitable, the deputies of the democratic party assembled to raise a cry for a "central power and parliament standing above the government." The assembly of deputies of the 1st of October, in which only one member from Austria and eight from Prussia took part, declared itself for the convening of a parliament. Bismarck, who after the Gastein Convention was raised to the rank of count, seized the idea: it would be conducive to the attainment of his object. By cleverly turning it to account he could attain far more than would have been possible by the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question.

He now cast the idea of a federal reform among the people. The circumstance that Austria in her need again clamoured for the rights of the confederation must have strengthened him in his actions. After he had completed his preparations, on the 24th of March, 1866, he directed a circular to the confederate governments in which, referring to the inadequateness of the organisation of the confederation, he threateningly held the fate of Poland before the German people, and as the interests of Germany and Prussia were "already identical by geographical situation," he placed the direct question before the confederate governments as to whether or not Prussia could reckon on their support in a war against Austria. All these governments answered evasively, whilst Bavaria once more sought to mediate. Then Prussia turned to the confederation, and on the 9th of April laid before it a plan of reform, stating that in this the royal government agreed with the nation, and, supported by this agreement, demanded that for the carrying out of the work of reform "an assembly elected from all parts of Germany" should be convoked. The proposal was referred to a committee.

Meanwhile war was becoming more and more imminent, as neither of the opponents would consent to demobilisation. In vain did the people call for

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peace; the die was already cast. Even the attempt at mediation on the part of the European powers was useless. Prussia allowed her troops in Schleswig to invade Holstein, which had been occupied by Austria since the Gastein Convention and whence the troops of the latter power withdrew under protest. On the 11th of June Austria implored the interference of the confederation in the attempted oppression of Prussia, and proposed the mobilisation of the confederation contingent, to which the confederation consented, on the 14th, in spite of the protests of Prussia, by nine votes to six. The Prussian ambassador, declaring this resolution to be a breach of the Act of Confederation, thereupon left the assembly.^f

THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866

King William now declared that he regarded the German Confederation as dissolved, and demanded the formation of a new confederation with a freely elected parliament and with the exclusion of Austria. As in a flash the strife of parties in Prussia came to an end on this 14th of June. As soon as it was understood that there was no evading the struggle for the honour or rather for the very existence of the state, the whole nation was resolved to sustain the contest with unbounded self-devotion. No one concealed from himself the greatness of the threatening danger and the uncertainty of the issue, but Prussia must and should win an honourable victory or succumb.

The superiority with which her adversaries entered into the war seemed overwhelming. Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Saxony, and almost all Germany, as well as the whole of Austria, were opposed to Prussia. It was in vain that King William offered to the rulers in Hanover, Dresden, and Cassel the assurance of the complete integrity of their sovereignty if they would remain neutral. He was met at first by evasive answers, then by decided refusals. The small courts were too deeply penetrated with faith in the eight hundred thousand men which were at the disposal of Austria—on paper.

In Prussia even the most confident hardly ventured to hope that large districts of the state would not be exposed at the beginning of the war to a hostile attack, which, had the Austrians acted in a decided fashion, would have been unavoidable, particularly as regards Silesia. Who can measure the results if the Croats and Pandours had fallen on the Prussians? For, as a melancholy token of the internal dissensions of the Austrian state, the Viennese authorities were compelled to send the German troops to Italy, and to reserve the Italians and Slavs for the struggle with Prussia in order to secure themselves against desertion and insubordination.

It was the greatest piece of good luck for the Prussians and their country that Napoleon III fancied himself to be acting very prudently in standing aloof as a quiet spectator of the coming struggle. Like every one else he cherished the conviction that the opponents were at least equal in strength, and that, therefore, the war would go on till both sides were exhausted. France would then be able to step in between the combatants as peacemaker, and stipulate, still more advantageously than in Italy, for her reward as mediator. Prussia had now to contend only against the Austrian and German armies. But this was a task sufficient to call forth the supreme efforts of all the forces of the state. On either side powerful armies stood completely equipped. Still both hesitated to strike the first blow. The reluctance for a war of Germans against Germans kept the sword in the sheath. But when Austria declared that she would suspend hostilities only on condition that Prussia should renounce any extension of territory—a condition by which the acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein would be prevented and the number of the

minor states dependent on Vienna would be still further increased—then it was no longer possible to think of a peaceful settlement.

The imperial army, under the supreme command of Benedek, stood in a wide semicircle on the upper Elbe. With her army ordered in three great divisions, Prussia marched against the enemy. Prince Frederick Charles commanded the first, the crown prince the second; the army of the Elbe, the third, was under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld. Two lesser divisions under Vogel von Falckenstein were sent forward to central Germany, in order to unite with the troops of Manteuffel which were advancing from Schleswig to the contest with the minor German states. King William had reserved for himself the chief command of the whole enterprise. Moltke was at the head of the general staff.

The king of Saxony had marched with all his troops and his treasure into Bohemia to fight by Austria's side against Prussia. Only at the almost impregnable Königstein the Saxon garrison remained till the conclusion of peace. Thus on the 18th of June, 1866, the army of the Elbe was able to enter Dresden without resistance. There everyone was so firmly convinced of the speedy and complete victory of the Austrians that, as the Prussians marched through, something like pity was bestowed on these hosts, of which certainly not a man would return alive from Bohemia. As more and more regiments appeared and the procession seemed to be absolutely in-



VON ROON
(1803-1879)

terminable, the people of Dresden said: "There cannot be so many soldiers; the troops go round the town and re-enter at the other gate, as they do at the theatre, so that their number may appear double to the eyes of the astonished Saxons."

The Hanoverians did not surrender their country so unresistingly as the Saxons. The blind king, George, in order to effect a junction with the Bavarians at Coburg, sought to lead his troops between General Manteuffel, who was approaching from the north, and Vogel von Falckenstein, who was hastening up from the east. But when the line from Eisenach to Erfurt was occupied by the troops of Prussia and Saxe-Coburg, which barred the way to the Hanoverians, then negotiations for a capitulation were opened. They were not successful and the Hanoverian general Arentschild therefore decided to force his way through. The vanguard of the Manteuffel-Falckenstein army attempted to frustrate this plan. Thus, on the 27th of June, a battle was fought at Langensalza, where the Prussians suffered a defeat from the superior numbers of the enemy. Great valour was displayed on both sides and countless victims fell in this useless fight. Two days later the brave Hanoverians, surrounded by the Prussians and deserted by the Bavarians, had to lay down their arms. Their regiments were disbanded and the country was occupied by Prussian troops. King George escaped to Austria. The elector of Hesse, who would by no means submit to the force of circumstances, was taken prisoner and kept in Stettin till the end of the war.

The occupation of the kingdom of Saxony enabled the Prussians to lead

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their three army corps through the border passes into Bohemia, that they might there oppose the enemy with their full strength before Benedek could execute his intention of advancing through Saxony into Prussian territory. So confident had he been of the victorious result of his plan that whole files of proclamations to be issued to the subjected populations of Silesia and Brandenburg were afterwards found in the possession of the captured officers.

During the last days of June the troops of Prince Frederick Charles, hampered by incessant contests with parties of Austrian and Saxon soldiers, set out by Reichenbach for Münchengrätz and Gitschin, whilst Herwarth advanced through Rumburg and Hühnerwasser in the same direction. The Posen army corps under Steinmetz succeeded, but only after sanguinary contests at Nachod and Skalitz, in throwing back the Austrians on the fortress of Josephstadt.

Meantime Bonin with the East Prussian regiments had reached the little town of Trautenau on the Liebau road, with the intention of crossing the difficult pass at that place. But there he was driven back by a superior division of Gablenz's army, and it was not till the following day, June 28th, that he was able, with the assistance of the guards, to attain his object. To the crown prince's army had been allotted the most difficult task—that of making its way through the mountains between Silesia and Bohemia, which could be effected only after days of extremely toilsome marches.

On the 2nd of July King William, accompanied by the ministers Von Roon and Bismarck and by General Moltke, appeared on the theatre of war to take over the supreme command. That same evening, at eleven o'clock, tidings were received that the whole Austrian army was drawn up before Königgrätz in readiness for the attack. Messengers were immediately despatched to the three sections of the army, with the order to approach one another with all possible speed, in order that the enemy's designs might be anticipated and that the Prussians themselves might make the first attack next morning.



CHARLES I OF WÜRTTEMBERG
(1823-1891)

Battle of Königgrätz or Sadowa (1866 A.D.)

On the 3rd of July the great decisive battle was fought. At eight in the morning the contest began at the heights occupied by the enemy between Sadowa and Königgrätz. Prince Frederick Charles advanced against the centre of the strongly fortified position; but the terrible hail of grape-shot from the Austrian artillery arrested his bold attack. Everything depended on whether the crown prince and his army would arrive in time to fall on the enemy in the rear. The order to attack, despatched the previous evening, had reached the heir apparent only at daybreak. The roads, rendered soft by the heavy rains, delayed his march, so that it was past six before his troops got as

far as the little town of Chlum. This place was taken by storm, and it was not till this had been accomplished that the crown prince was able to give effective support to the Prussians already engaged. As at the same time General von Herwarth hastened up from the other wing, Prince Frederick Charles made a new and powerful attack. After a sanguinary contest which lasted till evening, a brilliant victory was won at every point along the line of battle. The Austrians had to beat a retreat which soon developed into a wild flight. King William in person had placed himself at the head of the pursuers. The battle of Königgrätz, as the victors called it, or Sadowa, under which name it is known abroad, practically brought about a complete decision of this "Seven Days' War," by which the Prussian army was once more proved to be the first military force in Europe.^d

Napoleon's Mediation

The Austrian army was in a state of dire disorganisation; in the Saxon corps alone firm cohesion and good discipline were maintained. The very day after the battle General von Gablenz presented himself at the Prussian headquarters with a flag of truce and applied for an armistice, which the Prussians naturally refused, as no one but Austria could have profited by it. At the same time the emperor Francis Joseph appealed to the emperor Napoleon to intervene on behalf of peace, flattering his vanity by the voluntary cession of Venice to France. Thus Austria gave away her fairest province, the scene of Radetzky's victories, the land at whose river frontier the eagles of the third Napoleon were checked in their flight to the Adriatic, the land for which the blood of Austrian warriors had but lately been shed in victorious fight at Custoza (June 24th)—gave it away in consequence of the victory of Prussia at Königgrätz: and not to Italy, who had striven for its possession in many a passage of arms, but to Napoleon III, to flatter his self-complacency and the vanity of the French, and so secure the aid of France against Prussia. Count Mensdorff built great hopes upon this masterpiece of the traditional policy of the Austrian cabinet; for had not Napoleon III himself a while before proclaimed the "maintenance of the high position of Austria in Germany" to be one of the leading features of his mediation programme, and had not the jealousy of the French nation been strongly excited since then by the success of the Prussian arms? The cession of Venice was extolled in France as a triumph of Napoleonic policy which threw even Sadowa into the shade. Paris was decked with flags and illuminated, all France was jubilant, and Napoleon experienced the proud satisfaction of feeling that he had drawn the eyes of all Europe upon himself—the mediator of peace between two great powers. Fortunately the decision did not rest with the cabinet of the Tuileries but with King William's headquarters, where no one, least of all the king himself, had a doubt that the war which had been victoriously waged so far must be fought out to its ultimate issues, and concluded only by a peace which should answer to Prussia's success in the field and fully satisfy her claims in the German question.

On the 5th of July King William replied to Napoleon's telegram, declaring that he was ready to accept the French emperor's mediation, "but that before the conclusion of the armistice he must obtain the consent of his Italian allies and settle the fundamental conditions of peace negotiations." The Prussian ambassador at Paris received instructions more fully to acquaint the emperor with these conditions, giving the first place to the exclusion of Austria from the new Germany that was to be organised under the hegemony of Prussia.

Diplomacy and military tactics went hand in hand. While Count

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Bismarck, the Prussian minister-president, was frustrating by his moderate and steadfast bearing all the intrigues of the French ambassador, Benedetti, who dogged the king's footsteps from headquarters to headquarters and endeavoured to arrest the triumphal march of the Prussian armies by perpetually urging the conclusion of a truce, these armies advanced from the interior of Bohemia and along the course of the Main from Thuringia, and with unfaltering steps drew daily nearer to their goal.

After collecting the army of the Main at Eisenach, General Vogel von Falckenstein had before him the twofold task of driving back the forces of the 8th confederation corps (*Bundescorps*) under Prince Alexander of Hesse, which had started from Frankfort in the direction of Fulda, and on the other hand preventing their junction with the Bavarians, who were marching against him from the neighbourhood of Meiningen. Consequently we see him turning his arms first against one adversary and then against the other in a series of engagements, according as one or other was the more troublesome to him at the moment.^g

The Battle of Kissingen

On the 10th of July General Beyer's division of Falckenstein's army defeated the Bavarians in a sharp fight at Hammelburg, and on the same day a second not less important victory over the Bavarian corps took place at the celebrated bathing resort of Kissingen. Visitors to the baths and residents were thrown into considerable excitement, for fleeing inhabitants of Albertshausen had brought news that the Prussians were advancing; nevertheless people would not believe it, hoping that Prussia and Austria had come to an understanding which had rendered the bathing resort neutral ground, although Kissingen was garrisoned on the Bavarian side. On the 9th of July, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, people became aware that the Prussians were almost upon them; and a couple of hours later the Bavarians, about twenty thousand strong, were concentrated in and about the town, in position and ready for battle.

The Bavarians hurriedly made such preparations as were absolutely necessary. The wooden bridge over the Saale at the Schweizerhaus, the iron one behind the arcades, as well as the one above the Linden Mill were broken down; the beams supporting this last were, however, left, and it was by them that the Prussians subsequently effected their first crossing of the Saale. The stone bridge was barricaded as strongly as was possible in such haste, and two twelve-pounders were planted on the hither bank of the river. Kissingen itself was garrisoned by four Bavarian battalions.

To meet these troops advanced Prussian divisions. The Bavarians had taken up an excellent position; but guns were not placed on the Dark Mountain, strategically so important. A battery there would have made the Altenberg an untenable position for the Prussians, and entirely prevented them from crossing the Saale at that point. Lieutenant-General von Zoller took the command. Quite early on the 10th of July Prussian hussars showed themselves, and the strife soon began. Meanwhile there commenced an independent battle near Friedrichshall just above Kissingen. When the brigade under Major-General von Wrangel approached Kissingen they received orders to take the Altenberg and, if possible, outflank the enemy's right wing. The neighbourhood of Garitz was immediately reconnoitred.

Three companies under Captain von dem Bursche crossed the road between two villas and covered over the supports of the former bridge with tables and benches, having by half-past eleven with great labour so far succeeded that people could cross over one by one. These companies soon reached a small wood to the southeast of Kissingen; arrived there they formed a column and

so, accompanied by compact skirmishing parties, they advanced on Kissingen. These troops were followed over this imperfect bridge by others, so that two and a half out of the battalions from the south pressed on towards Kissingen and were soon sharply engaged on the road. Companies and two battalions were thus led along the right bank of the Saale, by the road, to the main bridge at Kissingen. Grapeshot and rifle-fire caused the Prussians much loss; but they nevertheless pressed onwards without a pause. The Bavarian army ought to have taken at least one hundred and thirty-six guns into the engagement; but the one hundred and nineteen cannon were "in Kornäckern, on the Trimbürg (between Kissingen and Hammelburg on the Frankish Saale) and in Feuerthal, near Poppenhausen, and elsewhere." The brave officers of artillery, listening for hours to the firing and not allowed to advance, were almost in despair.

The crossing of the Saale by the Prussians decided the day. They now seized the Dark Mountain and the Botenlaube, a hill crowned by the ruins of an ancient castle of that name; they then marched in great force with loud hurrahs into the town itself. The riflemen of the Bavarian rifle-battalion made a gallant defence here also; but it was as unsuccessful as former attempts. It is certain that a very bitter feeling underlay this battle of Kissingen, and people were sacrificed to it in considerable numbers. In the afternoon at half-past three the town was captured, and the Prussians marched into it with bands playing. Towards five o'clock a contingent of Bavarians returned to the neighbourhood of the Catholic church; but they were put to rout by a division of Manteuffel's corps, after which, at ten o'clock that night, the Prussians became masters of every position in the town.^b

On July 13th Göben's division defeated the troops of the confederation at Laufach. A second victory over them was obtained at Aschaffenburg (July 14th), and after ten days of battle and victory General Vogel von Falckenstein arrived on the 15th of July at the gates of the ancient imperial city on the Main. The diplomatists of the rump diet at Frankfort packed up their state papers in hot haste, and fled to Augsburg under the protection of the "Three Moors," and Frankfort mothers sang:

*Schlaf, Bübchen, schlaf,
Bleib immer fromm und brav,
Sonst kommt der Vogel von Falkenstein
Und steckt dich in den Sack hinein,
Der Bismarck kommt dahinter
Und frisst die grossen Kinder.¹*

On the 16th of July Falckenstein made his entry into Frankfort, dissolved the diet of the free city of the empire, as it had been up to that time, took over the government in the name of the king of Prussia, and at the same time imposed a war indemnity of 6,000,000 gulden on the wealthy city as a punishment for its hostile attitude towards Prussia.

The Prussians Approach Vienna

In the Austrian theatre of war the Prussian army marched within fifteen days from the battle-field of Königgrätz to the gates of the imperial city, winning victories as it went—at Tobitschau and Rokeinitz (July 16th)—and on the 20th of July stood ranged along the margin of the valley wherein lies the famous "Marchfeld" (plain of the March), where long ago King Rudolf laid

¹[Sleep, laddie, sleep, be good and gentle ever, or Vogel von Falckenstein will come and pop you into his sack, and Bismarck will come behind him to eat the big children up.]

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the foundation of the dynastic power of the Austrian Habsburgs by his victory over Ottocar, king of Bohemia, and where so much valiant Austrian blood had been shed in the wars of the first Napoleon.

On the 16th of July the advanced guard of the first army occupied Lundenburg, where the railway from Olmütz joins that from Brünn to Vienna. This obliged Benedek to turn aside with the main army on the left bank of the March and to retreat through the Lesser Carpathians so as to reach Vienna by way of Pressburg. Prince Frederick Charles detached a corps under General von Fransecky to reinforce the troops on the farther side of the Main, so as to enable them to take Pressburg and cut the Austrian main army off from Vienna. The result was a fierce engagement at Blumenau near Pressburg on the 22nd of July. General von Fransecky did not try to do more than keep the enemy's front in the extraordinarily strong position where he found it posted, while he sent a brigade under General von Bose over a pathless spur of the Carpathians to turn their flank and take them in the rear.

This movement would have decided the victory had not General von Fransecky received the intimation that an armistice had been concluded at Nikolsburg the evening before, to come into effect at midday on the 22nd of July. The struggle had come to an end. Both France and Austria had good reason for expediting the conclusion of the armistice, for in a few days the die might have been cast before the walls of Vienna and the imperial city compelled to open her gates to a conqueror. The pride of the Habsburgs was prepared to pay any price to avert the disgrace of seeing the banners of the Hohenzollern king borne up to the Hofburg. In a happy hour for Austria the armistice interrupted the operations the Prussians were in the act of undertaking, which operations must infallibly have resulted in the fall of the capital.

PEACE AND THE RETURN OF THE VICTORS (1866 A.D.)

The preliminaries of peace were to be settled within the space of five days. The Prussian government was satisfied with demanding such conditions as would insure the national development of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia. What it desired was not to humiliate a fallen foe, but to bring about a lasting peace and to avert the danger of foreign intervention by concluding it quickly. The principal points in the preliminary proposals of peace, which were accepted by both parties on the 25th of July, were as follows: The maintenance of the Austrian Empire in its present extent (with the exception of Venice), on condition of Austria's retirement from Germany; the formation of a closer north German confederation of all states north of the Main, under the hegemony of Prussia; the right of the south German states to form an independent national confederation among themselves; the union of the Elbe duchies with Prussia, and the recognition by Austria of the annexations which Prussia purposed to make in north Germany (Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort-on-the-Main); and lastly, a subsidy to be paid by Austria towards the cost of the war.

Even before peace had been definitely concluded with Austria at Prague on the basis of these preliminary proposals (August 23rd), the south German states had opened negotiations with Prussia, and peace was concluded with Würtemberg on the 13th of August, with Baden on the 17th, and with Bavaria on the 22nd. In these negotiations Prussia observed the same principle of action, treating her conquered foes with consideration and clemency, and imposing no humiliating conditions which would prove a bar to future reconciliation. While the negotiations with Bavaria were pending, Count Bismarck pointed out to the south German plenipotentiaries that it would be easier to come to an understanding and would afford a surer guarantee for the main-

tenance of the sovereign prerogatives and territorial rights of their governments, if these states were for the future to pursue a national German policy in concert with Prussia rather than place their crowns and dominions under the protection of foreign powers. These hints gave the first impulse to the formation of the offensive and defensive alliances which were soon after concluded between Prussia and the south German states. If Napoleon, by the stress he laid upon the Main frontier in his mediatory proposals, had aimed at maintaining the division of Germany into Prussian and non-Prussian elements and had hoped to make French influence predominant in the latter, then we may say that these offensive and defensive alliances built the first arch of the bridge that was to span the Main frontier, and were the first step towards the union of the whole of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia.

The peace with Hesse-Darmstadt followed next in order (September 3rd), on condition of the accession of the province of Upper Hesse to the north German league that was to be formed, the grand duke having previously ceded the landgrafschaft of Hesse-Homburg, which he had inherited from his father shortly before the war. The negotiations with Saxony were more protracted, as Napoleon made a fresh attempt to intermeddle in German affairs while they were pending. Peace was not finally concluded until the 21st of October. Prussia renounced her original intention of annexing Saxony, stipulating, however, that the latter country should join the North German Confederation and make certain concessions—such as delegating its diplomatic representation in foreign countries to Prussia and handing over to her the management of its postal and telegraphic system.

No peace was concluded with Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort-on-the-Main; these districts were permanently incorporated with the Prussian monarchy by a royal message of the 17th of August, on the grounds of the right of war and conquest and “to protect the hereditary dominions from the recurrence of danger, and to give a broader and firmer basis to the national remodelling of Germany”—as were also Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse-Homburg, and the small districts ceded to Prussia by Hesse-Darmstadt and Bavaria to complete her frontier. King William started on the return journey to Berlin soon after the ratification of the preliminaries of peace with Austria, and towards eleven in the morning of the 4th of August the royal train, drawn by two engines wreathed with garlands, drew up in the decorated station there, amidst indescribable popular rejoicings.

The entrance of the victorious army into the capital (September 20th and 21st) grew into a festival of the whole nation to celebrate the conclusion of peace. The king himself welcomed the troops in the square in front of the Brandenburg gate (now known as the “Königsplatz”), and then took his place at the head of the procession. Before him rode Count Bismarck, Von Roon, and Von Moltke, together with the chiefs of the staff of the first and second armies, Von Voigts-Rhetz and Von Blumenthal. In front of them a triumphal path between the double row of two hundred and eight cannon taken on the field of battle stretched from the entrance of the “Linden” to the monument of Frederick the Great. Under the Brandenburg gate, above which victory has stood sentinel for more than half a century, the king was welcomed by Provost (Oberbürgermeister) Seidel, and by maidens who strewed his way with flowers, while their spokeswoman addressed him in the lines:

*Willkommen, König! Deine Metropole
Grüsst jubelnd Dich und Deine Heldenschar,
Durchflog Borussia doch beschwingter Sohle
In sieben Tagen Friedrich's "sieben Jahr."*

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
*Nun reicht herab von ihrem Kapitele
 Victoria den vollen Kranz Dir dar,
 Gott war mit Dir, und Gott wird mit Dir gehen
 Bis über Lorbeerhainen Palmen wehen.¹*

It is interesting, in the light of subsequent events, to read the words in which the great Prussian historian Treitschke, writing while the issue was scarcely determined, tersely reviewed the situation and attempted to forecast the future.^a

"The German constitution that will result from this war," he says, "hardly promises to endure for more than a generation. It will be dubbed a 'federal state' because German liberalism has become enamoured of the title, and erudite professors will expound to curious audiences the theory of the federal state of Germany, just as their predecessors sagely discoursed upon the monarchical constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. But to the serious politician it must be evident that what will emerge from this conflict will be a Prussia stronger than before, combined with vassal states more or less dependent. Such a state of things bears no guarantee of permanence in itself. It is problematical whether a German and a Prussian parliament can long continue to exist side by side, and how the petty thrones will hold their ground against the slowly maturing political insight and energy of the nation. But the realisation of the fact that the present crisis has not carried us to the end of the German revolution need not overcast our joy at the blessings of the last few weeks. Our emancipation from the foreign yoke of Austria has cleared the way for the growth of national political life. And even should the achievement of the complete unity of our country be reserved for our sons, yet we who have lived through the War of Independence on the plains of Bohemia have good reason to bless our fate; we know now for what we were born."ⁱ

¹ Welcome, O King! We of thy city greet
 Thee and the band of heroes, thy compeers.
 Hath not Borussia sped with winged feet
 In seven days through Frederick's "seven years"?
 Lo! Victory stoopeth from her lofty seat
 To crown thee with the laurel wreath she bears.
 God was with thee, and with thee God will go
 Till palms shall wave where now the laurels grow.





CHAPTER XI

THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

[1866-1871 A.D.]

The unity of the greater part of Germany has been secured, and, by a pardonable confusion of ideas, the Imperial title has been assumed by the chief of the united nation. I need not show that such a title is in strictness inaccurate, but it would be hard to find a title more appropriate than that of Emperor for the head of a confederation of kings and other princes. The new German Empire is a fair revival of the old German Kingdom, but it must be borne in mind that it is in no sense a revival of the Holy Roman Empire. That has passed away forever.

—FREEMAN.^b

AFTER the preliminaries of peace had once been concluded between Prussia and Austria, the two principal adversaries, it was but a matter of course that the other combatants should also be obliged to make peace with Prussia. Representatives from the central states hurried to Berlin, which King William, acclaimed by a patriotic, excited crowd, reached on August 4th. The settlements with Würtemberg and Baden were reached with the least difficulty, but even the difficulties in the way of peace with Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt, which had arisen out of the attitude of Napoleon and the attempted interference of Russia, were removed by the loyal attitude of Prussia. Peace was concluded with Würtemberg on August 13th, with Baden on the 17th, with Bavaria on the 22nd, with Hesse on September 3rd, and finally with Saxony on October 21st. Bavaria, especially, was entirely won over by Bismarck's communication concerning the intentions of France with regard to the Rhenish Palatinate. The hindrances raised by Italy, in spite of another reverse experienced at the hands of Tegetthoff on the sea near Lissa, were finally disposed of, and peace was arranged on October 3rd between Austria and Italy.

THE RECONCILIATION OF GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE

Königgrätz had also exercised an influence on the internal affairs of Prussia. The scales then fell from the eyes of the majority of the liberals. They saw that the way to German unity had been opened, that when King William had ground and sharpened the Prussian sword, he had had in view the wel-

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fare of the fatherland, and the fact that this action, and this action alone, could pave the way for it. On August 5th the king inaugurated the newly convened diet with an address from the throne.

Anxious silence reigned in the chamber. The question uppermost in men's minds was what use the king would make of his matchless position after those unexampled successes. Would the constitutional struggle be continued at home, would the budget be still further postponed? And even if many in their hearts were ready to make peace, what prospect was there of gaining this without a complete and humiliating submission? Then the unexpected occurred. The speech from the throne recognised in a few simple sentences that the supplies granted for state expenditure during the past four years lacked the only legal authorisation which finances can receive, as has been repeatedly acknowledged, by an annual legislative agreement between the government and the representatives of the nation. This was not by any means a confession of guilt, as has been wrongly judged, because of the apprehensions of a few ministers, but an invitation to legalise the procedure of the government by subsequent confirmation. The king had been obliged to act as he had done—so he declared to the delegates when the address was delivered, and he would act in the same way again should a similar condition of affairs present itself. “Yet, gentlemen,” he added confidently, “this will not occur again.” But by pleading for justification under such circumstances and in such a magnanimous way, the king brought about internal peace.

To bring about a reconciliation between government and people, to restore complete harmony between them, was an easy task while the national spirit was thus buoyed up, and therefore it was, as the more enlightened among the liberals, Count Schwerin, Twesten, and many others, recognised, of the utmost necessity. At last the ministers of the king had regained the confidence of the nation, which became convinced that the king's aim was to establish the power of Prussia and the unity of Germany. The statesmanlike liberals separated themselves from the progressist party and formed the national liberal party. The thought which had lain dormant for years was now at last understood—that no amount of enthusiasm can fulfil an ideal if the only practical means for accomplishing it is scorned. The nation became finally convinced that the government was enthusiastically bent on furthering the power and greatness of the whole fatherland, but that the government alone had found the means of bringing this to pass—by the strength of the Prussian sword. And yet many difficulties remained to be overcome, and the progressist party—which knew of a better means for forging German unity than Bismarck, namely, the way of freedom—refused to pass the bill of indemnity. But this was immaterial, and the bill was passed by a majority of two hundred and thirty.

A few difficulties were also experienced in passing the bill for the new extensions of territory, which at last were to bring about the cohesion of the Prussian territory and to protect the state from a recurrence of the drawback of having to fight a foe in its rear. But on September 7th this bill also was passed with a minority of only fourteen—that is to say, therefore, with the consent of the majority of the progressist party. At last after an incredible number of formalities a grant of 60,000,000 thalers was voted to the state, which had conducted a mighty war that shook the world to its very foundations without imposing fresh taxes or raising a loan, in order to provide for the army equipment, the demobilisation, and to enable the nation to be ready again for mobilisation at any moment—a necessary measure on account of the strained relations between Austria and Italy. The far-reaching activity displayed by Queen Augusta in caring for the wounded will long be remembered. In its further and sublime development it created a wide field for Christian

charity, and also, as her husband later pointed out in her praise, it greatly furthered the unity of the German races.

As the war had been waged for the unity of Germany, King William lost no time in placing before the north German states, on August 4th, the draft for a treaty of confederation. By August 18th it had been signed by most of the states, and before October all the states north of the Main had joined it. This inter-state confederation, however, had yet to be converted into an enduring constitutional federal state, in opposition to the unstable league of states formed by the Vienna congress. The governments deliberated among themselves and drafted a scheme for the constitution, and in August a franchise bill, on the broad democratic lines of universal suffrage, was presented before the Prussian diet, according to which a north German parliament was to be elected for the purpose of adopting the constitution. But distrust of Bismarck was so ineradicable in the ranks of the Prussian progressists that here also they suspected bad motives, and passed the bill only under the proviso that the new imperial diet (*Reichstag*) should be convened solely for deliberation upon the new constitution. On February 24th King William opened the imperial diet, and although the latter eventually made many individual alterations in the constitution, the governments declared on April 17th their agreement thereto, and after the diets of the individual states had signified their approval the federal constitution was made public on June 24th, and on July 1st, 1867, the North German Confederation came into being.

GERMAN UNITY IS AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT

It had come to pass at last: the German peoples were united in a real constitutional union—had, in fact, become a nation. And the transgressions of centuries against the good genius of Germany were wiped out by the devoted labour of the Prussian rulers. The work was even grander, because more true to life, than the men of the Paulskirche had ever dreamed. The German princes had in no way become vassals of the crown of Prussia, but the government of the confederation was intrusted to the king of Prussia as its president; the part taken by the people in the government was based, it is true, on purely democratic principles, but their lawful sphere of action was clearly defined and led into proper channels, thus preventing degeneration into a democratic government, but rather effectually protecting the constitutional power of the crown. Now, after a period of a thousand years, King William had attained, through the storm and stress of battle, that which torrents of blood and arduous thought had failed to accomplish. German unity was now an accomplished fact, a reality. The problem for whose solution the noblest and best in the land had laboured, that of combining the rights of the princes with complete imperial power, of re-establishing the ancient German right of the nation to participate in the government under such involved circumstances, and without imperilling the power of the whole by the flood of revolutionary and republican notions which had overflowed from France—this problem had been solved by King William, with the advice of his champion, Count Bismarck. The solution had been successful, however, there is no possible doubt, chiefly thanks to the solicitude and faithfulness with which the king had combated all the hostility directed against his military regulations.

For that was the strange part of it. Ostensibly the union of Germany was only for the north, but in reality it involved the whole realm. Austria had, indeed, assented to the reorganisation of Germany only on the northern side of the Main, and had reserved for the south German states the privilege of forming themselves into a separate confederation, a privilege that France had warmly espoused. During the peace negotiations, however, the represen-

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tatives of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and more particularly of Baden, displayed not the slightest inclination for such a union, which would only have deprived each state of part of its sovereignty, without any guarantee whatever of greater protection against foreign aggression, and motions were brought forward in the parliaments of Baden and Bavaria for immediately joining the North German Confederation. In fact, the Zollverein, which had already been recognised in the peace negotiations, was replaced on July 8th, 1867, by a new Zollverein, which bore the impress of a constitutional confederacy instead of the international character which had distinguished it before. For the purpose of the new Zollverein, mandatories from the south German states, on the one hand, assembled with the north German federal diet, for a customs diet, and on the other hand, freely elected representatives assembled with the imperial diet for a customs parliament. It was still more significant that, simultaneously with the conclusion of peace, offensive and defensive alliances were signed between Prussia and the southern states, in which the states agreed not only to afford one another mutual assistance in time of war, but that the southern troops should be placed under the supreme command of the king of Prussia.

FRENCH CLAIMS

The economic as well as the political union was thus established, in so far as it concerned foreign countries. The attempts on the part of Russia to interfere and to deliberate on the new organisation of Germany in a European congress were soon disposed of. Yet the more far-seeing statesmen knew and the nation felt that this magnificent result would be anything but agreeable to foreign countries—to France in particular; and it was just this circumstance which had led to the offensive and defensive alliances. How, indeed, could France have recognised the right of Germany to decide her fate for herself? On the contrary, at the beginning of August, Napoleon's ambassador, Benedetti, had again formulated the well-known desires of France, already intimated at Nikolsburg, to receive compensation for Germany's increased power in the shape of all the lands of Darmstadt to the left of the Rhine, inclusive of Mainz and the Rhenish Palatinate.

But Bismarck had no intention of giving up an inch of German soil to France, nor would King William ever have given his consent to such a proposition. Bismarck had used the full weight of his overwhelming personality to rebuff the ambassador. Peace would be concluded at once with Austria, he said; eight hundred thousand men would cross the Rhine, to whom the unprepared French army could offer no resistance; Alsace would again be taken from France; all the revolutionary forces in Germany would be unchained; and the German dynasties could afford it, for they were more firmly established than that of Napoleon. Then the emperor, who had given his consent to such a proposal unwillingly and grudgingly, withdrew it immediately. But soon afterwards he renewed the proposal, insisting on the boundary limitations of 1814 as far as Landau and the upper Saar; if necessary, Prussia should conquer Belgium for him. But this was declined at Berlin "in dilatory form," on the ground that it would lead to England's interference, which had fortunately been avoided so far. But who could have thought that German unity, founded in a struggle with Austria, could be maintained, if the German sword had not held in check the passionate lust for conquest which was burning fiercely on the banks of the Seine! The emperor might personally wish to avoid the struggle, on account of his ill health. But Thiers had announced to the whole world in unequivocal terms, in his impassioned speech before the war, that France would never agree to the unity of Germany, for the dismemberment of Germany was the fundamental

condition required by the French ascendancy in Europe. The frantic applause with which the whole of France greeted these hostile expressions showed what Germany had to expect from the country which was even then priding itself on being the champion of the independence of all nations.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNAL HARMONY

From the borders of the sea to the Main Germany was united, and Prussia, reaching forth across the Main, had also grasped the southern states and had bound them by means of a firm national bond of defensive alliance and customs-union to the great fatherland; the openly expressed sentiments of the monarchs and cabinets of Munich, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe formed a guarantee of the durability of this union. The community of the economic interests with the south German confederates and the powerful defence of all the best aspects of national life were assured, as the king had declared. But it was quite natural that the old hatred of Prussia should not yet have quite died out among the people and the ultramontanes of Bavaria—"patriots" they called themselves—and the "people's party" in Würtemberg did their best to fan it into flame again. There was still wanting, in order to consolidate the union of the governments and the commercial unity, that most important cement for a complete national union between those who had only recently crossed swords—the brotherhood in arms, the bond of blood shed in common defence of the fatherland, which the struggle for freedom between north and south had unfortunately not yielded. The constitutional struggle had been so violent in Prussia that its waves would not calm down, and the spirit of opposition still showed itself in the chamber of deputies, as well as in the north German parliament.

The most important claim which the radical parties could make, that of universal suffrage, had been supported in the German parliament by Bismarck himself, and the king had, with the fullest confidence, given his assent thereto. The progressist party, however, refused to reciprocate the confidence of the king, and considered it advantageous to oppose all bills presented by the government; and the deputy Virchow did not even shrink from presenting a motion on October 29th, 1869, for bringing about disarmament, thus absolutely setting at naught the fundamental conditions of political existence. This proposal was supported by Windthorst, the former minister of justice for Hanover, who made no secret of his Guelf tendencies, but who at the same time threw the whole weight of his great talents on the side of the Catholic faction, as yet only moderately represented; thus began the first skirmish in the interests of the Catholic church, although the latter enjoyed the fullest and most comprehensive liberty. At that time he was yet excelled by his partisan, the noble-minded Peter Reichensperger, who was at one with him in anger against the Prussian government, for he could not endure the exclusion of Austria from the confederation. Religious as well as national grievances united the Polish delegates with these opposition parties, and nothing could more clearly have defined their attitude than the fact that they abstained from voting on the federal constitution, because it was a German question. Finally, seven social democrats joined this group; for since about 1862 Ferdinand Lassalle and his pupil Von Schweitzer had won the favour of the masses by their exposition of the "iron law of wages," and Marx even surpassed them when in London in 1864 he founded the International Workingmen's Association, and won over to his teachings two such powerful agitators as Liebknecht and Bebel in Germany.

The national liberal party, in its turn, adhered firmly to its liberal principles and made the fulfilment of its duty by no means an easy task to the

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government, for as the conservatives commanded only the smaller half of the majority, the government was dependent on the support of this party for the realisation of its national aims. But this party made it its sincere endeavour to help in the establishment of German unity, and had recognised that the chancellor of the North German Confederation, as the office of Count von Bismarck was now called, had this aim in view. The confidence which they and the majority of the Right, especially the free-conservative party, reposed in the powerful Iron Chancellor, and also the readiness of the government and of these parties to make sacrifices for the sake of the Germanic idea, brought it about that, in the great questions of national life, "the unity of the German people" was sought in accordance with the actual circumstances, that the attainable was not again sacrificed to the desirable, and that their tasks were accomplished "by bringing into substantial accord the government and the representatives of the people."

After the first imperial diet had passed a so-called iron war budget until the end of 1871, and had thus defined the strength of the army in time of peace, the north German federal army was entirely reorganised according to the Prussian system by the indefatigable solicitude of the king. The extension of the navy and of the coast defences was assured by means of a loan. For now Prussia also possessed the shores of the North Sea, and what the central states had never been able to bring about for the fatherland was now accomplished by union. The fleet, which Prussia brought to the empire and the opening of Wilhelmshaven, on June 17th, 1868, were in very truth the "morning gift," as Von Roon, the minister of war, now raised to the rank of first lord of the admiralty, expressed it, which Prussia presented to the young empire for its defence and for the furtherance of its commercial interests. Of fundamental importance to trade was the postal administration, which may be said to have had its share in furthering German unity. After the settlement of the rights that still remained in the possession of the princes of Thurn and Taxis in certain districts, and after the introduction of the uniform groschen postage and of post cards, the postal service, under the able postmaster-general, Von Stephen, attained proportions undreamed of, in spite of the ever-increasing network of railways, or rather because of this.

It is, however, the penal code of laws which claims the first place, according to the king's opinion, among the important laws, and which was passed by the imperial diet on May 15th, 1870, after a violent debate aroused chiefly by the question of retaining or abolishing capital punishment. The great work of a national uniform jurisprudence was thereby substantially furthered. An impulse towards freedom of expansion was given to the life of the middle classes by the new industrial regulations, by freedom of domiciliation, by the abrogation of the police regulations concerning marriage contracts, by the removal of the manifold income taxes, by the regulation of naturalisation and of citizenship in confederation and state; and this freedom was protected and preserved in foreign states by means of the common representation of the confederation by consulates, embassies, and especially by means of the federal flag. The Prussian finances were subjected by Camphausen, the minister of finance appointed in October, 1869, to a thorough revision. Although there existed so much antipathy and aversion to Prussia in the new provinces, and more especially in Hanover, it is undeniable that the majority of the inhabitants rallied round the Prussian banner. The introduction of the Prussian organisation, such as local and provincial government, and the abundant sources of economic interests opened out by the extension of the state territory, all helped to make the transition easier for the new Prussians. The king's personality was also a most potent factor in winning all hearts, even the most antagonistic. The king became the real embodiment of the national pride.

THE LUXEMBURG QUESTION

As early as 1867 Napoleon, convinced that the court of Berlin would not yield him any German territory, endeavoured to take advantage of the singular position of the grand duchy of Luxemburg, in order to allay the irritation of France against Germany. Every day the desire was expressed in France in ever louder and clearer tones to take part in the reconstruction of the map of Europe, to annihilate Prussian supremacy, and to chastise those "*maudits Prussiens*" for Königgrätz.^c

On March 19th, 1867, the *Preussische Staatsanzeiger* (*Prussian Political Advertiser*) printed the full text of the three defensive and offensive alliances [with Württemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, dated the 13th, 17th, and 22nd of August, 1866], which had up to that time been kept secret, and the provincial correspondent added the following remarks in reference to the expressions Count Bismarck had recently let fall in the north German diet: "Now that the reasons for the temporary secrecy observed about these treaties have passed away, all German hearts will draw from the terms of the alliance now before them the joyful assurance that any apprehension that Germany may present a disunited and divided front to other nations has no substantial basis in fact; but that the Prussian government, though adopting the Main as the frontier of the North German Confederation, cherished the earnest desire of renewing by special treaties the national bond with south Germany which had been stipulated for in the peace with Austria. We can now clearly see that in the treaties with the states of south Germany our government was actuated by the wish to substitute a bond of sincere and cordial friendship and alliance for previous dissensions. The military union of the south German states, by which the army system of south Germany is brought into practical conformity with that of Prussia and the North German Confederation, must be regarded as a direct consequence of the treaties of alliance according to which, in case of war, the king of Prussia assumes supreme command over the troops of his south German allies. Hence we have full security that the line of the Main, which marks the frontier of the North German Confederation, will be no dividing line of national unity, but that, on the contrary, the strength of the nation as a whole will henceforth rest on a firmer foundation than before. In this strength of the nation Germany and Europe will find the best and surest basis and guarantee of lasting peace."

Which meant briefly: the German question no longer exists, nor the Main frontier, nor any distinction between the confederations of north and south Germany. These names were empty words which did not answer to the facts of the case, as was decided before ever the words received official confirmation. By the secret treaties of Berlin, dated the 13th, 17th, and 22nd of August respectively, it was settled that what was written at Prague on August 23rd concerning the national independence of a southern confederation should never come into being, but remain a dead letter signifying nothing.

Dutch Negotiations

The disclosure produced a great effect. The slender remnant of prestige which imperial diplomacy had still to lose was forfeited when this last and worst strategic defeat came to light. What reliance could be placed upon the assurance in which this cabinet indulged of its knowledge concerning the intentions of the Prussian court, if such a trick could be played upon it? The king of Holland put this question to himself and urged Baudin with greater insistence than ever to come to that very understanding with Prussia which

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the government of Paris was anxious, for excellent reasons, to avoid. On March 22nd Baudin telegraphed: "The king, unfortunately, has made up his mind; he wishes to have the cession of Luxemburg regulated by the signatories of the treaty of 1839. I answer that there can be no thought of it, and intimate your refusal beforehand. They are all the more eager for the assent of Prussia, because the fear of war and of Herr von Bismarck has been revived by the publication of the treaty with Bavaria."

The minister, De Moustier, endeavoured to soothe the king's alarm; he promised to speak out at Berlin if the king expressly desired it, but he would gladly be excused from doing so. It was Count Bismarck's wish to seem to act under compulsion, and to have the cession come upon him as a *fait accompli*. The king of Holland, however, insisted on the preliminary condition that no decision should be taken without Prussia's knowledge, and proceeded to act accordingly, for in the first place he started the subject in conversation with the Prussian ambassador Perponcher, and in the second he empowered Herr von Bylandt, his own ambassador at Berlin, to enter into negotiation with Count Bismarck.

According to the communication which Count Bismarck made to the diet on April 1st, the king of Holland had inquired how the Prussian government would take it if his majesty of the Netherlands were to resign the sovereignty of the grand duchy of Luxemburg. And according to the same authority the answer which Count Perponcher was instructed to make ran as follows: at the present time his majesty's government and their confederates had no call to express their opinion on the question, and must leave to his majesty of the Netherlands the responsibility for his own actions. At the same time, if it were necessary for his majesty's government to express their opinion, they would do nothing before they had assured themselves how the question was regarded by their German allies, the signatories of the treaties of 1839, and by public opinion in Germany, which last possessed a suitable exponent in the diet of the North German Confederation. The Dutch government had at the same time made a proffer, through Herr von Bylandt, its ambassador at Berlin, of its good offices in the negotiations which it believed to be pending between Prussia and France on the Luxemburg question. To this the answer was that no such negotiations had taken place, and that they were consequently unable to avail themselves of the said good offices.

The king of Holland took this reply as an encouragement to complete the sale of Luxemburg; and having received warnings simultaneously from Berlin and Paris that the language of the Prussian press on the subject was becoming so hostile and menacing that if he did not speedily strike a bargain the whole affair would come to nothing, he took his resolution and had the following telegram despatched to Paris on March 28th: "The prince of Orange is authorised to inform the emperor that the king, desirous of doing him pleasure, consents to the cession and begs his majesty to confer with Prussia." By the 30th of March all difficulties were adjusted and the king was won over. On the same day the emperor gave audience to the prince of Orange, who was the bearer of his father's consent. The price was fixed, part of the purchase-money assigned; for all else the king counted confidently upon the emperor. Baudin, summoned by telegram, arrived in Paris on the morning of March 31st, and started back to the Hague that same evening, primed with verbal messages and provided with a letter from the emperor, informing the king that he would take the entire responsibility for the understanding with Prussia, and requesting his signature by return. Moustier telegraphed to Benedetti: "So we have reached the moment of decision at last; take every possible precaution—the emperor looks upon the whole question as settled, and thinks retreat in any direction impossible."

Growing Excitement in Berlin

In Berlin, however, an ominous change had taken place, of which the minister was advised, on the evening of the 31st of March, by four consecutive telegrams from Count Benedetti. The first was delivered at five o'clock in the evening, and informed him that Count Bismarck, wrought upon by the general excitement and the news that the liberal party were going to interrogate him next day on the subject of Luxemburg, declared it essential that the settlement should be deferred. Benedetti had answered that at the stage to which matters had advanced it would be easier for the king's government to assent to the cession of Luxemburg than for the emperor's to renounce it. Bismarck had earnestly deplored the communication which the king of the Netherlands had addressed to King William, since it rendered it impossible for him now to give the assurance that Prussia had had no opportunity of opposing the cession. He also spoke of regrettable demonstrations in the grand duchy of Luxemburg. Benedetti believed that the real difficulties arose from the attitude of the military party, which was supported by the princes immediately about the king, and from the refusal of France to consent to the demolition of the fortifications. He had grounds for the assumption that the reports of Count Goltz were drawn up in a most unfavourable spirit.

The second telegram, despatched at eleven o'clock, said: "Since yesterday Herr von Bismarck feels himself overwhelmed (*débordé*) by the agitation which has broken out in the press and parliament. Questions are announced for to-morrow. The minister will reply that in answer to a question from the Dutch government he said that if he were obliged to express an opinion he should have to consult his fellow confederates and the signatories of the peace (of 1839). The crown prince has called upon him." A third telegram, sent immediately after, announces: "I have represented to Herr von Bismarck that everything is probably settled by now and that we can in no case withdraw. Goltz's despatches breathe the worst possible spirit. He says we want war." And about midnight Benedetti sent a fourth telegram, which ran: "A rumour is current that the seventh and eighth army corps have been mobilised to-day. I have written about it to Bismarck, who begs me by letter to contradict these rumours. This sort of talk, circulated by officers, will serve as a criterion of the excitement of men's minds and show you that we must be prepared for anything."

About ten o'clock on the morning of the 1st of April, Count Bismarck left his official residence in the Wilhelmstrasse to go to the diet where, amidst the tensest excitement of the nation, nay, of the world, the question of Deputy von Bennigsen awaited him. On the way he was met and joined by Count Benedetti, anxious to speak to him once more immediately before the decision.

Bismarck said: "I shall explain to the chamber that negotiations have been opened at the Hague, that a treaty may be signed at any moment; but I shall not be able to assure them that the matter is settled without incurring the risk of a denial from the Dutch government. Will you authorise me to add that the French ambassador has been commissioned to inform me of the fact? If you so authorise me I cannot deny that I shall find myself face to face with a demonstration of the utmost gravity, and perhaps by to-morrow the control of events may have slipped out of my hands."

Benedetti refused to take the responsibility. He said that letters had been exchanged between the emperor and the king of Holland; that no doubt these letters contained reciprocal pledges which it would be hard to retract; that consequently—strictly speaking—the cession of Luxemburg to France might be regarded as a *fait accompli*, even though no deed to that effect had been signed. Bismarck answered: "What you say is not enough for me. At least

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you must allow me to add to my explanation that I was notified of it by the French ambassador."

This Benedetti absolutely declined to do, and when he got back to the embassy he sincerely congratulated himself upon his course of action. For there he found a despatch from his minister, which had been sent off during the night, but so delayed on the way that it did not reach Berlin till eleven o'clock. It ran: "Herr von Tornaco has been called to the Hague to sign the deed of cession. The sentiments of the king and the ministers are excellent. The treaty will be signed to-day."

If Benedetti had received the news at ten o'clock he would have given Count Bismarck the authorisation he asked for. The latter would then have informed the diet that Luxemburg had actually been ceded to France, and this communication would have been followed by a resolution of the diet which would have forced upon the emperor the choice between war and renunciation, war without an army, or renunciation and indelible disgrace. As matters now stood, the fatal step, even if already taken, was not yet made public, and retreat was still possible if the king of Holland retracted his consent for fear of creating a *casus belli* with Prussia; which was what actually took place in consequence of the proceedings of the 1st of April in the diet.



COUNT BENEDETTI
(1817-1900)

Deputy von Bennigsen's Speech

Deputy von Bennigsen, in giving reasons for his motion, which was signed by seventy of his colleagues, took as his point of departure the rumours which grew more persistent from day to day, and according to which a treaty for the cession of Luxemburg to France was, it might be, already concluded. If such were the case, then a prince of German blood, unmindful of the great traditions of his house, which had once given an emperor to Germany, had entered into a bargain concerning a country which was no province of Holland, but had been German from time immemorial, and had fallen to the share of the reigning house of Holland only when the German Confederation was founded, as compensation for rights in other German countries. It was an urgent summons to the diet to come to a clear understanding as to what the confederated governments and the representatives of the German nation were minded to do in face of such a danger; and the liberal party had taken the first step to bring the question under discussion because it felt itself peculiarly bound to safeguard the differences of opinion which had come to light on particular points in the constitution of the North German Confederation against the misconstruction that they could extend to questions of foreign policy which involved the defence of German soil from the unjust aggression of foreign powers. "No!" he said amidst a storm of applause from all parts of the house; "internal dissensions of that kind will not exercise the slightest effect upon the attitude of the whole house when it is a question of presenting a

bold and resolute front to the outside world and of giving the strongest support in our power to the vigorous policy which the Prussian government and the minister-president have hitherto maintained. It is no small temptation to foreign countries to take advantage of the dissolution of the German Confederation, to take advantage of the time before the new organisation of German states is fully complete, and while quarrels over domestic politics are raging in the country, in order to strengthen their own position in relation to Germany. If we do not oppose the first attempt of this kind, such attempts will be made again and again, and the remodelling of Germany at present proceeding will not result in the establishment of a strong federal state, but only in the permanence of the old condition of dismemberment and impotence."

The speaker recalled the lively response awakened years ago by the king's saying that not a village should be sundered from German soil, and solemnly declared, amidst the renewed applause of the assembly, that if King William found himself under the necessity of calling upon the nation to defend Germany from foreign foes, he would find no parties, but a united and determined people: "We do not seek for war. Should war break out the responsibility will rest with France alone. Any war waged between these two great nations will inflict deep wounds on the progress of prosperity and civilisation in Europe; no one feels that more keenly than we, the representatives of the German nation; for we have come together in the first instance for the discharge of peaceful tasks—the task of laying for Germany the foundations of a constitution which shall form the basis of justice and peace. But should foreign countries disturb us in our work, should they exploit its incompleteness for their own unjust beginnings, they will light upon a nation—and, as we doubt not, upon governments—prepared to combat all attempts of the kind with the utmost resolution."

The speaker concluded amidst loud applause from every side, and Count Bismarck then took up the word, to explain, in the first place, how the grand duchy of Luxemburg came to be in a position which rendered it liable to become the subject of European complications. The path of association with Prussia, upon which the north German governments had voluntarily entered immediately upon the dissolution of the old confederation, had never been trodden by the government of the grand duchy of Luxemburg; on the contrary, as early as October, 1866, a despatch from that quarter had tried to establish proof that Prussia had no longer the right to maintain a garrison in Luxemburg, and all reports of the temper that prevailed in the government and population of that small country had been concordant with this official step. The question as to whether pressure should be applied on the part of Prussia to enforce the accession of this little country (which was already a member of the customs-union) to the northern confederation had been answered by the government in the negative, because the grand duke of Luxemburg—who, as king of the Netherlands, had always had his centre of gravity outside Germany and would so have it in future—would have been a very questionable acquisition for the northern confederation.

For the rest, his majesty's government had been obliged to handle this question with exceptional caution because of the peculiar circumstances of Luxemburg, particularly those inseparable from its geographical situation. "No more than justice is done to the policy of Prussia by the statement, emanating from a high place, that 'Prussia's policy endeavours to respect the susceptibilities of the French nation—in so far, of course, as is consonant with her own honour.' The policy of Prussia found and finds a motive for this course in its just appreciation of the important bearing of friendly relations with a mighty nation, standing on an equal footing with ourselves, upon the peaceful development of the German question." While thus declining to ex-

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press a definite opinion on the question of the right of maintaining a garrison, he told the house that the government had no certain information on the subject of cession, except the question which had been asked of Count Perponcher a few days ago and answered as before stated. The government had no grounds for assuming that the treaty had already been concluded; but, on the other hand, it had no assurances, and therefore could give none, that its conclusion was not imminent.

This memorable speech concluded with the words: "The confederated governments believe that no foreign power will prejudice the incontestable rights of German states and peoples; they hope that they are in a position to secure and protect those rights by methods of peaceful negotiation, without imperilling the friendly relations which Germany has hitherto maintained with her neighbours, to the satisfaction of the confederated governments. The more fully we live up to the declaration which I was glad to hear made a while ago by the interpellant, namely, that by our deliberations we shall give proof of our steadfast confidence in the inviolable unity of the German nation, the more confidently we may indulge in this hope."

Thus at the moment when everything was finished except the signatures, a power had intervened whose existence had never been taken into account by either of the contracting parties—the public opinion of the German people, represented and expressed by the diet of the North German Confederation, and the halt they cried was not destined to pass like idle breath.

War Clouds

The emperor Napoleon was beside himself; he would have war rather than resign what he called his rights and the prize that was to be snatched away after he thought he had it in his hands. On the 3rd of April his minister received orders to telegraph to the Hague: "We persist in holding the king personally responsible. We will not compromise him, but take no fresh step like that which has had such evil consequences and of which Herr von Bismarck so bitterly complains. Nor is it permissible that Prince Henry should provoke counter demonstrations in the grand duchy; this is of the utmost importance."

Count Zuylen was in an awkward dilemma when Baudin pressed these considerations upon him. But on that same day, the 3rd of April, Count Perponcher, the Prussian ambassador, helped him out of all his perplexities by a declaration which left nothing to be desired in the way of positiveness. It ran: "In view of the agitation of public opinion in Germany, the cabinet of Berlin would be constrained to regard the cession of Luxemburg to France as a *casus belli*. The king of the Netherlands is free to act as he pleases, but he must likewise bear the responsibility for his actions, and if he has regarded the negotiations in which he has been engaged as a guarantee for the peace of Europe, it is my duty to undeceive him. My government would most strongly advise him not to give Luxemburg over to France."

Count Zuylen promised to apply for his sovereign's commands, but stated that in view of the imminent danger of a European war there could be no doubt as to the decision of the government. When Baudin came again and demanded that if the choice were between France and Prussia the king should abide by his pledges and decide for the former, he received the answer that the king of the Netherlands had stipulated for the assent of Prussia when he gave his promise, that France had persistently assured him of it, but that Prussia, instead of consenting, was threatening war. Under these circumstances there could be no thought of the cession of Luxemburg. A treaty of alliance, on the other hand, was superfluous and inopportune, the community

of interest between France and Holland was far too close for the former to entertain a doubt of the attitude Holland would assume in case of war. Such was Count Zuylen's last word, and that was the end of the matter. Rothan concludes the record he kept with documentary fidelity with the melancholy words, "Luxemburg was refused to us; the Dutch alliance slipped through our fingers; we were checkmated."^a

THE CUSTOMS PARLIAMENT IN BERLIN

The south German states of the Zollverein now issued the writs and completed the elections to the first German customs parliament. The youngest deputy who sat in that parliament has grown old, and after the vast changes in times and conditions which have taken place since then no one, even in the south, could be wounded by the unfolding of the whole tale of the passionate folly of reactionaries and particularists which raged throughout the electoral campaign in Bavaria, Swabia, and Baden. But it does not fall within the scope of this work. In Würtemberg, thanks to the intervention of the ministers and prefects in favour of the ultramontanes and republicans, not a single deputy of the "German party" was elected. From Baden, on the other hand, only a few opponents of the union proceeded to Berlin. The same was the case with Hesse. Bavaria furnished the main strength of the opposition, although she also sent forth enthusiastic champions of the national cause in Prince Hohenlohe, Völk, Marquard, Barth, Feustel, Stauffenberg, Marquardsen, Krämer-Doos, and others. The total result of the south German elections was only forty-nine anti-nationalists to thirty-six supporters of the union.

If we consider the votes recorded from this point of view, and if we add the forty-five thousand lost votes of the German party in Würtemberg to those polled by deputies with German leanings, then even the first elections to the customs parliament of Germany showed that a considerable majority in south Germany was in favour of Bismarck's national policy. On April 27th, 1868, the first German customs parliament met at Berlin and was opened by the king, in the White Hall (Weisser Saal) with a speech from the throne. He sketched in broad outline the development of the German customs union for the past forty years, enumerated the government proposals, and concluded with the words:

"Keep the common interests of Germany steadily in view, treat individual interests from that standpoint, and your exertions will be crowned with a success which will rightfully merit the gratitude of the nation. The friendly relations which the governments of Germany maintain with all foreign powers give grounds for confidence that the development of national prosperity, which the German races have met together to-day to promote, will continue to be fostered by that peace which the German states have bound themselves together to safeguard, and will ever be able, by God's help, to count upon the strength of the united German nation."

National Unity Furthered

In the first German customs parliament party divisions were not by any means based upon economic questions. Free trade and protection, tobacco, petroleum, and rags were not the points in debate, or were so rarely and for a brief while only. Party opposition existed solely upon political, nay, upon national questions, and there it was as complete as possible. The thirty-six partisans of union from south Germany were one and all enthusiastic champions of German unity; they had striven and suffered for it all their lives,

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and held the unalterable conviction that no power upon earth could prevent its consummation. But they had learned to wait, and not one among them cherished the childish illusion that the ultimate goal of national aspiration could be attained in the few weeks of discussion and resolution allotted to the first German customs parliament. But both they and their constituents felt the necessity of bearing open testimony to their nationalist sentiments before Germany and the whole world in this the first assembly since the year 1848 which represented the entire German race. The king's speech had done the same thing.

They therefore took the initiative in the resolution of the nationalist party to present an address to the king in reply to the speech from the throne. The masterly draft of an address drawn up by Deputy Metz-Darmstadt answered their purpose while observing the utmost moderation in tone. Referring directly to the king's own words, it stated: "We live in faith that the force of this national idea will bring about the complete unity of the whole of our native Germany by peaceful and prosperous ways; that national representation in every branch of public life, after which the German people has striven for decades, which has been recognised, at one time or another, as an imperative necessity by all German governments, cannot be permanently withheld from our nation. The love we bear our German fatherland will find a way to overcome all obstacles at home. Our national honour will gather the whole nation together without distinction of party if any attempt should be made from abroad to oppose the craving of the German nation for greater political unity. We trust that it may be given to your majesty, sustained by the united strength of the German nation and in accord with your majesty's distinguished allies, to complete the consolidation of our common work, the consummation whereof will guarantee safety, power, and peace without, and material prosperity and lawful liberty within."

The forty-nine south German opponents of union, on the other hand, acted as if bent on giving daily confirmation to Bismarck's saying that they were nearly a generation behind the north Germans. To them the year 1866 had by no means set the clock of development right for a century. To tell the truth, they had not the slightest idea what hour it had struck. They stood with flaming sword at the line of the Main, and fancied it a bulwark unsurmountable to all eternity. They dubbed themselves the "south German faction," and invariably said "we south Germans" in debate, as though there were no opinion but theirs south of the Main. On the national question they took up the same position as Herr von Beust, who even at the beginning of the current decade had understood the "reform of the confederation" to mean the prohibition of so much as a word on the subject of German unity. True to this obsolete political wisdom they opposed Metz's draft of an address by moving that the house should simply proceed to the order of the day.

Conservatives and Particularists Unite

It was the simplest and readiest means of putting a forcible end to this odious prate of German unity; for after that, according to the order of the day in the customs parliament, only the "referent" (reporter or one who sums up) Von Bennigsen might speak for the address and the co-referent Von Thüngen against it; and after them one might speak in favour of the motion for the order of the day, and one against it. The fate of this motion, which met with no opposition except from the eighty-seven members of the national liberal party, depended entirely upon the action of the north German conservatives. Then was witnessed the astounding spectacle of Prussian conservatives allying themselves with south German particularists to frustrate the de-

sign of this national address, and informing everyone who cared to hear that Bismarck was quite of their minds.

After the breach of faith of which the national liberals had been guilty in the north German diet, on April 22nd, he was supposed to be seeking more trustworthy comrades in arms. This rumour found credence in many quarters, especially when Bismarck's bosom friend Moritz von Blanckenberg ascended the tribune, on May 7th, to speak in favour of simply passing on to the order of the day—and in what a tone! For the fundamental thought of his speech was nothing but insolent mockery of the national idea, nothing but raillery at the expense of the most sacred interests of Germany. His concluding words, "Let us get to work, and away with all humbug!" spoken with reference to an address to the king bearing the signature of nearly a hundred members of the house, would certainly have incurred a call to order from any president less forbearing than Simson. But since the so-called progressist party joined the confederacy of Prussian feudalism, south German hostility to Prussia, ultramontanism, and republicanism, the motion to pass simply over to the order of the day was carried on May 7th by one hundred and eighty-six votes to one hundred and fifty.

As for the myth that Bismarck had turned his back on the national liberal party since the occurrences of April 22nd, and was henceforth going to lean only upon the Prussian squirearchy and Prussia's enemies in south Germany, and that he had accordingly taken exception to the address, the wish had once more been father to the thought. Bismarck himself expressed his real sentiments on the subject with his habitual frankness, on April 30th, to Deputy Bluntschli of Heidelberg, the famous professor of constitutional law and the champion of the idea of nationality in Baden. Bluntschli had been put forward by the nationalist party to speak against the motion for proceeding to the order of the day, and was therefore desirous of learning in confidence what position Bismarck actually took up with regard to this burning question. Bismarck received him readily in his study "with a glass of beer and cigars," and in the course of conversation made no secret of his profound annoyance at the conduct of the national liberals. They could not get quit of party vanity and the trick of theorising, and thus frequently placed very considerable difficulties in his way. It was true that he had declared, "Let them put us in the saddle, and we will manage to ride"; but considering the peculiar conditions that prevailed in Germany he ought not to be required to ride "like a riding-master," strictly according to rule. He would not pronounce against an address though it might be very well to give these rabid particularists the chance of spurting venom and showing themselves in their true colours; neither would he go in for it whole-heartedly, lest it should be said that the address and the debate on it had been done to his order. The conversation then turned upon "greater matters." In this place we can insert only the following observations of Bismarck's.

He said: "It may seem fanciful to you if I say that it is with nations as with the rest of nature, some are masculine, others feminine. The Teutons are so masculine that by themselves they are absolutely intractable. Each man lives after his own good pleasure. If they are welded together they are like a flood that carries all before it, irresistible. The Slavs and Celts, on the other hand, are feminine. On their own initiative they accomplish nothing, they have no procreative force. The Russians can do nothing without the Germans. They cannot work, but they are easily led astray. They have no power of resistance, but simply follow their master. The Celts, again, are nothing but a passive mass. Not till the Teutons appeared on the scene did nations in the political sense arise from the intermixture. So it was with the English, with the Spaniards, as long as the Goths took the lead; with the

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French as long as they were directed by the Frankish element. The French Revolution thrust it forth, and so gave the preponderance once more to the Celtic type. That is why the French are prone to submit to authority. The Westphalians and Swabians are genuine Teutons with but little admixture, and that is why they are so slow to accustom themselves to government. If they are seized upon and possessed by a national idea they will weld rocks together. But that seldom happens. As a rule every village and every peasant is for itself or himself alone. The Prussians are Teutons with a strong admixture of the Slavonic element. That is the principal reason why they are politically serviceable. They have something of the docility of the Slavonic character and something of the strength and virility of the Teuton.

"Then there is another thing. From the outset the Hohenzollerns established a real monarchy and subdued the refractory nobles to the state. My family belongs to the aristocracy that lived on the left bank of the Elbe and fought on the side of the sovereign power to coerce the nobles on the right bank. In every other part of Germany the aristocracy maintained an independence incompatible with the existence of any state. In Prussia alone it learned to yield to the state and serve it. The sovereigns were absolute rulers, but their absolutism served the state and not their own persons. They sometimes hanged even gentlemen of rank, to show that in Prussia no man might infringe the law. Thus Prussia has grown. How small she was, even under Frederick the Great, who said that the sovereign was the first servant of the state! The Hohenzollerns have not forgotten this precept. They are bred in its spirit, and it has passed into their blood."

He fully corroborated Bluntschli's opinion that above all things there must be no halt. "We can let things develop quietly only if we are really taking thought for their development. To stand still is to go back." With reference to Baden's accession to the North German Confederation, Bismarck observed: "We must deal gently with Bavaria. If Baden belonged to the confederation, Würtemberg would have to follow. Well, that is no great matter. But Bavaria would look upon this embrace as a menace to herself, and it might incite her to take a false step. We should then be forced in the long run to coerce Bavaria by force. That I wish to avoid. No German blood shall henceforth be shed with my good will by Germans at war with Germans. We will give the Bavarians time to bethink themselves. They will feel all around the walls for a way out, and they will find none. Then they will end by submitting to their fate. We have time enough, because we have no reason to fear war. Everything can be peacefully settled with Bavaria. We must certainly not stand still. We must go forward. But we will deal gently with the Bavarians. I have told your grand duke (of Baden) so."

The statesman who thus judged on April 30th, 1868, was far above the suspicion cast upon him by his conservative friends, by the insinuation that their obsequious following in the train of the "south German fraction" on May 7th had been to Bismarck's mind. The victory of the feudal-particularist-progressist coalition on that day drove the "south German fraction" into presumptuous exaltation. The rallying-cry of victory had been the "competency objection"—that is, the assertion that an address dealing with any other matter than duties on rags, tobacco, and petroleum (such subjects to address the king of Prussia on!)—would go beyond the competency of the customs parliament and violate the treaty of July 8th, 1867. This "competency objection" was raised in every subsequent debate, and always successfully; for Blanckenberg and his conservative following voted with the "we south Germans" to put an end to the "national humbug" in the customs parliament. This same German customs parliament on which all Germany had set such great hopes began, to the horror and distress of all patriotic souls, to play a ludicrous part, "to be-

have," as Ludwig Bamberger, deputy for Mainz, aptly put it, "like a customs parliament pure and simple." At home and abroad men began to scoff at the *Parlement douanier* of the Germans.

The favourite "competency objection" was raised again on May 18th, in the final debate upon the commercial and customs treaty with Austria, when deputies Bamberger and Metz, with twenty-nine others, brought forward a motion to bring the reduced duty on Hessian wines into accord with the "existing system of indirect taxation" in a manner profitable to the wine-growing industry in Hesse. On this occasion, however, the stock objection was not raised by mere deputies, but by one of the ablest members of the customs confederation council, Geheimer Hessischer Legationsrath (privy councillor to the Hessian embassy) Hofmann. "According to the provisions of the customs union treaty," he briefly and decisively said, "the customs parliament is not called upon to deduce the consequences to internal taxation which may ensue from the reduction of import duties. I hold that the house is not competent to come to a resolution upon motions of this character." The tone of these words conveyed a sense of infallibility, *i.e.*, a certainty beforehand of the unanimous assent of the customs confederation council.

Speeches in the Customs Parliament

It was then that Bismarck rose to make his first speech in the customs parliament; to express, no doubt, the unanimous feeling of the customs confederation council. The anticipation that so it would be was clearly manifest in the smiling faces of the ultra-Main and conservative members. But the whole assembly listened with breathless attention as Bismarck said: "I am naturally no better qualified than my colleague of the grand duchy of Hesse to speak in the name of the council at this moment, and to say whether it, or a majority of its members, would hold itself competent to judge of the motion with which I have now for the first time become acquainted. But since doubt has been cast upon its competency by a member of the council itself, I feel constrained to state that, in saying that we are not in a position to express an opinion on this question in the name of the council, the honourable member is merely giving his personal views on the subject, and that my own impression *prima facie* is diametrically opposed to that of my colleague of the grand duchy of Hesse [loud applause]; for I am strongly of opinion that the confederation council—should it have reason to suppose that the modality of taxation was interfering with or endangering the freedom of commerce at home which is guaranteed by the institutions of the customs union—might well feel itself competent to apply the remedy." [Loud applause.]

Count Bismarck's "colleague of the grand duchy of Hesse" was not the sort of man to submit tamely to correction in presence of the assembled house. He made, for the first time, a public exhibition of the sharp divergence of opinion among the members of the council of the customs federation. He set Bismarck right at some length on the tenour of the customs union treaty, and insisted on his assertion that, "with regard to the question of competency, there cannot be the slightest doubt that internal taxation, in so far as it is not common, is subject to local legislation." Bismarck replied immediately: "Without anticipating a discussion that may arise within the council itself, I may remark that, in my opinion, the question at issue is not whether the legislation of the grand duchy of Hesse is contrary to the spirit of the customs union treaty, but whether the legislative organs of the union are justified in concerning themselves with the question of whether this is the case." [Acclamation.]

Up to this time the debate had moved within the limit of a "customs par-

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liament pure and simple." For Advocate Probst, deputy for Stuttgart, "the best orator in Swabia," as his ultramontane-republican constituents boasted, was reserved the involuntary merit of giving it a national scope by appealing to "the fear of foreign countries and the disturbance of peace which must ensure from outspoken opposition between south and north Germany." Bismarck rose at once to make an explanation. He could appeal to all men, even to the gentlemen from south Germany, to witness that he, his government, and his "colleagues of the northern confederation" had avoided anything that might lay them open to the insinuation that they desired to exercise coercion of any sort, even by way of the mildest persuasion, upon the gentlemen of south Germany, to induce them to lend themselves to an extension of the competency of the customs parliament. How little thought he had of such a thing best appeared from his circular letter of September 7th of the current year. He proceeded:

"Even were you to express a wish to give up your independence—it is you and not I who call it so—to draw nearer to the North German Confederation, as I should prefer to put it, you would have to give such reasons for your wish as would insure it favourable consideration by both parties. You think us far more eager than we are. [Laughter.] But though I thus protest against the attempt to extend the competency of the customs union, I am no less bound to oppose any attempt to diminish that competency as established by treaty. Whether such an attempt is here involved I will not profess to say, but I will remind the honourable gentleman who has just sat down, and all others who may treat of the same theme, that the appeal to fear never finds an echo in a German heart." [Vehement applause.]

These significant words prepared the way for the greatest speech of that great day, the greatest ever made in the German customs parliament—the speech of Doctor Völk of Augsburg, which concluded with the words: "There are still some people who take pleasure in pelting one another with snowballs; but the increasing warmth of the sun will soon deprive them of their material: yes, gentlemen, it is spring in Germany!" The whole speech, as well as this peroration, was so absolutely free from clap-trap that it remained imperishably enshrined in the heart and mind of Bismarck, the great enemy of all clap-trap, and he always retained an affection for the honest Swabian from Bavaria. When the worthy Völk died in 1882, too soon for his country, Prince Bismarck, then imperial chancellor, testified to the value of his faithful helpmeet, and expressed his grief at the passing away of "one of the best of Germans."

In the division which followed upon Völk's speech on Bamberg's motion, the unnatural alliance between the north German conservatives and the "south German fraction" was completely and finally dissolved. Bismarck's few words had sufficed to bring his old political allies to a better state of mind. Among the economic labours of the first German customs parliament we may mention the conclusion of the commercial treaty with Austria and the ratification of the tobacco tax law. Some advance was made in the recasting of the tariff in accordance with free-trade ideas, and the duty on petroleum was rejected. On May 21st the mercantile world of Berlin gave a breakfast to the deputies of the customs parliament in the new Bourse. After President Simson had replied to Doctor Siemens' toast, "the customs parliament," by calling for a cheer for the mercantile and industrial classes of Berlin, Bismarck rose and spoke the following words:

"I cannot absolve the toast just given by my right honourable colleague the president of the customs parliament [Bismarck himself was president of the customs federation council] from a certain egoism, since he addresses a *captatio benevolentiae* to the jury [*i.e.*, the mercantile and industrial classes of

Berlin] which is to sit in judgment upon us, and pronounce 'You have done well!' Yet if I myself steer clear of this rock, will you permit me to express the feeling by which we north Germans are actuated in our farewell greetings to our south German brethren? The short time we have been together has passed as quickly as a day in spring; may its after effects be those of spring upon the coming season! I believe that after our common labours for the interests of Germany you will carry home the conviction that here you will find the hearts and hands of brothers in every circumstance of life, and that every fresh meeting will and must strengthen these relations. Let us hold this kinship fast, let us cherish this family life! In this sense I wish our south German brethren a hearty 'Au revoir.'” These words were greeted with loud and long-continued applause.

The speech from the throne with which King William closed the customs parliament on May 23rd likewise expressly vindicated the national prerogatives of the presidency, the customs union, and the German nation against the “south German fraction.” At the end the king said: “Since I have been called to this high position in our common fatherland of Germany by the unanimous and lawfully expressed will of the legislative authorities of the same who are entitled to do so, I feel myself bound in honour to declare, before the representatives of the German nation elected to this parliament, that I will maintain and turn to good account the rights conferred upon me, as a sacred charge confided to me by the German nation and its princes, in conscientious reverence for the treaties concluded and the historical title upon which our country's commonwealth is based.”

Delbrück had opened the second session of the German customs parliament on June 3rd. Bismarck's state of health and the journey to Hanover in attendance on the king, prevented him from speaking before the final sitting of June 21st, which was to decide upon the petroleum duty which the government had demanded. He set forth before his opponents the ideal of pure revenue taxes (*Finanzzölle*) just as he had done, on May 21st, in the diet: “I am seized with a certain regret that we do not express ourselves to one another with complete and genuine frankness whenever I hear sentimental lamentations over the poor man who is to see taxes imposed on his petroleum, his eyesight, his intelligence, and his pipe of tobacco, proceeding from the same mouth which gives its assent without the least scruple of conscience to the taxation of flour, bread, fuel (under certain circumstances), meat, and salt, at the expense of the same poor man.” The duty on petroleum was nevertheless rejected. On the other hand, a new customs union law was enacted this session, commercial treaties were ratified with Japan and Switzerland, and a sugar tax was imposed. The rejection of the petroleum tax put an end to tariff reform. On the same day, June 22nd, on which the diet was closed, the king made the closing speech in the customs parliament.^e

THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE (1870 A.D.)

Whilst such steps as this were being taken towards the attainment of harmony among the various German states, the external menace offered by the attitude of France was by no means removed. Austria had watched with a jealous eye every movement of the Prussian king, and of his chief adviser, Bismarck.^a The visit of the emperor Alexander of Russia to Berlin in May, 1870, and the journey of King William to meet Alexander at Ems in the following June, were only natural courtesies between near relatives. But the courts of Paris and Vienna could not but regard as significant the fact that both the chancellor of the confederation, Count Bismarck, and Oubril, the Russian ambassador to Berlin, were present at the meeting at Ems. Bismarck,

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with his keen penetration, saw clearly what might be expected from France since the accession of the incapable duke de Gramont to the guidance of foreign affairs, and at the conference he sought to provide himself with a support in Russia in case of war with France, offering her, if Prussia were victorious, the revision of the Peace of Paris, of 1856.^{af}

From a Madrid telegram of July 3rd Paris learned the news that Prince Leopold Hohenzollern was to be king of Spain, and the *Constitutionnel* which was Gramont's organ, in its issue of July 4th published an article drawn up by the duke himself, or at least inspired by him, in which it was indeed conceded that the Spaniards were at liberty to regulate their own destinies, according to their own discretion, but at the same time astonishment was expressed that matters should have gone so far that France was obliged to see the sceptre of Charles V intrusted to a Prussian prince. This candidature was no new thing to the French government. The French cabinet, like those of the other great powers, had known for at least three weeks of the Spanish government's negotiations with Prince Leopold. But it purposely represented itself as ignorant, in order that it might pose before the country as the innocent lamb, tricked and taken unawares, and so give vent to its virtuous indignation at this unscrupulous game of intrigue in the most vehement and provocative fashion. For it is clear that it lay with the French government to determine whether it would solve this Hohenzollern-Spanish question in a peaceful or a warlike manner. If it desired the former, Gramont had only to try diplomatic methods, to negotiate with Prussia, request the co-operation of the other chief powers, and success was insured. For it is not conceivable that Bismarck, who three years before had not gone to war about the Luxemburg question, popular though that was in Germany, now, in a case which did not specially touch the interests of Germany, and which, as it concerned a prince who was not a Prussian but a Hohenzollern, could hardly rise to the importance of a national affair, should leave out of account the apprehensions and wishes of France, and press this very question to the point of war.

But Gramont, who thought to be a Bismarck to France, would not enter on this peaceful course, but by the advice of his friend Beust chose rather to make a pretext for a war out of a question that was not national but purely dynastic. He laid the whole matter before the legislative body, and here indulged in such warlike threats that war could no longer be avoided. Breaches of tact and instances of insolence towards Prussia and her king followed one another. Roughly speaking, the conduct of France towards Prussia greatly resembled the situation from 1805-1806, but with this difference—that King William's father had taken up arms only after allowing a series of insolences to be heaped upon him, while the son at the very first manifestation of France's ambitious madness had taken up the gauntlet. But the same fate was intended for him. "Submission or war," rang the word in the Tuileries. And if Prussia had conceded the first submission the second would have followed in a few weeks, and so on continuously till finally the son like his father would have had to begin the war all the same, under perhaps far more unfavourable conditions. For the aim of Gramont's policy was conquest, the seizure of Belgium and Luxemburg or of the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, or both together; for the annexation of the one implied also that of the other, and the much-talked-of extension of the French rule as far as the Rhine from Bâle to its mouth would then be an accomplished fact. Since Prussia had refused any treaty of alliance with France, an attempt was now to be made to see whether the aggrandisement of France could not be effected in war with Prussia instead of in alliance with Prussia.

Although the Spanish ministers and ambassadors asserted in the most positive terms that they had never negotiated with the Prussian government, but

only with Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern; although everyone knew that this prince occupied an entirely independent position, and in a question like that of accepting the Spanish throne it was not the part of the king of Prussia either to command or forbid; although in any case the occupation of the Spanish throne by a German prince was of no conceivable benefit to Prussia and at the very most secured but the negative advantage that then a Franco-Spanish alliance, such as had been planned in the year 1868 between Isabella and Napoleon, would be relegated to the domain of impossibilities—yet from the very first the French government put the person of the Prussian king into the foreground, made him responsible for the whole quarrel, treated the whole matter as a purely Prussian and indeed dynastic intrigue, and thus deprived the king of the possibility of a peaceful arrangement.

Events followed one another with unexampled swiftness and precision. On the 4th of July Gramont caused the French *chargé d'affaires* in Berlin to question the secretary of state, Thile, on the subject of the candidature for the throne; and received for answer that this affair was absolutely no concern of Prussia's. The same day Gramont charged the Prussian ambassador at Paris, Freiherr von Werther, who was just about to start for Ems, to tell the king that the French government expected that he would induce Prince Leopold to refuse the crown offered him by Spain, and that France made this a question of war. On the 6th of July, without waiting for a word from Ems, Gramont in the legislative body answered the interpellation made on the preceding day by saying: "We do not consider that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to endure that a foreign power, by placing one of her princes on the throne of Charles V, should disturb the present balance in Europe and be enabled to endanger the interests and honour of France. We hope that this eventuality will not be realised; in this we rely on the wisdom of the German and the friendship of the Spanish people. If it should turn out otherwise, we should be compelled to do our duty, without hesitation and without weakness, strong in your support and that of the nation." At the same time warlike preparations were set in hand both by land and sea, and the French press assumed towards Prussia such a tone as might have led the reader to suppose that the latter country had already a second Jena behind it.

Benedetti's Mission

The French ambassador to the court of Berlin, Count Benedetti, was then sojourning at the baths of Wildbad, in the Black Forest region of Würtemberg. On the 7th of July he received from Gramont telegraphic instructions to proceed instantly to Ems. On the 9th of July he had his first audience of the king, and demanded in the name of his government that the king should issue a command to Prince Leopold to recall his acceptance of the Spanish crown. The king answered that he had neither commanded the prince to accept the crown, nor could command him to take back his word. This answer was regarded by the French government as a mere evasion, and it again emphasised the exclusive responsibility of the king. Then, on the 12th of July, a telegram from the castle of Sigmaringen was published, which announced the withdrawal of Prince Leopold from the candidature for the Spanish throne. With this the conflict seemed laid aside and all solid grounds for it done away with. Indeed, on the 8th and 10th of July, Gramont had said in conversation with the English ambassador that the matter could find its simplest and happiest solution in the voluntary retirement of the prince; and on the receipt of the Sigmaringen telegram the minister of justice, Ollivier, had immediately sent round a declaration to the deputies that this closed the incident.

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But what about the war by which it was hoped to win back France's lost prestige? Gramont therefore went a step farther, though he might have told himself that if France did not content herself with the prince's withdrawal, but instituted still further demands, she would be taking on herself the whole responsibility of the question of war, and must allow the judgment to be passed on her that she was not working for peace but for war. Would the question then remain a purely dynastic one? Or would it not rather become a national one which might set half Europe in flames?

Indifferent to such considerations, Gramont preserved his dictatorial demeanour. On the 12th of July he said to the Prussian ambassador who had just returned from Ems: "The prince's abdication is a minor affair; in any case France would never have suffered him to ascend the throne: the main thing now is to allay the ill feeling excited by his candidature and to quiet the excitement among the French people; with this object the king of Prussia should write the emperor a letter which may be published, saying that the king in authorising the prince to accept the Spanish crown could not have supposed that he was touching too closely the interests and honour of the French nation, and that he acquiesces in the prince's abdication with the wish and hope that any grounds of a breach between the two governments may thus disappear." Freiherr von Werther had at least sufficient tact not to telegraph so shamefully unreasonable a demand direct to the king as Gramont wished, but not enough to reject it altogether and leave to Gramont himself the form in which it was to be presented. He sent an official report of it to Count Bismarck, and the latter returned no answer whatever, made no attempt to lay the report before the king, and immediately gave the ambassador leave of absence.

After the conversation with the Prussian ambassador, Gramont commissioned Count Benedetti by telegram to demand of the king that he would expressly signify his approval of Prince Leopold's renunciation, and give assurance that he would never give his consent to any future candidature of the prince of Hohenzollern. Benedetti executed this commission in a very tactless fashion, in the morning of the 13th of July, on the Brunnenpromenade at Ems. The king answered that he could indorse the renunciation only as a private person, not as king of Prussia, but that in the interests of Prussia he must emphatically refuse any engagement for the future in this and all other matters. When, a few hours later, Benedetti requested a fresh audience in order to discuss the same subject once more, the king sent a message to say that he must not return to the subject: he had already spoken his last word on the matter; if the ambassador could not let it rest he must turn to the Prussian ministry of foreign affairs. On the evening of the 13th of July the proceedings at Ems were communicated to the Prussian ambassadors at foreign courts by the Prussian government in a telegram which merely stated the facts, and were brought to the knowledge of the German nation in an extra edition of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the organ of Count Bismarck.

This firm, manly attitude on the part of the king ill suited the plans of the French war party. The news spread by Benedetti roused great excitement and confusion in Paris. Some held the conflict at an end; others who had already gone too far were unwilling to retreat, and preferred to plunge the dynasty and the country into a very hazardous war rather than have it said of them that they had again laid demands before Prussia and had again received an unfavourable answer; so that, in fine, it was not the king of Prussia but themselves who had suffered a humiliation. Napoleon wavered. For a cause like this to begin war with the united power of the North German Confederation, perhaps even with all Germany, appeared to him a dangerous proceeding. For a long time he could come to no decision, listened while all and

sundry gave their views, and brooded over them in his wonted fashion. In a short time peace was all but decided on. But in the night of the 14th to the 15th of July, in which the decisive sitting of the ministerial council was held at St. Cloud, the ministers Gramont and Lebœuf, both anxious for war, and the empress Eugénie, instigated and instructed by the Jesuits, urged on the emperor no longer to take these perpetual rebuffs and humiliations from Prussia but, for the safety of his throne, which rested on the respect of the French people, to declare war, and in alliance with the great Catholic nations fall on heretic Germany. The emperor finally yielded, manifestly with a heavy heart, and the empress cried triumphantly: "This is my war! With God's help we will overthrow Protestant Prussia."

In the sitting of the senate and legislative body, on the 15th of July, an official memorial was issued by the ministers Gramont and Ollivier—the latter of whom, though no enemy to Germany and averse to war, had been drawn along by his colleagues. In this memorial the facts of what had passed at Ems were completely distorted. It spoke of an affront to Count Benedetti, who had been shown the door, and of a telegram to the foreign powers, damaging to the honour of France, and it drew attention to the Prussian preparations for war which had been already begun on the 14th of July. In consequence of this the government had summoned the reserves and was about to take further measures. At the same time a demand for credit for the army and navy and a law concerning the summoning of the *garde mobile* to active service and the enrolment of volunteers were brought in. The senate approved unanimously all the demands of the government; the legislative body granted the credit for the army by 245 to 10 votes and the rest of the demands with only one dissentient voice. It was in vain that a few members of the opposition, who saw through the ministerial web of lies, pointed out that the king had done all that could be expected of him and that no actual affront could be cited; in vain they demanded that the despatch containing an affront to France should be laid before them as evidence; in vain did Thiers, who for years had worked on the vanity of the French nation and incited them to war, declare that the occasion for war had been unskilfully chosen and that the preparations for war were not complete: the ministers of the Bonapartist majority shouted down these individual warning voices. On the evening of this day a mob of ragged men was to be heard calling in the streets of Paris, "To Berlin—to Berlin!" and the official press spoke of the defeat of Prussia and the seizure of the left bank of the Rhine as a matter of course. The official declaration of war was handed to the Prussian government by the French *chargé d'affaires* on the 19th of July.

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870

France had spoken. After the ballot of the 15th of July no one could say that it was only the emperor who had desired war. Since the senate unanimously and the legislative body by 245 to 10 votes had declared for the proposals, all the people's representatives—that is, the whole country—were responsible for the war. In Germany the gauntlet which had been flung down was accepted with determination, even with enthusiasm. There was no more talk of a dynastic war. Since Gramont had not contented himself with Prince Leopold's resignation, though this had evidently been made at the king of Prussia's request; since Gramont had gone so far as to ask of the king the despatch of a letter of excuse to be published before all the world and the formal promise to keep the house of Hohenzollern forever out of Spanish affairs—everyone in Germany perceived that the question of the Hohenzollern candidature was a side issue, that the real question was war at any price, that its object was interference in

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German affairs, destruction of the process of unification, and annexation of German territory. Consequently all Germany felt the humiliation intended for the king as one destined for the whole country, looked on the war as wholly national, and indulged the hope that the time had now come for completing the work of 1866 and at the same time paying off the grudges of a



VON MOLTKE
(1800-1891)

century. The aim of 1866, the foundation of German unity, had been defeated by France's intervention; France meant that the new war should render this interference permanent and all-powerful; but the German nation was determined to utilise this war for the completion of her own unity. As in the year 1866 the Schleswig-Holstein question gave an opportunity for a war of Prussia with Austria and her allies, but immediately widened into a German question, so in 1870 the question of union was the inducement to the war between France and Germany; and with the first hopes of victory, and completely with the first victories, this question irrevocably broadened into an Alsace-Lorraine question.

A war in which such great possessions were at stake was the more popular in Germany since there men were for the moment keenly aware of what a serious block the process of German unification had come to. The hopes set on the customs parliament had not been fulfilled, thanks to the south German fraction and the governments which stood behind it; it seemed that a full parliament would never proceed from this customs parliament unless external conditions were to give a fresh turn to affairs; the political condition of Bavaria and Würtemberg was such that a union of these states with the North Ger-


man Confederation had been relegated to an incalculable distance, and even the stoutest hearts despaired of living to see this union. On the contrary, a backward step had to be taken; for the clericals and democrats of Bavaria and Würtemberg were in a fair way to get the better of their governments, and so to procure the abrogation of the treaties with Prussia and bring on the scenes a wonderful mixture of state institutions compounded according to the ideas of those who favoured the union of church and state, republican principles, and the confederation of the Rhine, and this southern confederation would not appear as an alliance in aid of north Germany but as an alliance against her, relying on Austria on the one hand and on the other on France.

Such was the state of affairs in Germany when Gramont seized the occasion for war, and by his manner of doing so provided for the sudden removal of the obstacles in the way of German unity, so that all that great Germany which extends from the Kongs-Aa to the Alps rose up and sang the *Wacht am Rhein*. And it did not stop at singing. The most decisive steps followed one after the other. As early as the 12th of July Bismarck and Moltke came to Berlin and conferred with the ministers. On the 13th Bismarck declared to the English ambassador that the king had already shown far too much rather than too little moderation, and that it was now Prussia's turn to require France to take back her threatening language and give an explanation of her warlike preparations.

The Army is Mobilised

On the 15th of July the king left Ems and returned to Berlin. His journey was a triumphal progress; wherever he stopped he received patriotic addresses and replied to them. The crown prince, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon came to Brandenburg to meet him. In Berlin a vast throng of people awaited the king's arrival. It took place shortly before nine o'clock in the evening, and only now, at the railway station in Berlin, did the king learn that in Paris the decision had already been submitted to the two chambers. On the evening of July 15th the king resolved on the mobilisation of the army, on the 16th directions were given for precautionary measures on the northern coasts, and the council of the North German Confederation was summoned to an extraordinary sitting. A resolute acceptance of the arrogant challenge was unanimously agreed upon by the representatives of the states of the confederation. On the 19th of July King William opened the north German diet. The speech from the throne was full of lofty patriotism, boldness, and confidence:

"If in former centuries Germany has borne in silence such violations of her rights and her honour, she did so only because in her distracted state she knew not how strong she was. To-day when the bond of spiritual and legal unity, which the wars of liberation began to twine, is ever drawing the German races more closely together; to-day when Germany's armour no longer offers a weak spot to the enemy, Germany bears within herself the will and the power to cope with new acts of French violence. And since the allied governments are conscious that all honour permits has been done to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and since it is indubitably manifest to all eyes that the sword has been forced into our hands, with so much the more confidence do we turn, strengthened by the united support of the German governments alike of the south and north, to the patriotism and readiness for sacrifice of the German people, with the summons to the defence of their honour and their independence." On the 21st of July the diet unanimously granted the £24,000,000 required by the government. On the 29th Bismarck published the various proposals offered by France as the basis of a treaty in 1866 and



THE THIRD CUIRASSIERS AT REICHSHOFEN (WÖRTH), 1870

(From the painting by Aimé Morot)

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1867, and thus disclosed to Germany and the foreign powers the plans of conquest cherished by the Napoleonic government.

The south German governments had already received this information and had been able to conclude that in dealing with so faithless a power as France, they would if they preserved their neutrality have absolutely no guarantee that they would remain uninjured, but that on the contrary it was far more likely that on the conclusion of peace an understanding would be arrived at at their expense. This made them all the more ready to adhere to their resolution, faithfully and honourably to observe the treaties of alliance. On the 16th of July King Ludwig of Bavaria gave orders for the mobilisation of the army, and the chamber of deputies did not hearken to the committee, composed chiefly of ultramontanes and their spokesman Dr. Jörg, which brought in a motion in favour of an armed neutrality, but to the demands of honour and good faith, and on the 19th of July, by 101 to 47 votes it granted the sum of 18,260,000 florins for the purpose of equipping and maintaining the army. The Reichsrath chamber unanimously agreed to this resolution.

In Württemberg, after the Bavarians had shown the way, the democrats and "great Germans" ventured on no further opposition. They saw how almost the whole country had laid aside its hatred of Prussia to attend to the matter in hand, and agreed to the resolutions passed in an assembly of the people at Stuttgart on the 16th of July whereby the government was requested to take part in the national war. King Charles, returning from Switzerland on the 17th of July, immediately issued an order for mobilisation, and the chambers, summoned on the 21st of July, granted the required credit on the 22nd—the second chamber by eighty-five votes to one, the first unanimously. At the same time the king appointed the Prussian lieutenant-general Von Prittwitz, who in the forties had conducted the building of the fortress of Ulm, governor of that fortress; and the Prussian lieutenant-general Von Obernitz, formerly military plenipotentiary in Stuttgart, commander of the Württemberg troops. In Hesse the minister, Von Dalwigk, hard as it was for him to do so, had to ask the chamber for a credit. It was unanimously granted. The grand duke of Baden, knowing himself in harmony with the wishes of his people, ordered a mobilisation of the army on the 16th of July, and on the 22nd sent the French ambassador his passports. On the 16th communication between Kehl and Strasburg was interrupted by the withdrawal of the bridge of boats and the removal of the rails from the railway bridge, and on the 22nd any possibility of a surprise by rail was destroyed by the blowing up of a pier of the railway bridge.

The day previously, on the groundless rumour that explosive bullets had been distributed to the troops of Baden, an official of the French ministry had informed the ambassador of Baden in Paris that if this were so France would resort to reprisals, would regard Baden as outside the pale of the law of nations, and would waste the country as had been done in Melac's time, not even sparing the women.

Thus by the 22nd of July the whole of Germany, the south as well as the north, was resolved on a great and decisive struggle, and a national enthusiasm, an emulous co-operation, a self-devoted zeal for sacrifice, such as had never before been seen in Germany, were shown amongst all races and all orders of the population. "Now or never!" was the watchword of the whole nation; to repel the enemy whose challenge had been given with such arrogant brutality was the first aim; if this were attained the political union of Germany, as yet still split up into small sections, would certainly follow, and the centre of Europe would then be occupied by a nation respected for its intellectual cultivation and dreaded for the steadfast commanding force of its arms.

It was the idea of being now able to attain these objects by a single blow

which lent the German movement of 1870 that marvellous impetus, equipped the soldiers with such incredible bravery and endurance, and made victory appear to them as an absolute command of duty and necessity. From all sides, even from the most distant lands, volunteers had hastened to the country, the most desirable posts were forsaken by young men engaged in manufactures and trades, and the lecture rooms of the universities by the lecturers and students, all with the one sole object of preserving their fatherland. "Germany before everything," was the proud word with which the *Landwehr* seized the rifle, and he who was left behind sought to heal the wounds of war.

At no time and amongst no people was care so patriotically and magnanimously bestowed on the wounded and those who remained behind, on the families of the reservists and the *Landwehr*, as was done by the German people throughout the war, without remission and without neglect. State, general, and private resources were brought into play. Private persons also gave large sums for remarkable deeds performed during the war. On the 19th of July the King of Prussia renewed for the whole German army the order of the Iron Cross, which his father had founded.

German Military Plans

The excellence of the Prussian military institutions, the exactness of Moltke's plan of campaign which went into the minutest details, and in co-operation with it the energetic military administration of Roon, made it possible for considerable masses to take the field at the outset, so that the mobilisation for which orders were given on the 16th of July was completed by the evening of the 26th, that is, in eleven days; and eight days later the German army had already taken up its position on the left bank of the Rhine. The strength of the German army was 1,183,389 men and 250,373 horses.

On the supposition that the French could not effect a rapid mobilisation, and be the first to take the offensive and cross the Rhine, Moltke's plan provided that the first army under General Steinmetz should march from its place of assembly at Coblenz to the Saar at Saarbrücken; the second army, under Prince Frederick Charles, should also take the direction from Bingen and Mainz towards the Saar at Saarbrücken and Saargemünd; whilst the third army under the crown prince of Prussia marched from Mannheim and Rastatt towards the Lauter in the northeastern angle of Alsace. The further plan was that the crown prince, whose army, according to the first disposition, already stood near the French border, should begin the campaign, hurl the right wing of the French position across the Vosges, and advance as far as the Moselle; that at the same time Prince Frederick Charles and Steinmetz should push the French forces, which had taken up a position before Metz, back on that fortress, cut off their retreat to Châlons or Paris, deliver a decisive battle at Metz, either throw back the beaten foe into the fortress or drive him towards the northern border, and so lay open the way to Paris for the third army and the other troops that could be disposed of. This plan was as skilful as it was bold, and in the main the military operations followed the course intended.

Besides these three armies, with thirteen army corps, at the time of the first disposition there were still three and a half army corps with about 112,000 men as a first reserve in Germany. Of these the first and second army corps, which were intended to oppose a body of French and Danish troops sent to land on the north coast, were summoned to the battle-ground of Metz soon after the first victories, whilst the sixth army corps, which covered Silesia against Austria, then mustering her troops, in the month of August joined the army of the crown prince, and similarly in September the seventeenth division

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marched towards France, where it was subsequently to display a glorious activity on the Loire.

The provinces lying near the seat of war and the coast districts of the North Sea and the Baltic were declared to be in a state of war; five governors-general were appointed for them, and General Vogel von Falckenstein, who had won fame in the campaign on the Main in 1866, was appointed governor of Prussia, Pomerania, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hanover. The seventeenth division and the other *Landwehr* divisions set apart for the defence of the coast districts were under the command of the grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

The commanders of the three great armies left Berlin on the 26th of July for the appointed places of assembly of their troops. On the 31st of July the king of Prussia, who held the chief command over all the German forces, left his residence at Berlin. He was accompanied by Count Bismarck and generals Moltke and Roon. On the morning of the 2nd of August he entered Mainz. Here the general headquarters had been erected, and from here a proclamation was issued to the German army. Here in the general headquarters and there in the three great armies was concentrated the whole force of Germany. The gaze of the whole German people was directed towards the Rhine and the Saar; anxious, but confident, it expected the first tidings.

French Plans; Outline of the War

It is characteristic of the peculiarities of French diplomacy that France, which could have deferred the outbreak of the war until she was ready to strike, had declared war at a time in which she was so far behindhand with her preparations that not only was an offensive advance out of the question, but also an adequate defence. Already the attitude of south Germany had greatly thwarted Napoleon's plans. Imagining the wrongheadedness of the ultramontanes and democrats to be irresistible, he had a firm belief in the neutrality of Bavaria and Würtemberg, and had now to learn on the 16th and 17th of July that the order for mobilisation had already been given there. To prevent the union of the south German troops with the north German, he wished to execute a part of Niel's plan of campaign and by the rapidity of his operations to make up for what his troops lacked in numbers. The strength of the German field force he reckoned at 559,000 men, that of his own at 300,000. This almost double superiority of the enemy he hoped to reduce to a considerable extent by a swift and powerful attack; 150,000 men were to assemble at Metz, 100,000 at Strasburg, 50,000 in the camp at Châlons. He would unite the first two armies, and at the head of 250,000 men would cross the Rhine at Maxau, place himself like an iron bar between north and south Germany, and reduce the south German states to neutrality, or perhaps even compel a new confederation of the Rhine. If this succeeded, he hoped to secure the alliance of Austria and Italy, with which favourable negotiations had already been opened, and then it would be time to look for the Prussian army, which he reckoned as at most 350,000 men, and subdue them by means of the proverbial *élan* of his victorious troops. Meantime the 50,000 men assembled at Châlons were to march towards Metz, to cover the rear of the operating army and watch the northeastern frontier, and the appearance of the French fleet in the North Sea and the Baltic, with the French troops to be landed with their Danish auxiliaries, would retain a portion of the Prussian forces in the coast districts.

The execution of this plan was possible only if Napoleon could cross the Rhine with 250,000 men at the very moment of declaring war. But there were at that time only 100,000 men in Metz, in Strasburg only 40,000; in

Châlons two divisions were missing, artillery and cavalry were not ready for service, not a single army corps had a complete field equipment, and when Napoleon gave orders to hasten the arrival of the missing regiments, obedience was only indolently rendered on the plea that Algeria, Paris, and Lyons could not be denuded of garrisons. But other necessities were also wanting. Great stores of provisions, munitions, and equipments had been collected, but unfortunately not where they were needed. The railway administrations were not organised for and not accustomed to such colossal transports of men and stores. Consequently there was huge confusion; the railway stations were overflowing with materials required for the war, while the fortresses were suffering for want of them.

In such a state of affairs there was no question of executing Napoleon's plan of campaign and taking the offensive. With this, other hopes fell to the ground: south Germany completed her military union with the north, troops for landing might well be hard to produce when there was a lack of land forces, and the conclusion of alliances with Denmark, Austria, and Italy probably depended on the question of who should gain the first successes. The desire for an invasion of Schleswig-Holstein and other Prussian territories was not wanting in Denmark; but the recollection of the blows of 1864 was still too keen for the Danes to venture on any sort of hostilities before the appearance of at least 40,000 French troops for the landing and before Napoleonic successes were announced. In Austria, where, ever since the Salzburg interview negotiations had been going on for an alliance with France, the moment for war was indeed regarded as very ill-chosen; but the war party, strengthened by Beust's intrigues and by hatred for Bismarck, still thought it inexpedient not to take advantage of the opportunity to humiliate Prussia and recover the Habsburg position in Germany, and gave a promise that the preparations for war should be immediately taken in hand, and after their completion, in the month of September, war should be declared against Prussia and the Austrian troops should march into Germany. A formal treaty of alliance between France and Austria had been already drawn up at St. Cloud and awaited signature; but this never took place; for the mobilisation could not be effected so quickly in Vienna as at Berlin, and before preparations were completed the tempter of St. Cloud was already behind lock and key.

Italy occupied the peculiar position of having both France and Prussia for her allies. To the latter she owed the possession of Lombardy, to the former that of Venetia. Thus the necessity of Italy's neutrality was a foregone conclusion. Yet it appears that the king and a notable party of generals and statesmen might have been won over by Napoleon if he had assured them the delivery of Rome into their hands as the price of the alliance. Perhaps at this price alone could the dislike of the parliamentary opposition to a French alliance have been overcome. But Napoleon, in whose military programme the Pope and the Jesuits played so important a part, rejected the request of the Italian government; Italy then remained neutral and seized the favourable opportunity to take what she wanted herself. The events of 1866 were here repeated in their results.

Thus France was isolated. She had begun the war by herself, and must also go through with it alone. The fair speeches of French diplomatists and the later journey of the French statesman, Thiers, to London, Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, changed nothing of this. All the states showed a marked preference for neutrality, though they did not all observe it very strictly—as, for example, England and the United States of North America, which provided the French ships with coal, and in the second stage of the war sold to the French army weapons, without which those in power would not have been able to continue the struggle. The Spanish government, which



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NAPOLÉON III AND BISMARCK ON THE MORNING AFTER SEDAN

(From the painting by Camphausen)

[1870 A.D.]

had been forbidden by Gramont's declarations to persist in the Hohenzollern candidature, showed very little sense of honour in face of this arrogance. It confirmed Prince Leopold's declaration of July 12th, declared that the whole affair no longer interested Spain, and the prime minister, Prim, looked about for another candidate. Only one state showed a regard for right and honour, and that was Russia. Germany went to war without a single ally, and might esteem herself fortunate that she had none; for in 1814 and 1815 she had had to perform the hardest part of the task, only to receive the most insignificant share of the booty and to see her most important and reasonable suggestions and demands treated as waste paper. In 1870 Germany was strong enough to enter alone on the struggle with France; if the struggle ended victoriously, she was also strong enough to turn a deaf ear to the urgent voices in favour of peace, and to keep at arm's length the compassionate brothers from London and other places while she dictated conditions of peace at her own discretion, and in this as in the war to act only in accordance with her own interests.

But still it was fortunate for Germany that she had some one to cover her rear and make it possible for her almost entirely to denude her eastern provinces of troops and bring whole army corps to the seat of war. It was the declaration made by the emperor Alexander at the beginning of the war which kept the sword of Austria and, perhaps, those of other states, in the sheath. He would, he said, remain neutral so long as the other powers did the same; but so soon as a third power joined in the war and appeared on the side of France he would likewise do his part and come forward as the ally of Prussia. By this firm attitude of the emperor Alexander the Franco-German War was localised and hindered from developing into a European one. If at any stage of the war Austria sent troops into Germany, the Russians would march into Austria and take the opportunity to revenge themselves for 1854. At the close of the war King William addressed a telegram on this subject to the emperor Alexander; it was dated the 27th of February, 1871, and ran thus: "Prussia will never forget that she owes it to you that the war did not assume the utmost dimensions."^f

The story of the war has already been told in our history of France (Volume XIII), and need not be repeated here. Every reader will recall the chief incidents of the brief but epoch-making conflict—the decisive engagement at Sedan, which resulted in the surrender of the French emperor; the capitulation of Bazaine at Metz; the investment and final capture of Paris. There are but two scenes in this dramatic story which we shall dwell upon here. One of these has to do with the victory of Sedan, through which the foundations were laid for all the successes that followed; the other depicts that culminating event in which King William of Prussia became Emperor William I of a united Germany. We shall introduce the picture of Sedan, not to add any new facts to the story as it has already been told in our earlier volume, but to illustrate the personal character of the Prussian king; for the account which we present is given in his own words, in three messages to his wife. These messages speak for themselves and make comment superfluous:^a

BEFORE SEDAN, September 2nd, 1:30 P.M.

TO QUEEN AUGUSTA AT BERLIN:

The capitulation by which the whole of the army in Sedan yield themselves prisoners of war has just been concluded with General Wimpffen, who takes command in place of Marshal MacMahon, wounded. The emperor surrendered only his own person to me, as he does not hold the command, and leaves everything to the regency at Paris. I shall settle his place of residence after I have spoken to him in a rendezvous which is to take place immediately.

What a turn of fortune, by God's providence!

WILHELM.

[1870 A.D.]

VENDRESSE, September 4th, 8 A.M.

What an agitating moment, that of the meeting with Napoleon! He was cast down, but dignified in bearing and resigned. I have assigned Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel to him as a residence. Our meeting took place in a little château in front of the western glacis of Sedan. You can imagine my reception by the troops! Indescribable! By the fall of dusk, 7:30, I had finished my five hours' ride, but did not get back here till one o'clock.

God help us farther!

WILHELM.

VENDRESSE, SOUTH OF SEDAN, September 3rd.

TO QUEEN AUGUSTA AT BERLIN:

From my three telegrams you know the full magnitude of the great historic event that has come to pass! It is a dream, even to us who have seen it unfold from hour to hour.

When I reflect that I who, after one great and successful war, could not reasonably expect to witness anything more glorious in the course of my reign, now see this epoch-making act ensue, I humble myself before God who alone has chosen me, my army, and my allies, to bring that about which has come to pass and has appointed us the instruments of his will. This is the only light in which I can look upon it, and praise the mercy and guiding hand of God. Now listen to a description, in briefest outline, of the battle and its consequences.

On the evening of the 31st and the early morning of the 1st the army arrived at the positions it had been directed to take up round about Sedan. The Bavarians were on the left wing at Bazeilles on the Maas; next to them were the Saxons, towards Moncelle and Daigny, the guards were on the march to Givonne, the 6th and 11th corps to St. Menges and Fleigneux. Here the Maas makes a sharp bend, so that no corps was posted between St. Menges and Donchery, but the Württembergers were at the latter place, where they served the further purpose of protecting the rear from sorties from Mézières. Count Stolberg's division of cavalry formed the right wing, on the plain of Donchery. On the front, towards Sedan, were the rest of the Bavarians.

In spite of the thick fog the fight began at Bazeilles early in the morning, and gradually developed into a very fierce engagement, in which the houses had to be taken one by one, which lasted nearly the whole day, and in which Schöler's Erfurt division (from the reserve, 4th corps) had to lend a hand. When I reached the front of Sedan, at eight o'clock, the great battery was just opening fire upon the fortifications. A fierce artillery fight now arose on all sides, which lasted for hours, and during which our men gradually gained ground. The villages I have mentioned were taken.

Very deep ravines clothed with forest impeded the advance of the infantry and favoured defensive operations. The villages of Illy and Floing were taken and the circle of fire gradually contracted about Sedan. It was a magnificent sight from our position on a commanding height behind the battery I have mentioned, in front and to the right of Frénois and above Petit Torcy. The vigour of the enemy's resistance began to slacken by degrees, as we could see from the scattered battalions which hastily retreated at a run from the woods and villages. The cavalry attempted an attack on some of the battalions of our 5th corps, which behaved admirably; the cavalry dashed through the open spaces of the battalions, wheeled round, and came back the same way; this was done by three different regiments in turn, so that the ground was strewn with the bodies of men and horses—all of which we could see from our position. I have not yet been able to find out the number of this brave regiment.

In many places the enemy's retreat had resolved itself into flight, and infantry, cavalry, artillery, all were crowding into the town and its immediate neighbourhood; and yet there was no sign that the enemy purposed to extricate themselves from this desperate situation by capitulating, and consequently we had no choice but to bombard the town with the battery before spoken of. In about twenty minutes it was on fire in several places—which combined with the many burning villages within the area of the fight to present an awful spectacle—and I therefore silenced the fire and sent Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf from the staff with a white flag to parley and offer terms of capitulation to the fortress and army. He was met by a Bavarian officer despatched to tell me that a French officer with a flag of truce had appeared at the gates. Lieutenant-Colonel von Bronsart was admitted, and on asking for the general *en chef* was to his surprise taken to the emperor, who desired to intrust him with a letter for me. When the emperor inquired what his orders were and received the answer, "To call upon the army and fortress to surrender," he answered that on this point he must address himself to General von Wimpffen, who had just taken over the command from MacMahon, who was wounded, and that he himself would send his letter to me by Reille, his adjutant-general. It was seven o'clock when Reille and Bronsart arrived, the latter somewhat the earlier of the two, and from him we first learned the certainty of the emperor's presence. You can imagine the effect of the news upon all of us and on me above all! Reille sprang from his horse and handed me the emperor's letter, adding that he had no further orders. Before opening the letter I said to him, "But I require as a primary condition that the army shall lay down its arms." The letter begins, "*N'ayant pas pu mourir à la tête de mes troupes, je dépose mon épée à votre majesté*"; leaving everything else to me.

My answer was that I deplored the way in which we met and begged him to send an offi-

[1870-1871 A.D.]

eer with full powers to conclude a capitulation. By two o'clock on the morning of the 2nd no word had come from Moltke concerning the negotiations for capitulation which was to have taken place at Donchery, and I therefore drove to the battle-field at eight in the morning, as had been agreed, and met Moltke, who was coming to me to get my assent to the capitulation proposals, and who informed me at the same time that the emperor had left Sedan at five in the morning and had come to Donchery too. As he wished to see me, and there was a little château in the neighbourhood with a park, I chose that as our meeting-place. At ten o'clock I reached the heights in front of Sedan, at twelve Moltke and Bismarck appeared with the deed of capitulation executed, at one o'clock I started off with Fritz, accompanied by the cavalry staff officers. I dismounted in front of the château, where the emperor came to meet me. The visit lasted a quarter of an hour; we were both deeply moved at meeting again thus.

What I felt, who had seen Napoleon at the height of his power only three years ago, I cannot describe. After this interview I rode through the whole of the army before Sedan, which took from two-thirty to seven-thirty. I cannot describe to you to-day my reception by the troops nor the meeting with the decimated guard; I was profoundly moved by so many proofs of love and devotion. Now farewell, with a heart full of emotion at the end of a letter like this!

WILHELM. *g*

These despatches and this letter, as Sheibert,^g from whose work we quote them, says, "show forth the noble and devout spirit of the German monarch, and the feeling of the times." It is not difficult to imagine the excitement which such news created in Germany.^a Berlin gave way to a tumult of joy. Crowds swarmed in front of the royal palace, sung the national hymn, and gave vent to their joy by shouting "Hurrah! *Hoch! Hoch!*" and in every possible way. Her majesty the queen herself came out upon the balcony, ordered a chamberlain to read aloud the king's despatch once more, and constantly waved her handkerchief to the assembled people.

The monument to King Frederick II opposite the palace was gorgeously decorated with flowers, and a boy had climbed to the very top in order to crown the statue with a wreath. Arrested in this act by the police, he was nevertheless immediately after summoned by one of the royal lackeys to the queen, who regarded his patriotic venture from another aspect, and rewarded him with a cup full of hard thalers. For hours together the people swarmed in front of the palace, all of them wishing to see the queen.^h

KING WILLIAM PROCLAIMED EMPEROR (JANUARY 18TH, 1871)

This was in September. The other great dramatic episode to which we have referred took place four months later at Versailles, whilst the army of invasion lay about the doomed city of Paris.^a Following the lead of the grand duke Frederick of Baden, the south German states had approached the North German Confederation, or rather put their hands into the one which was offered to them. Already at the end of October began the negotiations at Versailles, where little by little the structure was built up which we now call the German Empire.

Baden and Giessen concluded on the 15th, Bavaria on the 23rd, and Würtemberg on the 25th of November the treaties of union, to which separate treaties with Baden and Würtemberg containing special conventions regarding the army were added. And in the first days of the New Year the decree was to go forth concerning this structure, and King William, the leader of the German army, was to be proclaimed emperor of Germany. On New Year's Day the official announcement of the foundation of the German Empire had been made; on the 18th of January the great day of commemoration for the Hohenzollern-Prussian dynasty, the solemn proclamation of the emperor was to take place. All the generals of the troops which were in the neighbourhood, as well as delegations from the different regiments, assembled with their flags in the "Hall of Mirrors" in the old royal castle at Versailles, in which

plans had so often been made for the destruction of Germany; and here, in the midst of the armed and unarmed representatives of the German nation and its princes, old King William accepted the German imperial crown. The resounding shouts which hailed the German emperor found an enthusiastic echo in the fields beyond and at home in the new German Empire.

But to the German army the following order of the day was addressed by the emperor:

On this day, memorable for me and my house, I, supported by all German princes and with the consent of all German peoples, assume in addition to the dignity of king of Prussia which I inherited, by God's grace the dignity of German emperor. It is owing to your bravery and steadfastness in this war, for which I have repeatedly expressed to you my fullest appreciation, that the work of the internal unity of Germany has been hastened—a result you have fought for at the risk of your blood and of your lives. Always remember that the sentiment of honour, faithfulness, comradeship, courage, and obedience make an army great and victorious; keep up these old traditions, and the "fatherland" will always look upon you with pride as it does to-day and you will always be its strong arm.

(Signed)

WILLIAM.

VERSAILLES, January 18th, 1871.

"Feelings not to be expressed were inspired in us," says a hearer, "when these simple yet forcible words which spoke such great things to us were read out. All toils, all fatigues were forgotten. A change of world-wide import had taken place in our own vicinity and by our means—a change whose consequences we were not yet able to measure, only to guess at. The humiliation of centuries had been wiped out, a deep-seated longing of all Germans had found its fulfilment. Strongly united the German races stood there: a powerful German emperor once again held the protecting sword over the German land. And we had helped to bring all this about by our own toilsome labours during the war; the great object had been attained. If now, after the lapse of years, we wish to recall the feelings of that great day, we shall scarcely succeed; the enthusiasm of that time was too great, the flight too high."

THE END OF THE WAR

On the day following the coronation of the German emperor Trochu made the last sortie from Paris with 100,000 men, but was everywhere driven back. On the 21st Trochu was deprived of his command, disturbances arose, and on the 23rd Jules Favre began the negotiations for surrender. On the 28th of January the convention was concluded before Versailles. The following were the terms of the armistice:

Article 1. A general armistice of twenty-one days is to begin; the line of demarcation is defined. Article 2. Elections are to take place for an assembly in Bordeaux. Article 3. All forts on the outer line of defence are to be surrendered. Article 4. During the armistice the German army shall not enter Paris. Article 5. The guns are to be removed from the ramparts. Article 6. The garrisons of Paris and the forts are prisoners of war. Article 7. The national guard is to retain its weapons and take charge of the protection of Paris. Articles 8 and 9. The provisioning of the town is permitted. Article 10. Stipulations concerning the surrender of the town. Article 11. The town is to pay 200,000,000 francs. Articles 12 and 13. Prohibition of the removal of valuables and the introduction of weapons. Article 14. Exchange of prisoners. Article 15. A postal service for unsealed letters is to be instituted.

In Germany 385,000 French soldiers were prisoners, in Paris 150,000, almost 100,000 in Belgium and Switzerland; 22,000 fortresses and 25 departments were in the hands of the Germans, besides a large quantity of war material. Nearly 1,000,000 Germans were on French soil. Yet although under



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KING WILLIAM I OF PRUSSIA PROCLAIMED GERMAN EMPEROR AT VERSAILLES, JANUARY 18TH, 1871


(From the painting by Anton von Werner)

[1871 A.D.]

such circumstances the continuation of the war was a folly, Gambetta protested against the armistice and sought to put difficulties in the way of the elections; but on the 6th of February he resigned. On the 13th the national assembly in Bordeaux was opened and elected Thiers head of the government. On the 21st of February he appeared at Versailles, where extremely excited negotiations took place. Thiers, who was anxious to save Metz, Belfort, and several milliards, won England's intercession for the latter, and obtained the relinquishment of Belfort and some milliards. On the 26th of February the preliminaries were signed by Bismarck, the Bavarian minister Von Bray, the Würtemberg minister Von Wächter, the Badenese minister Jolly, and Thiers and Favre.

Article 1. Alsace, except Belfort, German Lorraine with Metz, are to be surrendered. Article 2. Five milliards of francs are to be paid, one at least in the course of the year 1871, the rest in the course of three years. Article 3. The evacuation to begin after the ratification by the national assembly, but as a pledge six departments with Belfort to remain occupied by fifty thousand men. Articles 4 and 6. Stipulations concerning the maintenance of the troops, commercial facilities for the districts surrendered, and permission to emigrate from them, and restoration of prisoners. Article 7. The definitive peace to be considered at conferences at Brussels. Articles 8 and 10. Stipulations concerning the administration of the conquered districts and concerning the ratifications. In two supplementary conventions it was agreed that on the 1st of March a portion of Paris should be occupied by thirty thousand German soldiers. On the 1st and 2nd of March a parade was held at Longchamps; the troops made their entry undisturbed, though Eugénie had begged by telegram that this might be omitted. The rest of the troops were also allowed to enter without arms for the purpose of inspecting the city. On the 2nd of March the preliminaries were ratified, and on the 3rd the evacuation took place. On the 7th the emperor William I. quitted Versailles.





CHAPTER XII

GERMANY SINCE 1871

THE overthrow of the first European power and the establishment of a German central power were bound to have a decisive significance for European relations. This was already apparent during the war. After the catastrophe of the Napoleonic empire, Rome, which had been evacuated by the French at the end of July, was occupied by the Italians on the 20th of September, 1870, this being the crowning point of their national unification. By a note of the 1st of October, however, Russia broke the treaty securing the neutrality of the Black Sea, the chief accomplishment of the Crimean War, and united her relations with Germany more closely, as was in harmony with the personal inclination of the emperor Alexander II and the interests of both empires. But Austria, too, abandoned the policy she had followed since 1866 and drew nearer to the German Empire, and as early as September, 1871, both emperors met in Salzburg for the first time since 1865. Moreover, after the retirement of Count Beust on the 1st of November, 1871, his successor, Count Julius Andrassy, maintained the attitude assumed by his predecessor, under stress of political necessity, with the deepest conviction. And so at the meeting of the three emperors in Berliu in September, 1872, most brilliant expression was found for the close understanding between the three eastern powers in the "league of the three emperors" (*Dreikaiserbündnis*). Italy, too, liberated from the oppression of French supremacy, made friendly overtures to the league of the three emperors, and King Victor Emmanuel of Italy exchanged visits with the rulers of Germany and of Austria (1873 and 1875). For two decades the pivot of European policy was in the German capital.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Not to dominate Europe, however, but to win peace for Germany and Europe was the motive actuating Prince Bismarck in his manipulation of German superiority—a policy of unexampled moderation after unexampled

[1872-1887 A.D.]

victories, which made it difficult for the world to grow accustomed to believe in him. But peace rested on the fact that France was kept in that isolated position into which the war had plunged her, for only thus was her burning desire for revenge to be cooled. Under the guidance of Adolphe Thiers she rose with surprising power from the depths of her destruction. He retired on the 24th of May, 1873, under the presidency of Marshal MacMahon, the "gloriously defeated hero" of Sedan; it was now attempted to restore the monarchy of the house of Bourbon-Orleans in the person of Henri, Comte de Chambord; but the plan failed in October, 1873, and the tottering French Republic steadied itself, and on the resignation of the marshal, whose views were really monarchical, on the 30th of January, 1879, it put at the helm honourable adherents of its own, like Jules Grévy and Léon Gambetta. Certainly it founded no general democracy, but rather a moneyed oligarchy of stockbrokers and advocates, in which, side by side with the financial interests of the different groups of adventurers, the principal sources of opposition between clericalism and the religious liberalism of the free-thinkers contended with one another, and all that was left to unite them in a single idea was the lust for revenge. But France did not acquire the capability to command alliance.

This state of affairs began to change its aspect when Germany's relation to Russia grew looser, for in Russia the influence of the Panslavists grew stronger and stronger; they thought to erect a radical democracy under the national despotism of the czar, and with it to reduce the "debased West" to the supremacy of the young Slav movement under the guidance of orthodox Russia; but for the attainment of this future ambition they recognised the German Empire and Austria as most serious obstacles. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 to 1878, a campaign for the liberation of the Christians in the Balkan states, led only to a partial success, for Austria and England were determined on war when the Russians stood before Constantinople in February, 1878, and the congress of Berlin (from June 13th to July 13th, 1878) under the presidency of Prince Bismarck compelled the Russians to content themselves with a moderate acquisition of territory in Asia, with the extension of their frontiers to the mouth of the Danube, and with the formation of two Bulgarian vassal states; they were even obliged to acquiesce in the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria (1878).

As all the deep rancour of the Russians was directed against Prince Bismarck, the "honest jobber" (*ehrlicher Makler*), he concluded a defensive alliance on the 7th of October, 1879, with Count Andrassy in Vienna. This German-Austrian defensive alliance provided that the two empires should assure each other full support in case one of them was attacked on two sides simultaneously (thus if Germany were so attacked by France and Russia); and in any war at least a friendly neutrality was to be observed. Thus the "further bond" (*weitere Bund*) planned in 1849, the national connection of Austria with the German confederate state, was brought to completion. It was renewed in 1883, and now brought Italy into the alliance. From this time the triple alliance of central Europe formed the strongest bulwark of the peace of Europe.

The emperor Alexander II was brutally murdered on the 13th of March, 1881. He was succeeded by his son Alexander III (1881 to 1894), and anti-German Panslavism now governed Russia. In spite of all this, Prince Bismarck yet understood not only how to preserve the alliance of the three emperors, but even on its expiration, on the 1st of April, 1884, to renew it in such a form that the three powers guaranteed to one another that they would preserve peace, and in case of dissension would attempt a peaceable settlement amongst one another. When this treaty also came to an end in 1887 and Austria refused to renew it in order to preserve a free hand over Turkey in the

East, Prince Bismarck still succeeded in guaranteeing the friendly neutrality (in case of a collision with England) of Germany towards Russia for three years by a treaty with her, and similarly he secured for Germany the neutrality of Russia in case of a war with France, while he protected at the same time the interests of Austria and of Italy. Thus the German Empire powerfully maintained her position as an instrumental and so a leading power, and preserved peace for herself as well as for all Europe.

FERMENTATION OF NATIONALITIES

The same principle of nationalities, on which the new configuration of central Europe rested, had an inherently disintegrating effect upon ancient Austria, especially in her parliamentary organisation. While in Hungary the Magyars recklessly maintained the supremacy of their national existence and of their language, and encountered but little resistance from the Germans in Hungary, except from those brave Transylvanian Saxons who at all events maintained their Protestant German churches and schools, the Germans in the west part of the empire had neither the geographical nor the national consolidation necessary for the attainment of a great position in European affairs. So there continued to exist a state of affairs that hesitated between the Slav clerical federalist tendency and the German liberal centralist tendency. A short rule of the former party under Count Hohenwart (1871) was followed, after the retirement of Beust, when his successor, Count AndrÁssy, took up office (14th of November, 1871), by the hegemony of Hungary which has prevailed from that time. In Austria it was succeeded during a series of years by the supremacy of German liberalism under the Auersperg ministry.

Acting in the spirit of centralism this ministry changed the Reichsrath from an assembly of delegates from the diets into a national assembly composed of direct representatives. The Czechs however obstinately refused to take part in it, and the ministry formally abandoned the concordat of 1874, without eradicating, it is true, the ultramontane sympathies of the clergy. Equally incapable was it of preventing the Czech population, which was favoured by an almost exclusively Czech clergy, by large land holdings and by the development of industry, from pushing farther and farther into the German border-districts of Bohemia and Moravia.

At last the German liberals themselves dug the grave of their supremacy; for, afraid of a strengthening of Slav superiority, they were short-sighted enough to oppose an occupation of Bosnia which was indispensable to the interests of the monarchy. The Auersperg ministry returned in February, 1879, and in August Count Edward Taaffe, a friend of the emperor's youth, led the government with a programme which aimed at the reconciliation of national differences by a policy of concession. When, further, the German liberals refused to pass the military law embodied in a proposal for the establishment of a ten years' peace, Taaffe for the first time granted in principle an official equality to the Czechs in the Bohemian and Moravian ordinance for the regulation of languages, of April, 1880, and replaced the German liberal members of his cabinet by Czechs and Poles. The Germans now drew closer together and attempted to protect by the German *Schulverein* their *Deutschthum*, but in Bohemia the opposing tendencies grew stronger from year to year. In 1882 the Czechs carried through the division of the University of Prague into two halves, and at the end of 1886 the German minority retired from the Bohemian diet. Also the Slovenes, a small peasant race without any written language, succeeded in impressing the Slav influence upon their schools.

This backward process of German culture before the advance of the less valuable semi-culture of small races was but imperfectly compensated for in

[1869-1899 A.D.]

the brilliant improvement of domestic concerns, the development of industry, chiefly in Bohemia, the expansion of a network of railways that grew thicker and thicker, the spread of trade especially in the Levant, the superb improvement of Vienna, etc.; and the sudden death of the talented crown prince, Archduke Rudolf, on the 30th of January, 1889, shrouded as it was in mystery, placed the future of the monarchy in a still more uncertain light. Finally, out of all this confusion the only points firmly established came to be the absolutely natural geographical and economic association of these masses of territory with one another, the old tradition of the coherence of the state, and the ruling house, especially the personality of the emperor Francis Joseph, who, although insisting on the clear emphasis of his will, has always known in a marvellous way how to produce the feeling that he was equally close to all his peoples.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL INTERESTS

Quite different was the impression made upon the Germans in the empire by the emperor William I and his imperial chancellor Prince Bismarck, who were regarded not only as the founders but also as the embodiment of the national greatness of Germany. For this Hohenzollern was a king from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet. He combined a dignified majesty with willing mildness, a princely consciousness of his own qualities and an iron will with a simple modesty, an almost unerring knowledge of mankind with a touching devotion to his great counsellors, an honourable piety with a large-hearted tolerance, and even in his extreme old age he combined a tranquillity of demeanour with a wonderful capacity for projecting himself into the mysteries of new enterprises. Thus he acquired the unanimous veneration of all races and all circles, from the princely palace to the simple hut, and with every year he grew more firmly attached to the hearts of his Germans. But in Prince Bismarck the nation came more and more to recognise the mightiest embodiment of German character since Martin Luther. While he conducted the foreign policy, first of Prussia, then of the empire, with the most brilliant results, his inspired vision and his iron will made quite new paths for the inner development of the nation as well, so that attaching himself now to this party, now to that, changing his methods according to his circumstances and always victorious over all "frictions" even in court circles, he steadfastly and unceasingly pursued his sole aim: the greatness of his fatherland.

In constructing the empire like this, the national liberal party, that is to say, the heart of the property-owning bourgeois classes, was in the nature of things in the foreground; for in this party the yearning after national unity had been the liveliest, and the conservatives followed the new and daring flights of the great chancellor only after much hesitation. In this most doctrinaire of nations there grew up side by side two international parties, which were either hostile to the new national unity or indifferent to it. Separated from the adherents of Lassalle, whose programme was still national on the whole, A. Bebel and W. Liebknecht formed an international social democratic party under the influence of the London agitators Marx and Engel. In 1869 the programme of its "future state" (*Zukunftsstaat*) was announced at Eisenach; it included: "Cooperative production, a universal, equal and direct vote for all representative bodies at a majority of twenty years, direct legislation by the people, national defence, abolition of all indirect taxation, and a progressive income tax." With the rapid growth of national well-being, and the increased facilities for communication, above all with that "boon of the millions" which covered the country with stock-companies of the most different

[The five milliards war indemnity paid by France to Germany after the war of 1870-71.]

kinds, and everywhere increased the demands on life, the labouring classes, the "fourth estate," acquired self-assurance and greed. They saw in social democracy that they were all the more represented, inasmuch as the liberalism of the bourgeois classes was still entirely removed from all thought of yielding state help for the grievous and undeniable needs of the fourth estate, in marked contrast with their frequent readiness to pursue their own self-seeking enterprises, and with their widespread material view of the world, in which terrestrial well-being was made to appear the highest of all blessings. Thus Bebel's teaching brought over even the adherents of Lassalle to the Eisenach programme in 1875, made common cause with his fellow-thinkers all over middle and western Europe, resulted in the formation of a great international league in September, 1877, and won, by means of restless and unscrupulous agitation, in debate and in the press, one seat after another in the Reichstag.

THE HIERARCHY OF THE CHURCH

If the social and economical interests may be seen here to have submerged the national instinct, so too this instinct in other circles was forced into the background by the hierarchy of the church. Even the German bishops after some opposition at the beginning had submitted to the new dogma of papal infallibility. The "old Catholic" movement which refused to go beyond what was laid down in the council of Trent was conducted by only a few scholars, like J. J. I. von Döllinger, J. H. Reinkens, J. von Schulte, and confined itself to narrow circles; the great mass of priests and laymen submitted to the dogma now expressly represented by the bishops.

At first Prince Bismarck had allowed this theoretical declaration of war by the papacy against the modern state to remain unnoticed. But immediately after the war Ludwig Windthorst and Peter Reichensperger formed a confessional Catholic party of sixty-three members for the Reichstag, the Centre party, in order thereby to furnish the interests of their church with such backing as they had lost by the secession of Austria from the German state community. They demanded restoration of the ecclesiastical state "freedom" of the church and the expansion of the empire on a "federative" basis. In June, 1871, the Prussian government abolished the Catholic section of the ministry of public instruction, because it had become a church weapon against the state, and an imperial law of December, 1871, threatened with punishment every abuse of the pulpit with a view to raising agitation.

Hereupon the new minister of public instruction (from January, 1872), Adalbert Falk, who, jurist and doctrinaire as he was, went much further in resistance to the aggressions of the Roman Church than was wise or necessary, introduced for Prussia a law of school inspection, and for the empire a law compelling the expulsion of the Jesuits (on the 4th of July, 1872), and finally, in 1873, the "May laws," which included the limitation of ecclesiastical vindictive jurisdiction to purely ecclesiastical matters, training of priests exclusively in German institutions, state inspection of ecclesiastical institutions, compulsory notice by ecclesiastical superiors on appointment of their inferiors to office, and a royal disciplinary court of justice for ecclesiastical concerns. Other laws transferred the pecuniary control of vacant bishoprics to royal commissioners (May, 1874) and that of parishes to a secular body representing the parish (June, 1875); that of all dioceses was placed under state supervision (July, 1876), priests at loggerheads with one another were deprived of state fees (April, 1875), and all religious foundations not devoted to healing the sick were abolished (May, 1875). The introduction of civil marriage into Prussia in 1874, and into the whole empire in 1875, was calculated to preserve the solemnisation of marriage from all abuse at the hands of the ecclesiastical

[1872-1886 A.D.]

power. But the hope that was entertained of separating the Catholic laymen from the clergy, and so compelling the latter to submit, was a total fiasco, and the clergy, starting with the assumption that all these laws were invalid because they lacked the sanction of the church, offered the most obstinate resistance. So, at the end of 1876, seven out of twelve Prussian bishops gradually came to be dispossessed by sentence, a thousand parsonages were left vacant, and ill feeling was further increased by frequent agitation in the *Kaplanspresse*, which shot into rapid notoriety, agitation that was demagogical and knew no bounds, so that on the 13th of July, 1874, a fanatic in Kissingen went so far as to attempt to murder Prince Bismarck.

These contests between the sovereign state and the church, which at the same time disputed with it that sovereignty, prehistoric conflicts receiving illustration anew in modern form, naturally impeded to no small degree the expansion of the empire. And yet it made vigorous progress. The French war indemnity was devoted to compensating the damage done in the war, repairing the material of the army and the barracks, building ships, helping the wounded, rewarding especially deserving generals and statesmen, and forming an imperial war fund of 120,000,000 marks. Alsace-Lorraine, being "imperial territory" under the joint sovereignty of the empire, received a new university as early as 1872 in Strasburg, and, after a short period of dictatorship, a kind of representation in the governing committee (*Landesausschuss*) and the right of sending its members to the Reichstag; it was also made secure by strong fortifications in Strasburg and Metz, as well as by the formation of a new army corps (the 15th). At last in 1879 the supreme control of the country was transferred from Berlin to Strasburg, and General Edwin von Manteuffel was placed at the head as imperial governor. In spite of the greatest precaution the population was won for Germany only by slow degrees. About one hundred and fifty thousand emigrated to France, and the Catholic priests as well as the upper classes who had become half French were for long in the main hostile.

UNIFICATION AND HOME RULE

New rivets to make the empire fast were found in the new ordinance for a single standard of measures, coinage, and weights (1873); in the magnificent development of the imperial postal and telegraphic system due to the intelligence of the imperial postmaster, Heinrich von Stephan (from 1870); in the army, the peace establishment of which was fixed for seven years in 1874 at 401,000 men; in the imperial navy, which in 1872 was placed under the imperial admiralty and built up according to the naval scheme of 1873; finally, in the unification of the regulations governing the courts of law in 1876, of which the crowning point was the establishment of the imperial court at Leipsic in 1879.

Meanwhile the separate states were concerned in an attempt to secure control in state and church matters by a more vigorous expansion of home rule. Prussia received a new classification in circles for the eastern provinces in 1872, gave a liberal spirit to its provincial diets in 1875, and gave the provinces a larger proportion of the French war indemnity for their own use. The provincial churches (*Landeskirche*) of the eastern provinces received a new parochial and synodal organisation in 1873, and in 1876 a general synod for all the old provinces. Saxony fared similarly under King Albert (from 1873); a single school system regulated and unified the whole province. In Bavaria, whose idealistic king, Ludwig II (1864 to 1886), took small pleasure in business, the diet was divided by a contest between two almost equally strong parties—the clerical old Bavarian particularists and the nationally dis-

posed liberals—so that the whole of legislation was obstructed; yet the minister Von Lutz knew at all events how to avoid a religious conflict. In Würtemberg the ministry of Mittnacht had to go through many a hard fight with a tough bourgeois particularist democracy; in Baden the ministry of Jolly continued for many years on the basis of a sound national liberal majority. Meanwhile the imperial idea in south Germany made decided progress.

In no respect was the empire so closely bound up with its co-ordinate states as in its finance. For to meet the ever-increasing tasks that were imposed upon it the empire had to look to the income from its indirect taxes, its duties, and its imperial regalia (post and telegraph); but besides this it was bound to continue to lay claim to the monetary contributions (*Matrikularbeiträge*) of the individual states; in this respect, therefore, it was dependent on them, and in other ways often influenced their finances in an irregular and damaging manner. For this reason Prince Bismarck wished to put the empire on its own feet by increasing its own income and to make the single states its boarders (*Kostgänger*), that is to say, its financial dependents. The first move was to carry out the splendid plan of bringing all the German railways into the possession of the empire, and so making an end at one blow to the ever-increasing confusion caused by eighty-two independent railway districts with sixty boards of directors, forty-nine of which were private undertakings; but this plan proved impracticable in 1876, for the secondary states offered the most determined opposition—all it did was to serve as an introduction for the general transformation of the railways into state property by the separate states. In the case of Prussia this was effected with most brilliant results by Albert Maybach (from 1879).

In his second course, that of raising the duties, Prince Bismarck encountered the opposition of the doctrine of free trade that prevailed everywhere. The abolition of the iron tax on the 1st of January, 1878, showed at last that one of the most important branches of German industry had been imperilled as a consequence of a practical application of this doctrine, and at the same time the rapid growth of social democracy showed that the state could not waste any further time before actively intervening between employers and workmen without prejudicing its own interests. In support of this view what was called *Kathedersozialismus* (Gustav Schmoller) brought forward the theories of political economy. The crisis, however, was not reached until in April, 1877, Prince Bismarck, weary of office and ill in health, handed in his resignation; and the emperor, recognising the incomparable merits of the great statesman, wrote upon it his "Never!" and accordingly expressed his willingness to give him a free hand.

Two foul attempts at murder were now aimed at the humane monarch, on the 11th of May and on the 2nd of June, 1878; with lightning flash they illuminated the abyss to which social democracy when left to itself had brought the German people. After the first attempt the Reichstag still refused to pass a special law against it; after the second attempt the newly elected Reichstag adopted one that had been better prepared, on the 19th of October, 1878, to extend until the 31st of May, 1881; this was several times prolonged (until 1890). Thus with one blow the whole social democratic press and the open organisation and agitation of a party that placed itself outside the pale of the law were suppressed.

IMMIGRATION

At the same time set in a great period of economic and social reform. By elaborate care it was made possible to separate the fourth estate from the mad illusions of the social democrat, to secure the national market for national production, to open large new markets and areas of trade for the acquisition

[1879-1896 A.D.]

of raw material from over sea—finally, to turn German emigration to the advantage of the nation. The reform duties of 1879 put import duties on corn, wood, and iron, and in 1881 was finally accomplished by law the addition of the two most powerful German ports, Hamburg and Bremen, to the German customs territory (*Zollgebiet*), together with preservation of an area indispensable for the interchange of their trade as mutually open ports. The “Zollverein” was thus brought to completion and the empire actually made financially independent. The royal message of November 17th, 1881, indicated the line to be taken by social reform. What the German monarchy had once undertaken for the peasant classes, what the guilds of the Middle Ages had once done for their artisans, was now attempted by the national policy of the emperor for his millions of industrial labourers by means of insurance against accidents, illness, and incapacitation, in the imperial laws of 1883.

Economic development was pursued still further. Since the foundation of the empire the population rose enormously (between 1871 and 1885 from 41,000,000 to 47,000,000); so too rose emigration across the seas, which was a total loss to the fatherland (in 1880 it reached its culminating point in 220,000). Exports rose between 1872 and 1875 from 2,500,000,000 to 2,900,000,000 marks; the merchant navy was increased between 1871 and 1885 from barely 1,000,000 to 1,294,000 tons. Under the influence of unlimited liberty of emigration and free trade there took place an ever-increasing movement of the population from the country and the small towns into the capitals, which consequently grew with a speed out of all proportion (between 1860 and 1888 Berlin rose from one half to one and a half millions); thus there was an ever-growing mass of the classes occupied in trade and industry, an ever-thickening immigration of Polish workmen and Polish-Jew retailers, from the thinly populated eastern provinces to them unlucrative to the great centres of industry and trade and to the farm lands in need of workmen as far as Westphalia. For West Prussia and Posen this caused a considerable check to the development of pure German nationality and German territorial ownership; for the large towns, however, especially for Berlin, it meant an unhealthy increase of only semi-Germanised Jewish inhabitants (as early as 1880 54,000 of the 364,000 Prussian Jews lived in Berlin), and the overflow of this semi-foreign element into the stock exchange and the press as well as into some of the learned professions.

While these evils were combated with small success on the whole by the anti-Semitic movement, now by moderate measures and now with more violence, the Prussian government sought to counteract the progress of Polish influence in the east in 1885 by sweeping edicts of expulsion directed against the Polish-Russian immigrants. Once more it took up the policy of interior German colonisation which distinguished the earlier Hohenzollerns; in 1886 it obtained a grant from the diet for 100,000,000 marks with which to acquire Polish property in Posen and West Prussia and to settle German colonists in it (up to the end of 1896, 10,000 persons over an area of 92,000 hektars). The formation of *Rentengüter*¹ from 1890 to 1891 contributed materially to the increase of peasant births in the east.

COLONISATION

With a slowness that is remarkable, the nation at last developed an understanding of the necessity of acquiring commerce beyond the sea. As late as 1880 the Reichstag was short-sighted enough to reject the proposal of the

[¹ *Rentengüter* are pieces of land the possession of which is secured to the tenant in return for a fixed rent.]

imperial chancellor to guarantee the interest on the bonds of the German Trade-and-Plantation Company of the South Sea Islands located on the Samoa group, and only with great difficulty did the German Colonial Society from 1882 and the German Colonising Company from 1883 succeed in preparing the ground in the mother country for colonial enterprise. More immediate was the operative effect of the German travellers, Paul Pogge, Hermann Wissmann, and others, and the enterprising trade houses, especially the Hanseatic ones, which set up their factories on the west and east coasts of Africa in territory as yet ungoverned, and the Rhenish missionaries who had worked with much success, for example, in the Hottentot country of southwest Africa.

It was here that the merchant Lüderitz from Bremen acquired extensive authority in the neighbourhood of Angra Pequena, and Prince Bismarck inaugurated the official colonial policy of Germany when, by his telegram of the 24th of April, 1884, he placed Lüderitz and his acquisitions under the protection of the empire and then caused the German flag to be hoisted at several points along the coast. In July of the same year the experienced African traveller, Gustav Nachtigal, as imperial commissioner, took possession of Togoland not far from the old and ruined settlements of the Great Elector, and also the Cameroons at the foot of the mighty "Mountain of the Gods." Towards the end of the year Karl Peters by a succession of treaties founded the German protectorate in central east Africa. The African conference in Berlin (from the 15th of November, 1884, until the 26th of February, 1885) under Bismarck's guidance declared all equatorial Africa to be a kind of free-trade area, granted France a large slice of the lower Kongo, recognised the independence of the Kongo Free State, the foundation of King Leopold II of Belgium, and made it the duty of all colonial powers to come to an agreement with one another on the occasion of fresh aggrandisements. English colonial monopoly was thereby broken and a juster distribution of colonial possession was at all events inaugurated. Peculiar difficulties were afterwards caused to Germany by her largest possession, East Africa, in the necessity for securing it against the claims of the sultan of Zanzibar, and forcibly subduing a rising of the Arabs who had hitherto reigned there in undisturbed possession (1888). This was accomplished with brilliant success between 1889 and 1890 by Hermann von Wissmann, as imperial commissioner.

In tropical Australasia also the empire set its foot between 1884 and 1885 by the acquisition of the Bismarck Archipelago, the northeast of New Guinea, and the Marshall Islands; and in the same year the Reichstag granted considerable subsidies for two postal steamship lines to eastern Asia and to Australia. If [German] Southwest Africa is the only one of the new colonies which may be regarded as suitable for emigration, and the others are to be considered only plantations, nevertheless Germany has entered the rank of colonial states and so of world power. The expansion of the German navy certainly did not keep pace with this rapid growth of interest beyond the seas, for the first two heads of the admiralty, generals Von Stosch and Von Caprivi, still treated the fleet more as an instrument for the defence of the coasts than for dominion over the sea.

THE SPIRIT OF CONSOLIDATION

With the internal peace and well-being of Germany, the final and the highest aim of all these enterprises, was destined to be associated that ecclesiastical peace which the *Kulturkampf* had interrupted for the Catholic Germans. Social as well as political considerations pointed to the attainment of such a peace. At the same time the secession of a large fraction of the liberals (since 1879) from the new policy of taxation and economic adjustment com-

[1878-1889 A.D.]

pelled Prince Bismarck to come to an understanding with the Centre, and this involved concessions to the church. Moreover, a change of front in the papacy seemed more possible under Leo XIII, who succeeded to Pius IX in 1878, than under Pius himself.

Consequently Falk was replaced in July, 1879, by Puttkamer, who again, on becoming minister of the interior, was succeeded by Von Gossler. The abolition of several punitive enactments in the May laws made it now possible to restore regular incumbents in the majority of the vacant parishes; the majority of the deposed bishops, with the exception of Melchers of Cologne and Ledochowski of Gnesen and Posen, were enabled to return to their dioceses; and when in 1883 Leo XIII had given his consent to the law of notice on appointment, all the still unoccupied parsonages were filled, and in 1886 the new bishops also were nominated by papal brief with the assent of the territorial prince; finally, in 1887 a series of ecclesiastical orders was admitted. Thus the obligation to give notice on appointment was adhered to, as were also the participation of laymen in the ecclesiastical control of the parish and civil marriage; the Jesuits remained banished from the territory of the empire, and the Catholic section of the ministry of public worship was not re-established. Whatever material concessions the state may have made, it had yet preserved in the main the sovereignty of its legislation and of its administration.

Destructive and confusing as had been the effect of the *Kulturkampf*, the nation grew more and more consolidated. National holidays were made of Sedan day, the birthday of the emperor, and, more particularly since 1885, of the birthday of Prince Bismarck; everywhere rose innumerable monuments commemorating the great time of the wars of unification and their leaders—sometimes only simple stones, sometimes splendid works of art. In the middle strata of the nation was to be observed at the same time a clearer consciousness of the singleness of the empire. For the German princes, instead of wasting their powers on the maintenance of what was after all only an apparent sovereignty, followed the honourable example of the emperor William more and more by placing themselves in the service of the empire and becoming its best support. Only in this way could this monarchical federate state, the most difficult form in which a state can be united, acquire stability. This imperialistic temper stood the shock of even severe blows, as, for example, in Brunswick at the death of Duke William in 1884, when the Bundesrat of 1885 declared the accession of Duke Ernest Augustus of Cumberland as deficient so long as he, who was the son of King George V of Hanover, should not expressly have recognised the imperial constitution and the proprietary rights owned by the German states at that time, the result being that Prince Albert of Prussia was made regent; another case was that of Bavaria, when King Ludwig II had to be deposed on account of his lunacy and committed suicide in the Lake of Starnberg on the 13th of July, 1886, and when his brother Otto, also incurably insane, took his place under the regency of Prince Luitpold. Lively expression was given to the close interdependence of loyalty for the princely house at home with fidelity to the empire, in a number of brilliant celebrations, such as that of the seven hundred years' jubilee of Wittelsbach in Bavaria in 1880 and in the celebration commemorating the transference of the mark of Meissen eight hundred years ago to the house of Wettin, held in Saxony in 1889.

The immense development in intellectual life which many expected from the splendid renewal of a common national existence among the German people certainly did not answer these expectations, for periods of strong political movement and hard economical labour are rarely particularly productive of art. In the narrative fiction, in lyrics, especially in devotional lyrics, and at all events in certain branches of the drama, we have had much that is sound

and refreshing; portraiture, landscape, historical and religious painting, and modelling received many a fertile impulse from this great period through the increased penetration of vision into the life of nature and of the emotions; but especially since the eighties the realism which had long prevailed in France, Russia, and Norway entered into German art, substituting the characteristic for the beautiful and abolishing all artistic traditions. The most splendid tasks were imposed upon architecture and fulfilled by it, as the welfare of the country increased; certainly an independent style was never reached, but art industries made an extraordinary advance. The pre-eminence of German science remained undisputed, although specialisation made a survey of the larger areas of science more and more difficult.

Thus the nation which had risen to new power lived a rich life, but was penetrated by all the contradictions of the modern world and acquired no real harmony in its structure. Even that patriotic sentiment which is, as a matter of course, the property of cultured nations that have acquired political unity was, it must be admitted, not universal nor omnipresent in Germany, not to speak of that social democracy which is fundamentally international and so owns no fatherland. Obstinacy and doctrinarianism, prejudices and separate interests split up the Reichstag into contending parties, so that the master builder of the empire never obtained a firm majority for himself. Yet when the safety of the empire was in jeopardy the noise of factions was silent; the Reichstag elected in 1887, while men were still impressed with the hasty arming of France under Boulanger, granted an increase in the peace establishment of the army to 468,000 men for another seven years, that is to say, the formation of two new army corps—the 16th and the 17th. When, in spite of the treaty of neutrality of 1887, Russia kept on increasing the number of her troops in the western provinces, although not with a direct object of attack, the proposal for new defences (renewal of the *Landwehr* the second levy and establishment of a *Landsturm*) was almost unanimously accepted on the 6th of February, 1888, after a powerful speech by Prince Bismarck.

THE DEATH OF WILLIAM I (MARCH 9TH, 1888)

This was the last victory of the victorious emperor William, a ray of light in that deep distress which he felt for the crown prince Frederick William, his suffering son, who was already at that time doomed to a certain death and who was staying far away from home in San Remo.^b

The iron constitution which the emperor had kept unimpaired by habits of soldierly activity and a Spartan simplicity of life began to give way more and more frequently after a severe cold caught during the festivities at Holtenau, when he laid the foundation stone of the Baltic and North Sea Canal; and it was really a serious indisposition from which he rose to go in person to meet the emperor Alexander III of Russia on the 18th of November, on the occasion of his visit to Berlin.

The reports from San Remo steadily assumed a more melancholy tone, and meanwhile the powers of the aged emperor declined with alarming rapidity. Long before this he had been obliged to forego the dearest wish of his heart, which was to hasten in person to his son's sick-bed at San Remo; and more and more frequently did the people of Berlin wait in vain to see the figure of the venerable emperor appear at the historic corner window of the palace, whence he was wont to watch the parade of the guard at mid-day. Whenever he was able to appear there he was fond of setting his eldest great-grandson on the window-sill for the applauding crowd to see, and once—it was on Sunday, the 26th of February—three great-grandsons stood in front of the emperor, while their happy mother, the princess Augusta Victoria, stood by his side,

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the fourth in her arms. The indescribable and touching joy with which he was hailed on these occasions by a concourse of thousands must have poured balm, for the time at least, upon his bleeding heart, torn afresh in the midst of wearing grief by his son's hopeless malady, by the loss of a grandson of the finest promise, and by the death of Princee Ludwig Wilhelm of Baden in the flower of his manhood.

On the 3rd of March an attack of his old nephritic trouble compelled him to take to the bed from which he was not destined to rise. His power of psychical endurance had been undermined by mental agitation of the most painful kind, and unconquerable drowsiness coupled with complete loss of appetite brought on a rapid failure of physieal strength. The first official bulletin, published on the 7th, prepared the sorrow-stricken nation for the worst. During the night the grand duke and duchess of Baden, who had been summoned by telegraph, reached the deathbed of father and father-in-law. Early on the 8th the chancellor, Count Moltke, and the comptroller of the household passed through a crowd of tens of thousands which had been waiting with eager anxiety since the early hours of the morning in the avenue Unter den Linden and in the square in front of the Opera House for news of the dying emperor. The latter was still able to understand the prayers for the dying recited by the court chaplain, Doctor Kogel, and he responded to them with profound devotion and feeling. He then asked for Prince William and Field Marshal Moltke, and talked to the latter about the army, the possibilities of war, and German allianees. The grand duchess of Baden felt constrained to entreat her father not to overexert himself, whereupon the emperor answered, "I have no time to be tired now."

In the evening he fell asleep. All the bells of Berlin began to toll solemnly and in the capital it was supposed that he had already passed away, but he woke once more in the dark hours of Friday morning. At four o'clock the court chaplain offered up the following prayer:

"Be Thou my shield to comfort me in the hour of death, and let me see the image of Thy sufferings on the Cross. Then will I look towards Thee, then will I clasp Thee to my heart in faith. He who dies thus, dies well."

He next repeated the Lord's Prayer, in which the emperor joined, and then recited the first verse of the 27th Psalm, "The Lord is my light and salvation, whom then shall I fear?" and added the words, "I wait for the Lord, my soul doth wait, and in his word do I hope." The grand duchess asked, "Papa, do you understand?" and he answered, "It was beautiful." Again the grand duchess asked, "Do you know that mamma is sitting beside you and holding your hand?" He opened his eyes and turned a long, serene gaze upon the empress. His last look was for her.

It was half past nine on the morning of Friday the 9th of March, 1888, when all the church bells throughout the German Empire tolled to announce the passing of the noble emperor William, and the whole nation wore the aspect of a mourning congregation. The diet assembled at twenty-five minutes past twelve. The whole House rose to their feet as Prince Bismarck, mastering with difficulty his emotion, took up the word to announce that, his majesty the emperor William having been gathered to his fathers, the crown, and Prussia, and with it, by Article II of the Constitution, the dignity of emperor of Germany, had devolved upon his majesty Frederick III, king of Prussia. The chancellor had before him a sheet of paper with the emperor's last signature, written in order to give him authority to effect the impending prorogation of the diet. The chancellor had asked only for the initial letter of the emperor's name, but the dying emperor, with the industry and conscientiousness which ceased only with his life, had written his signature in full in a clear hand and with the usual flourish all complete, in spite of evident

traces of failing powers. The chancellor made no use of the authorisation to close the diet, because he assumed that it would and must remain sitting until the arrival of his majesty the emperor, but for the sake of the signature he deposited the now purposeless decree amongst the national records as an historical document. Then with quivering voice, pausing more than once lest he should break into audible sobs, he said that it was not for him in his official capacity to express the feelings which overwhelmed him at his master's death, the passing away of the first German emperor from their midst.^b

FREDERICK III—"UNSER FRITZ"

Emperor Frederick returned on the 11th of March from the Riviera to spend the winter at home, a dying man. His rule of ninety-nine days is an appalling tragedy, in which we see the painful helpless battle between the consuming disease and his princely sense of duty, a battle which the noble sufferer fought with the courage of a hero.^b



FREDERICK III
(1831-1888)

He immediately entered into communication with his people. The first order which he gave was to forbid national mourning to be regulated by ordinance; every Prussian and every German was to be influenced by his feelings without consulting the police. Then came the manifestoes: the Prussian proclamation "to my people," the letter to the chancellor, the messages from the king of Prussia to the two chambers of his parliament and from the emperor to the imperial parliament, the imperial proclamation to the imperial province of Alsace-Lorraine, and an order to the crown prince William.

The emperor expressed the hope that Germany, honoured in the council of nations, might be the hearth of peace. Indifferent, he said, to the glitter of great actions which procure glory, he would be satisfied if, later on, it was

said of his reign that he was serviceable to his people, useful to his country, and a blessing to the empire. He promised to respect the rights of his people, the rights of the German nation, the rights of the confederate princes, his allies. He said to the Prussian chambers that his conduct would assuredly be governed by the provisions of the constitution of the country. To the German parliament, he said: "We have the firm resolve to observe scrupulously the constitution of the empire, to maintain it, and therefore conscientiously to protect the constitutional rights of the federal states and those of the empire."

He repudiated a violent spirit in sect or clique, and declared to all his subjects that, to whatever religion they might belong, they were equally near to his heart. He wished to reconcile in social peace the rival interests of the different classes of society, and to make them all compete, by the accord of reciprocal rights, "in bringing about public prosperity, which remains the supreme law." He desired that higher education should be made accessible to

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wider strata of society. Against the ever-growing pretensions of "instruction," he stood up in defence of the "educating mission," working by means of religion, science, and art. To this it would be a "special gratification" to him to give its complete development. He hoped, so he continued, to find in others the good will and sincerity which were in himself. He asked his people to collaborate with him in their hearts, for it was in harmony with the customs of the nation that he wished to consolidate the constitution and the law. To struggle with social dangers, he told his people, he counted on a race trained in the healthy principles of the fear of God and in simple habits; to govern, he relied on the devotion of Bismarck and the aid of his consummate experience, on the unanimous collaboration of the organs of the empire, the devoted activity of popular representation and of men in authority, and on the constant co-operation of all classes of the people. He expressed undaunted confidence in the proved devotion and patriotism of the nation. He wished to live in firm union with his people, to be a just and faithful king in times of prosperity and in those of trouble.

This language of a Christian philosopher naturally touched men; nor were these the only words that made a deep impression on their hearts. Realisation of the difficulties attending the duty to be fulfilled and of the impossibility of putting an end to all the evils of society is found repeatedly; one perceives a sort of weariness accentuated by the fear of "shocks caused by frequent changes of the constitution and the laws"; a great desire for rest is apparent, and there is a prophetic note in the phrase, "during the time that God may grant me to reign." The shadow of death that hovered above this good man completed the mournful grandeur of the picture.^c

WILLIAM II AND THE FALL OF BISMARCK

Frederick died on the 15th of June, 1888, in the new palace at Potsdam; he was laid in his last resting-place with the sword which he had borne at Wörth on the day of his noblest victory, and his eldest son, Emperor William II (born 27th January, 1859), ascended the throne. While the German princes thronged round him when, on the 25th of June, for the first time he solemnly opened the Reichstag, they declared before the whole world that the German Empire was a solid and indestructible fabric, and the young ruler added his pledge that he would be the first servant of the state, connecting the future with the best and greatest traditions of the Hohenzollerns.^b

The first year of the new reign was uneventful. In his public speeches the emperor repeatedly expressed his reverence for the memory of his grandfather and his determination to continue his policy; but he also repudiated the attempt of the extreme conservatives to identify him with their party. He spent much time on journeys, visiting the chief courts of Europe, and he seemed to desire to preserve close friendship with other nations, especially with Russia and Great Britain. Changes were made in the higher posts of the army and civil service, and Moltke resigned the office of chief of the staff, which for thirty years he had held with such great distinction.

The beginning of the year 1890 brought a decisive event. The period of the Reichstag elected in 1887 expired, and the new elections, the first for a quinquennial period, would take place. The chief matter for decision was the fate of the socialist law; this expired September 30th, 1890. The government at the end of 1889 introduced a new law, which was altered in some minor matters and which was to be permanent. The conservatives were prepared to vote for it; the radicals and Centre opposed it; the decision rested with the national liberals, and they were willing to accept it on condition that the

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clause was omitted which allowed the state governments to exclude individuals from districts in which the state of siege had been proclaimed.

The final division took place on February 25th, 1890. An amendment had been carried omitting this clause, and the national liberals therefore voted for the bill in its amended form. The conservatives were ready to vote as the government wished; if Bismarck was content with the amended bill, they would vote for it, and it would be carried; no instructions were sent to the party; they therefore voted against the bill and it was lost. The house was immediately dissolved. It was to have been expected that, as in 1878, the



WILLIAM II
(1859)

government would appeal to the country to return a conservative majority willing to vote for a strong law against the socialists. Instead of this, the emperor, who was much interested in social reform, published two proclamations. In one addressed to the chancellor he declared his intention, as emperor, of bettering the lot of the working classes; for this purpose he proposed to call an international congress to consider the possibility of meeting the requirements and wishes of the working men; in the other, which he issued as king of Prussia, he declared that the regulation of the time and conditions of labour was the duty of the state, and the council of state was to be summoned to discuss this and kindred questions. Bismarck, who was less hopeful than the emperor and did not approve of this policy, was thereby prevented from influencing the elections as he would have wished to do; the coalition

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parties, in consequence, suffered severe loss; socialists, Centre, and radicals gained numerous seats. A few days after the election Bismarck was dismissed from office. The difference of opinion between him and the emperor was not confined to social reform; beyond this was the more serious question as to whether the chancellor or the emperor was to direct the course of the government. The emperor, who, as Bismarck said, intended to be his own chancellor, required Bismarck to draw up a decree reversing a cabinet order of Frederick William IV, which gave the Prussian minister-president the right of being the sole means of communication between the other ministers and the king. This Bismarck refused to do, and he was therefore ordered to send in his resignation.^d

BISMARCK IN RETIREMENT

After his retirement he resided at Friedrichsruh, near Hamburg, a house on his Lauenburg estates. His criticisms of the government, given sometimes in conversation, sometimes in the columns of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, caused an open breach between him and the emperor; and Caprivi, in a circular despatch, which was afterwards published, warned all German envoys that no real importance must be attached to what he said.^f

A short time after his fall, Bismarck illustrated his absorbing interest in politics by a pretty parable. One of his guests at breakfast having asked him why he, the prince, had so entirely given up his passionate love for the chase, he replied: "As to passions, they resemble the trout in my pond: one eats up the other, until there remains only one fat old trout. Thus gradually my passionate love for politics has devoured all other passions." Just as on this occasion, and as he had done in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* after the issue of the Caprivi order, so Bismarck also expressed himself to the delegations which from all parts of Germany came to Friedrichsruh to do him homage. Thus, for instance, on the 14th of June, to a deputation of the united moderate parties of Düsseldorf which presented him with an address, he said that, though retired from public life after a career of forty years in office, he was not able to forego his interest in politics, to which he had sacrificed all other inclinations and connections. At the same time nothing was further from his thoughts than the wish to influence anew the march of politics. The right of freely expressing his opinions, which belongs to every private person, was one of those privileges to which he was entitled, and he was quite able to take the full responsibility for his attitude.

Much more bitterly did he express himself on the 22nd of July, 1890, to a correspondent of the *Novoya Vremya*: "They are bestowing upon me in my lifetime the honours due to the dead. They are burying me like Marlborough. They desire not merely that Marlborough should not come back, but also that he may actually die or at least remain silent for the rest of his days. I must admit that to this end they give me every assistance, and none either of my political friends or of my numerous acquaintances puts temptation in my way by his visits. They cry 'Halt!' to me, they shun me like one infected with the plague, afraid as they are to compromise themselves by visiting me; and only my wife from time to time receives visits from her acquaintances. They cannot prevent me from thinking, but they would like me not to give expression to my thoughts, and were such a thing possible, they would long ago have put a muzzle on me."^g

A reconciliation between Bismarck and the emperor took place in 1893. The aged statesman retained all along a foremost place in the affections of the German people. His eightieth birthday was celebrated with great enthusiasm in 1895. A witticism of his pronounced on this occasion has become famous. "My dear sir," he said, in response to the conventional well-wishers, "the first

eighty years of a man's life are sure to be the happiest." Back of the jest lay probably a vein of bitterness at having to pass in the idleness of retirement such portion of the implied "second eighty years" as might be granted him—for the veteran retained his activity of mind to the end. He died on the 31st of July, 1898.^a

CHANCELLORSHIP OF COUNT VON CAPRIVI

Among those more immediately connected with the government, Bismarck's fall was accompanied by a feeling of relief which was not confined to the opposition, for the burden of his rule had pressed heavily upon all. There was, however, no change in the principles of government or avowed change in policy; some uncertainty of direction and sudden oscillations of policy showed the presence of a less experienced hand. Bismarck's successor, General von Caprivi, held a similar combination of offices, but the chief control passed now into the hands of the emperor himself. He aspired by his own will to direct the policy of the state; he put aside the reserve which in modern times is generally observed even by absolute rulers, and by his public speeches and personal influence took a part in political controversy. He made very evident the monarchical character of the Prussian state, and gave to the office of emperor a prominence greater than it had hitherto had.

One result of this was that it became increasingly difficult in political discussions to avoid criticising the words and actions of the emperor. Prosecutions for *lèse-majesté* became commoner than they were in former reigns, and the difficulty was much felt in the conduct of parliamentary debate. The rule adopted was that discussion was permitted on those speeches of the emperor which were officially published in the *Reichsanzeiger*. It was, indeed, not easy to combine that respect and reverence which the emperor required should be paid to him with that open criticism of his words which seemed necessary (even for self-defence) when the monarch condescended to become the censor of the opinions and actions of large parties and classes among his subjects.

The attempt to combine personal government with representative institutions was one of much interest; it was more successful than might have been anticipated, owing to the disorganisation of political parties and the absence of great political leaders; in Germany, as elsewhere, the parliaments had not succeeded in maintaining public interest, and it is worth noting that even the attendance of members was very irregular. There was below the surface much discontent and subdued criticism of the exaggeration of the monarchical power, which the Germans called *Byzantinismus*; but after all the nation seemed to welcome the government of the emperor, as it did that of Bismarck. The uneasiness which was caused at first by the unwonted vigour of his utterances subsided, as it became apparent how strong was his influence for peace, and with how many-sided an activity he supported and encouraged every side of national life. Another result of the personal government by the emperor was that it was impossible, in dealing with recent history, to determine how far the ministers of state were really responsible for the measures which they defended, and how far they were the instruments and mouthpieces of the policy of the emperor.

The first efforts of the "new course," as the new administration was termed, showed some attempt to reconcile to the government those parties and persons whom Bismarck had kept in opposition. The continuation of social reform was to win over the allegiance of the working men to the person of the emperor; an attempt was made to reconcile the Guelfs, and even the Poles were taken into favour; Windthorst was treated with marked distinction. The radicals alone, owing to their ill-timed criticism on the private

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relations of the imperial family and their continued opposition to the army, were excluded. The attempt, however, to unite and please all parties failed, as did the similar attempt in foreign policy. Naturally enough, it was social reform on which at first activity was concentrated, and the long-delayed factory legislation was now carried out. In 1887 and 1888 the clerical and conservative majority had carried through the Reichstag laws restricting the employment of women and children and prohibiting labour on Sundays. These were not accepted by the Bundesrat, but after the international congress of 1890 an important amendment and addition to the *Gewerbeordnung* was carried to this effect. It was of even greater importance that a full system of factory inspection was created. A further provision empowered the Bundesrat to fix the hours of labour in unhealthy trades; this was applied to the bakeries by an edict of 1895, but the great outcry which this caused prevented any further extension.

THE PROGRESS OF SOCIALISM

These acts were, however, accompanied by language of great decision against the social democrats, especially on the occasion of a great strike in Westphalia, when the emperor warned the men that for him every social democrat was an enemy to the empire and country. None the less, all attempts to win the working men from the doctrinaire socialists failed. They continued to look on the whole machinery of government, emperor and army, church and police, as their natural enemies, and remained completely under the bondage of the abstract theories of the socialists, just as much as fifty years ago the German bourgeois were controlled by the liberal theories. It is strange to see how the national characteristics appeared in them. What began as a great revolutionary movement became a dogmatic and academic school of thought; it often almost seemed as though the orthodox interpretation of Marx's doctrine were of more importance than an improvement in the condition of the working men, and the discussions in the annual socialist congress resembled the arguments of theologians rather than the practical considerations of politicians.

The party, however, prospered and grew in strength beyond all anticipation. The repeal of the socialist law was naturally welcome to them as a great personal triumph over Bismarck; in the elections of 1890 they won thirty-five, in 1893 forty-four, in 1898 fifty-six seats. Their influence was not confined to the artisans; among their open or secret adherents were to be found large numbers of government employés and clerks. In the autumn of 1890 they were able, for the first time, to hold in Germany a general meeting of delegates, which has been continued annually. In the first meetings it appeared that there were strong opposing tendencies within the party which for the first time could be brought to public discussion. On the one side there was a small party, *die Jungen*, in Berlin, who attacked the parliamentary leaders on the ground that they had lent themselves to compromise and had not maintained the old *intransigent* spirit. In 1891, at Erfurt, Werner and his followers were expelled from the party; some of them drifted into anarchism, others disappeared.

On the other hand, there was a large section, the leader of whom was Herr von Vollmar, who maintained that the social revolution would not come suddenly, as Bebel and the older leaders had taught, but that it would be a gradual evolution; they were willing to co-operate with the government in remedial measures by which, within the existing social order, the prosperity and freedom of the working classes might be advanced; their position was very strong, as Vollmar had succeeded in extending socialism even in the Catholic parts of Bavaria. An attempt to treat them as not genuine socialists was

frustrated and they continued in co-operation with the other branch of the party. Their position would be easier were it not for the repeated attempts of the Prussian government to crush the party by fresh legislation and the supervision exercised by the police. It was a sign of most serious import for the future that in 1897 the electoral law in the kingdom of Saxony was altered with the express purpose of excluding the socialists from the Saxon Landtag. This and other symptoms caused serious apprehension that some attempt might be made to alter the law of universal suffrage for the Reichstag, and it was policy of this kind which maintained and justified the profound distrust of the governing classes and the class hatred on which social democracy depends. On the other hand, there were signs of a greater willingness among the socialists to co-operate with their old enemies the liberals in opposition to the commercial policy of the government, and every step is welcomed which will break down the intellectual isolation in which the working classes are kept.

THE ARMY, SCHOOLS, AND COMMERCE

In foreign affairs a good understanding with Great Britain was maintained, but the emperor failed at that time to preserve the friendship of Russia. The close understanding between France and Russia, and the constant increase in the armies of these states, made a still further increase of the German army desirable. In 1890, while the Septennate had still three more years to run, Caprivi had to ask for an additional twenty thousand men. It was the first time that an increase of this kind had been necessary within the regular period. When, in 1893, the proposals for the new period were made, they formed a great change. Universal service was to be made a reality; no one except those absolutely unfit were to escape military service. To make enlistment of so large an additional number of recruits possible, the period of service with the colours was reduced to two years.

The parliamentary discussion was very confused; the government eventually accepted an amendment giving them 557,093 for five and a half years instead of the 570,877 asked for; this was rejected by 210 to 162, the greater part of the Centre and of the *Freisinnige* voting against it. Parliament was at once dissolved. Before the elections the *Freisinnige* party broke up, as about twenty of them determined to accept the compromise. They took the name of the *Freisinnige Vereinigung*, the others who remained under the leadership of Richter forming the *Freisinnige Volkspartei*. The natural result of this split was a great loss to the party. The liberal opposition secured only twenty-three seats instead of the sixty-seven they had held before. It was, so far as now can be foreseen, the final collapse of the old radical party. Notwithstanding this the bill was only carried by sixteen votes, and it would have been thrown out again had not the Poles for the first time voted for the government, since the whole of the Centre voted in opposition.

This vote was a sign of the increasing disorganisation of parties and of growing parliamentary difficulties which were even more apparent in the Prussian Landtag. Miquel, as minister of finance, succeeded indeed in carrying a reform, by which the proceeds of the tax on land and buildings were transferred to the local government authorities, and the loss to the state exchequer made up by increased taxation of larger incomes and industry. The series of measures which began in 1891 and were completed in 1895 won a more general approbation than is usual, and Miquel in this successfully carried out his policy of reconciling the growing jealousies arising from class interests.

A school bill for Prussia was less successful, and aroused conflicts of principle which afterwards divided the country. It is remarkable that up to this time there is no general law existing in Prussia regulating the management of

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the elementary schools. In every province there are different rules as to the age at which attendance is compulsory as to school management, the regulation of religious education, and the relation of the church to the schools. A clause in the constitution states that these matters are to be regulated by law, but no law has yet (1902) been carried. In November, 1890, a general law was introduced, but it was opposed by the Centre on the ground that it would adversely affect the religious teaching, and Gossler, minister of education, had to resign; he was succeeded by Count Zedlitz, who, in 1892, introduced a new law so drawn up as greatly to strengthen the influence of the church. This led to a violent agitation; all the liberal parties joined in opposing it; the agitation spread to the learned classes, and the cry was raised that culture and learning were being handed over to the priests. Caprivi defended the law as part of the great struggle between Christianity and atheism, but the ministry was nearly equally divided; the emperor was dissatisfied with the manner in which it had been introduced, and on March 16th the law was withdrawn. The next day Zedlitz resigned; Caprivi also sent in his resignation, but, at the special request of the emperor, continued in office as chancellor; he was succeeded by Count Eulenburg as president of the Prussian ministry.

Caprivi's administration was further remarkable for the arrangement of commercial treaties. In 1892 treaties with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland for twelve years bound together the greater part of the Continent, and opened a wide market for German manufactures; the idea of this policy was to secure, by a more permanent union of the middle European states, a stable market for the goods which were being excluded owing to the great growth of protection in France, Russia, and America. These were followed by similar treaties with Rumania and Servia, and in 1894, after a period of sharp customs warfare, with Russia. In all these treaties the general principle was a reduction of the import duties on corn in return for advantages given to German manufactures, and it is this which brought about the struggle of the government with the agrarians, which after 1894 took the first place in party politics.

The agricultural interests in Germany had during the middle of the nineteenth century been in favour of free trade. The reason of this was that, till some years after the foundation of the empire, the production of corn and foodstuffs was more than sufficient for the population; as long as they exported corn, potatoes, and cattle, they required no protection from foreign competition, and they enjoyed the advantages of being able to purchase colonial goods and manufactured articles cheaply. Mecklenburg and Hanover, the purely agricultural states, had, until their entrance into the customs union, followed a completely free-trade policy. The first union of the agrarian party, which was formed in 1876 under the name of the Society for the Reform of Taxation, did not place protection on their programme; they laid stress on bi-metallism, on the reform of internal taxation, especially of the tax on land and buildings, and on the reform of the railway tariff, and demanded an increase in the stamp duties. These last three points were all to some extent attained. About this time, however, the introduction of cheap corn from Russia began to threaten them, and it was in 1879 that, probably to a great extent influenced by Bismarck, they are first to be found among those who ask for protection.

After that time there was a great increase in the importation of foodstuffs from America. The increase of manufactures and the rapid growth of the population made the introduction of cheap food from abroad a necessity. In the youth of the empire the amount of corn grown in Germany was sufficient for the needs of its inhabitants; the amount consumed in 1899 exceeded the amount produced by about one-quarter of the total. At the same time the

price, making allowance for the fluctuations owing to bad harvests, steadily decreased, notwithstanding the duty on corn. In twenty years the average price fell from about 235 to 135 marks the 1,000 kilo. There was therefore a constant decrease in the income from land, and this took place at a time when the great growth of wealth among the industrial classes had made living more costly. The agriculturists of the north and east saw themselves and their class threatened with loss, and perhaps ruin; their discontent, which had long been growing, broke out into open fire during the discussion of the commercial treaties. As these would inevitably bring about a large increase in the importation of corn from Rumania and Russia, a great agitation was begun in agricultural circles, and the whole influence of the conservative party was opposed to the treaties. This brought about a curious situation, the measures being only carried by the support of the Centre, the radicals, and the socialists, against the violent opposition of those classes, especially the landowners in Prussia, who had hitherto been the supporters of the government. In order to prevent the commercial treaty with Russia, a great agricultural league was founded in 1893, the *Bund der Landwirthe*; some seven thousand landowners joined it immediately. Two days later the Peasants' League, or *Deutsche Bauernbund*, which had been founded in 1885 and included some forty-four thousand members, chiefly from the smaller proprietors in Pomerania, Posen, Saxony, and Thuringia, merged itself in the new league. This afterwards gained very great proportions. It became, with the social democrats, the most influential society which had been founded in Germany for defending the interests of a particular class; it soon numbered more than two hundred thousand members, including landed proprietors of all degrees. Under its influence a parliamentary union, the *Wirtschaftsvereinigung*, was founded to insure proper consideration for agricultural affairs; it was joined by more than one hundred members of the Reichstag; and the conservative party fell more and more under the influence of the agrarians.

CAPRIVI IS SUCCEEDED BY HOHENLOHE

Having failed to prevent the commercial treaties, Count Kanitz introduced a motion that the state should have a monopoly of all imported corn, and that the price at which it was to be sold should be fixed by law. On the first occasion, in 1894, only fifty members were found to vote for this, but in the next year ninety-seven supported the introduction of the motion, and it was considered worth while to call together the Prussian council of state for a special discussion. The whole agitation was extremely inconvenient to the government. The violence with which it was conducted, coming, as it did, from the highest circles of the Prussian nobility, appeared almost an imitation of socialist methods; but the emperor, with his wonted energy, personally rebuked the leaders, and warned them that the opposition of Prussian nobles to their king was a monstrosity. Nevertheless they were able to overthrow the chancellor, who was specially obnoxious to them. In October, 1894, he was dismissed suddenly, without warning and almost without cause, while the emperor was on a visit to the Eulenburgs, one of the most influential families of the Prussian nobility.

Caprivi's fall, though it was occasioned by a difference between him and Count Eulenburg and was due to the direct act of the emperor, was rendered easier by the weakness of his parliamentary position. There was no party on whose help he could really depend. The military bill had offended the prejudices of conservative military critics; the British treaty had alienated the colonial party; the commercial treaties had only been carried by the help of Poles, radicals, and socialists; but it was just these parties which were the most

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easily offended by the general tendencies of the internal legislation, as shown in the Prussian school bill. Moreover, the bitter and unscrupulous attacks of the Bismarckian press to which Caprivi was exposed made him unpopular in the country, for the people could not feel at ease so long as they were governed by a minister of whom Bismarck disapproved. There was therefore no prospect of forming anything like a stable coalition of parties on which he could depend.

The emperor was fortunate in securing as his successor Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe. Though the new chancellor once more united with this office that of Prussian minister-president, his age, and perhaps also his character, prevented him from exercising that constant activity and vigilance which his two predecessors had displayed. During his administration even the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, and afterwards Count von Bülow, became the ordinary spokesman of the government, and in the management of other departments the want of a strong hand at the head of affairs was often felt. Between the emperor, with whom the final direction of policy rested, and his subordinates, the chancellor often appeared to evade public notice. The very first act of the new chancellor brought upon him a severe rebuff. At the opening of the new buildings which had been erected in Berlin for the Reichstag, cheers were called for the emperor. Some of the socialist members remained seated. It was not clear that their action was deliberate, but none the less the chancellor himself came down to ask from the house permission to bring a charge of *lèse-majesté* against them, a request which was, of course, almost unanimously refused.

The agrarians still maintained their prominent position in Prussia. They opposed all bills which would appear directly or indirectly to injure agricultural interests. They looked with suspicion on the naval policy of the emperor, for they disliked all that helps industry and commerce. They would only give their support to the navy bills of 1897 and 1900 in return for large concessions limiting the importation of margarine and American preserved meat, and the removal of the *Indemnitäts Nachweis* acted as a kind of bounty on the export of corn. They successfully opposed the construction of a canal from Westphalia to the Elbe, on the ground that it would facilitate the importation of foreign corn. They refused to accept all the compromises which Miquel, who was very sympathetic towards them, suggested, and thereby brought about his retirement in May, 1901.

The opposition of the agrarians was for many reasons peculiarly embarrassing. The franchise by which the Prussian parliament is elected gave the conservatives whom they controlled a predominant position. Any alteration of the franchise was, however, out of the question, for that would admit the socialists. It was, moreover, the tradition of the Prussian court and the Prussian government (and it must be remembered that the imperial government is inspired by Prussian traditions) that the nobility and peasants were in a peculiar way the support of the crown and the state. The old distrust of the towns, of manufacturers and artisans, still continued. The preservation of a peasant class was considered necessary in the interests of the army. Besides, intellectual and social prejudices required a strong conservative party. In the south and west of Germany, however, the conservative party was practically non-existent. In these parts, owing to the changes introduced at the revolution, the nobility, who hold little land, are, comparatively speaking, without political importance. In the Catholic districts the Centre had become absolutely master, except so far as the socialists threatened their position. Those of the great industrialists who belonged to the national liberals or the moderate conservatives did not command that influence which men of their class generally hold in Great Britain, because the influence of social democracy

banded together the whole of the working men in a solid phalanx of irreconcilable opposition, the very first principle of which was the hostility of classes. The government, therefore, was compelled to turn for support to the Centre and the conservatives, the latter being almost completely under the influence of the old Prussian nobility from the northeast. But every attempt to carry out the policy supported by these parties aroused an opposition most embarrassing to the government.

The conservatives distrusted the financial activity which centred round the exchanges of Berlin and other towns, and in this they had the sympathy of agrarians and anti-Semites, as well as of the Centre. The agrarians believed that the Berlin exchange was partly responsible for the fall of prices in corn; the anti-Semites laid stress on the fact that many of the financiers were of Jewish extraction; the Centre feared the moral effects of speculation. This opposition was shown in the demand for additional duties on stamps (this was granted by Bismarck), in the opposition to the renewal of the Bank Charter, and especially in the new regulations for the exchange which were carried in 1896. One clause in this forbade the dealing in "futures" in corn, and at the same time a special Prussian law required that there should be representatives of agriculture on the managing committee of the exchange. The members of the exchange in Berlin and other towns refused to accept this law. When it came into effect they withdrew and tried to establish a private exchange. This was prevented, and after two years they were compelled to submit and the Berlin bourse was again opened.

POLITICAL BARGAINING

Political parties now came to represent interests rather than principles. The government, in order to pass its measures, was obliged to purchase the votes by class legislation, and it bought those with whom it could make the best bargain—these being generally the Centre, as the ablest tacticians, and the conservatives, as having the highest social position and being boldest in declaring their demands. No great parliamentary leader took the place of Windthorst, Lasker, and Bennigsen; the extra-parliamentary societies, less responsible and more violent, grew in influence. The anti-Semites gained in numbers, though not in reputation. The conservatives, hoping to win votes, even adopted an anti Semite clause in their programme. The general tendency among the numerous societies of Christian socialism, which broke up almost as quickly as they appeared, was to drift from the alliance with the ultra-conservatives and to adopt the economic and many of the political doctrines of the social democrats. The *National-Socialer Verein* defended the union of monarchy and socialism. Meanwhile the extreme spirit of nationality was fostered by the *All-deutscher Verein*, the policy of which would quickly involve Germany in war with every other nation. More than once the feeling to which they gave expression endangered the relations of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The persecution of the Poles in Prussia naturally aroused indignation in Austria, where the Poles had for long been among the strongest elements on which the government depended; and it was not always easy to prevent the agitation on behalf of the Germans in Bohemia from assuming a dangerous aspect.

In the disintegration of parties the liberals suffered most. The unity of the conservatives was preserved by social forces and the interests of agriculture; the decay of the liberals was the result of universal suffrage. Originally the opponents of the landed interest and the nobility, they were the party of the educated middle class, of the learned, of the officials, and of finance. They never succeeded in winning the support of the working men. They had iden-

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tified themselves with the interests of the capitalists, and were not even faithful to their own principles. In the day of their power they showed themselves as intolerant as their opponents had been. They resorted to the help of the government in order to stamp out the opinions with which they disagreed, and the claims of the artisans to practical equality were rejected by them, as in earlier days the claims of the middle class had been by the nobles.

The Centre alone maintained itself. Obligated by their constitution to regard equally the material interests of all classes—for they represent rich and poor, peasants and artisans—they were the natural support of the government when it attempted to find a compromise between the clamour of opposing interests. Their own demands were generally limited to the defence of order and religion, and to some extent coincided with the wishes of the emperor; but, as we shall see, every attempt to introduce legislation in accordance with their wishes led to a conflict with the educated opinion of the country, which was very detrimental to the authority of the government. In the state parlia-



MONUMENT TO WILLIAM I, BERLIN

ments of Bavaria, Baden, and Hesse their influence was very great. There was, moreover, a tendency for local parties to gain in numbers and influence—the Volkspartei in Württemberg, the anti-Semites in Hesse, and the Bauernbund (Peasants' League) in Bavaria. The last demanded that the peasants should be freed from the payment to the state, which represented the purchase price for the remission of feudal burdens. It soon lost ground, however, partly owing to personal reasons, and partly because the Centre in order to maintain their influence among the peasants adopted some features of their programme.

Another class which, seeing itself in danger from the economic changes in society, agitated for special legislation was the small retail traders of the large towns. They demanded additional taxation on the vast shops and stores, the growth of which in Berlin, Munich, and other towns seemed to threaten their interests. As the preservation of the smaller middle class seemed to be important as a bulwark against socialism, they won the support of the conservative and clerical parties, and laws inspired by them were passed in Bavaria, Württemberg, and Prussia. This *Mittelstand-politik*, as it is called, was very characteristic of the attitude of mind which was produced by the policy of protection. Every class appealed to the government for special laws to protect itself against the effects of the economic changes which had been brought about by the modern industrial system. Peasants and landlords, artisans and tradesmen, each formed their own league for the protection of their interests, and all looked to the state as the proper guardian of their class interests.

COLONIAL AGGRANDISEMENT UNDER WILLIAM II

Emperor William II early set himself the task of doing for the German fleet what his grandfather had done for the army. The acquisition of Helgoland enabled a new naval station to be established off the mouth of the Elbe; the completion of the canal from Kiel to the mouth of the Elbe—an old plan of Bismarck's which was begun in 1887 and completed in 1895—by enabling ships of war to pass from the Baltic to the North Sea, greatly increased the strategic strength of the fleet. In 1890 a change in the organisation separated the command of the fleet from the office of secretary of state, who was responsible for the representation of the admiralty in the Reichstag, and the emperor was brought into more direct connection with the navy. During the first five years of the reign four line-of-battle ships were added and several armoured cruisers for the defence of commerce and colonial interests.

With the year 1895 began a period of expansion abroad and great naval activity. The note was given in a speech of the emperor on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the foundation of the empire, in which he said, "the German Empire has become a world empire." The ruling idea of this new *Welt-Politik* was that Germany could no longer remain merely a continental power; owing to the growth of population she depended for subsistence on trade and exports; she could not maintain herself amid the rivalry of nations unless the government was able actively to support German traders in all parts of the world. The extension of German trade and influence has, in fact, been carried out with considerable success.^d

In the year 1888 the German flag had, indeed, long floated on the coast of Africa and on the Pacific, but German influence and the dominion of the German Empire were practically confined to a few isolated posts (some of them in the hands of private companies), wholly unable to inspire the natives with a correct idea of the greatness and power of Germany. In their infancy, the colonial possessions might be regarded as the foundations of an empire beyond the sea, but they were far from being real colonies, or, as such, a source of blessing and prosperity to Germany proper. With this epoch a change for the better sets in, accompanied by hard struggles and severe reverses, but nevertheless distinct and unmistakable. The idea of a policy of expansion was still so new and strange that, up to that time, the government had ventured on none but the most trivial and timid measures in the interests of the German colonies; but when the consequences of this unfortunate niggardliness became manifest in the distress that prevailed throughout East and West Africa, the German Empire, under the mighty ægis of the emperor, began to take up a position beyond sea more correspondent with its resources at home.

In East Africa the government of the strip of coast which the German East African Company had rented from the sultan of Zanzibar for a term of fifty years was taken over on August 16th, 1888. To the roar of cannon the flag of the German company was hoisted in fourteen ports. During the quiet weeks that followed German custom-houses were set up at Lindi, Mikindani, Kilwa, Dar-es-Salaam, Bagamoyo, Pangani, and Tanga. A bustle of business began to stir everywhere, eager to exploit the economic resources of the East African territory for the benefit of German trade; men fancied they were witnessing a new departure in German colonial policy, a wide prospect opened before their eyes, in which the German merchant of the future bent his steps to the region of the Great Lakes and the frontiers of the Kongo Free State. Then all at once a tempest broke forth which in a few months destroyed all the long results of German industry in those parts.

The Arab slave-dealers, who were settled in large numbers on the Nyassa, were apprehensive that the German occupation of the East African coast, and

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of the harbours more particularly, would interfere with or even destroy their nefarious but profitable traffic, and they therefore incited the Arab population to make a raid on the coast for the purpose of putting an end to the rule of the German company, which was neither prepared for such attacks nor in a position to cope with them. The revolt, headed by Buschiri, an Arab, broke out in September, 1888, and spread to the major part of the Arabs resident in the German stations. Every station except Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam fell into the hands of the Arabs. At Kilwa some company officials perished; the rest fled to Zanzibar. The two places which had not been conquered could hold out only by the help of the man-of-war *Möwe*, which happened to be at hand. On December 6th and 7th Buschiri, whose troops were armed with rifles and cannon, attacked Bagamoyo. The company officials made a gallant defence and were vigorously supported by the cruiser *Leipzig*, which was lying in the harbour, and Buschiri was consequently forced to retreat with the loss of his artillery, after plundering and burning the houses of the station.

THE ARAB REVOLT IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA

This dire catastrophe which had thus befallen the German possessions in East Africa brought home to public opinion the conviction that the system hitherto pursued—that of leaving the colonisation of such vast districts to private enterprise—was no longer applicable to present conditions and that the sooner it was broken with the better. The request for a vote of 2,000,000 marks for the suppression of the Arab rising, which was submitted to the diet of the empire, the despatch of a number of battleships to East Africa, and, lastly, the appointment of Wissmann, the most experienced of African explorers as imperial commissioner, proved that in the hour of need the clear eye and vigorous hand of the emperor William could bring order out of the confused medley of affairs. And if the power of choosing the right men for the execution of great deeds and important missions be regarded, as it always has been, as one of the most laudable of princely qualities, we may well insist that in this matter of the selection of Wissmann to subdue the Arab revolt it was a singularly happy touch that intrusted this responsible duty to the most popular of African travellers.

But the government was by no means blind to the fact that these Arab disturbances were something more than a rebellion, and that the struggle was really a crusade against the slave trade which disgraces our age. Thus this war with the Arabs became a Christian act which could not but redound to the advantage of all western nations holding possessions in Africa. Acting upon this view the admirals in command of the German and English squadron declared the coast in a state of blockade on December 2nd, 1888, an energetic measure which contributed materially to the ultimate suppression of the slave trade.

The first great battle between Wissmann and the rebel Arabs took place in the summer of 1889, in the East African protectorate. On the 8th of May Wissmann's troops and the marines under Admiral Deinhardt, amounting together to sixteen hundred men, attacked Buschiri's position near Bagamoyo and carried it by assault, without heavy loss. On the same day the native regiment of Dar-es-Salaam took the village of Magagoni, and on May 21st and 22nd the rebels in the Dar-es-Salaam district were subdued. These engagements, however, had not struck a decisive blow at the rebel cause. Buschiri had fallen back on Pangani and Sadani. Wissmann stormed the latter place on the 7th of June. Four weeks later an attack was made by sea on Pangani, the main stronghold of Buschiri's adherents, vigorously supported by the guns of the German ships *Leipzig*, *Carola*, *Möwe*, *Pfeil*, and *Schwalbe*. Wissmann's

troops then landed, and three hundred sailors attacked the north side of the town, which was simultaneously bombarded on the south by the machine-guns of Wissmann's two steamers. The place was taken without serious resistance. Tanga fell soon after, and Buschiri withdrew to the interior.

The capture of the Arab leader was not achieved until December. Wissmann had Buschiri tried and hanged as a punishment for his crimes. Banaheri of Useguha took his place as the principal opponent of the German troops, and with the bulk of his followers established himself in the neighbourhood of Pangani.

By a fortunate coincidence the safety of the great caravan route from the coast to the lakes, which Wissmann secured by a brilliant campaign in the interior, was established at the very time when Emin Pasha returned, accompanied by Stanley. The pasha had come from the equatorial province of Egypt, which he had ruled and defended against the mahdi for years with energy and prudence. Wissmann sent Baron von Gravenreuth as far as Mpuapa to meet him, with troops and provisions for the assistance and support of his party. The news of Emin's liberation and return to the east coast roused the liveliest interest in Germany. The hope that the dauntless German champion of civilisation might yet be successfully rescued from his desperate situation had never been completely abandoned, and now it had actually been fulfilled.

The following year Wissmann successfully prosecuted his campaign against the Arabs. On January 4th he stormed the enemy's camp and put them to flight, leaving the further pursuit to Baron von Gravenreuth, one of his bravest officers, who defeated Banaheri, Buschiri's successor, in several smart engagements, with the result that the rebel leader declared his willingness to surrender and sued for peace. Gravenreuth went to Sadani to receive Banaheri as Wissmann's representative. Two days afterwards more than twelve hundred men surrendered in a deplorable condition. When the northern part of the protectorate, including the towns and seaboard settlements of Sadani, Pangani, and Tanga, had been wrested from the Arabs, Wissmann found himself confronted by the task of bringing the southern portion of the country, including the ports of Kilwa, Lindi, and Mikindani, into his power. No sooner had the expected reinforcements of men, rifles, ammunition, mountain batteries, and rowboats reached him, under the command of Major Liebert, than he opened a fresh campaign. Supported by German men-of-war, he took Kilwa on the 7th of May, Lindi on the 10th, and Mikindani on the 14th. Thus the whole maritime district was reconquered by the Germans and the military honour of Germany vindicated.

His brilliant feats in Africa had made Wissmann one of the most popular men of the day at home, and the emperor rewarded his valiant subject in right kingly fashion, gave him a major's commission, presented him with eight cannon as a mark of special favour, and bestowed hereditary rank upon him when he returned at the end of the war.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT

Now it was for Germany to consolidate in peace what she had won back by war. In consideration of the increasing expansion of German dominion the first thing needful seemed to be a more definite determination of the German and English spheres of influence, so as to secure a firmer foundation for the civilising labours of the two nations. With this object the much-discussed Anglo-German agreement was concluded, which extended to Africa and also brought the island of Helgoland, off the north German coast, into the possession of Germany. The great value of this acquisition to the German fleet and

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to the defence of the mouths of the Elbe, Weser, and Jade is now universally recognised.

It was a matter of great importance to the future development of German territory in East Africa that traffic between Lake Nyassa and the Kongo Free State, between lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, on the latter lake, and between it and the northern frontier of both spheres of influence, should remain open duty free to the subjects and goods of both nations. At the same time freedom of worship and instruction was guaranteed to the missions of both countries and equal rights to the subjects of both powers. One important practical result of the agreement was an understanding between the imperial government and the sultan of Zanzibar, by which the latter pledged himself to abdicate his sovereign rights over the strip of coast let to the East African Company in return for the sum of 4,000,000 marks. Thereupon the company concluded an agreement with the imperial government in November, by which the latter took over the sovereign rights and the collection of customs dues, undertaking to pay the company in exchange an annual sum of 600,000 marks.

THE GOVERNORSHIP OF EAST AFRICA

The years 1891 and 1892 were marked by many untoward events and losses in the East African Protectorate, where Herr von Soden had been appointed the first governor at the beginning of April, 1891. Three companies of the protectorate troops under Captain von Zelewski were attacked and almost annihilated by robber Wahehe tribes on August 17th, 1891; and in the following year a like tragic fate overtook another division of the protectorate troops under Lieutenant von Bülow. In consequence of these disasters, which grew more serious after Wissmann had left, the higher powers deemed it advisable to combine, for a time at least, the supreme civil and military commands. Lieutenant-Colonel von Schele was therefore despatched to East Africa in October, 1892, and Baron von Soden, the former governor, resigned his office.

A fresh and enlivening breeze began to blow in East Africa on the arrival of the energetic new governor. The protectorate troops, under the gallant leadership of the first lieutenant prince, succeeded in storming the fortified capital of the bold and crafty chief Sike at the beginning of 1893, and thus once more secured the safety of the remote advanced station of Tabora. They also had victorious encounters with another chief, Masenta by name. But Schele's brilliant campaign against the Wahehes in the autumn of 1894, which ended with the storming of the stronghold of Kuirenga—a strategic achievement of the first magnitude—and which wreaked bloody vengeance for Zelewski's defeat, did more than anything else to invest the German arms with fear and terror in the eyes of the natives. Unhappily Schele was denied the chance of labouring at the peaceful task of making the German colony in East Africa of economic value to the mother country, as he, with his remarkable gift for organisation, intended to do. But his extraordinary military achievements contributed materially to assure the tranquillity of the country thenceforward. The emperor William, who was strongly attached to Governor von Schele, conferred on him the highest military distinction, the order *Pour le mérite*.

After a long interval the post of governor of East Africa was filled again at the end of April, 1895. This time the choice fell upon Major von Wissmann, formerly imperial commissioner, who, by his services to science in his two daring journeys across the Dark Continent, his suppression of the Arab rising in 1889, his talent for organisation, and, lastly, by his laborious expedition to Lake Nyassa by steamboat in 1892-1893, had given the surest guarantee of his ability to cope with the vast and varied demands which the rapid development of East Africa would necessarily make upon the governor. The

emperor William's appointment of Wissmann to the head of the German colony in East Africa not only gave general satisfaction in colonial circles, but was hailed with pleasure by the industrial companies interested in the country. They regarded him as the most notable judge and representative of African economic policy.

In the second half of the year 1895 the disturbances stirred up in the south of the protectorate by the chiefs Machemba and Hassan bin Omar had attained such proportions that further attempts at a peaceful settlement seemed neither hopeful nor politically advisable. Lieutenant-Colonel von Trotha, commander of the protectorate troops, succeeded in defeating a body of rebels and capturing Hassan bin Omar. Machemba then submitted unconditionally, was placed under the German flag, and appeared at Dar-es-Salaam in person to ratify the peace when it was concluded.

After this, rapid and satisfactory progress was made towards the pacification of the country. The next revolt, in the hinterland of the southern coast, was suppressed, the attempt at rebellion in the maritime district was quelled. The natives had lost their taste for rebellion against German rule under their hereditary sultans or at the instigation of Arabs or leaders of mixed Arab blood, since it had become known throughout the whole protectorate that every rebel against German rule had sooner or later been overtaken by the punishment he merited.

In October, 1896, Major von Wissmann resigned on account of his health, and his place was taken by his friend and former comrade, Colonel Liebert, a man of great knowledge and experience in African affairs. Next to Wissmann the most brilliant of all German travellers in Africa, Liebert inspired the fullest confidence and highest hopes amongst all sound colonial politicians in Germany. His government of East Africa showed that he was worthy of his reputation, and the silence that has fallen upon the clash of arms in the colony redounds most highly to his honour.

THE WEST AFRICAN PROTECTORATE

The work of colonising the West African Protectorate, which was begun in 1885, has also made satisfactory progress in the recent years of the emperor William II's reign. In the year 1888, Von Puttkamer, imperial commissioner of Togoland, had explored the Agotimi country, which extends to the foot of the Agome Mountains; and Captain von François and Doctor Wolf of the army medical staff had also successfully explored a considerable area. A station was established in the highlands of Adeli on the heights of Adado, and named Bismarckburg. It was intended to serve as a base from which to push forward into the unknown hinterland. At the end of the year 1888 Doctor Wolf started from this point on a journey to Salaga, in the hitherto unexplored Adjuti country. In 1890 Lieutenant Herold founded the station of Misahöhe, a post of peculiar value from the fact that it commands the important caravan route leading from Salaga and Kpandu to the coast. The officials of the station have taken great pains to complete and improve the roads in hopes of attracting trade to the German coast.

The Anglo-German agreement of July 1st, 1890, extended the German possessions northwards and assigned the important town of Kpandu and the surrounding district as far as the eastern bank of the river Volta to the German sphere of interest. Towards the end of 1894 the Gruner expedition undertook to advance into the district about Salaga, to the east of what was called the neutral zone, to take possession of the regions north and northeast of Togo, if possible, as far as the banks of the Niger. Several French expeditions had started a short time before with the same object, and had advanced as far as

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the newly established station of Carnotville in the ninth degree of north latitude. Under the circumstances there seemed little chance that the race for the rich hinterland of Togo, on which both the French and Germans had entered, would be decided in favour of the latter. The unexpected happened nevertheless. The expedition under Doctor Gruner, sent out by the German Colonial Company and assisted by the German foreign office, overtook Decœur's French expedition on January 10th, 1895, although the latter had had a good start of it in the first instance. Gruner marched north-northeast through several native kingdoms, until he reached Say, and thence was able to proceed by the Niger to Karmamma. There the expedition divided, one part of it, under First-Lieutenant von Carnap, going on down the Niger, and the other, under Doctor Gruner, starting on the return journey through the Borgu country, after paying a visit to the kingdom of Gando on the left bank of the Niger. During these journeys Gruner concluded treaties with several sultans, which formed the basis for future negotiations with France.

After protracted negotiation the year 1897 witnessed, in the treaty of July 23rd, 1897, the final adjustment of the frontier of the French and German spheres of influence respectively. By it Germany was secured in possession of the territory north of Togo up to the eleventh degree north latitude, and of the right bank of the river Monu in the maritime zone, which had been held by the French up to that time.

During the first year of the emperor's reign Doctor Zintgraff, in the Kamerun country, took the first steps to make a way from thence to the Adamaua country and the Benuë. He first founded the station of Barombi on Lake Elephant, and made two expeditions from that point in the year 1888, both of which were unfortunate and ultimately abortive, in consequence of the hostility of the inhabitants of the district of Banyang. In the following year he started with a larger following, reached the Bali territory, and there founded a new station. At the end of April he started again and ultimately reached Ibi on the Benuë. He afterwards returned to South Adamaua, within the German sphere of interest, by way of Kundi. Captain Zeuner had travelled through the same region simultaneously with Doctor Zintgraff, and had navigated the Mungo, Wuri, and Massake rivers. The southern part of the Kamerun country was also explored at the same time by lieutenants Kund and Tappenbeck. They had to contend with great difficulties, due to the obstinate resistance of the warlike natives in many places. Both returned from this first expedition severely wounded, making their way back through the dense belt of primæval forest which divides the populous inland country of the South Kameruns from the coast.

When they had recovered, the two brave explorers undertook a fresh expedition into the hinterland of the Batanga coast, for the purpose of founding a station between the rivers Njong and Sannaga. After establishing the station of Kribi on the Kribi River, Kund founded that of Jaunde in the river-basin aforesaid, the superintendence of which was undertaken by Lieutenant Morgen, when he succeeded first Tappenbeck, who died of fever, and then Kund, who had fallen dangerously ill.

The expeditions of Doctor Zintgraff, captains Zeuner and Kund, and lieutenants Morgen and Tappenbeck, briefly sketched above, had proved that the Kamerun hinterland was fertile, populous, and accessible to exploration. The expedition under First-Lieutenant von Stetten, which started from Kamerun at the beginning of 1893 with the intention of being beforehand with the rapid advance of the French, who were pressing into the hinterland of Kamerun from the south along the Sanga, a tributary on the right bank of the Kongo, and from the north along the Benuë, arrived in safety at Yola, the capital of the great sultanate of Adamaua, which Germany had resigned to England in

1886. After obtaining important concessions from the sultan of Yola with reference to the southern part of Adamaua, Von Stetten returned to Kamerun by water, along the Benuë and Niger. An agreement made with England on November 13th, 1893, secured for Germany the possession of the greater part of Adamaua as far as that country was concerned, and access to the southern shore of Lake Chad, though at the price of a final renunciation of Yola, the capital.

THE ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH

German possessions in these regions were presently exposed to extreme peril by the unrelenting advance of the French (who had vast resources at their disposal for the pursuit of their political object) towards the country around Lake Chad. It was impossible to come to an understanding with France (who was obviously aiming at the possession of Adamaua) as to how far latitude 15° , which had been fixed upon in the Franco-German arrangement of December 24th, 1885, as the provisional boundary of the Kamerun territory to the east, was to be regarded as the dividing line of the French and German spheres of interest to the north, because she could point to her practical occupation of the country about the Sanga and to the success of French explorers in the Shari basin, whereas not one of the German expeditions from Kamerun eastwards had succeeded in penetrating into those regions. On the contrary, they had always been driven northwards to the Benuë by the hostility of the natives.

Under these critical circumstances it was of the utmost advantage to German interests that the expedition under Baron von Uechtritz and Doctor Passarge, which was sent to Yola by the Kamerun committee on the Benuë in the middle of 1893, was crowned with political and scientific results of considerable importance. The expedition traversed the region between Yola and the lower Shari, though it was unable to reach Lake Chad on account of military complications then prevailing between the local sultanates, but explored the upper course of the Benuë and returned to the mouth of the Niger in the summer of 1894. Influenced by the success of this expedition, France consented to open negotiations with a view to the final settlement of the eastern frontier of German territory in the Kamerun hinterland. The negotiations were conducted at Berlin and came to a conclusion in March, 1894.

It was a great advantage to the French that their exploring expeditions into the regions claimed by Germany to the east of latitude 15° had preceded those of all other travellers and secured them certain rights there. Under the circumstances no valid objections could be raised against the French claims. France profited greatly by the agreement which was finally made on March 15th, 1894, though after long opposition on the part of the German commissioners. In virtue of this agreement she retained possession of all points she had reached to the east of latitude 15° . She also obtained the right of navigating the Shari and the shore of Lake Chad east of the mouth of that river, while the space between the mouth of the Shari and the English frontier was all of the southern shore that fell to Germany. This fact was deplored in German official circles, as certain expeditions and travels in pre-colonial times had given Germany some moral claim to the territory thus lost, in the eyes of those Germans who advocated German colonisation. Moreover, in the Anglo-German agreement of 1893, Germany had stipulated for the recognition of her claims in the very districts of the river system of the Shari and Bagirmi, down to Wadai, which had now been ceded to the French. In a memorandum attached to this Franco-German agreement by the German government the reason given for this concession was that French expeditions, equipped at very considerable expense from public and private funds, had concluded treaties in

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these countries, while German enterprise, lacking sufficient means at command, had done too little in that direction.

Towards the end of the year 1893 it almost seemed as though the Kamerun Protectorate would be overwhelmed by the same grievous catastrophe that had befallen German East Africa five years before. The rebellion, which broke out without any warning and compelled the representatives of the German government to fly the country for a while, seemed likely to assume very formidable proportions. The rebels were slaves from Dahomey, whom Gravenreuth had purchased and set free in 1891; they had been enrolled in the protectorate regiment, and now turned against their liberators the knowledge they had gained from them.

The evil tidings from Kamerun had no sooner reached Germany, where they produced general consternation, than the emperor William himself sent telegraphic orders for the most comprehensive measures to subdue the rebellion, and it was by this means alone that every trace of the revolt was obliterated by the following February (1894). Morgen, the African expert, whom the emperor himself had selected for the mission, reorganised the protectorate regiment in Kamerun and coerced with the strong hand such tribes as persisted in making a disturbance.^c

Early in 1899 the German authorities undertook a campaign for the suppression of slave-raiding and the establishment of their power in the Kamerun hinterland so that the country as far as Lake Chad might be explored. A force under Captain Kamptz marched against the Wute tribe. This was a vassal tribe of the sultan of Tibati who came to their assistance, and was subdued only after a severe campaign. Later in the year the Bali rose in revolt and destroyed the Catholic mission at Kribi on the coast. Revolts continued throughout 1900. In 1901 the home government largely increased the forces in the colony, since when better order has been preserved.^a

THE SOUTHWEST AFRICAN PROTECTORATE

The protectorate of Southwest Africa presented a sorry spectacle at the emperor William's accession. Of all the colonial possessions of Germany it was regarded as the most dubious acquisition, since its future seemed practically to depend upon the chance of the discovery of rich mineral treasures there. Moreover, it was well known that the German Colonial Company of Southwest Africa, which had taken the country over from Lüderitz, who had acquired it in the first instance, had done so from motives of pure patriotism, in order that land which might possibly prove valuable in future should not pass into the possession of a foreign power. And, apart from this, the protectorate was encompassed on all sides by hostile elements; to the south the government of Cape Colony looked with jealous and suspicious eyes upon the German settlements which had come into being in its neighbourhood, and whose frontiers were not determined until 1890 by an agreement with England; to the east the South African Company, which regarded both Bechuanaland and Matabeleland as falling within its sphere of influence, did all it could to prevent a *rapprochement* between the German colony and the Transvaal Republic and to thwart any correspondence between them. And then, to add to all this, there was perpetual strife and friction with savage and refractory tribes, such as the Hereros, Ovambos, Namas, and other native races which refused to recognise the German protectorate.

During the period between 1888 and 1894, when the authority of the German Empire in Southwest Africa was hardly more than a name, Captain François and his insignificant force had the hard task of maintaining the credit of Germany among the natives, keeping neighbouring tribes in check, and repel-

ling foreign adventurers. François had held his advanced post as beseems a gallant officer, and the credit for the fact that there was no general rising against the Germans is entirely due to his extraordinary skill in dealing with the natives. It is true that neither he nor Doctor Göring, the imperial commissioner, could prevent the sanguinary feuds of the savage races with one another; and these feuds were the insurmountable obstacle to opening the country up to civilisation. The unquiet spirits among the natives of Southwest Africa found a leader of extraordinary ability in Henric Witboy, the boldest of all Southwest African chiefs. No one who was personally acquainted with the local situation could doubt that a struggle with this enemy, whose power and reputation increased from day to day, was inevitable. At the beginning of the year 1893 the emperor William resolved, in face of the desperate state of things in the protectorate, to reinforce the Southwest African protectorate regiment by more than two hundred men, and François was thus able to enter upon the decisive struggle with his antagonist. A bold *coup de main* was to end the disturbance at a single blow.

In the early dawn of April 12th, 1893, the protectorate regiment appeared before the stronghold of Hornkranz, the base from which Witboy made his sallies in search of plunder. The place was taken after a sanguinary fight, but the crafty chief escaped with the greater number of his followers, and a guerrilla war ensued to which François was unequal. But in judging of his failure we must not forget that, if he was unable to subdue the rebel leader, the fault did not rest with him, but with the wretchedly inadequate resources at his disposal. It cost his successor, Major Leutwein, a long and bloody struggle to restore peace, even after the protectorate regiment in Southwest Africa had been very considerably increased. Witboy submitted, and his subsequent conduct showed that he had become a good friend to the Germans.

After peace had been concluded with Witboy, Governor-General Leutwein, by his energetic action and attractive personal character, maintained the state of tranquillity which was imperatively necessary for the further development of the country. His wise and vigorous administration restored the credit the name of Germany had once enjoyed, and through days of strife and of peaceful rule he amply earned the honours that were heaped upon him on his return.

The most important step towards the rapid opening of the protectorate was inaugurated by the emperor himself, when he made arrangements for the construction of the Swakopmund railway and sent out a brigade of the "railway regiment" (*Eisenbahn Regiment*) to take it in hand. The first section of ten kilometres, between Swakopmund and Nonidas, was opened on November 5th, 1897.^e

In December, 1897, a revolt of the Zwartberg Hottentots occurred in the north and the German posts were threatened with destruction. The uprising was, however, suppressed with little loss of blood, although the natives destroyed valuable flocks and other property.^a

THE SOUTH SEA PROTECTORATES

The history of the South Sea protectorates has been marked by fewer notable events. The government of Kaiser Wilhelm Land in New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago passed into private hands, those of the New Guinea Company, in 1889. Since 1890 the stations of Finschhafen and Hatzfeldthafen in Kaiser Wilhelm Land can boast of considerable areas under cultivation (the chief of them being tobacco and cotton plantations), the produce of which has already been introduced into the Bremen and Hamburg markets. The cultivation of edible fruits and the breeding of imported cattle have also made good progress. When the first harvest of tobacco and cotton from the exper-

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imental plantation of Hatzfeldthafen was sold in the Bremen market the result was astonishingly satisfactory. The stations in the Bismarck Archipelago are also in thorough working order, in spite of the difficulties of recruiting labour among the Papuans. The plantations of some private firms on the GAZELLE Peninsula have produced positively brilliant results in the last few years, and hold out sure promise of a hopeful future. No one who has seen this wonderful country, with its exuberant fertility, can have any other wish than that the imperial government should soon take it in hand again.

Somewhat to the north of the equator and remote from the bustle of the world lies another little German protectorate, the Marshall Islands, a tranquil, silent, insular region whence little news reaches the public ear. But it has one great advantage, which is that the German Jaluit Company, which controls its economic resources, is flourishing there. The Marshall Islands are to Germany even now what a good colony ought to be to the mother country—a source of gain and a good market for home-grown commodities.

THE COMPACT BETWEEN GERMANY AND CHINA

It is an old saying, and often repeated, that the world beyond Europe is already parcelled out, and that Germany has entered too late upon the race for colonial possessions. An act of colonisation which rang like a trumpet-call not only through Germany but wherever German patriots dwell—we refer to the creation of a politico-commercial and maritime base in China—has shown that the old saying does not convey an indisputable truth.

The murder of two German missionaries in the Chinese province of South Shantung furnished the emperor William with a pretext for ordering the German squadron under Rear-Admiral von Diederich, which was then in eastern Asiatic waters, to effect a landing in Chinese territory to avenge the massacre. With this object Admiral von Diederich ran into Kiao-chau Bay, landed six hundred men, and ordered the Chinese commandant of the port to surrender the position. The latter resolved to retreat, and Admiral von Diederich seized the fourteen guns ranged there, together with their ammunition. A few days before Christmas a second detachment of the cruiser squadron, consisting of three ships under the command of Prince Henry, left Germany. Two transports started at the same time, carrying a marine battalion with its full complement of men, for garrison duty on land, a company of marine artillery, and a detachment of pioneers, and arrived at Kiao-chau at the end of January, on the very eve of the birthday of the emperor of Germany. Four-and-twenty hours later the camping-ground about the fortifications of Kiao-chau witnessed the brilliant spectacle of the first review of German marines.

Meanwhile a compact had been concluded between the German and Chinese governments by which a lease of Kiao-chau Bay for ninety-nine years was granted to the former. The *Reichsanzeiger* (Imperial Advertiser) made the following communication on the subject: "The object is to satisfy the reasonable desire of the German government to possess a base for commerce and navigation in Chinese waters, as other powers do. The concession takes the form of a lease for a long term of years. The German government is at liberty to erect all necessary buildings and other structures within the territory leased, and to take any measures requisite for its defence."

This territory included the two tongues of land to the north and south which formed the entrance to the bay, the whole basin of the bay itself up to high-water mark, and the islands at its mouth. Its whole superficial area amounted to some few square miles and was surrounded by a larger zone encircling the bay, within which the Chinese were to take no measures and make no dispositions without the consent of Germany. In particular, no obstacles

were to be placed in the way of such regulations as the Germans might think desirable for the water courses. Most Germans in China agreed that if one spot on the coast of China was fitter than others to constitute the starting-point for the development of German interests by railway construction, mining, and commerce, Kiao-chau Bay was that spot.^e

THE NAVY AND PAN-GERMANISM

In Turkey the government, helped again by the personal interest of the emperor, who himself visited the sultan at Constantinople, gained important concessions for German influence and German commerce. The Turkish armies were drilled and commanded by German officers, and in 1899 a German firm gained an important concession for building a railway to Baghdad. In Brazil organised private enterprise established a considerable settlement of German emigrants, and though any political power was for the time impossible, German commerce increased greatly throughout South America.

Encouraged by the interest which the events in China had aroused, a very important project was laid before the Reichstag in November, 1897, which would enable Germany to take a higher place among the maritime powers. A completely new procedure was introduced. Instead of simply proposing to build a number of new ships, the bill laid down permanently the number of ships of every kind of which the navy was to consist. They were to be completed by 1904, and the bill also specified how often ships of each class were to be replaced. The plan would establish a normal fleet, and the Reichstag, having once assented, would lose all power of controlling the naval budget. The bill was strongly opposed by the radicals; the Centre was divided; but the very strong personal influence of the emperor, supported by an agitation of the newly formed *Flotten Verein* (an imitation of the English Navy League), so influenced public opinion that the opposition broke down. A general election was imminent, and no party dared to go to the country as the opponents of the fleet.

Scarcely had the bill been carried when a series of events took place which still more fully turned public attention to colonial affairs and seemed to justify the action of the government. The war between the United States and Spain showed how necessary an efficient fleet was under modern conditions, and also caused some feeling of apprehension for the future arising from the new policy of extension adopted by the United States. The government was, however, enabled to acquire by purchase the Caroline Islands from Spain. This was hardly accomplished when events in South Africa occurred which made the nation regret that their fleet was not sufficiently strong to cope with that of Great Britain. The government used with great address the bitter irritation against Great Britain which had become one of the most deep-seated elements in modern German life. This feeling had its origin at first in a natural reaction against the excessive admiration for English institutions which distinguished the liberals of an older generation. This reaction was deliberately fostered during Bismarck's later years for internal reasons; for, as Great Britain was looked upon as the home of parliamentary government and free trade, a less favourable view might weaken German belief in doctrines and institutions adopted from that country. There also existed in Germany a curious compound of jealousy and contempt, natural in a nation the institutions of which centred round the army and compulsory service, for a nation whose institutions were based not on military but on parliamentary and legal institutions. It came about that in the minds of many Germans the whole national regeneration was regarded as a liberation from British influence. This feeling was deliberately fostered by publicists and historians, and was intensified by

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commercial rivalry, since in the struggle for colonial expansion and trade Germans naturally came to look on Great Britain, who held the field, as their rival. The sympathy which the events of 1896 and 1899 awakened for the Boers caused all these feelings, which had long been growing, to break out in a popular agitation more widespread than any since the foundation of the empire. It was used by the nationalist parties, in Austria as well as in Germany, to spread the conception of Pan-Germanism; the Boers as Low Germans were regarded as the representatives of Teutonic civilisation, and it seemed possible that the conception might be used to bring about a closer friendship, and even alliance, with Holland. In 1896 the emperor, by despatching a telegram of congratulation to President Kruger after the collapse of the Jameson Raid, had appeared to identify himself with the national feeling. When war broke out in 1899 it was obviously impossible to give any efficient help to the Boers, but the government used the opportunity to make an advantageous treaty by which the possession of Samoa was transferred to Germany, and did not allow the moment to pass without using it for the very practical purpose of getting another bill through the Reichstag by which the navy was to be nearly doubled. Some difficulties which arose regarding the exercise by the British government of the right of search for contraband of war were also used to stimulate public feeling. The Navy bill was introduced in January, 1900. There were some criticisms of detail, but the passing of the bill was only a matter of bargaining. Each party wished in return for its support to get some concessions from the government. The agrarians asked for restrictions on the importation of food; the Centre for the *Lex Heinze* and the repeal of the Jesuit law; the liberals for the right of combination.

The murder of the German ambassador, Baron von Ketteler, at Peking in 1900 compelled the government to take a leading part in the joint expedition of the powers to China.^a A force of over twenty thousand men was sent out under Count von Waldersee, who was also given supreme command over the allied forces, but did not reach China until the real work was accomplished. The government was severely criticised for having undertaken the expedition without consulting the Reichstag. It was desirable in such circumstances to have a younger and more vigorous statesman than Prince Hohenlohe at the head of affairs; on October 17th he resigned, and was succeeded by Count von Bülow, the foreign secretary.

The years since 1900 have not been marked by any events of first-rate importance. In internal politics the strength of the Social Democrats has been rapidly growing; in the elections in June, 1903, they increased the number of their seats in the Reichstag from 58 to 81, and their popular vote from 2,107,000 in 1898 to 3,010,771. In the colonies the chief event was an uprising in January, 1904, of the Hereros in Southwest Africa; owing to the nature of the country, the revolt has cost about £30,000,000, and has not yet been put down. In international politics the Kaiser has, as usual, figured prominently, but without the accomplishment of any very noteworthy results. During the Russo-Japanese war he sought to improve his relations with Russia, and thereby weaken the Dual Alliance between Russia and France. He has also endeavoured to thwart French plans in Morocco, but at the Algeiras Conference on Morocco his success was not pronounced, largely because England used her influence to support France.

The most striking feature of the general election of 1907 was the rout of the Social Democrats, who only mustered a total of 43 seats instead of their previous 81. The clerical centre party remained practically as they were, the seats gained from the socialists being divided among the government *bloc*. This result was regarded by the Kaiser and Prince Bülow as a personal triumph.^a



APPENDIX

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GERMAN HISTORY

I

CHARLEMAGNE'S CAPITULARY OF 802

[Charlemagne's Capitulary of 802 is in reality the foundation charter of the Holy Roman Empire which began its existence at Rome on Christmas Day, 800. It was a declaration of political ideals never to be realised, just as the ideal of the empire itself was never to be fulfilled, but it contained many points of importance that found a place in subsequent mediæval legislation, such as the institution of the "missi dominici," the imperial envoys, an idea later embodied in the legislation of Henry II of England. See Volume VII, History of the Western Empire, Chapter V.]

(From *Monumenta Historiæ Germanica, Leges, Sectio II.*, tom. i., pp. 91-99)

CHAPTER 1. *On the embassy sent by the lord emperor.*

Now the most serene and most Christian lord Emperor Charles chose out from his most circumspect nobles even the wisest men, both archbishops and other bishops, and as well venerable abbots and pious laymen, and sent them throughout all his realm, and through them by all the following orders granted that men should live in accord with righteous law. Where, however, they found aught established in law other than by righteousness and justice, he bade them search this out with most diligent spirit and make it known to him; which thing he by God's gift desires to better. And no one through craft or subtlety of his own should attempt to disturb the written law, as many are wont to do, or his own sentence, or be overbearing with churches of God, with the poor, with widows, with wards, or with any Christian man. But they should by all means live according to the commandment of God with just reason and just judgment, and each man should be advised to live content in his station or calling; those that are canonical (the monastic clergy) should hold thoroughly to a canonical life without labour for base gain, nuns should guard their lives under diligent ward, the laymen and the secular clergy keep the laws righteously without evil fraud, and all live together in perfect love and peace. And those that are sent forth (the *missi*) were diligently to search

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wherever any man claimed that injustice had been done him by any, as they wish to guard God Almighty's favour towards themselves and by being faithful to assure his promises to them. So by all means in all cases and in all places, whether as regards God's holy churches, or the poor, the wards, and the widows—in sooth, the whole people—they should administer law and justice in full measure and in accord with the will and fear of God. And if there be aught such that they of themselves together with the counts of each province cannot better or bring to justice, let them without any uncertainty report it with their minutes to his own (the emperor's) court of judgment; and through no man's flattery, or no man's bribe nor by any plea of blood-kinship or fear of the mighty should the righteous way of justice be blocked by any man.

2. *On loyalty to be rendered to the lord emperor.* He ordains also that every man in all his realm, whether churchman or lay, each and every one according to his station and calling, who heretofore had promised fealty to him under the title of king, now make the same promise under the name of emperor; and that those who hitherto had not made the same promise should all, even those that are in their twelfth year, do likewise. And that all be publicly informed, in such manner as each could understand, how great and how many things are contained in this oath, not, as many even up to the present time have thought, merely loyalty to the lord emperor so long as he himself live, nor that he bring not any enemy into his realm for the sake of hostility, nor that he agree not to any disloyalty towards him, nor be silent concerning any such disloyalty, but that all should know that this oath is on this wise:

3. First, that each and every one and of his own proper person, in accordance with God's commandment and his own promise, strive fully to keep himself in God's holy service with all his mind and all his strength, since the lord emperor himself cannot give necessary care and training unto all separately.

4. Secondly, that no man, neither with false swearing nor any other craft or deceit, or through flattery of any man or by means of a bribe, shall by any means say him nay, nor dare remove from him nor to conceal a serf of the lord emperor nor a district nor land nor anything that appertains to him by right of his power; and no man shall make bold to conceal or to remove from him with false swearing or any other craft the slaves of his revenue, who unjustly and with deceit call themselves free.

5. That neither as concerns the holy churches of God, nor widows, nor orphans, nor pilgrims, shall any man make bold with deceit to do robbery upon or aught of harm, inasmuch as the lord emperor himself, next to the Lord God and his saints, has been made their protector and defender.

6. That no man shall dare lay waste a benefice of the lord emperor, to make it his own property thenceforth.

7. That no man dare overlook the call to arms of the lord emperor, and that no count make so bold as to dare discharge any of them that are bound to military service, either through any plea of kinship or the flattery of a gift.

8. And no man by any means under any circumstances shall make bold to interfere with any call or command of the lord emperor, or to delay his works or hinder or damage them, or in other matters act counter to his will or commandments. And let no man dare interfere with his dues and revenues.

9. And let no man in court be wont to argue for another when the plea of the other be unjust, whether by reason of some greed inasmuch as his argument avails little, or by his craft in argument to impede just judgment; or, when his case is weak, from a desire for oppression. But each and every man as regards his own case or tax or dues shall argue in his own defence, unless some be weak therefor or ignorant of pleading, in whose behalf either they that are sent (the "missi"), or superiors that are in that court, or a judge

knowing the case of this argument, shall argue before the court; or, if need be, such an one shall be granted for the argument as is approved by all and as knows well this very case; which thing, however, shall by all means be done according to the will of the superiors or of those that are sent and are there present. Which thing also by every means shall be done in accord with justice and law; and by no means shall any man be bold to block justice by a bribe, payment, or any other trick of evil flattery or the plea of kinship. And let no man in anything with any man come to unjust understanding, but with all zeal and eagerness shall all be ready to carry through justice.

Now these things all above mentioned are bound to be observed in the oath to the emperor.

10. That bishops and priests both live in accord with canons and thus teach all others to live.

11. That bishops, abbots, and abbesses, that are placed in control over others, with the greatest reverence strive to surpass in piety them that are under them; that with harsh rule or tyranny they crush not them that are under them, but by sincere affection together with mercy and love and the example of good works they anxiously guard the flock entrusted to them.

12. That abbots should live where the monks are, and wholly with the monks, and in accord with the rule; that they eagerly learn and keep the canons. That abbesses do likewise.

13. That bishops, abbots, and abbesses shall have bailiffs, sheriffs, and judges that know the law, love justice, and are peaceful and merciful, in such wise that through them also the gain and vantage of God's holy church shall grow; inasmuch as we will that by no means shall we have in the monasteries neither provosts nor bailiffs greedy for gain and injurious to the church, by whom our greatest evils and losses arise. But let them be men such as the canon or rule of the order bids them be, subject to God's will and ever ready to accomplish justice unto all, fully keeping the law without evil deceit, ever exercising just judgment in all matters—such provosts, in truth, as holy rule teaches should be. And by all means let them hold unto this, namely, that they by no means depart from the rule of the canon or of the order, especially in view of our warning, but that they be lowly in all things. If, however, they make bold to do otherwise, let them feel the discipline of the order; and if any refuse to reform themselves, let them be removed from office and those that are worthy be substituted in their places.

14. That bishops, abbots, and abbesses, together with the count, be mutually in accord, agreeing upon the law so as to carry out just judgment with all love and peaceful harmony, and that they faithfully live after God's will, so that at all times and all places by them and between them just judgment be accomplished. Let the poor, widows, orphans, and pilgrims have comfort and aid from them; in order that we also through their good deeds the rather win favour and the reward of life everlasting than punishment.

15. We will and command that abbots and monks by all means be subject to their bishops with all lowliness and compliance, as the canons demand. And all churches and chapels shall remain under the protection and control of the church. And let none dare cast lots for or divide the property of the church itself. And what once has been given (to the church), let it not be turned back, but be consecrated and appropriated. If, however, any one make bold to do otherwise, he shall pay and satisfy our (royal) mulct. And the monks shall be rebuked by the bishop of the same province; but if they better themselves not, then shall the archbishop summon them to the synod; and if not even then do they correct themselves, then, together with their bishop, they shall come into our presence.

16. As regards ordination and election, as the lord emperor granted it pre-

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viciously by the Frankish law, even so he confirms it at this time. With this restriction, however, that neither bishop nor abbot cherish the worthless men rather than the good of a monastery, nor strive, because of blood-kinship to them or any flattery, to advance them above their betters; and such men shall he not bring for our ordination, having better ones hidden and kept under. This we in no wise will allow, inasmuch as this seems to us to be done in derision and sport of us. But let men be trained in the monasteries for ordination in whom our gain and vantage shall grow and that of those that commended them.

17. Moreover, let the monks live immovably and boldly according to the rule, inasmuch as we know that he displeases God that is lukewarm, even as John bears witness in the Revelation: "Would that thou wert either hot or cold; but because thou art lukewarm, shall I begin to spue thee out of my mouth." Secular business they shall by no means undertake. Outside the monastery let them have no permission whatsoever to go, save when forced by the greatest need; nay, the bishop in whose diocese they are shall take all care that they be not wont to wander outside the monastery. But if there be need in any matter of obedience that any go out, even this is to be done only with the bishop's advice and permission, and such persons with certification shall be sent against whom there may be no ill report or by whom no ill fame shall arise. As to the money or property of the monastery abroad, let the abbot of the monastery with the license and counsel of his bishop appoint one to care for it, not a monk, unless he be a faithful one. But the gain of this world and greed for earthly possessions they shall by all means shun, for avarice and greed of this world are to be shunned by all Christians, and most of all by those that seem to have given up the world and worldly desires. Strife and quarrels let no one, neither within nor without the monastery, make bold to arouse. However, he that thus presumes shall be corrected with the severest punishment of the order, so that others shall fear to do the like. Let them flee drunkenness and gluttony, inasmuch as all know that chiefly therefrom comes the defilement of lust. For to our ears has come that most ruinous report that much fornication together with abomination and uncleanness has already been found in the monasteries. Chiefly it grieves and disturbs us that it can be said with little error that even from those things whence the greatest hope of salvation is believed to arise for all Christians, namely, from the chaste life of the monks, thence is evil; forasmuch as it is said some monks are guilty of sodomy. Wherefore then we ask and command that hereafter they strive the more and with the greatest certainty to keep themselves by every guard from these sins, so that never more hereafter a like thing come to our ears. And let this be known to all, inasmuch as by no means shall we consent to these evils in any place hereafter in all our kingdom, and so much the less among those whom we desire to be the better in chastity and sanctity. Of a truth if hereafter aught of the like come to our ears, not only against them, but even upon all others also who consent to such things, we shall visit such punishment that no Christian shall hear of it and in any way thereafter make bold to do aught of the like.

18. Monasteries for women shall be strictly watched, and the nuns shall by no means be permitted to wander, but with all care shall be kept; nor shall any make bold to stir up strife or quarrels among themselves, nor in any wise be disobedient or oppose their masters or abbesses. Moreover, when they live under the rule, let them by all means keep themselves after the rule, that they be not given over to fornication, nor become slaves to drunkenness nor to greed, but that in every way they live justly and temperately. And let no man enter into their cloister or monastery, save a priest enter with certification to visit the sick or for the mass only, and he shall go forth immediately.

And let no one enroll his daughter [or] another man's in a congregation of nuns without the knowledge and advice of the bishop in whose diocese the place belongs; and let the bishop carefully inquire in what wise she desires to remain in God's holy service and strengthen there her steadfastness and her vows. The servants of other men or such women as are not willing to live after the manner and walk of the holy congregation, let all these be completely driven out from the congregation.

19. That no bishops, abbots, priests, nor any deacon of all the clergy make bold to have hounds for hunting, or hawks, whether falcons or sparrow-hawks; but that each and every one keep himself utterly in his place in accord with canon or rule. He, however, that shall thus make bold, let each and every one know that he shall lose his standing. In truth, moreover, let him suffer such punishment that others be afraid to take unto themselves such things.

20. That the abbesses together with their nuns shall eagerly and with one spirit keep themselves within their cloisters and on no account make bold to go abroad. But that abbesses, when they purpose to send forth any of the nuns, by no means do this without the permission and advice of their bishop. Likewise also when they ought to ordain any in the monastery or receive any within the monastery, even this let them beforehand thoroughly discuss with their bishops; and what is decided to be for the greatest health and good the bishops shall carry word of to the archbishop, and upon his advice those things that are to be done shall be carried out.

21. That priests and all such other canonical clergy as they have for assistants in their service show themselves ever subject to their bishops as the canonical commandment bids them; of these bishops they shall be fully willing to learn in holy training, even as they desire by our favour to have their own preferment.

22. That canon priests, moreover, keep wholly to the life ordered by canon, and that in the palace of the bishop or in monasteries they ought to be trained with all care according to the training of the canons. That they shall not at all be allowed to wander abroad, but shall live under all guard; that they be not given up to base gain, not fornicators, not thieves, not murderers, not ravishers, not quarrelsome, not quick to anger, not puffed up, not drunken; but pure of body and of heart, lowly, humble, moderate, merciful, peaceful, that they may be worthy sons of God to be preferred in holy orders; not like the Sarabaites in towns and villages near the church or bordering upon it, with neither master nor discipline, revelling, fornicating, or doing all other iniquity, to permit which is impossible.

23. Priests shall anxiously supervise clerks whom they have with them, that they live according to canon and be not wonted to silly sport, worldly feasts, singing, or revelry, but live purely and wholesomely.

24. Any priest or deacon who hereafter shall make bold to have women with him in his house without the consent of the canons shall be deprived of his rank and his heritage even until he shall be brought into our presence.

25. Let counts and judges insist upon the doing of all justice, and they shall have such younger men in their service as they can securely trust to keep faithfully law and justice, never to oppress the poor; and let them not, through any flattery or bribe nor under any pretence, dare conceal thieves, robbers and murderers, adulterers, evil-doers, enchanters or witches, or any sacrilegious men, but rather surrender them, that they be bettered and punished according to law, so that by God's bounty all these evils be far removed from a Christian folk.

26. That judges judge justly in accord with written law, not their own whim.

27. And we command that in all our realm neither to rich nor to poor nor

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to pilgrims shall any one dare deny hospitality, namely, to pilgrims walking through the land for God's sake, or to any one whatever travelling for the love of God and for the salvation of his own soul; to him let none deny roof and fire and water. Moreover, if one will to do them aught more of kindness, let him know that from God he shall have best requital, as he himself said, "Whoso shall receive a little one in my name, receiveth me," and in another place, "I was a stranger and ye took me in."

28. *On embassies coming from the lord emperor.* For the envoys (*missi*) sent forth, let counts and centenaries provide with all care, even as they desire favour from the lord emperor, that these without any delay may go upon their business; and he bids all by all means, inasmuch as they are bound to provide in this manner, that never any suffer delay, but with all haste that they speed them on their way and have their provision in such wise as our envoys dispose.

29. Let not our judges, counts, or envoys reckon the poor, however, to whom in his charity the lord emperor remitted what they were bound to pay in accord with his bann, as given up to them to wring from them anything upon their own part.

30. Of those whom the lord emperor wills through Christ's favour that they have peace and protection in his realm, namely, those who make haste to his presence, desirous to bring him news of anything, whether they be Christian or pagan, or if through poverty or hunger they be seeking aid, let no man dare constrain them for his own service or seize them for himself nor make way with them nor sell them; but where of their own accord they will to remain, under the guardianship of the emperor, there let them have help in his bounty. If any make bold to transgress this order, let them know that they shall atone for it with their lives for thus boldly treating the lord emperor and his commands.

31. And against them that make known the justice of the lord emperor, let not any make bold to contrive aught of harm or injury, nor to rouse against them any enmity. He however that so makes bold let him pay the emperor's fine, or, if he be prisoner for a greater penalty, it is ordered that he be brought to the emperor's presence.

32. Murders, whereby perisheth a multitude of Christian folk, by all that is holy we bid you quit and forbid, for the Lord God forbids hatred and enmity among his faithful, much more does he forbid murder. For in what wise can a man trust that God shall be reconciled to him if he have killed his son and nearest of kin? And how shall he think that Christ the Lord shall show him favour if he have slain his brother? It is a great danger and also one not to be lived under to arouse together with God the Father and Christ the Lord of Heaven the enmities of man; wherefrom for a little time one can escape by hiding, but still by some fate he falleth into the hands of his enemies. Where, however, shall he be able to escape Him to whom all hidden things are known? By what bold rashness doth any reckon to escape his anger? Wherefore that the people committed unto our rule perish not through this sin, we have taken care to avoid it by every possible rule, inasmuch as he shall not find us reconciled and showing favour, who has not feared God's wrath against him; but with strictest severity we will to punish him that has dared commit the sin of murder. Therefore lest sin still grow more and more, that there be not the greatest enmity among Christian men, where persuaded by the devil they do murder, straightway shall the guilty return to make amends, and with all speed let him make worthy agreement for the evil done to the nearest of kin of the dead man. And this we strictly command that the kin of the dead shall not dare increase still further the enmity because of the crime done, nor refuse to make peace when he ask it, but shall receive his given pledge and the fine

he hath prepared and make a lasting peace, and that the guilty man as well make no delay in paying the fine. When, however, it befall through result of sin that any one kill his brothers or his kin, straightway he shall yield himself to the penance prescribed for him, even thus as his bishop decide and without any hesitation; but with God's aid let him strive to accomplish his healing, and pay the fine for the murder after the law, and make full satisfaction to his kinsmen, and when pledges have been made let none thereafter rouse up any enmity. He however who deigns not to make worthy amends, let him be deprived of his heritage even until our judgment shall have been rendered.

33. The crime of incest we utterly forbid. If any one be defiled by sinful fornication, he shall surely not be let freewithout strictest severity, but in such wise shall be punished therefor, that all others be afraid to do the like, so that this uncleanness be utterly removed from Christian folk, and that the guilty purge himself thoroughly therefrom by penance as it is decided by his bishop. And let the woman be entrusted to the hands of her kin even until we have passed judgment. If, however, the man will not to agree to the judgment of the bishop for his betterment, then let him be brought into our presence, remembering the example made of the incest that Fricco wrought upon a nun of God.

34. Let all be thoroughly and well prepared, whensoever our order or bidding shall come. If any, however, shall say that he is then unready and shall neglect the command, he shall be brought to the palace, and not only he but all those who make bold to disobey our bann or bidding.

35. That all men at all times revere with all honour their bishops and priests in the service and will of God. Let them not dare to make themselves and others defiled with incestuous marriages; nor shall they make bold to contract an alliance until bishops and priests together with the elders of the people with all care inquire into the degree of blood-kinship between those that are contracting; and then with the blessing let them be joined together. Drunkenness they shall shun, greed flee, and no theft commit; strife and quarrels and cursing, whether in banquet or assembly, shall be utterly avoided, but with love and harmony they shall live.

36. Also let all by all means in every pursuit of justice be in full agreement with our envoys. And the habit of false swearing let them by no means allow, forasmuch as it is necessary to remove from out a Christian folk this most evil crime. If any hereafter shall be convicted of perjury, let him know that he shall lose his right hand; moreover, let his personal heritage be taken away until our judgment.

37. As to those that have killed father or brother, or slain an uncle of the father's or mother's family or any other of their kin, and who are not willing to agree and render obedience to the judgment of the bishops, the priests, and the other judges, then for the salvation of their souls and the doing of just judgment let our envoys and the counts restrain them in such custody that they be safe and defile not other folk even until they be brought into our presence; and of their property they shall have naught in the mean time.

38. Likewise let it be done for those that have been reprov'd and punished for unlawful and incestuous unions, and will not to better themselves nor to submit to their bishops or priests, but make bold to hold lightly our command.

39. In our forests let none dare steal our game, which we have many times forbidden to be done; and now again do we firmly decree under bann that none do it more; as each and every one desires to keep his fealty and promises towards us, even so let him keep watch on himself. Still if any count or centenary or lower officer of ours or one of our servants shall steal our game, by all

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means let him be brought to our presence to give an account. As for others of the common people, whoever shall make this same theft of game, let him by all means pay what is just, and by no means whatsoever let any hereafter be mildly treated. Moreover, if this have been done with the knowledge of any in that fealty which they have promised to keep towards us and now must promise again, let them not conceal it.

40. Lastly, therefore, we wish our decrees to be known of all in our entire realm, through our envoys now sent forth, whether among men of the church, bishops, abbots, priests, deacons, canon priests, all monks or nuns, how each and every one in his service and calling may keep our ban or decree either where thereafter it be fit for their goodwill to pay their thanks to citizens or lend succour, or where there be aught that it be necessary to better. Likewise also laymen in all and every place, whether of protection of holy churches or our decree concerning widows, or orphans, or the weak, and robbery, and military matters, even in regard to all these details according to our command or our will that they be obedient, and moreover keep our ban in such wise as each and every one should strive to guard himself in God's holy service. And that all these good things be greatly to the praise of God Almighty, and that we may give thanks where it is right; but where we believe aught has gone unpunished, that we may so strive for the bettering of all with both zeal and eagerness, that with God's help we may bring this to betterment, both to our eternal gain and that of all our loyal followers. Likewise also of counts or centenaries, our servants, we wish that all the above-named matters between us be favourably known.

II

THE WAR OF THE INVESTITURES

[Nothing better exemplifies the power and position of the papacy in mediæval Europe than its struggle with the German emperors over the question of investiture. A full discussion of this may be found in Volume VII, *History of the Western Empire*, Chapter IX, and in Volume VIII, *History of the Papacy*, Chapter III. The documents here presented are: (I) Gregory VII's letter of reproof to Henry IV for his obstinacy in refusing to cast off the five counsellors whom Gregory had placed under the ban for simony, and for his disregard of the papal admonition concerning lay investiture. (II) Henry's sharp reply to Gregory. (III) Gregory's first bull of excommunication and deposition against Henry IV. (IV) Gregory's communication to the princes of the empire, relating how Henry did penance at Canossa and how he had removed the ban of excommunication. (V) The Concordat of Worms, the compromise between the emperor, Henry V, and Pope Calixtus II, by which the long struggle over the investiture was at length ended.]

I. Gregory VII to Henry IV, December 26th, 1075

(From Migne, *Patrologia*, Series II., tom. cxlviii., pp. 439-442)

Gregory, Bishop, servant to God's servants, to King Henry greeting and apostolic benediction, if so be that he be obedient to the apostolic see, as becometh a Christian king.

As we reckoned and weighed carefully with how stern judgment we shall have to render an accounting for our stewardship of the ministry entrusted to us by Saint Peter, first of the apostles, with doubting have we sent thee the apostolic benediction, inasmuch as thou art said knowingly to commune with them that are excommunicated by judgment of the apostolic see and decree

of synod. The which, if it be true, thou knowest of thyself that thou canst receive the grace of neither divine nor apostolic benediction, unless thou separate from thee them that are excommunicate and drive them to repent, and with proper penitence and satisfaction for thy sin first gain absolution and indulgence. Whence we counsel thine excellency that, if thou dost feel thy guilt in this matter, thou go with speedy confession to take counsel of some canonical bishop, who with our permission shall enjoin upon thee fit penance for this thy sin and absolve thee, that he may endeavour to tell us truly by his letter the limit of thy penance with thine agreement thereto.

For the rest it seems unto us exceeding strange that thou dost send us so often such devout letters and dost show such lowliness of thine highness by the words of thine envoys; dost call thyself son of Holy Mother Church and of us, devoted in faith, single in affection, foremost in piety; and, finally, with all manner of suavity and veneration dost commend thyself; but in sooth, however, and in deeds showest thyself most perverse and goest counter to canonical and apostolic decrees in those matters where the bond of the church makes most demand. For to hold our peace of other matters, in the affair of Milan what thou hadst promised us through thy mother, through our fellow bishops, whom we sent to thee—how thou didst purpose, or with what heart thou didst promise, the outcome shows; and now indeed to shower blow upon blow, counter to decrees of the Apostolic See, thou hast given over the churches of Fermo and Spoleto—if indeed a church can be given over or granted by a man, and that to certain persons unknown to us; for they cannot so much as lay on hands by rule unless they have been approved and are well known.

It had befitted thy royal dignity, inasmuch as thou dost confess thyself a son of the church, to look with more reverence upon the church's master, namely, Saint Peter, foremost of the apostles, to whom, if thou art of the Lord's sheep, thou art given to be fed by the word and power of the Lord, for Christ saith unto him, "Peter, feed my sheep," and again, "To thee are given the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed in heaven." In his see and apostolic rule, while we, sinners though we be and unworthy the grant of God, bear sway with his power, assuredly he has received whatever thou hast sent us whether in writing or in mere words; and while we read letter by letter or hear the speaker's words, he himself with his keen gaze sees from what heart this bidding came forth.

Wherefore it should have been seen to by thine highness that there be not found any difference of feeling in thy words and embassies to the Holy See, and in those matters whereby Christian faith and the condition of the church most avail to eternal salvation thou shouldest not have refused worship due, not to us, but to God Almighty, although the Lord thought it good to say to the apostles and their successors, "He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that refuseth you, refuseth me." For we know that he who refuses not to give loyal obedience unto God, in all matters which we have spoken in agreement with the judgment of the holy fathers, does not refuse to keep our commandments as if he had had them from the mouth of the apostle himself. For if, because of veneration of the seat of Moses, the Lord bade the apostles to heed whatsoever the scribes and Pharisees spoke when they sat thereon, there can be no doubt that the teaching of the apostles and of the gospels, whose seat and foundation is Christ, for whom is all reverence from the faithful, is to be received through those who are chosen for the service of proclaiming it, and is to be kept. For when a synod gathered together this year at the apostolic see, over which synod a dispensation from on high willed that we preside, and at which some of thine own faithful followers were present, see-

[1075 A.D.]

ing that the discipline of the Christian religion for many seasons now had tottered, that the first and foremost means of winning souls had long since fallen utterly and been trodden down through the devil's urging, and being stricken with the danger and evident ruin of the Lord's flock, we turned us again to the commandments and teaching of the holy fathers, decreeing nothing new, naught of our own invention, but the early and sole rule of discipline in the church, and we decreed that all error should be left behind, and the pathway trod by the saints again be sought and followed. For we see not any entrance to our salvation and life everlasting open for Christ's sheep nor for their shepherds other than that shown by Him that said: "I am the door; through me if any enter in he shall be saved and shall find pasture"; this way, preached by the apostles and kept by the holy fathers, we have learned in the Gospel and in every page of the Holy Scriptures.

Now as to this decree, which some, setting man's favour before God's, call an unbearable weight and tremendous burden, but which we, however, with a more fitting title style the truth and the light needful to gain salvation again, we adjudge that it is eagerly to be received and kept, not only by thee or by those that are in thy realm, but by all the princes and peoples of the earth that confess Christ. Although we much desired and it would have greatly befitted thee that, even as thou art greater than others in fame, favour, and valour, so thou shouldst be high above others in loyalty to Christ; nevertheless, lest these things seem to thee beyond measure heavy and unjust, by thy faithful followers we have sent bidding unto thee lest change in an ill custom alarm thee, that thou shouldst send unto us what wise and pious men thou couldst find in thy realm, so that, if by any argument they might show or explain to us in what way we might lighten the decree published by the holy fathers and yet offend not the honour of the eternal King nor put to peril the safety of our own souls, we might bow before their counsel. But even hadst thou not been in so friendly wise advised by us, nevertheless it had been just that thou shouldst make demand of us with moderation in matters wherein we oppressed thee or offended thy dignity, before thou didst violate apostolic decrees. But of what import thou madest our warnings or our adherence to justice is made clear in these matters that have since been done and ordained by thee.

But inasmuch as God's long-suffering is ever patient and calls thee to amend thy ways, as thine understanding groweth we hope that thy heart and soul may be turned to hearken unto the commands of God. With a father's love, knowing Christ's dominion over thee, we bid thee ponder how dangerous a thing it is to prefer thine honour to his; and that thou no longer by thy present doings hinder the freedom of the church, whom he deemed a spouse worthy to join to him in heavenly marriage; but that thou begin to lend the aid of thy valour and loyal devotion for the greatest growth to the honour of God Almighty and Saint Peter, by whom thine own glory shall win increase. This thing, in sooth, because of the victory won over thine enemies, now most especially thou oughtest to recognise as a thing thou shalt owe to them; and while they bless thee with notable good fortune, let them see devotion in return for the bounty granted thee. And that the fear of God, in whose powerful hand is every realm and empire, may sink deeper into thine heart than has our warning, hold this in mind, namely, what happened to Saul after he had won a victory through obedience to the bidding of the prophet, but then boasted of his triumph and did not carry out the command of the same, and how he was reprov'd of the Lord; but how great favour came to King David for reward of lowliness in the midst of the glories of valour.

Lastly, of those matters in thy letters that we have seen and know but say naught of, we shall give thee no set answer to them until thine ambassadors,

Rabbodi, Adelprech, and Vodescal, and they that we joined unto them, be returned unto us and open up to us more fully what things we committed to them to discuss with thee.

Given at Rome, December the twenty-sixth, the fourteenth indiction.

II. Reply of Henry IV to Gregory VII, March 27th, 1076

(From *Monumenta Historiæ Germanica, Leges, Sectio IV., tom. i., p. 110*)

Henry, king not by illegal usurpation, but through the holy ordination of God to Hildebrand, now not pope but false monk.

Such greeting hast thou won by thine own strife, for thou hast passed by no rank in the church without making it share in strife, not in honour; in cursing, not in blessing. For to speak out of many of a few particulars, the rulers of Holy Church, namely, archbishops, bishops, priests, as the Lord's anointed, hast thou not only not feared to touch, but as if they were bond slaves, knowing not what their lord doeth, under foot dost thou tread them. By this treading of them under foot thou hast got praise from the mouth of the rabble. All them thou hast judged to know nothing and thyself alone to know all things; which same knowledge, however, thou art eager to use, not for building up but for tearing down—so that we may believe that Saint Gregory, whose name thou dost seize for thyself, spake prophecy of thee when he said on this wise: "From the great number of his subjects is the spirit of a master often lifted up and he deems that he knows more than all men, since he sees that he is powerful more than all men." And we have borne all this in our eagerness to keep safe the honour of the Apostolic See. But thou didst esteem our lowliness to be fear, and therefore fearedst not to rise up against that very kingly power granted us by God, which power thou hast dared threaten to take away from us; as if we received rule from thee, as if in thy hand and not in God's hand were rule or empire. Nay, our Lord Jesus Christ called us to rule, but called thee not to priesthood. For thou hast risen by these steps: namely, by trickery, which a monk's calling detests, thou hast attained money; by money, favour; by favour, the sword; by the sword, the See of Peace; and from the See of Peace thou hast disturbed peace, in that thou hast armed subjects against their lords, in that thou, though not called of God, hast taught that our bishops, called of God, are lightly to be esteemed, in that thou hast seized for laymen the ministry over their priests, so that by their own power they displace or condemn those whom they of their own selves had received as their teachers from God's hand, through the laying on of the hands of the bishops. On me also, who, unworthy though I be, am anointed among them that are anointed to rule, thou hast laid thy hand; although the tradition of the holy fathers teacheth that I am to be judged by God alone, nor for other charge declares that I be deposed unless—what be far from me—I have strayed from the faith; for even Julian the apostate the wisdom of the holy fathers entrusted not to themselves, but to God alone to judge and depose. Himself also the true pope, Saint Peter, cries, "Fear God, honour the king." But thou, that fearest not God, dost dishonour me, appointed of him. Inasmuch as Saint Paul, when he spared not an angel from heaven, should he preach otherwise, excepted not thee, who upon earth dost preach otherwise. For he saith, "If any one, either I or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel than we have preached unto you, let him be damned." Thou therefore, condemned by this anathema, by the judgment of all our bishops, and by our judgment, descend, leave the usurped seat of the apostles. Let another rise upon the throne of Saint Peter, who shall not hide

[1076-1077 A.D.]

violence under the cloak of religion, but shall teach the sound teaching of Saint Peter. I, Henry, king by God's grace, together with all our bishops, say unto thee, "Descend, descend, thou that shalt be damned through all ages."

III. *Excommunication of Henry IV*

(From *Migne, Patrologia, Series II., tom. cxlviii., p. 790*)

O Saint Peter, chief of apostles, incline, we ask, thy holy ears unto us, and hear me, thy servant, whom thou hast nursed from childhood and whom even until this day thou hast freed from the hand of the wicked, that did hate me and do hate me for my loyalty to thee. Thou art my witness and my lady the Mother of God and Saint Paul, thy brother, and all saints, that thy Holy Roman Church drew me against my will to her guidance, and that I thought not of force to sit upon thy seat, but rather wished to end my life as a pilgrim than to seize thy place by worldly guile for the sake of earthly glory. Therefore of thy favour and not of my deeds, I believe that it has pleased and now pleases thee that the people of Christ particularly entrusted unto thee should be obedient unto me, particularly because of thy life entrusted unto me; and by thy favour unto me is the power given of God to bind and to loose in heaven and on earth. Trusting in this belief, on behalf of the honour and protection of thy church, on the part of Almighty God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, through thy power and authority, to King Henry, son of the emperor Henry, who hath rebelled against thy church with unheard-of haughtiness, do I forbid the rule of the entire realm of the Germans and of Italy; and all Christian men do I free from the bond of such oath to him as they have made or shall make; and I forbid that any serve him as king. For it befits that he who strives to lessen the honour of thy church should himself lose what honour he seemeth to have. And since as a Christian he has scorned obedience, nor has returned to the Lord whom he deserted, holding intercourse with those that were excommunicated, and spurning my commands, sent to him as thou art witness for his own salvation, and separating himself from the church, which he tried to break asunder, now I, in thy stead, bind him with the bond of anathema, and so bind him, out of belief in thee, that the nations may know and have proof that thou art Peter, and upon this rock the Son of the living God hath built the church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

IV. *Gregory VII to the German Princes, January 27th, 1077*

(From *Migne, Patrologia, Series II., tom. cxlviii., pp. 465-467*)

Gregory, bishop, servant to the servants of God, to all archbishops, bishops, dukes, counts, and other princes of the German realm, that defend the faith of Christ, greeting and apostolic benediction.

Inasmuch as for love of justice ye have taken up common cause and peril with us in the struggle of Christ's warfare, we have wished to make known to your affection with sincere love how the king brought down to penance besought the mercy of absolution, and in what manner the whole case has been carried on since his entry into Italy even until now.

As had been decided between us and the envoys who were sent to us on your part, we came into Lombardy, about twenty days before the term at which one of the dukes was to meet us at Clusæ, awaiting his coming until we could cross over to those parts. But when after the term had passed news came to us that at this time, because of many difficulties (as we do indeed be-

lieve), an escort could not be sent to meet us, and when we had not elsewhere succour to cross over to you, we were encompassed by no small anxiety as to what had better be done. In the mean time we knew of a certainty that the king was drawing near, who, even before he entered Italy, sent to us envoys to make supplication, offered in all matters to give just dues to God, Saint Peter, and ourselves, and again made promise to mend his life and to heed all obedience, if only he should win from us the gift of absolution and apostolic benediction. This we long postponed by holding many councils, and when we had sharply reproved him for his error through all messengers that went between us, at length he came with a few followers, making no show of rashness or hostility, to the town of Canossa, where we were then staying. There for three days, before the gate, with all royal garb laid off, indeed barefoot and clad in woollen rags, he stood, nor ceased imploring with much weeping the help and comfort of apostolic mercy, until he forced all that were there present and those to whom report thereof came to such pity and compassionate sympathy that in his behalf all interceded with many cries and tears—all marvelling at our unwonted hardness of heart, and some even crying out against us that this was not the weight of apostolic severity, but a sort of cruelty of tyrant fierceness. Finally, by the insistence of his repentance and the great supplication of all there present we were overcome, and finally, having loosed the bond of the anathema, we took him back into the favour of fellowship and into the bosom of Holy Mother Church, but not before we had from him the assurances written below, of which moreover we received confirmation by the hands of the abbot of Cluny, of our daughters Mathilda and the countess Adelaide, and of other princes, bishop and lay, as seemed to us valuable herefor.

When these things were thus brought to conclusion, in order that for the peace of the church and the harmony of the realm (as we have long wished) we might be able, with God's help, to join together all things more fully, we desired at the first opportunity granted us to come unto you. For we will that your affection know this thing beyond doubt, that, inasmuch as the case of this whole matter is in such suspense as ye may see from the assurances named, both our coming unto you and your agreement in our counsels seem to be very particularly needful. Wherefore in that faith wherein ye began and in love of justice do ye all strive to remain, knowing that we are not otherwise given over to the king save that by mere speech, as is our wont, we have said that he might hope of us in all matters wherein we should be able to lend him aid, either with justice or with mercy, but without peril to our soul or to his.

Oath of Henry, King of the Germans

"I, King Henry—by reason of murmuring and dissension, which now archbishops, bishops, dukes, counts, and other princes of the kingdom of the Germans have against me, and by reason of others who follow them in the same matter of dissension—within the term that the lord Pope Gregory shall determine, according to his judgment will do justice or according to his counsel will make harmony, unless an absolute impediment block either me or him, which stay having come to an end, I shall be ready to accomplish the same. Likewise if the same Pope Gregory will to go across the mountains or to other regions of the earth, he shall be secure, in so far as I am concerned and all whom I shall be able to constrain, from all hurt of life and limb, or from capture, both he and they that shall be in his escort or company, or they that are sent by him, or come to him from whatsoever region of the world, both going, tarrying there, or returning thence; nor shall he have any other hindrance with

[1077-1122 A.D.]

my consent that shall be counter to his honour. And if any do aught to him, I shall help him in good faith according to my ability."

Given at Canossa, January twenty-seventh, the fifteenth indiction.

V. The Concordat of Worms, September 23rd, 1122

(From *Monumenta Historiæ Germanica, Leges, Sectio IV., Constitutiones, tom. i., 159-161*)

1. Privilege of the emperor.

In the name of the holy and undivided Trinity. I, Henry, by God's grace august emperor of the Romans, for the love of God and of the Holy Roman Church and of lord Pope Calixtus and for the cure of my soul, give to God, to God's holy apostles Peter and Paul, and to the Holy Catholic Church all investiture through ring and staff, and grant that in all churches that are in my empire there be canonical election and free consecration.

The possessions and regalia of Saint Peter, which, from the beginning of this disagreement even unto this day, whether in my father's time or in my own, have been removed—what I have the same I restore to the Holy Roman Church, and what I have not I will faithfully help that they be restored.

The possessions also of other churches, and of princes and others, both clergy and lay, which have been lost in this war, by advice of princes or by process of justice—what I have I shall give back, and what I have not I shall faithfully help that they be restored.

And I give true peace to lord Pope Calixtus, the Holy Roman Church, and all who are or have been upon his side.

And wherein the Holy Roman Church shall ask my aid, I will faithfully help, and wherein it shall make to me complaint, I will work due justice. These things all are done with the agreement and advice of the princes whose names are written below:

Adalbert, archbishop of Mainz. F., archbishop of Cologne. H., bishop of Ratisbon. O., bishop of Bamberg. B., bishop of Spire. H., of Augsburg. G., of Utrecht. Ö., of Constance. E., abbot of Fulda. Henry, duke. Frederick, duke. S., duke. Pertolf, duke. Margrave Teipold. Margrave Engelbert. Godfrey, count palatine. Otto, count palatine. Berengar, count.

I, Frederick of Cologne, archbishop and archchancellor, give recognisance.

2. Privilege of the pope.

I, Calixtus, bishop, servant to God's servants, to thee, loved son Henry, by God's grace august emperor of the Romans, grant: elections of bishops and abbots in the German realm, which appertain to the realm, shall be held in thy presence without simony or any violence, so that, if any disagreement arise between factions, with advice or judgment of the metropolitan and his fellow provincials, thou mayst furnish assent and assistance to the sounder party. He that is elected, moreover, shall receive his regalia from thee and by thy lance and shall do thereafter what is legally due unto thee.

One consecrated in other regions of the empire within six months shall receive his regalia from thee and by thy lance and shall do thereafter what is legally due unto thee; saving all things that are recognised as appertaining to the Roman Church.

Wherein thou shalt make complaint to me and ask aid, according to the due of my office I will give thee aid. I give thee true peace and likewise all who are upon thy side or were at the time of this disagreement.

III

THE TRUCE OF GOD (1085 A.D.)

[This document is commonly accepted as the decree of the synod of Mainz or of the emperor Henry IV. This has, however, been questioned by some late editors, who hold that its scope was less than such an origin would imply, and that it was dioecesan rather than national. Similar attempts to curb private warfare were made in France and other European countries.]

(From *Monumenta Historiæ Germanica, Leges, Sectio IV., tom. i., pp. 605-608*)

1. Inasmuch as in our days the holy church has been afflicted beyond measure with tribulation, suffering so much stress and danger, we have set ourselves to come to her aid, through God's favour, in order that peace, which for pressure of our sins we could not make lasting, might be strengthened a little by the exemption at least of some days.

2. In the year of the Lord's incarnation 1085, in the eighth indiction, through God's intervention, by the agreement of clergy and people alike it was decreed by vote that from the first day of the Advent of the Lord until the final day of Epiphany, and from the beginning of Septuagesima even to the eighth day of Pentecost and through that whole day, and on every fifth, sixth, Sabbath day, and Sunday even until the rising of the sun on the second day of the week, with the addition of the fourth fast day of the four seasons, and on each evening of the feast day of an apostle together with the day following, and besides on every day canonically set apart in the past or in the future for fasting or for feasting, this decree of peace shall be observed. In order that there may be the greatest security of all upon the road or tarrying at home, no man shall do murder and arson, robbery and assault, no one with cudgel or sword or any manner of weapon shall harm any, and no one no matter for what wrong he be at feud, from the Lord's Advent even unto the fifth day of Epiphany and from Septuagesima to the eighth day of Pentecost, shall make bold to bear arms, shield or sword or lance or the load of any armour whatsoever.

3. Likewise on other days, that is Sundays, the fifth and sixth days of the week, the Sabbath, on each evening of the feast day of an apostle together with the day following, and besides on every day canonically set apart in the past or in the future for fasting or for feasting, it is not permitted to any to bear arms unless they be going far, and then, moreover, with this exception, that none in any way do hurt therewith.

4. If it be needful for any within the term of the set peace to go to any other place, where this peace is not kept, let him bear arms, so however that he harm not any one, unless he be assailed and is compelled to defend himself. Moreover, when he return again let him lay down arms.

5. If it befall that a castle be besieged, throughout the day included within the peace let them stay from the assault, unless they be assaulted by the besieged and be forced to repel their assault.

6. And lest this decree of peace be violated by any person without punishment, by all present there was decreed this sentence: If a freeman or noble shall violate it, that is, if he do murder or wound any one or in any way whatsoever transgress, without any intervention from his wealth or from his friends he shall be driven out from the bounds of his neighbours, and all his estate his heirs shall take, and if he have a benefice, the lord to whom it pertains shall receive it. But if his heirs be found and proved to furnish him

[1085 A.D.]

with any aid, after he have been expelled, or with any sustenance, the estate shall be taken from them and be allotted to the royal dignity. But if he wish to clear himself of the charge against him, with twelve men who are both noble and free, they shall swear.

7. If a bondman kill a man, he shall be beheaded; if he wound him, his right hand shall be cut off; if in any other way, striking with fist or stone or club, or in whatsoever way he fail of fulfilling the law, he shall be beaten and his hair shall be cut. If, however, the accused wish to prove himself innocent, let him clear himself by the ordeal of cold water, in such wise, however, that he himself and none other in his place be put into the water. If, however, fearing the judgment made against him, he flee away, he shall lie under perpetual excommunication, and in whatsoever place he be heard to be let a letter be sent thither, wherein it be announced that he is excommunicated and that none shall be allowed to have fellowship with him.

8. There ought not to be cutting off of hands in the case of boys not yet twelve years old. If these have sinned against this peace, let them be punished only with whipping.

9. It breaks not the peace if any order to beat with rods or clubs a faulty bondman or a pupil or one subject to him in any manner soever.

10. Another exception from this decree of peace is if the lord emperor publicly order a campaign to be made to attack the enemies of the realm, or if it please him to hold council for the judgment of the adversaries of justice.

11. The peace is not violated if in the mean time a duke or other counts or bailiffs, or they that occupy the place of these, hold court and in accordance with the law do justice on thieves, robbers, and other criminals.

12. For the security of all, especially them that are at feud, this peace of the Lord has been decreed, but not that after the completion of the term of truce they may dare rob and plunder through villages and homes, for the law and sentence decreed against them before this peace was determined shall most diligently be preserved, so that they be kept from injustice, inasmuch as robbers and assassins are absolutely excluded from this peace of God and from every truce.

13. If any strive to oppose this holy decree, and will neither promise God this truce nor keep it, for him let none of the priests make bold to sing a mass nor pay heed to his salvation. If he be sick, let no Christian make bold to visit him; and let him have no eucharist at his end, unless he repent.

14. If any either at the present day or forever in the time of our descendants make bold to violate this truce, he is excommunicated by us without hope of reinstatement.

15. We ordain that not more in the power of counts or judges or any other of the mighty than in that of the whole people in common does it lie to visit the above-mentioned punishments on them that violate the holy truce. And let them most diligently beware lest when they punish they exercise friendship or hate or aught else counter to justice; let them not hide the crimes of certain ones, but rather bring them to light. Let no man, to redeem those taken in crime, receive money.

16. Merchants on the road whereon they do business, farmers giving heed to their farm work, ploughing, digging, reaping, and other matters of the like, shall have peace on every day. Women likewise and all that bear title in sacred orders shall enjoy continual peace.

17. In churches also and church graveyards let worship and reverence be given to God, so that if thither there flee a robber or a thief he be not taken, but be hemmed in there until by force of hunger he be forced to give himself up. If any make bold to aid an accused man by protection, weapons, food, or flight, he shall be subject to like penalty with the guilty.

18. Moreover, by our ban we forbid that any member of a holy order being proved a transgressor of this holy truce be punished by lay court, but that he be given up to the bishop. Where laymen are beheaded, let clergy be degraded; where laymen are mutilated, let clergy be suspended from office and by the vote of laymen be punished with frequent fasts and whippings until there be satisfaction. Amen.

IV

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUCHY OF AUSTRIA (1156 A.D.)

[This grant of Frederick Barbarossa erected Austria, hitherto merely a margravate, into a duchy, and laid the foundation of its future power and strength among German states. See Volume XIV, *The Holy Roman Empire*, Chapter I.]

Establishment of the Duchy of Austria, September 17th, 1156

(From *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica, Leges, Sectio IV., tom. i., pp. 221-223*)

In the name of the holy and undivided Trinity. Frederick, through the gracious mercy of God, august emperor of the Romans.

1. Although an exchange of goods may stand unquestioned by means of actual bodily transfer, and such matters as are done lawfully cannot be violently undone by any resistance, nevertheless, that there be no possibility of misunderstanding what has actually been done, our imperial authority must needs intervene.

2. Know then the present generation and the descendants to come of all that are faithful to Christ and to our empire, how we, through the assisting favour of Him by whom peace came from heaven on earth to men, in the general court of Ratisbon held on the nativity of Holy Mary, in the presence of many pious and Catholic princes, have brought to an end the strife and quarrel which was long carried on between our beloved uncle, Henry, duke of Austria, and our dear nephew, Henry, duke of Saxony, over the duchy of Bavaria, in this manner, that the duke of Austria has given up to us the duchy of Bavaria, which we straightway granted as a benefice to the duke of Saxony.

3. Moreover, the duke of Bavaria has made over to us the march of Austria with all its rights and with all such benefices as the former margrave Leopold had from the duchy of Bavaria.

4. Lest in doing this the honour and glory of our loved uncle seem at all lessened, by the counsel and judgment of the princes, on the proposal of the decree by Ladislaus, noble duke of Bohemia, and the approval thereof of all the princes, we have changed the march of Austria into a duchy, and this same duchy with all rights we have granted as a benefice to the aforesaid Henry, our uncle, and to his right noble wife Theodora, decreeing by perpetual law that they themselves and their children after them, whether male or female, shall have and possess the aforesaid duchy of Austria from the realm with hereditary right.

5. If, however, the aforesaid duke of Austria, our uncle, and his wife die without children, they shall be free to leave the same duchy to whomsoever they will.

6. We decree also that no person, great or small, within the realm of the same duchy shall make bold to exercise any justice without permission and consent of the duke.

[1156-1648 A.D.]

7. The duke of Austria for his duchy shall owe none other service to the empire, save that he come when he is bidden to the courts which the emperor shall decree in Bavaria; also he shall owe no campaign service, except what the emperor perchance shall ordain against the kingdoms or provinces adjoining Austria.

8. And that this our imperial decree remain for all time sure and unbroken, we have bidden that this present be copied hence and sealed with the imprint of our seal, with the addition of the names of fitting witnesses, which are these: Pilgrim, patriarch of Aquileja; Eberhard, archbishop of Salzburg; Otto, bishop of Freising; Conrad, bishop of Padua; Eberhard of Bamberg; Hartmann of Brescia; Hartwig of Ratisbon; the bishop of Trient; Lord Guelfo; Duke Conrad, brother of the emperor; Frederick, son of King Conrad; Henry, duke of Carinthia; Margrave Engelbert of Istria; Margrave Albert of Staden; Margrave Diepold; Hermann, count palatine of the Rhine; Otto, count palatine, and his brother Frederick; Gebhard, count of Sulzbach; Rudolf, count of Swinshud; Engelbert, count of Halle; Gebhard, count of Burchusen; the count of Buthene; the count of Pilstein; and many others.

The seal of Lord Frederick, most invincible emperor of the Romans.

I, Reinhold, chancellor, in place of Arnold of Mainz, archbishop and arch-chancellor gave recognisance.

Given at Ratisbon, September 17th, the fourth indiction, the year of the Lord's incarnation the one thousand one hundred fifty and sixth, in the rule of Lord Frederick, august emperor of the Romans; favourably in Christ, Amen; in the year of his reign the fifth, of his empire the second.

V

THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA¹ (OCTOBER 24, 1648)

[The Peace of Westphalia, the first of the great international treaties by which the states of Europe took on their modern forms, was of importance not only as terminating the Thirty Years' War, but as readjusting the political and religious affairs of Europe and as containing the first recognition of the principle of the Balance of Power. The negotiations were carried on for five years, 1643-1648, at Münster, between the representatives of France, the Empire, Spain, and the German Catholic states, and at Osnabrück between representatives of Sweden, the Empire, and the German Protestants. After preliminary treaties had been signed at Osnabrück and Münster, the Osnabrück diplomats went to Münster in October, and there on the 24th a general peace was signed. Our text is translated from F. W. Ghillany's *Europäische Chronik* (Leipsic, 1865), vol. i., pp. 148-164.]

I. TREATY OF PEACE SIGNED AT OSNABRÜCK BETWEEN THE EMPEROR FERDINAND III ON THE ONE SIDE, AND QUEEN CHRISTINA OF SWEDEN AND HER GERMAN ALLIES ON THE OTHER

Art. I. "There shall be a Christian, universal, and perpetual peace and a real and sincere friendship between his imperial majesty and the House of Austria with all his allies and retainers and all heirs and successors on the one side, and between her imperial majesty and the kingdom of Sweden with all her allies and subjects, especially between the very Christian king (of France), together with the electors, princes, and estates of the realm on the other side; and this peace shall be sincerely and conscientiously upheld and cherished," etc.

Art. II. General amnesty on both sides. All insults and outrages, dam-

[¹ The articles not accompanied by quotation marks are given in condensed form.]

ages and expenses, caused during the war in word, writing, or deed, shall be forgotten without respect to persons.

Art. III. 1. In consequence of this amnesty all estates of the realm, electors, princes, knights, citizens, and subjects shall be reinstated in their possessions as they stood before the outbreak of the war.

2. This reinstatement is to be understood in the sense that no one is to suffer any infringement of his rights.

Art. IV. 1. In the following paragraphs the more important of these restitutions are enumerated separately, from which it must not be concluded that the restitution is not to be carried out in respect to those persons who are not mentioned here by name. 2. Above all things, the peace congress has settled the question of the Palatinate as follows: 3. "First, in regard to the House of Bavaria; the electoral dignity, which formerly belonged to the electors of the Palatinate, with all the regalia, dignities, privileges, insignia, and prerogatives belonging to that office, without any exception, together with the whole Upper Palatinate and the *grafschaft Cham*, with all their appurtenances, prerogatives, and rights, shall remain, in the future as hitherto, in the possession of the lord Maximilian, count palatine of the Rhine, duke of Bavaria, of his children, and of the whole house of William so long as there shall be male heirs of that house. 4. On the other hand, the elector of Bavaria renounces for himself, his heirs, and successors, the demand for the thirteen millions (made of the emperor for expenses of war), and also all claims upon Upper Austria, and from the moment of the proclamation of peace will hand over to his imperial majesty all documents which have been preserved concerning that demand, to be annulled and destroyed." 5. An eighth electorate shall be established for the house of the Rhenish Palatinate (the count palatine Karl Ludwig and his heirs—the line of Rudolf). 6. The said count palatine Karl Ludwig and his heirs shall again receive the Lower or Rhenish Palatinate with all its rights and with the same extent which it had before the outbreak of the Bohemian disturbances. 7. However, the few districts lying on the *Bergstrasse*, which the electorate of Mainz mortgaged to the Palatinate in 1463, shall be returned to the electorate of Mainz against a cash compensation for the value of the mortgage. 8. The claims laid by the bishops of Speier and Worms to certain estates in the Lower Palatinate shall be settled before a regular judge. 9. "If it should happen that the (Bavarian) line of William should have no male heirs, and that the (Bavarian) palatine line (the line of Rudolf) should still be in existence, not only the Upper Palatinate but also the electorate, which the dukes of Bavaria owned, shall revert to the surviving counts palatine, who in the mean time had been in possession of the co-investiture; the eighth electorate, however, shall then wholly cease to exist. On the other hand, the Upper Palatinate in that case shall revert to the surviving count palatine in such a way that all transactions and benefits of the law, which rightfully belong to the heirs to the allodial estates of the elector of Bavaria, shall be reserved to them." 10. All family compacts between the electoral house of Heidelberg and Neuburg shall remain intact so far as they do not conflict with the provisions of the present peace. 11. The rights of the Palatinate over the Julian fief shall likewise be preserved intact. 12. The emperor will pay to the brothers of the count palatine Karl Ludwig, in order to lighten his appanage, 400,000 reichsthalers within four years, at the rate of 100,000 thalers annually. 13. The amnesty is expressly extended over all officers and retainers of the house of the palatinate. 14. "On the other hand, the lord Karl Ludwig, with his brothers and the remaining electors and princes of the realm, shall swear faith and obedience to the emperor, and, in addition, both he and his brother shall renounce all claims to the Upper Palatinate, for himself and his heirs, as long as there shall be legitimate male heirs of the line

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of William." 15. The emperor promises to pay to the widowed mother of the count palatine Karl Ludwig 20,000 reichsthalers, once for all, and 10,000 reichsthalers to every one of his sisters upon her marriage. 16. The counts of Leiningen and Dachsburg shall not be disturbed by the count palatine Karl Ludwig in their prerogatives. 17. The free nobility (Reichsritterschaft) in Franconia, Swabia, and on the Rhine shall remain undisturbed in its immediate state. 18. The barons (*Freiherren*) of Waldenburg, Reigersberg, Brömse von Rüdesheim, Metternich, and the elector of Bavaria shall retain their fiefs in the Lower Palatinate. 19. "The adherents to the Augsburg confession in the Lower Palatinate, who were in possession of the churches, and among them especially the citizens and inhabitants of Oppenheim, shall preserve the status of the church as it was in the year 1624, and they, as well as the others who shall demand it, shall be allowed free exercise of the Augsburg confession, both publicly in the churches at set times and privately in their own houses or in those of others, their own or neighbouring servants of the divine word officiating." 20. The count palatine Ludwig Philip, duke of Simmern, shall receive again all the lands and rights which he owned before the outbreak of the war. 21. The count palatine Friederich of Zweibrücken shall receive again the cloister Hornbach and the fourth part of the toll at Vilzbach. 22. The count palatine Leopold Ludwig of Veldenz shall receive again the *grafschaft* Veldenz with the same ecclesiastical and secular status which it had in 1624. 23. The stronghold of Wilzburg shall be given back to the markgraf of Brandenburg, Kulmbach-Ausbach, and his dispute with the bishop of Würzburg over the city of Kitzingen shall be settled by a summary legal process. 24. The house of Württemberg shall be reinstated in all the ecclesiastical and secular estates and privileges which it anywhere owned before the outbreak of the war. 25. Also the princes of Württemberg of the Mömpelgard line shall be reinstated in their possession in Alsace and elsewhere, especially in the two Burgundian fiefs of Elerval and Passavant. 26. The markgraf Friederich of Baden and Hochberg shall be reinstated in his territory and in his rights, as they were before the outbreak of the war. 27. The princess of Baden shall receive again the baronial estate of Hohen-Geroldseck, so far as she shall have proved her claims thereto by authentic documents. 28. The duke of Croy shall receive an amnesty; he shall continue to possess his part of the estate (*herrschaft*) of Vinstingen, with the reservation, however, of the rights of the German Empire to that estate. 29. The dispute between Nassau-Siegen and Nassau-Siegen shall be settled by a legal commission. 30. The counts of Nassau-Saarbrücken shall be reinstated in their ecclesiastical and secular estates. 31. Likewise the house of Hanau. 32. Likewise the count of Sohns. 33. Likewise the house of Hohen-Sohns. 34. The counts of Isenburg shall enjoy an amnesty. 35. The Rheingrafs shall be reinstated in their districts, Troneck and Wildenburg. 36. The widow of Count Ernest of Sayn shall be reinstated in the possession of the district Hachenburg and of the village Bendorf. 37. The *grafschaft* Falkenstein shall be restored to the person to whom it legally belongs. 38. The house of Waldeck shall be reinstated in all the prerogatives over the estate Didinghausen, etc. 39. Count Joachim Ernst of Öttingen shall receive again all the ecclesiastical and secular estates which his father owned before the outbreak of disturbances. 40. Likewise the house of Hohenlohe. 41. Likewise the count Ludwig of Löwenstein and Wertheim. 42. Also the Catholic line of Löwenstein-Wertheim. 43. Also the counts of Erbach. 44. Also the counts of Brandenstein. 45. The baron of Khevenhüller, the heirs of the chancellor Löffler, the heirs of Konrad of Rhelingen shall receive back their confiscated estates. 46. The contracts, exchanges, and promissory notes, which were extorted by unlawful means, and concerning which Speier, Weissenburg on the Rhine, Landau, Reutlingen, Heilbronn, and

others complain particularly, also those indictments which have been bought and ceded to another, shall be destroyed in such fashion that it shall be absolutely impossible to bring a legal suit with such a title. 47. Against debtors who can prove that they were forced by one of the belligerent parties to pay their debt, no process shall be instituted by the injured, although they may be the real creditors. 48. The suits which have already arisen from this cause shall be terminated within two years. 49. The legal judgments which were delivered on secular matters during the wars may be subjected to revision at the instance of one of the parties, within the first half year after the conclusion of peace. 50. No one shall suffer loss by not having renewed his tenure since the year 1618 or for not having performed his obligations therefor. The time in which the investiture is to be renewed shall begin from the conclusion of peace. 51. All civil and military persons, from the highest to the lowest, their children and heirs, without exception, shall, in respect to their persons and property, be reinstated by both sides in the same condition of life and reputation, of honour, of conscience, of liberty, rights, and prerogatives, which they actually held before the disturbances or which they might rightfully have held. No lawsuit shall be brought against them nor shall any punishment be inflicted upon them. 52. The amnesty extends also to the Austrian subjects. 53. On the other hand, the emperor insists that the confiscated estates on his hereditary lands shall not be given back to their old owners, but shall remain in the possession of the present owners, if the confiscation took place before the appearance of the Swedes. 54. Those estates which were confiscated on account of their owners' going over to the Swedes or French shall be returned to their former possessors, without reimbursement for their use or for any injury that may have been done them. 55. In private summons the Protestants in Austria shall receive the same justice as Catholics. 56. No compensation will be made for buildings, furniture, and other objects injured by the war. 57. No war shall be begun on account of the Julian succession; the same shall be settled by compromise or by legal suit.

Art. V. The following has been decided in regard to the religious difficulties: 1. The Treaty of Passau (1552) and the Augsburg religious treaty of peace shall remain holy and inviolable. The present treaty of peace shall be decisive in the disputed points of those contracts. In all else a complete mutual equality shall exist between the electors, princes, and estates of both confessions; what is right for one side shall be right for the other. All acts of violence between both sides shall cease and are forbidden. [Then follow 58 provisions concerning rights and lands of religious orders, provisions insuring absolute freedom of religious exercise and belief, etc.]

Art. VI. The city of Bâle and the remaining cantons of Switzerland shall remain in the possession of their complete freedom and separation from the German Empire, and hence they shall in no way be subject to the tribunals of the empire.

Art. VII. "It has been unanimously decided by his imperial majesty and all estates of the empire that all the rights and benefits, together with all the other imperial decisions, which the religious peace, this public treaty, and—within the latter—the settlement of religious disputes, promised to the other Catholic and evangelical estates, shall also hold good for those who are called reformed. . . . But because the religious disputes which prevail among the Protestants have not yet been settled, but are reserved for a future agreement, and hence the Protestants form two parties; they have both agreed in regard to the right of reforming that, if a prince or other lord or church patron afterward goes over to the religion of the other side, or else, either through the rights of inheritance or according to the terms of this treaty, he acquires or regains possession of a principedom or of a rulership in which at present the

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religious exercises of the other party are observed, such princes may indeed have court preachers of their own confession in their residences without objection and without injury to their subjects, but they shall not be permitted to change the public form of religious worship or the church laws and regulations which have hitherto been in effect; neither shall they deprive the followers of the other sect of the churches, schools, and hospitals, or of the income, benefices, and tithes belonging to them, to use them for followers of their own sect; nor shall they, by urging the rights of supremacy of a bishopric, of a patron, or otherwise, impose on their subjects clergy of another confession, nor in any other direct or indirect way put a hindrance or a disadvantage in the way of the religion of the other," etc. 2. Single communities, which of their own free will and at their own expense desire to adopt the religion of their new overlord, may do so; on the other hand, the consistories and the professors in the universities shall be confessors of the generally accepted form of religion. Besides the Catholic, Lutheran, and reformed religion, no other form shall be adopted or tolerated in the Roman Empire.

Art. VIII. 1. All estates of the realm shall be confirmed in their rights. 2. They shall have the right of voting in all deliberations concerning the affairs of the empire. 3. Concerning the Reichstag and the articles of the next Reichstag. 4. The free imperial cities, like the other estates of the realm, have a deciding vote (*votum decisivum*) in the general as well as in the special assemblies of the empire. 5. Concerning war debts.

Art. IX. 1. The tolls and duties imposed during the war shall be removed, and the former freedom of commerce shall be re-established. 2. The taxes justified by long years' custom shall continue.

Art. X. The Swedish Indemnity. 1. The emperor Ferdinand gives over to Queen Christina of Sweden and to her heirs the dominions hereinafter named with all their rights, as a continual and direct imperial fee. 2. The whole of that part of Pomerania, usually called Hither Pomerania, with the island Rügen. Of Further Pomerania the cities Stettin, Garz, Damm, Golnow, and the fresh-water lake connected with the Baltic. 3. The kings of Sweden from this day forth for all times shall own these districts as a hereditary fief. 4. The rights, likewise, which the dukes of Hither Pomerania have had over the bishopric of Kammin shall be given over to Sweden, who can transfer them to the crown after the death of the present prebendaries. On the other hand, the rights of the dukes of Further Pomerania over Kammin shall fall to the elector of Brandenburg. 5. The elector of Brandenburg renounces any claims to the territories assigned to the crown of Sweden in the above paragraphs. 6. Moreover, Sweden receives the city of Wismar with harbour and fortification. 7. Moreover, the bishopric Bremen and the bishopric Verden, with the city and the district (*Amt*) of Wilshausen. 8. The city of Bremen and its territory shall remain in possession of its present freedom with all ecclesiastical and secular rights. 9. On account of these German possessions the Swedish kings shall be counted among the direct German estates of the realm under the title, "Duke of Bremen, Verden, and Pomerania, Prince of Rügen, and Lord of Wismar." 10. The vote which the crown of Sweden is to have in the upper Saxon Reichstags. 11. The same in the assemblies of imperial delegations. 12. In respect to these German fiefs the emperor grants the crown of Sweden the privilege *de non appellando*. 13. Also the right to erect a university. 14. The emperor absolves the inhabitants of these countries from their obligations to their earlier overlords and summons them to become subject to Sweden. 15. The crown of Sweden, on the other hand, in return for these German provinces, recognises the emperor as suzerain and takes the oath of allegiance like the other vassals of the empire. 16. The city Stralsund and the Hanseatic cities are confirmed in their rights and liberties.

Art. XI. The Brandenburg Indemnity. 1. The elector Frederick William of Brandenburg shall receive the bishopric of Halberstadt in return for his renunciation of Hither Pomerania and Rügen. 2. He shall also receive the grafschaft of Hohenstein belonging to that bishopric. 3. The elector shall leave the count of Tettenbach in possession of the grafschaft Rheinstein. 4. The elector receives, further, the bishopric Minden. 5. Also the bishopric Kammin in so far as the rights of the dukes of Further Pomerania extend over that bishopric. 6. Furthermore, the reversion of the archbishopric Magdeburg after the death of the present administrator, Duke August of Saxony. 7. The chapter of the archbishopric Magdeburg shall do homage to the elector immediately after the conclusion of peace. 8. The rights and privileges of the city of Magdeburg shall remain inviolate. 9. The four Magdeburg districts, Querfurt, Jüterbog, Damm, and Bork, shall be made over to the elector of Saxony. 10. The debts of the present administrator of Magdeburg, Duke August of Saxony, may not be covered by the income of the archbishopric after the vacancy of the archbishopric. 11. In the provinces ceded to Brandenburg the rights of the estates and of the subjects shall be preserved in regard to the religious confession hitherto practised. 12. The queen of Sweden shall return Farther Pomerania and Kolberg to the elector of Brandenburg. 13. Likewise all places in the Mark of Brandenburg which are occupied by the Swedes. 14. Furthermore, all the commanderies and lands belonging to the Knights of Malta which do not lie in the lands ceded to Sweden.

Art. XII. Mecklenburg Compensation. 1. The duke Adolf Friederich of Mecklenburg-Schwerin receives the bishopric Schwerin with Ratzeburg in compensation for the city of Wismar ceded to Sweden. 2. The right to the income of two prebends at the Cathedral of Strasburg shall remain in possession of the house of Mecklenburg. 3. The house of Mecklenburg shall also receive the two commanderies of the Knights of Malta, Mirow and Numerow, which lie in its territory. 4. It shall also be confirmed in the possession of the Elbe tolls, and in the imperial contributions which are to be levied to indemnify the Swedish army it shall be allowed to consider the sum of 200,000 thalers as if it had been already paid.

Art. XIII. 1. The ducal house of Braunschweig-Lüneburg receives the right of succession in the bishopric Osnabrück alternately with the Catholics. 2. The Swedish count Wasaburg, who renounces the rights acquired by him during the present war over the bishopric Osnabrück, in return for this renunciation shall receive 80,000 thalers from the revenues of the bishopric. 3. In return he shall give back the bishopric of Osnabrück to the present bishop, the prince Franz Wilhelm. 4. The religious conditions in the bishopric Osnabrück shall be restored to their status on January 1st, 1624. 5. After the death of the present bishop, Duke Ernst-August of Braunschweig-Lüneburg shall succeed as bishop. 6. The further occupation of the episcopal seat in Osnabrück shall take place in such a way that an evangelical bishop from the ducal house of Braunschweig-Lüneburg shall always be succeeded again by a Catholic bishop, chosen by the chapter of the cathedral. 7. Thereby the religious position of both confessions in respect to congregations and clergy shall be preserved intact in the bishopric. 8. During the time which a Protestant occupies the episcopal seat in Osnabrück, the archbishop of Cologne has the supervision over the Catholic clergy and the Catholic church of that place. 9. The cloister Walkenried with the estate Schawen is given to the dukes of Braunschweig as a perpetual fief. 10. The cloister Gröningen is also restored to them. 11. The debt of the duke Friederich Ulrich of Braunschweig-Lüneburg to the king of Denmark, which the latter made over to the emperor in the Peace of Lübeck, but which the emperor presented to General Tilly, is cancelled. 12. Likewise the debt of 20,000 guldens of the dukes of Braun-

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schweig-Lüneburg to the chapter of Ratzeburg. 13. The two younger sons of the duke August of Braunschweig-Lüneburg shall be invested with two prebends in the bishopric of Strasburg at the next vacancy. 14. In return, however, the dukes of Braunschweig-Lüneburg shall renounce their coadjutories in the archbishoprics Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, and Ratzeburg.

Art. XIV. 1. The markgraf Christian Wilhelm of Brandenburg shall receive the Magdeburg districts (*Ämter*) Zuina and Lohburg in place of the 12,000 reichsthalers which he was to receive from the archbishopric Magdeburg. 2. Since, however, these districts as well as the whole bishopric have been very much devastated by the war, 3,000 reichsthalers shall be paid the markgrafs out of an assessment to be raised in the archbishopric. 3. After the death of the markgraf the two districts shall remain in the possession of his heirs for five years, after which time they shall revert to the owner of the archbishopric.

Art. XV. The Hesse-Cassel Question. 1. The landgraf house of Hesse-Cassel shall be completely reinstated in its possessions and rights as they were before the war. 2. It shall receive the abbotship of Hirschfeld. 3. Also the districts of Schaumberg, Bückeburg, Sachsenhagen, and Stadthagen, which hitherto have belonged to the bishopric Minden. 4. It shall be paid 600,000 reichsthalers by the archbishopric Mainz and Cologne, by the bishopric Münster and Paderborn, and by the abbotship Fulda, in return for its surrender of the captured places. 5. As security for the payment of this sum the Hessians receive the strongholds Nuess, Kösfeld, and Neuhaus. 6. The Hessian garrisons of these places must be supported at the expense of the said archbishoprics and bishoprics. 7. When half of the sum has been paid, Nuess shall be given back. 8. After the payment of the whole sum with interest, the two other places shall also be evacuated by the Hessians. 9. The revenues which are to be used to cover the sum will be designated later. 10. Hesse-Cassel immediately after the conclusion of peace shall surrender all other foreign places occupied by it. 11. Upon leaving those places it shall take nothing which it did not bring into them. 12. All estates on this side and beyond the Rhine which have paid taxes to Hesse since March 1st, 1648, shall contribute towards the compensation to Hesse, mentioned above, for the evacuation of the fortified places. 13. The treaty between the houses of Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt of April 14th, 1648, in regard to the succession in Marburg, is sanctioned. 14. Also the treaty between the landgraf Wilhelm of Hesse and the count Christian of Waldeck, of April 11th, 1635, in regard to Waldeck. 15. The right of primogeniture in Hesse-Cassel and in Hesse-Darmstadt shall be preserved inviolate.

Art. XVI. Concerning the execution of the treaty [20 paragraphs].

Art. XVII. Concerning the ratification of the treaty [12 paragraphs].

II. MÜNSTER TREATY OF PEACE

Between The Emperor Ferdinand III On The One Side And The French King Louis XIV On The Other

Introduction. The emperor Ferdinand III and the king Louis XIV conclude peace through the mediation of the Republic of Venice.

1. This Christian, universal, and perpetual peace between the two crowns and their allies shall be sincerely and earnestly enforced and preserved. 2. On both sides the hostilities and injuries which have been committed shall be forgotten. 3. No part shall support the enemies of the other nor grant them reception and passage way. 4. The dispute concerning Lorraine shall be set-

bled by friendly negotiation. 5. The German Imperial Estates shall be reinstated in their previous ecclesiastical and secular position. 6. Those persons who think they have any cause for complaint concerning their reinstatement in their possessions may bring the same before a regular judge, after the restitution has taken place. 7. The most important of the restitutions are here enumerated, but it must not be concluded that the restitution does not affect the others which are not mentioned here. 8. The Imperial Attachment of the estates of the elector of Treves is repealed. 9. The Emperor withdraws his garrison from the stronghold of Ehrenbreitenstein and Hammerstein and gives over both places to the elector of Treves. 10. The question of the palatinate is settled as follows: 11. The electoral right of the palatine and the upper palatinate remain in the possession of the House of Bavaria.

(The following paragraphs of this article, to 68 inclusive, are practically covered by the Osnabrück Treaty.)

Cession to France. 69. In order still further to strengthen the peace between the Emperor and the French King, the following points have been established with the consent of the German Estates of the Empire. 70. The princely power and the seigniorial (*landesherrlich*) rights over the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, in the same way as they have hitherto belonged to the Roman Empire, shall in the future belong to the Crown of France and shall be joined to it irrevocably and for all times. 71. The Duke Francis of Lorraine, after he has taken the oath of allegiance to the King of France, shall be reinstated in the bishopric of Verdun. 72. Emperor and Empire give to the King of France and to his successors seigniorial (*landesherrlich*) and suzerain (*oberhoheits*) rights over Pignerol. 73. "Thirdly, the Emperor renounces for himself, for the whole house of Austria, and for the empire, all title, property, dominion, possession, and jurisdiction which hitherto belonged to him, to the empire and to the house of Austria—the title to the City of Breisach, to the landgrafschaft of Upper and Lower Alsace, to Sundgau, to the governorship of the ten imperial cities situated in Alsace, viz., Hagenau, Kolmar, Schlettstadt, Weissenburg, Landau, Ober-Ehnheim, Rosheim, Münster-im-Thal St. Gregory, Kaisersberg, Türkheim, and to all the villages and other titles which belong to the aforesaid districts, and cedes all of these to the Crown of France; so that the said city of Breisach, with the hamlets Hochstadt, Niederrinsing, Harten, and Acharren, which belong to the township of Breisach, together with the whole district and jurisdiction, shall continue under the crown of France as it was of old, with the exception, however, of the privileges and liberties of this city which it had already attained and received from the house of Austria." 74. "The said landgrafschaft of Upper and Lower Alsace and Sundgau, likewise the governorship over the said ten cities and the places appertaining to them, together with all vassals, freeholders, dependents, people, soldiers, cities, towns, hamlets, castles, forests, gold, silver, and other kinds of mines, rivers, brooks, meadows, and all rights, prerogatives, and appurtenances, without any reservation, with full jurisdiction, suzerainty, and seigniorial rights, from now and for everlasting times shall belong to the very Christian king and crown of France, and shall be annexed to said crown without opposition from the side of the Emperor, the empire, the house of Austria, or from any other source, so that no emperor or prince from the Austrian house shall be able or permitted to lay claim to or exercise any rights or authority in the aforesaid districts situated on this and on the other side of the Rhine." 75. The crown of France shall be bound (*sit tamen rex obligatus*) to maintain the Catholic religion in the ceded districts, as the Austrian princes were in the habit of doing. 76. The king of France shall have the right to keep a French Garrison at his own expense in the stronghold of Philippsburg (on the right bank of the Rhine three hours from Speier). "The

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king shall also have free passageway through the empire by land and water, to bring in soldiers, provisions, and anything else in as great a quantity and as frequently as is necessary. 77. The right of possession, however, of the stronghold of Philippsburg shall remain to the Bishop of Speier. 78. The house of Austria (including Spain) confirms also in a separate document the cession of the said provinces to the crown of France, releases the subjects from their oath, and summons them to take the oath of allegiance to the king of France. 79. All imperial laws which conflict with this cession shall be repealed. 80. In addition, the next Reichstag shall also give its ratification to the cession. 81. In Alsace the fortresses Benfeld, Rheinau, Alsace-Zabern, the castle Hohenbar and Neuburg on the Rhine shall be dismantled. 82. The City of Zabern shall preserve a strict neutrality and shall allow French troops a free passageway at all times. On this side of the Rhine bank no fortifications shall be erected from Bâle to Philippsburg. 83. The Archduke Ferdinand Karl of Innsbruck assumes the third part of the debts of the City of Ensisheim. 84. The estates alone pay the other debts, made by the estates alone in Alsace, or under agreement with the Austrian princes at the provincial landtag. 85. The king of France gives back to the Austrian house, and more particularly to Archduke Ferdinand Karl, the first-born son of the deceased Archduke Leopold, the four forest cities of Rheinfelden, Säckingen, Lanfenburg, and Waldshut, together with all lands, the Grafschaft Hauenstein, the Schwarzwald [Black Forest], all Upper and Lower Breisgan, with the cities of Neuburg, Freiburg, Endingen, Kenzingen, Waldburg, Villingen, Bräunlingen, which have belonged to the house of Austria from olden times, all Ortenau with the imperial cities Offenbach, Gengenbach, and Zell-am-Hammersbach. Commerce and navigation shall be free between the inhabitants on both sides of the Rhine. 86. The confiscated estates shall be returned to all vassals and dependents on this and on the other side of the Rhine. 87. "The very Christian king shall leave not only the bishops of Strasburg and Bâle together with the city of Strasburg, but also all the other estates in Upper and Lower Alsace which are immediately subordinate to the Roman Empire, viz., the abbots of Murbach and Ludern, the abbess of Andlau, the cloister of the Benedictine order in the St. Gregory valley, the counts palatine at Lützelstein, the counts and barons (*freiherren*) of Hanau, Fleckenstein, Oberstein, and the nobility (*Ritterschaft*) of all Lower Alsace, likewise the above-mentioned ten imperial cities which belong in the district of Hanau—he shall leave these in the liberty and in the position of immediate subordination to the Roman Empire which they have always enjoyed; so that in the future he shall be able to lay no claim to royal dominion over them, but shall be content with those rights which the house of Austria had and which by this treaty of peace are made over to the crown of France. Nevertheless, the present declaration shall deprive the highest sovereign right of nothing which was conceded to it above." 88. The king of France shall pay the archduke Ferdinand Karl 3,000,000 livres as compensation for the ceded territories. 89. He shall also assume two-thirds of the debts of Ensisheim. 90. The documents concerning the territories which are given back to the archduke Ferdinand Karl shall be handed over to him without delay. 91. Of those documents which concern the territories as a whole, authentic copies shall be furnished the Archduke as often as may be requested. 92. The Treaty of Cherasco, of April 6th, 1631, settling the dispute between the dukes of Mantua and of Savoy over Montferat, shall be maintained. 93. The same shall not be opposed from any side. 94. On account of the cession to France of Pignerol, concerning which the French king compromised with the duke of Savoy, France, in order to avoid further dispute, shall pay the duke of Mantua 494,000 gold guildens. 95. The emperor shall invest the duke of Savoy with Montferrat. 96. The duke of

Savoy shall remain in possession of the fiefs Rocheveran, Olmi, and Cäsola. 97. The emperor shall reinstate the counts of Cacheran in the fiefs Rocha and Arazzio. 98. All hostilities shall cease after the signing and sealing of the peace. 99. Authorized commissioners from both sides shall come to an agreement concerning the evacuation of places and the withdrawal of soldiers. 100. The emperor shall publish edicts throughout the whole empire that the provisions of the peace may be immediately carried out by all concerned. 101. Wherever it is necessary the emperor shall appoint special commissioners for this purpose. 102. The provisions of the peace shall be punctually obeyed. 103. No prince, district magistrate, or military commander shall oppose its execution. 104. The prisoners of war shall be set at liberty. 105. All foreign garrisons shall leave the places which are to be given back. 106. The places captured during the war shall be given back to the rightful owners. 107. Their restitution shall be faithfully observed by both sides. 108. The archives and the artillery found in a place at the time of capture shall likewise be given back. 109. The places hitherto occupied shall from now on remain free of garrisons. 110. The imperial estates shall reduce the number of troops to a peace footing. 111. The ambassadors promise the ratification of the peace on the part of their constituents within eight weeks. 112. The peace shall be a universally binding law of the realm. 113. No objections shall be made to it. 114. Whoever acts against the peace in counsel or deed, whether he be of clerical or secular station, shall incur the penalty of breaking the peace of the land. 115. All participants in the peace pledge themselves to a joint execution of the same against insubordination. 116. This shall be done by force of arms in case of need. 117. First, the magistrates of single districts shall proceed against insubordinates in their district. 118. Whoever wishes to march soldiers across the territory of another may do so only at his own costs, without annoying the dependents of the other state. 119. Included in this peace are the Republic of Venice as mediator and the dukes of Savoy and Modena. 120. Signatures of the ambassadors. Done at Münster in Westphalia, October 24th, 1648.

VI

THE PRUSSIAN EDICT OF EMANCIPATION (1807 A.D.)

[We give the text of the edict as it appears in Seeley's *Life and Times of Stein*. Sections III and V, being purely technical, are given only by headings.]

Edict concerning the facilitation of possession and the free use of landed property, as well as the personal relations of the inhabitants of the country.

We, Frederick William, by the grace of God king of Prussia, etc., etc.

Make known hereby and give to understand. Since the beginning of the peace we have been before all things occupied with the care for the depressed condition of our faithful subjects and the speediest restoration and greatest improvement of it. We have herein considered that in the universal need it passes the means at our command to furnish help to each individual, and yet we could not attain the object; and it accords equally with the imperative demands of justice and with the principles of a proper national economy to remove all the hindrances which hitherto prevented the individual from attaining the prosperity which, according to the measure of his powers, he was capable of reaching; further, we have considered that the existing restrictions, partly on the possession and enjoyment of landed property, partly on the per-

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sonal condition of the agricultural labourer, specially thwart our benevolent purpose and disable a great force which might be applied to the restoration of cultivation—the former by their prejudicial influence on the value of landed property and the credit of the proprietor, the latter by diminishing the value of labour. We purpose, therefore, to reduce both within the limits required by the common well-being, and accordingly ordain as follows:

SECTION I. Freedom of Exchange in Land.—Every inhabitant of our states is competent, without any limitation on the part of the state, to possess either as property or pledge landed estates of every kind: the nobleman therefore to possess not only noble but also non-noble, citizen, and peasant lands of every kind, and the citizen and peasant to possess not only citizen, peasant, and other non-noble, but also noble pieces of land, without either the one or the other needing any special permission for any acquisition of land whatever, although, henceforward as before, each change of possession must be announced to the authorities.

SECTION II. Free Choice of Occupation.—Every noble is henceforth permitted without any derogation from his position to exercise citizen occupations; and every citizen or peasant is allowed to pass from the peasant into the citizen class, or from the citizen into the peasant class.

SECTION III. How Far a Legal Right of Pre-emption and a First Claim still Exist.

SECTION IV. Division of Lands.—Owners of estates and lands of all kinds, in themselves alienable either in town or country, are allowed after due notice given to the provincial authority, with reservation of the rights of direct creditors and of those who have the right of pre-emption (Section III), to separate the principal estate and its parts, and in general to alienate piecemeal. In the same way co-proprietors may divide among them property owned in common.

SECTION V. Granting of Estates under Leases for a Long Term.

SECTION VI. Extinction and Consolidation of Peasant Holdings.—When a landed proprietor believes himself unable to restore or keep up the several peasant holdings existing on an estate which are not held by a hereditary tenure, whether of a long lease or of copyhold, he is required to give information to the government of the province, with the sanction of which the consolidation, either of several holdings into a single peasant estate or with demesne land, may be allowed as soon as hereditary serfdom shall have ceased to exist on the estate. The provincial authorities will be provided with a special instruction to meet these cases.

SECTION VII. If, on the other hand, the peasant tenures are hereditary, whether of long lease or of copyhold, the consolidation or other alteration of the condition of the lands in question is not admissible until the right of the actual possessor is extinguished, whether by the purchase of it by the lord or in some other legal way. In this case the regulations of Section VI also apply.

SECTION VIII. Indebtedness of Feudal and Entailed Estates in Consequence of the Ravages of War.—Every possessor of fental or entailed property is empowered to raise the sums required to replace the losses caused by war by mortgaging the substance of the estates themselves as well as the revenues of them, provided the application of the money is attested by the administrator (*Landrath*) of the circle or the direction of the department. At the end of three years from the contracting of the debt, the possessor and his successor are bound to pay at least the fifteenth part of the capital itself.

SECTION IX. Extinction of Feudal Relations, Family Settlements, and Entails, by Family Resolution.—Every feudal connection not subject to a chief proprietor, every family settlement and entail may be altered at pleasure or entirely abolished by a family resolution, as is already enacted with reference

to the East Prussian fiefs (except those of Ermeland) in the East Prussian Provincial Law, Appendix 36.

SECTION X. Abolition of Villainage.—From the date of this ordinance no new relation of villainage, whether by birth, or marriage, or acquisition of a villain holding, or by contract, can come into existence.

SECTION XI. With the publication of the present ordinance the existing condition of villainage of those villains with their wives and children who possess their peasant-holdings by hereditary tenures of whatever kind ceases entirely both with its rights and duties.

SECTION XII. From Martinmas, 1810, ceases all villainage in our entire states. From Martinmas, 1810, there shall be only free persons, as this is already the case upon the domains in all our provinces; free persons, however, still subject, as a matter of course, to all the obligations which bind them as free persons by virtue of the possession of an estate or by virtue of a special contract.

To this declaration of our royal will every man whom it may concern, and in particular our provincial and other governments, are exactly and loyally to conform themselves, and the present ordinance is to be made universally known.

Authentically, under our royal signature. Given at Memel, October 9th, 1807.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM,
Schrötter, Stein, Schrötter II.

VII.

THE TREATY OF VIENNA (1815 A.D.)

[Late in September, 1814, representatives of all the principal states of Europe and of many of little importance, assembled in Congress at Vienna to readjust their claims and settle their mutual relations. The Congress was the most august, the most complete, and in its action the most important assemblage of representatives of independent powers that ever took place. The emperors of Austria and of Russia, the kings of Prussia, Denmark, and other minor states, were present in person. The delegates themselves included some of the foremost diplomats in the world's history—Talleyrand, Metternich, Castlereagh, Von Humboldt, Hardenberg, and Nesselrode. The sessions, which lasted till June, 1815, were marked by long and acrimonious debates, and several times the Congress seemed on the point of breaking up. The landing of Napoleon in March, 1815, caused the delegates to bury their animosities, stop their wrangling, and hurry their work to a conclusion. A large number of preliminary treaties were signed, all being at last embodied in the final act, signed by the powers on June 9th, only nine days before Waterloo. Few of the participants were satisfied with the results achieved, as few received all they contended for. But Hardenberg's bitter characterisation of the gathering as an "auction of nations and an orgy of kings" was scarcely justified by the results, for it firmly re-established the principle of the balance of power, and gave to Europe forty years of international peace. The text here presented, which is from E. Herstlet's *Map of Europe by Treaty* (London, 1875), vol. i., pp. 216-274, includes all the more important articles.]

GENERAL TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, FRANCE, PORTUGAL, PRUSSIA, RUSSIA, SPAIN, AND SWEDEN (SIGNED AT VIENNA, JUNE 9TH, 1815)

Article I. The duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of the provinces and districts which are otherwise disposed of by the following Articles, is united to the Russian Empire. It shall be irrevocably attached to it by its constitu-

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tion, and be possessed by his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, his heirs, and successors in perpetuity. His imperial majesty reserves to himself to give to those states enjoying a distinct administration the interior improvements which he shall judge proper. He shall assume with his other titles that of czar, king of Poland, agreeably to the form established for the titles attached to his other possessions.

Article VI. The town of Cracow, with its territory, is declared to be forever a free, independent, and strictly neutral city, under the protection of Austria, Russia, and Prussia.

Article XI. General amnesty.

Article XV. Cessions from Saxony to Prussia.

Article XVII. International guarantee of above-named cessions.

Article XIX. His majesty the king of Prussia, and his majesty the king of Saxony, wishing particularly to remove every object of future contest or dispute, renounces each on his own part, and reciprocally in favour of one another, all feudal rights or pretensions which they might exercise, or might have exercised beyond the frontiers fixed by the present treaty.

Article XX. His majesty the king of Prussia promises to direct that proper care be taken relative to whatever may affect the property and interests of the respective subjects, upon the most liberal principles. The present Article shall be observed, particularly with regard to the concerns of those individuals who possess property both under the Prussian and Saxon governments, to the commerce of Leipsic, and to all other objects of the same nature; and in order that the individual liberty of the inhabitants both of the ceded and other provinces may not be infringed, they shall be allowed to emigrate from one territory to the other, without being exempted, however, from military service, and after fulfilling the formalities required by the laws. They may also remove their property without being subject to any fine or drawback (*Abzugsgeld*).

Article XXI. Concerning the guarantee and preservation of the rights and privileges of the communities, corporations, and religious establishments, and those for public instruction in the provinces ceded by his majesty the king of Saxony to Prussia, or in the provinces and districts remaining to his Saxon majesty.

Article XXIII-XXV. Designation of the Prussian possessions.

Article XXVI. His majesty the king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having substituted for his ancient title of elector of the Holy Roman Empire that of king of Hanover, and this title having been acknowledged by all the powers of Europe, and by the princes and free towns of Germany, the countries which have till now composed the electorate of Brunswick-Lüneburg, according to their limits have been recognised and fixed for the future, by the following articles, shall henceforth form the kingdom of Hanover.

Articles XXVII-XXX. Territorial and commercial arrangements between Prussia and Hanover.

Article XXXIII. Cession made by Hanover to Oldenburg.

Articles XXXIV-XXXVI. Concerning the titles of the grand dukes of Oldenburg, of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Strelitz, and of Saxe-Weimar.

Article XXXVII. Cessions of territory by Prussia to Saxe-Weimar.

Article XLII. Prussian sovereignty over the town and territory of Wetzlar recognised.

Article XLIV. His majesty the king of Bavaria shall possess, for himself, his heirs, and successors, in full property and sovereignty, the grand duchy of Würzburg, as it was held by his imperial highness the archduke Ferdinand of Austria, and the principality of Aschaffenburg, such as it con-

stituted part of the grand duchy of Frankfort, under the denomination of the department of Aschaffenburg.

Article XLV. The rights and prerogatives, and the maintenance of the prince primate as an ancient ecclesiastical prince.

Article XLVI. The city of Frankfort, with its territory, such as it was in 1803, is declared free, and shall constitute a part of the Germanic league. Its institutions shall be founded upon the principle of a perfect equality of rights for the different sects of the Christian religion. This equality of rights shall extend to all civil and political rights, and shall be observed in all matters of government and administration. The disputes which may arise, whether in regard to the establishment of the constitution or in regard to its maintenance, shall be referred to the Germanic Diet, and can only be decided by the same.

Article XLVII. His royal highness the grand duke of Hesse, in exchange for the duchy of Westphalia, ceded to his majesty the king of Prussia, obtains a territory on the left bank of the Rhine, in the ancient department of Mont-Tonnerre, comprising a population of 140,000 inhabitants. His royal highness shall possess this territory in full sovereignty and property. He shall likewise obtain the property of that part of the salt mines of Kreutznach which is situated on the left bank of the Nahe, but the sovereignty of them shall remain to Prussia.

Article XLVIII. The landgrave of Hesse-Homburg is reinstated in his possessions, revenues, rights, and political relations, of which he was deprived in consequence of the Confederation of the Rhine. . . .

Article LIII. The sovereign princes and free towns of Germany, under which denomination, for the present purpose, are comprehended their majesties the emperor of Austria, the kings of Prussia, of Denmark, and of the Netherlands; that is to say: The emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia, for all their possessions which anciently belonged to the German Empire; the king of Denmark, for the duchy of Holstein; and the king of the Netherlands, for the grand duchy of Luxemburg; establish among themselves a perpetual confederation, which shall be called "The Germanic Confederation."

Article LIV. The object of this confederation is the maintenance of the external and internal safety of Germany, and of the independence and inviolability of the confederated states.

Article LV. The members of the confederation, as such, are equal with regard to their rights; and they all equally engage to maintain the act which constitutes their union.

Article LVI. The affairs of the confederation shall be confided to a federative diet, in which all the members shall vote by their plenipotentiaries, either individually or collectively, in the following manner, without prejudice to their rank:—

1, Austria, 1 vote; 2, Prussia, 1 vote; 3, Bavaria, 1 vote; 4, Saxony, 1 vote; 5, Hanover, 1 vote; 6, Wurtemberg, 1 vote; 7, Baden, 1 vote; 8, Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel), 1 vote; 9, Grand duchy of Hesse (Hesse-Darmstadt), 1 vote; 10, Denmark for Holstein, 1 vote; 11, Netherlands for Luxemburg, 1 vote; 12, Grand ducal and ducal houses of Saxony, 1 vote; 13, Brunswick and Nassau, 1 vote; 14, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Strelitz, 1 vote; 15, Holstein-Oldenburg, Anhalt and Schwartzburg, 1 vote; 16, Hohenzollern, Liechtenstein, Reuss, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe and Waldeck, 1 vote; 17, free towns of Lübeck, Frankfort, Bremen and Hamburg, 1 vote. Total 17 votes.

Article LVII. Austria shall preside at the federative diet. Each state of the confederation has the right of making propositions, and the presiding state shall bring them under deliberation within a definite time.

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Article LVIII. Whenever fundamental laws are to be enacted, changes made in fundamental laws of the confederation, measures adopted relative to the federative act itself, and organic institutions or other arrangements made for the common interest, the diet shall form itself into a general assembly, and in that case the distribution of votes shall be as follows, calculated according to the respective extent of the individual states:

Austria shall have 4 votes; Prussia, 4 votes; Saxony, 4 votes; Bavaria, 4 votes; Hanover, 4 votes; Wurtemberg, 4 votes; Baden, 3 votes; Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel), 3 votes; Grand duchy of Hesse (Hesse-Darmstadt), 3 votes; Holstein, 3 votes; Luxemburg, 3 votes; Brunswick, 2 votes; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 2 votes; Nassau, 2 votes; Saxe-Weimar, 1 vote, Saxe-Gotha, 1 vote; Saxe-Coburg, 1 vote; Saxe-Meiningen, 1 vote; Saxe-Hildburghausen, 1 vote; Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 1 vote; Holstein-Oldenburg, 1 vote; Anhalt-Dessau, 1 vote; Anhalt-Bernburg, 1 vote; Anhalt-Cöthen, 1 vote; Schwartzburg-Sondershausen, 1 vote; Schwartzburg-Rudolstadt, 1 vote; Hohenzollern-Heckingen, 1 vote; Liechtenstein, 1 vote; Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 1 vote; Waldeck, 1 vote; Reuss (Elder line, Reuss Greitz), 1 vote; Reuss, (Younger line, Reuss Schleitz), 1 vote; Schaumburg-Lippe, 1 vote; the free town of Lübeck, 1 vote; the free town of Frankfort, 1 vote; the free town of Bremen, 1 vote; the free town of Hamburg, 1 vote. Total 69 votes.

The diet in deliberating on the organic laws of the confederation shall consider whether any collective votes ought to be granted to the ancient mediatised states of the empire.

Article LIX. The question whether a subject is to be discussed by the general assembly conformable to the principles above established shall be decided in the ordinary assembly by a majority of votes. The same assembly shall prepare the drafts of resolutions which are to be proposed to the general assembly, and shall furnish the latter with all the necessary information, either for adopting them or rejecting them. The plurality of votes shall regulate the decisions, both in the ordinary and general assembly, with this difference, however, that in the ordinary assembly an absolute majority shall be admitted sufficient, while in the other, two-thirds of the votes shall be necessary to form the majority. When the votes are even in the ordinary assembly, the president shall have the casting vote; but when the assembly is to deliberate on the acceptance or the change of any of the fundamental laws, upon organic institutions, upon individual rights, or upon affairs of religion, the plurality of votes shall not be deemed sufficient, either in the ordinary or in the general assembly. The diet is permanent; it may, however, when the subjects submitted to its deliberation are disposed of, adjourn for a fixed period which shall not exceed four months. All ulterior arrangements relative to the postponement or the despatch of urgent business which may arise during the recess shall be reserved for the diet, which will consider them when engaged in preparing the organic laws.

Article LX. With respect to the order in which the members of the confederation shall vote, it is agreed, that while the diet shall be occupied in framing organic laws, there shall be no fixed regulation; and whatever may be the order observed on such an occasion, it shall neither prejudice any of the members nor establish a precedent for the future. After framing the organic laws, the diet will deliberate upon the manner of arranging this matter by a permanent regulation, for which purpose it will depart as little as possible from those which have been observed in the ancient diet, and more particularly according to the *Recess* of the deputation of the empire, in 1803. The order to be adopted shall in no way affect the rank and precedence of the members of the confederation except in as far as they concern the diet.

Article LXI. The diet shall assemble at Frankfort on the Main. Its first meeting is fixed for the 1st of September, 1815.

Article LXII. The first object to be considered by the diet after its opening shall be the framing of the fundamental laws of the confederation, and of its organic institutions, with respect to its exterior, military, and interior relations.

Article LXIII. The states of the confederation engage to defend not only the whole of Germany, but each individual state of the union, in case it should be attacked, and they mutually guarantee to each other such of their possessions as are comprised in this union. When war shall be declared by the confederation, no member can open a separate negotiation with the enemy, nor make peace, nor conclude an armistice, without the consent of the other members. The confederation states engage, in the same manner, not to make war against each other, on any pretext, nor to pursue their differences by force of arms, but to submit them to the diet, which will attempt a mediation by means of a commission. If this should not succeed, and a juridical sentence becomes necessary, recourse shall be had to a well-organised austregal court (*Austrägalinstanz*), to the decision of which the contending parties are to submit without appeal.

Article LXIV. The Articles comprised under the title of *Particular Arrangements*, in the act of the Germanic confederation, as annexed to the present general treaty, both in the original and in a French translation, shall have the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted herein.

Article LXV. The ancient united provinces of the Netherlands and the late Belgic provinces, both within the limits fixed by the following Article, shall form—together with the countries and territories designated in the same Article, under the sovereignty of his royal highness the prince of Orange-Nassau, sovereign prince of the united provinces—the kingdom of the Netherlands, hereditary in the order of succession already established by the act of the constitution of the said united provinces. The title and the prerogatives of the royal dignity are recognised by all the powers in the house of Orange-Nassau.

Article LXVI. Boundaries of the kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article LXVII. That part of the old duchy of Luxemburg which is comprised in the limits specified in the following Article is likewise ceded to the sovereign prince of the united provinces, now king of the Netherlands, to be possessed in perpetuity by him and his successors, in full property and sovereignty. . . . The grand duchy of Luxemburg shall form one of the states of the Germanic confederation. . . . The town of Luxemburg, in a military point of view, shall be considered as a fortress of the confederation. . . .

Article LXVIII. Boundaries of the grand duchy of Luxemburg. . . .

Article LXX. Renunciation by the king of the Netherlands of Fulda and of the sovereign possessions of the house of Nassau-Orange in Germany (Dillenburg, Dietz, Siegen, and Hadamar) in favour of the king of Prussia.

Article LXXI. The right and order of succession established between the two branches of the house of Nassau, by the Act of 1783, called *Nassauischer Erbverein*, is confirmed and transferred from the four principalities of Orange-Nassau to the grand duchy of Luxemburg.

Article LXXII. His majesty the king of the Netherlands, in uniting under his sovereignty the countries designated in Articles LXVI and LXVIII, enters into all the rights, and takes upon himself all the charges and all the stipulated engagements relative to the provinces and districts detached from France by the treaty of peace concluded at Paris the 30th of May, 1814.

Article LXXIII. Concerning the force and validity of the articles uniting the Belgic provinces to the Netherlands.

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Article LXXIV. The integrity of the Nineteen Cantons as they existed in a political body, from the signature of the convention of the 29th of December, 1813, is recognised as the basis of the Helvetic system.

Article LXXV. The Valais, the territory of Geneva, and the principality of Neuchâtel, are united to Switzerland and shall form three new cantons. La Vallée des Dappes, having formed part of the canton of Vaud, is restored to it.

Article LXXVI. The bishopric of Bâle, and the city and territory of Bienne, shall be united to the Helvetic confederation, and shall form part of the canton of Berne, with the exception of certain districts and communes united to the cantons of Bâle and Neuchâtel.

Article LXXVII. Provisions for the guarantee of the religious, political, and civic rights of the above (Article LXXVI) annexed districts.

Article LXXVIII. Confirmation of the lordship of Razuns to the canton of Grisons.

Article LXXIX. Concerning the commercial and military communications of the town of Geneva with the rest of Switzerland.

Article LXXX. Concerning the cession by the king of Sardinia of a part of Savoy to the canton of Geneva, and the guarantee of commercial and military communications between Geneva and the Valais by the road of the Simplon.

Article LXXXI. Concerning reciprocal compensations, payable by the cantons of Argau, Vaud, Ticino, and St. Gall to the ancient cantons of Schwyz, Unterwald, Uri, Glaris, Zug, and Appenzell.

Article LXXXII. Concerning the funds placed in England by the cantons of Zurich and Berne, and the regulation and payment of the Helvetic debt.

Article LXXXIII. Concerning indemnification to landowners and a settlement of differences between the cantons of Berne and Vaud, concerning the same.

Article LXXXIV. Confirmation of the Acts of Adhesion, and the principles therein established.

Article LXXXV. Frontiers of the states of the king of Sardinia.

Articles LXXXVI and LXXXVII. Concerning the union of the former republic of Genoa with the kingdom of Sardinia.

Article XC. Reservation to the king of Sardinia of the right of fortifying such points in his state as he may judge proper for his safety. . . .

Article XCII. The provinces of Chablais and Faucigny, and the whole of the territory of Savoy to the north of Ugine, belonging to his majesty the king of Sardinia, shall form a part of the neutrality of Switzerland, as it is recognised and guaranteed by the powers.

Article XCIII. Description of the territories, etc., of which the emperor of Austria takes possession on the side of Italy, —Istria, Dalmatia, mouths of the Cattaro, Venice, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, etc.

Article XCIV. Territories united to the Austrian monarchy, the Valtelline, Bormio, Chiavenna, Ragusa, etc.

Article XCV. Austrian frontiers in Italy.

Article XCVI. The general principles, adopted by the congress at Vienna, for the navigation of rivers shall be applicable to that of the Po. . . .

Article XCVIII. His royal highness the archduke Francis d'Este, his heirs and successors, shall possess, in full sovereignty, the duchies of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, as they existed at the signature of the Treaty at Campo Formio (1797). The archduchess Maria Beatrice d'Este, her heirs and successors, shall possess, in full sovereignty and property, the duchy of Massa and the principality of Carrara, as well as the imperial fiefs in La Lunigiana. The latter may be applied to the purposes of exchanges, or other arrangements made by common consent and according to mutual convenience, with his im-

perial highness the grand duke of Tuscany. The rights of succession and reversion, established in the branches of the archducal houses of Austria relative to the duchies of Modena, Reggio, Mirandola, and the principality of Massa and Carrara, are preserved.

Article XCIX. Her majesty the empress Marie Louise shall possess, in full property and sovereignty, the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, with the exception of the districts lying within the states of his imperial and royal apostolic majesty on the left bank of the Po. The reversion of these countries shall be regulated by common consent, with the courts of Austria, Russia, France, Spain, England, and Prussia; due regard being had to the rights of reversion of the house of Austria, and of his majesty the king of Sardinia, to the said countries.

Article C. Possessions of the grand duchy of Tuscany. The Presidii, Elba, Piombino, imperial fiefs, etc.

Article CI. The principality of Lucca, erected into a duchy, shall be possessed in full sovereignty by her majesty the infanta Maria Louisa; and her descendants, in the direct male line. Engagement of Austria and Tuscany to pay an annuity of 500,000 francs.

Article CIII. The Marches, with Camerino, and other dependencies, the duchy of Benevento and the principality of Ponte-Corvo, Ravenna, Bologna, and Ferrara, with the exception of that part of Ferrara which is situated on the left bank of the Po, are restored to the holy see. The inhabitants of the countries who return under the government of the holy see, in consequence of the stipulations of congress, shall enjoy the benefit of Article XVI of the Treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814.

Article CIV. His majesty King Ferdinand IV, his heirs and successors, is restored to the throne of Naples, and his majesty is acknowledged by the powers as king of the Two Sicilies.

Article CV. Affairs in Portugal. Restitution of the town of Olivença. . . .

Article CVII. His royal highness the prince regent of the kingdoms of Portugal and Brazil, wishing to give an unequivocal proof of his high consideration for his most Christian majesty, engages to restore French Guiana to his said majesty, as far as the river Oyapok.

Article CVIII. The powers whose states are separated or crossed by the same navigable river engage to regulate by common consent all that regards its navigation. For this purpose they will name commissioners, who shall assemble, at the latest, within six months after the termination of the congress, and who shall adopt, as the bases of their proceedings, the principles established by the following Articles.

Article CIX. The navigation of the rivers along their whole course, referred to in the preceding article, from the point where each of them becomes navigable to its mouth, shall be entirely free, and shall not, in respect to commerce, be prohibited to any one; it being understood that the regulations established with regard to the police of this navigation shall be respected, as they will be framed alike for all, and as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations.

Article CX. The system that shall be established both for the collection of the duties and for the maintenance of the police shall be, as nearly as possible, the same along the whole course of the river, and shall also extend, unless particular circumstances prevent it, to those of its branches and junctions which in their navigable course separate or traverse different states.

Article CXI. The duties on navigation shall be regulated in a uniform and settled manner, and with as little reference as possible to the different quality of the merchandise, in order that a minute examination of the cargo may be rendered unnecessary, except with a view to prevent fraud and evasion.

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The amount of the duties, which shall in no case exceed those now paid, shall be determined by local circumstances, which scarcely allow of a general rule in this respect. The tariff shall, however, be prepared in such a manner as to encourage commerce by facilitating navigation; for which purpose the duties established upon the Rhine, and now in force on that river, may serve as an approximating rule for its construction. The tariff once settled, no increase shall take place therein, except by common consent of the states bordering on the rivers; nor shall navigation be burdened with any other duties than those fixed in the regulation.

Article CXII. The offices for the collection of the duties, the number of which shall be reduced as much as possible, shall be determined upon in the above regulation, and no change shall afterwards be made but by common consent, unless any of the states bordering on the rivers shall wish to diminish the number of those which exclusively belong to the same.

Article CXIII. Each state bordering on the rivers is to be at the expense of keeping in good repair the towing-paths which pass through its territory, and of maintaining the necessary works through the same extent in the channels of the river, in order that no obstacle may be experienced to the navigation. The intended regulation shall determine the manner in which the states bordering on the rivers are to participate in these latter works, where the opposite banks belong to different governments.

Article CXIV. There shall nowhere be established store-house, port, or forced harbour duties (*Droits d'étape, d'échelle, et de relâche forcée*). Those already existing shall be preserved for such time only as states bordering on rivers (without regard to the local interest of the place or country where they are established) shall find them necessary or useful to navigation and commerce in general.

Article CXV. The custom-houses belonging to the states bordering on rivers shall not interfere in the duties of navigation. Regulations shall be established to prevent officers of the customs, in the exercise of their functions, throwing obstacles in the way of navigation; but care shall be taken, by means of a strict police on the bank, to preclude every attempt of the inhabitants to smuggle goods through the medium of boatmen.

Article CXVI. Everything expressed in the preceding articles shall be settled by a general arrangement in which there shall also be comprised whatever may need ulterior determination. The arrangement once settled shall not be changed but by and with the consent of all the states bordering on rivers, and they shall take care to provide for its execution with due regard to circumstances and locality.

Article CXVII. The particular regulations relative to the navigation of the Rhine, Neckar, the Main, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Schelde, such as they are annexed to the present act, shall have the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted herein.

Article CXVIII. The treaties, conventions, declarations, regulations, and other particular acts which are annexed to the present act, viz. :—

1. The treaty between Russia and Austria relative to Poland, of the 21st of April (3d of May) 1815, No. 12;
2. Treaty between Russia and Prussia, relative to Poland, of the 21st of April (3d of May), 1815, No. 13;
3. The additional treaty, relative to Cracow, between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, of the 21st of April (3d of May), 1815, No. 14;
4. The treaty between Prussia (Austria and Russia) and Saxony of the 18th of May, 1815, No. 16;
5. The declaration of the king of Saxony respecting the rights of the house of Schoenburg of the 18th of May, 1815, No. 17;
6. The treaty between Prussia and Hanover, of the 29th of May, 1815, No. 21;
7. The convention between Prussia and the grand duke of Saxe-Weimar, of the 1st of June,

1815, No. 24; 8. The convention between Prussia and the duke and prince of Nassau, of the 31st of May, 1815, No. 23; 9. The act concerning the federative constitution of Germany of the 8th of June, 1815, No. 26; 10. The treaty between the king of the Netherlands and Prussia, England, Austria, and Russia, of the 31st of May, 1815, No. 22; 11. The declaration of the (eight) powers on the affairs of the Helvetic confederation of the 20th of March, No. 9; and the act of accession of the diet of the 27th of May, 1815, No. 20; 12. The protocol of the 29th of March, 1815, on the cessions made by the king of Sardinia to the canton of Geneva, No. 10; 13. The treaty between the king of Sardinia, Austria, England, Russia, Prussia, and France, of the 20th of May, 1815, No. 19; 14. The act entitled "Conditions which are to serve as the basis of the union of the states of Geneva with those of his Sardinian majesty," No. 19; 15. The declaration of the (eight) powers on the abolition of the slave trade of the 8th of February, 1815, No. 7; 16. The regulation respecting the free navigation of rivers, No. 11; 17. The regulation concerning the precedence of diplomatic agents, No. 8; shall be considered as integral parts of the arrangement of the congress, and shall have, throughout, the same force and validity as if they were inserted, word for word, in the general treaty.

Article CXIX. All the powers assembled in the congress as well as the princes and free towns, who have concurred in the arrangement specified, and in the acts confirmed, in this general treaty, are invited to accede to it.

Article CXX. The French language having been exclusively employed in all the copies of the present treaty, it is declared, by the powers who have concurred in this act, that the use made of the language shall not be construed into a precedent for the future; every power, therefore, reserves to itself the adoption in future negotiations and conventions of the language it has heretofore employed in its diplomatic relations; and this treaty shall not be cited as a precedent contrary to the established practice.

Article CXXI. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged in six months, and by the court of Portugal in a year or sooner, if possible. A copy of this general treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the court and state of his imperial and royal apostolic majesty at Vienna, in case any of the courts of Europe shall think proper to consult the original text of this instrument.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this act, and have affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done at Vienna, the ninth of June, in the year of our Lord, 1815.

VIII

CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

[This translation is from the text of the constitution as adopted April 14th, 1871, and amended in 1873 and in 1888, given in a supplement to *Vorwärts*, Berlin, 1891.

His majesty the king of Prussia in the name of the North German Confederation, his majesty the king of Bavaria, his majesty the king of Würtemberg, his royal highness the grand duke of Baden, and his royal highness the grand duke of Hesse and by Rhine (und bei Rhein) for those parts of the grand duchy of Hesse lying south of the Main, conclude an everlasting confederation for the protection of the federal territory and of the laws effective within the same, as well as for the fostering of the welfare of the German people. This confederation shall bear the name German Empire, and shall have the following constitution:

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I. FEDERAL TERRITORY

Article 1. The federal territory consists of the states of Prussia with Lauenburg, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Waldeck, Reuss of the Elder Line, Reuss of the Younger Line, Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg.

II. IMPERIAL LEGISLATION

Article 2. Within this federal territory the empire exercises the right of legislation according to the contents of this constitution, and to such effect that the imperial laws take precedence of local laws. The laws of the empire are rendered binding by imperial proclamation, made by means of a bulletin of the imperial laws (*Reichsgesetzblatt*). In so far as no other date is set in the published law for its going into effect, this date is to be the fourteenth day after the expiration of that day on which the copy of the imperial law bulletin in question was issued in Berlin.

Article 3. The right of citizenship is uniform for all Germany. By virtue thereof the native (subject, citizen) of every federal state is to be treated in every other state of the confederation as a native, and accordingly is to be admitted to permanent residence, to the pursuit of his trade, to public offices, to the acquisition of real estate, to the attainment of rights of local citizenship, and to the enjoyment of all other civic rights under the same conditions as a native, and is also to be treated as such in regard to legal prosecution and the protection of the law.

No German shall be restricted in the exercise of this privilege by the authorities of his own state or by those of any other state of the confederation.

Those regulations relating to the care of paupers and their admission to the privileges of any local community are not affected by the principles expressed in the first paragraph.

Moreover, for the present those treaties which exist between the individual states of the confederation in regard to the custody of persons to be banished, the care of sick persons, and the burial of deceased citizens remain in force.

The necessary regulations in regard to the fulfilment of military duty in relation to the native state will be made hereafter in the way of imperial legislation. All Germans shall have equal claims upon the protection of the empire, as against foreign countries.

Article 4. The following matters are subject to the supervision of the empire and to its legislation:

1. the regulations concerning removal from place to place, the acquiring of home and residence, citizenship in individual states, passports, and police surveillance of foreigners, and concerning the carrying on of trade, as well as the insurance business, in so far as these matters have not been already provided for in Article 3 of this constitution—in Bavaria, however, with the exclusion of matters relating to the establishment of home and residence—and also regulations in regard to colonisation and emigration to foreign countries;

2. legislation concerning customs duties, and commerce, and the taxes to be applied to the uses of the empire;

3. the regulation of the systems of weights and measures, and the coinage, together with the determination of the principles to be observed in the emission of funded and unfunded paper money;

- 4. the general regulations concerning the banking business;
- 5. patents for inventions;
- 6. the protection of intellectual property.
- 7. the organisation of common protection for German trade in foreign countries, of German navigation, and of the flag at sea, and arranging for general consular representation, which is provided by the empire;
- 8. the system of railroads, in Bavaria with the restrictions of the provisions in Article 46, and the construction of means of communication by land and water for the purposes of defence of the country, and for common intercourse;
- 9. rafting and navigation on those water routes common to several states, and the condition of these routes, as well as river and other water dues; likewise the signals in use in navigation of the sea (lighthouses, barrels, buoys, and other day signals);
- 10. the postal and telegraph service, in Bavaria and Württemberg, however, only according to the provisions in article 52;
- 11. provisions for the mutual execution of judicial sentences in civil matters and the satisfaction of requisitions in general;
- 12. likewise concerning the authentication of public documents;
- 13. common legislation as to the whole civil law, the criminal law, and judicial proceedings;
- 14. the imperial military organisation and the navy;
- 15. regulations for the surveillance of medical and veterinary practice;
- 16. regulation of the press and of societies.

Article 5. The legislative functions of the empire are exercised by the *Bundesrath* (federal council) and the *Reichstag* (diet). A concordance of the views of the majority of both houses is necessary and sufficient for the passage of a law of the empire.

If, upon the proposal of a law concerning the army, the navy, and those taxes specified in article 35, there occurs a difference of opinion, the vote of the presiding officer decides, if this vote is in favour of the maintenance of the existing arrangement.

III. BUNDES RATH

Article 6. The Bundesrath consists of the representatives of the members of the confederation, among whom the votes are divided so that Prussia with the former votes of Hanover, the electorate of

Hesse, Holstein, Nassau, and Frankfort shall have.....	17 votes
Bavaria.....	6 "
Saxony.....	4 "
Württemberg.....	4 "
Baden.....	3 "
Hesse.....	3 "
Mecklenburg-Schwerin.....	2 "
Saxe-Weimar.....	1 "
Mecklenburg-Strelitz.....	1 "
Oldenburg.....	1 "
Brunswick.....	2 "
Saxe-Meiningen.....	1 "
Saxe-Altenburg.....	1 "
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.....	1 "
Anhalt.....	1 "
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt.....	1 "
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen.....	1 "
Waldeck.....	1 "
Reuss of the Elder Line.....	1 "
Reuss of the Younger Line.....	1 "
Schaumburg-Lippe.....	1 "

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Lippe.....	1 vote
Lübeck.....	1 “
Bremen.....	1 “
Hamburg.....	1 “

Altogether 58 votes

Every member of the confederation is entitled to appoint as many delegates to the Bundesrath as it has votes. The total of the votes accredited any one state shall, however, be cast as a unit.

Article 7. The Bundesrath takes action:

1. concerning the measures to be proposed to the Reichstag and the resolutions passed by that body;

2. concerning the general ordinances and regulations necessary for the execution of the laws of the empire in so far as the law of the empire does not prescribe otherwise;

3. concerning defects which may appear in the execution of the laws of the empire or in the above-mentioned ordinances or regulations.

Every member of the confederation is privileged to introduce proposals and bring them up for discussion, and it is the duty of the presiding officer to submit them to deliberation.

Resolutions are passed, excepting as prescribed in articles 5, 37, 78, by simple majority. The votes not represented or instructed are not counted. In case of a tie the vote of the presiding officer decides.

In the passage of a resolution concerning matters which according to the provisions of this constitution are not common to the whole empire, only the votes of those members of the confederation are counted to whom this matter is common.

Article 8. The Bundesrath appoints from among its members permanent committees:

1. on the army and the fortifications;
2. on naval affairs;
3. on customs and taxes;
4. on commerce and traffic;
5. on railroads, postal service, and telegraphs;
6. on the judiciary;
7. on accounts.

In each of these committees at least four states of the confederation shall be represented in addition to the presiding officer, and in these committees each state has but one vote. In the committee on the army and the fortifications Bavaria has a permanent seat. The remaining members of this committee as well as the members of the committee on the navy are appointed by the emperor; the members of the other committees are elected by the Bundesrath. These committees are to be reconstituted at every session of the Bundesrath, that is, each year, and then the retiring members shall be again eligible.

In addition, there shall be appointed in the Bundesrath a committee on foreign affairs, composed of the delegates of the kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg, and two to be elected yearly by the Bundesrath from other states of the confederation; in this committee Bavaria presides.

The committees shall be provided with the officials necessary to the execution of their labours.

Article 9. Every member of the Bundesrath has the right to appear in the Reichstag, and shall be heard there at any time at his request to represent the views of his government, even when these have not been adopted by the majority of the Bundesrath. No one shall be at the same time a member of the Bundesrath and the Reichstag.

Article 10. The emperor is under obligation to afford to the members of the Bundesrath the customary diplomatic protection.

IV. PRESIDIUM

Article 11. The king of Prussia shall be the president of the confederation, and shall bear the title German Emperor. The emperor shall represent the empire in international affairs, shall declare war and conclude peace in the name of the empire, enter into alliances and other treaties with foreign states, accredit and receive ambassadors.

The sanction of the Bundesrath is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the empire, except when an attack is made on the territory of the confederation or its coasts.

In so far as the treaties with foreign countries relate to such matters as, according to article 4, come within the scope of the imperial legislation, the approval of the Bundesrath shall be required for their ratification and the consent of the Reichstag to make them effective.

Article 12. The emperor shall convene the Bundesrath and the Reichstag, and open and adjourn and close them.

Article 13. The Bundesrath and the Reichstag shall be convened annually, and the Bundesrath may be convened for the preparation of business without the Reichstag, but the Reichstag shall not be convened without the Bundesrath.

Article 14. The Bundesrath must be convened upon the demand of one-third of its members.

Article 15. The chancellor of the empire, who is to be appointed by the emperor, is to be the presiding officer of the Bundesrath and to have the supervision of its business.

The chancellor of the empire may appoint any member of the Bundesrath to represent him by written authorisation.

Article 16. The necessary bills shall be presented to the Reichstag in the name of the emperor according to the resolutions of the Bundesrath, and they are to be supported in the Reichstag by the members of the Bundesrath or by special commissioners to be appointed by them.

Article 17. The emperor is to prepare and publish the laws of the empire and to supervise their execution. The ordinances and regulations of the emperor are to be issued in the name of the empire, and require for their validity the signature of the chancellor of the empire, who thereby becomes responsible for them.

Article 18. The emperor appoints the officers of the empire, and has these render their oaths of office, and if necessary attends to their dismissal.

Officials of a state of the confederation appointed to an office under the empire shall enjoy the same rights with regard to the empire which were due them in their native state because of their official position, provided that no other stipulation has been made by imperial legislation before their entrance into the imperial service.

Article 19. If members of the confederation shall not fulfil their constitutional duties towards the confederation, they may be compelled to do so by means of [military] execution. This execution is to be ordered by the Bundesrath and to be carried out by the emperor.

V. REICHSTAG

Article 20. The Reichstag is to be formed by direct universal election with secret ballot.

Until the regulation by law which is reserved in section 5 of the election

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law of May 31st, 1869 (*Bundesgesetzblatt*, 1869, p. 145), there shall be elected 48 delegates in Bavaria, 17 in Württemberg, 14 in Baden, 6 in Hesse south of the Main, 15 in Alsace-Lorraine; the total of delegates therefore is 397.¹

Article 21. Leave of absence is not required of officials for entering the Reichstag.

When a member of the Reichstag accepts a salaried office of the empire, or a salaried office of a state of the confederation, or enters upon an office in the service of the empire or of an individual state which brings with it a higher rank or a higher salary, he loses his seat and vote in the Reichstag and can regain his place therein only by a new election.

Article 22. The transactions of the Reichstag are public.

Accurate reports of the transactions in the public sessions of the Reichstag are not to render their authors accountable.

Article 23. The Reichstag has the right within the competency of the empire to propose laws and refer to the Bundesrath or the chancellor of the empire petitions addressed to it.

Article 24. The legislative period of the Reichstag lasts five years.² For the dissolution of the Reichstag within this period a resolution of the Bundesrath with the approval of the emperor is required.

Article 25. In case of dissolution of the Reichstag the electors shall assemble within sixty days thereafter, and the Reichstag within ninety days.

Article 26. Without its own approval the Reichstag shall not be adjourned for a period longer than thirty days, and adjournment shall not be repeated during the same session.

Article 27. The Reichstag examines the legality of the election of its members and decides thereon. It regulates the routine of its business and its discipline by a code of rules and elects its presidents, its vice-presidents, and secretaries.

Article 28. The Reichstag passes laws by an absolute majority. The presence of the majority of the lawful number of members is necessary to render valid its resolutions.

Article 29. The members of the Reichstag are representatives of the whole people, and are not bound by orders or instructions.

Article 30. No member of the Reichstag shall at any time undergo judicial prosecution or discipline because of his vote or because of utterances made in the execution of his official functions, or shall otherwise be held responsible outside the assembly.

Article 31. No member of the Reichstag shall be tried or arrested for an act involving punishment during the session of the Reichstag without the consent of that body, except when arrested in the act or in the course of the following day.

Similar permission is necessary for arrest because of debt.

Upon the demand of the Reichstag, every legal proceeding against one of its members and all imprisonment in civil cases or preceding trial shall be suspended during the session.

Article 32. Members of the Reichstag are not allowed to draw any salary or compensation as such.

[¹ The total membership of the Reichstag as arranged by the constitution and by the election law, 397, as stated above, is distributed as follows: Prussia 235, Bavaria 48, Saxony 23, Württemberg 17, Alsace-Lorraine 15, Baden 14, Hesse 9, Mecklenburg-Schwerin 6, Saxe-Weimar 3, Oldenburg 3, Brunswick 3, Hamburg 3, Saxe-Meiningen 2, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 2, Anhalt 2, and all the rest one each. The members are chosen in single electoral districts fixed by imperial law.]

[² The period was originally three years. It was changed to five by an amendment of March 19th, 1888.]

VI. CUSTOMS AND COMMERCE

Article 33. Germany forms a single territory in regard to customs and commerce, having a common tariff frontier. Portions of territory not adapted for inclusion in this tariff boundary remain excluded. All objects which enjoy free exchange within a state of the confederation may be introduced into every other state of the confederation, and are to be subject to taxation in the latter only in so far as similar domestic products in the same are subject to taxation therein.

Article 34. The Hanseatic cities, Bremen and Hamburg, together with a district of their own or of the surrounding territory adequate to the purpose, remain free ports outside of the common tariff boundary, until they request their inclusion in the same.

Article 35. The empire has the exclusive right of legislation concerning everything relating to customs, the taxation of salt and tobacco produced within the territory of the confederation, brandy and beer manufactured within it, and sugar and syrup made from beets or other domestic products; concerning the mutual safeguarding against fraud of the taxes levied in the various states of the confederation upon articles of consumption; also concerning the measures which are necessitated by special exemptions from taxation and for the protection of the common tariff boundary.

In Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, the taxation of domestic brandy and beer is reserved for local legislation. The states of the confederation will, however, endeavour to secure correspondence in their legislation concerning the taxation of these articles also.

Article 36. The imposing and the regulation of customs and excise (art. 35) within its own territory is reserved to each state of the confederation in so far as it has hitherto exercised these functions.

The emperor supervises the legal proceedings by imperial officials whom he assigns to the customs or excise offices and to the administrative boards of the various states, after hearing the committee of the Bundesrath on customs revenues.

Reports made by these officials concerning defects in the execution of the common legislation (art. 35) are presented in the Bundesrath for action.

Article 37. In taking action upon these ordinances and regulations for the execution of common legislation (art. 35), the vote of the presiding officer decides when it accords with the maintenance of the existing ordinance or regulations.

Article 38. The revenue from customs and other dues, mentioned in article 35, these latter in so far as they are subject to the legislation of the empire, goes to the imperial treasury.

This revenue consists of the whole income of the customs and other taxes after deduction of:

1. concessions in taxes and reductions resting upon the provisions of the laws or general constitutional regulations,
2. reimbursements for taxes improperly collected,
3. the cost of collection and administration, to wit:

(a) in case of customs, the expenses necessitated by the protection and collection of the customs on the frontier and in frontier districts lying towards countries outside of the empire;

(b) in case of the tax on salt, the expenses necessitated by the payment of salaries to officials intrusted with the collection and control of this tax in the salt mines;

(c) in the case of taxes on beet sugar and tobacco, the compensation to be

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allowed to the various governments of the confederation according to the resolutions of the Bundesrath for the expenses of administering this taxation;

(d) in the case of the remaining taxes, 15 per cent. of the total receipts.

Those districts lying outside of the common customs boundary contribute to the expenses of the empire by the payment of an aversum [a sum of acquittance].

Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden have no part in the income derived by the imperial treasury from taxes on brandy and beer, nor in the corresponding portion of the above-mentioned aversum.

Article 39. The statements to be rendered at the end of each quarter by the revenue boards of the states of the confederation, and the final settlements to be made at the close of the year and upon the closing of the books, concerning the receipts of the customs and taxes on consumption, due to the imperial treasury according to article 38 in the course of the quarter or, respectively, of the financial year, are put together by the administrative boards of the states of the confederation, after having been examined, in general summaries, in which every duty is to be shown separately, and these summaries are to be forwarded to the committee of the Bundesrath on accounts.

By means of these summaries the latter temporarily determines, every three months, the amount due to the imperial treasury from the treasury of each state of the confederation, and informs the Bundesrath and the states of the confederation of the condition of these accounts, and also presents yearly a final statement of the amounts with its comments to the Bundesrath. The Bundesrath takes action upon this statement.

Article 40. The regulations of the customs-union treaty, of July 8th, 1867, remain in force in so far as they are not changed by the regulations of this constitution and so long as they have not been changed in the manner prescribed in article 7, respectively 78.

VII. RAILWAYS

Article 41. Railways which are considered necessary to the best interests of the defence of Germany or of the general commerce may be constructed at the expense of the empire, by virtue of a law of the empire, even against the objections of the members of the confederation whose territories these railways traverse, without detracting from the rights of local sovereignty, or concessions for their construction may be granted to private contractors together with the rights of expropriation.

It is the duty of every existing railway management to permit newly constructed railways to form junctions with their roads at the expense of the former.

All the legal regulations granting to existing railway companies the right of injunction against the construction of parallel or competing railways are hereby abolished throughout the empire, without prejudice to rights already acquired. Such right of injunction, moreover, is not to be granted in the concessions to be given in the future.

Article 42. The federal government binds itself to manage the German railways in the interest of general commerce as a uniform system, and for this purpose to have railways to be built in the future also constructed and equipped according to uniform standards.

Article 43. In accordance with this, harmonious arrangements as to management shall be made with all possible speed; especially, uniform regulations shall be introduced for the policing of the railways. The empire shall provide that the management of the railways shall at all times keep them in such con-

dition as to construction that they afford the necessary security, and shall fit them out with rolling stock as the needs of traffic demand.

Article 44. Those having the management of the railways are bound to provide such passenger trains of the requisite speed as are necessary for traffic and for the establishment of schedules which shall properly harmonise, and in the same way to provide the freight trains necessary for the proper conduct of the freight traffic, and also to arrange for a direct transfer of passengers and freight from one railway to another at the customary rates.

Article 45. The empire shall have control of the rates of fare. It shall especially endeavour to attain the following objects:

1. that uniform regulations of traffic be established on all German railways as speedily as possible.

2. that the greatest possible uniformity and reduction of rates be attained, especially that with greater distances in transportation of coal, coke, wood, metals, stone, salt, crude-iron, manures, and similar substances, a rate sufficiently low be established to correspond to the needs of agriculture and industry, and that, in particular, the one *Pfennig* rate be introduced as soon as possible.

Article 46. In the case of conditions of distress, especially at a time of an unusual increase in the price of provisions, the railways are bound to introduce temporarily a reduced rate for transportation, especially of grain, flour, cereals, and potatoes, this rate to correspond to the special need and to be fixed by the emperor upon the advice of the competent committee of the Bundesrath. This rate, however, shall not descend below the lowest rate for raw products on the railway in question.

The preceding regulations as well as those in articles 42 to 45 are not applicable to Bavaria.

The empire also in Bavaria has the right to fix by way of legislation uniform standards for the construction and equipment of railways important for the defence of the country.

Article 47. To the demands of the authorities of the empire with reference to the use of railways for the needs of the defence of Germany all railway managements must comply without hesitation. Especially army equipments and all war material are to be forwarded at uniform reduced rates.

VIII. POSTAL AND TELEGRAPH SERVICE

Article 48. The postal and telegraph services are to be arranged and managed for the whole territory of the German Empire as uniform state institutions of communication.

The legislation of the empire provided for in article 4, as to postal and telegraph affairs, does not extend to those matters whose regulation, according to the principles which have obtained in the North German postal and telegraph administration, is left to administrative adjustment or fixed rules.

Article 49. The receipts from the postal and telegraphic services are common to the whole empire. The expenses are to be met out of the common income; the surplus is to go to the imperial treasury (Section XII).

Article 50. The emperor controls the administration of the postal and telegraph service. It is the duty and right of the magistrates appointed by him to establish and maintain uniformity in the organisation of the administration and in the management of the service, as well as in the qualifications of the officials.

The emperor has the authority to establish the rules of the service. He supervises the general administration and holds the exclusive right of control of the relations to other postal and telegraph services.

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It is the duty of all post and telegraph officials to obey the orders of the emperor. This duty shall be recognised in the oath of office. The power of appointment of all superior officials, *e.g.*, directors, advisers, inspectors, in the various districts of the postal and telegraph service throughout the whole German Empire, shall belong to the emperor, to whom these officials pledge themselves in the oath of office. The appointment of all superior officials (such as directors, advisers, inspectors) that are necessary for the administration of the postal and telegraph service, also the appointment of post and telegraph officials (such as inspectors and comptrollers) who, as agents of the aforesaid superior officials, shall act in the capacity of supervisors in the various districts, shall be made for the whole territory of the German Empire by the emperor, to whom these officials shall pledge their fealty in the oath of office.

Other officials required by the postal and telegraph service,¹ including those engaged in local and technical work and those at the actual postal and telegraph centres, etc., shall be appointed by the individual state governments.

In places where there is no independent postal or telegraph service, the appointments shall be settled by the terms of the special treaties.

Article 51. In consideration of the disparity that has hitherto existed in the amounts cleared by the different departments, and in order that a corresponding equalisation may be secured during the period of transition fixed below, the assigning of the surplus of the postal department for the general purposes of the country (art. 49) shall proceed as follows:

An average yearly surplus shall be computed from the surplus which has accrued in the several postal districts during the five years 1861 to 1865; the share that each district has had in the surplus accumulated for the use of the whole empire shall be determined by a percentage.

During the eight years following their entrance into the postal department of the empire, according to the proportion thus established the separate states shall have credited on the account of their other contributions to the expenses of the empire this quota which has accrued to them from the postal surplus.

After the period of eight years that distinction ceases to exist, and the postal surplus passes in its entirety to the treasury of the empire, according to the principle set down in article 49. Half of whatever quota of postal surplus accrues to the Hanseatic towns during the afore-mentioned period of eight years shall be placed at the disposal of the emperor to defray the expenses of establishing suitable postal service in the Hanseatic towns.

Article 52. The provisions contained in articles 48 to 51 do not apply to Bavaria and Würtemberg. Instead, the following shall be applied to these two states of the confederation:

The empire alone holds the right of legislation over postal and telegraph privileges, over the legal relation that the postal and telegraph departments bear to the public, over franks and tariff, exclusive, however, of any control of administration and tariff within Bavaria and Würtemberg. The empire holds the right, also under a like limitation, to legislate upon the establishment of rates for telegraphic communication.

In like manner the empire regulates postal and telegraphic communication with foreign countries, excepting the immediate communication of Bavaria and Würtemberg with neighbouring states that do not belong to the empire. For this exception provision is made in article 49 of the postal treaty of November 23rd, 1867.

Bavaria and Würtemberg have no share in the proceeds accruing to the treasury of the empire from the postal and telegraph service.

[¹ By combining the postal and telegraphic departments Germany has been saved a large number of officials and has effected important economies.]

IX. NAVY AND NAVIGATION

Article 53. The navy of the empire is united under the supreme authority of the emperor. He forms and organises it, appoints the naval officers and functionaries, and all of these, along with the common sailors, must take an oath of allegiance to him.

The harbours of Kiel and of the Jade are imperial harbours of war.

The sum necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the fleet and its appurtenances shall be taken from the treasury of the empire.

All seamen inhabiting the empire, including machinists and mechanics, employed in the navy are exempt from service in the army; but, on the other hand, are compelled to serve in the imperial navy.

Article 54. The merchant ships of all the states of the confederation form a united commercial marine.

The empire determines upon the method of ascertaining the tonnage of vessels, regulates the issuing of certificates of measurement and shipping papers, and fixes the stipulations upon which permission to navigate a ship depends.

In the harbours and on all natural and artificial waterways of the various states of the confederation the merchant vessels of all these states shall be allowed equal rights and privileges. The taxes which are imposed upon the vessels or their loadings for the use of shipping conveniences in the harbours must not exceed the amount necessary for the maintenance and preservation of such conveniences.

On all natural waterways taxes may be imposed only for the use of special conveniences which are destined to increase the facility of traffic. These taxes, as well as the taxes for the navigation of artificial watercourses which are state property, must not exceed the amount necessary for the maintenance and preservation of such conveniences. These stipulations apply to the use of rafts, in so far as they may be floated on navigable waterways.

No single state, but the empire alone, has the right to levy on foreign vessels or their freight other or higher taxes than are levied on the vessels of the confederate states or their freight.

Article 55. The flag of the navy (including both merchant ships and ships of war) is black, white, and red.

X. CONSULAR AFFAIRS

Article 56. All consular affairs of the German Empire are under the supervision of the emperor. He appoints consuls after a hearing of the committee of the Bundesrath on commerce and traffic.

No new state consulates may be established within the jurisdiction of the German consuls. The German consuls exercise the functions of a state consul for the confederate states that have no representation in their precincts. All the state consulates that now exist shall be abolished as soon as the organisation of the German consulates is completed, in such a manner that the representation of the individual interests of all the confederate states is recognised by the Bundesrath as secured by the German consulates.

XI. MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE

Article 57. Every German is subject to military service, and cannot supply a substitute to fulfil this duty.

Article 58. The cost and burden of the entire imperial military system must be borne equally by all the states of the confederation and their subjects,

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so that neither privileges nor prerogatives of individual states or classes can be taken into consideration.

In cases where an equal distribution of burdens is not possible without detriment to the general welfare, matters shall be equalised by law in accordance with justice.

Article 59. Every German that is liable to military service belongs to the standing army for seven years—usually from the completion of his twentieth to the beginning of his twenty-eighth year: the first three years in the field, the last four in the reserve. The next five years he belongs to the first levy of the militia; and then, until the 31st of March of that calendar year in which he completes his thirty-ninth year, he belongs to the second levy of the militia. In those states of the confederation in which until the present time a service longer than twelve years has been required, a gradual diminution of the time of service shall take place according as such diminution may be compatible with a proper regard for the military status of the empire.

In regard to the emigration of members of the Reserve Corps, only those rules shall apply that apply to the emigration of the members of the militia.

Article 60. The strength of the German army in time of peace shall be reckoned until December 31st, 1871, as 1 per cent. of the population of 1867, the confederate states contributing to this percentage according to their population. After that time the strength of the army shall be determined by legislation.

Article 61. After the publication of this constitution the entire military system of Prussia shall be instituted throughout the whole empire, as well the laws themselves as the regulations, instructions, and rescripts governing their execution, elucidation, or completion; for example, the military criminal code of April 3rd, 1845; the military regulations of the penal code of April 3rd, 1845, governing the punishment of military offenders; the enactment concerning the court of honour of July 20th, 1843; the stipulations in regard to drafting, time of service, matters of special payment and maintenance, of soldier billeting, claims for damages, mobilisation, etc.—for both peace and war. The military church regulations are, however, excepted. After the German army has been uniformly organised a comprehensive code of imperial military law shall be submitted to and constitutionally acted upon by the Reichstag and the Bundesrath.

Article 62. For the defrayment of the expenses of the whole German army and everything appertaining thereto, there shall be placed at the disposition of the emperor until December 31st, 1871, the sum of 225 (two hundred and twenty-five) *thalers* per capita for the soldiers of the army during time of peace (see Section XII).

After December 31st, 1871, the payment of these contributions to the imperial treasury must be continued by the separate states of the confederation. This reckoning shall be made according to the strength of the army in time of peace, as temporarily fixed in article 60, until it is altered by a law of the empire.

The expenditure of this sum for the entire army and everything appertaining thereto shall be determined by budget law.

The amount of expenditure for the army shall be determined upon the basis of the regular organisation of the imperial army, according to this constitution.

Article 63. The entire land force of the empire shall compose a united army which shall be under the command of the emperor in both peace and war.

The regiments throughout the whole army shall be numbered consecutively. The Prussian army shall be taken as the model for the color and cut of cloth-

ing. It is left to the officers of contingent forces to decide upon the external insignia (cockades, etc.).

It is the emperor's duty and right to take care that all divisions within the German army be represented in full equipment and efficiency, and that unity be established and maintained in the organisation and formation, in the supply of arms, in the command and training of the soldiers, and in the qualification of officers. For this purpose the emperor has authority to inform himself at any time, by inspection, of the condition of the various contingents, and to provide for the supplying of any needs thereby discovered.

The emperor determines the force, construction, and classification of the contingents of the imperial army as well as the organisation of the militia, and he has the right to designate garrisons within the jurisdiction of the confederation, as well as to order any part of the army into action.

For the sake of maintaining the requisite uniformity in the administration, arming, and equipment of all the troops of the German army, the orders bearing upon these matters, which shall be in future issued for the Prussian army, shall be communicated in proper form to the commanders of the remaining contingents by the committee on the army and fortifications, provided for in article 8, No. 1.

Article 64. Absolute obedience to the commands of the emperor is required of all German troops. This obligation shall be embodied in the oath of allegiance.

The commander-in-chief of a contingent, as well as all officers who command troops of more than one contingent, and all commanders of fortifications, are appointed by him. The officers appointed by him take the oath of fealty to him. The appointment of generals and of all those officers fulfilling the duties of generals within the contingent is subject to the approval of the emperor.

The emperor has authority to choose officers from all contingents of the empire in case of the transfer of men with or without promotion to any positions to be filled by imperial appointment, whether in the Prussian army or in other contingents.

Article 65. The right to erect forts within the territory of the confederation belongs to the emperor, who may acquire the means requisite thereto—in so far as the regular budget does not provide them—according to Section XII.

Article 66. Where special agreements do not otherwise stipulate, the princes of the confederation and the senate respectively appoint the officers of their contingents, subject to the limitation of article 64. They are the chiefs of the troops belonging to their respective jurisdictions, and enjoy the honours incident thereto. They have the right to make inspections at any time. They receive regular reports and announcements of any changes about to be made and timely information concerning promotions and appointments in the respective contingents, that these may be published in the different territories.

Furthermore, they have the right to use for police duty not only their own troops, but also any other imperial troops that may be stationed in their territories.

Article 67. Any sums appropriated to army purposes and not expended must under no circumstances fall to the share of a single government, but invariably to the imperial treasury.

Article 68. If the public safety of the country is threatened, the emperor may declare every part thereof in a state of war. Until a law is issued governing the grounds, the form of announcement, and the effects of such a declaration, the provisions of the Prussian law of June 4th, 1851 (Laws of 1851, page 451), shall be in order.

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Final Clauses of Section XI

The provisions contained in this section shall go into effect in Bavaria according to the provisions of the treaty of alliance of November 23rd, 1870 (*Bundesgesetzblatt*, 1871, Section 9), under III. Section 5, in Würtemberg, according to the provisions of the military convention of November 21st–25th, 1870 (*Bundesgesetzblatt*, 1870, pp. 65–68).

XII. FINANCES OF THE EMPIRE

Article 69. All receipts and expenditures of the empire shall be estimated for every year and entered upon the imperial budget. The latter must be fixed by law according to the following principles, before the beginning of the fiscal year.

Article 70. All general expenses shall be defrayed by whatever surplus remains from previous years—the receipts accruing as well from the customs taxes and the common excise duties, as from the postal and telegraph service. In so far as the aforesaid expenses are not covered by such receipts they shall be met, as long as no taxes of the empire are instituted, through the assessment of the several states according to their populations. This assessment shall be determined by the chancellor of the empire, up to the limit of the amount fixed in the budget.

Article 71. The amount of general expenditure shall be, as a rule, granted for one year; it may, however, in special cases be granted for a longer period.

During the intermediate time fixed in article 60 the budget of army expenditures, arranged with lettered heads, etc., shall be laid before the Bundesrath and the Reichstag for their information.

Article 72. A yearly report of the expenditure of all receipts of the empire shall be submitted by the chancellor of the empire to the Bundesrath and the Reichstag.

Article 73. In case of extraordinary necessity a loan may be contracted in accordance with the laws of the empire, the empire itself furnishing security for such loan.

Final Clause of Section XII

Articles 69 and 71 regulate the expenditures of the Bavarian army only in accordance with the provisions of the final clause of Section XI of the treaty of November 23rd, 1870, and article 72, only in so far as is necessary to inform the Bundesrath and the Reichstag of the assignment to Bavaria of the sum required for the Bavarian army.

XIII. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND REGULATIONS REGARDING PUNITIVE MEASURES

Article 74. Every undertaking inimical to the existence, the integrity, the safety, or the constitution of the German Empire; any offence against the Bundesrath, the Reichstag, a member of the Bundesrath or of the Reichstag, a magistrate, or a public servant of the empire, while any one of these is engaged in fulfilling the duties of his office or duties related thereto, whether such undertaking or offence be through word of mouth, writing, printing, signs, pictures, or other impersonation, shall be judged and punished in the separate states of the confederation according to the laws which exist or shall hereafter exist in them, according to which laws shall be judged any similar

act that is hostile to the individual state, its constitution, its legislature or assembly, or the members of its legislature or assembly, its officials or magistrates.

Article 75. For the offences against the German Empire designated in article 74, which if directed against one of the individual confederate states would be considered high treason, the superior court of appeals in Lübeck of the three free Hanseatic towns is the final authority in the first and last resort.

More definite regulations in regard to the authority and the administration of the superior court of appeals shall be determined by laws of the empire. Until such laws are instituted, the authority which the courts of the separate states have hitherto possessed, and the stipulations concerning the administration of these courts, shall stand.

Article 76. Quarrels among the different states of the confederation, in so far as they are not of a private nature and so to be settled by the courts qualified therefor, shall be adjusted by the Bundesrath upon the appeal of one of the parties.

Disputes about constitutional matters in those states of the confederation whose constitution makes no provision for the appointment of a board to adjust such disputes, shall be peaceably settled by the Bundesrath upon the appeal of one of the parties; or, if that is not successful, they shall be settled by legislative authority.


Article 77. If in one of the confederate states a case occurs where justice is denied and sufficient relief cannot be secured by legal means, then it is the duty of the Bundesrath to receive such legitimate complaints of the denial or restriction of justice as are to be judged according to the constitution and the existing laws of the state concerned. The Bundesrath shall then secure legal aid from the confederate government which has caused the difficulty.

XIV. GENERAL STIPULATIONS

Amendments of the constitution shall be enacted by the legislature. They shall be considered as rejected when fourteen votes are cast against them in the Bundesrath.

The provisions of the constitution of the empire which establish the fixed rights of individual states of the confederation in their relationships to the whole empire can be altered only with the approval of the state concerned.





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^b E. A. FREEMAN, *Historical Essays*.—^c E. BERNER, *Geschichte des Preussischen Staates*.—^d W. ONCKEN, *Das Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm*.—^e H. BLUM, *Fürst Bismarck und seine Zeit*.—^f W. MÜLLER, *Politische Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, 1816-1875*.—^g G. SCHEIBERT, *Der Krieg zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jahren 1870-1871*, including the correspondence of William I.—^h K. DRYANDER, *Erinnerungen aus der Kriegezeit*.—ⁱ F. EHRENBURG, *Kleine Erlebnisse in Grosser Zeit*.—^j B. GEBHARDT, *Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte*.

CHAPTER XII. GERMANY SINCE 1871

^b O. KAEMMEL, *Der Werdegang des Deutschen Volkes*.—^c E. LAVISSE, *Trois Empereurs d'Allemagne: Guillaume I, Frédéric III, Guillaume II*.—^d J. W. HEADLAM, "Germany," in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.—^e V. VON STRANZ, *Die Kolonial Politik in Unser Kaiser, zehn Jahre der Regierung Wilhelms II 1888-1898*.—^f J. W. HEADLAM, "Bismarck," in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.—^g H. BLUM, *Fürst Bismarck und seine Zeit*.—^h W. ONCKEN, *Das Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm*.

APPENDIX. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GERMAN HISTORY

The documents here given are to be found in the following sources and publications: I, II ii, II v, III, and IV in *Monumenta Historiæ Germanica*, Hanover and Berlin, 1826-1898; II i, II iii, and II iv in J. P. MIGNÉ's *Patrologiæ cursus completus*, Paris, 1844-1864; V in F. W. GHILLANY'S *Europäische Chronik*, Leipsic, 1865; VI in J. R. SEELEY'S *Life and Times of Stein*, Cambridge, 1878; VII in E. HERSTLET'S *Map of Europe by Treaty*, London, 1875; VIII in a supplement to *Vorwärts*, Berlin, 1891.



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Alfred von Arneth was born in Vienna, July 10th, 1819. After completing a course of legal study a predilection for historical research caused him to enter the government service as an employee in the Imperial Archives. The reputation gained by his published works caused his advancement in 1858 to the position of vice-director of archives and ten years later to that of director. He entered political life in 1848 as a member of the national assembly; was elected to the diet of Lower Austria in 1861; and in 1869 was appointed a life member of the Austrian

senate, where he participated in the celebrated debates on the confessional laws. Arneth was for many years a member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, becoming its president in 1879. His official position in the archive office afforded unusual opportunity for research in Austrian history, and he published several scholarly works upon the eighteenth century period, and in particular the momentous reign of Maria Theresa. He died at Vienna in 1897.

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Karl Friedrich Becker, who was born at Berlin in 1777, studied philosophy and history at Halle, became a private tutor, and in 1798 was made a fellow of the Normal College at Berlin. Severe illness caused his retirement from active teaching in the year 1800, and the remainder of his short life was passed in the composition of his *World History for Children and Teachers*, the last volume of which was published shortly before his death in 1806. This work, charming in style and arrangement, has been repeatedly edited and enlarged and is a standard textbook in the German schools.

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Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck was born April 1st, 1815, at the Manor House of Schönhausen, in Brandenburg. His family had for six centuries been among the landed gentry of Prussia and many of his ancestors had held high rank in the kingdom. Educated at Berlin and Göttingen, he entered the public service at the age of twenty, but soon resigned, finding it extremely distasteful and not himself possessing the characteristics of the valuable clerk. For a number of years he lived quietly on the family estates, travelled in England, France, and Switzerland, and developed his mental powers by wide reading. As a young man he was inclined to liberal opinions, but soon acquired the strong monarchical principles in whose maintenance his life was passed. In 1847 he entered parliament and from this date until his final retirement in 1890 he was never free from public office. His work as the unifier of Germany is fully spread upon the preceding pages of this history and need not be here referred to. Bismarck was a maker of history, not a writer; but his letters and speeches and the recollections of his strenuous life as dictated to Horst Kohl will always be valuable to the historian of his period. Though not in the strict sense of the word a scholar, his mind was full of wide information, his memory apt and retentive, and he used words as he would a sword—to cut and smite. His family letters reveal his kindly nature, his strong affections, and earnest religious feeling. His speeches, strong, pungent, and interspersed with apt quotations, were always received with the close attention which they merited.

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William Coxe was born in London, March 7th, 1747, educated at Cambridge, and in 1771 became curate of Denham, but soon resigned and spent several years on the Continent as tutor of the marquis of Blandford and several other young English noblemen. Their travels were extensive and Coxe collected a vast store of information of all kinds, which appeared in numerous volumes of history and travel, evincing close observation and profound research. Upon his return to England he became rector of Bemerton in 1788, of Sturton in 1800, and archdeacon of Wiltshire in 1804. He died at Bemerton in Wiltshire, June 16th, 1828.

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Hans Delbrück was born at Bergen on the island of Rügen, November 11th, 1848, and was educated at Heidelberg and Bonn. His studies were interrupted by the Franco-German War, in which he served and was made an officer after the battle of Gravelotte. From 1874 to 1879 he was tutor of Prince Waldemar of Prussia. Entering public life in 1881, he was a representative in the chamber of deputies of Prussia until 1884, when he was elected to the Reichstag and took prominent place among the liberal conservatives. In 1883 he became an editor of the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, and assumed its control in 1889. Since 1885 he has also occupied the chair of history in the University of Berlin, where his lectures have achieved great popularity. In addition to collaborating with Sybel in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, he has published several volumes of independent research upon notable events and personages in German history.

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Johann Gustav Droysen was born July 6th, 1808, at Treptow in Pomerania, Prussia. He

was educated at Berlin, where he became a lecturer on history in 1833 and professor in 1835. Called to the University of Kiel in 1840, he became prominent in the Schleswig-Holstein troubles as an advocate of the German claims, and represented Kiel in the Frankfort parliament. After holding a professorship at Jena he was recalled to Berlin in 1859, and devoted the remainder of his life to the duties of his office and the composition of historical works, whose vast erudition, lucid style, and critical acumen have caused him to be ranked among the greatest German historians. Droysen's writings cover a wide field. He was equally at home among the ancient Greeks as in more modern Germany, and in his life of Yorck von Wartenburg has given us a masterpiece of biography. His most important contribution to German history is the *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*.

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Eduard Duller, born at Vienna, November 8th, 1809, was educated in his native city and gave early promise of brilliant intellectual powers by producing at the age of seventeen a drama, *Meister Pilgram*, which was most favourably received. Feeling that his mind could not have proper development under the repressing influence of Metternich's rule, he left his native land in 1830, and spent the remainder of his life in Germany, residing successively in Munich, Frankfurt, Darmstadt, and Mainz. During his residence in Darmstadt he became greatly interested in the German-Catholic movement and strongly upheld religious liberty. In addition to his numerous poetical and dramatic writings, Duller gave much attention to history and wrote a history of the Jesuits, besides several standard works upon the history of Germany. He died at Wiesbaden, July 24th, 1853.

Dumas, M., *Précis des événements militaires, ou essai historique sur les campagnes de 1799 à 1814*, Paris, 1817-1826, 19 vols. — **Dümmeler**, E., *Geschichte des Ostfränkischen Reichs*, Berlin, 1862-1865, 2 vols., 2nd edition, 1887-1888, 3 vols. — **Duncker**, Max, *Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen und Friedrich Wilhelms III.*, Leipsic, 1876.

Maximilian Wolfgang Duncker, the eldest son of the publisher Karl Duncker, was born at Berlin, October 15th, 1811. While a student at Berlin University in 1834 he was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for membership in the students' societies which the government was endeavouring to abolish. He was released after six months, but was debarred from pursuing his studies until 1839, when he entered the University at Halle, where he obtained a professorship in 1842. Duncker took an active part in the political strife from 1848 to 1852 and was refused promotion by the Prussian government on account of his opposition to Manteuffel. Recalled to Berlin in 1859, he held important official positions until 1875, when he retired from public life. During this active public career he pursued his historical researches and produced many voluminous works, which are distinguished for lucidity of style and accuracy of statement. Duncker's writings cover a wide range, and while his *Geschichte des Alterthums* is the foundation-stone of his eminent reputation, his contributions to German history are of great value. He died at Ansbach, July 21st, 1886.

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Einhard, sometimes known as Eginhard, the celebrated secretary and supposed son-in-law of Charlemagne, was born in Germany about the year 770. While a student at the monastery of Fulda he displayed such ability that he was sent to complete his education at the school of the palace. His acquirements and talents attracting the attention of the emperor, Einhard soon received important court appointments which brought him into close intimacy with the royal family. Whether the romantic story of his love for the princess Emma be true or false, it is at all events well told, and, after being embellished by the elegant pen of Addison, was thought worthy of insertion in the third volume of the *Spectator*. His tender attachment for his wife Imma is proved by a letter written after her decease, which recounts her virtues in the most affectionate terms; but it is far from certain that she was the daughter of the emperor.

After the death of Charlemagne, Einhard became abbot of several monasteries, finally settling at Mühlheim, where he founded a monastery and passed the remainder of his life. His death occurred March 14th, 840, and he was buried beside his wife, who had died a few years before. Their coffins are still shown in the castle of Erbach, whose counts claim him as an ancestor. Many of Einhard's works have been preserved and his letters are of great value.

for the history of his time. The *Vita Caroli Magni*, completed about the year 820, is the most important biographical history which has survived the Middle Ages.

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Gustav Freytag, a distinguished German dramatist and historical novelist, was born at Kreuzburg, Silesia, July 13th, 1816. He studied at Breslau and Berlin, taught in the University of Breslau, and in 1848 with Julian Schmidt founded at Dresden *Die Grenzboten*, a monthly periodical devoted to the exposition of liberalism in politics and especially distinguished for the soundness of its literary criticism, with which he maintained his connection until 1870. Freytag during this period published many successful novels, wrote comedies which still hold the stage, and a series of essays illustrating the history and manners of ancient Germany. During the Franco-Prussian War he was for a time attached to the staff of the crown prince, and a journal of those days, published in 1889 under the title of *Der Kronprinz und die Kaiserkrone*, revealed the liberal tendencies of Frederick III in a manner very displeasing to the young emperor William II. The series of historical novels, *Die Ahnen*, published in 1872–1880, is already classic in German literature. The stories begin in the early dawn of German history and reproduce in vivid, lifelike pictures the manners and customs of the past, the motives and passions which influenced the nation in its most formative and critical periods. After their completion Freytag withdrew from active life and resided at Wiesbaden until his death, which occurred April 30th, 1895.

Friedjung, H., *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland*, 1855–1866, Stuttgart, 1896, 2 vols.; *Freiherr von Benedek*, Stuttgart, 1900. — **Froude**, J. A., *Luther and Erasmus*, in *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, London, 1867–1882, 4 vols. — **Fürste**, E., *Der Tag von Königgrätz*, Magdeburg, 1867.

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War, London, 1874. — **Gass**, W., and E. L. T. **Bial**, Henke's Neuere Kirchengeschichte, Halle, 1874–1880, 3 vols. — **Gebhardt**, B., Deutscher Kaisersaal, Stuttgart, 1894; Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, Leipsic, 1891–1892, 2 vols.

Bruno Gebhardt was born October 9th, 1858, at Krotoschin, Prussia, studied history at Breslau, gaining his degree of doctor of philosophy in 1884 by a dissertation entitled *Die Gravamina der deutschen Nation gegen den römischen Hof*, which was published and has passed through several editions. He taught for several years in the gymnasium at Breslau, and afterwards in the industrial school at Berlin, of which he became a professor in 1899. Gebhardt has published several valuable works on German history and biography and collaborated in the production of a *Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte*, published at Stuttgart, 1892.

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Friedrich Wilhelm Benjamin von Giesebrecht, who was born at Berlin, March 5th, 1814, pursued historical study at the University of Berlin under the tuition of Leopold von Ranke, under whose direction he subsequently published an excellent history of Otto II in the *Jahrbücher*, and edited the *Annales Altahenses*. Giesebrecht spent some years in historical research in Italy, and as a result published *De Literarum Studiis apud Italos primis mediæ ævi sæculis*. In 1857 he was appointed professor of history at Königsberg, and in 1862 succeeded Sybel at Munich, where he later became secretary of the Historical Commission. His great work is the *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit*, in the preparation of which he spent thirty-three years, and for which he was awarded by the Berlin Academy the Frederick William IV prize for distinguished service to German history. His historical writings are marked by extreme accuracy and evince the most careful and minute investigation. He died at Munich, December 17th, 1889.

Gieseler, J. K. L., Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Bonn, 1824–1856, 6 vols., English translation, Text-book of Ecclesiastical History, Philadelphia, 1836, New York, 1868.

Johann Karl Ludwig Gieseler, distinguished as a church historian, was born at Petershagen, in Westphalia, March 3rd, 1792. He was educated at Halle and served in the war of Liberation in 1813–1814. While acting as director of a gymnasium at Cleves he published his first essay on church history, in consequence of which he was called in the following year to the professorship of theology in the recently established University of Bonn. In 1831 he removed to Göttingen and devoted himself to the completion of his monumental work, *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, three volumes of which were published during his life and two more in the year following his death. His contributions to periodicals were numerous and valuable, and he edited several ancient chronicles and biographies.

Gindely, A., Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Kriegs, Prague, 1869–1880, 4 vols., English translation, History of the Thirty Years' War, New York, 1884; Zur Beurtheilung des kaiserlichen Generals Albrecht von Waldstein, Prague, 1887. — **Gneist**, H. R. H. F. von, Berliner Zustände, Berlin, 1849; Die staatsrechtlichen Fragen des preussischen Volksschulgesetzes, Berlin, 1892. — **Goedeke**, K., Grundriss zur Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung, Hanover, 1857–1881, 3 vols., Dresden, 1884–1893, 5 vols. — **Goerlach**, W., Fürst Bismarck, 5th edition, Stuttgart, 1885. — **Görres**, J. J. von, Deutschland und die Revolution, Coblenz, 1819. — **Goethe**, J. W. von, Campagne in Frankreich 1792, English translation, Campaign in France, London, 1849. — **Goette**, R., Geschichte der Deutschen Einheitsbewegung im 19. Jahrhundert, Gotha, 1891. — **Görgey**, A., Mein Leben und Wirken in Ungarn in den Jahren 1848 und 1849, Leipsic, 1852, 2 vols. — **Gostwick**, J., and **Harrison**, Outlines of German Literature, Philadelphia, 1854. — **Gottschall**, R. von, Die deutsche National-Litteratur des 19ten Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1885, 2 vols., 6th edition, Breslau, 1891, 4 vols.; Studien zur neuen deutschen Litteratur, Berlin, 1892. — **Götzinger**, E., Reallexikon der Deutschen Alterthümer, Leipsic, 1881–1882, 2 vols. — **Grand-Carteret**, J., Bismarck en caricature, Paris, 1890. — **Grimmelshausen**, H. J. C. von, Der abenteuerliche Simplicissimus, Mömpelgart (Montbéliard), 1669. — **Grotowsky**, P., Der eiserne Kanzler im deutschen Lied, Leipsic, 1894. — **Grube**, A. W., Charakterbilder aus der Geschichte und Sage, Leipsic, 1852, 3 vols., 27th edition, 1888, English translation, Heroes of History and Legend, London, 1880. — **Grünbeck**, J., Historia Friderici III et Maximiliani I, 1508, Tübingen, 1721, German translation by T. Ilgen, Leipsic, 1891. —

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Karl Rudolf Hagenbach was born March 4th, 1801, at Bâle, studied at Bonn and Berlin, and became professor of history at Bâle in 1828. He was a distinguished public lecturer and delivered several courses of lectures on the Reformation, the early history of the church, and on church history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were most favourably received, have passed through numerous editions, and been translated into other languages. His busy life was filled with literary work. In addition to the duties of his professorship and his public lectures, he was an admired preacher and a poet. Hagenbach published several doctrinal works, edited the *Kirchenblatt* for twenty-three years, and a valuable series of biographies of the reformers of the church, to which he contributed the lives of *Æcolampadius* and *Myconius*. He died at Bâle, June 7th, 1874.

Hahn, L. E., Der Krieg Deutschlands gegen Frankreich, Berlin, 1871; Geschichte des preussischen Vaterlandes, 23rd edition, Berlin, 1893; Fürst Bismarck, sein politisches Leben und Wirken, Berlin, 1878-1885, 4 vols., vol. 5 by K. Wippermann, 1890; Wilhelm der erste Kaiser des neuen deutschen Reichs, Berlin, 1888. — **Halévy**, L., Récits de guerre. L'invasion 1870-1871, Paris, 1891. — **Hallam**, H., View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, London, 1818, 2 vols., 1853, 3 vols., 1884, 2 vols. — **Hamel**, R., Das deutsche Bürgerthum unter Kaiser Wilhelm II, 2nd edition, Halle, 1890. — **Hansing**, K., Hardenberg und die dritte Koalition, Berlin, 1899. — **Hardwicke**, C., A History of the Christian Church, London, 1873, 3rd edition, 2 vols. — **Hart**, J. M., German Universities, New York, 1872. — **Hartig**, F. von, Genesis der Revolution in Oesterreich, Leipsic, 1850. — **Hartmann**, E. von, Zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Politik, Leipsic, 1889. — **Hartmann**, J., Erlebtes aus dem Kriege 1870-1871, Wiesbaden, 1885. — **Hartmann**, J. von, Lebenserinnerungen, Briefe und Aufsätze, Berlin, 1882. — **Hasner**, L. von, Denkwürdigkeiten, Stuttgart, 1892. — **Hassell**, W. von, Die Schlesischen Kriege, und das Kurfürstenthum Hannover, Hanover, 1879. — **Hast**, J., Geschichte der Wiedertäufer, Münster, 1835. — **Haugwitz**, C. A. H. K., Fragment des Mémoires inédits du comte de Haugwitz, Jena, 1837. — **Hauréau**, J. B., Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, Paris, 1872-1881, 3 vols. — **Hauser**, C. F., Deutschland nach dem dreissigjährigen Kriege, Leipsic, 1862. — **Häusser**, L., Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Gründung des Deutschen Bundes, Leipsic, 1854-1857, 1869, English translation, Period of the Reformation, London, 1873. — **Haym**, R., Die romantische Schule, Berlin, 1870. — **Headlam**, J. W., Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire, London, 1899. — **Heeren**, A. H. L., Geschichte der Europäischen Staaten, Göttingen, 1800, 5th edition, 1830; Historische Werke, Göttingen, 1821-1826, 15 vols., English translation, Historical Treatises, Oxford, 1836.

Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, whose life was largely spent in the investigation of the politics and commerce of the ancients, was born near Bremen, October 25th, 1760, and educated at Bremen and the University of Göttingen. His first work was an edition of Menander's *De Encomiis*, and in the years 1792-1801 he travelled extensively through France, Italy, and the Netherlands while preparing material for an edition of the *Eclogues* of Stobæus. In 1796 his *Ideen über Politik* appeared at Göttingen and at once gave him high rank among historians. In 1801 he became professor of history at Göttingen. As a teacher he was far beyond others of his time a stimulating and productive force. The formative periods of history were to him regions to be carefully explored, and, like all great pioneers, he possessed the energy and magnetism which inspire his followers. Numerous works evincing acute observation, careful research, and developing new views of ancient times came rapidly from his pen. For his *Versuch einer Entwicklung der Folgen der Kreuzzüge*, published in 1808, he was awarded a prize by the Institute of France. The last years of his life were comparatively unproductive, being devoted to the revision and reproduction of his earlier works. He died at Göttingen, March 6th, 1842.

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berg, H., Die Politischen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich unter König Albrecht I, 1289-1308, Strasburg, 1891. — **Henne-am-Rhyn, O.**, Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte, Leipsic, 1870-1877, 6 vols.; Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Volkes, Berlin, 1886, 1893, 2 vols.; Die Nationale Einigung der Deutschen, Hanover, 1891.

Otto Henne-am-Rhyn was born at St. Gall, Switzerland, August 26th, 1828, and inherited a love for historical research from his father, a Swiss historian and poet. He studied at Berne and taught for several years before becoming editor of the *Freimaurerzeitung* at Leipsic in 1872. A profound student of the history of civilisation, he has published many works dealing with the growth and development of the Swiss and German peoples, their national characteristics, manners, and customs, besides an interesting and instructive treatise upon the Jewish race.

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Heinrich Friedrich Theodore Kohlrausch, born November 15th, 1780, at Landolfshausen, after completing his studies at Göttingen became tutor to young Count Wolf Baudissin, with whom he sojourned at the universities of Berlin, Kiel, and Heidelberg. He afterwards taught at Barmen, Düsseldorf, and Münster, and in 1830 was made school inspector of the kingdom of Hanover, serving as such until 1864, when he became general director. He wrote a number of works upon general history and chronology, mainly intended for use in schools, which have been frequently republished and are of high authority. *Deutsche Geschichte*, first published in 1816, is his most important production and is still a standard work. His long and useful life came to a close January 29th, 1867.

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Franz Xaver Krones, count of Marchland, was born at Ungarisch-Ostrau in Moravia, November 19th, 1835. He studied philosophy and history at Vienna and became instructor in Austrian history at Kaschau in 1857. From 1865 he was professor of history at the University of Gratz. Krones' published works upon Austro-Hungarian history are both numerous and valuable, including comprehensive reviews of general history as well as monographs upon important epochs and historical biographies of noted persons.

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Henry Charles Lea was born in Philadelphia, September 19th, 1825. He did not receive a college education, but entered his father's publishing business at the age of eighteen, becoming its head in 1865. The activity of a successful business life and a profound interest in general public affairs has not, however, hindered Mr. Lea's pursuit of his chosen literary career. His interest in mediæval church history has been fruitful in many valuable contributions to the literature of that eventful period, and his researches have shown in strong light much of the ignorance, superstition, and cruelty of the Dark Ages. He is a member of many

learned societies in Europe and the United States, and has been granted honorary degrees by several universities.

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Theodor Lindner was born May 22nd, 1843, at Breslau, received his education there and at Berlin, and after teaching in Breslau and Münster was appointed to a professorship in the University of Halle in 1888. His published works on German history cover a wide range and include some valuable biographies.

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János Majláth, a Hungarian poet and historian, was born at Pest, October 3rd, 1786. He was a member of a noble Hungarian family which had long been prominent in the state. His education was obtained at Erlau and Raab, and having chosen the profession of law he was until 1848 chancery-councillor at Pest. Compelled to resign his position by reason of a disease of the eyes, he endeavoured to maintain himself by literary work in Vienna and Munich, but, overcome by the cares and worries of life, drowned himself and his daughter in the Starnbergersee, January 3rd, 1855. His historical works are numerous and are of special value to the student of Hungarian history.

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Wolfgang Menzel, noted as critic and historian, was born June 21st, 1798, at Waldenburg, Silesia, and studied at Berlin, Jena, and Bonn. He was an ardent follower of Jahn and was engaged in the Turner movement in 1818. From 1820 to 1824 he taught at Aarau in Switzerland, but in 1825 took up his permanent residence in Stuttgart, where he established the *Litteraturblatt*, which he edited until 1848. Menzel was a member of the Würtemberg diet from 1830 to 1838, joining Uhland, Schott, and Pfizer in the opposition party, but being unsuccessful in political life he returned to literary pursuits. His bitter attacks on Goethe led to sharp conflicts with Heine and others, and for years he was a "storm centre" in German literary circles. While teaching in Switzerland he wrote his popular *Geschichte der Deutschen*, and in his later and very numerous historical works developed his strong monarchical tendencies. His large library passed, after his death on April 23rd, 1873, into the possession of the University of Strasburg.

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Berthold Georg Niebuhr was born August 27th, 1776, at Copenhagen. His father, Karstens Niebuhr, who was among the first modern explorers of Arabia and Syria, superintended his

early education, and he completed his studies at Kiel and Edinburgh. He early showed remarkable aptitude for the acquisition of knowledge and was distinguished throughout life for the variety and accuracy of his information. Niebuhr was at first in government service at Copenhagen, afterwards at Berlin, but in 1806 at the opening of the University of Berlin he became a lecturer on history in that institution. The new critical methods which he applied to the study of history revealed the exactness of his thought and created a new science of historical study. While his conclusions may not be wholly accepted at the present day, he paved the way and indicated the proper means for historical research and criticism. Returning to public life, he was appointed ambassador at the papal court, and his sojourn in Rome enabled him to examine the sources of historical knowledge in which that city abounds. Returning to Germany in 1823, he lectured at Bonn on classical and archæological subjects until his death, January 2nd, 1831. Niebuhr was a man of great mental power and vast acquirements. While his literary work was almost wholly confined to antiquity, his services in elucidating the sources of German history will cause him to be always ranked among the great historians of Germany.

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Wilhelm Oncken, born December 19th, 1838, at Heidelberg, was educated at Heidelberg, Göttingen, and Berlin, taught from 1862 to 1866 in Heidelberg, and in 1870 became professor of history at Giessen. From 1873 to 1876 he represented Giessen in the German parliament. In 1877 he became editor of the series entitled *Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen*, to which he has contributed several valuable sections.

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August Potthast was born at Höxter in Westphalia, August 13th, 1825. He studied at Halle, and, becoming interested in the history of the Middle Ages, has devoted his life to that work. By diligent study of the chroniclers of that period he accumulated a vast repertoire of historical fact, from which he has built his *Bibliotheca historica medii ævi*, a work of the utmost value to historical students. Potthast was commissioned by the Berlin Academy to continue the great work commenced by Jaffé in his *Regesta pontificum*, which that scholar had completed to the year 1198. Potthast's continuation covers the period from 1198 to 1304 and is a work of vast erudition, most useful to the student of ecclesiastical history. He was for years librarian of the Reichstag and has published several monographs on epochs of mediæval history, besides numerous contributions to periodicals. He died February 13th, 1898.

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Leopold von Ranke, born at Wiehe in Thuringia, December 21st, 1795, shares with Niebuhr the honour of creating the modern school of historical research. Educated at the University of Leipsic, he became instructor in classical history at Frankfurt. While preparing himself for this work by systematic reading of the ancient historians, he conceived the idea of imparting to modern history the interest and vitality whose absence in most writers rendered their writings dull and wearisome. In 1825 he was appointed professor at the Berlin University, and began special investigation of the relations of Venice with the German Empire. The knowledge of the value of diplomatic history thus obtained was of great service in his subsequent researches, and its use is a marked characteristic of his writings. The outcome of Ranke's study of the Reformation period in the various states of Europe was a series of luminous pictures, forming a related whole which are among the most notable of his contributions to modern history. Ranke became historiographer of Prussia in 1841, was ennobled in 1865, and received many private and national honours. He retired from his professorship in 1871, but at the age of eighty-one began the preparation of his *Weltgeschichte*. Failing sight compelled him to depend upon the assistance of readers and secretaries, but his mind, stored with the accumulations of sixty years, was an unfailing spring, and the published volumes had reached the period of the Crusades when he died, May 23rd, 1886.

For years before his death Ranke had been considered first among modern historians. This was due not alone to the value of his publications, but to his work in the university. He trained generations of historical students, who came not alone from Germany but from all other civilised countries to learn his methods and be imbued with his spirit. His writings are distinguished for methodical research, rigorous criticism, art in grouping and animating facts, and the portrayal of character. Dispassionate and serene in his study of an epoch, he was animated by the sole desire to learn what actually occurred and to sum up with clearness and brevity its great characteristics and the events bearing upon general history. He is a political historian and deals only with rulers and great events, ignoring economic or social problems and limiting himself to the history of the state, not of its people.

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Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller was born in Marburg, Württemberg, November 10th, 1759. His father was an army surgeon, later inspector of parks and gardens of the ducal summer residence, the "Solitude," near Stuttgart. His mother was the daughter of a baker and innkeeper named Kodweis. The military profession of the father necessitated frequent changes of residence, and the early education of the future poet and historian was under the instruction of the pastor of Lorch, where the family resided from 1763 to 1766. In 1766, Schiller's father being in garrison at Ludwigsburg, the boy became a pupil of the Latin school, which was later removed to Stuttgart and became a semi-military institution. Here he remained from his fourteenth year until he was twenty-one. He was intended for the ministry, but soon abandoned the idea and took up the study of law, leaving that again to study medicine. He was made most wretched by the harsh discipline of the school, but found some alleviation in the study of many forbidden books, which he managed to obtain in spite of the vigilance of his superiors. The works of Shakespeare, Goethe, Rousseau, Lessing, Herder, and Klopstock strongly influenced his character and turned his mind towards literature and the drama.

Schiller's life may be divided into three periods: that of his youth from 1759 to 1785, the Storm and Stress period, during which he wrote and published the *Robbers*, *Fiesco*, *Love and Intrigue*, and his lyric poems; the second was the period of scientific study and production from 1785 to 1794, during which he wrote *Don Carlos*, *The Revolt of the Netherlands*, *The Thirty Years' War*, and many philosophic and æsthetic treatises; the third period from 1794 to 1805 was that of his greatest productivity. His best poems and ballads date from this period, as well as his most important dramas—the *Wallenstein* trilogy, *Mary Stuart*, *Maid of Orleans*, and *William Tell*. His first important work was published when he was eighteen years of age. It was a powerful tragedy which at once established his fame throughout all Europe. It was put on the stage at Mannheim in 1782. On account of certain passages offensive to the duke of Würtemberg, Schiller was forbidden to write any more dramas, but to confine himself henceforth only to medical subjects. These restrictions being intolerable to the young poet, he fled to Mannheim, renounced his allegiance to the duke of Würtemberg, and became naturalised as a subject of the elector palatine. The ten years he spent in Mannheim were a constant struggle against poverty and debt in spite of his literary productions and journalistic enterprises. In 1787 he went to Weimar, there meeting Goethe, with whom he formed a lifelong friendship, later collaborating with him in the *Almanac of the Muses* and the *Xenien*. Through the influence of Goethe he obtained the post of professor of history at the University of Jena in 1789.

Schiller was tall and slight, his complexion pale, hair of a reddish colour, eyes hazel. His aims were high and he was deterred by no obstacle from reaching the goal he had set for himself. In spite of almost constant poverty and adversity and long years of physical suffering, he was cheerful, patient, tender, and sympathetic. He died of consumption, May 9th, 1805.

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Friedrich Christoph Schlosser was born at Jever in Oldenburg, November 17th, 1776. His first inclination was towards theological study, but after entering Göttingen in 1794 he devoted himself to scientific work. For some years he was tutor to Count Bentinck's children and was then appointed vice-rector of the college at Jever. During this period he turned his attention definitely to history, and in 1814 became professor at Frankfurt; two years later he was made librarian of that city. In 1817 he was made professor at Heidelberg University, where he soon attained high repute. Schlosser is a modern historian in the full sense of the term, and has exerted great influence upon his time by the liberalism and breadth of his thought. He is not so distinguished for erudition as for his love for truth and exact statement, and deals more with the life and civilisation of the people than with their wars and the lives of their princes. He died at Heidelberg, September 23rd, 1861, and a monument has been erected to his memory at his birthplace.

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Heinrich von Sybel, born at Düsseldorf, December 2nd, 1817, studied at Bonn and Berlin, where he was a pupil of Ranke, and in 1841 published his first work, a *History of the Crusades*, in which he controverted established beliefs. In 1844 he became professor extraordinary at Bonn, two years later removing to Marburg, where he wrote his notable *History of the French Revolution*, in which, from his use of material never before utilised, he was able to throw new light upon many important particulars. Called as professor to Munich in 1856, he instituted the Bavarian Historical Commission and founded the *Historische Zeitschrift*. Sybel returned to Bonn as full professor in 1861, and having in 1875 been made director of the Prussian archives, began the preparation of his chief work, *Die Begründung des deutschen Reichs*, for which his position afforded unusual facilities. He was prominent in public affairs and for many years was a member of the German parliament. In addition to his numerous individual publications Sybel was associated in the preparation of the political correspondence of Frederick the Great, and was an editor of the *Monumenta Germaniæ historica*. He died at Marburg, August 1st, 1895.

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Heinrich von Treitschke, an eminent German historian and publicist, was born at Dresden, September 15th, 1834. He studied at Bonn, Leipsic, Tübingen, and Heidelberg, and became professor at Freiburg in 1863. His ardent advocacy of German unity led him at the period of the Seven Weeks' War to resign his professorship and assume the editorship of the *Preussische Jahrbücher* at Berlin, a position which he retained until 1889. In 1866 he was made professor at Kiel, but in the following year accepted a call to Heidelberg, where he remained until his permanent removal to Berlin in 1874. Treitschke was a member of parliament from 1871 to 1888 and prominent in debate as a representative of the liberal element. He succeeded Rauke as historiographer of Prussia in 1886 and lectured for many years in the University of Berlin, impressing his strong personality and ardent patriotism upon thousands of the German youth. His strong partisanship makes him less trustworthy as a historian than Ranke, but his sincerity and marked ability entitle him to high rank among modern German writers. Treitschke's published works are numerous and relate wholly to epochs of the nineteenth century. His style is picturesque, spirited, and graphic.

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Georg Weber was born at Bergzabern in the Rhine-Palatinate, February 10th, 1808. Upon the completion of his studies at Erlangen he became a professor in the high school of Heidelberg and from 1848 to 1872 was its director. His life was passed in the quiet performance of his professional duties and in the preparation of numerous historical works which are of special value to the student. Doctor Weber frankly stated that he wrote for the educated class, not for popular use; but the clear and easy style, the judicious arrangement, and unbiassed treatment of fact make his writings profitable and instructive to all. He died at Heidelberg, August 10th, 1888.

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Georg Winter, born at Breslau, February 3rd, 1856, is prominent among modern German historians. His individual works are already numerous and valuable, and having been an assistant of Ranke in the preparation of the *Weltgeschichte*, he became one of the editors of the volumes uncompleted at the death of that great historian.

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
Adam Wolf, a noted Austrian historian, was born at Eger in Bohemia, July 12th, 1822. He studied at Prague and Vienna, becoming a lecturer on history in the University of Vienna in 1850. Appointed professor at Pest in 1852, he was for some years tutor to the daughter of Archduke Albert and in 1865 became professor at the University of Gratz, where he remained until his death, October 25th, 1883. A profound student of Austrian history, especially of the times of Maria Theresa, he wrote a number of important treatises, besides valuable biographies of Francis I and the archduchess Marie Christine.

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Eduard Zeller was born at Kleinbottwar in Württemberg, January 22nd, 1814. He studied at Tübingen and Berlin, and in 1840 became a lecturer on theology at Tübingen. His advanced views caused bitter opposition to his appointment to a professorship at Berne in 1847, and in 1849 he accepted a call to Marburg, where he remained until his appointment as professor of philosophy at Heidelberg in 1862. In 1872 he became professor at Berlin University, but at the age of eighty years retired from active life and settled at Stuttgart. Zeller ranks among the most noted German historians of philosophy and his publications are marked by original thought and profound erudition.

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HISTORY OF THE GERMANIC EMPIRES

A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF THE GERMANIC EMPIRES FROM THE TIME OF THE HOHENSTAUFENS TO THE PRESENT

[1138-1904 A.D.]

THE TWELFTH CENTURY

- 1138 **Conrad III** elected king of Germany over his rival, Henry Guelf (the Proud), duke of Bavaria. Conrad fears Henry and puts him under the ban, giving Saxony to Albert the Bear, and Bavaria to Leopold IV, markgraf of Austria.
- 1139 Death of Henry the Proud.
- 1140 His brother Welf asserts rights to Bavaria and is defeated by Conrad at Weinsberg.
- 1141 On death of Leopold of Austria, Bavaria falls to Henry Jasomirgott, brother of Henry the Proud. Conrad restores Saxony to Henry the Lion, son of Henry the Proud. Albert the Bear gives up claim to Saxony and his former possessions are restored to him.
- 1147 Conrad joins the Second Crusade.
- 1149 Return of Conrad renews strife with Welf of Bavaria. Conrad prepares to go to Rome to claim imperial crown.
- 1151 Death of Conrad's eldest son Henry, already crowned king of Germany.
- 1152 Death of Conrad. He has enjoined the electors to make his nephew, **Frederick (I) Barbarossa** emperor, which they do. The king of Denmark acknowledges himself Frederick's vassal.
- 1154 Frederick starts for Italy to restore the imperial authority there.
- 1155 He takes some small towns in northern Italy—is crowned king of Italy at Pavia and emperor by Adrian IV at Rome. Execution of Arnold of Brescia.
- 1156 Frederick undertakes to settle the Guelf and Ghibelline question. Bavaria restored to Henry the Lion. Henry Jasomirgott made duke of Austria. Welf receives Tuscany, Spoleto, and some of the countess Matilda's possessions. The Guelf power is once more fully established.
- 1157 Nearly all the western princes do homage to the emperor at the Diet of Würzburg. Frederick bestows the crown of Bohemia upon Wladislaw. Rupture between pope and emperor on account of the former's confirmation of William II of Sicily.
- 1158 Frederick goes again to Italy. The Diet of Roncaglia defines rights of emperor against the Lombard cities. Revolt of Milan.
- 1160 Siege and destruction of Crema. Schism in the church.
- 1162 Siege and surrender of Milan. The city burned.

- 1163 Frederick again visits Italy to settle affairs in the kingdom.
- 1166 Fourth visit of Frederick to Italy.
- 1167 Siege of Ancona. Formation of the Lombard League. Union of Guelfs and Ghibellines. Second coronation of Frederick by the anti-pope Paschal III.
- 1168 Plague nearly annihilates Frederick's army and he returns to Germany with difficulty. The Diet of Bamberg ends a feud between Henry the Lion and his foes.
- 1169 Frederick's son Henry chosen king of the Romans. Rebuilding of Milan. The new city of Alessandria built.
- 1174 Fifth expedition of Frederick to Italy.
- 1175 Unsuccessful siege of Alessandria.
- 1176 Disastrous defeat of Frederick by the Lombards at Legnano. He makes an armistice with the pope and the Lombards.
- 1177 Reconciliation of Pope Alexander III and Frederick at Venice.
- 1178 End of the schism in the church.
- 1182 Submission of Henry the Lion. Division of the duchy of Saxony.
- 1183 Peace of Constance. The Lombard cities gain their independence, recognising the overlordship of Frederick, which however they may redeem by annual payment.
- 1186 Frederick visits Italy for the sixth time. He attempts to repress the growing energy of the Lombard and Tuscan cities. Marriage of Henry to Constance, daughter of Roger II of Sicily.
- 1188 Frederick joins the Third Crusade. Henry made vice-regent. He goes to war with Henry the Lion. Death of William II of Sicily. Henry by virtue of his marriage claims the kingdom, but it is secured by Tancred.
- 1190 Henry comes to an understanding with Henry the Lion. Death of Frederick while bathing in a stream in Cilicia. **Henry VI** succeeds.
- 1191 Coronation of Henry as emperor. He abandons Tusculum. Siege of Naples in war with Tancred.
- 1194 End of a two years' war with Henry the Lion and liberation of Richard Cœur de Lion, his brother-in-law.
- 1195 Henry subjugates the kingdom of Sicily which he treats in merciless fashion. William III resigns the crown to Henry. End of the Norman dynasty, Germany's most dangerous rival in Italy.
- 1196 Henry's eldest son Frederick elected king of the Romans.
- 1197 Rebellion in Sicily crushed. Henry makes great plans for conquest of the Eastern Empire, but dies suddenly.
- 1198 Some of the German princes elect **Philip of Swabia**, Henry's brother, king. Others bestow the title upon **Otto IV**, son of Henry the Lion. A war for the crown between the Guelfs and Hohenstaufus begins. Pope Innocent III recognises Otto. The name Guelf applied to partisans of the pope. Defeat of Otto and restriction of his power.

THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

- 1208 Murder of Philip. Otto universally hailed as sovereign.
- 1209 Coronation of Otto as emperor. He abandons the estates of Matilda to the pope.
- 1212 In consequence of quarrels between Otto and the pope, the latter makes **Frederick II**, grandson of Barbarossa, king of Germany.
- 1214 Battle of Bouvines. Otto in alliance with King John of England and others defeated by Philip Augustus of France. He withdraws to the Harzburg.
- 1215 Coronation of Frederick as king of Germany. He promises to undertake a crusade.
- 1218 Death of Otto IV.
- 1220 Frederick's young son, Henry, to whom Swabia has been given, is elected king of Rome. Coronation of Frederick as emperor upon renewing his promises to the papal see by Honorius III.
- 1222 Coronation of Henry as king at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle).
- 1226 Quarrels with the Lombard cities.
- 1227 Abortive attempt of Frederick to conduct a crusade. He is excommunicated for not fulfilling his promise. Defeat of the Danish king, Valdemar II, at Bornhöved.
- 1228 Frederick sails for the East on his crusade. The pope excommunicates him for starting without absolution.
- 1229 The pope's army ravages Apulia. Frederick concludes a ten years' truce with the Saracens, receives Jerusalem and other places, and returns to Italy. He is excommunicated a third time for coming back. Frederick drives the papal troops from his territories.
- 1230 Peace made with the pope. Absolution of Frederick.
- 1234 Revolt of Frederick's son Henry in lower Germany. He is subdued and sent to Italy. Public peace enacted at Mainz. The laws first published both in Latin and German.
- 1236 Victories over the Lombard cities.
- 1237 Frederick seizes Austria, and deposes Duke Frederick the Warlike. The empress' second

- son, Conrad, elected king of the Romans. In Lombardy Frederick wins a decisive victory over the Lombard cities at Cortenuova. The smaller cities hasten to make peace. Milan holds out.
- 1238 Siege of Brescia. Frederick retires to Cremona. Frederick's natural son, Enzo, assumes title of king of Sardinia, which offends the pope.
- 1239 Beginning of war with the papacy. Excommunication of Frederick. Enzo captures Ancona.
- 1240 Frederick appears before Rome, but returns to Naples.
- 1241 Sea victory of Enzo at Elba. In Germany Duke Henry the Pious, of Liegnitz, fights a battle at Wahlstatt with the Mongols, who have invaded the country. Although victorious, the Mongols turn back.
- 1245 Innocent IV, having escaped from Frederick, summons council at Lyons and declares Frederick deposed. All subjects of the emperor are ordered to revolt, and a new election is called for.
- 1246 **Henry Raspe**, landgraf of Thuringia, is elected. He is defeated at Ulm by Conrad.
- 1247 Death of Henry. **William of Holland** elected to succeed him.
- 1248 Defeat of Frederick at Padua. He retreats to Naples.
- 1249 Victory at Fossalta for the Lombard cities. Capture of Enzo.
- 1250 Frederick dies at Fiorentino. His son, **Conrad IV**, succeeds. Germany torn by factions. Conrad stays in Italy. The pope refuses to recognize him as emperor. Conrad is by Frederick's will king of Sicily also. He and his brother Manfred recover Naples and Capua from the pope.
- 1252 The pope offers the crown of Sicily to Richard, earl of Cornwall, and to Charles, count of Anjou, in return for an alliance against Conrad and Manfred. Neither accepts.
- 1254 Death of Conrad, said to be caused by Manfred's ambitions. Manfred becomes regent in Sicily for Conrad's son Conradin.
- 1256 Death of William. *Interregnum* in Germany.
- 1257 Double election of **Richard of Cornwall** and **Alfonso of Castile** to the German kingdom. The former is crowned at Aachen, but is recognised only in the Rhine valley. The latter never comes to Germany.
- 1258 Manfred states that Conradin is dead and has himself crowned king of Sicily. The pope refuses to recognise him.
- 1264 Pope Urban IV offers the crown of Sicily to Charles of Anjou, who accepts.
- 1265 Coronation of Charles as king of Sicily. He proceeds against Manfred.
- 1266 Death of Manfred in battle of Benevento.
- 1267 Expedition of **Conradin** into Italy to recover his hereditary rights.
- 1268 Defeat of Conradin at Tagliacozzo. He is captured and executed.
- 1272 Death of Richard of Cornwall. The pope threatens to appoint an emperor if the electors do not choose one. A new era for the empire begins. Italy has been lost to it. The house of Anjou is established in southern Italy. The Guelf triumphs in the north have put an end to imperial authority. The ecclesiastical power has entirely overshadowed that of the emperor. The title continues only in name. The electors become a distinct element in the state.
- 1273 Diet at Frankfort, assembled to elect a successor to Richard, king of the Romans, passes over the chief candidates, Ottocar king of Bohemia and Alfonso the Learned of Castile, and chooses **Rudolf of Habsburg**. He conciliates the papacy by making ample concessions.
- 1276 Vienna taken by Rudolf from the Bohemian king, who resigns Austria, Styria, Carinthia, etc., to Rudolf. Rudolf restores order in the realm.
- 1278 Ottocar defeated by Rudolf at the battle of Marchfeld. Death of Ottocar. His successor, Wenceslaus II, marries Rudolf's daughter.
- 1291 Rudolf dies.
- 1292 **Adolphus of Nassau** elected German king to the exclusion of Albert, Rudolf's son. Civil war.
- 1298 **Albert I** elected. He defeats and slays Adolphus at Göllheim, subdues Theobald of Pfirt, and makes peace with the electors.
- 1299 Treaty with Philip the Fair of France.
- 1300 A campaign undertaken by Albert to assert his claims to the domains of the deceased count of Holland fails. He puts down internal enemies.

THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

- 1301 Charles Martel, son of Charles II of Naples, made king of Hungary by the pope. The Hungarians choose the son of Wenceslaus of Bohemia.
- 1303 Albert exchanges the alliance of Philip of France for that of Pope Boniface VIII. War with Wenceslaus II of Bohemia.
- 1306 Albert seizes the Bohemian kingdom on the death of Wenceslaus III and makes his own son Rudolf king.
- 1307 Battle of Lucka. Albert's troops defeated by the Thuringian princes. Death of Rudolf

- of Bohemia. The Bohemians elect Duke Henry of Carinthia king. Albert invades Bohemia.
- 1308 Albert murdered by his nephew, John the Parricide. **Henry VII of Luxemburg** elected German king at Rhense. Waldemar, the powerful markgraf of Brandenburg, begins his rule.
- 1309 Henry makes a compact with the excluded princes of the house of Habsburg.
- 1310 Henry of Carinthia is expelled from the Bohemian throne and the crown transferred to John, son of Henry of Luxemburg. Henry of Luxemburg assembles an army to assert the imperial supremacy over Italy. He enters Lombardy and is crowned with the iron crown at Milan. He favours the Ghibellines. Guelf rising against him. Unsuccessful siege of Brescia. The Genoese welcome Henry.
- 1312 Henry VII receives the imperial crown at Rome and attacks Florence. Waldemar of Brandenburg defeats Frederick of Thuringia at Grossenhain. War between Ludwig of Bavaria (the Bavarian) of the house of Wittelsbach and Frederick the Handsome of Austria.
- 1313 Henry prepares to oppose Robert king of Naples. Death of Henry VII. Battle of Gammelsdorf: Ludwig of Bavaria defeats Frederick the Handsome.
- 1314 **Ludwig (IV) the Bavarian** elected German king at Frankfort, and **Frederick the Handsome** at Sachsenhausen. The cities support Ludwig. General anarchy and war between the Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs.
- 1315 Battle of Morgarten. Duke Leopold of Austria, brother of Frederick, defeated by the Swiss confederates.
- 1316 Waldemar of Brandenburg defeats a league of Poland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway at Granson.
- 1322 Ludwig the Bavarian defeats and captures Frederick at Mühldorf.
- 1323 Brandenburg, left vacant by the extinction of Waldemar's family, conferred on Ludwig, son of Ludwig the Bavarian.
- 1324 Pope John XXII declares Ludwig deposed and his followers excommunicate. The electors refuse to acknowledge the sentence.
- 1325 Ludwig and Frederick agree to reign conjointly.
- 1326 Death of Leopold of Austria.
- 1327 Ludwig goes to Milan and receives the crown of Lombardy.
- 1328 Ludwig seizes Pisa. He is crowned emperor at Rome, and sets up an anti-pope, but finds himself surrounded by enemies and returns home.
- 1330 Death of Frederick the Handsome. His surviving brothers make peace with Ludwig. King John of Bohemia secures the inheritance of Henry of Carinthia by marrying his son, John Henry, to Henry's daughter, Margarete Maultasch, and makes a successful expedition into Italy.
- 1331 Ludwig fails in an attempt to reconcile himself with the pope. The Swabian League formed by the cities to resist oppression by the nobles.
- 1333 John of Bohemia forced to evacuate Italy.
- 1336 Division of the dominions of Henry of Carinthia. John of Bohemia takes Tyrol and the Habsburgs Carinthia and Carniola.
- 1337 Ludwig makes alliance with England against France.
- 1338 Diet of Frankfort. The estates of the empire declare John XXII's interdict against Ludwig to be null and void. The electors declare the choice of an emperor to rest with them independently of the pope's sanction.
- 1340 Ludwig abandons the English alliance for that of France.
- 1341 Lower Bavaria is united to Ludwig's dominions on extinction of the ducal house. Louis the Great, son of Charles Martel, becomes king of Hungary.
- 1342 Tyrol acquired for the house of Wittelsbach by the marriage of Margarete Maultasch with Ludwig of Brandenburg.
- 1346 Ludwig takes possession of Holland, Zealand, and Friesland in right of his wife. Clement VI excommunicates Ludwig and declares him deposed. **Charles (IV) of Luxemburg**, son of King John of Bohemia, elected German king. The cities refuse to receive him. He flees to France.
- 1347 Death of John of Bohemia at Crécy. Charles succeeds him. Death of Ludwig. Louis of Hungary invades Naples to avenge the death of his brother, King Andrew.
- 1348 Charles IV supports the claim of the false Waldemar to Brandenburg. Charles founds the University of Prague.
- 1349 **Günther**, Count of Schwarzenburg, made German king by the supporters of the house of Wittelsbach, rivals of the false Waldemar. Günther resigns his claims for a money payment.
- 1350 Charles abandons Waldemar's cause.
- 1353 The count palatine resigns half the upper Palatinate to the Bohemian crown.
- 1354 Charles crowned at Milan with the iron crown of Lombardy.
- 1355 The Bohemian laws modified at Charles' suggestion. He negotiates a peace between the Visconti and the Lombard League and is crowned emperor at Rome. Charles attacked in Pisa. He returns home.

- 1356 The Golden Bull, agreed to by the diet at Nuremberg, regulates the method of the election of German emperors.
- 1358 Alliance between Rudolf IV of Austria and the counts of Würtemberg against Charles. Louis the Great of Hungary conquers Dalmatia from Venice.
- 1360 Charles detaches the counts of Würtemberg from Rudolf IV.
- 1364 By the Treaty of Brunn, between Rudolf and Charles, the houses of Habsburg and Luxemburg conclude a perpetual alliance by which on the extinction of the one house the other becomes its heir.
- 1366 Battle at the Iron Gates between the Hungarians and Turks.
- 1368 Charles leads an army into Italy against the Visconti and gains their promise not to make alliances against the pope. Charles again goes to Rome.
- 1370 Louis of Hungary makes himself king of Poland.
- 1372 Battle of Altheim. The Swabian League defeated by the count of Würtemberg.
- 1373 The Treaty of Fürstenwald. The house of Wittelsbach resigns the mark of Brandenburg to Charles IV. Pomerania and Mecklenburg acknowledge Charles' suzerainty.
- 1376 Charles' son Wenceslaus chosen emperor in his father's lifetime. Ulm, Constance, and other cities unite to defend their liberties and refuse to do homage to Wenceslaus.
- 1377 Battle of Reutlingen. The troops of the cities defeat those of Würtemberg. Charles confirms the liberties of the cities in return for their homage to Wenceslaus. The cities in the Swabian League increased to thirty-two. Charles divides his territories among his sons.
- 1378 Death of Charles IV. **Weneeslaus** succeeds.
- 1379 The dukes of Bavaria, the counts palatine, and the markgraf of Baden join the Swabian League. Leagues of the sword, crown, lion, etc., formed by the knights to counter-balance the Swabian League. Wars between the towns and knightly leagues.
- 1382 In the league of Ehingen, the Swabian League and the knightly leagues unite to preserve order. Death of Louis of Hungary. His daughter Mary, wife of Wenceslaus' brother Sigismund, succeeds him.
- 1384 Wenceslaus elected head of the leagues.
- 1385 Five Swiss towns join the league of cities.
- 1386 Duke Leopold of Austria defeated and slain by the Swiss at Sempach.
- 1387 War between the princes and the Swabian League. Sigismund, markgraf of Brandenburg, brother of Wenceslaus, crowned king of Hungary.
- 1388 Battle of Näfels. An Austrian army defeated by the Swiss Confederation. Battle of Döfingen. The princes defeat the Swabian League.
- 1389 Diet of Eger. Wenceslaus persuades the princes and many of the towns to agree to a *Landfriede* or "king's peace" for six years. Massacre of Jews in Prague.
- 1393 Conflict between Wenceslaus and the Bohemian clergy. The Bohemian nobles form a noble league (*Herrenbund*) against Wenceslaus. They are joined by Sigismund of Hungary, Jobst of Moravia, and other princes.
- 1394 Wenceslaus imprisoned by the Bohemian nobles. John, duke of Görlitz, brother of Weneeslaus, defeats the Bohemian rebels.
- 1395 Wenceslaus makes Galeazzo Visconti hereditary duke of Milan.
- 1396 Battle of Nikopoli; the Turks defeat Sigismund of Hungary.
- 1397 The diets of Temesvár (1397) and Buda (1405) organise the Hungarian chambers of peers and representatives.
- 1400 Weneeslaus deposed by the electors.

THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

- 1401 They choose **Rupert** Clem, the count palatine, Roman king. Rupert makes alliance with the *Herrenbund*. He leads an army into Italy, but returns to Germany unsuccessful.
- 1402 Sigismund of Hungary rules Bohemia for Wenceslaus. He imprisons Weneeslaus.
- 1403 Wenceslaus escapes. The Hungarians make Ladislaus of Naples king. Sigismund propitiates the Hungarians and Ladislaus withdraws.
- 1405 League of Marbach. The archbishop of Mainz, the markgraf of Baden, the count of Würtemberg, and seventeen Swabian cities unite against Rupert.
- 1409 The archbishop of Prague commands Wycliffe's writings to be publicly burned.
- 1410 John Huss laid under the ban of the church for heresy. Death of Rupert. **Sigismund** of Hungary chosen emperor. Another party elect Jobst of Moravia.
- 1411 Jobst dies. Agreement between Sigismund and Wenceslaus. Sigismund again elected. Frederick von Hohenzollern becomes administrator of Brandenburg.
- 1412 Hussite disturbances in Prague.
- 1414 Council of Constance meets to end the papal schism and deal with the Bohemian heresy and with church reform. Sigismund attends it.
- 1415 John Huss burned at the stake by order of the council. The majority of the Bohemian nobles form an alliance to support Hussite doctrines.
- 1416 Jerome of Prague burned.

- 1419 Revolt of the Taborites, a branch of the Hussites in Prague. Wenceslaus murdered. Churches and cloisters attacked by the Hussites. They take arms and led by Zizka capture the citadel of Prague.
- 1420 Crusade declared against the Hussites. The Hussites institute a regular government under Nicholas of Hus and Zizka and it is supported by the main portion of the Bohemian nation. Sigismund's troops defeated before Prague. The Calixtines, or Utraquists, the moderate Hussite party, embody their doctrines in the Four Articles.
- 1421 The Hussites take many cities and ravage the country.
- 1422 Battle of Deutsch-Brod. Sigismund defeated by Zizka. Dissensions among the Hussites.
- 1424 Zizka dies.
- 1426 The Hussites defeat the imperials at Aussig and make raids into the empire.
- 1428 The Hussites invade Silesia and Hungary.
- 1431 Hussite victory at Taus. Sigismund receives the Lombard crown at Milan. Council of Bâle meets and negotiates with the Hussites.
- 1433 Sigismund recognises Eugenius IV as pope and is crowned emperor at Rome. The council of Bâle offers the Hussites concessions known as the Compactata, granting the administration of the cup in both kinds and consecration of Utraquist priests. The Hussites refuse the terms offered.
- 1434 The nobles in Bohemia unite to restore order and defeat the Hussites at Lipan. Order restored in Bohemia.
- 1436 Sigismund concedes the Bohemians' demands in favour of the independence of the church in Bohemia. The Compactata are accepted and Sigismund is received in Prague as king of Bohemia.
- 1437 Sigismund dies and the house of Luxemburg becomes extinct.
- 1438 Duke Albert of Austria elected German king as **Albert II**.
- 1439 Albert dies in a war with the Turks.
- 1440 With the election of Frederick III (IV) the empire returns to the house of Habsburg. Wladislaw Jagello of Poland chosen king of Hungary.
- 1442 Hungarians under John Hunyady defeat the Turks at Szent-Imre and the Iron Gates.
- 1443 Hunyady beats the Turks at Nish and crosses the Balkans.
- 1444 At Frederick's suggestion a force of Armagnacs invades Switzerland. It is defeated at Sankt Jakob. Battle of Varna. The Turks defeat Hunyady and kill Wladislaw Jagello. Wladislaw the Posthumous, king of Bohemia, son of Albert II, chosen king of Hungary. John Hunyady appointed governor in his absence. George Podiebrad becomes leader of the Utraquist party of Hussites, now the dominant one in Bohemia.
- 1445 Hunyady besieges Vienna to compel Frederick to release Wladislaw the Posthumous.
- 1446 Treaty between Frederick and Pope Eugenius IV. Two electors deposed. The electors league against the pope. War between Elector Frederick of Saxony and Duke William of Thuringia.
- 1447 Through the efforts of Æneas Sylvius the obedience of the German princes is restored to the pope.
- 1448 Battle of Kosovo. Hunyady defeated by the Turks. George Podiebrad takes Prague. War between Hussites and Catholics in Bohemia.
- 1449 The Markgrafs War of Albert Achilles of Brandenburg and other princes against Nuremberg. Several German princes combine to replace Frederick by George Podiebrad, but fail of their object.
- 1451 Frederick III recognises the authority of George Podiebrad in Bohemia. Podiebrad finally suppresses the Taborite sect of Hussites.
- 1452 Frederick crowned emperor at Rome. (This was the last occasion on which a German emperor was crowned at Rome.)
- 1453 Frederick permits Wladislaw the Posthumous to assume government of Hungary. Hungary threatened by the Turks after the fall of Constantinople.
- 1456 Hunyady defeats the Turks in a great battle at Belgrade. He dies.
- 1457 Lower Austria falls to Frederick on the death of Wladislaw the Posthumous. The crown of Hungary falls to Matthias Corvinus, son of Hunyady; that of Bohemia to George Podiebrad.
- 1462 Battle of Säckingen; Frederick, count palatine, defeats Ulrich of Würtemberg and his allies. Rising in Vienna under Frederick III's brother Albert.
- 1463 The death of Albert puts Frederick in possession of Upper Austria.
- 1468 The pope refuses to confirm the Bohemian Compactata, excommunicates George Podiebrad, and incites Matthias Corvinus to war with him.
- 1469 Matthias is crowned king of Bohemia, but is soon after expelled thence.
- 1471 On the death of George Podiebrad, Wladislaw Jagello of Poland becomes king of Bohemia. Matthias continues the war with Bohemia.
- 1474 Charles the Bold of Burgundy besieges Neuss.
- 1475 Frederick relieves Neuss.
- 1477 Maximilian, son of Frederick III, marries Mary of Burgundy, heiress of Charles the Bold.

- 1479 By the Treaty of Olmütz, Wladislaw of Bohemia abandons Silesia, Moravia, and Lusatia to Matthias Corvinus. Battle of Guinegate. Maximilian defeats the French. The Hungarians defeat the Turks at Kenyer-mesö.
- 1482 Death of Mary of Burgundy; Maximilian rules the Netherlands for their son Philip. Revolts against him. Peace of Arras. Maximilian resigns Burgundy and Artois to France.
- 1485 Matthias Corvinus conquers Austria and forces Frederick to acknowledge his rights in Silesia. He makes Vienna his capital.
- 1486 Maximilian chosen king of the Romans.
- 1488 Great Swabian League of the archduke Sigismund of Austria, twenty-two Swabian cities, etc., to maintain order. Frederick III invades the Netherlands to release Maximilian, kept prisoner at Bruges.
- 1489 Frederick defeats the Flemings at Bertborg.
- 1490 Frederick abandons the government to Maximilian. Wladislaw, king of Bohemia, becomes king of Hungary on the death of Matthias Corvinus. Maximilian attacks Wladislaw and recovers Austria.
- 1491 By the Treaty of Pressburg Wladislaw promises Maximilian the succession to Hungary if he himself should die without heirs.
- 1492 Charles VIII of France marries Maximilian's betrothed, Anne of Brittany; England and Spain unite with Maximilian against France.
- 1493 Peace made with Charles VIII, who surrenders Franche-Comté and Artois to Maximilian. Death of Frederick III. **Maximilian** succeeds him. Maximilian repels an invasion of the Turks.
- 1494 Maximilian surrenders the government of the Netherlands to his son Philip.
- 1495 Maximilian joins the league of Venice for the expulsion of the French from Italy. Diet of Worms. Permanent peace within the empire agreed upon. Imperial chamber formed to settle quarrels between the princes. The tax called "common penny" imposed to support it.
- 1499 Failure of Maximilian's expedition into Italy. His son Philip marries Juana of Spain.
- 1499 War with the Swiss Confederation. Imperials are defeated at Dorneck. Maximilian makes alliance with Frederick of Naples against France. Diet of Augsburg. Imperial council of regency appointed for six years.

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

- 1501 Part of the imperial chamber's jurisdiction transferred to the Aulic council. Treaty with Louis XII of France, whom Maximilian promises to invest with the Milanese.
- 1502 Electoral union formed at Gelnhausen. The electors agree to act in imperial affairs only by mutual consent and to maintain their privileges against the emperor.
- 1504 Maximilian joins in the Bavaria-Landshut war of succession and wins the victory of Ratisbon. Treaty of Blois. Maximilian promises Louis XII the investiture of Milan.
- 1508 Unsuccessful invasion of Venetia by Maximilian. The Venetians conquer and retain Trieste and Fiume. Maximilian forms the league of Cambray with France, Spain, and the pope for the partition of Venice.
- 1509 Successful expedition of Louis XII into Italy. Maximilian's expedition unsuccessful.
- 1510 The pope abandons the league.
- 1512 French victory at Ravenna. Maximilian abandons the cause of the French, and they are expelled from Italy. The empire divided into administrative circles.
- 1513 Battle of Guinegate, or the Spurs; Maximilian with English troops defeats the French.
- 1514 Peasant insurrection in Hungary known as that of the *Kurucs* or Crusaders. The peasants under Dosza defeated at Temcsvár and punished with great cruelty. Verböczy's codification of the laws called *Tripartitum Opus Juris Regni Hungaræ* adopted by the Hungarian diet.
- 1515 On the death of Wladislaw of Hungary his son, Louis II, succeeds him.
- 1516 Expedition of Maximilian to Italy. He makes peace with France.
- 1517 Luther begins his attack on the sale of indulgences.
- 1518 Luther summoned to Rome to answer the charge of heresy. Luther appeals to a general council.
- 1519 Death of Maximilian. **Charles V**, grandson of Maximilian, elected emperor.
- 1520 A papal bull declares Luther a heretic and excommunicates him. Charles crowned at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle). Luther burns the bull of excommunication.
- 1521 Diet of Worms. By the Edict of Worms Luther is laid under the ban of the empire. He is concealed in the castle of Wartburg. His doctrines spread. The prince of Anhalt adopts them. The imperial chamber re-established. Belgrade captured by the Turks. Charles cedes Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola to his brother Ferdinand. The emperor's troops drive the French from the Milanese.
- 1522 Charles cedes the Tyrol to Ferdinand. The French fail in an attempt to recover the Milanese. League between Charles, the pope, Venice, and other Italian cities against France. Bremen accepts the Reformation. It is preached in Silesia. Franz von

Siekingen, at the head of troops of the Swabian League and the Rhenish League of Knights, attempts to introduce a reformation of the church by force. He besieges Treves unsuccessfully.

- 1523 Siekingen's castle of Landstuhl taken and himself slain.
- 1524 The diet of Nuremberg recommends the summoning of a council to settle the religious disputes. The Catholic princes of Germany unite in the league of Ratisbon to enforce the Edict of Worms. Magdeburg accepts the Reformation. Appearance of the fanatical sect of anabaptists. They rouse the peasants to rebel against their lords.
- 1525 A savage peasant war is repressed with equal barbarism. Charles V defeats Francis I at Pavia. John the Constant, elector of Saxony, espouses Luther's cause. Albert of Brandenburg, grandmaster of the Teutonic order of knighthood, adopts Lutheranism, converts East Prussia into an hereditary dukedom, and makes alliance with John the Constant. Luther, having abjured his monastic vows, marries a nun. The reformed doctrines are adopted by Philip, landgraf of Hesse Cassel, and by the city of Nuremberg.
- 1526 Treaty of Madrid. Francis renounces his claims on Milan and Naples and promises to restore Burgundy to Charles. Alliance of Torgau between the Protestant princes. The pope forms the Holy League of Cognac with Francis I against Charles. The diet of Speier effects a compromise with Luther's followers. Great Turkish victory over the Hungarians at Mohács. Death of Louis II of Hungary. Buda and Pest surrender to the Turks. Ferdinand, brother of Charles V, becomes king of Bohemia. John Zápolya, voivode of Transylvania, crowned king of Hungary. Ferdinand becomes king and expels John Zápolya.
- 1527 Charles' troops ravage the papal territories and take Rome. Sack of Rome. The pope a prisoner.
- 1528 The reformed doctrines accepted by the city of Brunswick and established in Brandenburg.
- 1529 The second diet of Speier issues a decree unfavourable to the reformers. The Lutherans protest and hence acquire the name of Protestants. Hamburg and Strasburg accept the Reformation. Charles signs the Treaty of Cambray with Francis I. The Turks, having overrun Hungary in support of John Zápolya, lay siege to Vienna.
- 1530 Charles receives the iron crown of Lombardy and is crowned emperor by the pope. He summons a diet at Augsburg. The Protestants draw up the Confession of Augsburg (it was subscribed to by the elector of Saxony, the markgraf of Brandenburg, Ernest, duke of Lüneburg, the landgraf of Hesse, the prince of Anhalt, the cities of Nuremberg, Reutlingen, Kempten, Windsheim, Heilbronn, and Weissenburg). Charles publishes a decree condemning Protestant doctrines and laying the Protestants under the ban of the empire. The Protestant princes unite in the Schmalkaldic League (it included the elector of Saxony, the landgraf of Hesse, the prince of Anhalt, the dukes of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the counts of Mansfeld, the cities of Magdeburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Strasburg, Lindau, Constance, Memmingen, Biberach, Isny, Reutlingen, and Ulm).
- 1531 Ferdinand chosen Roman king. Göttingen adopts the Reformation.
- 1532 The "Carolina" ordinance regulating the punishment of crime in Germany promulgated. By the religious peace of Nuremberg, Charles agrees to leave the Protestants unmolested till the summons of a general council. Charles leads a great army to the relief of the little Hungarian city of Gunz besieged by a formidable Turkish force. The Turks retire.
- 1534 Peace of Nuremberg renewed. The Anabaptist commonwealth in Münster commits terrible excesses. Bugenhagen introduces the Reformation into Pomerania.
- 1535 The anabaptists in Münster put down. Charles V makes an expedition to Tunis, expels the usurper Barbarossa, and restores the king Mulei Hassan. Francis I seizes the occasion to renew the war.
- 1536 Francis I occupies Piedmont. Charles invades Provence, but finds it already desolated by the French and retreats in disorder.
- 1538 Treaty of Grosswardein between Ferdinand and John Zápolya; John to retain for life the part of Hungary actually in his possession. Ten years' truce with France (Truce of Nice). Mutiny amongst Charles' troops in Milan, Sicily, and Africa; their generals borrow money to pacify them.
- 1539 The Reformation established in Frankfort-on-the-Oder.
- 1540 Death of John Zápolya. His widow, aided by Martinuzzi, bishop of Grosswardein, asserts the claims of her son John Sigismund to Hungary.
- 1541 Expedition led by Charles against the pirates of Algiers. Great part of the fleet destroyed in a storm. The army returns, having accomplished nothing. Ferdinand's troops besiege John Sigismund in Buda. Buda is relieved by the Turks under Suleiman the Magnificent, who then takes possession of John Sigismund's Hungarian domains for himself.
- 1542 Hermann, archbishop of Cologne, adopts Protestantism.
- 1544 Battle of Cerisole in Piedmont. Imperial troops defeated by the French. Charles in-

- vades France in conjunction with Henry VIII. Peace of Crespy. Charles renounces his claims to Burgundy and Francis I his to Naples, Flanders, and Artois.
- 1545 The Smalkaldic League captures the Catholic duke, Henry of Brunswick, after having driven him from his dominions. The council of Trent assembles to consider the question of reform.
- 1546 Charles makes a secret treaty with the Protestant duke, Maurice of Saxony, and concludes a league with the pope. The princes of the Smalkaldic League renounce their allegiance to Charles. Maurice occupies the electorate of Saxony. Charles subdues all the members of the league except John Frederick, elector of Saxony, and the landgraf of Hesse. The elector of Saxony recovers his dominions.
- 1547 The pope transfers the seat of the general council from Trent to Bologna. The German members continue to sit at Trent. The Bohemians demand the restoration of their liberties and make alliance with the elector of Saxony. At the battle of Mühlberg Charles crushes the forces of the elector of Saxony. The landgraf of Hesse submits and is imprisoned by Charles. The Saxon electoral dignity transferred to Maurice. Ferdinand suppresses the Bohemian revolution and restricts the liberties of the towns. He holds the "Bloody Diet" and executes the ringleaders of the revolution.
- 1548 Charles promulgates the Augsburg Interim, which concedes the communion in both kinds, but upholds the Roman Catholic doctrine in general and fails to satisfy the Protestants. The imperial cities refuse to recognise the Interim. Charles compels most of them to submit.
- 1549 The Jesuits settle in Bavaria.
- 1550 Transylvania and the Hungarian possessions of John Sigismund surrendered to Ferdinand in exchange for territories in Silesia.
- 1551 Magdeburg taken by Maurice of Saxony after ten months' siege and compelled to accept the Interim. Maurice makes a secret alliance with Henry II of France.
- 1552 Maurice declares for the Protestants. The French capture Metz, Verdun, and Toul. The Swabian cities join Maurice. He defeats the imperial troops at Reuti and captures Ehrenberg. Flight of Charles V from Innsbruck. By the Peace of Passau, Charles concedes religious liberty to the Protestants. Maurice leads his army against the Turks. Charles besieges Metz. Canisius founds a Jesuit college at Vienna.
- 1553 Charles retires from Metz. Albert of Brandenburg carries on a predatory war against the Catholic princes till he is defeated at Sieveshausen by Maurice of Saxony, who is there mortally wounded.
- 1555 Religious peace of Augsburg agreed to by the diet presided over by Ferdinand; religious liberty granted to the Protestants of the Augsburg Confession; toleration in individual states dependent on the rulers; in a clause known as the Ecclesiastical Reservation, ecclesiastics converted to Protestantism are required to vacate their benefices; the Protestants reject this clause. Ferdinand's declaration granting liberty of conscience to Protestants of the Augsburg Confession being subject to ecclesiastical princes, is rejected by the Catholics.
- 1556 Charles resigns the empire to his brother **Ferdinand I**. The family of Zápolya re-established in Transylvania. Pope Paul IV refuses to recognise Ferdinand as emperor. The papal coronation of the emperor is declared unnecessary. A Jesuit college founded at Prague. The University of Ingolstadt handed over to the Jesuits by the duke of Bavaria.
- 1558 Ferdinand crowned at Frankfurt.
- 1559 The Aulic council reorganised by Ferdinand.
- 1560 Pope Pius IV reconvenes the council of Trent. The diet of princes at Naumburg declares the emperor to be alone capable of summoning a general council.
- 1561 The elector palatine, Frederick III, becomes a convert to Calvinism and attempts to establish it in the Palatinate.
- 1563 The council of Trent confirms the existing dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church.
- 1564 Ferdinand dies and is succeeded in the empire by his son **Maximilian II**. Maximilian's troops invade the territories of John Sigismund Zápolya.
- 1566 Suleiman the Magnificent invades Hungary and dies at the siege of Sziget.
- 1567 Maximilian makes concessions to the Protestants of Bohemia. The Elector Augustus of Saxony takes Gotha, where the freebooter, William von Grumbach, is sheltered by the duke. The duke of Gotha imprisoned for life.
- 1568 German troops sent to aid the prince of Orange are defeated by the duke of Alva at Jemgum. Maximilian commissions David Chyträus to organise the Protestant church in Austria and Styria.
- 1571 Death of John Sigismund Zápolya. Maximilian succeeds to his Hungarian dominions. Stephen Báthori becomes voivode of Transylvania.
- 1575 The diet of Ratisbon elects Maximilian's son Rudolf king of the Romans.
- 1576 Death of Maximilian. His son succeeds as **Rudolf II** and begins to put restrictions on the Protestants in his Austrian dominions. The elector palatine, Ludwig VI, expels the Calvinist preachers from the Palatinate.
- 1580 The Lutheran princes and cities issue the *Book of Concord*, embodying the Lutheran as

- opposed to the Calvinistic doctrines, and require its acceptance by priests and teachers. Schism between the Lutherans and Calvinists finally effected.
- 1582 Gebhard, archbishop and elector of Cologne, embraces Calvinism. The emperor and pope depose Gebhard, who resists the sentence. Civil war in Cologne. The Lutheran princes decline to support Gebhard.
- 1583 On the succession of Frederick IV to the Palatinat the Lutherans are expelled.
- 1584 Ernest of Bavaria establishes himself as elector of Cologne by expelling Gebhard and prohibits Protestant worship.
- 1591 Turks invade Hungary.
- 1592 The Strasburg Protestant canons choose John George, markgraf of Brandenburg, as their bishop. The Catholic minority elect Charles, cardinal archbishop of Mainz. War between the rival bishops.
- 1594 League between the elector palatine, the duke of Würtemberg, and other Protestant princes to withhold aid for the Turkish war until their grievances are settled; they complain of imperial and papal encroachment on their religious and civil jurisdiction and of the attempted introduction of the Gregorian calendar.
- 1595 Peasant disturbances in Austria. Rudolf makes alliance with Sigismund Báthori, voivode of Transylvania, against the Turks.
- 1596 The Turks capture Erlau and defeat an Austrian army at Keresztes.

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

- 1604 John George, markgraf of Brandenburg, resigns the Strasburg bishopric to the archbishop of Mainz for a money payment. Revolt of Stephen Bocskay and the Protestants of upper Hungary against government persecution. They are joined by the Transylvanian exiles under Bethlen Gábor. Bocskay with the aid of the Turks makes himself prince of Transylvania and master of upper Hungary.
- 1605 Rudolf II orders the decrees of the council of Trent to be accepted in Bohemia.
- 1606 Rudolf's brother Matthias concludes the Peace of Vienna with Stephen Bocskay; the laws of Hungary are confirmed, freedom of religious worship is granted her, and the appointment of only native officials promised; Bocskay is recognised as prince of Transylvania and East Hungary. Matthias concludes a truce with the Turks at Zsitvatorok. Bocskay dies.
- 1607 Sigismund Rákóczy succeeds Bocskay.
- 1608 Diet of Ratisbon. The Protestants demand the abolition of the illegal jurisdiction of the Aulic council and the retention by their party of the ecclesiastical property belonging to it in accordance with the Peace of Passau. A Protestant union formed at Ahausen by the elector palatine, Christian of Anhalt, the duke of Würtemberg, markgrafs of Ansbach, Kulmbach, and Baden, and the count palatine of Neuburg. Matthias wins over the Hungarians by confirming their privileges. He invades Bohemia with Austrian and Hungarian troops and forces Rudolf to cede to him Hungary, Austria, and Moravia.
- 1609 The elector of Brandenburg, the landgraf of Hesse, with Strasburg, Ulm, Nuremberg, and other imperial cities join the Protestant Union. The estates of Hungary, Austria, and Moravia compel Matthias to restore their religious privileges. The Protestant Union demands religious and administrative reforms. Various princes lay claim to the vacant duchy of Jülich and Cleves. John Sigismund, elector of Brandenburg, and the count palatine of Neuburg by the Treaty of Dortmund agree to take joint possession. Rudolf refuses to recognise them and appoints the archduke Leopold administrator. Civil war in Jülich. The Bohemian Protestants extort from Rudolf full toleration of religious worship and independent church and school government. Maximilian, duke of Bavaria, unites the Catholic princes in a Catholic league.
- 1610 The Protestant Union renewed, the members agreeing to support the Treaty of Dortmund. Rudolf confers Jülich on the elector of Saxony. Henry IV of France prepares to come to the aid of the union, which negotiates with the United Provinces and other Protestant powers. Death of Henry IV. The Protestants invade Alsace. Maximilian of Bavaria makes peace with the union.
- 1611 The Bohemians transfer their crown to Matthias.
- 1612 Death of Rudolf II. Interregnum. Matthias elected emperor.
- 1613 Bethlen Gábor, assisted by the Turks, makes himself prince of Transylvania.
- 1614 The count palatine of Neuburg goes over to Catholicism and quarrels with John Sigismund of Brandenburg. The prince of Orange comes to the aid of John Sigismund, and Spanish troops under Spinola support Neuburg. The peace of Xanten arranges a division of the Jülich territories between Brandenburg and Neuburg. The Dutch and Spanish refuse to leave the country.
- 1616 Ferdinand of Styria, cousin of Matthias, crowned king of Bohemia.
- 1618 Ferdinand orders the Protestant churches in Bohemia to be destroyed. The people petition Matthias, who supports Ferdinand. The delegates of the Bohemian estates invade a meeting of the council of regency in Prague and fling two of the members

- from the window. This act gives the signal for the Thirty Years' War. The Bohemian estates organise a government under thirty directors. Matthias endeavours to make peace. The Bohemian insurrection spreads. Matthias persuades the Catholics to dissolve their league. The Protestants renew the union and send an army under Mansfeld to assist the Bohemians. The Austrians and the Catholics of the empire refuse to assist Matthias.
- 1619 Matthias dies. Protestants in Austria withhold their allegiance from Ferdinand. The Bohemian insurgents refuse his terms, the Moravians join them, and the allied armies under Thurn march on Vienna. Spanish troops under Boucquoi defeat Mansfeld. The Bohemians withdraw from Vienna. Ferdinand elected emperor as **Ferdinand II**. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia form a confederacy with Austrian Protestants and Hungarian malcontents against Ferdinand, depose him, and bestow the Bohemian crown on Frederick V of the Palatinate. Bethlen Gábor of Transylvania invades Hungary, taking many fortresses, including Pressburg. He summons the Hungarian estates which join the confederacy against Ferdinand. Bethlen and Thurn defeat Boucquoi and threaten Vienna. Boucquoi defeats the Hungarians at Hainburg. The Catholic League arms for Ferdinand.
- 1620 The elector of Saxony and other Lutheran princes side with Ferdinand. A Spanish force under Spinola sent against the Palatinate. The Protestant Union agrees not to support Frederick's claims to Bohemia, and the league not to attack the Palatinate. The Austrian Protestants submit to Ferdinand. Bethlen Gábor elected king of Hungary. The forces of the league capture Pisek. Other towns in Bohemia submit. Battle of the White Mountain. Frederick is defeated and flees to Berlin. The Bohemians submit to Ferdinand.
- 1621 Pressburg and other Hungarian cities recovered by the imperials. Boucquoi killed at the siege of Neuhäusel. His troops retire. Bethlen Gábor wins successes. Ferdinand punishes the Bohemian insurgents by executions and confiscations and lays Frederick under the ban of the empire. The Protestant Union promises neutrality. The duke of Bavaria reduces the upper Palatinate. Mansfeld relieves Frankenthal and devastates the bishoprics of Speier and Strasburg. Christian of Brunswick raises an army for Frederick V and plunders the districts on the Main.
- 1622 By the Treaty of Nikolsburg Ferdinand II surrenders Bethlen Gábor seven Hungarian provinces with the principalities of Ratibor and Oppeln, and Bethlen resigns the crown of Hungary. The forces of the league under Tilly defeated by Mansfeld at Wiesloch. Tilly defeats the markgraf of Baden-Durlach at Wimpfen and Christian of Brunswick at Höchst and drives Christian and Mansfeld into Alsace. Frederick disavows Mansfeld and Christian, who pass into Holland. The conquest of the Palatinate completed by Tilly. Mansfeld invades East Friesland. Christian raises an army in lower Saxony.
- 1623 Ferdinand transfers the electorship of the Palatinate from Frederick V to Maximilian of Bavaria. Christian of Brunswick invades Westphalia and is defeated by Tilly at Stadtlohn.
- 1624 Mansfeld retires to Holland. Catholicism restored in Bohemia. The peasant resistance repressed with great cruelty. Wholesale emigrations from Bohemia.
- 1625 Protestant League formed under Christian IV of Denmark. Tilly invades Calenberg and Brunswick. The emperor accepts Wallenstein's offer to raise an army at his own expense.
- 1626 Bethlen Gábor allied with Christian of Denmark. Tilly defeats Christian IV at Lutter am Barenberge. Wallenstein repulses Mansfeld at the bridge of Dessau. Mansfeld invades Silesia, wins the battle of Oppeln, and invades Moravia. He joins Bethlen Gábor in Hungary. Bethlen Gábor makes peace with Wallenstein. Pappenheim crushes a peasant rising in Upper Austria. Death of Mansfeld.
- 1627 Wallenstein and Tilly invade Denmark. Ferdinand abolishes the Bohemian liberties and renders the Bohemian government purely monarchical, hereditary, and Catholic, and cruelly persecutes the Protestants, banishing large numbers.
- 1628 The dukes of Mecklenburg laid under the ban of the empire and their territories transferred to Wallenstein, who assembles a fleet, invades Pomerania, and unsuccessfully besieges Stralsund. Ferdinand suppresses Lutheranism in Austria. Christian IV destroys Wallenstein's fleet.
- 1629 Ferdinand publishes the Edict of Restitution, commanding the restoration of ecclesiastical property secularised since the Peace of Passau. Peace between the emperor and Christian IV. The latter's dominions are restored and he abandons his allies.
- 1630 Ferdinand sends an army which expels the duke of Mantua from his dominions. A diet at Ratisbon demands and obtains Wallenstein's dismissal. Gustavus Adolphus lands in Germany, occupies Stettin, and makes alliance with the duke of Pomerania. He expels the imperials from Pomerania and invades Brandenburg.
- 1631 Gustavus Adolphus concludes the Treaty of Bärwalde, which promises him a subsidy. Peace of Cherasco between Ferdinand and Richelieu. Ferdinand restores Mantua to its duke. Gustavus takes Frankfort and Landsberg. Tilly takes and sacks Magde-

- burg. The Swedes conquer Mecklenburg and reinstate its dukes. The landgraf of Hesse and the elector of Saxony join Gustavus. Gustavus defeats Tilly at Breitenfeld and captures the fortresses on the Main and Rhine.
- 1632 The Swedes universally successful. Prague taken by the Saxons and Lutheranism restored. Tilly defeated and slain at Rain. Wallenstein is restored to his command and raises a fresh army. He drives the Saxons from Bohemia and threatens Nuremberg. Gustavus fails to dislodge Wallenstein from his position. Battle of Lützen. The Swedes defeat Wallenstein. Gustavus slain.
- 1633 Oxenstierna, the Swedish chancellor, renews the alliances of Gustavus in the union of Heilbronn and is appointed director of the evangelical alliance. Charles Ludwig, the son of Frederick V, restored to the Palatinate. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar commands the Swedes and obtains many successes. Wallenstein makes conquests in Silesia and Brandenburg.
- 1634 Wallenstein disgraced and murdered. The emperor's son, Ferdinand, king of Hungary, succeeds Wallenstein. He captures Ratisbon and wins the battle of Nördlingen. The imperials invade the Palatinate and take Heilbronn.
- 1635 Peace of Prague between the emperor and the elector of Saxony settles the questions concerning ecclesiastical property and toleration, which is not to be exercised in Ferdinand's hereditary dominions. The union of Heilbronn dissolves; imperials under Piccolomini are sent to the Netherlands. They compel the French to raise the siege of Louvain and invade France.
- 1636 By the Treaty of Wismar France engages to carry on the war on her side of the Rhine and Sweden in Silesia and Bohemia. The Swedes victorious at Wittstock. Zabern in Alsace taken by Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar.
- 1637 Death of Ferdinand II. Ferdinand of Hungary succeeds as **Ferdinand III**. Death of Duke Bogislaw of Pomerania. The elector of Brandenburg claims his territories and joins the imperials in invading them. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar defeats the duke of Lorraine.
- 1638 Bernhard captures Säckingen, Laufenburg, and Waldshut, defeats Johann von Werth at Rheinfelden and Götz at Wittenweier. The sons of Frederick V attempt to recover the Palatinate and are defeated at Minden. Bernhard takes Breisach.
- 1639 The Swedes drive the imperials from Pomerania and invade Bohemia. Death of Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar.
- 1640 The Swedes expelled from Bohemia.
- 1641 The Swedes threaten Ratisbon where the diet is assembled.
- 1642 Imperials defeated at Kempen. Swedes under Torstenson invade Silesia and Moravia and rout the imperials at Breitenfeld.
- 1643 Negotiations for a general peace opened at Münster and Osnabrück. Torstenson overruns the Danish territories. The imperials and Bavarians defeat the French at Tuttlingen.
- 1644 George Rákóczy, prince of Transylvania, invades the Habsburg territory. Swedish victory at Jüterbog. Torstenson invades Bohemia.
- 1645 Torstenson defeats the imperials at Jankau and approaches Vienna. Rákóczy invades Hungary. French victory at Allerheim. Peace of Linz between Ferdinand and George Rákóczy.
- 1646 Swedes under Wrangel invade Bavaria, but are driven out by the archduke Leopold.
- 1647 The elector of Bavaria concludes a separate armistice with France and Sweden, but soon after breaks it. Ferdinand grants privileges to the Hungarian Protestants in order to secure the Hungarian crown for his son.
- 1648 Turenne and Wrangel defeat the imperials at Zusmarshausen and overrun Bavaria, but are checked by Piccolomini. The Swedes surprise the Kleinseite of Prague and besiege the old town. A general peace (the Peace of Westphalia) signed at Münster and Osnabrück; France retains Metz, Toul, and Verdun; Sweden, upper Pomerania, Rügen and Wollin, and Wismar; the lower Palatinate restored to Charles Ludwig, son of Frederick V; the Swiss confederacy's independence recognised; the religious differences adjusted and privileges extended to the Calvinists; the emperor's prerogatives greatly diminished; he surrenders Alsace to France.
- 1651 Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, invades Berg to assist the persecuted Protestants. He is compelled to make a peace with the duke of Neuburg by which liberty of conscience is secured to the Protestants.
- 1654 Dispute between Sweden and the empire for the sovereignty of Bremen temporarily adjusted through Dutch mediation.
- 1656 The Great Elector as a vassal of Poland for East Prussia, being involved in the war between Poland and Charles X of Sweden, is forced to transfer his allegiance from Poland to Sweden by the treaty of Königsberg. The troops of the elector and Charles X defeat the Poles at Warsaw. By the Treaty of Labiau, Charles X acknowledges the independent sovereignty of Brandenburg over East Prussia.
- 1657 Alliance between Poland and the emperor. Ferdinand III dies. The king of Denmark and the Great Elector join the Polish alliance. The imperials expel Sweden's ally,

- George (II) Rákóczy of Transylvania, from Poland. By the treaty of Wehlau Poland recognises the Great Elector's independent sovereignty in the dukedom of Prussia. The Great Elector makes alliance with Poland. The Turks depose Rákóczy.
- 1658 **Leopold I**, son of Ferdinand III, elected emperor. The Rhenish Alliance formed between Mainz, Cologne, Treves, Münster, Sweden, Neuburg, Hesse-Cassel, and Lüneburg to maintain their rights under the peace of Westphalia. Louis XIV of France joins the alliance. Charles X invades Denmark.
- 1659 The allies invade Pomerania. England and France send fleets to aid the Swedes. The allies defeat Charles X at Nyborg.
- 1660 Peace of Oliva ends the war between Sweden and Poland and confirms the independent sovereignty of East Prussia to the Great Elector. Battle of Klausenburg. Rákóczy defeated by the Turks. Leopold sends aid to the Transylvanians. The Turks take Grosswardein.
- 1662 The battle of Nagy-Szöllos establishes Michael Abafi as prince of Transylvania under Turkish protection.
- 1663 The Turks under Ahmed Köprili invade Austrian territory. Abafi attacks Croatia. Leopold summons a diet to Ratisbon. The diet becomes permanent.
- 1664 The German states, aided by foreign powers, collect forces against the Turks. Imperials under Montecuculi rout Turks at St. Gotthard on the Raab. Leopold concludes a twenty years' truce with the Turks; Abafi acknowledged as independent prince of Transylvania; the Turks retain Grosswardein.
- 1670 Thirteen Hungarian comitats join with Francis, son of George (II) Rákóczy, in an association against Leopold.
- 1671 Rákóczy defeated and the other leaders executed. Leopold quarters troops on the Hungarians.
- 1672 Leopold and the Great Elector conclude an alliance with the Dutch against France and send troops.
- 1673 Leopold establishes a new form of government in Hungary under a president and council and institutes a cruel persecution of the Protestants. The Great Elector concludes the truce of Vossem, by which he agrees not to fight against France. Leopold makes an alliance with Spain. Imperial troops under Montecuculi repel a French invasion of Franconia and the allied troops take Bonn.
- 1674 The diet of Ratisbon declares war on France. The Great Elector joins the imperials.
- 1675 The Great Elector defeats the Swedes at the battle of Fehrbellin, and takes Rügen, Usedom, and Wolgast.
- 1677 Stettin taken by the Great Elector.
- 1678 Stralsund and Greifswald taken by the Great Elector. He occupies all Pomerania. The Dutch conclude a separate peace with France at Nimeguen. Hungarian rebels under Tököly make irruptions into Hungary and Austria from Transylvania.
- 1679 Leopold makes peace with France and Sweden. The Great Elector obliged to abandon his conquests in the Treaty of St. Germain.
- 1680 Louis XIV establishes *chambres de réunion*, through which he uncashes the claims of France to imperial fiefs, which he proceeds to "reunite" to France.
- 1681 The Great Elector makes alliance with France. Louis XIV seizes Strasburg. Leopold makes alliances with Brunswick-Lüneburg, Bavaria, Sweden, Spain, and the United Provinces. The Hungarian constitution restored.
- 1682 Tököly is installed as prince of upper Hungary by the Turks, and captures several cities.
- 1683 Great Turkish invasion of Hungary. Leopold makes alliance with John Sobieski, king of Poland. The Turks drive back the imperial troops and besiege Vienna. Tököly defeated at Pressburg. John Sobieski relieves Vienna and defeats the Turks at Parkány.
- 1684 The emperor and Spain conclude the truce of Ratisbon with France; Louis is confirmed in possession of Strasburg, Kehl, and places reunited before August, 1683, and is conceded supreme right over Alsace.
- 1685 Death of Charles, elector palatine. Philip William of Neuburg succeeds. Louis XIV supports the claims of the duchess of Orleans.
- 1686 The Great Elector joins with the emperor and the United Provinces against France. In the league of Augsburg, the emperor, the United Provinces, Sweden, Spain, Bavaria, Saxony, and the Palatinate unite against France.
- 1687 Louis conquers the Palatinate. The imperials under Charles of Lorraine defeat the Turks at Mohács. The emperor's general, Caraffa, punishes an alleged conspiracy by tortures, proscriptions, and executions on a spot known as the Bloody Theatre of Eperies. Leopold abolishes the Hungarian rights to elect and resist the sovereign. The Hungarian diet consents to render the crown hereditary in the male Habsburg line. Erlau recovered from the Turks.
- 1688 The Great Elector dies. Belgrade and Munkács taken by the imperials.
- 1689 The French waste the Palatinate and withdraw. Mainz and Bonn taken by the imperials. Leopold, the United Provinces, England, Bavaria, and Savoy join in the Grand Alliance against France.

- 1690 The French defeat the allies at Fleurus. The Turks take Belgrade and win other successes. Tököly invades Transylvania and is made its prince by the Turks, but is expelled by the imperials.
- 1691 The Turks defeated at Slankamen.
- 1692 The allies defeated by the French at Steenkerke.
- 1693 Allies defeated at Neerwinden and Marsaglia.
- 1696 Turks defeat the imperials at Lugos. Indecisive battle of Olasch between the Turks and the imperials under Augustus of Saxony.
- 1697 Imperials under Prince Eugene of Savoy defeat the Turks at Zenta and invade Bosnia. Peace of Ryswick. Strasburg ceded to France. France resigns her claims on towns in the empire except in Alsace.
- 1699 Peace of Karlowitz. Austria, Russia, Venice, and Poland make peace with Turkey. Transylvania and Hungary between the Theiss and Danube secured to Austria.
- 1700 Death of Charles II of Spain. Philip, duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, succeeds as Philip V. Leopold prepares to assert the claims of his son, the archduke Charles, to the Spanish succession. The elector of Brandenburg promises his aid.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

- 1701 The elector of Brandenburg crowned king of Prussia as **Frederick I**. Imperials under Eugene invade Italy and defeat the French at Carpi and Chiari.
- 1702 Grand Alliance between the emperor, the United Provinces, and Great Britain. The circles of Franconia, Swabia, and Upper and Lower Rhine join the Grand Alliance, which declares war on France. The allies take Kaiserswerth and Landau. Drawn battle between Eugene and the French and Spaniards at Luzzara. The elector of Bavaria joins France.
- 1703 Portugal accedes to the Grand Alliance. The French invade Baden and join the elector of Bavaria, who invades the Tyrol but is expelled thence. The duke of Savoy joins the Grand Alliance. Rebellion in Hungary under Francis Rákóczy II.
- 1704 Allies under Marlborough and Eugene defeat the French at Blenheim, invade Alsace, and conquer Bavaria.
- 1705 Leopold dies and is succeeded by his son, **Joseph I**. Eugene defeated at Cassano. Peasant rebellion in Bavaria repressed with severity. Rákóczy institutes a Hungarian confederacy of which he is proclaimed *dux*. The confederates win successes and overrun Transylvania. Imperials recover Transylvania.
- 1706 Marlborough wins the battle of Ramillies, which gives the allies command over almost the whole Spanish Netherlands. French successes on the Rhine. Eugene wins the battle of Turin and is appointed governor of the Milanese. Charles XII of Sweden having invaded Saxony forces the elector (Augustus II of Poland) to sign the Peace of Altranstadt.
- 1707 The allies fail in an attempt to take Toulon.
- 1708 Allies are successful at Oudenarde and take Lille and Ghent. Joseph annexes Mantua. Rákóczy defeated at Trentschin. Minorca, Majorca, and Sardinia conquered by the allies.
- 1709 Fruitless peace negotiations with France. Battle of Malplaquet won by the allies.
- 1710 Hungarian insurgents defeated at Zadok. Imperials defeated at Villaviciosa.
- 1711 By the Treaty of Szatmár the emperor amnesties the Hungarian confederates and confirms Hungarian liberties and freedom of worship. Death of Joseph I. The archduke Charles elected emperor as **Charles VI**.
- 1712 French successes in the Netherlands.
- 1713 **Frederick William I** becomes king of Prussia. Treaty of Utrecht. The Grand Alliance, the emperor excepted, makes peace with France, recognising Philip V as king of Spain; the Spanish Netherlands, Sardinia, the Milanese, and Naples to belong to Austria.
- 1714 Treaties of Rastatt and Baden between the emperor and France; Naples, Milan, Mantua, Sardinia, and the Netherlands secured to Charles VI. He reinstates the elector of Bavaria. Prussia declares war on Sweden and occupies Rügen and Stralsund.
- 1715 Treaty of Westminster; the emperor makes alliance with England and recognises the claims of George I to Bremen, Lauchburg, and Verden. The Barrier Treaty arranges the surrender to Charles by the Dutch of the Netherlands provinces formerly belonging to Charles II of Spain.
- 1716 Eugene defeats the Turks at Peterwardein and takes Temesvár.
- 1717 Triple alliance between England, France, and Holland. Eugene defeats the Turks at Belgrade. The Spaniards conquer Sardinia and invade Sicily.
- 1718 Austria and Venice agree to the Peace of Passarowitz with Turkey; part of Bosnia, Wallachia, and Servia, and the Banat of Temesvár ceded to Austria. Quadruple alliance between Great Britain, France, and the emperor (afterwards joined by United Provinces); Sicily to be ceded to the emperor in exchange for Sardinia. By the Pragmatic Sanction Charles VI makes his daughter Maria Theresa his heiress.

- 1719 Peace of Stockholm. Sweden resigns Bremen and Verden to Hanover.
- 1720 Spain joins the Quadruple Alliance. Peace of Stockholm between Prussia and Sweden; Usedom and Wollin, and the country between the Oder and the Peene ceded to Prussia.
- 1725 Alliance between the emperor and Spain. Treaty of Hanover between Great Britain, France, and Prussia.
- 1726 Russia makes alliance with Charles VI and guarantees the Pragmatic Sanction. By the Treaty of Wusterhausen Prussia guarantees the Pragmatic Sanction.
- 1727 Charles VI concludes an armistice with England, France, and the United Provinces.
- 1729 By the Treaty of Seville, Spain breaks with the emperor and makes alliance with France and Great Britain.
- 1731 Alliance between Great Britain and the emperor in the Treaty of Vienna; the emperor promises to abolish the Ostend Company, Great Britain guarantees the Pragmatic Sanction. Spain and the United Provinces guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction.
- 1732 The German princes, except the Bavarian, Saxon, and palatine electors, guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction.
- 1733 Charles VI supports the elector of Saxony's candidature to the Polish throne and so involves him in war with France. The Milanese overrun by the troops of France, Spain, and Sardinia. Kehl taken by the French.
- 1734 The Spaniards conquer Naples, defeating the imperials at Bitonto. The Spaniards subdue Sicily. Indecisive battle of Parma between the French and imperials. French successes on the Rhine.
- 1735 The imperials relieve Mantua. Preliminaries of Vienna. France and Sardinia make peace with the emperor.
- 1737 Unsuccessful campaign against the Turks.
- 1738 Fresh Turkish successes. Definitive Treaty of Vienna between France and the emperor.
- 1739 Philip of Spain and his son Charles accede to the Treaty of Vienna, Charles retaining the Two Sicilies. The Turks defeat the imperials at Kozka. Peace of Belgrade; the emperor surrenders Servia with Belgrade and Austrian Wallachia to the Turks.
- 1740 **Frederick (II) the Great** becomes king of Prussia. Charles VI dies. **Maria Theresa** succeeds to his Austrian dominions. Charles Albert, elector of Bavaria, disputes her claims. Frederick II occupies Silesia and begins the First Silesian War.
- 1741 The Prussians defeat the Austrians at Mollwitz. France, Prussia, Spain, and Saxony unite against Maria Theresa for the War of the Austrian Succession. England, Holland, and Russia declare for Maria Theresa. The elector of Bavaria, aided by French troops, takes Linz and invades Bohemia. Maria Theresa appeals to the Hungarians. The tribes rally to her standard. Charles Albert takes Prague and is crowned king of Bohemia.
- 1742 Charles Albert elected emperor as **Charles VII**. The Austrians recover Linz and invade Bavaria. Frederick invades Moravia and Bohemia and defeats the Austrians at Chotusitz. Peace of Breslau; Austria cedes Silesia to Prussia. The Austrians besiege the French and Bavarians in Prague. Great Britain sends succour to Maria Theresa. The king of Sardinia espouses her cause. French attempt to relieve Prague frustrated. French retreat from Prague. The elector of Saxony (Augustus III, king of Poland) goes over to Maria Theresa.
- 1743 Austrian victory over the Spaniards at Campo Santo. Maria Theresa crowned at Prague. Austrians conquer Bavaria. "Pragmatic army," Austria's British, Dutch, Hessian, and Hanoverian allies, under George II of England, defeats the French at Dettingen. Maria Theresa makes alliance with Great Britain and the king of Sardinia at Worms, ceding Sardinia various Italian possessions.
- 1744 The French invade the Austrian Netherlands. Austrians occupy Alsace. Frankfort Union between Prussia, the emperor, France, Sweden, Hesse-Cassel, and the elector palatine formed against England and Maria Theresa for the Second Silesian War. East Friesland lapses to Prussia. Frederick occupies Bohemia. His allies reinstate Charles VII in Bavaria. Successful Austrian expedition against Naples. King of Sardinia defeated at Cuneo. Hungarians rise to defend Maria Theresa. Frederick expelled from Bohemia.
- 1745 Charles VII dies. Treaty of Füssen; the new elector of Bavaria renounces his Austrian claims. French victory at Fontenoy. The Spaniards overrun the Milanese. Alliance between Austria, Augustus of Poland and Saxony, and the maritime powers concluded at Leipsic. The Prussians defeat the Austrians and Saxons at Hohenfriedberg. Great Britain makes peace with Prussia. Austrians severely defeated by Frederick at Soor. The duke of Lorraine, husband of Maria Theresa, elected emperor as **Francis I**. Prussians defeat the Austrians at Hennersdorf and the Saxons at Kesseldorf. Peace of Dresden; Maria Theresa confirms Frederick's possession of Silesia.
- 1746 Austrian Netherlands occupied by the French. They defeat the Austrians at Rocoux. Austrian successes in Italy. The imperials defeat the French and Spaniards at Piacenza.
- 1747 French defeat the allies at Lawfeld and storm Bergen-op-Zoom. The increase of ecclesiastical property forbidden in the Austrian dominions and many festivals abolished.

- 1748 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, agreed to by France, England, Holland, Spain, Maria Theresa, and Sardinia, closes the War of the Austrian Succession. Austrian Netherlands restored to Maria Theresa; Silesia secured to Frederick; Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla ceded to Don Philip of Spain.
- 1749 The Codex Fridericianus drawn up by the Prussian grand chancellor, von Cocceji. The administration of justice separated from the legislative and executive in Austrian dominions.
- 1753 Count Kaunitz becomes chief administrator of Austrian affairs.
- 1756 Prussia concludes a convention of neutrality with England (Treaty of Westminster). Maria Theresa makes alliance with France by the Treaty of Versailles. Frederick the Great opens the Seven Years' War by invading Saxony. Austrians come to the aid of the Saxons, but are defeated at Lobositz and the Saxon army capitulates at Pirna.
- 1757 The empire, Sweden, and Russia declare against Prussia. Prussian invasion of Bohemia and victory at Prague. Prague besieged. At Kolin Austrians under Daun defeat Frederick, who evacuates Bohemia. The French defeat the duke of Cumberland at Hastenbeck and force him to sign the convention of Closter-Seven engaging to break up his army. The Swedes invade Prussian Pomerania. The Russians take Memel, invade Prussia, and win the battle of Grossjägerndorf. Austrians invade Brandenburg. Frederick defeats French and Austrians at Rossbach and Leuthen.
- 1758 Frederick takes Schweidnitz. He concludes a subsidy treaty with England. French defeated at Crefeld. Frederick besieges Olmütz. Daun raises the siege. Frederick defeats the Russians at Zorndorf and is defeated by Daun at Hochkirch. Second treaty of Versailles confirms the Franco-Austrian alliance.
- 1759 Battle of Züllichau; the Russians defeat the Prussians. The French defeated at Minden. Frederick defeats the Austrians at Gubern and is totally defeated by an Austro-Russian army at Kunersdorf. The imperials overrun Saxony and take Dresden. A Prussian force surrenders to Daun at Maxen.
- 1760 Landeshut captured by the Austrians. Frederick defeats the Austrians at Liegnitz. The Austrians and Russians enter Berlin. French victory at Kloster Camp. Frederick victorious at Torgau.
- 1761 Austrians invade Silesia and capture Schweidnitz. Russians take Kolberg.
- 1762 Peter III succeeds to the Russian throne and concludes an alliance with Frederick. Armistice between Prussia and Sweden. The French defeated at Wilhelmsthal. Catherine II makes herself empress of Russia and declares against Frederick. Frederick drives Daun from Burkersdorf. French defeated at Lutterberg. Frederick captures Schweidnitz. The Prussians defeat the imperials at Freiberg and overrun Bohemia and Saxony.
- 1763 France makes a separate peace with England. The Peace of Hubertusburg between Austria, Prussia, and Saxony closes the Seven Years' War.
- 1764 Maria Theresa's son, the archduke Joseph, chosen king of the Romans.
- 1765 Death of Francis I. Joseph succeeds as **Joseph II** and becomes co-regent with Maria Theresa in the Austrian monarchy. Maria Theresa introduces into Hungary the reforms called *Urbarium*, regulating the relations of serfs and landowners.
- 1766 Commission of instruction and press-censorship founded for Austrian dominions. *Hof-commerzialrath*, or Board of Trade, established in Austria.
- 1768 *Constitutio criminalis Theresiana*, a uniform code of criminal law for the Austrian dominions, published.
- 1770 Elementary state schools founded by Maria Theresa.
- 1772 Russia and Prussia agree to the First Partition of Poland. Maria Theresa accedes to the scheme. The three powers extort the consent of the Polish king and nobles and impose a constitution on the relics of Poland. The county of Zips, part of the governments of Cracow and Sandomir, Lemberg, Halicz, Belz, and part of Podolia assigned to Austria; the greater part of the modern Polish Prussia to Prussia. Conscription ordered for Bohemia, Austria, Moravia, Carniola, Carinthia, Galicia.
- 1773 Jesuit order suppressed.
- 1775 Bukowina surrendered to Austria by Turkey.
- 1777 Death of the elector of Bavaria without direct heirs. Maria Theresa and Joseph claim his dominions.
- 1778 The elector palatine protests and is bought off. Frederick the Great defends the rights of the presumptive heir, the duke of Zweibrücken. War between Austria and Prussia (War of the Bavarian succession). The Prussians invade Bohemia. Catherine of Russia declares for Frederick.
- 1779 War of the Bavarian Succession terminated by the Peace of Teschen. The elector palatine receives Bavaria, minus the Innviertel, assigned to Austria. Duke Charles of Zweibrücken acknowledged as heir to the elector palatine.
- 1780 Meeting of Joseph and the empress Catherine at Mohileff. Death of Maria Theresa. Joseph introduces extensive and premature administrative reforms. His edict regulating the taxes abolishes serfdom.
- 1781 The Tolerance Edict grants liberty of worship to Protestants and Greek Christians, de-

- clares all Christians capable of holding office, and confers privileges on the Jews. Joseph orders the demolition of almost all the fortresses of the Austrian Netherlands, insists on the withdrawal of the Dutch garrisons.
- 1782 Pius VI visits Joseph and protests in vain against the religious innovations.
- 1784 The Porte grants Joseph the free navigation of the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Dardanelles. Joseph demands the opening of the navigation of the Schelde; the Dutch resist. Joseph's customs duties introduce a protective system. Foreign imports prohibited.
- 1785 Russia proposes to the duke of Zweibrücken, heir to Bavaria, an exchange of Bavarian dominions for the Austrian Netherlands. Europe is alarmed at the proposed increase of Austrian power and the project is abandoned. Frederick the Great forms a "league of princes" (the *Fürstenbund*) with the electors of Hanover and Saxony, ostensibly to preserve the constitution of the empire and really to resist Austrian aggression. Many princes join it. Freemasonry recognised in Austria. By the treaty of Fontainebleau Joseph renounces his claims respecting the Schelde.
- 1786 Frederick the Great dies and is succeeded by his nephew, **Frederick William II**. Joseph II's innovations in the Austrian Netherlands excite tumults.
- 1787 The troops of Frederick William II restore the prince of Orange to the Stadholdership in Holland. The Austrians make an unsuccessful attack on Belgrade.
- 1788 Defensive alliance between Prussia, England, and Holland. Joseph II declares war on Turkey. Religious edict in Prussia, restricting the liberty of preachers. Turkish successes. Austrians defeat the Turks at Dubica and take Dubica, Novi, and Chotin. Troops under Joseph forced to retreat. An edict of censorship curtails the liberty of the press in Prussia.
- 1789 The estates of Brabant protest against the withdrawal of their constitution. Joseph abolishes the constitutions of Hainault and Brabant (Statute of Joyous Entry). Austrians defeat the Turks at Fokshani and Rimnik and take Belgrade and the Turkish border fortresses. Revolt of the Austrian Netherlands. The Hungarians protest against Joseph's innovations. The French national assembly, by abolishing ecclesiastical and territorial rights in France, encroaches on German rights in Alsace, Franche-Comté, and Lorraine guaranteed by the Peace of Westphalia.
- 1790 Prussia makes alliance with the Turks. Joseph restores the Hungarian constitution. Death of Joseph. His brother Leopold succeeds. He restores the old system of taxation and abolishes Joseph's extreme reforms. He permits the Illyrians to form a national diet at Temesvár. Austrians repulsed by the Turks at Giurgevo. Leopold conciliates the maritime powers. By the Convention of Reichenbach Leopold promises Prussia to conclude an armistice with the Turks. Armistice concluded. Leopold chosen king of the Romans and crowned emperor as **Leopold II**. The Hungarians exhibit a rebellious spirit, but are conciliated by Leopold at his coronation. Leopold demands from France the restoration of the rights of German princes in Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche-Comté, and is refused.
- 1791 The diet of Ratisbon determines to enforce the demands of the princes on France. The Prussians invade Poland and take Dantzic and Thorn. Peace of Sistova between Austria and Turkey. By the Convention of Pillnitz Leopold II, Frederick William II of Prussia, and the count d'Artois agree to a declaration, which they issue, announcing their intention to rescue the king of France. Leopold subdues the rebels in the Low Countries. By a convention concluded at the Hague, England, Holland, and Prussia guarantee Leopold in possession of the Austrian Netherlands. Ansbach and Bayreuth incorporated with Prussia.
- 1792 Alliance between the emperor and Prussia against France. Leopold dies. France declares war against Leopold's successor, **Francis II**. French invasion of Flanders repulsed. The duke of Brunswick, commander of the allied armies, issues a manifesto summoning the French to submit to their king. The French depose Louis XVI. The allies invade France. Drawn battle at Valmy. The French take Mainz and defeat the Austrians at Jemmapes.
- 1793 Russia and Prussia agree to the second partition of Poland. Louis XVI executed. England, Holland, and Sardinia join Austria and Prussia in the First Coalition. The French besiege Maestricht and are defeated at Neerwinden and Louvain. Prussians recover Mainz. Austrians take Condé and Valenciennes. Russia and Prussia occupy Poland; the governments of Posen, Kalisz, Sieradz and Plock, Dantzic and Thorn, and half the government of Brzesc fall to Prussia. The English defeated at Hondschoote. Indecisive battle of Wattignies between the French and Austrians. French defeated by Brunswick at Kaiserslautern and by Wurmser at Weissenburg. Allies defeated at Wörth and Fröschweiler.
- 1794 Kosciuszko begins a fight for liberty in Poland. Austrians defeated at Fleurus, English at Breda. Holland conquered by the French. Allies successful at Kaiserslautern and in Belgium. Kosciuszko defeated at Maciejowice. Austria annexes the palatinates of Lublin and Sandomir in Galicia.
- 1795 The king of Prussia concludes at Bâle a separate peace with the French, by which the

latter are confirmed in possession of the Rhine's left bank, the Austrian Netherlands, Holland, and Jülich. Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Spain, and Portugal acquiesce in the treaty. Third partition of Poland. Warsaw and part of the modern Russian Poland fall to Prussia and part to Austria. Russia absorbs the remainder of Poland. Masséna defeats the Austrians at Loano. Austrian victories at Kreuznach, Mannheim, and Mainz.

- 1796 Armistice between Austria and France. Bonaparte defeats the Austrians at Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, and Lodi, and occupies Milan. Austrians defeated at Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano. Austrian victories at Amberg and Würzburg. French under Moreau invade Bavaria, but are forced to retreat. Bonaparte, defeated at Lavis and Caldiero, is victorious at Arcola and Rivoli.
- 1797 The imperials take Kehl. The French capture Mantua. Bonaparte invades the dominions of Austria and compels her to agree to the Preliminaries of Leoben. Peace of Campo-Formio, by which Francis II resigns the left bank of the Rhine, Flanders, and his provinces in Lombardy, and receives the Venetian territories, the see of Salzburg, and part of Bavaria. A congress summoned to Rastatt to adjust other questions. Frederick William II of Prussia dies and is succeeded by his son, **Frederick William III**, who abolishes the Religious Edict.
- 1799 Failure of the Rastatt congress to reach an agreement. Austria joins England and Russia in a Second Coalition against France. Archduke Charles defeats Jourdan at Stockach. Armed attack on French envoys at Rastatt. The allies drive the French from Switzerland, defeat them at Magnano and Novi, and expel them from Italy. The French defeat the Russian, Korsakoff, at Zurich. English defeated at Bergen-op-Zoom. Austrian victory at Fossano. The Russian troops are withdrawn.
- 1800 Moreau defeats the Austrians at Stockach. Bonaparte defeats the Austrian, Melas, at Marengo and recovers Italy. Austrians defeated at Hohenlinden with heavy loss.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

- 1801 Peace of Lunéville signed by Francis II in behalf of Austria and the empire; Tuscany and Modena ceded to the Cisalpine Republic.
- 1803 A decree of the diet of Ratisbon sanctions territorial changes; the ecclesiastical principalities abolished; Baden, Würtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg made electorates; the liberties of the imperial cities abolished except in six cases; Prussia receives the bishoprics of Hildesheim and Paderborn, the greater part of Münster, the Thuringian territories of the Mainz electorate, Erfurt, the Eichsfeld, and the imperial cities of Mühlhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar; Bavaria acquires the ecclesiastical territories of Würzburg, Bamberg, Freising, Augsburg, part of Passau and Eichstädt, twelve abbays and seventeen imperial cities and towns, including Ulm, Nordlingen, Memmingen, Kempten, and Schweinfurt, with a population of 854,000. To Austria fall the ecclesiastical principalities of Trent and Brixen. The French conquer Hanover. On Napoleon declaring himself emperor of the French, Francis II assumes the title of Emperor of Austria and makes it hereditary in his family.
- 1805 Austria joins England, Russia, Sweden, and Naples in the Third Coalition against France. Napoleon has for allies Hesse, Nassau, Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria; the latter is invaded by the Austrians. Austrians defeated at Elchingen. Capitulation of Ulm; the Austrian, Mack, surrenders with all his army. The Tyrol bravely but uselessly defended by the peasants. The emperor of Russia goes to Berlin and in the Treaty of Potsdam obtains from the king of Prussia a promise to join the coalition. Napoleon occupies Linz. Russians defeated at Amstetten and Austrians at Mariazell. French checked at Dürrenstein. Napoleon enters Vienna and defeats the allied armies in the great Battle of the Three Emperors at Austerlitz. Peace of Pressburg; Austria cedes her south German provinces with the Tyrol to Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden and Venetia and Dalmatia to the kingdom of Italy, and receives Würzburg and Berchtesgaden. Würtemberg and Bavaria made kingdoms. Prussia agrees to abandon Ansbach to Bavaria, and Cleves and Neuchâtel to France in exchange for Hanover.
- 1806 Napoleon forms the Confederation of the Rhine under his suzerainty and consisting of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau-Usingen, Nassau-Weilburg, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Arenberg, and eight other states. Napoleon declares the German empire dissolved. Francis II resigns the dignity of German emperor and is henceforth known as **Francis I**, emperor of Austria. Prussian districts of Elten, Essen, and Werden annexed by the grand duke of Berg (Murat). Prussia summons Napoleon to evacuate south Germany and recognise the formation of a North German Confederation. Saxony and Weimar make alliance with Prussia. Prussians defeated by Napoleon at Saalfeld, Jena, Auerstädt, Halle, and Lübeck. The Prussian fortresses surrender. Napoleon enters Berlin. Prussian armies capitulate at Prenzlau and Ratkau. Napoleon in Berlin decrees the Continental System, declaring the British

- Isles in a state of blockade, the British excluded from all intercourse with Europe, and all merchandise belonging to British subjects lawful prize.
- 1807 Indecisive battle of Eylau between Napoleon and the Russians and Prussians. Obstinate resistance to the French in Silesia and at Kolberg in Pomerania. Russia and Prussia join in the Fourth Coalition, supported by England and Sweden. Dantzic surrenders to the French. Allies defeated at Friedland. Russia concludes a separate peace. By the Peace of Tilsit Prussia cedes her territory west of the Elbe to Napoleon; her gains in the second and third partitions of Poland become the grand duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon forms the kingdom of Westphalia from Brunswick, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, parts of Saxony, and Prussia. Abolition of serfdom and compulsory labour in Prussian domains. Prussian army reorganised.
- 1808 Austria institutes the *Landwehr* or militia. Napoleon engages to evacuate Prussia, exacting a large indemnity and retaining garrisons in Stettin, Küstrin, and Glogau. The Prussian town ordinance restores self-government to the boroughs. The Prussian constitution altered; a state council with five ministers instituted. France compels the resignation of the Prussian reforming minister Stein.
- 1809 Fifth Coalition between Austria and England. Austria renews the war. The Tyrol revolts. Archduke John defeats Eugène de Beauharnais at Sacile. Austrians defeated at Thanu, Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon. Eugène defeats Archduke John at the Piave. Linz and Vienna capitulate. Archduke Charles defeats Napoleon at Aspern. The Tyrolese defeat the French at the Brenner Pass. The Prussian free-lance Schill defeated by the French at Stralsund and his officers executed. Eugène defeats Archduke John at Raab. French victory at Wagram. The armistice of Znaim ends the war. Treaty of Schönbrunn; Austria resigns the Tyrol, Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, the Innviertel, and part of the Hausrukiertel to Bavaria; and Carinthia, part of Carniola, Istria, Trieste, Görz, and Gradiska to Napoleon, who forms them into the Illyrian Provinces. The French subdue the Tyrol. Count Metternich becomes chief minister in Austria.
- 1810 Napoleon marries the archduchess Marie Louise. Cloisters and other ecclesiastical foundations in Prussia made state property. New educational system organised in Prussia. Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg incorporated with France.
- 1811 State bankruptcy in Austria. Notes reduced to one-fifth their nominal value. Freedom of trade proclaimed throughout Prussia.
- 1812 The civil code of 1811 given effect throughout the Austrian empire except in Hungary and Transylvania. Emancipation of the Jews in Prussia. Austria obtains neutrality for her own territories in the Franco-Russian war, but has to supply Napoleon with a contingent. Prussia concludes a treaty with Napoleon, leaving her fortresses in French hands. Napoleon's disastrous Russian expedition. By the Convention of Tauroggen, the Prussian auxiliaries suspend hostilities.
- 1813 The Prussian king summons his people to arms. Enthusiastic response. Russia and Prussia form the Sixth Coalition at Kalish. The French abandon Berlin and retreat to the Elbe. The Prussian militia forces of the *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* formed. The war of Liberation begins. The Prussians take Lüneburg. The confederation of the Rhine sides with Napoleon. Napoleon defeats the allies at Lützen. The king of Saxony declares for France. Napoleon defeats the allies at Bautzen. Armistice. Austria joins the Coalition. Allies victorious at Grossbeeren and the Katzbach, and defeated at Dresden. Allies victorious at Dennewitz. The Treaty of Ried detaches Bavaria from Napoleon. Napoleon defeated in the Battle of the Nations at Leipsic. Napoleon withdraws to France. Dissolution of the kingdom of Westphalia. The legitimate rulers of Hesse, Oldenburg, and Brunswick return to their sovereignties. The French expelled from Minden, Münster, and East Friesland. Three allied armies converge on France from Holland, Coblenz, and Switzerland.
- 1814 The French surrender Dantzic and other Prussian fortresses. The allies enter France. Indecisive battle of Brienne. Napoleon defeated at La Rothière. Peace congress at Châtillon. Napoleon wins successes at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau Thierry, Etages, Vauxchamps, Montereau. Allies victorious at Bar-sur-Aube. Congress of Châtillon fails. Allied forces of Bülow and Blücher join hands at Soissons. Napoleon defeats Blücher at Craonne and the Prussians at St. Priest, but is checked by Schwarzenberg at Arcis-sur-Aube. Allies march on Paris, defeating the French at La Fère Champenoise. Fight before Paris. Allies enter the city. Napoleon surrenders and is sent to Elba. The Bourbons restored. First Peace of Paris ends the war; France is allowed her boundaries of 1792 with some additions. The congress of Vienna meets to readjust the territorial divisions of Europe.
- 1815 Napoleon returns to France. Europe unites against him. Murat, king of Naples, declares for him. A British army under Wellington lands in the Netherlands, and is joined by troops from the Netherlands, Nassau, Hanover, and Brunswick. Prussians under Blücher sent to the Netherlands. Murat defeated at Tolentino by the Austrians, who occupy Naples and restore Ferdinand IV. An Austrian force enters Alsace. Final act of the Vienna Congress passed. Germany recognised as an alliance of thirty-

- nine sovereign states, under the name of the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*), with a diet (*Bundestag*) at Frankfort-on-the-Main under the presidency of Austria.
- 1815 In a secret treaty between Austria and Ferdinand of Naples, king of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand pledges himself against liberal innovations.
- 1817 Union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches in Prussia. Riot at the Wartburg festival in Eisenach.
- 1818 Prussian Customs law (*Zollgesetz*) abolishes internal customs and establishes a general frontier tariff. Conferences of representatives of Russia, England, Austria, Prussia, and France at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) lead to the evacuation of France by the allies; France agrees to co-operate with the allies in maintaining the peace of Europe. Bavaria, Baden, and Nassau receive constitutions.
- 1819 Murder of the anti-nationalist editor Kotzebue. Ministers of Austria, Prussia, and several minor German states confer at Karlsbad and pass the Karlsbad Decrees, declaring for an extraordinary commission at Mainz to investigate secret societies, government inspection of the universities, and a strict censorship of the press. The diet of the confederation confirms the decrees. Constitutions introduced into Württemberg and Hanover. Schwarzburg-Sondershausen joins the Prussian customs system.
- 1820 Constitutions granted to Brunswick and Hesse. Conference of ministers of different states agree to the Supplementary Act of Vienna altering the laws of the German Confederation and limiting the force of constitutions in German states. Humboldt and other liberal Prussian ministers resign. Congress of Troppau between the czar, the Austrian emperor, and the Prussian king; they formulate the principle of the right of sovereigns to interfere in foreign countries to suppress resistance to authority; England protests.
- 1821 An Austrian army restores despotic power to Ferdinand of Naples. Insurrection in Lombardy, supported by Piedmontese rebels, suppressed by Austria.
- 1822 Death of the Prussian chancellor, Hardenberg; the king becomes his own minister. Congress of Verona attended by representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, England, France, Two Sicilies, and Sardinia results in a permission to France to interfere in Spanish affairs. Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt joins the Prussian customs system.
- 1823 Provincial estates with advisory power established in Prussia. Saxe-Weimar and Anhalt-Bernburg join the Prussian customs system.
- 1824 Prussian province of the Lower Rhine with Jülich, Cleves, and Berg formed into the Rhine province or Rhenish Prussia.
- 1825 Attempt of the Prussian government to introduce a new ritual into the Prussian church excites eager opposition.
- 1826 Lippe-Detmold and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Anhalt-Dessau, and Anhalt-Cöthen join the Prussian customs system.
- 1828 Austria and England intervene to prevent Russia's occupying Constantinople. Customs union between Prussia and the grand duchy of Hesse. South German Customs Union (*Süddeutscher Zollverein*) formed between Württemberg, Bavaria, and the Hohenzollern principalities. Central German commercial union (*Mitteldeutscher Handelsverein*) formed between Hanover, the electorate of Hesse, Saxony, Brunswick, Nassau, the principalities of Schwarzburg and Reuss, and Frankfurt and Bremen.
- 1829 Commercial treaty of Prussia and Hesse with the South German Union.
- 1830 Revolutionary movement in the Bavarian Palatinate.
- 1831 Austrian troops suppress insurrection in Rome and restore Pope Gregory XVI. The electorate of Hesse joins the Prusso-Hessian customs alliance. Constitution granted to Saxony.
- 1832 A second insurrection in Rome suppressed by Austrian troops. France asserts her power in central Italy. Revolutionary agitation and repressive measures throughout Germany.
- 1833 Frankfurter Attentat fails and is severely punished. Customs agreement between the Prusso-Hessian and south German customs unions. The kingdom of Saxony and the Thuringian states acquiesce in the customs agreement. Reforms in Hungary releasing the peasants from most of their burdens. The Magyar language introduced into debate.
- 1834 The *Deutscher Zoll- und Handelsverein* (German Customs Commercial Union) results from the customs agreement. A separate customs alliance called *Steuerverein* formed by Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, and Schaumburg-Lippe.
- 1835 Death of Emperor Francis. His son, **Ferdinand I**, emperor of Austria, succeeds. The *Staatskonferenz* formed to act as a regency.
- 1836 Baden, Nassau, Homburg, and Frankfort-on-the-Main join the German *Zoll- und Handelsverein*.
- 1837 The king of Hanover refuses to recognise the Hanoverian constitution.
- 1838 Commercial treaty between Austria and England.
- 1840 Frederick William III of Prussia dies and is succeeded by **Frederick William IV**. The king of Hanover forces a constitution of his own on the people. England, France,

- Russia, Austria, and Prussia interfere in the war between Turkey and the pasha of Egypt. Acre taken by the British, Austrian, and Turkish fleets.
- 1842 Brunswick, Lippe, and Luxemburg join the German *Zoll- und Handelsverein*. Legal and political literary club founded in Austria.
- 1846 Revolt in Galicia suppressed and Cracow annexed to Austria.
- 1847 Frederick William IV convokes the united diet of his kingdom. He decrees that the diet shall meet only for certain defined purposes, and that a committee shall meet once in four years.
- 1848 The Hungarian diet ordains the exclusive use of the Magyar language in all branches of the administration and in schools, with certain exceptions in favour of Croatia and Slavonia. Revolution in France echoed in Germany. The confederation diet promises a change in the constitution. The Viennese compel the dismissal of Metternich and the grant of a constitution. The Hungarians obtain a responsible ministry and various reforms; Croatia, Slavonia, Temesvár, and Transylvania revolt against the Magyar predominance. The Berlin mob forces the Prussian king to appoint a liberal ministry. Revolutions in Hesse, Nassau, Saxony, and Hanover. Lombardy and Venice revolt against Austria. Preliminary Parliament meets at Frankfurt to revise the constitution of the German Confederation. Troops of the confederation sent to aid Schleswig-Holstein against Denmark. Prussia suppresses a rebellion in Poland. German national assembly meets. Archduke John of Austria becomes Reichsverweser (imperial vicar) of the German Empire with a responsible ministry. Insurrection in Prague suppressed. The Austrians defeat the Sardinians at Custoza. Truce of Malmö suspends the Schleswig-Holstein War. Jellachich, ban of Croatia, invades Hungary; Kossuth forms a committee of national defence in Hungary. Hungarians defeat Jellachich. Murder of two conservative deputies. The Viennese government determines on war with Hungary and appoints Jellachich commander-in-chief. Revolution in Vienna. The Austrian emperor flees to Olmütz and his forces reduce Vienna. The Austrian emperor resigns his crown to **Francis Joseph I.** Prussian national assembly dissolved. Frederick William IV grants a Prussian constitution.
- 1849 Hungarian diet transferred to Debreczen. Budapest occupied by the Austrians. Hungarians defeated at Kápolna, successful in Transylvania. Austrians victorious at Novara; Venice capitulates. The Hungarian diet deposes the Habsburgs. The Schleswig-Holstein War renewed. New constitution in Austria. The imperial crown offered to the king of Prussia and refused by him. Dreikönigsbündniss, an alliance between Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony, formed. Hungarians recover Pest. Popular insurrections in Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden suppressed by Prussia. Danish victory at Fredericia. German national assembly dissolved. Russia sends Austria help against the Hungarians. Hungarian main army surrenders at Világos. Komárom capitulates to the Austrians. Hungary placed under martial law and subordinated to the Viennese government. Administration of the German Confederation confided to a commission. Radetzky's campaign against Sardinia. Sardinians are repulsed at Mortara and Vigevano. Battle of Novara.
- 1850 The Union Parliament meets in Erfurt in accordance with an imperial constitution drawn up by the members of the Dreikönigsbündniss and accepted by many of the states. The parliament recognises the constitution. College of princes formed to exercise provisionally the central power. Prussia and Germany make peace with Denmark, which subdues Schleswig and Holstein. Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg join Austria in sending representatives to a new confederation diet. Disturbances in Hesse. Prussia arms to maintain the union and the Hessian constitution. Olmütz conference between Prussian and Austrian ministers. The union dissolved. Dresden ministerial conferences to discuss a German constitution.
- 1851 The old German Confederation restored. Bismarck appointed Prussian envoy to the confederation. On the reconstitution of the Zollverein, Austria fails to supplant Prussia as its guiding spirit.
- 1852 Austrian constitution of March, 1849, is abolished and an attempt made to Germanise the various provinces. The confederation diet recognises a reactionary constitution in Hesse. London Protocol; England, Austria, France, Russia, and Sweden guarantee the succession of Prince Christian of Glücksburg to the whole Danish monarchy.
- 1853 Commercial treaty between Austria and Prussia. Prussia acquires from Oldenburg a site for the construction of a harbour. Beginning of difficulties in the Crimea.
- 1854 The *Steuerverein* united with the German *Zoll- und Handelsverein*. Hungary released from the reign of martial law.
- 1855 Concordat between Austria and Rome gives the Roman clergy control over public instruction, and exempts the bishops from the jurisdiction of the courts of law, giving them a measure of judicial power. Battle of Sebastopol.
- 1856 Peace of Paris.
- 1858 William, prince of Prussia, becomes regent of Prussia and appoints a liberal ministry. Radetzky dies and is succeeded by Archduke Maximilian. Convention signed for free navigation of the Danube. Diplomatic war in Piedmont.

- 1859 The Austrians invade Sardinian territory and are defeated at Magenta and Solferino. By the Preliminaries of Villafranca, confirmed in the Peace of Zurich, Austria resigns Lombardy. National languages permitted in Hungarian schools.
- 1860 The Austrian emperor issues the October diploma or constitution.
- 1861 The Prussian regent becomes king as **William I.** The February patent completes the October diploma and increases centralisation; dissatisfaction of the various nationalities in the Austrian Empire.
- 1862 Bismarck becomes first minister in Prussia. Prussia, in the name of the *Zollverein*, concludes a commercial treaty with France; the minor states protest.
- 1863 Francis Joseph summons an assembly to Frankfort to deliberate on the reform of the confederation; the Prussian king refuses to appear. Christian IX succeeds to the Danish throne and occupies Holstein. The prince of Augustenburg disputes his claims to Schleswig-Holstein. The Polish insurrection.
- 1864 Prussian and Austrian armies occupy the duchies. Düppel taken from the Danes and Jutland occupied. By the Peace of Vienna, Denmark surrenders Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to Austria and Prussia. The German states agree to the commercial treaty with France.
- 1865 February patent suspended; Hungarian demand for a responsible ministry refused. In the convention of Gastein, Austria cedes Lauenburg to Prussia for a money payment.
- 1866 Prussia proposes a scheme for the reform of the confederation. Alliance concluded between Italy and Prussia. European congress proposed. Austria refers the Schleswig-Holstein question to the confederation diet and convokes the Holstein estates. Prussia declares the Gastein convention violated and occupies Holstein. Austria persuades the confederation diet to mobilise its forces. Prussia declares the confederation dissolved. "Seven weeks' war" between Prussia and Austria. Most of the German states side with Austria. The Prussians occupy Saxony. The Hanoverians defeat the Prussians at Langensalza, but are surrounded and capitulate. Prussian victories at Nachod and Skalitz. Austrian victory at Custozza. Austrians defeated by the Prussians at Königgrätz (or Sadowa). Francis Joseph hands over Venice to Napoleon III. Prussians defeat the Bavarians at Kissingen and Hammelburg. Austrians defeated at Aschaffenburg. The Austrians defeat the Italians at Lissa. Truce of Nikolsburg mediated by Napoleon. Peace of Prague; Austria surrenders Venetia to Italy, recognises the dissolution of the German Confederation, consents to the reconstitution of Germany without Austria. Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, the electorate of Hesse, and Frankfort-on-the-Main incorporated with Prussia.
- 1867 A responsible ministry appointed in Hungary. Beust succeeds Belcredi as Austrian minister-president. Transylvania incorporated with Hungary. The provincial diets of the Austrian empire ordered to elect a Reichsrath according to the February constitution. The constituent imperial diet meets at Berlin and promulgates the constitution of the north German Confederation. The command of the military forces and the direction of diplomacy confided to Prussia. Prussia prevents the proposed annexation of Luxemburg by France. Francis Joseph crowned king of Hungary; amnesty to Hungarian outlaws. Bismarck concludes a customs treaty with the south German states, by which they agree to send representatives to the diet of the North German Confederation, thus converted into a *Zollparlament* for matters concerning the customs. Financial agreement (*Ausgleich*) between Austria and Hungary. Parliamentary government established in Cisleithania; "Bürgerministerium" appointed.
- 1868 The Austrian Reichsrath passes laws abrogating the concordat of 1855. Bohemian declaration demanding autonomy for the Bohemian kingdom. The Galician resolution sets forth a claim for greater independence of the central government. Disturbances in Bohemia and Moravia.
- 1869 A federal supreme commercial court erected at Leipsic. The Austrian emperor agrees to support Napoleon III if Prussia should disturb the *status quo* agreed on at the Treaty of Prague. Insurrection of the Bocchese.
- 1870 Failure of the attempt of the Austrian minister Potocki to reconcile the Czechs. France protests against the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne. Prince Leopold withdraws his candidature. France requires the king of Prussia to declare that no Hohenzollern shall ever be allowed to become a candidate for the Spanish throne; the king refuses. War between France and Prussia. The south German princes join forces with Prussia. French victory at Saarbrücken. The French driven from Weissenburg. French defeated at Wörth and Spicheren. Strasburg besieged by the Germans. French checked at Colombey-Nouilly. Battle of Vionville. The French army under Bazaine defeated at Gravelotte and St. Privat and shut up in Metz. Fights at Buzancy and at Nouart. German victory at Beaumont. An attempt to break out of Metz prevented in the battle of Noisseville. Battle of Sedan and surrender of Napoleon III and 84,580 French. French defeated at Sceaux. Paris besieged. Vitry and Strasburg surrender to the Germans. German victories at Ardenay and Orleans. Soissons surrenders. The Germans take Château-

- dun and Chartres. Sehlettstadt surrenders. Metz capitulates. Dijon taken. French victory at Coulmiers. The Germans evacuate Orleans. Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt enter the North German Confederation. Germans, victorious at Châteauneuf, occupy Nogent-le-Rotrou. Thionville capitulates. French under Garibaldi repulsed at Dijon. Bavaria and Württemberg join the North German Confederation. German victories at Beaune-la-Rolande and Amiens. French success at Villepion. Battle of Champagne. French defeated at Loigny, Poupri, Orleans. French defeated at Beaugency and Nuits. Bombardment of Paris begins. French defeated at the Hallue and Vendôme.
- 1871 Mézières surrenders. German victories at Bapaume, Corneille, and Le Mans. Rocroi surrenders. German victory at St. Quentin. French sortie from Mont Valérien fails. Battle of Belfort. The king of Prussia proclaimed German emperor as **William I**. Longwy surrenders. Capitulation of Paris and armistice concluded at Versailles. French army, defeated at Pontarlier, withdraws to Switzerland, where it is disarmed. Belfort surrenders. Preliminaries of Versailles. First German imperial diet meets at Berlin. Peace of Frankfurt. France gives up part of Lorraine with Metz and Thionville and Alsace except Belfort to Germany and pays a large indemnity. The *Kanzel-paragraph* provides for the punishment of clerical agitators in the German Empire. The Viennese government recognises Bohemia as a separate kingdom; the Czechs draw up the Bohemian constitution called the Fundamental Articles; the emperor's refusal to recognise it produces the resignation of the Hohenwart ministry. Beust dismissed.
- 1872 Jesuits and similar orders excluded from German territory. League of the Three Emperors (of Russia, Germany, and Austria).
- 1873 The right of election to the Austrian Reichsrath transferred from the provincial diets to the people. Universal exhibition in Vienna. The Vienna *Krach*, or financial crisis. Prussian May laws requiring secular university training for the clergy and establishing a royal tribunal for ecclesiastical matters; Catholic resistance severely punished.
- 1874 Septennial law concerning the peace establishment in Germany.
- 1876 Death of Deák. The Andrassy note drawn up by the ministers of Austria, Russia, and Germany demands from the Porte reforms in the revolted Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Saxon districts of Transylvania deprived of their privileges.
- 1877 Disputes in the Hungarian diet concerning the renewal of the Ausgleich. New tariff agreement between Austria and Hungary.
- 1878 William I wounded by a would-be assassin; temporary regency. Congress of Berlin settles the affairs of the Balkan peninsula. Austria commissioned to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The occupation takes place in spite of the resistance of the Mohammedan population, who are subdued after heavy fighting. Socialistic law passed by the German diet. William I resumes the government.
- 1879 Count Taaffe makes a compromise with the Czechs. Alliance between Germany and Austria against Russia. Imperial customs tariff accepted by the German diet.
- 1880 Diplomatic relations between the papacy and Germany renewed. Government offices and law courts in Bohemia and Moravia ordered to transact business in the language in which it is introduced. The Germans in Austria establish a German school union to aid German schools.
- 1881 Prussian May laws ameliorated. The Austrian Germans join together as the United Left. Revolt in Dalmatia extends to Herzegovina.
- 1882 Revolt in Dalmatia and Herzegovina finally put down. The clerical party in Austria founds the Clerical Club. Attempt on the life of Francis Joseph by Irredentists.
- 1883 The Triple Alliance formed between Germany, Austria, and Italy. Anti-Jewish riots in Hungary.
- 1884 Society of German Colonisation founded. Workmen's accident insurance law passed for Germany. Angra Pequena, Togoland, Kamerun, and Bismarck Archipelago taken under German protectorate.
- 1885 General act of the Berlin Conference concerning European occupation of East Africa signed by fourteen European powers. Dispute between Germany and Spain over the Caroline Islands settled by the pope's arbitration. In Austria the United Left separates into the German Austrian and German clubs. Reform of the Hungarian house of magnates.
- 1886 Solomon Islands taken under German protectorate. Agreement with England concerning Zanzibar.
- 1887 German protectorate proclaimed over Witu. Germans involved in civil war in Samoa.
- 1888 Death of the emperor William. His son, **Frederick III**, succeeds. Frederick dies and is succeeded by **William II**. Rising in East Africa; agreement with England to suppress it. In Austria the German Austrian and German clubs join as the United German Left.
- 1889 Death of the crown prince Rudolf, only son of Francis Joseph. Germans carry on a successful war in East Africa. Riots in Pest apropos of the army bill. Berlin Treaty between Germany, Great Britain, United States, and Samoa to guarantee Samoa's neutrality.

- 1890 Bismarck dismissed. Boundaries of German Southwest Africa defined. Germany recognises the British protectorate over Zanzibar; Helgoland ceded to Germany. The socialist law abrogated.
- 1891 Triple Alliance renewed. Germany makes commercial treaties with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium. Negotiations for an Ausgleich between the Viennese government and Bohemia fail.
- 1892 Reform of the Austrian currency.
- 1893 War in German Southwest Africa with the chief Witboi. Failure of Taaffe's reform bill and his resignation.
- 1894 Agreement between France and Germany concerning Kamerun. Rumanians prosecuted for protesting against their grievances.
- 1895 The Jewish religion recognised and freedom of worship sanctioned in Hungary.
- 1896 Millennium exhibition in Buda. Badeni's reform bill carried through the Austrian Reichsrath.
- 1897 Badeni's language ordinances introduced into Bohemia. Disgraceful scenes in the Reichsrath over the discussions on the renewal of the Ausgleich with Hungary; disorders in Vienna. Badeni resigns. Bohemian language ordinances revised; riots in Prague. Kiao-chau, China, is seized by a German fleet as a result of the murder of two German missionaries. Lease of a German zone at Kiao-chau for ninety-nine years secured.
- 1898 Kiao-chau is declared a German protectorate. The prolongation of the Ausgleich proclaimed by imperial warrant. Assassination of the empress-queen Elizabeth by an anarchist.
- 1899 Compromise with Hungary concerning the Ausgleich; the bank charter renewed till 1910, the customs union provisionally renewed till 1907; the Reichsrath refuses to confirm the compromise which is proclaimed by imperial warrant.
- 1900 Berlin treaty concerning Samoa abrogated; Great Britain receives compensation elsewhere, the Germans retain certain of the islands as a crown colony, the United States assuming sovereignty over others. Murder of the German minister in China; a German field-marshal appointed commander-in-chief of the forces of the powers in China. Anglo-German or "Yangtse" agreement concerning China. Chancellor Hohenlohe resigns. He is succeeded by Count von Bülow. Celebration of the bicentenary of the Prussian monarchy.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

- 1902 Revival of the strife of nationalities in the Austrian Reichsrath. The Brussels convention and the sugar bill accepted by the German diet. The fleets of Germany and England blockade the Venezuelan ports. Triple Alliance renewed to 1915. Renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich.
- 1904 Prohibition to Jesuits to settle in Germany removed. The Hungarian nationalists abandon their demand for the exclusive use of the Magyar language in the Hungarian army.
- 1905 Agitation for universal suffrage in Hungary and Austria. Germany quarrels with France over Morocco.
- 1906 International Conference at Alcegiras; adjudication of Franco-German disagreement over Morocco.
- 1907 The elections favour the Government; Prince von Bülow declares that "the German nation is now in the saddle and will ride down all its adversaries."




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
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